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Hegemonic logic perpetuates violence and makes all existence a standing

reserve

Nederveen, 7(Jan, professor of global studies and sociology at UC Santa Barbara, Political and

Economic Brinkmanship, Review of International Political Economy 14:3)The exercise ofAmerican power involves both deliberate(Shock and Awe) andunintentional heavy-handedness , such as the abuse of Iraqi detainees inAbuGhraib prison.Moreprecisely,muchheavy-handedness that is portrayed as accidental and unintended isintentional because it is part of the culture of inner circles of the militaryandis sanctioned through the chain of command (Hersh, 2004). From security professionals onetypically hears quite different rationales for military action and different actionprograms than from public platforms. Thus, according toMichael Scheuer, a senior CIA analystwho headed the Afghanistan desk until 2004, the way ahead is To secure as much of our way of life as possible, we will

have to use military force. . . Killing in large numbers is not enough to defeat ourMuslim foes.With killing must come a Sherman-like razing ofinfrastructure. Roads and irrigation systems; bridges, power plants and crops in the field; fertilizer plants and

grain millsall these and more will need to be destroyed to deny the enemy its support base. Landmines will be massivelyreintroduced to seal borders and mountain passes. . . such actions will yield large civilian casualties, displaced

populations, and refugee flows. . . (2004: 24142). Ralph Peters,a former army intelligence Major assigned to futurewar, who is widely admired in security circles for his outspokenness, outdoes George Kennanby formulating aphilosophy of constant conflict in these terms: We are entering a new American century, in which we willbecome still wealthier, culturally more lethal, and increasingly powerful.We will excite hatreds without precedent. . . .

The de facto role of the US armed forces will be to keep the world safe forour economy and open to our cultural assault. To those ends, we will do afair amount of killing (1997; cf. Peters, 2002, 2005). In an article titled Stability, Americas enemy Petersnotes, Our insistence on stability above all stands against the tides of history, and that is always a losing proposition. . .Historically, instability abroad has been to Americas advantage, bringing us enhanced prestige and influence, safe-havenseeking investment, a peerless national currency, and flows of refugees that have proven to be rivers of diamonds. . . (2001: 5). He criticizes diplomatic tradition and realism as morally corrupt and not in the national interest, and discussesseveral regions in which the quest for stability may prove antithetical to American interests, such as the Balkans, Russia(demand an accountable Russia), China (A fractured, squabbling China would be less threatening to US strategic

interests in the region and might well emerge as a far more advantageous business partner (or partners)), Africa(separatism is a natural and healthy force, until it is perverted by delay), the Middle East (would a peaceful resolution ofthe Middle East confrontation benefit the US, after all? . . . wouldntwelose critical leverage?), Indonesia (the ultimate

illogical state. . . [the US should] manage and facilitate Indonesias breakup). Striking in this perspectiveis thecasual mix of moralsounding arguments (what on earth iswrong with people wanting their freedom,20) and American self interest. The net effect is geopolitical opportunismcrudely masquerading as democracy, with large helpings of opinionunhindered by area knowledge, unlimited self confidence(we are a phenomenallystrong and resilient nation, 19) and plain aggression. In November 2004 Peters told Fox News that in Fallujathe best outcome, frankly, is if theyre all killed (Drayton, 2006). (470-1)

The shift towards multipolarity is occurring now - multipolarity is key to

prevent warLiru, 4/14Cui Liru is the former President of China Institutes of Contemporary InternationalRelations (CICIR). (Cui, 2014, Toward A Multipolar Pattern: Challenges In ATransitional Stage, US/China Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/toward-a-multipolar-pattern-challenges-in-a-transitional-stage/)

Todaysinternational economic and political development is increasingly

multipolar . Since the United States and the Soviet Union initiated the Cold War in the wake of World War II, people have been accustome d to employing such adjectives as bi-polar, uni-polar or multi-polar to

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illustrate the evolution of the power structure of contemporary international politics. Compared with the bi-polar framework during the Cold War and the uni-polar one in the post-Cold War era, the essence ofthe current trend of multi-polarization is the rapid diffusion ofinternational economic and political powers.However, the complexity of the political and economic implications of the multi-polarization goesfar beyond a power diffusion. This is because such multi-polarization occurred in the process of fast and forceful economic globalization in the post-Cold War era, and there h as been a symbiosis between the pattern of the new multi- polar world

and economic integration. Currently, global economic integration and connections between countries

have reached extremely profound and irreversible levels , and a multi-polarization in the distribution of power has

fundamentally shaken the world power regime that centered around the United States as the sole superpower. We can see the simultaneous progress of both economic integration and power diffusion. The UnitedStates hegemonic status, or its dominance of international affairs,has conspicuously weakened. Moreglobalcenters of power have emerged. The old international political andeconomic regimes are increasingly out of sync with the new realities ofinternational relations. There has been a major change in the strength of the worlds major economies and a number of emerging e conomies have arisen in the r apid globalization process. Assuch,the advantaged positions of the United States , Europe and Japan haverelatively declined, resulting in changesin the macro structure of international economic powers, as well as an increasingly multi-polar pattern. There has also been a diversification of development modes, which have received increasing recognition and changed the US-led political and

economic monopoly over the post-Cold War world. Meanwhile, a profound integration of global economies has

led to unprecedented, in-depth interdependence between countries , especially in big

countries.These economies have been so tightly entwined with each other that theyhave become indispensable mutual stakeholders.The interweaving ofcompetition and cooperation, an important feature of major-country relations in the 21st century, alongwith mutual nuclear

deterrence between big countries, has reduced the likelihood of a world war

to the lowest point in history. The main countries that make up the present -day multi-polar economic structure include the United States, European Union, Japan, Russia, China,India, and Brazil (the aggregate GDP of the seven economies accounted for two- thirds of the worlds in 2011.) The United States and China, respectively the bigge st developed country and the biggest emerging economy, with the largest andsecond-largest GDP, have become the two most influential players in the world economy (aggregate GDP of the United States and China accounted for a third of the worlds in 2011). Agreat number of important intermediate countries are also

playing increasingly active roles, constituting another significant part of the multi-polarizing regime (they include the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Mexico, and Australia).Weare in a significant stage ofhistorical transition, which will roughly run through the second decade of the 21st century. This period of historical transition is ofparticular importance, because the evolution of international order turned from a stage of quantitative accumulation into an essential one of qualitative transformation. The outbreak of thefinancial and economic crises abruptly accelerated the transition, resulting in the occurrence of somesignificant changes way before all parties were prepared. The sudden prominence of the conflicting and divergent aspects of state-to-state relations has led to strategic competition between major countries. The parties poor preparedness andinability to adapt have resulted in anxiety and fear, as well as anxiety caused by changes in comparative strength and more intensive competition. This is likely to create an upsurge of extreme nationalism, radical nationalism, or narrownationalism. During such a period, countries adjus tments of their foreign strategies are accompanied by domestic changes and reforms in their politics and economy. The interweaving of internal and external contradictions is highly complicated,resulting in extraordinarily fierce internal disputes. In China, for instance, the unprecedented diversification of social interests, p lus the increasing transparency brought by an information society have brought about unprecedented multi-partycompetition, and a substantial impact of public opinion on government decision-making. Such a period is full of uncertainty, unpredictability and multiple possibilities. The competition between the countries boils downs to their capabilities forgrasping macro trends, enduring internal and external pressures, and for internal coordination and rapid responses. Most countries need to retain control over the escalation of mutual competition. Maintaining the basic stability of internationaleconomic, political and security conditions is also a consensus among major countries, which constitutes the basis for cooperation. The Asia-Pacific has gener ally sustained regional peace and stability in the more than 20 years since the ColdWar. Robust economic progress and the fact that economic and trade collaboration has dominated state-to-state relations in the Asia-Pacific have to a great extent concealed problems in the security arena, and also distracted us from theineffectiveness or defects of Asias existing framework of security cooperation. It is a common wish to preserve the overall stability of regional security conditions. And, the positive aspect of cooperation is on the rise. Meanwhile, security concernshave become highly uncertain. In the face of unstable and uncertain factors, strategic hedging is also on the rise, causing tension. Under the complex circumstances of national transformation, with an increase in pressure during the transitionalperiod, diplomacy has been unprecedentedly affected . Peace, security, and stability are basic preconditions for ensuring sustainable economic progress in the Asia-Pacific. Setting up a region-wide and effective regional security framework is anattractive option, although unachievable in the short term. Yet from an optimistic perspective, perhaps we are in a transitional stage proceeding towards such a goal. Compared with other areas, the Asia-Pacific is the most vibrant, multivariate,and diverse region. And development is extremely imbalanced here. Asia-Pacific countries may share the macro goal of building an extensive and comprehensive regional security framework. But, there are huge divergences over the path toachieving it. It will take a considerably long time to explore, rally consensus, and create conditions through the further de velopment of economic, political and security relations. At present and even through the second decade of the 21st century,

security conditions in the Asia-Pacific will display the following characteristics: A certain degree of imbalance and disorder; Some e xisting non-universal security dialogue platforms and mechanisms; The actions of major countries will attracteven more attention. The United States will modify its strategies in the face of new conditions; in step with the conspicuous rise in its status and impacts, China actively deliberates on and explores how to play a new role; the ASEAN, as the solecommonwealth in the region, strives to play a peculiar role. During the transitional period, security relations between countries and the countries actions will be on two parallel tracks: Countrie s will manage and control the situation, takeadvantage of existing mechanisms to enhance dialogue, properly handle differences and sensitive issues, and maintain general stability of the overall situation; Countries will deliberate on and explore effective approaches to improving securityrelations and regional security conditions, including concepts and possible formats of a universal regional security framework. This calls f or courage to transcend past mindsets and ways of thinking, as well as endeavors to find converging pointsof common interests, discover new realms of collaboration, and build mutual trust th rough consecutive successes in pragmatic cooperation. Another major trend accompanying the multi-polarization of international economic and politicalconditions is the eastward shift of the worlds economic and political gravity center, from the two sides of the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific. This is a historic change, which may very likely become the prelude to a new historical cycle in economic,political, and cultural development in the 21st century. The Asia-Pacific has become the most important engine for world economic growth, the r ise of Asia as a whole is of more historic significance than that of China alone.

1. You view the world through American exceptionalismthis taints your

studies and predictions

Grondin, PHD of political studies @ U of Ottowa, 4[David, (Re)Writing the National Security State: How and Why Realists (Re)Builtthe(ir) Cold War,http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/rewriting_national_security_state.pdf ,accessed 7-14-14]

Hans Morgenthau once said that the intellectual lives in a world that is both separatefrom and potentially intertwined with that of the politician. The two worlds are separate

because they are oriented towards different ultimate values truth threatens power, andpower threatens truth (Morgenthau, quoted in Hill and Beshoff, 1994: xi). ForChristopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff, this means that, as international relationspractitioners and theorists, Like it or not, we are intellectuals in politics and the studyof international relations is not an innocent profession (Hill, 1994: 12). Comments suchas these are commonplace in academia, but many scholars would contend that the latteris wrong. Positivists be they neoclassical realists, neorealists, neoliberal

http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/rewriting_national_security_state.pdfhttp://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/rewriting_national_security_state.pdfhttp://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/rewriting_national_security_state.pdf

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institutionalists, or mainstream constructivists hold that by exercising parsimony andrigor, and by employing the scientific method, international relations can be studied inan objective manner, and scientific, neutral, and true knowledge can

be produced. Critically-inclined scholars would, however, argue otherwise, on thegrounds that [t]heory is alwaysfor someone andfor some purpose (Cox, 1981: 87).

Adopting a critical stance is not an easy task in International Relations today. And it is

even more difficult if one chooses to view the field through poststructuralist lenses, asthis means choosing to work on borderlines and in the margins (Ashley, 1989). As adiscipline, International Relations is dominated by American scholars and scholarstrained in the U.S. (Waever, 1998). As Steve Smith noted in his ISA presidential addressin 2003, predominantly American rationalist theories such as neorealism andneoclassical realism enjoy a hegemonic status within the discipline which reduces thetheoretical pluralism and diversity of the field (Smith, 2002). In this paper, I adopt apoststructuralist approach with the aim of developing a critical understanding of how thehegemonic status of realist theories serves to legitimize current U.S. national securitypolicy. I focus on two main points. First, I explore how the realism prevalent in thetheoretical discourse of IR in the United States is itself a political practice that isconstitutive of a particular reality, rather than merely neutrally describing it. Second, I

maintain that these realist discourses subjectively and artificially lock U.S. nationalidentity into a Cold War-like national security focus. As such, the United States remainsconstructed as a national security state in realist discourses. Indeed, realist discourses donot merely seek to explain but also serve to legitimate U.S. national security conduct andits hegemonic power in the wake of 9/11. I want to show how the idea of the U.S. as anational security state is being (re)produced by practices that would neither appear norclaim to do so.