heartland - 2006 01 the atomic rush

8/14/2019 Heartland - 2006 01 the Atomic Rush

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THE ATOMIC RUSH

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THE ATOMIC RUSH A GLANCE INTO PANDORAS BOX

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A GLANCE INTO PANDORAS BOX by RRaajjeesshhMM.. BBAASSRRUURRHome to the rising Asian powers, South Asia also hosts the largest concentration ofexisting nuclear-armed states as well as potential ones, in a context made unstable by

a shift in power structure, increasing nuclearization, ethnic strife and fast economic

growth. The India-Pakistan-China triangle. Interests and role of the United States.

If South Asia today is not quite the mostdangerous place in the world, as US President Bill Clinton once famously described it,

its nuclear politics is certainly a critical issue in global politics. The subcontinent is

also a key emerging market for trade and investment. It represents a major part of

rising Asia, which consists of a surging China, the awakened elephant that is India,

and a Japan showing signs that it will inevitably recover and bloom again. Rising Asia

is also a region marked by the presence of the largest concentration of existing

nuclear-armed states Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea as

well as potential ones: Iran, a unified Korea, and Japan.1 In addition, the Asian

continent is rife with terrorist activity, a substantial portion of which is centred in

South Asia. The shifting power structure, the increasing nuclearization of the region,

the instabilities wrought by ethnic strife and terrorist violence, and the acceleratingpace of economic growth and exchange together make a complex picture of

simultaneous conflict and cooperation. Because the world is closely interconnected,

this complexity inevitably extends to the rest of the world and the nuclear politics of

the subcontinent has ramifications well beyond its immediate geography. Four of

South Asias relationships are particularly relevant to this politics: India-Pakistan,

China-South Asia, West Asia-South Asia, and United States-South Asia.

1. The India-Pakistan relationship, widely viewed with alarm following their

matching nuclear tests of 1998, follows a pattern common to nuclear rivalries before it.

The Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and the

hostile relationship between China and the Soviet Union were marked by power rivalry,

ideological differences, angry rhetoric, confrontation, crises, and eventually,

stabilization measures. Though there were armed hostilities, such as the shooting down

of American aircraft by Soviet forces in 1960 and 1962, and a series of clashes

between Chinese and Soviet troops in 1969, the rivals always stopped well short of

full-scale conventional war. Indeed, the imminent risk of such a war, which could

escalate into nuclear conflict, brought them to the negotiating table in efforts to

1 Though the Middle East is often treated as distinct from the continent, Asia here is viewed asextending from what many in the region prefer to call West Asia to the Far East and Australasia.


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manage their conflicts. The India-Pakistan relationship, marked by a bitter dispute over

Kashmir and a series of wars in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971, followed a similar course.

Confrontations and crises (1986-87, 1990) began with the covert nuclearization of both

in the 1980s and, after the 1998 tests, became intense (1999, 2001-02). After each

crisis came a period of negotiations and relative stability. The current compositedialogue, which began in 2004, has been more wide-ranging and sustained than earlier

efforts, and includes a series of discussions that have brought agreement on nuclear

confidence building measures (CBMs). In August 2005, two CBMs were established:the setting up of a hotline between the foreign secretaries of the two countries, and an

agreement to pre-notify each other of impending ballistic missile tests.

But there are important differences between the India-Pakistan relationship and the

other two mentioned above. First and most remarkable, despite the high levels of

tension between them, neither has sought to deploy its nuclear weapons. Available

evidence indicates that both have stored their nuclear weapons in unassembled

condition (as the United States did initially when it was the sole nuclear power).

Second, both believe that deterrence is already in place with a relatively small

arsenal, which inhibits runaway arms racing. Third, both have carried out just a

handful of tests and believe that credible deterrence does not require more. And fourth,

they have succeeded early in their nuclear-strategic relationship in nuclear stabilization

through CBMs. The process began when they signed an agreement not to attack each

others nuclear facilities in 1988, a decade before they officially went nuclear. Part of

the reason for this early start lies in their previous record of signing a range of

non-nuclear CBMs.2

Though India and Pakistan have been like other nuclear rivals in going throughcycles of crises and stabilization, they have been different in terms of crisis stability

because they have not come as close to nuclear conflict as the other pairs have. The

prospects for stabilization are also stronger than in the other two cases because of their

long and persistent history of negotiating stability-inducing measures. On the negative

side, their deep rift over the disputed territory of Kashmir and the related issue of

Pakistani support for terrorist groups operating in India remains, and has the potential

to engender more crises.3 The terrorists themselves constitute a wild card with the

potential to destabilize the India-Pakistan relationship, as they did when they attacked

the Indian Parliament in December 2001, an act which set in motion the crisis of

2001-02.

Ground for optimism exists, however, because the two countries appear to have

learned that crises do not bring benefits, but create fresh dangers. Another source of

optimism is the multilateral South Asian Free Trade Agreement (January 2006), to

which India and Pakistan have acceded, in response to the pressures of globalization

2 Michael KREPON, Khurshid KHOJA, Michael NEWBILL, and Jenny S. DREZIN, eds.,A Handbookof Confidence Building Measures for Regional Security, 3rd edn., (Washington, DC: Henry L.Stimson Center, 1998), pp. 189-210.

3 On Pakistani backing of terrorists targeting India, see Peter CHALK, Pakistans Role in theKashmir Insurgency, Janes Intelligence Review, September 1, 2001, reproduced on the web site ofthe RAND Corporation .


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and the need for expanding markets. This may lead to greater convergence of interests

between India and Pakistan over time. Indias growing closeness to the United States,

cemented by their July 2005 agreement on nuclear cooperation and President Bushs

successful visit to India in March 2006, also puts Pakistan under pressure to come to

terms with India. Nonetheless, the potential for instability remains. The key issue iswhether the India-Pakistan relationship can emulate the India-China one in setting

aside a contentious dispute in order to attain mutual benefit through economic

cooperation.Finally, Pakistan has the potential to cause serious security problems with respect

to nuclear proliferation. It is known to have been a major conduit for a proliferation

ring extending from North Korea and China to Iran and Libya.4 Second, it is a hotbed

of jihadi activities that could destabilize the India-Pakistan relationship and generate

further crises between the nuclear rival. It is widely feared that Pakistani technology

and material could find its way into the hands of terrorist groups and enable them to

acquire a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb for use anywhere in the world. 5

Stabilization of India-Pakistan relations could go some way toward curbing this

potential.

2. Recognizing Indias emergence as a major economic and military power in the

making, Chinese leaders have sought to play a mixed game of cooperation and

containment with it. They have targeted India militarily with nuclear weapons, but at

the same time rapidly developed trade relations with it.6 Though China reacted angrily

to Indias citing it as a justification for the 1998 nuclear tests, trade between the two

countries expanded briskly in the same period, growing from $1.1 billion in 1995 tonearly $3.5 billion in 2001.7 That figure leapt to $13.6 billion in 2004.8 China and

India have also made common cause on global trade negotiations and have made some

efforts to cooperate rather than compete with respect to their hunger for energy

resources.

But while there is now a basic stability in their relationship, there have been

differences as well, especially on nuclear issues. Over the past several decades, China

has developed a close strategic partnership with Pakistan with a view to containing

India. India has long worried about the transfer of Chinese missile and nuclear

4 Chaim BRAUN and Christopher S. CHYBA, Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the NuclearNonproliferation Regime, International Security, 29, 2 (Fall 2004), pp. 5-49.5 On Islamic militancy in Pakistan and the Pakistani states failure to control it, see S. V. R. NASR,The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulema in Societyand Politics, Modern Asian Studies, 34, 1 (January 2000), pp. 139-180; andUnfulfilled Promises:Pakistans Failure to Tackle Extremism, International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 73,Islamabad & Brussels, January 16, 2004 http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=2472&l=16 On the Chinese nuclear threat to India, see Ashley J. TELLIS, Indias Emerging Nuclear Posture:Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), pp. 59-67.7 India, Ministry of External Affairs, India-China Trade Statistics, Table 1: India-China Trade

(1995-2001) www.meadev.nic.in/foreign/ind-china.htm8 Howard W. FRENCH, India and China Take on the World and Each Other, New York Times,November 8, 2005 http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/08/business/worldbusiness/08infosys.html


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technology to Pakistan.9 China has been wary of Indias nuclearization.10 But it has

refused to talk to India on nuclear issues, asserting that India should sign the Nuclear

Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-weapons state. This position was restated in

the wake of the recent Indo-US nuclear agreement. So long as this continues, the

possibility of CBMs or more serious arms control between India and China is ruled out.This in turn places limits on the extent to which India will be willing to negotiate

nuclear risk reduction with Pakistan. China may prevent the full realization of the

Indo-US nuclear agreement, assuming it clears the next hurdle when it comes beforethe US Congress, by blocking a consensus in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This will

bring fresh tensions between India and China, perhaps pushing India into a closer

defence relationship with the United States. On the other hand, if China acquiesces, the

nuclear deal will strengthen Indias hand and facilitate the stabilization of both the

India-China and India-Pakistan relationships.

3. West Asia is of course vital to South Asias energy needs. This aspect is entangled

with the nuclear politics of both regions. The potential for nuclear proliferation in West

Asia has negative implications for South Asia (and indeed the rest of the world) since

it may generate tensions in the region and possibly dislocate oil supplies. The

overthrow of Saddam Hussain averted one such eventuality. Irans nuclear

entrepreneurship has revived regional anxieties. The growing confrontation between

Iran and the United States has the potential to disrupt oil supplies and other east-west

trade in the Indian Ocean region.

Another problem arising out of the Iran-US confrontation is its possible fallout on

South Asias long-term energy arrangements. While both India and Pakistan haveaffirmed their commitment to the planned Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, that project

could be scuttled if the situation worsens. Iran-India relations have become somewhat

tenuous after India voted against Iran in September 2005 on an International Atomic

Energy Agency resolution recommending that the Iran issue be referred to the Security

Council. Pakistan too appears to be hedging its bets, with President Musharraf stating

in January 2006 that he was open to changing his mind if Pakistan was adequately

compensated.11 President Bush has indicated that the United States may not oppose

the pipeline, but a serious US-Iran crisis would almost certainly be problematic.

The nuclear linkage between West and South Asia has other dimensions. In the

mid-1980s, Pakistan worried about the possibility of an Israeli-Indian preventive strike

on its fledgling nuclear establishment.12 After the terrorist attacks of September 2001,

there was again apprehension that Israel or the United States might intervene and take

control of Pakistani nuclear facilities. Though such fears have subsided, they remain

9 John W. GARVER, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattleand London: University of Washington Press, 2001), pp. 324-331.10 Jing-dong YUAN, Indias Rise after Pokhran II: Chinese Analyses and Assessments, AsianSurvey, 41, 6 (November-December 2000), pp. 978-1001.11 Musharraf Wants Incentive to Abandon Iran Gas Pipeline, Daily Times, January 27, 2006

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\01\27\story_27-1-2006_pg1_212 Sumit GANGULY and Devin T. HAGERTY, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in theShadow of Nuclear Weapons(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 44-67.


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alive in Pakistani strategic consciousness. Pakistan has another problem. If Iran were

to go nuclear, it would be uncomfortably sandwiched between two nuclear powers. As

one senior Pakistani official told this author in an informal conversation in 2005,

Pakistan has had its share of tensions with Iran, and a nuclear Iran is not a prospect

that his country looks forward to.13

4. The United States has played an active role in South Asias nuclear politics.

India-Pakistan crises since the 1990s have invariably involved American efforts todefuse tensions. Following the end of the Cold War, the US attempted to roll back

Indias nuclear program, assuming Pakistan would have to follow suit. But the strategy

failed, and instead contributed significantly to Indias decision to test in 1998.

Sanctions were then imposed on both India and Pakistan, but these were

withdrawn after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. President Bush has launched

a major effort to de-hyphenate India and Pakistan. The latter is important to the US

in its immediate quest to hunt down members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. But

stabilizing it is also a long-term concern. The United States sees Pakistan as a

proliferation-prone and risk-taking nuclear weapons power, a breeding ground for

Islamic terrorism, and, putting the two together, potentially a major source of

nuclear/radiological terrorism. Hence American interest in Pakistan, contrary to the

suspicions of many Pakistanis, is likely to be sustained even if its counter-terrorist

campaign there is successful.

With India, President Bush is clearly trying to build an alliance-like relationship.

His basic objective is to give the United States a strong position in a continent which

has the maximum potential in terms of both military (including nuclear) and economicpower. It would be simplistic to treat the Bush initiative only as a balancing strategy

against China, for the United States has extensive trade and investment relations with

that country. But given its uncertain relations with China, US policy certainly involves

hedging against the possibility that Sino-American relations will deteriorate. However,

the move to draw closer to India has more to it.

Though the United States and India too have their differences, there is a strong

convergence of basic interests on counter-terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation (aside

from the NPT problem), and general stability of global markets and societies. On

nuclear issues, President Bush is seeking a major restructuring of the global regime

against nuclear proliferation: a shift from the leaky, relatively mild, and formal

NPT-based system to a more proactive one based on the identification of nuclear

threats. This is part of a larger restructuring that encompasses abrogation of the

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the embrace of missile defence, and the intensification of

counter-proliferation efforts through projects like the Proliferation Security Initiative.

As a hegemonic power, the United States has an interest above all in maintaining

global stability. But it understands the limitations on the unilateral exercise of power in

a world characterized by increasing interdependence. The Indo-US deal should be seen

13 See also Irans Nuclear Stand-off and Pakistan, Editorial, Daily Times, March 10, 2006http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\03\10\story_10-3-2006_pg3_1


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in this light as a major American effort to accommodate and ally with a like-minded,

liberal-democratic state with which its basic interests converge.

5. South Asia is in the throes of change. With India rising as a major regional power,

the gap between it and Pakistan is likely to widen, as many Pakistani commentatorsare beginning to recognize. The Kashmir dispute and attendant tensions over terrorism

and nuclear weapons are not likely to disappear overnight, but they will gradually

diminish under the pressure of change. Nuclear tensions can still be triggered byrecurring crises, but experience has taught Indians and Pakistanis that there is nothing

to be gained and much to be lost by repeated confrontations which raise the risk of war.

The world remains one in which military power is a currency and nuclear power is

highly valued as the ultimate defender of national survival. Nations will continue to

seek nuclear power or seek to deny it to others. Over time, the tension between

interdependence, which breeds cooperation, and conflict is slowly but steadily shifting

in favour of the former. Nuclear weapons will be less and less meaningful in years to

come, but for the time being, the complex game of cooperation and conflict will

continue to be played in the ways outlined here.


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THE ATOMIC RUSH GOOD BOMBS, BAD BOMBS

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GOOD BOMBSBAD BOMBS by MMaauurriizziiooMMAARRTTEELLLLIINNIIaannddAAnnddrreeaaPPLLEEBBAANNIIThe Indo-US nuclear agreement changes the rules of Asias atomic game. With this

deal the Bush administration introduces the distinction between tolerable and

non-tolerable nuclear powers. The consequences for the non-proliferation regime.

The joint India-US statement of 18 July 2005represents a dramatic turning point for the international nuclear non-proliferation

regime. In fact, the agreement announced by President Bush and Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh foresees a reprisal of the transfer of American civilian nuclear

technology to India. This marks a significant turn-about after twenty-five years of a

US policy of isolating nations, which have not signed the NPT, and preventing to give

assistance to them in the field of civilian use of atomic energy.

This article will outline the possible consequences of the agreement and

implications for the international political scenario and for our nation.

In the first section we will examine the reasons underlying the US administrations

decision to alter its policy in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. We will thenanalyse the internal and international obstacles which could prevent the US from

fulfilling the commitments undertaken on the 18 July 2005 and possible threats to

stability in Asia. In the final section we will outline the principal effects that this

agreement will have on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and for Italy.

1. India was one of the first countries to start a nuclear cooperation programme with

the United States. Its decision not to sign the NPT and, above all, the first nuclear test

carried out in 1974, however, led to the American assistance programme being

interrupted and clearly revealed how the transfer of nuclear technology for civilian use

could be used for the production of atomic weapons.

The testing of the India nuclear warhead marked a reversal in American policy and

caused the US administration to adopt a series of measures, on both the internal and

international level 1 , to prevent such developments recurring in the future. The

American administration actively committed itself to creating a voluntary,

international regime for controlling the transfer of nuclear technology and dual items,

the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)2. This was to become the cornerstone of the new

1 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act

2 The member states of the Nuclear Suppliers Group undertook, in particular, to institutecooperation programmes countries that did not possess nuclear weapons only after these latter hadadhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and had agreed to sign the international safeguard


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non-proliferation system and the main forum used by the United States for intensifying

restrictions on technology transfer and isolating those states which decided not to sign

the NPT.

The India-US agreement, therefore, represents a radical change in American policy

regarding the non-proliferation regime and highlights the deep rifts undermining thestability of a system whose reasoning and schematisation are now largely outdated.

Before examining the consequences of the 18 July agreement, however, we must

consider the real motives behind such a revolutionary change for the USadministration. Of fundamental importance here is the realisation that nuclear

proliferation is unavoidable. Although few states have succeeded in producing a

nuclear arsenal in the last fifty years, numerous analysts believe that the next few years

will see a second wave of countries acquiring such weapons. At the present time, the

international non-proliferation regime does not appear capable of limiting the

aspirations of these future nuclear powers, nor does it provide Washington with

adequate guarantees, as shown by the cases of Iran and North Korea.

American policy cannot, therefore, aim at maintaining the status quo but must

attempt to introduce a strategy for increasing cooperation to reduce nuclear

proliferation threats with those states considered capable of rising to nuclear regional

power and favouring also national interests.

This new approach to the subject of nuclear proliferation reveals an important

ideological change within the American establishment. The prospect of an increase in

the number of states possessing nuclear weapons no longer appears as a threat to be

avoided at all costs, and Kenneth Waltzs theories are no longer considered taboo3.

This is not to say that the new direction of American policy is based on theNuclear Weapons Dissemination Theory, but indicates an understanding of a

continually evolving scenario in which we witness a progressive rise of those

protagonists intent on increasing their own status by the pursuit of a military nuclear

programme. Underlying the India-US agreement, in effect, there is the awareness that

Americas historical policy in the field of nuclear non-proliferation can no longer be

applied and must, therefore, be replaced by a selective approach which distinguishes

between good and bad proliferating states. This position reflects the Bush

administrations deeply held convictions and emphasises once more its distrust of

international institutions and organisations.

The delicate nature of this subject and the far-reaching repercussions which any

decision in this regard could have on the international scenario require, however, that

the selection process is not dominated by a single protagonists even if this is the

major world power but is entrusted to the only international body that enjoys the

agreements to prevent the use of transferred technologies for purposes other than providingnuclear energy for civilian use.3 Waltz claims that the gradual proliferation of states possessing nuclear weapons could constitutea stabilising factor for the international political scenario. The political price of an escalation incrisis situations would, in effect, oblige the leading powers to exercise great caution so as to avoid a

nuclear conflict.On this subject, see Scott SAGAN, Kenneth WALTZ: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: a DebateRenewed, New York - London, 2002


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required consensus and credibility to perform such an important task: the United

Nations Organisation. Furthermore, the distinction between good and bad

proliferating states cannot be fixed and unchanging, but must enable individual states

to regulate their position by means of precisely defined unambiguous mechanisms.

This selective approach to the question of non-proliferation also marks the end ofthe international nuclear non-proliferation regime as we know it today. Such profound

changes offer the opportunity to reconsider the structural lines of the NPT and enter

into a wider debate on the best way of adapting its principles to the currentinternational scenario which, no longer dictated by Cold War logic, is characterised by

the presence of a single superpower and by the progressive rise of individual regional

protagonists capable of providing their own region with atomic cover. Given such

possible lines of development, it is to be hoped that the NPT should evolve on a

regional basis with a stronger Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) aspect so as to

favour a controlled growth of the nuclear proliferation process.

2. The India-US agreement not only casts grave doubts on the future of the

international non-proliferation regime, but also implies a serious revision of the policy

followed by these two states up until now. Under their commitments, in fact, India and

the United States are obliged to introduce a series of measures that will remove any

obstacles in the way of establishing nuclear cooperation. The US, in particular, finds

itself facing explicit obligations in both the internal and international fields.

The Atomic Energy Act (AEA), amended by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act

(NNPA) of 1978, regulates US policy concerning the transfer of nuclear energy

technology to states that do not have safeguard agreements with the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as in the case of de facto nuclear states which are

not members of the NPT4. The existence of international safeguard agreements and the

renunciation of an atomic arsenal are fundamental prerequisites for establishing a

rapport of assistance in the nuclear field and, therefore, pose serious problems for the

fulfilment of the obligations involved in the India-US agreement. India is not, in fact,

tied by any international safeguard agreements relating to its nuclear activity and is,

obviously, unwilling to give up its nuclear arsenal. This impasse can be overcome only

through the direct intervention of the US President, who may enter into agreements

that do not satisfy the conditions laid down in the AEA if he considers such

prerequisites may run counter to the aims of non-proliferation or represent a threat to

the nation. In this case, however, the agreement must be approved both by Congress

and by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission5.

It is, therefore, clear that it will be particularly difficult to implement the

commitments undertaken by the US administration on 18 July 2005 as obstacles exist

also on the international front. Over the years, the United States, as a member of the

4 The nations with nuclear deterrents which, to date, have not signed or have left the NPT areIndia, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea.

5 On the procedures provided for under US legislation for stipulating assistance agreements in thefield of nuclear power, see Sharon SQUASSONI, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues forCongress CRS Report for Congress, 29 July 2005


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NSG, has committed itself to furnishing assistance in the nuclear field only to countries

which have signed international safeguard agreements regarding their own nuclear

programmes.

The lack of any such undertaking by India obliges the United States to intervene

directly within the NSG so as to obtain the consensus required for implementing the 18July declaration. The Indian case, however, risks turning into a dangerous precedent

that could impel various countries to review their commitments in relation to the NSG

and, thus, create a deep rift in the international non-proliferation regime, to which theNuclear Suppliers Group is fundamental.

To prevent India-US cooperation from marking the start of an irresistible

disintegration of the non-proliferation regime it is essential that India agrees to

introduce a series of measures aimed at providing this initiative with the greatest

support possible. In particular, the Indian government should:

- declare an end to all activities relating to the production of fissile material.- promise not to conduct further atomic tests.- strengthen controls over the exportation of technologies relating to the use of

nuclear energy.

The renewal of Indian-US collaboration whilst sanctioning Indias entry into the

international non-proliferation regime represents a possible source of destabilisation

for the international political scenario and, in particular, for the delicate equilibrium of

South Asia. The agreement lays the foundations for a net increase in Indias capacity

and risks widening the military gap with Islamabad, thus further worsening relations

between the two countries which, at the present time, is not to be tolerated. Given theUS administrations refusal to offer a pact to Pakistan along the lines of this renewed

cooperation with India, it is vital for Delhi to introduce a series of measures aimed at

preventing the potential escalation of strategic asymmetries and to push for Nuclear

Confidence Building Measures similar to that created formerly between the Soviet

Union and the United States.

3. The India-US agreement of 18 July 2005 in effect marks the entrance of India as a

nuclear power into the international non-proliferation regime. Such recognition,

however, also delineates a variety of potentially destabilising scenarios and lays the

foundation for a rigorous review of the international non-proliferation system. The

renewal of cooperation with Delhi effectively runs counter to NPT guidelines which

sanction the principle that only those states which renounce the use of nuclear energy

for military purposes and agree to introduce international safeguard agreements with

the IAEA may enjoy the advantages deriving from cooperation in the field of civilian

nuclear power.

The supposedly special nature of the Indian case is not adequate to ensure that

other, similar situations do not occur in the future. Thus a highly destabilising

precedent is created, the repercussions from which could radically alter the very

structure of the NPT.The possible consequences for the Non-Proliferation Treaty of the 18 July


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agreement depend largely on the measures which India and the United States decide to

adopt within the context of the non-proliferation regime, but also raise a number of

questions that risk undermining the fundamental stability of the entire Treaty:

1) The US initiative risks having a direct impact on current negotiations with Iran andNorth Korea, which could use the agreement between Washington and Delhi to

their own advantage and openly condemn the American modus operandi, which is

quite clearly biased and changes according to which country is concerned.2) The slackening of international restrictions in the face of cooperation agreements in

the field of civilian atomic energy power could lead other nuclear powers and, in

particular, China and Russia- to sign similar agreements with countries they

consider to be of significant strategic interest for them.

3) Developments in the Indian case could cause non-nuclear weapon NPT countries to

feel that the benefits of adhering to the Treaty have been notably reduced by the

India-US agreements and, hence, to reconsider their positions. States which had

previously acquired a nuclear arsenal and then decided to abandon such

programmes for the benefits deriving from the NPT, could re-examine their

decisions.

This last point is of particular relevance for the European scenario since it raises

once again the question of an effective European nuclear deterrent umbrella. This issue

is a serious one for the entire continent: appealing to the doctrine of deterrence

guaranteed by NATO is not a credible solution, especially in a context such as todays,

characterised by the possibility of asymmetrical conflicts. The nuclear arsenals ofFrance and Great Britain could guarantee adequate cover, but there remains the

unknown factor of Paris and Londons effective willingness to place, at the disposition

of Europe, a strategic instrument that is so costly to maintain and of a geopolitical

stance.

In the corridors of certain European nations, therefore, the validity of adhering

to the NPT as members not possessing nuclear weapons has once more been brought

into question.

This debate is of immediate interest to our country. Without getting to the point of

developing an Italian nuclear deterrent, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that, in

the future, the international system will undoubtedly be characterised by a

dissymmetry between nations possessing nuclear weapons and those which do not, and

between countries capable of independently producing their own nuclear fuel and that

banned to do that.

Furthermore, future scenarios of energy security could lead Italy to reconsider its

position regarding the use of civilian nuclear energy, especially considering its lack of

domestic sources of hydrocarbons and the political price of depending on supplies

from the Middle East. Any choice in this sense would, however, only be considered if

a universal market for low enriched uranium, or the possibility of producing it

autonomously, were guaranteed.


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Italy is, therefore, directly affected by the consequences of the India-US agreement,

since its will have notable repercussions on the NPT. The Italian position in relation to

the agreement between Washington and Delhi must, therefore, be based on strategic

considerations and not on abstract concepts. Italy should lend its support to the

agreement only if this does not drastically change the NPT and, in particular, theinalienable right sanctioned in Article IV, which guarantees non-nuclear weapon states

adherents to the Treaty access to civilian nuclear technology (including enrichment

and reprocessing) for the production and independent use of nuclear fuel.The interpretation of the NPT in the 21st century must, therefore, tend towards greater

pragmatism in relation to the nuclear states which, although not having signed the

Treaty, have a proven history of non-proliferation. This, however, on the condition that

they agree to respect the limitations observed by the nuclear members of the NPT and

that this new approach does not lead to regional strategic destabilization or ulterior

discrimination (with regard to access to, develop and use of nuclear technologies)

against the non-nuclear weapon signatory nations. Should such consequences be

unavoidable, then it will be necessary to develop and introduce a series of corrective

measures that enable the NPT, revised in the light of the exceptional nature of the

Indian case and similar future cases, to guarantee adequate benefits and prizes for

its non-nuclear weapon members.


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THE ATOMIC RUSH UP (PAKISTANI) PATRIOTS, TO ARMS!

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UP (PAKISTANI) PATRIOTSTO ARMS! by NNaaeeeemmSSAALLIIKK

Indias growing nuclear capacity, coupled with the new Indo-US nuclear agreement

and its dowry of dual atomic technology for Deli, raises dramatic concerns in an

increasing alarmed Pakistan. While Islamabad takes its countermeasures, a worried

China observes.

1. Adebate has been raging in South Asia andwithin the US itself about the ramifications of the Indo-US nuclear deal since it wasfirst inked on July 18, 2005. It picked up a renewed momentum on the eve of President

Bushs visit to South Asia, at the beginning of this month. In India, the dissenting

voices came mainly from BJP, the leftist parties and the scientific lobby. Even the

Chairman of Indias Atomic Energy Commission, Dr Anil Kakodkar jumped into the

fray, making public his opposition to placing the Fast Breeder Reactors under

safeguards.1 This was something unusual given the strict political controls over the

civilian as well as military bureaucracies in India but more surprising was the fact that

he got away with it. In hindsight it appears that this statement was deliberatelyorchestrated to strengthen Indias negotiating position in the face of US pressure for

the inclusion of Breeder Reactors in the civilian list. In the event, the US side in its

indecent haste to sign the agreement during the Presidential visit readily agreed to

keep both the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor and the Fast Breeder Test Reactor out of

the list of safeguarded facilities.2

Prior to the Bush visit Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made a detailed statement

in the Parliament on 27th of February, reassuring the MPs that Indias strategic

interests will not be compromised in any way. While in the US the administration was

dismissive of the concerns expressed by the non-proliferation lobby arguing that we

are just trying to help India generate more nuclear power to meet its growing energy

needs and this will in no way augment Indias military nuclear capability. President

Bush himself argued that Indias ability to generate more nuclear power will reduce its

dependence on imported oil, thereby reducing the demand and lowering the prices of

petroleum world wide.3 In Pakistan, understandably, the official reaction has generally

been to play down the impact of the deal. However, Pakistans plea for a similar

1 Nuclear Deal with US could compromise Indias interests, The Daily Times, February 9, 2006.2 Elisabeth BUMILIER and Somini SENGUPTA, US and India Reach Agreement on Nuclear

Cooperation, The New York Times, March 2, 2006.3 President Addresses Asia Society, Discusses India and Pakistan, Office of the Press Secretary,White House, February 22, 2006.


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treatment had no takers in the Bush entourage, was a lost cause from the beginning and

only served to embarrass Pakistan further. Before getting into a discussion of the

political and diplomatic implications, and the blatant violation of the NPT through this

deal, I would focus on the technical aspects of the deal and try to highlight relevant

statistics to put it in the proper perspective.

2. The US officials have repeatedly claimed that the deal will in fact strengthen the

non-proliferation regime rather than weakening it by bringing 14 out of its 22 Indianreactors under IAEA safeguards, which is a blatant attempt at misleading the public

opinion. The fact of the matter is that 6 of these reactors are already under safeguards

and India would actually place only 8 new reactors under safeguards. The following

statistics would hopefully help in separating fact from fiction:

India has at the moment 16 operational nuclear power plants with a total installed

capacity of 3750 MWs. These include 2 US supplied Boiling Water Reactors at

Tarapur which run on Low Enriched Uranium. These reactors are already

safeguarded.

The remaining reactors are Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors, commonly known as

the CANDU type reactors. Out of these 2 reactors RAPS-1 & 2, supplied by Canada,

are safeguarded.

Currently, 6 nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 3340 MWs are under

construction. Five of these would be coming on line in 2007 and one in 2008. These

include two Pressurised Water Reactors of 1000 MW each, supplied by Russia and

safeguarded. Another 4 plants are planned to be operational between 2007-2011,with a combined capacity of 1440 MWs.

Currently nuclear power constitutes less than 3 percent of Indias total energy output.

79% is thermal (mainly coal fired) and 20% is hydel power.

With the completion of under construction and planned power plants the total output

of nuclear energy would rise to 8530 MWs by 2011, which at best would constitute

around 5-6 percent of Indias total electricity production considering the fact that

other means of energy production would also be growing.

India plans to have 20,000 MWs of nuclear energy capacity by 2020 and long term

projections suggest that nuclear power would constitute 20% of Indias total power

production by 2050. [By then the ME oil wells would have dried up].

Indias domestic Uranium reserves are estimated to be about 78,000 tons barely

sufficient to support production of 10000 MWs of nuclear power capacity. While,

the capacity for Uranium mining and processing is little more than 300 tons annually,

which can hardly feed the existing power plants and CIRUS and Dhruva reactors. It

is apparent that India doesnt have enough Uranium to support both its expanding

nuclear energy program as well as its ambitious nuclear weapons program.

Access to imported fuel for nuclear power plants would free up Indias domestic

uranium resources for military purposes. In case India leaves out one of its 220 MW

CANDU reactor from the civilian list its fissile material production will be more thandoubled.


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Currently India has two dedicated facilities for production of fissile material i.e. 40

MW CIRUS reactor functional since 1960 and 100 MW Dhruva which became

operational in 1985. According to my estimation India has a stockpile of 775 kgs of

plutonium, enough for 130-155 weapons depending on the design of its nuclear

warheads.Out of this inventory 450 kgs have been produced by CIRUS, which was supplied by

Canada and US for peaceful purposes. Plutonium produced by this reactor was used

in 1974 test.

In his statement in the Indian Parliament on 7 th of March, PM Manmohan Singh

explaining the nuclear deal announced that India would shut down Dhruva in 2010,

rather than placing it under safeguards for national security reasons. This would

mean that India would be able to extract another 50 Kgs of Plutonium from Cirus (its

annual production assuming 70% efficiency is approximately 10 kgs). Once this

plant is shut down no questions are likely to be raised about the 500 kgs of

Plutonium that it would have yielded by then, which has been diverted for weapons

purposes in violation of the agreement under which this reactor was supplied only for

peaceful purposes. In any case this 50 years old reactor would be due for dismantling

by 2010.4

The details of the agreement reached at New Delhi have not been made public yet,

except that India will complete the separation of civilian and military facilities by 2014.

Now the onus is squarely on the US to steer the deal through the US Congress and the

NSG. It has also taken upon itself to help India get a safeguards agreement of its

choice from the IAEA. India has been given a certificate of good conduct, despite adamning report recently released by ISIS,5 highlighting Indias indiscretions and

inappropriate procurement practices especially related to its Gas Centrifuge

Enrichment Program. The report has cited numerous occasions where export controls

of various supplier countries were circumvented by importing equipment and materials

of direct relevance to the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment program under the garb of dual

use items. In some instances information about the designs and technical specifications

of various sensitive components were provided to the manufacturers resulting in the

leakage of technology.

The Indians are also alleged to have used some persons reportedly part of the AQ

Khan network to procure certain items of equipment.6 Strange though it may appear

the story has neither been taken up by the US media nor has the US Administration

4 DavidALBRIGHT and Susan BASU, Separating Indian Military and Civilian Nuclear Facilities,Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Washington, D.C. December 19, 2005. Alsosee Prime Ministers Suo Motu Statement on Discussions on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperationwith the US: Implementation of Indias Separation Plan, The Hindu, New Delhi, March 7, 2006.Authors own calculation of Indias Plutonium Inventory based on the production by CIRUS andDhruva Reactors assuming a 70% capacity utilization.5 David ALBRIGHT and Susan BASU, Indias Gas Centrifuge Program: Stopping Illicit

Procurement and the Leakage of Technical Centrifuge Know how, ISIS, Washington, D.C. March10, 2006.6 Ibid.


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taken any notice of it. The officials continue to praise Indias unblemished and

clean record on proliferation, despite the well known fact that India had violated its

agreement with Canada and the US in 1974 by using plutonium produced by the

CIRUS reactor, which had been given to India for peaceful purposes, for its first

nuclear test. In not too distant a past the dossier issued by the British government onIraqs WMD programs had named an Indian company, NEC limited, for supplying

chemicals for Iraqs chemical and missile programs. Two Indian nuclear scientists, Mr

Y. R.S. Prasad and Mr Surinder Chaudhry, were placed in 2004, on the US Federal listfor working in Iran to assist the Iranian nuclear program.

3. The deal is a clear violation of the Article I obligation of the NPT7 under which

all the nuclear weapon states have committed not to assist any other country directly or

indirectly in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. In this case, as pointed out earlier,

the deal will free up Indias domestic Uranium resources for weapons production by

assuring it of guaranteed supply of imported fuel from US and its allies for its civilian

power reactors. It has also allowed India to keep eight civilian power reactors out of

safeguards which, if dedicated to the production of fissile material instead of

electricity generation, would multiply Indias weapons grade materials production by

at least 4-5 times.

Secondly, the deal is also in contravention to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

guidelines which call upon the member states not to export any nuclear materials or

technology to any country which does not accept full scope IAEA safeguards on all its

nuclear activities8. It would be of interest to note here that NSG in fact was created to

control the proliferation of nuclear technology as a result of Indias nuclear test in1974. Thirdly, it sets a dangerous precedent for others to follow. In fact, it has

encouraged Russia to supply 60 tons of Low Enriched Uranium Fuel to India ignoring

opposition by the NSG members and even the US protests. France has already signed a

memorandum of understanding for nuclear cooperation with India and it is expected

that China will now expand its civilian nuclear technology cooperation with Pakistan.

Other suppliers are likely to follow the American lead. Australia has already been

approached by India for the purchase of Australian Uranium. The process of

disintegration of the NSG has in effect already started.

Then is the question of the legal and moral grounds for opposing Irans nuclear

program, a country which is signatory to NPT and has signed even the IAEAs

additional protocol besides the normal safeguards agreement, whereas a country which

possesses nuclear weapons and has neither signed the NPT nor accepted the full scope

safeguards is being rewarded. The deal would, therefore, weaken the case against Iran

and North Korea and encourage other would be proliferators.9

Battle lines are already drawn in Washington between the non-proliferationists and

the administration supported by the powerful Indian lobby and the large Indian caucus

7 http://www.armscontrol.org/treaties

8 http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NSG.asp9 J. CIRINCIONE, Nuclear Cave In, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18082


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in the US Congress. In the next few weeks the struggle will move to Capitol Hill,

where the administration has already introduced a Bill to amend existing American

laws to allow India specific exemptions. The administration is also making strenuous

efforts to convince the Congressmen of the virtues of this deal. Secretary of State

Condoleeza Rice herself wrote an article in the Washington Post in which she arguedthat the deal would expand the reach of non-proliferation and stated that India plans to

import 8 new power reactors by 2012, if America gets orders for even two of these it

would mean thousands of new jobs for the Americans.10In an unusual statement the Department of Defense has also praised the deal and

has hinted that it would lead to greater defense cooperation with India, including the

sale of big ticket items such as aircraft and naval vessels.11 The big US Defense

manufacturers are already eyeing lucrative arms deals with India worth billions of

dollars. This is an argument many Congressmen who would like new jobs to be

created in their constituency would find irresistible in a mid term election year.

Robert Kagan, a senior analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

wrote in an op-ed article in the Washington Post that the benefits of an improved

strategic relationship with India are more valuable than the NPT.12

4. At a regional level, Pakistan is dismayed at this preferential treatment to India13

and as the perception grows about Indias acquisition of the ability to substantially

enlarge its nuclear arsenal as a result of the deal, it would be under great pressure to

respond by reviewing its Minimum Deterrence levels and increase the size of its own

nuclear arsenal. This would indeed be an undesirable development and would have

serious repercussions for the stability of an already fragile nuclear balance in SouthAsia. On the other hand, since the most enthusiastic supporters of the deal in the US

argue that this would help build India as a strategic counter weight to a rising China, 14

it would also have negative consequences for the India-China relations and thus

destabilize the whole region in and around South Asia.

At the end of the day it is evident that commercial interests take precedence over

all moral and legal arguments in favour of non-proliferation and other such lofty ideals.

It also highlights the fact that in the international relations the major powers do not

feel shy of applying double standards and use the rules of the game selectively to suit

their own self interests. It is quite likely that the biggest beneficiaries of the India-US

Nuclear Deal would not be the Americans but the French and the Russians, who would

soon make a bee line in New Delhi to sell their nuclear hardware and earn billions of

dollars in profits. In this kind of an environment of moral bankruptcy and utter greed

who cares about abstractions such as non-proliferation?

10 Condoleeza RICE, Our Opportunity with India, The Washington Post, March 13, 2006.11 Steven R. WEISMAN, Dissenting on Atomic Deal, The New York Times, March 3, 2006.

12 Robert KAGAN, India is not a Precedent, The Washington Post, March 12, 2006.13 Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, March 17, 2006.14 WEISMAN, op.cit.


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THE ATOMIC RUSH FRIENDS BY NECESSITY

20

FRIENDS BY NECESSITY by TTaallaattMMAASSOOOODDThe Indo-US 10 year defense agreement awakens Pakistans worst ghosts. Confrontedwith a nuclear-armed India with the blessing of the United States, Islamabad must bet

on its geo-strategic importance, its nuclear capability and pivotal role in the war on

terror. But, most of all, it must increase its cooperation with China.

1. India and the United States are supposed tobe natural allies, but Indias Nehruvian philosophy of non-alignment and its aspirations

to play a global role in exploiting the capitalist and communist blocks during the ColdWar, kept them apart. After the break up of the Soviet Union, that barrier was removed

and India and the United States started moving closer to each other. It was only after

the nuclear tests of May 1998 that this process met a temporary setback. But it did not

take long for the relationship to revive and in hindsight it seems that nuclear testing

was seized by Washington and New Delhi as an opportunity to optimize their

relationship and the several round of Singh Talbot talks provided that platform.

The visit of president Clinton to India in 1999 was a first manifestation of this

emerging partnership in the post-nuclear South Asia. The lifting of sanctions and

increased military to military cooperation, joint counter terrorist operations andestablishment of several committees to identify areas of mutual interest followed the

presidents visit. In Jan 2004, the US administration and Vajpayee government

announced further steps in Strategic Partner Initiative, which included cooperation on

missile defense, lifting ban on civilian space program and technology transfer from the

Unite States.

The Indo-US 10 year defense agreement and enhanced Indo-US cooperation in the

areas of civil nuclear, civil space and high technology commerce brings about a

qualitative change in their relationship with serious implications at the regional and

global level. These agreements will give India access to strategic weapon systems and

critical technologies provide opportunities for co-production and collaborativeresearch and development, including close collaboration in missile defense. It will also

foster greater intelligence sharing as well as increased trade in arms.

Although the nuclear and space cooperation is in civilian areas, India would fully

exploit the dual nature of these technologies for military advantage as has been the

case in the past. The nuclear deal combined with the defense and space cooperation

and the whole range of agreements public health, agriculture, trade, investment and

non-nuclear energy has catalyzed the best relations between the two countries since

independence in 1947.

In bringing the two countries close, expatriates, thinktanks, defense industrialcomplex and US and Indian conglomerates have played a significant role in an


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orchestrated and well-coordinated fashion.

US seems committed to assist India in transforming it into a world power as a

partner, on the lines of Japan, or even more, with the expectation that it will

compliment its efforts in the quest of shaping the world and particularly Asia to

advance its global designs.The major purpose of President Bushs recent visit to South Asia was to take its

relationship with India another leap forward toward strategic partnership.

According to American administration Indias energy needs are mounting as hereconomy grows at a fast pace. At the same time India being non- signatory to the NPT

cannot have access to nuclear plants, nuclear fuel and technology. During Mr.

Manmohan Singhs last visit to Washington in December 2005, the US agreed to give

India more or less the same privileges that are enjoyed only by the signatories of the

NPT. The other important feature of this agreement has been that the US perpetually

committed itself to supply nuclear fuel to India for its civilian nuclear plants, on the

grounds of Indias lack of Uranium. India on the other hand has to separate its nuclear

facilities into civilian and military and the former will come under IAEA safeguards.

During President Bush visit to India the two governments reached an agreement

according to which, over several years up to 2014, India will put 14 of its 22 nuclear

reactors under IAEA safeguards, but its two fast breeder reactors will be excluded

from the civilian category and not fall under the safeguards regime. According to the

US ambassador in Pakistan, 67% of the Indian production facilities will come under

IAEA safeguards as opposed to the present 11%. But it is evident that India is seeking

access to imported fuel for nuclear power plants in order to utilize its domestic

uranium resources for military purposes.The US administration is working hard with the Congress to change US laws to

get this agreement approved by the Congress. It is believed that a stand-alone bill will

be negotiated with the Congress to expedite the legal process. The amount of effort

being put in by the US administration to convince key members of the Congress and

the strong corporate and other interests that are in play, it is most likely that the

legislation will get through in its entirety or with a few riders. It would be relatively

more difficult for the US to get its international partners in the Nuclear Suppliers

Group (NSG) to alter their rules for India. The approving statement of the IAEA

Director, Mr. El Baradie, about the US India nuclear deal was most disappointing

and intriguing.

The non-proliferation lobby in the US has however has become very active and is

opposing the deal.

2. There are serious implications of this deal in the global and regional context. The

US strategic objectives of moving its relations with India at such an elevated plane

appear to have three main objectives. US expects that India will collaborate with it in

dealing with a strategic challenge from China, notwithstanding that both governments

deny that Beijing is a factor in their calculations, but it cannot be denied that both

consider China as a potential rival and wary of its growing strength. Currently there ishuge trade deficit between US and China that has become a source of friction and US


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support to Taiwan agitates Beijing. Despite these undercurrents, neither country can

afford to have bad relations with China. India has joined the Shanghai Initiative and

the trade between them is growing fast and already reached 30 billion dollars. And

United States cooperates with China on a vast range of issues. Nonetheless, China

would have to watch closely the rise of military and economic power of India inaddition to keeping its sights focused on the US.

United States also considers India as a partner in the fight against radical Islam.

Indias own Muslim population is considered a model of moderation and a robustparticipant in the democratic evolution of India as opposed to the dictatorial and

autocratic regimes of the Muslim world.

Indias growing economy and emergence of a sizeable middle class of nearly two

million people is another major factor that is drawing the two countries together.

The Indo-US nuclear deal is heavily tilted in Indias favor. Deli was already a

de-facto nuclear military power and now it is being brought closer to becoming a de

jure nuclear weapons state. India will be able to get rid of all the sanctions that have

been in force since the Pokhran test of 1974 and will have access to high technology in

critical civil nuclear, space and defense and also to acquisition of latest weapons and

equipment from the US. India will be allowed to have access to modern weapon

systems and technology. It may also become a conduit of out sourcing for Indian

defense industries in low and medium technology items. United States has also invited

India in the ITER initiative on fusion energy as an important further step towards the

goal of full energy cooperation.

Hawks in India are especially pleased that they have been able to keep the fast

breeder program out of the safeguards regime.Additionally, Indias agenda by entering into these agreements is to change its

standing in the world. The Indians want to acquire a position once held by the Soviets,

in which no major global decision is taken without their approval. Indian aspiration is

to get away from the orbit of South Asia where it is tied inextricably to Pakistan and

Kashmir.

In return for all these advantages U.S. would expect access to Indian military

capabilities. According to a respected think tank in America, India can take on more

responsibility for low end operations in Asia, which will allow the U.S. to concentrate

its resources on high-end fighting missions. Nonetheless, New Delhi wouldnt like to

give the impression that it has not compromised its foreign policy or has become too

dependent on Washington. It will play the balancing act of emerging as an independent

power and yet be a U.S. strategic ally.

Despite the congruence of vital national interests between the two countries, India

would not get everything it wants from the U.S. This was manifest in Washingtons

opposition to India bid for a permanent seat in the UNSC, taking the plea that U.N.

reform should take priority, yet it was clearly backing Japan. Nonetheless, it is very

much possible that U.S. may support that India (and China) are brought in the G-8

grouping in the near future. It would be, however, imprudent to expect that New Delhi

will be dictated by Washington or do its bidding unless there is a total convergence ofinterest. It is a different matter that it has tactically yielded to the US on the Iran


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nuclear issue by voting once in favor of referring the matter to the IAEA Board and

then to the UNSC.

The nuclear deal virtually grants India the status of the sixth nuclear power. It

raises Indias credibility at the expense of undermining the NPT and the statutes of the

NSG.In principle, it would become difficult for the US to deny similar concessions to

Pakistan although for a while it could take cover under the A.Q. Khan episode.

President Bush made the point that India and Pakistan have a different history. Itwas a loaded connotation. He was referring to AQ Khan, and much more, a different

history as related to democracy, in terms of extremism and freedom struggle or

militancy whatever you may call it. Pakistans proximity to China is also a factor for

the US to deny civil nuclear technology. Besides, the United States has very cleverly

used Pakistans current domestic difficulties and the war on terror to de-link its

policies in South Asia. Pakistan is considered both an important ally in the war on

terrorism and a battleground against terrorists. This illustrates the various

contradictions and causes of mistrust in their relationship.

The new alignment in US policy represents a highly discriminatory and tectonic

shift in the South Asian security paradigm. India and Israel have got away with their

nuclear weapons program and acquired respectability but left Pakistan in a strategic

limbo. The implications for Pakistan are therefore serious. It will further increase the

existing imbalance of power between India and Pakistan, which as it is was heavily

tilted in Indias favor giving rise to insecurities in Pakistan. It is likely to trigger a

trilateral arms race between India and Pakistan and between India and China. Beijing

would be especially concerned if the Ballistic Missile Defense agreement between USand India were actualized. Cooperation in space and missile defense and sale of

sensitive military technologies will weaken Pakistans nuclear deterrence and

conventional capabilities. It would also erode and weaken Pakistans nuclear

deterrence both with India and with the United States.

A more appropriate approach to meet Indias and other countries growing

economic needs would have been to set up an international consortium of nuclear

energy assistance under strict IAEA safeguards and develop technologies through

international effort of production of civil nuclear energy that is non-convertible or

useable for military purposes.

3. What then are the options for Pakistan in the current emerging scenario? Despite

the Indo-U.S. alignment, Pakistan must continue to foster close and friendly relations

with the U.S. and expand them in areas of overlapping vital national interests. These

include fighting global and regional terrorism and enhancing military cooperation

including co-production of military hardware. Developing close economic and trade

links and easier access to U.S. markets. Seeking support in strengthening education

and our technological infrastructure. Having good relations with the U.S. in a unipolar

world is by itself a positive factor in international relations.

At the same time Pakistan should broaden its options by fostering closer relationswith China and European countries and opening up to Russia, as there are no


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inhibitions or limitations of the Cold War. As excellent relations already exist with

Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States, Pakistan needs to build greater economic,

trade and cultural links and seek ways of cooperation in defense. Islamabad should

smoothen the tensions with Iran and Afghanistan, strengthen economic, political and

cultural ties and overcome past suspicions so that a new era of relationship based onmutual trust and respect can be built. Similarly, ties with Afghanistan must be

deepened and their concerns, whether real or perceived, should be removed through

intense engagement at all levels. These two countries need Pakistan as much asPakistan needs them.

Meanwhile, despite these adverse developments and misgivings generated by

Indias military build-up, Pakistan and India are likely to continue supporting the

peace process and move toward normalization of relations as both countries are aware

that war is no more an option. The US having such close relations with both countries

should assist in finding a solution of the Kashmir dispute. Resolution of the conflict

will allow India and Pakistan to harness their energies into development, poverty

alleviation and building their societies on a stable and solid foundation.

For its energy requirements Pakistan must continue cooperation with China in civil

nuclear technology and further strengthen its indigenous capability in this area. It may

increase its industrial capacity of Uranium enrichment. China has already installed a

nuclear plant of 325 megawatt at Chasma, and is installing another plant of same

capacity. Two additional plants of 600 megawatt are planned for the future: aim is to

lift the nuclear energy capacity to 8800 megawatts.

Pakistans geo-strategic importance, its significant position among Muslim nations,

its nuclear capability and pivotal role in the war on terror, if accompanied by domesticstability and economic development can counter the negative fall out of the growing

imbalance and promote regional stability.


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THEATOMIC RUSH

HEARTLANDPLUS


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THE ATOMIC RUSH HISTORYS REVENGE

26

HISTORYS REVENGE by LLuucciiooCCAARRAACCCCIIOOLLOOThe founders of the post-war European project believed they could erase history, andin doing so, create a new Europe without geopolitics. Todays Europeans are now

wrestling with the consequences of that belief. A survey of the regions. Conflicting

ambitions and goals, both within and beyond the continent.

1. Europe had to abolish history. Now historyhas abolished Europe. It has swept away Europeanism. Jean Monnet, one of its fathers,

summarized it thusly: Europe has never existed. Now it is a matter of truly creatingit. Over half a century has passed, but his utopia remains just that. A world ever more

full of competitors still lacks a European subject. The Chinese superstar darkens the

prospect of a new American century, while ambitious regional powersfrom India to

Brazil to South Africaare growing. A multipolar world looms, without our pole.

The European Union exists, of course. But who could mistake it for a global player?

How can we pretend that it speaks with a single voice (Euro-jargon)? Nature teaches

that such an end requires a single bodywhich the EU is not nor wants to become. To

give itself an identity, any organism needs to mark its boundaries with respect to what

lies beyond it; an exercise which the Europeanists have always avoided. Today itconsists of 25 countries, in the next decade it could host over thirty under its tent,

including Balkans and Turks. Nor can we rule out that the Swiss, Icelanders or

Norwegiansbut also Ukrainians, North Africans and Israeliswill one day join our

plethoric community. Contrary to the slogan in vogue during the Nineties, deepening

and enlargement are not parallel processes, but mutually exclusive. Any trace of the

first objective has been lost, while in fifteen years our club has more than doubled its

members.

Why does Europe not exist? At bottom it is a sin of intellectual arrogance.

Europeanism of the post-war variety was an ideology. As such it imagined that history

had an end: united Europe. Not in the imperial sense of Charlemagne or Napoleon, ofHitler or Stalin. It was not a matter of integrating a continent around a nation or worse

a superior race. On the contrary, it sought to pacify a tormented region of the needless

slaughter of the first half of the twentieth century, freeing it from the aggressive

nationalisms to come to an accord based on common interests, values and institutions.

Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer, De Gasperi and their followers did not deceive

themselves that European minds were ready for a similar evolution. For this, they bet

on the economy. Progressive economic integrationfrom an area of free trade to the

single market and currencywould plow the furrow from which one day European

politics would inevitably spring to life. A deliberately vague concept, both in the noun(which Europe, within which borders?) and the adjective (what type of union:


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28

publicly celebrated in the joint sessions of the Austrian and Magyar parliaments.

Beyond that is the Baltic macroregion, from Kiel to Danzig and Saint Petersburg,

from Copenhagen to Stockholm and Helsinki. An all-too-closed northern

Mediterranean, obliged to link up with the surrounding areas, as well as the Adriatic,

in search of new commercial outlets. In the heart of this borderline between Berlin andMoscow, historical associationslike the Polish-Lithuanian oneform, nurtured by

Russophobia. They are attempting to dig a new anti-Russian trench on the eastern

borders of the European Union. pushing it as close as possible to Moscow. Forexample, the Polish-Lithuanian management of the crisis that erupted a year ago in the

orange Ukraine, almost a model of the uncertain strip of frontier between the whole

Atlantic community and the vestige of Russian power, from the Baltic to the Black

Sea.

Another case study of a past that does not want to pass, is Spains Atlantic

projection. Zapatero looks to Ibero-America and creates his niche there as a medium

world power, favored by the anti-American turn of what was once Washingtons house

garden. A parallel is Great Britains Atlanticism, which instead aims north, expressing

its aim of alliance with the United States. And permanent distance from the Old

Continent.

Historys call not only reproduces geopolitical representations considered defunct,

but strains new axes, conceived to cancel out the past in the name of Europe. Such is

the case of the so-called center of gravity of the European Union, based around

France and Germany. The profound crisis of French identity and Berlins return to

neo-Bismarckian geopolitics, demands a rethinking of the Franco-German hypothesis.

So while Paris imagines an advance guard of six (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy,Spain and Poland)Nicholas Sarkozys warhorseAngela Merkel does not want to

hear talk of Euronuclei. And while repairing the breach with Washington, she emerges

as the protectress of the EUs little countries, which is to say the new members of the

club: Moscows former satellites, including the relatively big Poland. But Berlins

embrace doesnt exclude the Balkans and potentially Ukraine, Moldova and

Byelorussia (the leader of the opposition to the Minsk regime, Alyaksandr Milinkevich,

was surprisingly received by Merkel).

Hence the tired Franco-German couple is no longer the motor much less the

steering wheel of a community too heterogeneous to respond to the commands of the

two major continental powers, moved by increasingly less convergent interests.

The geopolitical earthquake of the post-89 era does not operate only in the

relations between states, but also within them. Regions and territories are

rediscovering roots and particular interests. From Scotland to Corsica, from the

Basque country to Catalonia, sincere independentist goals and instrumental uses of

national to divert or conserve material resources combine. Many have no intention of

integrating with the state, much less the wider community. The reform of the Catalan

statute is a good example. Barcelona wants to consolidate its unique identity, but

above all to reinforce its fiscal health. The balance between politics and economy can

easily end up beyond ones control. Drained of sovereignty from above (EU) andbelow (regions and territories), the nation-state loses itself, until it creates a gap of


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legitimacy that is not easy to close, because cannot be replaced with a collection of

regions or a pallid superstructure. And since democracy without a state has yet to be

invented, this geopolitical blur could be reflected in the character of our institutions.

3. In the larger and poorer (the average per capita income of the twenty-five-nationEU is 13% less than that of the fifteen ) Greater Europe, Delorsian federalism

(which distributes more money those with less, in order to build a true and proper

European economic policy) is on the decline. Nation and regional chauvinism prevailsover community solidarity. The old members of the club do not desire to finance the

enlargement. Rather, they aim to renationalize regional politics, designed to draw

poorer territories (eastern) close to richer ones (western). The standard-bearer of this

sacred egoism is Great Britain. A strategy profiled in detail during the negotiations

in the last European summit (December 15-17, 2005). According to Blair, if little

money remains in Brussels and agreeing on its equal distribution is impossible, the

individual governments may as well manage their own respective regional policies.

Also this avoids the paradox by which the majority of funds remains in the hands of

the old Fifteen, which have more territory, more citizens and greater capacity to

co-finance with national resources. To push the new contributors to help the new Ten,

London would have held back its money. Only Frances opposition, which maintains a

tight fist on its Common Agricultural Policy, has for now blocked the British project.

Germany intervened ably in the quarrel, earmarking 100 million euros to Poland to

smooth over the conflict. And to clear mark Berlin and not London as the grand

protector of Middle Europe.

In the well-off parts of Europe, some regions rebel against the costs ofenlargement and are demanding the funds from the state that they no longer receive on

account of Brussels. In Germany, the conflict between state and regions splits the

country in two. On one side, the easterners expect to claim 4 billion euros from Berlin,

which Brussels has taken from them for the 2007-2013 budged. But the rich western

Germans dont want to deal with it. Instead, they rally around the minister-president of

Lower Saxonym Christian Wulff, who would like to extend the national solidarity fund

to all territories in need, whether East or West. Bavaria, the state-within-a-state plays

the part of magnanimous mediator.

4. The return of history and national-regional egoisms is an alarm signal for Italy.

The erosion of state sovereignty is not equal for all. It strikes weaker states foremost,

Italy in particular.

We were taught for half a century to believe in the necessary coming of a united

Europe that would sublimate our nation-states deficit of legitimacy and efficiency. We

deceived ourselves that for our partners, Italy was a naturally European country. And

that the status of founding country automatically accorded us special rights. It is no

longer thus. At least since the European Union embarked on the course of expansion

toward the Northeast, attracted by the void left by a Russia in retreat. For the large part

of new members we are more an anomaly than a resource. And perhaps we were forthe founders as well. But they could not allow that to slip out in times of Cold War and


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stringent Euro-Atlantic solidarity.

Today Italy is a country without allies. We are not involved in any of the growing

macroregional conglomerations. Also because historically we have never been a part

of them. It is instructive in this regard to study the maps of the proto-federalist

Europeans. Like the New Europe of Bernard Norman (1943), where the continentalmosaic is entirely composed of federal units, with the unique exception of Italy.

Almost as if it were (is) impossible to connect the peninsula to any European subset.

Worse: if it doesnt help to connect ourselves to the heart of the continent, historynonetheless continues to dig inside our country. It is perhaps excessive to worry over

some independentist flare-up in certain regions that tend to consider themselves

nations within a (non)nation. Sicily, Sardinia, Veneto. Certainly the Padania project

(making northern Italy an autonomous country) is a pipedream. If anything, it provides

ammunition to the claims of linguistic minorities, which most Italians dont even

realize exist, but are officially protected by the Republic (law 482, December 15, 1999,

relating to the Albanian, Catalan, German, Greek, Slovak and Croat populations, and

those speaking French, Franco-Provencal, Friuliano, Ladin, Occitan and Sardinian).

The fact is that some of these dont consider themselves linguistic minorities, but

national ones; citizens of the Italian state, but also part of other nations. In todays

self-service Europe, where everyone feels free to value his own historical rights, we

would do well not to lose sight of them.

5. This continent, heavy with small and large sub-Europes but without Europe, is an

unknown quantity. The decomposition of the community fabric and the disaffection of

Europeansonly half of which consider membership in the EU a good thing, thisbeing the ultimate Eurobarometerhas surpassed even the intentions of the British

and Americans. The great sponsors of enlargement and thus of dilution may be pleased

to have defused the risk of a power-Europe. But an area so fragmented and unstable

could in the end create more problems than it solves. A common whole that is hardly

useful to we Italians, and to whoever is aware without some form of European

subjectivity, the economic and geopolitical decline of the continent is inevitable. And it

may produce explosive combinations, especially in more fragile and disoriented

societies.

Hence we watch what remains of the larger construct from our own point of view,

not from on high in some improbable European heaven. Let us seek to induce a

possible Europe, close to our interests; not to deduce an impossible one like that

imagined by the first Europeanists and the last functionalists.

We could then enumerate a twofold objective.

On the continental scale, it is necessary to reduce geopolitical complexity: 45

states (including the European parts of Russia and Kazakhstan) in 10 million square

kilometerswithout counting the territories aspiring to statehood or

semi-independence, like Kosovo and Transnistriaover a hundred regions and

territorial entities with political and fiscal ambitions are not easily brought to a some

common denominator. Reducing complexity is in fact imperative. Not to weld togetherincompatible entities, but so that intra-communitary borders become bridges, not


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barriers. There is nothing scandalous, then, in the recovering of old ties between the

ex-Hapsburg countries or between the Baltic ones, provided that they are not hostile to

their neighbors. From some of these processes of sub-European integration, real

institutional structures could mature, which do not exclude participation in the looser

space of the European Union, but rather contribute to rationalizing it.On the scale of the areas closest to our peninsula, from central Western Europe to

the Balkans to the Mediterraneanthere is only one urgency: to reconnect ourselves.

Leaving (self)isolation behind, following old and new paths of exchange, openingourselves to the people and cultures that surround us, and of which we have often lost

awareness. We can not disregard the Mediterranean area that our Nordic partners

ignore, or cut it off with an improbable barrier against migratory pressures from the

south. The tragic crisis stirred up by the Danish cartoons of Mohammedwhich

confirms how different the perceptions of the Islamic galaxy are in Europebring

home to us the implicit demands of our history and geography. Italy has a

Mediterranean responsibility, even towards the rest of the continent.

Nor can we delude ourselves over being in Europe and reduce ourselves to a

secondary track of east-west traffic, which is rapidly supplanting us beyond the Alps.

Instead of oscillating between impotent patriotic indignation and eager

subordination to the northern European nucleus, let us see if and how to connect to it,

bending it at last in part to our interests. We might then discover we matter much more

than we thought. And we would contribute to reversing the drift of the Old Continent,

which some im

heartland - 2006 01 the atomic rush

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