HEADNOTE: Rashida C. Dashiell v. State of Maryland,No. 1182, September Term, 2001

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CRIMINAL LAW – SEARCH AND SEIZURE –

When executing a search warrant, police officers may notautomatically pat down every person located on the premisesnamed in the warrant. The constitutionality of a pat-downdepends on the particular facts of each case. In this case,the pat-down was justified when the police executed a noknock warrant at an apartment. The warrant authorizedsearch of two apartments and a named individual. When thewarrant was executed at one of the apartments, appellant,one other adult, and two children were present. The warrantwas issued based on information, including that theapartment was used as a “stash house,” controlled dangeroussubstances were sold from the apartment, the individualnamed in the warrant carried a gun, and several other gunswere located in the apartment.

REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 1182

September Term, 2001

RASHIDA C. DASHIELL

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Eyler, James R.,Greene,Rodowsky, Lawrence F. (Ret., specially assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Eyler, James R., J.

Filed: March 5, 2002

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The Circuit Court for Wicomico County convicted Rashid C.

Dashiell, appellant, of two counts of possession of cocaine with

intent to distribute, possession of cocaine, and possession of

marijuana. The court denied appellant’s motion to suppress the

drugs discovered on her person during the execution of a search

warrant. Appellant contends the court erred because the police

violated her Fourth Amendment right by conducting a frisk or pat-

down absent articulable suspicion that she was armed and

dangerous.

Background

The Wicomico County Narcotics Task Force conducted a four-

month narcotics investigation of Brewington Holton Bivens. On

January 11, 2001, the police submitted an application for a

search and seizure warrant. The application alleged that Bivens

was concealing controlled dangerous substances (CDS) at 907 Booth

Street, Apartment #1 (Booth Street), and 1113 Parsons Road,

Apartment #A (Parsons Road), in Wicomico County. Based on a

finding that probable cause existed, the court issued a no-knock

warrant to search Booth Street, Parsons Road and Bivens, and

seize any CDS.

On January 25, 2001, at approximately 9:00 p.m., the police

executed the Booth Street search warrant. Appellant, her two

children, and Angela Bower were the only persons present.

Appellant was located in the living room. The police entry team,

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in the following sequence, rammed the front door to gain

entrance, handcuffed appellant and Ms. Bower, secured the

apartment, and conducted “pat-downs” for weapons. Once the

apartment was secure, members of the police task force entered to

conduct the search for CDS.

During the pat-down of appellant, an officer felt a plastic

bag believed to contain cocaine, but did not remove it. Having

been told about the plastic bag, Corporal Michael Kravitz, a

member of the task force but not the entry team, approached

appellant and stated “one of the State’s team members stated that

you had something on you.” Appellant responded, “yes, the dope.”

Corporal Kravitz could also see the plastic bag hanging out of

appellant’s front pocket. Corporal Kravitz then removed the bag

which contained cocaine. Appellant was placed under arrest. A

subsequent search of appellant revealed another plastic bag

containing crack cocaine and marijuana.

The search of the apartment uncovered one bag of marijuana

found underneath a sofa cushion in the living room. Appellant

was transferred to the police station. During processing,

appellant disclosed that Booth Street was her residence.

Appellant was charged with possession with intent to distribute

the CDS found on her person and inside the apartment.

Appellant filed a motion to suppress the CDS discovered on

her person, alleging that the pat-down was illegal. At the

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hearing on the motion to suppress, Corporal Kravitz testified

that based on police policy, when executing a search warrant, all

persons are secured and patted-down for weapons. The court

denied appellant’s motion, finding:

I don’t think those terms [“pat-down” and“search”] can be used interchangeably.

I agree [the police] can’t go in there andsearch and had they not just patted[appellant] down for weapons, if they hadsearched [appellant], if they had pulled thatout of [appellant’s] pocket, that would havebeen wrong.

The Court believes that when the officerspursuant to a search warrant enter thepremises, they do have the right to securethe people while they search the premises,and where they are entering pursuant to asearch warrant on probable cause that drugsare being – that there is drug traffickingoccurring within the premises to permit themto secure these individuals while the searchpursuant to a warrant was being conductedwithout giving them the [concurrent] right topat down for weapons would be pure folly.

If you can secure them, certainly think youcan determine that they do have no weapons toinjure those persons in the premises, so I amgoing to rule that the officers did have theright to pat down. Once they patted down,another officer determined that or talked toher and she said it was the dope in herpocket and they could see the plastic bagsticking out of her pocket, I believe at thatpoint they had probable cause to seize thatproperty.

Discussion

When a motion to suppress has been denied, an appellate

court shall consider the facts in the light most favorable to the

1“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches andseizures, shall not be violated. . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV.

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State, the prevailing party. See Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554,

569 (2001); Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282 (2000); Simpler

v. State, 318 Md. 311, 312 (1990). Our review is limited to the

facts presented at the time of the suppression hearing. See

Wengert v. State, 364 Md. 76, 80 (2001); Buie v. State, 320 Md.

696, 699 (1990); Trusty v. State, 308 Md. 658, 670 (1987).

Because appellant has alleged a violation of her Fourth Amendment

right, we must make our own independent constitutional appraisal

by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts. See Jones v.

State, 343 Md. 448, 457 (1996); Aguilar v. State, 88 Md. App.

276, 282 (1991).

The protections of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable

searches and seizures are applicable to the States through the

Fourteenth Amendment.1 The exclusionary rule provides that

evidence discovered in contravention of the Fourth Amendment is

inadmissible. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court held

that, under certain circumstances, police officers can conduct a

stop and frisk of a criminal suspect. A suspect may be stopped

or detained when there are specific facts producing rational

inferences that criminal activity may be afoot. Terry, 392 U.S.

at 30. Similarly, if articulable facts support a reasonable

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suspicion that the suspect poses a danger, the officer may

conduct a limited frisk or pat-down. Id. at 27. The measure of

reasonableness for a stop and frisk is often defined as

“suspicion,” “reasonable suspicion,” or “reason to believe,”

Payne v. State, 65 Md. App. 566, 569 (1985), and is less

demanding than probable cause. See United States v. Sokolow, 490

U.S. 1, 7 (1989). At a minimum, reasonable suspicion must be

based on more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or

hunch. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; Anderson v. State, 282 Md.

701, 702 (1978). The fundamental test for determining

reasonableness is the balancing of the need for governmental

intrusion against the nature and quality of the personal

invasion. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; In re David S., No. 2, 2002

Md. LEXIS 9, at *10-11 (Md. Jan. 22, 2002).

A stop is a separate intrusion from a frisk. See Payne v.

State, 65 Md. App. 566, 569-70 (1985). “Although a reasonable

‘stop’ is a necessary predecessor to a reasonable ‘frisk,’ a

reasonable ‘frisk’ does not inevitably follow in the wake of

every reasonable ‘stop.’” Gibbs v. State, 18 Md. App. 230, 238-

39 (1973). A frisk requires independent justification, see

Alfred v. State, 61 Md. App. 647, 664 (1985), yet sometimes the

same underlying facts that justify a stop may also justify a

frisk. See Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430 (1990) (reasonable

suspicion of handgun violation); Simpler v. State, 318 Md. 311,

2Appellant raises no objection to the use of force, thescope of the frisk, or the subsequent search other than asaffected by the frisk.

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318-19 (1990) (citing 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, §

9.4(a), at 505-06 (1987)) (reasonable suspicion of a violent

crime).

Even when a frisk is justified, it may be invalid because

the police unreasonably exceeded the permissible scope of a

frisk.2 See Aguilar v. State, 88 Md. App. 276 (1991). In Terry,

the frisk was limited to a pat-down of the suspect’s outer

clothing. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. In subsequent cases, the

permissible scope of a frisk was broadened under certain

circumstances. See In re David S., No. 2, 2002 Md. LEXIS 9, at

*12-13 (Md. Jan. 22, 2002). The scope of a frisk may not exceed

the bounds of what is minimally necessary to ensure safety, see

State v. Smith, 345 Md. 460, 465-66 (1997), and is designed

exclusively for detecting offensive weapons. See Alfred v.

State, 61 Md. App. 647, 669 (1985).

It is well settled that a person’s mere proximity to a

criminal suspect does not automatically give rise to articulable

suspicion or probable cause necessary to conduct a frisk or more

extensive search of that person. See Sibron v. New York, 392

U.S. 40, 62-63 (1968); In re Appeal No. 113, 23 Md. App. 255,

3A suspect’s proximity to a high crime neighborhood or crimescene does not support a finding of probable cause. See Lawsonv. State, 120 Md. App. 610, 619-20 (1998); Baziz v. State, 93Md. App. 285, 297 (1992) (citing United States v. Everroad, 704F.2d 403, 407 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S.at 593; State v. Brazil, 269 N.W.2d 15 (Minn. 1978)).

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260-61 (1974).3 The Supreme Court applied this rationale in

Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (“[A] person’s mere

propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal

activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to

search that person.”). The Court held that the police could not

automatically frisk all patrons of the Aurora Tap Room absent

articulable suspicion that the persons were armed or dangerous

when executing a search warrant based on probable cause that

drugs were being sold there. Id. at 93-94.

Two years after Ybarra, the Supreme Court held that when

executing a search warrant, the police have the authority to

detain occupants of the premises. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.

692 (1981). The factors justifying detention include the nature

of the “articulable facts” and the interest in minimizing the

risk of harm to police. Summers, 452 U.S. at 702. Although the

Summers Court did not address police frisks, the execution of a

search warrant was of prime importance in assessing the

reasonableness of the police intrusion. Id. at 701. The Court

recognized that “detention represents only an incremental

intrusion on personal liberty when the search of a home has been

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authorized by a valid warrant.” Id. at 703. The existence of a

search warrant justified detention because of the nexus between

the residence where criminal activity was suspected and the

occupants found therein, id. at 703-04, and diminished the

likelihood that police would contravene the Fourth Amendment and

use detention to gather information. Id. at 701-02.

Ensuring the safety of police officers who confront criminal

suspects is an important state interest. See, e.g., Maryland v.

Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032

(1983); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); Adams v.

Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). Chief Justice Warren discussed

officer safety during a stop and frisk as follows:

[T]here is the more immediate interest of thepolice officer in taking steps to assurehimself that the person with whom he isdealing is not armed with a weapon that couldunexpectedly and fatally be used against him. Certainly it would be unreasonable to requirethat police officers take unnecessary risksin the performance of their duties. Americancriminals have a long tradition of armedviolence, and every year in this country manylaw enforcement officers are killed in theline of duty, and thousands more are wounded. Virtually all of these deaths and asubstantial portion of the injuries areinflicted with guns and knives.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 23 (emphasis added). The goal of conducting a

frisk is to protect the police and bystanders from harm. See

State v. Smith, 345 Md. 460, 465 (1997). “The officer need not

be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is

4Our analysis is not affected by the fact that the policeofficer who conducted the pat-down of appellant did not testifyat the suppression hearing, because we apply an objective, not asubjective, test. The Court of Appeals expressly adopted anobjective standard for measuring the reasonableness of danger tojustify a pat-down. See Buie v. State, 320 Md. 696, 703 (1990). The Buie Court, quoting the Supreme Court, stated “‘that the factthat the officer does not have the state of mind which is[hypothesized] by the reasons which provide legal justificationfor the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken aslong as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify thataction.’” Buie, 320 Md. at 702 (quoting Scott v. United States,436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).

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whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be

warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in

danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added).

The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.

See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991). The actual

motivations or subjective beliefs of police officers do not

determine reasonableness. See Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272,

289 (2000). Rather, an objective standard is applied. See Ohio

v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).4 To decide whether a

reasonably prudent person in the officer’s position would be

warranted in believing his or her safety or that of others were

in danger, we examine the totality of the circumstances, see

Derricott v. State, 327 Md. 582, 588 (1992), including the modes

or patterns of operations of certain kinds of lawbreakers,

information in police reports, see Stokes v. State, 362 Md. 407,

416 (2001)(citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418

(1981)), any rational inferences that police officers are

5“The concept of reasonable suspicion, like probable cause,is not ‘readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legalrules.’” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (quotingIllinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)). Reasonablesuspicion “is a common sense, nontechnical conception thatconsiders factual and practical aspects of daily life and howreasonable and prudent people act.” Cartnail, 359 Md. at 287.See also id. at 289 (adopting Professor LaFave’s six factor testfor considering if reasonable suspicion exists); New Jersey v.T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 346 (1985) (“[T]he requirement ofreasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute certainty:‘sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone ofreasonableness. . . .’”) (quoting Hill v. California, 401 U.S.797, 804 (1971)).

6The Court of Appeals declined to define the scope of term“occupants” as used by the Supreme Court in Summers. Stanford v.State, 353 Md. 527, 538-39 (1999). Similarly, we need not decidethe issue because appellant satisfies all three definitionsdiscussed in Stanford. Appellant was a “resident” of the BoothStreet apartment.

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entitled to draw based on their training and experience, see

Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, and any other facts or evidence contained

in the record at the time of the suppression hearing. See Brooks

v. State, 320 Md. 516 (1990). We recognize that there is no

litmus test to define the “reasonable suspicion” standard. See

Stokes, 362 Md. at 415.5

Appellant does not contest the right of the police to detain

her while executing the Booth Street search warrant. See

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981); Hippler v. State, 83

Md. App. 325 (1990).6 Appellant contends, however, that the

police cannot justify a policy of conducting an automatic pat-

down of every person on the premises that is named in the search

warrant when executing the warrant. We agree. See Ybarra, 444

7The use of per se or bright line rules is generallydisfavored in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Ohio v.Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).

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U.S. at 93-94.7 The constitutionality of a pat-down depends on

the particular facts of each case. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30;

State v. Smith, 345 Md. 460, 468 (1997); State v. Wilson, 279 Md.

189, 201 (1977). The facts must be viewed collectively and may

be sufficient to meet the reasonable suspicion standard even

though a particular fact, standing alone, may appear “innocent”

and deserving of “little weight.” United States v. Arvizu, 122

S.Ct. 744, 750-51 (2002) (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s finding

that seven factors considered individually carried little or no

weight and remaining factors were insufficient to justify Terry

stop because a “divide-and-conquer” analysis of reasonable

suspicion was improper).

Looking objectively at the facts known to the police in the

case before us, we hold that a reasonably prudent officer would

be warranted in believing that his or her safety or that of

others was in danger when executing a “no-knock” search warrant

at Booth Street. No challenge has been made to the validity of

the search warrant. The application for the warrant contained

detailed facts supporting the position that CDS was being sold

and distributed from Booth Street. The facts were established

through information supplied by a confidential informant and

concerned citizens, complaints received by police, and two weeks

8Based on experience and training, affiants were aware thatdrug dealers use several residences when dealing CDS to avoidplacing too much suspicion on one location. Bivens had givenpolice the Parsons Road address as his residence in the past.

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of police surveillance conducted on Booth Street.

We accept the issuing court’s finding that probable cause

existed to search for CDS. See e.g. West v. State, 137 Md. App.

314, 325-26 (2001) (great deference is paid to probable cause

determination). The facts included in the application for the

search warrant are deemed credible, reliable, and trustworthy.

See Thompson v. State, 139 Md. App. 501, 532-33 (2001) (citing

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1978) (affidavits in

support of warrant application are presumptively valid)).

The police suspected that Bivens resided at Parsons Road and

operated a “stash-house” for CDS at the Booth Street apartment.8

The Booth Street neighborhood was recognized by police as a high-

traffic drug area or an open-air drug market. Concerned citizens

complained to police about the significant volume of foot and

vehicle traffic in and around the apartment during both daytime

and nighttime hours. The citizens reported that visitors either

went inside the apartment or were sometimes met outside at their

vehicles. Bivens, who was believed to deal drugs in the

community, was identified as the person making contact with the

occupants of the vehicles.

During police surveillance, officers observed Bivens,

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vehicle traffic, and foot traffic coming to and going from the

Booth Street apartment. On occasion, Bivens was seen exiting the

apartment to approach vehicles parked outside and making brief

contact with the occupants before the vehicles departed. The

police noted that any visitors remained in or around Booth Street

for only a short period of time. Based on police training and

experience, the sequence and timing of events reported and

observed was consistent with a drug house operation.

The information supplied to police by a few concerned

citizens confirmed the suspicion that Booth Street was a stash

house. The citizens had personal knowledge that CDS was located

and sold there. Of great importance, one person reported that

Bivens carried a handgun and that “several” other guns were

located inside the apartment. The police knew that Bivens had

been charged in the past with drug related and violent offenses

and had unsuccessfully attempted to elude police during a routine

traffic stop. Taken together, the information convinced the

issuing court that there was probable cause to believe that

illegal drugs were located inside and being distributed from

Booth Street.

As held in Ybarra and relied upon by appellant, the mere

presence of a suspect at a location being searched pursuant to a

warrant does not automatically justify a pat-down. Ybarra,

however, does not control the facts before us. The Aurora Tap

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Room was a public tavern; appellant was inside a private

apartment. The distinction is highly relevant. See, e.g.,

People v. Thurman, 257 Cal. Rptr. 517 (Cal. App. 1989); State v.

Gobley, 366 N.W.2d 600 (Minn. 1985); In re Andre W., 590 N.W.2d

827 (Neb. 1999); State v. Guy, 492 N.W.2d 311 (Wis. 1992).

There is a greater nexus between persons inside a private

residence than bystanders visiting a locale open to the general

public. Our analysis in Sutton v. State, 128 Md. App. 308

(1999), is instructive. We recognized that “courts are more

likely to uphold warrants authorizing the search of premises and

all persons present when the place to be searched is a private

residence and when police have probable cause to believe drug

dealing activity is taking place therein.” Sutton, 128 Md. App.

at 322 (emphasis in original). A search of “all persons” in a

private residence is less likely to entrap the innocent than a

search of a public place. See id. at 323. When probable cause

exists that drugs are being used or sold at a private residence,

it is likely that everyone present is aware of the criminal

offense. See id. (citing People v. Easterbrook, 43 A.D.2d 719

(N.Y. 1973)). See also United States v. Reid, 997 F.2d 1576

(D.C. Cir. 1993); State v. Zearley, 444 N.W.2d 353 (N.D. 1989).

The application for the Booth Street warrant explicitly mentioned

the heavy amounts of foot and vehicle traffic, implying that the

nature of the visitors’ contact was drug related. C.f. Ybarra,

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444 U.S. at 87-88 (warrant application silent as to nexus between

patrons of Aurora Tap Room and drugs).

The purpose of a frisk or pat-down is to allow officers to

pursue investigations without fear of violence. See Adams v.

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). An investigation pursuant to

a search warrant differs from Terry street encounters. See

generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 4.9(d), at

636-38 (1996). During a search, the police have a duty to

execute a warrant and are focused primarily on the subject of the

warrant, i.e. the premises or specific subject named in the

warrant. The length of time for the search is more than a

momentary encounter; it varies based on the nature of the warrant

and size of the property. By contrast, when police investigate

suspicious conduct on the street, all attention is on the suspect

and the stop or detention must cease when police either confirm

or deny their suspicions. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S.

675 (1985); Graham v. State, 119 Md. App 444, 467 (1998).

Different environments increase the likelihood of danger to

police, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (custody);

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (road-side stop),

including the dangers associated with a private residence. See

Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (in-home arrest). Persons

inside a private residence are usually comfortable and familiar

with their surroundings. See Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333 (1990)

9There is no per se exception to the knock and announce rulefor executing a warrant to search for drugs; rather, a reviewingcourt must examine the particular circumstances. See Lee v.State, 139 Md. App. 79 (2001). Appellant raises no objection tothe issuance of a “no-knock” warrant.

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(“[U]nlike an encounter on the street or along a highway, an in-

home arrest puts the officer at the disadvantage of being on his

adversary’s ‘turf.’ An ambush in a confined setting of unknown

configuration is more to be feared than it is in open, more

familiar surroundings.”); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure,

§ 4.9(d), at 637 (1996) (suspect in residence has greater

opportunity to reach for hidden weapon). Consequently, these

persons are more apt to react to any police intrusions. The

uncertain presence of additional persons during the search

increases the already present danger to police. From the

evidence of constant traffic at Booth Street, it can be inferred

that at any time, including January 9th around 9:00 p.m., it was

possible that several people could be inside the apartment.

Additionally, the nature of the criminal activity suspected

at Booth Street resulted in the issuance of a “no-knock” search

warrant.9 A “no-knock” warrant is utilized where exigent

circumstances justify not knocking and announcing. See Lee v.

State, 139 Md. App. 79 (2001). Exigent circumstances include a

reasonable suspicion that it would be dangerous for police to

knock and announce their presence. See id. at 89 (citing

Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997)); Wynn v. State,

10Affiants also sought the “no-knock” provision to preventevidence from being destroyed.

11Of course, just because a criminal suspect satisfies thedrug-courier profile, this, without more, does not give policereasonable suspicion required for a stop and frisk. SeeDerricott v. State, 327 Md. 582 (1992). Similarly, meresuspicion that a person is involved with illegal drugs, combinedwith knowledge that drug dealers frequently carry concealedweapons, without more, does not justify a search. See Aguilar v.State, 88 Md. App. 276, 287 (1991).

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117 Md. App. 133, 168 (1997) (officer’s safety justified “no-

knock” warrant). The knock and announce procedure was not

required for Booth Street, in part, because of impending

dangers.10

The degree of danger present at Booth Street was compounded

by the nature of drug trafficking. See, e.g., State v. Trine,

673 A.2d 1098 (Conn. 1996).11 Persons associated with the drug

business are prone to carrying weapons. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at

106 (Rehnquist J., dissenting) (“[F]irearms are as much ‘tools of

the trade’ as are most commonly recognized articles of narcotic

paraphernalia”) (quoting United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 62

(CA2 1977)); Whiting v. State, 125 Md. App. 404, 417 (1999)

(nexus between drugs and guns); Banks v. State, 84 Md. App. 582,

591 (1990) (“[O]ne who is involved in distribution of narcotics,

it is thought, a factiori, would be more prone to possess, and/or

use, firearms, or other weapons, than a person not so

involved.”). The connection of guns and drugs exposes officers

to greater risks when confronting suspects who deal drugs. See

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Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 (even where “no special danger to the

police [was] suggested by the evidence in this record, the

execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of

transaction that may give rise to sudden violence . . . . The

risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if

the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the

situation.”); People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 112 (N.Y. 1975)

(“Because of their illegal occupation, however, drug traffickers

do often commit crimes of violence against law enforcement

officers”). In the application for the search warrant, affiants

stated they were keenly aware through their training and

experience “that individuals in the distribution of controlled

dangerous substances . . . carry all types of weapons which puts

the officers in danger during the execution of search and seizure

warrants.”

The Terry Court warned against unnecessary police officer

risks. Terry, 392 U.S. at 23. In the case before us, for the

police to enter and search Booth Street without conducting a pat-

down of the persons inside would be contrary to the Court’s

advice. The balance of reasonableness weighs in favor of

permitting the pat-down of appellant. The pat-down was a minimal

intrusion on appellant’s privacy. A prudent person, under the

facts set forth herein, would reasonably believe that persons

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located inside Booth Street posed a danger sufficient to justify

a limited pat-down.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; COSTSTO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.