growth strategies and industrial policy motivation asian experience possible lessons for turkey...
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Growth Strategies and Industrial Policy Motivation Asian experience Possible lessons
for Turkey Derived from
research with Howard Pack
Why the resurgent interest in industrial policy (IP)? Disenchantment with
globalization/Washington consensus Notion that Japan/Korea/Taiwan
“beat the West at its own game”
Requirements for Successful IP Identify market failure Design correct policy intervention Implement
Calibrate intervention, Alter as changing circumstances require, Terminate as need be.
Note: IP justifications are most often due to internal market failure; some are international rent-shifting models, and in these cases one must consider possibility of retaliation
Four questions regarding the Asian experience: What was the impact of industrial
policy? Are these results likely to be
reproduced elsewhere today? Does the international system
impede implementation? Is the pursuit of an industrial policy
advisable?
Major Policies Actually Applied Capital channeling: direct and
indirect subsidies, tax breaks R&D promotion International trade and investment
protection Lax competition policy
Evaluation of impact Regression results (Beason-Weinstein
and Noland for Japan, Lee and Noland for Korea)
Input-output results (Pack)
Case studies
Political economy and ineffectiveness Benefits went predominantly to
declining natural resource sectors Net fiscal flows to manufacturing
were negative
On-budget subsidies went to declining sectors…
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Yea
r
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
year
sect
or
per
cen
t o
f to
tal
Sea Transport
Coal Mining
Small Business,Textiles, ectHigh Tech
Agriculture, Forestry andFisheriesSea Transport
Coal Mining
Small Business,Textiles, ectHigh Tech
Agriculture, Forestry andFisheries
Source: Ogura and Yoshino, 1988, Table 1
As did off budget subsidies…
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1955
1957
1959
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
Year
% o
f to
tal F
LIP
fu
nd
s Health, Education Welfare
Infrastructure
Small Business
Agriculture
Regional Development
Industry and Technology
Export and ODA
Postal Saving Own Inv
Source: Fiscal and Monetary Statistics Monthly
(FILP Volume), Ministry of Finance
Net subsidy to manufacturing was negative Tax incentives to
most manufacturing sectors were negative
Industrial policy amounted to partial compensation
IndustryNormalized Tax Rate
Industry Rank
Normalized Tax Rate
Industry Rank
Normalized Tax Rate
Industry Rank
Electrical Mach. -0.403 8 -0.26 8 -0.56 10General Mach. -0.403 8 -0.26 8 -0.56 10Trans. Equip. -0.403 8 -0.13 7 -0.56 10
Fabricated Metal
-0.069 7 -0.26 8 -0.35 8
Pet & Coal -0.009 3 0.3 3 0.14 3Precision Inst. -0.403 8 -0.26 8 -0.35 7
Cer/Stone/Glass -0.009 3 0.3 3 -0.56 10Pulp & Paper -0.891 13 -0.13 6 0 5
Chemicals -0.009 3 -1.72 13 0.04 4Basic Metals -0.069 6 0.3 3 -0.35 8
Processed Foods
-0.736 12 -1.52 12 0 5
Mining 6.658 1 0.92 2 1.04 1Textiles 0.719 2 11.68 1 0.5 2
Source : Beason and Weinstein (1996), Table 1.
1955-1990 1955-1973 1974-1990
A saving grace: targeting exports Clean standard not subject to
manipulation “these were the only statistics that
could not be faked” Local firms could not rig international
competition like they could domestic markets
Possible externalities Support to laggards terminated
Possible lessons for Turkey Modest positive impact at best If industrial policy pursued, are
these results likely to be reproduced in Turkey?
Does the international system impede implementation of Asian-style policies today?
Are the results likely to be reproduced? Three possible sources of “Asian
exceptionalism”: “Deceptively poor” Political upheaval, US-led land reforms,
and legitimacy through growth Land scarcity and “growth with equity”
v. “growth without development”
“Deceptively poor” Unusually high
levels of human capital
Low contemporaneous income due to lack of physical capital
Rapid convergence
Country YearHuman
Capital Index
Per Capita Income
Ratio of Human Capital Index to
Per Capita Income
Japan 1955 1673 519 3.2Korea 1955 494 217 2.3The Philippines 1956 738 277 2.7Israel 1954 1200 609 2Thailand 1955 302 181 1.7Greece 1956 693 468 1.5Malaysia 1957 334 351 1US 1955 2293 2443 0.9Italy 1956 787 971 0.8Turkey 1955 267 365 0.7Argentina 1955 760 1059 0.7Mexico 1955 352 637 0.6Spain 1955 389 652 0.6
Unusually egalitarian Unusually equal
distribution of income
US-led land reforms and relatively equal distribution of land
Legitimacy through prosperity
Gini Coefficient for Income
Gini Coefficient for Land
Japan 0.4 0.47Korea 0.34 0.39Taiwan 0.31 0.46Simple Average 0.35 0.44
Argentina 0.44 0.87Brazil 0.53 0.85Egypt 0.42 0.67Hong Kong 0.49 n.a.India 0.42 0.52Indonesia 0.33 n.a.Kenya 0.64 0.69Malaysia 0.42 0.47Mexico 0.53 0.69The Philippines 0.45 0.53Singapore 0.4 n.a.Thailand 0.41 0.46Turkey 0.56 0.68Simple Average 0.46 0.64
Source: adapted from Rodrik (1994)
Unusual endowments—the implications of land scarcity
Chi
ItaUK Isr
Grc
Spa
Mex
Ger
Fra
FinDen
CanBra
Aus
Arg
Tot
US
JapHK SngTai
Kor
Tun
Pak
IndPhl
SwdMal
Tha
Per
Nor
Tur
2
2
1
0.25
0.25
0.25
1
2
4
4
4
Physical K
Land
Labor 1
Replacing Physical Capital with Human Capital (1968 data)
Tur
Nor
Per
ThaMal
Swd
Phl
Ind
PakTun
KorTai
SngHK
Jap
US
Tot
Arg
Aus
Bra
Can
Den
Fin
Fra
Ger
MexSpa
Grc
Isr
UK
Ita
Chi
4
4
4
2
1
0.25
0.25
0.25
1
2
2
HK
LaborLand 1
Is it possible to reproduce? Are there new constraints imposed
by the WTO? New rules and disciplines—the
subsidies code The end of the Cold War and the
dispute settlement mechanism Ideological opposition by the IFIs
Weighting costs and benefits Modest benefits Possible
drawbacks: Encouragement of
corruption Dumbing down the
financial system
Corruption Rankings - Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Turkey
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentile
Japan
Korea
Taiwan
Turkey
Japan
Korea
Taiwan
Turkey
Japan
Korea
Taiwan
Turkey
Note: A larger value indicates less corruption.
Transparency International
PriceWaterhouseCoopers
World Bank
Governance Rankings - Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Turkey
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentile
Japan
Korea
Taiwan
Turkey
Japan
Korea
Taiwan
Turkey
Japan
Korea
Taiwan
Turkey
Note: A larger value indicates more effective government, less time spent with bureaucracy, and more competent public officials.
Government effectiveness(World Bank)
Time spent with government bureaucracy
(Global Competitiveness
Report)
Competence of public officials(Global
Competitiveness Report)
Estimated Net Cost of Financial Sector Clean-Up Korea: 16 percent of GDP Taiwan: 11 percent of GDP Japan: 10-15 percent of GDP?