governmental power sharing: imperative?
TRANSCRIPT
Governmental power sharing: imperative? A comparative case study on decentralization and its influence on public support for secessionism
Andrés Durante
Master’s Thesis
Uppsala University, 2020
Department of Government
Supervisor: Moa Mårtensson
Abstract
Scholarly debates about the merits of decentralization have long been central in comparative
politics. However, there is a lack of consensus in the existing literature on its relationship with
secessionism, and previous scholarship on autonomy and power sharing suffers from several
shortcomings that make it difficult to evaluate the influence of decentralization on secessionist
conflict. To address this research gap, a new theoretical framework is proposed which suggests
inclusion for regional elites within the state’s national decision-making institutions is
imperative for the prevention against secessionism in established democracies. Utilizing an
innovative comparative process tracing method, a theory-driven within-case empirical analysis
and between-case comparison is conducted between Spain and Catalonia, and the United
Kingdom and Scotland. The findings illustrate that decentralization with a higher degree of
governmental power sharing (shared rule) is associated with a lower degree of public support
for secessionism, and this association is produced through a social mechanism of power.
Keywords: decentralization, power sharing, secessionism, Spain, Catalonia, UK, Scotland
Table of contents
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES .........................................................................................................
1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1
2 THEORY ..................................................................................................................................... 3 2.1 Literature review............................................................................................................................ 4 2.2 Theoretical framework .................................................................................................................. 7
3 METHOD ................................................................................................................................. 10 3.1 Operationalization of dependent and independent variables .................................................... 10
3.1.1 Dependent variable: public support for secessionism .......................................................... 10 3.1.2 Independent variable: decentralization................................................................................ 11
3.2 Case selection .............................................................................................................................. 13 3.3 Control variables .......................................................................................................................... 17 3.4 Comparative Process Tracing (CPT): a two-step methodological approach ............................... 19
3.4.1 Within-case step.................................................................................................................. 20 3.4.2 Between-case step .............................................................................................................. 23
3.5 Empirical material and data ......................................................................................................... 25 3.6 Validity and reliability .................................................................................................................. 25
4 WITHIN-CASE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS.......................................................................................... 26 4.1 Spain and Catalonia ..................................................................................................................... 26
4.1.1 Overview of decentralization and public support for secessionism ..................................... 26 4.1.2 Implementation phase (a); 1978-1980 ................................................................................. 28 4.1.3 Interpretation ....................................................................................................................... 29 4.1.4 Bargaining phase (b); 1980-2010 ......................................................................................... 30 4.1.5 Interpretation ....................................................................................................................... 33 4.1.6 Mobilization phase (c); 2010-present ................................................................................... 34 4.1.7 Interpretation ....................................................................................................................... 37
4.2 United Kingdom and Scotland ..................................................................................................... 37 4.2.1 Overview of decentralization and public support for secessionism ..................................... 37 4.2.2 Implementation phase (a); 1997-1999 ................................................................................. 39 4.2.3 Interpretation ....................................................................................................................... 41 4.2.4 Bargaining phase (b); 1999-2011 ......................................................................................... 42 4.2.5 Interpretation ....................................................................................................................... 45 4.2.6 Mobilization phase (c); 2011-present ................................................................................... 45 4.2.7 Interpretation ....................................................................................................................... 47
5 BETWEEN-CASE COMPARISON ................................................................................................. 48 5.1 Implementation phase (a) ........................................................................................................... 48 5.2 Bargaining phase (b) .................................................................................................................... 49 5.3 Mobilization phase (c).................................................................................................................. 49
6 RESULTS .................................................................................................................................. 51 6.1 Consistency with the hypothesis ................................................................................................. 51 6.2 Limitations ................................................................................................................................... 51 6.3 Alternative explanations .............................................................................................................. 51
7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 53
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................... 56
APPENDIX .................................................................................................................................. 67
List of figures and tables
FIGURE 1. Theoretical argument.............................................................................................................. 8
FIGURE 2. Theoretical framework............................................................................................................ 9
FIGURE 3. Reverse causation ................................................................................................................. 52
TABLE 1. Controlled comparison............................................................................................................ 14
TABLE 2. Theoretical social mechanisms in a decentralization process ................................................ 22
TABLE 3. Public opinion on Catalonia’s political status within Spain .................................................... 27
TABLE 4. Public opinion on how Scotland should be governed............................................................. 39
"Seré curioso / señor ministro / de qué se ríe / de qué se ríe /
(...) Aquí en la calle / suceden cosas / que ni siquiera / pueden decirse"
Mario Benedetti
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1 Introduction
Public support for secessionism is on the rise throughout the world. Eight movements pursued
an independent state in 1915, in comparison with 59 in 2015 (Fazal 2018). To make matters
worse, consolidated democracies are not immune to secessionist tendencies. The Scottish
independence referendum held in 2014, the current implications of Brexit on Scotland and the
UK’s national cohesion, the Catalan independence referenda held in 2014 and 2017, and the
eruptions of violence experienced in Spain after the sentencing of nine Catalan leaders in 2019
are all recent examples of manifestations provoked by underlying secessionist tensions in
modern decentralized states with regional minority populations. Scholarly debates about the
pros and cons of decentralization have long been central in comparative politics. However,
despite the ongoing secessionist growth, there is little consensus in the existing literature on the
relationship between autonomy concessions and secessionism (see Bakke 2015). Some argue
that decentralization can contain conflicts of self-deterministic character by meeting regional
minorities halfway through institutional channels, allowing the voicing of their demands.
Others suggest that decentralization fuels further conflict and promotes state disintegration.
Specific power sharing elements of decentralization originally formulated by Elazar (1987,
1991: 8) have been scrutinized in studies. His distinction of self-rule and shared rule – the
capacity of regional governments to autonomously exercise authority over those who live in its
territory, and the capacity to co-determine the exercise of authority for the country as a whole,
respectively – has provided researchers with conceptualizations that are useful to help
understand the intricacies of decentralized governance. However, analyses looking on regional
autonomy in conjunction with power sharing have rarely been made, and few scholars have
considered the effects of self-rule in combination with shared rule (Cederman et al. 2015: 356).
An important research gap is identified as several contrasting findings suggest that
decentralization “can have a complex and multifold effect” (Massetti and Schakel 2017: 433).
The following research question was developed to seek further evidence on this phenomenon:
“How, and through what mechanisms, does decentralization with a higher degree of
governmental power sharing (shared rule) influence public support for secessionism?”
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This question is of importance because it seeks to understand how decentralization reforms can
be an effective instrument to manage and contain the challenges that secessionism poses to the
territorial integrity of states. This is of particular concern for policy formulation and
implementation, as autonomous claim by regional minorities are of great relevance for many
states today. It also distinguishes itself from the existing debate about peace-preserving
decentralization by relocating research direction. The intent is to explore how decentralization
influences an outcome of secessionism in one direction or the other rather than asking whether
decentralization ameliorates or exacerbates secessionism in the first place. More specifically,
the aim is to explicitly study the mechanisms of a decentralization process that are either
secession-preventing or secession-inducing in a given context. The revision of directional focus
is made because ultimately, the existing debate is inconclusive. There is plenty of empirical
evidence with credible argumentation to support any of the two sides. Also, the diverse accounts
of conflict in states which are decentralized, where adverse outcomes have been generated by
decentralization reforms, have not been adequately addressed.
The thesis is structured like this: a theory section is introduced, where theoretical concepts are
defined, and a review of the existing literature is made. Then, the study’s theoretical argument
is described, together with the theoretical framework and hypothesis. A methodological section
follows where operationalizations are outlined, the case selection strategy is illustrated, and
method of choice is presented. Cases are subsequently empirically analyzed and compared
between each other, followed by a discussion and presentation of results, limitations and
alternative explanations. To conclude the study, findings are briefly summarized, result
implications on theory are discussed, and recommendations for future research are suggested.
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2 Theory
Numerous definitions of decentralization can be encountered in the literature. However, some
consensus among scholars can be identified. Lijphart (1999: 175) recognizes the concept as a
framework constituting of an elemental feature that guarantees a power distribution among
central and regional levels of government. Accordingly, this study defines decentralization as
a governmental system where tiers of government share power, and where lower tier units
exercise some form of self-rule. This definition is only legitimate in democratic states. This is
because as Brancati (2006: 652) explains, the accreditation of power to regional legislatures
can principally be done by non-democracies. In practice, however, regional leaders with pro-
government sentiments are regularly installed, so as to not challenge the authority of the central
state. As such, regional governing powers are fundamentally disregarded or violated.
Federalism is commonly believed to be analogous to decentralization. Therefore, it is of
importance to stress the theoretical differences between them. Lijphart (1999: 176) illustrates
how the concepts relate with each other by highlighting the primary characteristics of
federalism; non-centralization and decentralization of power. What distinguishes federalism are
its secondary characteristics, which include a bicameral legislature with a strong federal
chamber, a written constitution, and a supreme court or special constitutional court. King (1982:
74) does not consider the concept of federalism institutionally, but rather views it as an
ideological philosophical principle of self- and shared rule. Burgess (2006: 2) argues that such
a federalist principle is in support for a federation and serves to recommend and promote such
an entity; that is, a federal state. Watts (1996: 8) explains that federalized states have a central
government in combination with strong constituent units, where citizens directly elect its
leadership by exercising power, and this power is authorized by a constitution.
A desire to consider de facto decentralized states which do not define themselves as federal,
but share important characteristics generally attributed to federalism, has meant scholars are
increasingly using the term decentralization instead of the term federalism (Brancati 2006: 654).
The concept of “power sharing” is an essential component in decentralized governance. As
such, it requires terminological attention. In this study, it is used to characterize any scheme of
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governance that permits group representatives (elites) to engage in shared decision-making
processes – either by granting territorially-concentrated groups regional autonomy (which is
labeled as territorial power sharing or self-rule), or through inclusion within the national
decision-making institutions (which is labeled as governmental power sharing or shared rule).
Governmental power sharing is closely related to the concept of consociationalism established
by Lijphart (see Cederman et al. 2015). The definition used in this study primarily concerns
decentralization within unitary states however and is therefore limited to a greater extent.
In this study, Hechter’s (1992: 267) definition of secessionism is used, namely “a demand for
formal withdrawal from a central political authority by a member unit or units on the basis of a
claim to independent sovereign status”. It is the fundamental desire of territorial group members
and elites for an independent state. Secession is successful when the withdrawal is recognized
by the host state and by others in the international community. It differentiates itself with
separatism, which does not aim for neither formal withdrawal nor recognition (Ibid).
In the next section, existing literature on the relationship between the concepts of
decentralization and secessionism is reviewed.
2.1 Literature review
At large, research on decentralization and secessionism has produced two contradictory
positions; a pessimistic and an optimistic. Scholars adherent to a more pessimistic point of view
argue that, as a method of conflict resolution, decentralization is ineffective and a hindrance to
peace (see Brubaker 1996; Kymlicka 1998). Chapman and Roeder (2007) contend that
decentralization can strengthen ethnic identities through the formal recognition and
legitimization of individual ethnic groups. Elkins and Sides (2007: 693) sustain that
decentralization provides considerable resources which can be used by groups to pressure the
state. Cornell (2002: 251-252) believes autonomous regions are inherently problematic, as they
capacitate ethnic groups to challenge central states’ authority through subnational political
institutions. By promoting ethnic mobilization and facilitating insurgency to maintain or
increase regional autonomy within territorial communities, decentralization undermines
interethnic stability. Self-governance ultimately leads to conflict, secessionism, and state
dissolution according to Cornell (2002: 275-276). Roeder (2009: 214) shares similar reasoning,
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arguing that by preserving a sovereign central state which also responds to autonomous claims
of ethnic groups, decentralization supports an inherent incompatibility. The fundamental issue
of the belonging of ethnic minorities in a common state is not sufficiently addressed. Instead,
dangerous implications for potential state disintegration are maintained by this vulnerable
equilibrium. Roeder (2009: 203, 208) argues that decentralization increases the risk of
secessionism by causing political vulnerability as actors become enclosed between two perils:
centralization and dissolution. Experimenting with institutional power sharing arrangements is
unlikely to resolve the fundamental issue. Chapman and Roeder (2007) advocate for partition
as a preferred solution over power sharing and autonomy.
Other authors hold that decentralization is related to the emergence and aggravation of
mobilization (e.g. Bunce 1999; Hale 2000; Kymlicka 1998; Treisman 2007). The devolution of
power and creation of regional self-governing institutions are catalysts for generating
opportunities that regional elites use to demand further authority. Scholars contend secessionist
movements mobilize public support to pressure central governments to agree to widen the
jurisdiction of regional institutions, or to pursue outright independence.
Scholars advocating a more optimistic viewpoint argue that by successfully responding to
autonomous demands via an increase of self-governance, decentralization decreases the
probability of ethnic conflict and secessionism. Hechter (2000: 8-9) believes decentralization
provides central governments with cost-effective measures to maintain state sovereignty by
granting autonomy concessions for regional ethnic groups. Thus, it is an appropriate system of
government for ethnically divided states. Lustick, Miodownik and Eidelson (2004: 210)
contend regional autonomy reduces conflict by ensuring governments take into consideration
the most vital concerns of minorities. Decentralization appeases potential secessionist groups
by providing them with adequate representation and protection. Representation implies a legal
framework with formal recognition and political integration (Bakke 2015). Other authors argue
that decentralization diminishes the probability of mobilization (e.g. Gurr 2000; Lijphart 1994;
Stepan 1999; Tsebelis 1990). Political institutions which facilitate the expression of local
grievances and have the ability to articulate immediate responses to collective needs decrease
contentious motivations of regional actors by increasing loyalty towards the central state.
Evidently, the relationship between decentralization and secessionism is controversial. Hechter
and Okamoto (2001) summarize it as “remarkably murky”. Overlaps between the two stances
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in the literature have been attempted but the results differ. For example, Mattes and Savun
(2009) and Walter (2002, 2009) endorse power sharing for conflict resolution but remain
skeptical about autonomy. In contrast, Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) argue that autonomy restrains
conflict more effectively than governmental power sharing (see also Martin 2013).1
Theories concerning ethnic conflict and its relationship with secessionism have traditionally
focused on grievance-based arguments, although much of recent literature within the subject
has cast doubts on said reasoning (see Blattman and Miguel 2010). They originate from research
illustrating how ethnic rebellion is instigated by governments maltreating minorities (e.g. Gurr
1993, 2000; Petersen 2002). Conflicts of secessionist character are often caused by ethnic
minorities competing for state power. Thus, the state plays an integral part, as ethnic groups
lacking access to state power are more likely to pursue independence (Gurr 2000: 195; Erk and
Anderson 2009: 192). Hechter (2004) presents support for an increased possibility of
ethnonationalist conflict in multiethnic states when ethnic minorities do not experience high
levels of self-governance. Similarly, Girardin et al. (2015) argue that “[group] exclusion from
government is associated with a higher risk of civil war”.
According to Bakke (2015: 13-15), self-determination conflicts revolve around demands of
independence, decentralization reforms, or greater autonomy from central governments (central
elites), regional minority groups (regional elites), and the population they represent. Such
demands are either ameliorated or exacerbated by political institutions which govern the
relationship between central and regional elites. She believes state institutions run the risk of
institutionalizing regional and ethnic identities, supplying assets for mobilization, and
encouraging the forming of regional and ethnic based political parties which have been shown
to increase the risk of ethnic conflict and secessionism (see Horowitz 1985; Brancati 2006).
Bakke (2015: 16-17) argues that autonomous institutions which are isolated from the state’s
central decision-making institutions are more susceptible for mobilization by regional elites.
She asserts that strong political ties between central and regional elites decreases the risk of
secessionist conflict substantially. Cederman et al. (2015: 358-359) claim that excluding ethnic
groups from political influence in the state’s central executive is associated with a higher risk
of ethnic conflict and secessionism. The risk is amplified considerably if the central government
implement unfavorable policies to ethnic minorities or attempt to recentralize power after
1 Important to note that these findings involve effects of types of power sharing adopted in peace agreements.
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regional autonomy is already in place. The authors argue that governmental power sharing has
the strongest mitigating effect as it requires central and regional elites to coordinate and
negotiate policies on a day-to-day basis with each other in lieu of operating through separate
compartments of governance. When political influence is shared within the national executive,
secessionist activity is better contained (Ibid: 364). Equivalently, Mattes and Savun (2009: 742)
argue that integrating regional elites in the governmental system and including them in the
state’s central decision-making processes is crucial for them to not develop anti-state incentives.
2.2 Theoretical framework
Building on theories where the role of the state is explicit in the causal argument, the theoretical
framework of the thesis differentiates itself from earlier research by suggesting a new
orientation. The aim is to attempt to reconcile several inadequacies identified in previous
literature on decentralization and secessionism. Firstly, most of the scholarly work done in this
field ignore cases where decentralized arrangements have attained positive outcomes by mainly
concentrating on cases which have experienced or are currently experiencing violent conflict.
Secondly, research has overlooked on the capabilities of self-rule and shared rule to influence
intrastate cleavages and secessionist conflict in different ways (Bakke 2015: 10). Thirdly,
seldom has an evaluation of the interaction and combination of territorial power sharing and
governmental power sharing been made. Lastly, research strategies rarely allow for the
possibility of scrutinizing reverse causation (Cederman et al. 2015: 356).
In contrast to prior research, I propose that in order for decentralization to have a significant
preventive effect against secessionism, a high degree of governmental power sharing – or
shared rule – is required. Territorial power sharing – or self-rule – might alleviate secessionism,
particularly short-term as it offers more political influence than no autonomy, but it is deemed
insufficient on its own. Instead, it is argued that a combination of self-rule and shared rule
should be the preeminent way to contain secessionist conflict long-term (see Durante 2018).
Most importantly, however, is the capacity of regional governments to influence national
decision-making. Regional populations and elites are legitimized by autonomy concessions.
Such arrangements acknowledge their demands which help demonstrate how central
governments are open for cooperation and negotiation with them. Unfortunately, they also
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promote tribalism in the sense that ethnic and regional identifications are institutionalized in
combination with a strong supply of resources which can be used for mobilization purposes. In
essence, decentralization per se induces a double-edged sword effect on secessionism.
The theoretical argument of the thesis is illustrated below in Figure 1:
Figure 1. Theoretical argument
Note: In the figure, x indicates a conditional relationship.
The implementation of self-rule paradoxically encourages secessionist activity. Regional elites
can mobilize public opinion and put pressure on national authority through the influence
obtained from autonomy. As such, I argue that decentralization is only more likely to be
pacifying if high degrees of governmental power is shared in addition. Inclusion for regional
elites within the state’s national decision-making institutions is imperative and works as a
preventive measure, reassuring that opponents of the central state do not engage in prohibited
behavior by interacting with them through peaceful political negotiations within the boundaries
of the law. Strong political ties between central and regional elites decrease the probability of
mobilization and in turn, the degree of public support for secessionism.
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This is illustrated in a theoretical framework below in Figure 2:
Figure 2. Theoretical framework
Note: In the figure, (a), (b), and (c) indicate theoretical phases
The model shows how the degree of shared rule is associated with the degree of public support
for secessionism. This association goes through a number of phases (i.e. a decentralization
process). In an implementation phase, power sharing institutions are established. Through them,
regional elites gain enough political influence to pressure the state, effectively introducing a
bargaining phase. Here, central and regional actors negotiate on degrees of power sharing.
Ideally, through consensus, a mobilization phase is avoided. The degree of shared rule is the
prominent factor that determines whether a decentralization process experiences a mobilization
phase or not. This study’s hypothesis outlines the argument:
Hypothesis: Decentralization with a higher degree of governmental power sharing (shared rule)
is associated with a lower degree of public support for secessionism.
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3 Method
In the next section, dependent, independent, and control variables are operationalized. Later,
the selection of cases is discussed and a controlled comparison between them is illustrated. The
methodological approach chosen for this study is then presented, as is the empirical material
and data used, and a discussion on their validity and reliability concludes the chapter.
3.1 Operationalization of dependent and independent variables
3.1.1 Dependent variable
The dependent variable is public support for secessionism. The incidence of secessionism
within a state is measured by identifying markers that help determine the territorial population’s
preferences with respect to secession. Analyzing the results of independence referenda held in
each case should therefore be the most logical primary source of data considering the task at
hand. However, given the problematic nature of the Catalan independence referenda (i.e. they
were declared illegal, had low turnout, and alleged irregularities were reported), support for
secessionism is also operationalized by using alternative opinion polls conducted to measure
public sentiments regarding independence.
Previous literature has measured and used the strength of regionalist parties to help explain
secessionism (see Brancati 2007; Massetti and Schakel 2017). While being a valid measurement
– particularly in quantitative research settings where a larger sample size is required, it is
considered problematic and subsequently inappropriate for this study. The main reason is that
while regionalist parties explicitly promote independence, they also tend to have other
important points at issue in their political agenda. Thus, a vote for a specific type of regionalist
party is not per se a definite advocacy for secessionist action.
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3.1.2 Independent variable
The independent variable is decentralization. For operationalization purposes, it is
conceptualized as an event – that is, the establishment of an elected regional tier of government
– and as a process – that is, all transfers of powers from the center to regions that might precede
and, most commonly, follow the establishment of elected regional governments. This is because
decentralization reforms do not exclusively occur once but are also a continuous process
(Massetti and Schakel 2017: 433, 447). Therefore, during this process, the degree of territorial
power sharing (self-rule) and governmental power sharing (shared rule) can vary over time.
As the ambition is to investigate the effects of decentralization as both an event and as a process,
a particularly useful measurement of regional reform over time is the Regional Authority Index
(RAI) proposed by Hooghe et al. (2010). This measurement distinguishes between self-rule –
authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region – and shared
rule – authority exercised by a regional government or its representatives in the country as a
whole. In RAI, self-rule is operationalized as “the extent to which a regional government has
the authority to act autonomously, the scope of its policy competencies, its capacity to tax, and
the extent to which it has an independent legislature and executive.”, and shared rule is
operationalized as “the capacity of a regional government to shape national decision making.
National decision making is disaggregated across four areas: normal legislation, executive
policy, taxation, and constitutional reform” (Ibid: 14).
The Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR-ETH) is part of the GROWup project and contributes
with data for an additional measurement of governmental power sharing (shared rule). It does
so by evaluating the access to central state power of ethnic groups active in the world between
1946 to 2017. It uses specific categories of power sharing configurations indicating
theoretically valid and relevant types, including annual data (Girardin et al. 2015).
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The first category has four subcategories on group elite positions in central government and is
labeled “included into the executive” (Cederman et al. 2010: 99-101; Girardin et al. 2015):
The second category has three subcategories on group elite exclusion from participation in
central government and is labeled “excluded from the executive” (Ibid):
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3.2 Case selection
The case selection strategy adopted in this study is based on Lijphart’s (1971) variant of a
controlled comparison. By relying on logic of experimentation, a researcher can identify
causality. John Stuart Mill based his discussion of the five methods of induction on such logic.
The method of choice for this study is called “method of difference”, and it compares cases that
differ in outcome. By excluding variables found across all cases, researchers can through the
use of logic eliminate them from having causal effects on outcome variance. This is because
those variables cannot be attributed to any of the conditions present in all cases (Mill 1843:
455). The most problematic aspect of using such logic is the fact that there are hardly any cases
that exist which are equal on all aspects except one. Mill was well aware of this issue, and as
such did not recommend its application on complex social phenomena. Lijphart (1971: 688)
however, believes that the logic of elimination can be applied successfully in social science
research, stating that such an exacting scientific principle is an unnecessary hindrance.
However, one should always strive to achieve this principle as best as possible.
George and Bennett (2005: 240-241) contend that the chosen research design should always be
the point of reference when selecting cases. The selection of cases ought to be guided by what
is being studied, and this requires clearly defined categories and scope conditions. Furthermore,
selected cases should provide adequate control and variation so as to be able to explain
circumstances that are of interest to the study in question.
This study’s case selection strategy is illustrated in Table 1.
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Table 1. Controlled comparison2
2 For detailed coding schemes of each dimension of regional authority in RAI, see Appendix.
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Spain and Catalonia were selected because of the difference to the UK and Scotland based on
the dependent variable (outcome) and degree of governmental power sharing (shared rule) –
whereas all other variables are similar. Spain is formally a unitary state with a decentralized
political system established by the Spanish Constitution of 1978 following the transition to
democracy. Regularly characterized as “a nation of nations”, Spain consists of ethnic minorities
organized territorially as autonomous communities (Colomer 1998: 40- 41). Catalonia, in
particular, was selected because it has commonly been described as “a paradigmatic example
of a ‘nation without state’ characterized by the importance of ‘dual identities’, with a
predominant ‘civic nationalism’ and claims for self-government of non-secessionist character”
(Serrano 2013: 523). Yet, recent developments emphasize a substantial rise of secessionism in
Catalan society (Guibernau 2014: 15; Colomer 2017). Most notable manifestations are the
Catalan self-determination referenda held in 2014 and 2017, which resulted in an overwhelming
majority vote for independence. Both were declared unconstitutional by the Spanish
government and have thus not received either national or international recognition. Opinion
polls measuring public sentiment on independence suggest results consistent with a majority in
favor of secession following the last held referendum.
The United Kingdom and Scotland were selected on the basis of the difference with Spain and
Catalonia in regard to the dependent variable (outcome) and degree of governmental power
sharing (shared rule) – in combination with similarities on all other variables. The UK is
formally a unitary state consisting of four constituent countries with devolved governments.
Scotland, in particular, was chosen because it has limited self-government within the UK, as
well as representation in the UK Parliament. Executive and legislative powers respectively have
been devolved to the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament at Holyrood in
Edinburgh since 1999. The political party with the largest number of seats in the Scottish
Parliament is the Scottish National Party (SNP), which actively campaigns for Scottish
independence. SNP enjoyed an overall majority victory in the 2011 Scottish Parliament
election, eventually leading to a proposed Scottish independence referendum, which was
conducted in 2014. Through the Edinburgh Agreement signed by both governments, the UK
government officially recognized and granted the Scottish parliament the necessary powers to
hold an independence referendum. It also received international recognition. The results were
a majority vote against independence from the United Kingdom (BBC News 2014a). SNP’s
overall majority in the Scottish Parliament was subsequently lost in 2016. Following the
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referendum, opinion polls measuring public sentiment on independence indicate results
consistent with a majority against secessionism, favoring devolution instead.
Both cases present an empirical puzzle. Spain and the United Kingdom are one of the most
decentralized and democratic states in the world, yet secessionism is prevalent. Extensive
decentralization has been found to decrease the likelihood of ethno-political mobilization and
secessionism, whereas weak and medium levels of decentralization increase it (see Miodownik
and Cartrite 2010). Furthermore, the correlation between consolidated democracies and absence
of internal conflict is well established in contemporary literature (see Hegre 2014). As such,
they can be classified as deviant cases. However, while Scotland and Catalonia share similar
context, their experience diverge. In the former case, secessionism has not been as dominant as
in the latter, as is highlighted by the contrasting results of their respective independence
referendum. Furthermore, while the British government recognized the 2014 Scottish
referendum as legitimate, the 2014 and 2017 Catalan independence referenda were declared
illegal by the Spanish government, resulting in violent conflict and the incarceration of leading
Catalan politicians (The Guardian 2019).
Why does the level of public support for secessionism differ between the cases, and why have
the state’s respective central governments reacted so differently to secessionist demands when
there are good grounds to expect that they would be considerably similar? An effective strategy
to help address cases that are not adequately explained by existing theories is to use case studies,
preferably with more than a single case (Lijphart 1971: 692; Levy 2008: 7).
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3.3 Control variables
Variables that can have a causal effect on both the dependent and independent variable of
interest – public support for secessionism and decentralization respectively, need to be
controlled when comparing different cases. When held constant, control variables cannot be the
cause for outcome divergence in compared cases (George and Bennett 2005: 428). The
variables that are controlled for in this study’s case comparison are: system of government,
degree of democracy, ethnic and cultural fractionalization, socioeconomic status, and regional
group concentration. Scores for each variable in each case are presented in Table 1.
System of government is included because the type of executive system in a country may affect
the likelihood of secessionism. Presidentialism, a system of government in which voters
directly elect a chief executive, as opposed to parliamentary systems of government in which
the national legislature elects a chief executive, is thought to increase ethnic conflict and
secessionism because executives in presidential systems of government are less likely to
represent ethnic groups than executives in parliamentary systems of government (Linz and
Valenzuela 1994). In parliamentary systems of government, the executive branch may include
ethnic groups through coalition governments (Brancati 2006: 671).
Degree of democracy is included because regional groups residing in democratic states should
have less resentment towards the central government when their civil liberties are respected,
and their political rights are guaranteed (Fearon and Laitin 2003). In strong democracies,
regional groups should be better capable of settling disputes with the central government
peacefully (Brancati 2006: 671). Therefore, secessionist activity should not be as severe in well-
functioning democracies. Research suggests that the risk of experiencing intrastate conflict is
lower in stable democratic states in comparison with fragile democracies and autocracies
(Hegre 2014: 163). Degree of democracy is measured using Freedom House’s composite score
ranging from 1-100, where a higher score reflects a higher degree of democracy.
Ethnic and cultural fractionalization is included because secessionism has a decreased
possibility of occurring in states which are ethnically homogenous, and an increased chance of
developing in states which are ethnically heterogenous. The likelihood increases when most of
the population does not feel ethnically represented by the central state (Lijphart 1977). The
18
diversification of ethnicity and culture can influence public stability in a negative way by
instigating animosity among groups (Horowitz 1985). Diversified scores measuring ethnicity
and culture are provided by Fearon (2003) and used in this study to control for ethnic and
cultural fractionalization. The definition provided on ethnic fractionalization derives from the
odds of two persons belonging to different ethnicity groups by chance selection. Scores are
given numerically (between 0 and 1), where largely fragmented states are placed around zero,
bipolar states are placed in between, and homogenous states are placed around 1. The definition
provided on cultural fractionalization derives from the estimation of how close groups are
culturally, by analyzing what languages are spoken. Scores are given numerically (between 0
and 1), where linguistic differentiated states are placed around zero, and linguistic homogenous
states are placed around 1 (Ibid: 196, 206-207, 212).
Socioeconomic status is included because economic development is associated with a decreased
probability of states experiencing conflict due to the increased ability of governments to handle
rebellion (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Economic development also improves education and social
welfare, making the population less susceptible to ‘radical beliefs’ (Lipset 1963).
Socioeconomic inequalities are associated with an increased risk of secessionism (Hechter and
Levi 1985). The variable is operationalized by using a metric developed by the United Nations
called the Human Development Index (HDI). It measures education, life expectancy, and per
capita income to assess the levels of social and economic development of states.
Regional group concentration is included because the literature suggests that geographically-
concentrated group are more likely to experience conflict and secessionism (see Toft 2002,
2003; Cornell 2002; Lichbach 1995; Goemans 2006). The variable is measured using the
Minority at Risk (MAR) dataset, which offers scores on group concentration. Data on group
spatial distribution is indicated by scores between 0 and 3 – where 0 is dispersed, 1 is urban or
minority in one region, 2 is majority in one region and others dispersed, and 3 is concentrated
in one region (Minorities at Risk Project 2009).
19
3.4 Comparative Process Tracing (CPT): a two-step methodological approach
The method of choice for this study is an innovative approach developed by Bengtsson and
Ruonavaara (2017) called ‘Comparative Process Tracing’ or CPT. It is chosen because it is
well-suited for investigating empirical-historical puzzles concerning two or more cases, as is
the case with this study on Catalonia and Scotland. Additionally, as Walt (1997: 15) explains,
process tracing “is especially appropriate because the universe of cases is too small for a
statistical analysis and the number of independent variables too large for a rigorous application
of John Stuart Mill’s ‘method of difference’ ”. Thus, process tracing is chosen as it can
ameliorate the limitations of a controlled comparison (George and Bennett 2005: 531-532).
In short, CPT is a two-step methodological approach that combines theory, chronology, and
comparison to make general inference possible. Because it has a comparative element, it uses
a broad understanding of process tracing that allows both formal testing of hypotheses and
narrative approaches. As such, CPT allows for both deductive and inductive reasoning, assumed
appropriate for systematic comparisons of complex political processes.
General understandings of cross-case comparison vary. Bennett et al. (2019: 1) argue that some
methods are based on the logic of approximating experimental control while other view
comparisons as useful for inspiring theory and producing strong tests of theory without
automatically providing a distinct logic of inference from process tracing. In this study, process
tracing is broadly referred to a research approach that is focused on tracing processes – that is,
that looks at how various social and political outcomes are produced by events that result from
actors’ actions and interactions, and various contextual factors. For each studied case, the
processes leading “from A to B” – in this case from decentralization to a given degree of public
support for secessionism – are reconstructed and analyzed through theoretical social
mechanisms (see Table 2), which are then compared in conjunction with the theoretical
framework (see Figure 2).
Bengtsson and Ruonavaara (2017: 44, 46-47) argue that their approach is fruitful for the
comparative analysis of all types of processes related to political actors, such as
democratization, globalization, conflict and war, and peace building. Such processes can often
be understood in terms of institutionalization and path dependence. As this study focuses on
the process of decentralization, this method is understood to be suitable for the particular
20
research purpose at hand. Having said that, in contrast with the approach presented by
Bengtsson and Ruonavaara, this study uses a slightly less inductive logic, where theory-
informed narratives are combined with the formal testing of a hypothesis, and independent and
dependent variables are discussed. Bennett et al. (2019: 13) maintain that “finding a middle
ground between coherent narrative and highlighting the inferential weight of key pieces of
evidence is an important methodological agenda”. In agreement with this sentiment, this study’s
methodological modus operandi aspires at such an ambition.
To sum, the two-step methodological approach by Bengtsson and Ruonavaara is based on
critical junctures and political focal points, social mechanisms, path dependence, context and
periodization, and counterfactual analysis. Said concepts will be further explained, and their
methodological relevance to this study’s empirical application will be further discussed below.
3.4.1 Within-case step
The first step in the analysis constitutes identifying and analyzing each case’s historical and
empirical characteristics through the identification of critical junctures and political focal points
which have contributed to either the path dependence of decentralization or to its change –
where the social mechanisms that made decentralization path dependent will be identified, and
an analytical periodization of the development of decentralization will be applied to each case.
The concept of critical junctures – an important part of the first, within-case step of CPT – is
well-established within literature on path dependence (see Collier and Collier 1991; Mahoney
2000), where it is regarded as decisive in accounting for institutional and political change. This
is because periods of continuous development that are sometimes interrupted by ruptures which
create new contextual situations are common in historical social science. Collier and Collier
(1991: 29) define a critical juncture as “a period of significant change, which typically occurs
in distinct ways in distinct countries (or in other units of analysis) and which is hypothesised to
produce distinct legacies”. Similarly, Mahoney (2000: 513) discusses critical junctures as
transitional situations in which actors are faced with choices that would open a new path.
Deciding on a new path is seen as creating a legacy, a new path dependence, since it becomes
more difficult to return to the initial starting point where alternatives were still available. In this
study, critical junctures which have contributed to either the path dependence of
decentralization or its change will be identified and analyzed.
21
However, critical junctures are not the only decision-making situations of interest in an analysis
with regards to path dependence and CPT. Bengtsson and Ruonavaara (2017: 52) suggest an
additional concept which they label political focal point. The reasoning being that other
situations where policy and institutions are discussed are as important as critical junctures, as
they may instead demonstrate, manifest, and consolidate the path dependence of a direction
taken previously. Unlike critical junctures, focal points are always politically salient. A political
focal point is thus a decision point where the restricting role of dominant institutions is made
explicit. As such, situations where decentralization is explicitly discussed by actors and
subsequently institutionalized will be identified and analyzed in each empirical case.
The concept of mechanisms is central in process tracing (see Beach and Pedersen 2013) as well
as in the analysis of path dependence (e.g. Mahoney 2000). The concepts’ core definition is
debated within said fields, where different definitions are incompatible. Yet, Bengtsson and
Ruonavaara (2017: 53) identify general characteristics found in the various ways of using the
term. Mechanisms are regular patterns of actions and interactions. They are causally productive,
meaning they bring about outcomes. To be useful in comparative research, patterns discovered
in one context should also be possible to be discovered in others – i.e. mechanisms should be
portable (see Falleti and Lynch 2009: 1145). In a limited sense, they should also be
generalizable. CPT allows for an open-ended approach to mechanistic thinking which makes it
suitable for comparison between complex processes which must be based on general patterns
instead of precise variables (Bengtsson and Ruonavaara 2017: 54). Therefore, CPT is suitable
for a comparison made between two cases of separate decentralization processes – where
generalization is obtained through abstraction and inference. Empirical observations made in
each case are abstracted through identified mechanisms, and later inferred through a
comparison between each context.
What social mechanisms of path dependence can be identified theoretically in a decentralization
process? Bengtsson and Ruonavaara (2017: 55) differentiate between efficiency, legitimacy,
and power mechanisms. Each identifies a different mechanism of institutional reproduction –
i.e. how decentralization is self-reinforced, and each suggests a different mechanism of
institutional change – i.e. how decentralization is strengthened (see Table 2).
22
Table 2. Theoretical social mechanisms in a decentralization process
Note: Author’s adaptation from Bengtsson and Ruonavaara (2017: 55) and Mahoney (2000: 517).
An efficiency mechanism is emphasized by most path dependence theorists and involves actors’
perceptions of economic and other benefits and costs attached to different choices and
outcomes. The logic derives from established institutions’ considerable coordination capacities,
which are costly to alter. Institutional change takes place when it is no longer in the self-interest
of actors to reproduce a given institution (Ibid). A legitimacy mechanism works on the decision-
makers’ and the public’s perceptions of existing institutions as legitimate, which contributes to
giving these an advantage over alternative institutional arrangements. Institutional change
occurs when actors adopt new subjective evaluations and moral codes concerning
appropriateness in relation to cognitive frameworks predominant in their societal context
(Mahoney 2000: 523-525). A power mechanism works through inclusion and exclusion of
actors in decision-making, their varying influence on decisions, and their differing capacity of
establishing the decision-making agenda. Political power is distributed by institutions between
group of actors, and this distribution makes it beneficial for some actors to keep the status quo,
while others challenge it. Institutional change may materialize when reproduction reaches a
critical threshold point, after which time self-reinforcement accentuates conflictual aspects
between elites and subordinate groups (Ibid: 521-523). This study’s hypothesis highlights the
importance of this particular mechanism in its causal argument (see Figure 1).
Process tracing does not necessarily build on theories of path dependence. However, Bengtsson
and Ruonavaara (2017: 48-49) argue that CPT is linked to this type of institutional theory.
Therefore, comparing decentralization processes requires an analysis in terms of continuity and
change. The core notion about path dependence can be considered a truism (i.e. history matters),
23
and some outcomes are such that they cannot be explained by general causes but only by the
sequence of events in their specific history. Sewell 2005: (100-101) defines path dependence
as a process where “that what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the outcomes of a
sequence of events occurring at a later point in time”. The analysis must be strong on historical
description. As such, it is crucial to also analyze how history matters in a decentralization
process and what mechanisms are keeping its development on said path. What distinguishes
Bengtsson and Ruonavaara’s view is that path dependence is seen as a broad and open-ended
conception, so as to be more fruitful for comparison. In contrast to a strong and deterministic
definition proposed by Mahoney (2000: 511), Bengtsson and Ruonavaara (2017: 50-51) argue
for a weak definition, where path dependence is seen as “a historical pattern in which a certain
outcome can be traced back to a particular set of events on the basis of empirical observation
guided by social theory”. This definition leaves open the possibility of endogenous institutional
change and allows for degrees of path dependence, considered important in an analysis of
decentralization processes where change is possible through the actions and interactions of
actors involved. Whereas a deterministic definition produces a robust explanation, it also
demands a ceteris paribus assumption where extreme scope conditions are required for the
validity of the generalization – making it less constructive in comparative research on politics.
Nevertheless, Mahoney (2000: 508) claims that processes that are anomalous are useful for
analysis in terms of path dependence. As is previously argued, the cases chosen in this study
satisfy such ambition, as outcome that are predicted by theory did not occur. Lastly, a theoretical
framework is important in a perspective of weak path dependence, where narration is, to a
certain extent, theoretically laden. The CPT approach to process tracing is actor-centered and
thinly rationalistic. By thinly rational action, Bengtsson and Ruonavaara (2017: 51) mean that
actors can be assumed to act on the basis of their beliefs to accomplish a goal. Beliefs and goals
do not have to be rational in an “objective” sense – thinly rational actors act for a reason on the
basis of these which are largely shaped by their context.
3.4.2 Between-case step
The second step in the analysis involves a systematic comparison of the historical and empirical
characteristics between the cases through the theoretical framework of this study (see Figure
2), and by the theoretical social mechanisms identified in each case.
24
An integral part in the second, comparative step of CPT is establishing the relevant context as
well as deciding and specifying the empirical focus in the reconstruction of the selected cases
analyzed in the first step. Accounts of how decentralization with a given degree of shared rule
lead to a given degree of public support for secessionism must consider the social, political, and
cultural contexts in which actors act and social mechanisms operate. This is because, as
Bengtsson and Ruonavaara (2017: 56) allude to, the course of action taken by actors – whether
considered rational or “meaningful” – depends on the context in which they find themselves.
As specified in case selection, careful consideration of context and empirical focus was
effectuated through a controlled comparison between Catalonia and Scotland (see Table 1).
Evidently, the contexts of both cases are similar enough to make a systematic comparison
possible, and different enough to make such a comparison meaningful. This is critical, because
in order to make comparison relevant, analogous contexts are required. In open-ended CPT
however, identical contexts are not mandatory (Ibid).
Another significant component in the comparative step of CPT is a theoretically informed
model of periodization. As Bengtsson and Ruonavaara (2017: 57) argue, a combination of such
a model in conjunction with social mechanisms based on thin rationality can serve as a basis
for comparing patterns between complex macro-level processes which are characterized by too
many operationalized variables and too impregnated with context. Through periodization,
temporally ordered processes of decentralization are divided up into subsequent, homogenous
eras, periods, or epochs. Within periods, there is similarity, and between periods, there are
differences. Distinguishing them is conditioned by the chosen perspective. Like context,
periodization should be theory-relevant, to focus the analysis in a way that contributes to
comparative consistency. The model created and used in this study is illustrated in Figure 2.
Finally, Mahoney (2000) recommends a type of counterfactual thinking that uses theory to
answer “what if” questions, in order to obtain ideas of what would have happened if the
development had taken a different path than what actually did. Bengtsson and Ruonavaara
(2017: 59) argue that counterfactual analysis can give further evidence to the significance of
path dependence. In this study, the decision was made to disregard such an examination, for the
reason that it is considered less fruitful when only two cases are used, and the limited scope of
this study prohibits a constructive counterfactual analysis to be adequately produced.
25
3.5 Empirical material and data
The CPT method entails exploring in depth the mechanisms of path dependence in selected
cases. As such, access to primary actor material in the form of documents and interviews is
required (Bengtsson and Ruonavaara 2018: 55-56). Bennett et al. (2019: 49) argue that
“qualitative research is at its best when it showcases salient evidence in its original form”, for
example, through direct quotations from documents and informants. Evidence presented
directly permit readers to assess whether the author’s interpretations and inferences are
convincing. Therefore, primary sources in the form of official statements, public speeches, and
interviews, etc. are prioritized in this study. Critically reviewed secondary sources akin to
relevant literature and peer-reviewed scholarly articles are used in combination. Relevant in
this case means that research done in the fields concerning the study in question was
systematically selected and intentionally included. Furthermore, additional information from
non-academic sources including reports, databases and statistics by international organizations
and institutions, as well as public data and official documents by governments will be a part of
the study’s analysis. Lastly, news media articles will be used as complimentary material.
3.6 Validity and reliability
An analysis on how decentralization impacts the degree of public support for secessionism in
established democracies is dependent on using valid and reliable markers that indicate and
measure the theoretical concepts relevant to the study at hand. The conceptual definitions
previously outlined have been purposely chosen to be suitable for the studied cases, so that
variables and mechanisms can be appropriately operationalized. This assists on finding
corresponding markers when assessing the empirics. One of the advantages of qualitative case
studies is that they allow for more sophisticated conceptualizations, which provide researchers
with greater validity degrees when applied on small-n research designs. In comparison,
quantitative studies are limited in their conceptual advancement by requiring extensive case
samples (George and Bennett 2005: 83-85). In this study, general concepts including
“decentralization”, “power sharing”, and “secessionism” are theoretically refined using
descriptions which designate important subcategories through labels such as “territorial”,
“governmental”, “self-rule”, “shared rule”, “inclusion” and “exclusion”, etc.
26
4 Within-case empirical analysis
In this section, each case is analyzed by an overview of their decentralization and public support
for secessionism. An empirical analysis as a narrative for how the process has developed in
each phase is then presented, followed by an interpretation. This is repeated in each phase.
4.1 Spain and Catalonia
4.1.1 Overview of decentralization and public support for secessionism
Spain is a decentralized unitary state with a diverse population represented by ethnic minorities
territorially organized as autonomous communities. Frequently referred to as the “State of
Autonomies”, it features a unique institutional framework of 17 autonomous communities
(AACC), each with regional institutions and democratic constitutional statues of autonomy.
There is not yet consensus on whether Spain should be regarded as a de facto federal state or
federation (Moreno 1997: 95). For example, Elazar (1991: 228) refers to it as a “federation in
all but its name”, whereas Lijphart (1999: 191) classifies it as a “semi-federal” state.
Catalonia’s adoption of its statute of autonomy in 1979 marked the beginning of the region’s
self-government through the Generalitat, where it possesses jurisdiction over various areas of
competence excluding those which are exclusive to the Spanish government. Catalonia has
limited shared rule, where representatives account for a minority of the senate which can
influence national tax policy and some reserved powers over constitutional appointments.
However, they can be overridden by a majority in the lower house. Thus, a lack of decision-
making in the national arena and no control over the Spanish constitution, is evident (Hooghe
et al. 2010: 142, 221-223). RAI scores on self-rule and shared rule are shown in Table 1.
Catalonia and its population have had representation in the national parliament in every
legislature but have never been formally part of the government. Although Catalan politicians
have been ministers in different national governments, they did not represent the interests of
Catalan citizen. Support of Catalan parties of the investiture of national governments did not
mean direct access to executive power, but rather a set of policy concessions or exchange
support at the regional level. As such, the EPR-ETH categorize Catalan regional elites as
excluded from the executive and coded as powerless (Girardin et al. 2015).
27
Concerning public support for secessionism, the 2014 Catalan self-determination referendum
asked two questions: "Do you want Catalonia to become a State?" and "Do you want this State
to be independent?”. The second question could only be answered by those who had answered
Yes to the first one (Generalitat de Catalunya 2014). Results showed an 80.8% support for the
Yes–Yes option, with an overall turnout ranging between 37% to 41.6%, depending on source.
Yes-No received 10.1% and the No option 4.5%. The second Catalan independence referendum
held in 2017 asked only one question: "Do you want Catalonia to become an independent state
in the form of a republic?", where voters could answer with “Yes” or “No”. 90.09% voted for
independence while 7.87% voted against, with a turnout of 42.34% (Generalitat de Catalunya
2017). Following the 2017 referendum, the Center for Opinion Studies (CEO) conducted a total
of 5 polls on public sentiments towards independence, where 4 showed a predominant “In
favor” answer, and 1 showed a predominant “Against” answer. “In favor” has been the
predominant answer on the opinion polls conducted until July 2019.
In addition, CEO has performed regular polls studying opinion of Catalan citizens regarding
Catalonia’s political status within Spain. Table 3 illustrates an annual poll using the question:
"Which kind of political entity should Catalonia be with respect to Spain?"
Table 3. Public opinion on Catalonia’s political status within Spain
Note: Author’s elaboration using data from Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió (CEO) 2005-2019.
28
4.1.2 Implementation phase (a); 1978-1980
The beginnings of secessionism in Catalonia can be traced back to the mid 19th century
(Ucelay-Da Cal 2018: 15). The country was led by general Francisco Franco and his
authoritarian regime for almost four decades. During this time period, a “sacred unity of the
homeland” was enforced. Ideologies with secessionist and federalist tendencies were actively
suppressed, as were ethnic identities in the form of cultural and linguistic differences. The
Spanish transition to democracy began with Franco’s death in 1975. Following the first free
election since 1936, the 1977 Spanish general election was called by Prime Minister Adolfo
Suárez to elect a constituent assembly that was to promulgate a new constitution. Formulated
in combination with negotiations between central and regional elites – including former Catalan
President Josep Tarradellas, who spent 38 years in exile – the fathers of the 1978 Spanish
constitution had to strike a balance between the centralist view inherited from Franco, and the
pluralistic view of Spain as a “nation of nations” (Moreno 1997). It laid the foundation to the
conception known as the “State of Autonomies” – a compromise of "(1) the idea of an
indivisible and solely Spanish nation-state and (2) a concept of Spain as an ensemble of diverse
peoples, historic nationalities, and regions" (Ibid: 69). The genesis of regional autonomy in
Catalonia is illustrated in the Art. 2 of the constitution (Hernandez Lafuente 1999: 50-67):
“The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and
indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of
the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all.”
The new Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia was submitted for a referendum held in October
1979, where the Catalan population voted for a Catalan Parliament with a majority of 88.1% in
favor. Following the results, the statute was approved by the Congress in November, and by the
Senate in December (De La Granja et al. 2001: 215-216). The first Catalan election was held
in March of 1980, which saw the Catalan nationalist electoral alliance Convergence and Union
(CiU), under the leadership of Jordi Pujol, receive the majority of votes. As President of the
Generalitat, Pujol and his party would lay the foundation of the new regional administration.
He would later reveal his vision of autonomy, declaring that “[it] responds to the need to
institutionally recognize the will of one’s own way of being, with the intention of bringing
power closer to the people. Since the people in Spain are diverse, their autonomies must be
diverse” (Miranda and Castelló 2003).
29
Later the same year, Suárez would reflect on the institutional changes adopted stating:
“It must be remembered that in three years we have transitioned from an authoritarian regime to a
democratic system, several elections have been held, a Constitution has been drafted through
compromise, political legislation has been renewed and important reforms have been made to
achieve a more fair and stable social life (…)” and “When evaluating the situation, the positives of
the Government's actions are very eloquent: Basque and Catalan self-government institutions have
been constituted with democratic normality (…)” (El País 1980)
He added that the decentralization reform as a method of gradual change has “advantages and
costs” and that the Spanish Government “assume [the costs] without complexes, because we
believe the advantages far outweigh them”. Suárez would further argue that:
“Compared to the centralist model, the superiority of strong autonomies is based on the advantages
offered by bringing the decision power closer to the governed and identifying the different
communities with their cultural and historical being, which does not have to be annulled by the
general and common [being] of the entire nation.” (Ibid)
4.1.3 Interpretation
The death of Franco defines a critical juncture in Spanish society, as elite actors inherited a
situation of transition following decades of dictatorship. The new path taken during this period
of time was manifested through the drafting and promulgation of the 1978 constitution, which
established Spain as a democratic state – a framework present to this day. Under this political
focal point, the unity of Spain as a nation was declared in accordance with the formal
recognition of its plural identity by granting autonomy to its historical nationalities, including
Catalonia. Through the approval of a Catalan statute, decentralization was established.
During the implementation phase, key actors recognized that decentralization offered more
benefits than disadvantages in comparison to the centralist model, which dominated for nearly
four decades. This time period served as a learning process – effectively justifying institutional
change, and through cost-benefit assessments, decentralization was subsequently strengthened.
Thus, an efficiency mechanism is evident. It does not account for the developments in its
entirety, however. Equally apparent is the alteration in the values and beliefs of the central
government, which saw decentralization as ‘fairer’ and more democratic. Key actors in general,
and Suárez in particular, recognized decentralized institutions as more legitimate, and more in
line with the new democratic context that comprehensively had transformed Spanish society at
30
the time. Therefore, a legitimacy mechanism is also present. Lastly, evidence of a power
mechanisms can be found in the explicit inclusion of regional actors throughout the negotiation
and implementation of decentralization, which subsequently weakened central elites.
Nevertheless, the central government welcomed and supported this change, which led to the
path dependence of newly established decentralized institutions.
4.1.4 Bargaining phase (b); 1980-2010
With autonomy established, a decentralization process was initiated. Suárez resigned in 1981,
and his successor Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo shared his predecessor’s directional strategy:
“Regarding autonomous policy, my Government will fully assume what is ordered by the
Constitution. We will diligently apply the Catalan and Basque statutes (…)” and “Now, we are not
willing to dismantle the force and powers of the State, which is an essential part of the autonomous
system itself, and whose exclusive or shared competences must be technically profiled. Nor will we
allow the rupture of the economic unit of Spain. My ideas about this chapter are not complicated,
but they are clear and firm, and we could summarize them like this: a strong [‘State of Autonomies’]
is a strong State” (El País 1981)
Through their respective statutes, regional parties increased their political influence
significantly. Regional tiers of government meant regional parties could organize and obtain
self-governance. The territorial model allowed competencies to be evolved via bargaining in
the national parliament and be distributed across all state levels (Field 2016: 43).
Calvo-Sotelo’s term would prove to be short – the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE),
under the leadership of Felipe González, took office after winning the 1982 general election by
absolute majority. PSOE became the first party to achieve this since Spain’s transition to
democracy, and González managed to repeat this feat in the 1986 and 1989 general elections.
Given PSOE’s parliamentary majority, the political influence of CiU and Pujol was hindered
(Pastor 1994). The relationship among the two leaders was characterized by hostility, and
several meetings resulted in failed negotiations. Pujol would confirm in 1984 that there was “a
different conception of what autonomy is” between them. Pujol would later accuse the central
government of promoting anti-autonomic policy, and to economically asphyxiate the
Generalitat. It changed after the 1993 general election, where PSOE lost their absolute majority.
31
After two successive meetings between them, Pujol would guarantee González parliamentary
support if an economic and autonomous program deemed acceptable was authorized (Ibid).
Regional governments enjoyed an increase in fiscal allocations in Spain between 1978-1992,
and it subsequently led to a growing influence in politics. For example, central government
expenditures fell from 90% to 60%, whereas expenditures in the regions rose from zero to 27%
(Moreno 1997: 74-75). Leading Catalan parties negotiated an increase in self-governance in
exchange for supporting Spanish governments which did not have a majority in the parliament
(Colomer 2017: 953). CiU aimed to increase Catalan autonomy within the boundaries of the
Spanish constitution by a moderate territorial strategy. This is exemplified by Pujol when
expressing the explicit demands of his party under negotiations with PSOE:
“I do not deny that we have problems with the central government, but Catalonia is for autonomy
and not for independence" (El Pais 1993)
This gradualist approach helped CiU extract further powers to the Catalan regional institutions.
By appealing to Catalan voters across the traditional left-right ideological dichotomy, the party
achieved victories in successive elections by absolute majority for 19 years, governing
Catalonia for 23 consecutive years between 1980-2003. Legislative support was provided for
minority PSOE and conservative People’s Party (PP) governments in Madrid 1993-1996 and
1996-2000 respectively, in exchange for enhanced autonomy (Elias 2015: 85, 92-93). The
cooperation with José María Aznar, the PP leader was notably controversial. This is because an
historical antagonism between the parties existed. Neither enjoyed a parliamentary majority, so
both parties gained from the mutual political exchange. As a result, Catalonia was granted
further autonomy, including an increase in income tax control (Maiz et al. 2010: 67).
At the 2000 general election, Aznar’s PP secured a historic absolute majority. In principle, the
result meant that political influence obtained by Catalan nationalists was reduced. CiU’s in
particular, as PP no longer needed their support. Pujol lamented the circumstances, saying that
“it is clear that we are no longer decisive” (Prieto 2000). Subsequently, the political discourse
changed. Guibernau (2013: 381) explains that Catalan demands for greater autonomy met
hostile neo-centralist, conservative and neo-liberal argumentation, replacing earlier
sympathetic understanding. Maiz et al. (2010: 67) argue that Spanish nationalism stopped being
stigmatized. Statements made by Aznar after the election exemplified the new situation:
32
“The moment of claiming [regional] nationalism has ended”, expressing expectations on regional
parties to “commit to political stability and the great national projects we are going to undertake”
(El Pais 2000)
Aznar’s initial approach was to not alter the established institutional relations with the
Generalitat, stating he would “fulfill his commitments, but without concessions” (Aizpeolea
2000). Increased autonomy demands were consequently dismissed. Accusations against
opposition parties for expressing desires of federal constitutional reform were made, which PP
viewed as a threat against national unity, by promoting secessionism (González Casanova
2009). Aznar’s position was stated in a political gathering, where he argued that “Spain is made
possible by its Constitution, which is not to be played with by means of federalisms or
frivolities” (Casqueiro 2000). Aja (2003) describes Aznar’s position as decisive in preventing
further decentralization. The legitimation of existing autonomic structures meant further
reforms were discarded. Offers from PP to form part of the central government were
subsequently rejected. Pujol rationalized his decision in an interview, noting:
“We distinguish some trends from Aznar’s government that concern us: a series of proposals for
new laws that, if passed, would represent a step back for autonomy” and “a CiU minister cannot talk
about the government of the nation, because his nation is Catalonia” (Rusiñol and Casqueiro 2002)
In 2003, a three-party coalition led by Pasquall Maragall and composed by the Socialists’ Party
of Catalonia (PSC), the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) and Initiative for Catalonia Greens
(ICV) won the election – introducing a new Catalan government. Immediately, it declared
Aznar’s government its antagonist, suspending any form of governmental or parliamentary
cooperation. The coalition’s fundamental aspiration was to to extend self-government by
elaborating a new Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia (Colomer 2017: 960).
Meanwhile, dissatisfaction with Aznar’s government meant that opposition leader of PSOE, J.
L. Rodríguez Zapatero received great support from Catalans. The general perception of him as
a defender of a plural Spain with sympathetic sentiments towards Catalonia meant his 2004
general election victory was received well, as he was perceived as a defender of a plural Spain.
with sympathetic sentiments towards the political aspirations of Catalonia (Guibernau 2013:
381). Zapatero later affirmed what he had promised the previous year as opposition: he would
support a new statute which defined Catalonia as a nation, stating that he "will not engage in a
battle of words and terminology but a commitment to coexistence" (Rusiñol and Cué 2003: El
33
País 2005). Mariano Rajoy, new leader of PP responded by declaring in a large gathering in
Madrid that “[Spain does] not constitute a nation of nations” and “there is only one nation, the
Spanish” (Marcos 2005). Nevertheless, through renegotiations with the Spanish government,
modifications by the Spanish parliament, and ratification through a referendum in Catalonia,
the new statute would later be approved (Colomer 2017: 960). 73.9% of Catalans voted in favor,
while 20.76% against with a low turnout of 49.42% (El Mundo 2006).
It was challenged for being unconstitutional in the Spanish Constitutional Court through legal
proceedings influenced by PP. After four years of deliberation, the sentence was made public
in 2010. By a six to four majority, the Court's justices rewrote 14 articles and imposed the
interpretation for 27 more, most relating to language, justice and fiscal policy. It also signaled
that “The Constitution knows no other nation than the Spanish” (El Pais 2010).
4.1.5 Interpretation
During the bargaining phase, decentralization was reproduced and strengthened, albeit in
different degrees. A pattern is recognized where reproduction versus strengthening depended
on the political power of the central government. The status quo was preferred by central elites
when they enjoyed an absolute majority in the Spanish parliament, weakening regional elites
and their capacity to influence decision-making. In contrast, when the central government
needed political support, regional elites were strengthened, and institutional change was
pursued. As such, a power mechanism is evident, where inclusion and exclusion depended on
the political power of the central elites. Furthermore, the degree of path dependence seemed to
depend on the ideology and political position of the central government – where the social-
democratic PSOE self-reinforced a decentralized state whereas conservative PP were more
reluctant, and even exhibited centralist and nationalist tendencies when they enjoyed an
absolute majority in the parliament. Nevertheless, commitments on institutionalized autonomy
concessions were fulfilled by both parties, illustrating how path dependence was well-
established during this phase.
A legitimacy mechanism is noticeable in the reproduction of decentralization, as key elite actors
from the central government consistently referenced the Spanish constitution when justifying
the “State of Autonomies”, displaying a clear conviction of its appropriateness. The regional
governance led by Pujol also characterized such a justification, as independence was neither
34
promoted nor pursued, but supportive of the strengthening of the current state of affairs. In
contrast, the post-Pujol era is distinguished by a stronger challenge of the status quo.
Efficiency mechanisms are less apparent during this phase. An exception is PSOE’s leadership
under Zapatero, where the mechanism was evident in the strengthening of decentralization
through increased competitive pressures, since his perception was that support for a new
Catalan statute gave a political advantage as opposition. It proved to be successful too, as he
received strong support from Catalonia, which helped him become Prime Minister of Spain. A
power mechanism is also accentuated during this time, as Zapatero’s inclusion of regional elites
in negotiations of the new statute exemplifies, strengthening decentralization. The status quo
was never altered however, as the sentence by the Constitutional Court meant existing
institutions were continuously self-reinforced.
4.1.6 Mobilization phase (c); 2010-present
Newly appointed leader of the Generalitat José Montilla described the sentence as an “attack
on self-government” and urged Catalans to “go out massively in the street in an act of catalanity
and unity” (Noguer 2010). The following day, a protest was held in Barcelona which was
attended by over a million people. During this period, CiU changed its historic moderate
position by defending Catalonia’s political sovereignty, despite internal differences (Barrio and
Field 2018: 713). Several months later, the 2010 Catalan election saw CiU return to power
under the leadership of Arthur Mas. He pledged to improve Catalonia’s fiscal relationship with
Spain. In 2011, Zapatero called for a snap election four months earlier than anticipated. The
general election was held the same year and resulted in an absolute majority victory for Rajoy
and PP – a historic result for the party (Hernanz 2011).
On the national day of Catalonia, the 2012 Catalan independence demonstration was held,
where around 1.5 million protestors demanded secession. Meanwhile, meetings with Rajoy
proved unsuccessful, with Mas declaring that the message received on greater fiscal autonomy
was “of no margin to negotiate” (Piñol and Cué 2012). As a result of the demonstration, Mas
called a snap election. CiU won, obtaining 71 out of 135 seats in the Catalan parliament
(Guibernau 2014: 20). In 2012, the prospect of holding an independence referendum became
the central debate in Catalan politics. Mas became committed to hold a non-binding self-
determination referendum. Rajoy was categorical in his response, stating “I guarantee that this
referendum is not going to be held. It is unconstitutional” (Cué 2013a). He added:
35
“If there are proposals, I will be open to dialogue, but there are some issues on which I cannot be
asked to give in. Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitution, Spain and national sovereignty for me are not
negotiable” (Cué 2013b)
After Spanish authorities prohibited the referendum, the Catalan government rebranded the vote
as a “participation process”, and the result showed a clear majority in support for independence.
Mas and members of the Catalan government were banned from holding public office for their
involvement in the vote (Barrio and Field 2018: 714). Prohibited from holding a legal
referendum, Mas began to design a plan to proclaim independence within 18 months (Noguer
2014). In 2015, by repeating a snap election, he confirmed that it would be considered an
alternative vote on independence. Committed to declare independence if they won, an alliance
of pro-independence parties called Together for Yes (JxSí) led by Mas came out victorious,
albeit without an absolute majority, obtaining 62 seats out of 135. Because of this, a three-
month deadlock ensued. It culminated when Mas struck a last-minute agreement to form a new
government, with him stepping aside to seal the deal (The Guardian 2016). Carles Puigdemont
became the new President of the Generalitat in 2016. He promised to hold a referendum on
independence even if it infringed Spanish law (Barrio and Field 2018: 714).
Keeping his promise, the 2017 Catalan independence referendum was held, regardless of
Spain's Constitutional Court ruling that it breached the Spanish constitution. Despite the
Spanish Police closing voting centers (Grierson 2017) and using excessive force (Human Rights
Watch 2017), 43% of Catalan citizens managed to vote in the referendum with 92% of them
supporting independence. Following the result, Puigdemont called for direct negotiations
between Rajoy, sending him a letter in which he wrote:
“For the next two months, our main objective is dialogue” and “Let’s not let the situation deteriorate
further. I am sure we can find the path to a solution. Our offer for dialogue is sincere despite
everything that has happened.” (Fotheringham 2017)
Deputy PM Soraya Saenz de Santamaria responded by arguing that Puigdemont had yet not
decided if he officially declared Catalonia independent or not, noting that “We deeply regret
that. Nobody’s denying him the right to ask for dialogue, but you can only have dialogue inside
the law” (Ibid). The Generalitat declared independence in October 2017, which resulted in the
Spanish government imposing direct rule on Catalonia, dismissing Puigdemont and the Catalan
government. Charges of rebellion, sedition, and misuse of public funds were brought, which
36
meant some independence leaders were sent to preventive detention without bail whereas
Puigdemont and four members of his government fled into self-exile to Belgium (La
Vanguardia 2017a). Nonetheless, the 2017 Catalan election was held two months later. Anti-
independence party Citizens (Cs) emerged as the largest winner with 36 seats, but the combined
votes for pro-independence parties meant they maintained their majority, with 70 seats of 135.
Puigdemont described the result as “a slap to the face” to Madrid (Burgen and Jones 2017).
In a televised interview, Puigdemont revealed he declared independence because “there was no
other option”, stating that “it obviously is not the only solution”, maintaining that “it is the duty
of Spain to formulate its solution for this problem” (La Vanguardia 2017b). He added:
"What is not acceptable is to deny the problem (...), we are willing to listen to everything, but you
have to sit down and talk" Puigdemont explains that after the Statute ruling, the itinerary of the State
itself was chosen, but “maybe it could be a State that has a confederal, federal, associated with Spain
or independent”, but the answer has always been 'no' (Ibid)
In contrast, Rajoy revealed in his book ‘A Better Spain’ that when he had his first meeting with
Puigdemont in 2016, it took him “a minute to confirm what he already sensed: [Puigdemont’s]
only intention was to continue with the secessionist process”. Allegedly, Puigdemont told Rajoy
that “You will not authorize it because, in addition, you cannot”, referencing the 2017
independence referendum. According to the former PP leader, Puigdemont “never had the will
to agree anything” (Rajoy 2019). He added:
“The right to decide is the sweetened and angelic way that nationalists have found to hide their true
will: to achieve the right to self-determination, which does not admit any democratic state” (Ibid)
Pedro Sánchez of PSOE became Prime Minister in 2018 after a successful motion of no
confidence against Rajoy. He would later announce that “The important thing is that those
involved [in the secessionist process] have to be tried by Spanish courts. And that will happen”
(González et al. 2018). In October 2019, the verdict of Spain’s Supreme Court was made public,
which sentenced nine Catalan independence leaders to between nine and 13 years in prison.
Following the decision, protests erupted in Barcelona, where large crowds of pro-independence
protesters clashed with police, resulting in a series of violent uprisings (BBC News 2019). After
five consecutive days of violence, newly elected President of the Generalitat Quim Torra called
for talks with Spain’s government, noting that violence did not reflect the nature of the
37
traditional Catalan independence movement (Burgen and Jones 2019). Sánchez refused to
dialogue, arguing that the Catalan government had insufficiently condemned the violence. He
concluded asserting “Democracy, yes, violence, never” (Recuero 2019).
4.1.7 Interpretation
During the mobilization phase, decentralization was severely challenged. The sentencing of the
new Catalan statute fueled an outrage from not only regional elite actors but also a big part of
the Catalan population. A legitimacy mechanism for the self-reinforcement of existing
decentralized institutions is present in the sense that Madrid defended and enforced the Spanish
constitution, arguing in favor of its legitimacy, and imposing its reproduction. Contrastingly, a
large number of Catalan elites began changing their perceptions and beliefs, favoring
independence over the reproduction and strengthening of decentralized institutions. Also, the
Catalan population’s perception of existing institutions as legitimate changed – evident by the
independence referendum results, the shift in public opinion towards a stronger support for
secessionism, and the increase in protests and demonstrations against the current state of affairs.
The development is equally explained by the presence of a power mechanism self-reinforcing
the status quo. Reproduction was supported by central elites, whereas regional elites were
excluded from decision-making, with a lowered capacity of political influence as a result.
Political negotiations were absent between central and regional elites and the absolute majority
achieved by Rajoy in 2011 meant political power was kept in the central government. A strong
path dependence was evident, consolidated by considerable inertia from Spanish central elites.
4.2 United Kingdom and Scotland
4.2.1 Overview of decentralization and public support for secessionism
The United Kingdom is a decentralized unitary state. It comprises of four countries: England,
Scotland, and Wales (which collectively make up Great Britain) and Northern Ireland. The
latter three have gained a degree of autonomy through a process formally referred to as
devolution. It differs from federalism in that the devolved powers of the regional authorities
reside in the central government – thus the state remains, de jure, unitary (Harvey 2019: 2).
Scotland, following a referendum held in 1997, gained an autonomous executive accountable
to an elected legislature in the form of the Scottish Parliament. It has legislative powers with
respect to all policies except those considered as exclusive matters for the UK. Scotland also
possesses governmental power sharing arrangements, as routine meetings between central and
38
regional governments to negotiate policy are held, albeit without legally binding authority.
Regional representatives are consulted on regional aspects of UK legislation. Regional
governments are also a represented majority in constitutional reform legislature, meaning they
can raise the barrier for constitutional change. Via the 1998 Scotland Act, it was stipulated that
the Scottish executive must be consulted on relevant UK and EU laws (Hooghe et al. (2010:
38, 41, 147-149). RAI scores on self-rule and shared rule are presented in Table 1.
In the devolved government of the United Kingdom, Scotland and its population are
constitutionally represented through the Secretary of State for Scotland. As such, in terms of
access to executive governmental power, the EPR-ETH categorize Scottish regional elites as
included into the executive and are coded as junior partner (Girardin et al. 2015).
In terms of public support for secessionism, the Scottish independence referendum held on 18
September 2014 resulted in Scotland voting against independence by 55.3% to 44.7%, with an
overall turnout of 84.6% (BBC News 2014a). The question was: “Should Scotland be an
independent country?”, which voters answered with “Yes” or “No” (Gov.uk 2014a). Following
the referendum, opinion polls have asked how people would vote in a hypothetical second
referendum. 25 opinion polls were conducted in the year after the referendum, with 17 showing
a predominant “No” answer, 7 showing a predominant “Yes” answer, and 1 showing an equal
proportion (Curtice 2015). Between 18 September 2015 and 18 September 2016, a further 24
opinion polls were conducted, of which 20 had a predominant “No” answer, and 4 had a
predominant “Yes” answer (Curtice 2016). 26 opinion polls were conducted from 18 September
2016 to 18 September 2017, with 25 returning “No” as the predominant answer and only 1
returning “Yes” as the predominant answer (Curtice 2019). “No” has been the predominant
answer on opinion polls conducted until December 2019.
Since devolution, the annual Scottish Attitudes Survey (SSA) conducted a survey between
1999-2017 on Scottish citizens which included a question on independence. Table 4 illustrates
public opinion regarding constitutional preference on how Scotland should be governed:
39
Table 4. Public opinion on how Scotland should be governed
Note: Author’s elaboration using data from SSA in conjunction with Curtice (2016).
4.2.2 Implementation phase (a); 1997-1999
The origins of Scottish devolution are rooted in a long history. Ever since the Parliament of
Scotland adjourned in 1707, an active advocacy for the return of a Scottish Parliament had been
present (UK Government 2013: 16). Under the leadership of the Conservative Party and
Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister of the UK, devolution suffered strong opposition and
defeat, after a disappointing referendum result in 1979. The Conservatives under Thatcher’s
successor John Major rejected devolution as well, albeit to a lesser degree. In contrast, in a 1993
speech by the then leader of the Labour Party, John Smith, referred to the prospect of a Scottish
Parliament as “the settled will of the Scottish people”, the creation of which would form the
“cornerstone” of his party’s plan for “democratic renewal” in the UK (Rhodes 2019). It was the
return to office of the Labour Party in 1997, under the leadership of Tony Blair, after eighteen
years in opposition that ensured devolution and Scotland’s position within the Union would be
put on the agenda. Blair had campaigned for a version of devolution much different than its
equivalent kind proposed in 1979. The Scottish Parliament would be powerful domestically,
with only a few policy matters reserved to Westminster (Kidd and Petrie 2016: 41-43).
Devolution was realized with remarkable efficiency. After the general election held in May
40
1997, legislation was passed by the end of July to conduct a referendum in Scotland. The
referendum was held in September (Mitchell 2014: 248). Three days before the historic vote,
Blair campaigned in Edinburgh, arguing the vote for Scottish devolution was one of “huge
significance” to the UK as a whole and stated it would:
“show the whole of the United Kingdom that there is a better way that Britain can be governed, that
we can bring power closer to the people, closer to the people’s priorities and that we can give
Scotland the ability to be a proud nation within the United Kingdom.” (Rhodes 2019)
The referendum campaign came to focus about the two questions voters were to be asked; first,
whether they wanted a Scottish Parliament, and second, whether that parliament should have
taxation powers. In support for devolution was the Labour Party together with the Liberal
Democrats and the SNP as part of ‘Scotland FORward’. The opposition was led by the
Conservative Party as part of ‘Think Twice’ (Kidd and Petrie 2016: 43-44). The Scottish
population voted for a Scottish Parliament (74.3%) and for taxation powers (63.5%) with a
turnout of 60.4% (Mitchell 2014: 251). After the results of the referendum were confirmed,
Blair flew to Edinburgh and spoke publicly, declaring:
“This is a good day for Scotland, and a good day for Britain and the United Kingdom … the era of
big, centralised government is over!” (Pilkington 2002: 96)
The confidence and conviction shown by the Labour Party when implementing devolution
stood in stark contrast with the timidity of earlier proposals. A revision of opinion had taken
place in the intervening years, with most of its members now near-unanimously in favor of
devolution (Kidd and Petrie 2016: 44). The referendum was held before legislation, which
meant that debates in Westminster were based on an understanding that devolution would
happen, so as to avoid incentives to disrupt reform as had been the case in the 1970s (Mitchell
2014: 248). Blair would later confirm this strategic choice in his autobiography, commenting
also why devolution was pursued in the first place:
“I was never a passionate devolutionist. It is a dangerous game to play. You can never be sure where
nationalist sentiment ends and separatist sentiment begins. I supported the UK, distrusted
nationalism as a concept, and looked at the history books and worried whether we could get it
through. However, though not passionate about it, I thought it inevitable.” and “We didn’t want
Scotland to feel the choice was status quo or separation. And it was a central part of our programme
for Scotland.” (Blair 2010: 540-541)
41
According to Kidd and Petrie (2016: 45) devolution was seen as a resolution, not a beginning
for Labour elites. Perhaps the clearest example of this was made by George Robertson in 1996,
then Labour’s Shadow Scottish Secretary, who remarked that devolution was expected to “kill
Scottish nationalism stone dead”. Others were not as convinced. Ron Davies, the Welsh
Secretary saw devolution as a process rather than an event (Ibid). Tam Dalyell, a Scottish
politician who was a member of the House of Commons, thought devolution would lead to
independence. Blair later reflected on this period in an interview, stating:
“I think generally, the Labour politicians genuinely believed that devolution was the right thing,
because I had this conversation a lot with John Smith and Donald [Dewar] and those are the two
people whose judgement I really trusted, and they were the ultimate, sane, rational guys.” and
“Ultimately, I think we overestimated, for sure, the degree to which devolution would quash
independence, that’s correct, but then I think, as I say, if you look round the world and you look at
Canada, you look at Spain, you look at all of the classic disputes over devolution vs independence,
they all followed the same pattern, but I think were it not for Brexit now, probably the mood in
Scotland would be less in favour of independence than for some time.” (Rhodes 2019)
The Scotland Act of 1998 was introduced by the Labour government after the referendum took
place, creating the Scottish Parliament in 1999. At the opening ceremony Donald Dewar, the
Labour First Minister and chief architect of the new parliament, delivered a speech in which he
proclaimed that “Today, we look forward to the time when this moment will be seen as a turning
point: the day when democracy was renewed in Scotland, when we revitalised our place in this
our United Kingdom.” (UK Government 2013: 11).
4.2.3 Interpretation
The UK 1997 general election marked a new contextual and transitional situation, as the victory
of the Labour Party ended an eighteen-year dominance of the Conservative Party characterized
by its centrist doctrine. During this critical juncture, Tony Blair and his party had the possibility
to open up a new path in British politics – one which would account for significant institutional
and political change. The direction taken was consolidated and made explicit with the passing
of the Scotland Act in 1998, which established the Scottish Parliament as a devolved legislature
for Scotland in order to guarantee autonomy. The decision-making process manifested in this
period marks a political focal point that consolidated the initial path dependence of devolution.
42
During the implementation phase, the centrist institutional reproduction was abrupted when
devolution was implemented. Leading actors within the Labour Party recognized a democratic
deficit, suggesting that Britain could be governed in a “better” way, where power could be
brought closer to the people. The status quo was challenged by Labour elites, and institutional
change was achieved through the inclusion of Scottish elites in the decision-making agenda,
emphasizing a power mechanism at work. However, the decision to pursue devolution was
taken prior to Labour Party’s election victory. It was done so because it was perceived to give
a political advantage as opposition. A centrist doctrine was no longer in the self-interest to
reproduce for Labour elites, as this established institution had been shown to mostly benefit the
Conservative Party. The eighteen years as opposition had served as a learning process. Thus,
institutional change came also via an efficiency mechanism.
Lastly, during this phase, devolution was perceived as “the right thing” by leading Labour
politicians. Tony Blair might not have shared their sentiment, but he trusted the judgement of
Smith and Dewar which believed centrist institutions were inappropriate. As such, change was
brought forward through a mechanism of legitimacy too, as devolution reforms were
understood to be more legitimate than existing centrist institutions.
4.2.4 Bargaining phase (b); 1999-2011
Preparatory work began under the supervision of an all-party Consultative Steering Group
(CSG), chaired by Scottish Office Minister in charge of devolution, Henry McLeish. The first
elections to the Scottish Parliament were held in 1999 and saw Labour win 56 seats out of 129.
The SNP won 35, the Conservatives 18 and the Liberal Democrats 17. As First Minister of
Scotland, Dewar spoke of creating “a new politics in Scotland, bringing back popular
legitimacy while creating the basis to reinvigorate Scottish life”, noting that the Scottish
Parliament would “speak for the people of Scotland, is closer to their needs and concerns, and
is ultimately accountable to them” (Mitchell 2014: 247-254).
The CSG attempted to develop the idea of “new politics” but focused preliminary on the
operation of the parliament instead of the executive. Barry Winetrobe, former House of
Commons official, had an important role in advising parliamentary procedures. After its
establishment, the Scottish Parliament adopted the CSG principles, which he described:
43
“The first principle, ‘sharing the power’, is best regarded as an overarching aspiration, and the fourth
principle, ‘equal opportunities’, should be a criterion applicable to any public institution or activity.
Thus, the second and third principles, ‘accountability’ and ‘access and participation’, are the
substantive, practical core of the CSG approach, with accountability being the expression of a central
parliamentary function, and access and participation emphasising the ‘new politics’.” (Ibid: 256)
During this time, parliamentary debates highlighted how little attention had been paid to
devolution’s implications for the rest of the Union. An amendment proposed the establishment
of a formal ‘Interparliamentary Consultative Commission’ to guarantee cooperation and avoid
damaging turf wars. In response, an announcement was made by the government that it intended
to establish “standing arrangements for the devolved administrations to be involved by the UK
government at ministerial level when they consider reserved matters which impinge on
devolved responsibilities”. Though not intended to be on a statuary basis, an important body
for relations between Scotland and London called the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) was
established, consisting of ministers from Westminster and devolved administrations. They
would meet in a consultative manner, installing a format for cooperation between the
governments (Tierney 2007: 745) The UK government also established ‘concordants’ between
various parts of the two executives which Donald Dewar would label as “road maps for
bureaucrats” (Mitchell 2014: 253).
Following the death of Dewar in 2000, Henry McLeish became Scotland’s First Minister.
Unlike his predecessor however, he developed a different understanding of devolution. Opting
for less conservatism, negotiations meant various different policy advances allowed the
Holyrood administration to differentiate itself from Westminster (Kidd and Petrie 2016: 46)
Much decision-making involved interdependence between different levels of government and
many policies had spillover effects, creating demands for similar policies in England. His tenure
lasted only a year, as he had to resign following a financial scandal. Jack McConnell became
his replacement and led the party to its second election victory in 2003. Rather than pursuing
policy development, the hallmarks of devolution under his leadership were characterized by
stability and partnership with London (Mitchell 2014: 261).
While Labour treated devolution as a promise delivered, the SNP had been adjusting to the new
political landscape. At the 2007 elections and under the leadership of Alex Salmond, they
emerged as the largest party, securing 47 seats to Labour’s 46 (Kidd and Petrie 2016: 46). SNP
favored independence and committed to solicit a referendum on the matter. Public support for
44
independence was lower than SNP’s support, but the party’s independence stance contributed
to the sense that they would stand up for Scotland in bargaining with London. Following their
victory, the SNP announced that the Scottish Executive was to be renamed as the “Scottish
Government”, a proposal made by McLeish which had met strong resistance from his party at
the time (Mitchell 2014: 271). In the early months of the SNP minority government, Labour
provided robust opposition. It urged a review of the provisions of the Scotland Act of 1998,
which resulted in the establishment of the Calman Commission, a body supported by all the
pro-Union parties. The Commission’s final report notes that devolution “works well in practice”
and “is here to stay” – recommending further devolved powers to the Scottish Parliament and
Government, concluding that:
“devolution is also an efficient, effective and collaborative form of government. Effective co-
operation between Scotland’s two governments is built into the fabric of devolution, and exemplified
in how they work together on a daily basis.” (UK Government 2013: 22, 28)
The SNP adopted a pragmatic, technocratic approach to government much in contrast to how
Scottish Labour had been under Dewar, McLeish, or McConnell. Cooperation with
Westminster was pursued but not reciprocated. Mitchell (2014: 272) notes how Labour had
difficulty coming to terms with defeat after being the dominant party for half a century. Blair
refused to phone Salmond to congratulate him on becoming First Minister yet had no issues to
congratulate Rhodri Morgan on his re-election as Welsh First Minister. It was evident that
Labour perceived the SNP as upstart usurpers. Meanwhile, Salmond argued for a resurgence of
the formal inter-governmental machinery that had been established in 1999 but had seldom
been used. His formal request was ignored by London. Labour expected that the SNP
government would fail, but it became the other way around. Gordon Brown became Prime
Minister in 2007, and his relationship with Blair deteriorated. Despite being born in Scotland
and an early supporter for devolution, the new Prime Minister appeared uncomfortable with his
Scottish identity – a discomfort which did not help inter-governmental relations (Ibid).
After three consecutive victories, the Labour Party led first by Blair and then Brown suffered
defeat in the 2010 UK general election against the Conservative Party led by David Cameron.
Cameron had in the previous years as opposition utilized Labour’s difficulties with devolution
to self-promote his party’s new stance on the matter, suggesting a less hostile position against
45
the Scottish Parliament (Ibid: 274). He would later call for an “agenda of respect”, ensuring
good relations between Edinburgh and London. He added:
“I also want to see a fresh start in the relationship between the British Prime Minister and the Scottish
First Minister. This relationship is important. However much we may disagree about issues we
should try to work together for the benefit of the whole of the United Kingdom and for the benefit
of Scotland as well. That is what I’m determined to do.” (Gov.uk 2010)
4.2.5 Interpretation
During the bargaining phase, decentralized institutions were reproduced. The new politics
adopted in Scotland legitimized the reformed institutions on the basis of a majority of actors
who deemed them to be justified and appropriate within their societal context. Devolution was
reproduced by elite actors who argued that it worked well in practice, exemplified by ample
cooperation between governments. As such, mechanisms of efficiency and legitimacy are
identified in the self-reinforcement of decentralization.
Powers were gradually devolved to Scotland on the basis of principles agreed by both Labour
and Scottish elites. Devolution was strengthened by elite actors who included Scottish elites in
the decision-making agenda, strengthening their political influence not only regionally, but
nationally as well. A power mechanism is evident during this period. When the SNP came to
power after the 2007 Scottish election the status quo was questioned. However, given the
previous mechanisms, devolved institutions continued to be reproduced by the majority of elite
actors involved. Conservative elite actors took advantage of the difficulties experienced by the
Labour Party to reinvigorate their former traditional centrist stance. This unprecedented
development demonstrates how path dependence was well-established at this point.
4.2.6 Mobilization phase (c); 2011-present
The SNP repeated its commitment to hold an independence referendum prior to the 2011
Scottish Parliament election (Stuart 2011). The election result delivered the first majority
government since the opening of Holyrood, with the SNP winning 69 seats – a remarkable feat
considering the electoral system had been designed to prevent it. Support for the party had
doubled between 2003 and 2011 elections, but support for independence remained equal.
Nevertheless, Kidd and Petrie (2016: 47) claim an independence referendum became probable,
if not inevitable. Indeed, after obtaining an absolute majority, the SNP addressed whether the
46
Scottish Parliament could legislate an independence referendum. Legal opinion was divided,
but the UK constitution remains a “political institution”, and in Griffith’s (1979: 17) classic
account there are only “political claims by individuals and groups”. Disputes about legality
gave way to the political importance of the situation (Mitchell 2016: 80).
Westminster conceded that “the future of Scotland’s place within the United Kingdom is for
people in Scotland to vote on”, stating they would not interfere with the SNP and a referendum
on Scottish independence (UK Government 2012: 5). This commitment was delivered through
the Edinburgh Agreement, which transferred the powers to hold a legal, fair and decisive
referendum on independence to the Scottish Parliament – enabling the Scottish Government to
meet its democratic mandate (UK Government 2013: 19). The Scottish Government's official
publication on the independence referendum argued that it was “a once in a generation
opportunity” (Scottish Government 2013).
The referendum campaign involved ‘Yes Scotland’, in favor of Scottish independence, and
‘Better Together’, in favor of Scotland remaining in the United Kingdom. The latter had support
from all pro-union parties, including the Conservative Party, Labour Party and Liberal
Democrats. In a televised debate ahead of the referendum, Salmond proclaimed:
“My case this evening is simple - no one, absolutely no one will do a better job of running Scotland
than the people who live and work in Scotland.” (BBC News 2014b)
Mitchell (2016: 90) notes that the referendum saw an exceptional increase in public
participation, and interest in politics assumed unprecedented levels during the campaign.
Interviews with key figures on both sides of the debate as well as journalists covering the
campaign confirmed this perception (Bicker 2014). In the end, the result of the referendum was
unambiguous, as a clear majority voted to remain in the union. The length and intensity of the
campaign were unusual and helped ensure higher levels of public engagement, voter
registration, and turnout (Mitchell 2016: 97). Following the outcome of the referendum, Prime
Minister David Cameron issued several statements, including:
“The Scottish National Party (SNP) was elected in Scotland in 2011 and promised a referendum on
independence. We could have blocked that; we could have put it off, but just as with other big issues,
it was right to take - not duck - the big decision.” and “I am a passionate believer in our United
Kingdom – I wanted more than anything for our United Kingdom to stay together. But I am also a
47
democrat. And it was right that we respected the SNP’s majority in Holyrood and gave the Scottish
people their right to have their say.” (Gov.uk 2014b)
Salmond accepted the “verdict of the people” and called on “to follow suit in accepting the
democratic verdict of the people of Scotland”. He called the referendum “a triumph for the
democratic process and for participation in politics” (Scottish Government 2014).
The 2015 United Kingdom general election saw Cameron and the Conservatives win by an
absolute majority. At the Scottish election in 2016, the SNP led by Nicola Sturgeon were re-
elected, albeit with two seats shy of an absolute majority. Seven weeks later at the 2016 Brexit
referendum, 62% of Scotland voted to remain in the EU, while a UK-wide majority voted to
leave (McHarg and Mitchell 2017: 512; Thompson 2019: 141). Sturgeon reacted to the result
by stating that it would be “democratically unacceptable” that Scotland should face the prospect
of leaving the EU against its will. On the probability of a second independence referendum, she
answered “highly likely” (BBC News 2016). In 2017, a non-binding vote (90 to 34) to oppose
Brexit was passed by the Scottish Parliament (McHarg and Mitchell 2017: 523).
The 2017 United Kingdom general election saw the Conservatives, now led by Theresa May,
win again but without an absolute majority. May said she called for a snap-election to strengthen
her position in the forthcoming Brexit negotiations (McAuley 2017). It failed, and a prolonged
parliamentary deadlock over Brexit ensued. It forced the resignation of May, and her successor
Boris Johnson called for election in December 2019. It resulted in an absolute majority win for
the Conservatives. Following the results, Sturgeon highlighted “the democratic right of the
people of Scotland to determine our own future”. Johnson rejected her call, and a spokesperson
said the 2014 vote “should be respected” (Carell and Brooks 2019).
4.2.7 Interpretation
During the mobilization phase, devolution was challenged. The parliamentary majority
achieved by the SNP in the 2011 Scottish election meant that independence was put on the
political agenda. The Scottish government argued that devolution had not adequately managed
the perceived democratic deficit, presenting independence as a solution for institutional change.
In this argument, the presence of all three mechanisms are identified. Efficiency and power
mechanisms are manifested through the notion that independence would give the people of
Scotland the means to pursue their own policies, contributing not only to more effective
48
governance, but also empowerment. A legitimacy mechanism can be observed through Scottish
elites’ perception on devolved institutions, which were believed to be unjust.
The developments of increased secessionist pressures from elite Scottish nationalists instigated
an immediate reaction from David Cameron and his government. As a result, political power
was transferred from Conservative to Scottish elites to hold an independence referendum,
despite the UK government acknowledging a preference for the preservation of the union. Thus,
a lack of inertia from the central government meant decentralization was strengthened through
a mechanism of power, instead of reproduced. The referendum result showed voters rejected
independence, meaning the majority of the Scottish population were in disagreement with their
elite representatives in relation to their support for devolution. Effectively, the political
landscape was reversed to a bargaining phase.
However, Brexit has meant that a second independence referendum is being pursued by SNP,
despite initial consideration of the 2014 referendum as a generational phenomenon. With a
majority in Scotland against leaving the EU, it could help explain the shift in Scottish public
opinion on independence registered between 2016-2017 by SSA (see Table 4).
5 Between-case comparison
In this section, both cases are systematically compared between each other. Historical and
empirical characteristics are distinguished in conjunction with the theoretical social
mechanisms identified in each case. This is repeated in each phase.
5.1 Implementation phase (a)
Both cases are strikingly similar during this phase. All three mechanisms of efficiency,
legitimacy and power are identified in each case, and they appear to have worked together as
catalysts for the institutionalization of a decentralization process. However, it is not easy to
point out a particular one as decisive in this development. Both cases are characterized by a
rather drastic and accelerated institutional change – from institutions with a predominant
centralist doctrine, to institutions of decentralization to counter a perceived democratic deficit
in each respective society, albeit in different degrees. Spain and Catalonia’s transition from
authoritarian regime to democracy was of course far more radical. Nevertheless, the contextual
49
circumstances experienced in each case share similarities, as key actors took advantage of
transitional situations to establish and subsequently reproduce a new path dependence.
5.2 Bargaining phase (b)
During this phase, the differences between the cases begin to become discernible. In Spain and
Catalonia, all mechanisms are present, although efficiency less so than the other two. However,
their directions were dependent on whether the central government enjoyed an absolute
majority or not. When they did, decentralization was reproduced without concessions given to
regional governments, and when they did not, decentralization was strengthened. A power
mechanism was evident, but inclusion and exclusion depended on the political power of the
central elites. Yet, regardless of an absolute majority or not, Catalan elites did not participate
in the Spanish central government. They enjoyed no additional political influence when central
majority governments were in power, and they gave parliamentary support in exchange for
greater autonomy when single-party minority governments were in power. Relations between
central and regional governments were dependent on political party affiliations.
In contrast, decentralization was reproduced through social mechanisms of efficiency and
legitimacy in the UK and Scotland. The decentralization process was not as strongly influenced
by the composition of the central government. Because of this, a power mechanism allowed for
an acceleration of the process, and Scottish elites were included in the UK government,
receiving enhanced decision-making competencies regionally and nationally. Thus, the degrees
of path dependence differ – a stronger dependency is identified in Spain and Catalonia, where
considerable inertia was present in central elites, whereas a weaker dependency is recognized
in the UK and Scotland, where central inertia was not as severe.
5.3 Mobilization phase (c)
The differences between the cases in this phase are clear. In Spain and Catalonia, the
decentralization process was fiercely challenged by regional elites through illegal independence
referenda. Mobilization for secessionism was accentuated by the Spanish government’s active
exclusion of Catalan elites from political influence. Political ties between them were practically
non-existent. Despite having a majority in favor of an independence referendum in the
Generalitat, the Spanish government of Rajoy refused to acknowledge their secessionist
demands, referencing the Spanish Constitution as justification. Thus, social mechanisms of
50
legitimacy and power worked to impose the status quo, rather than change it. As a result, the
degree of public support for secessionism reached unprecedented levels, manifested by massive
demonstrations and protests against a perceived maltreatment of the Spanish government.
The decentralization process was also challenged by Scottish elites in the UK. However,
whereas Madrid dismissed all Catalan demands, London chose to take a different course.
Instead of getting stuck in legality disputes, the UK government of Cameron opted for a
political approach – where a democratic process was respected over a judicial counterpart,
despite having an anti-independence standpoint. Therefore, a social mechanism of power was
decisive in the central government’s response to Scotland’s challenge of the status quo, granting
Scottish elites the required political capacities to legally hold an independence referendum,
including them within the national decision-making institutions. In response, the degree of
public support for secessionism did not increase, and a majority of the Scottish population voted
against independence. Throughout the process, public support for independence was lower than
public support for the SNP, suggesting a majority of Scotland’s population perceived the
existing decentralization institutions as legitimate and just. Brexit has had an impact however,
but it remains to be seen if it is long-lasting or a temporary phenomenon.
In sum, social mechanisms of legitimacy and power were decisive in reproducing existing
decentralization institutions in Spain and Catalonia. Considerable inertia from the central
government forced the process to linger in a mobilization phase, with higher degrees of public
support for secessionism compared to previous phases. Contrarily, a power mechanism proved
causal in containing secessionism in the UK and Scotland. By strengthening decentralization,
the process was reversed to a bargaining phase, and the degree of public support for
secessionism saw no significant increase, remaining consistent throughout all three phases. A
shift can be observed post-Brexit, although opinion polls conducted after and until December
2019 show a majority against independence, albeit by narrow margins (Curtice 2019).
51
6 Results
6.1 Consistency with the hypothesis
The findings indicate that the hypothesis of the thesis receives support. It reads:
Decentralization with a higher degree of governmental power sharing (shared rule) is associated
with a lower degree of public support for secessionism.
A lower degree of shared rule in Spain and Catalonia was associated with a higher degree of
public support for secessionism. In comparison, a higher degree of shared rule was associated
with a lower degree of public support for secessionism in the United Kingdom and Scotland.
The findings are consistent with the hypothesis.
6.2 Limitations
The “method of difference” – effectuated through a controlled comparison in this study – is a
compelling instrument to use when the research ambition is to primarily identify causality. Used
in conjunction with an innovative CPT method, a systematic and theory-informed comparison
between two historical cases illustrating an empirical puzzle was successfully carried out.
However, it has limitations and is inherently problematic through aspects which cannot be
disregarded. Finding cases which coincide on all relevant aspects bar one is almost impossible,
as is circumventing all the relevant intricacies found within social science research (George and
Bennett 2005: 419-410, 428-429). In this case, excluded variables from the analysis could very
well have important causal significance on the findings. When it comes to evaluate ‘if’ and
‘how’ a specific variable influenced case outcome, case studies are appropriate. As such, the
research design of this thesis is well-suited for the specified research question. Nevertheless,
quantitative studies can achieve stronger certainty when evaluating causality. An awareness of
the compromise that is made when deciding research strategy on the ability to generalize versus
the ability to be as specific and in-depth as possible is therefore important (Ibid).
6.3 Alternative explanations
Reverse causation might be the alternative explanation that is the most critical against the thesis
argument, i.e. decentralization is implemented by governments because secessionism is
prevalent in a state, not the other way around. This is illustrated in Figure 3:
52
Figure 3. Reverse causation
This claim suggests that states with diverse populations consisting of ethnic minorities are more
likely to encounter secessionism in their societies and are therefore more likely to attempt
decentralization reforms. However, Brancati (2007: 660) argues that while the presence of
secessionism can be partly responsible for decentralization, it does not fully explain why
governments choose to decentralize to begin with. She provides empirical evidence to support
this assertion, showing no increase in experienced secessionism for decentralized systems of
government in comparison with centralized counterparts.
In fact, many ethnically divided countries are not decentralized because central elites are
unwilling to relinquish power to decentralize. Other countries with similar characteristics
choose not to implement decentralization reforms because they fear that it will increase
secessionism, not decrease it (see O’Neill 2003; Eaton 2004).
Endogeneity is addressed by evaluating public support for secessionism during the
implementation of decentralization in each case. In Spain and Catalonia, Catalan’s were not
actively seeking independence when decentralization was implemented. Manifestations in
Catalonia in 1976 explicitly appealing for “liberty, amnesty and statute of autonomy” attest to
the political climate at the time (Gil 2017). Instead, compromise was sought to reach an
agreement with the Spanish government on autonomy concessions. Self-governance was the
main objective for Catalan elites during this time period (Colomer 1998: 43; Guibernau 2013:
380). Decentralization was promoted during the state’s transition to democracy to reestablish
former Catalan institutions which were abandoned during the authoritarian regime of Franco.
In the UK and Scotland, devolution was implemented in a period when the Scottish population
and its representative elites were in favor of autonomy rather than secession (see Table 4). The
electoral success of the SNP is a modern phenomenon, as their increased public support is new.
The 1999 Scottish election results illustrate this, as Labour emerged as the largest party with an
explicit ideology in favor of British unionism (Kidd and Petrie 2016: 45).
53
While the accounts presented might alleviate some concerns of reverse causation, a definitive
answer requires a more sophisticated research design than what can be provided in this thesis.
7 Summary and conclusion
How, and through what mechanisms, does decentralization with a higher degree of
governmental power sharing (shared rule) influence public support for secessionism?
The findings illustrate that decentralization with a higher degree of shared rule is associated
with a lower degree of public support for secessionism, and this association is produced through
a social mechanism of power. The research question was answered through the application of
an innovative theoretical framework that attempts to address several research gaps identified in
the existing literature. It succeeds by addressing cases where decentralization has provided
positive outcomes, drawing attention to the capabilities of self-rule and shared rule to influence
secessionism, analyzing the nexus of territorial and governmental power sharing, considering
the combined effect of self-rule and shared rule, and taking into account the role of reverse
causation in the causal argument. It was made possible by using a theoretical argument that
suggests inclusion for regional elites within the state’s national decision-making institutions is
imperative for the prevention against secessionism in established democracies.
More specifically, in the case of the UK and Scotland, a power mechanism was demonstrated
to be causally productive in accounting for stable public support for secessionism throughout
all phases of the decentralization process, in a period where Scottish elites pushed hard for
independence. What proved decisive was the central governments’ lack of inertia, reacting
promptly to secessionist pressures and strengthening decentralization by transferring
authoritative powers to SNP elites to hold an independence referendum. The result showed a
majority vote against secession, and the process was reverted back to a bargaining phase.
In the case of Spain and Catalonia, social mechanisms of legitimacy and power were found to
be causally productive in increasing the degree of support for secessionism, in a period where
Catalan elites initially aimed for extended self-government. Considerable inertia from the
central government meant existing decentralized institutions were reproduced – through
enforcement of the Spanish constitution, the exclusion of Catalan elites from decision-making,
54
and the lack of political ties between central and regional elites – self-reinforcement kept the
process in a mobilization phase. Thus, findings illustrate that decentralization with a lower
degree of shared rule is associated with a higher degree of public support for secessionism, and
this association is produced through social mechanisms of legitimacy and power.
In terms of path dependence, findings show stronger dependency in Spain and Catalonia, and
weaker dependency in the UK and Scotland, suggesting important theoretical implications.
Findings illustrate how much of previous research has underestimated the influence of
decentralization in general, and governmental power sharing (shared rule) in particular on
combating secessionist tendencies. The results on the UK and Scotland refute studies which
affirm that the inherent problems of decentralization are unlikely to be solved by adjusting
power sharing arrangements (e.g. Roeder 2009). The results also contradict studies which argue
that partition is a preferable choice to withstand secessionism in comparison to solutions of
autonomy and power sharing configurations (e.g. Chapman and Roeder 2007), as the latter were
found to be effective in stabilizing secessionism when a high degree of shared rule was present.
The results suggest important policy implications, as they indicate that decentralization
processes can diverge in effect, as is evident in the different outcomes between the two cases
analyzed in this study. Spain and Catalonia, despite implementing high levels of autonomy, had
a lower degree of shared rule which proved decisive in failing to contain rising public support
for secessionism. As such, these findings imply that for decentralization formulation to be
successful, a high degree of governmental power sharing is necessary in the design of
institutional schemes of governance which aspire to experience less secessionism. However,
the results do not automatically suggest that high degrees of shared rule will guarantee the
absence of secessionism. Rather, they serve as evidence and recommendations for policymakers
and researchers to take into account for further discussion and future research.
The observed effects of Brexit on public support for secessionism in the UK and Scotland open
up for a potential future research area which could prove vital on improving our understanding
of decentralization and its relationship with public support for secessionism. Unitary states that
are not only internally decentralized but also form part of supranational and inter-governmental
unions such as the EU, where national and regional legislature and governance coincide with
European counterparts, might be susceptive to external circumstances unbeknownst to the
55
contemporary scholarly field concerning decentralization and secessionism. More research on
the subject is needed. Lastly, the dilemma of endogeneity needs to be more adequately
addressed than what was possible in this study. Future research should aim for a more nuanced
understanding of reverse causation and its implications for decentralization as a method against
secessionism by making use of sophisticated research designs suitable for this endeavor.
In sum, this study has been able to show through its findings that decentralization can be
beneficial for democratic states with regional minority populations enduring increased public
support for secessionism, if it has a high degree of governmental power sharing (shared rule).
56
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Appendix
Regional Authority Index (RAI) – Hooghe et al. (2010: 21-41)
SELF-RULE
Institutional Depth
We conceive institutional depth as a continuous dimension ranging from no autonomy from the
central government to complete autonomy. The latter is a conceptual, but not an empirical,
possibility. The variation is mostly at the lower end of the scale and the intervals are spaced
accordingly.
We distinguish four categories. The first is a null category where there is no functioning
general-purpose regional administration. The second is described by the Napoleonic term,
déconcentration, which refers to a regional administration that is hierarchically subordinate to
central government. A deconcentrated regional administration has the paraphernalia of self-
governance - buildings, personnel, a budget - but is a central government outpost. The final two
categories distinguish among regional administrations that exercise meaningful authority. The
more self-governing a regional government, the more its relationships with the central
government are lateral rather than hierarchical. The fundamental distinction here is whether
regional self-government is, or is not, subject to central government veto.
To score more than zero, a region must have a functioning administration. Purely statistical
regions do not reach the bar.
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Policy Scope
Policy scope taps regional authority over policy making. We group policies into three areas:
economic, cultural-educational, and welfare:
• economic policy encompasses regional development, public utilities, transport including
roads, environment, energy;
• cultural-educational policy encompasses schools, universities, vocational training, libraries,
sports and cultural centres;
• welfare policy encompasses health, hospitals, social welfare (e.g. elderly homes, poor relief,
social care), pensions, social housing.
These categories aggregate diverse policy responsibilities specified in constitutions and
legislation. We differentiate among regional governments that exercise authority in none, one,
or more than one of these policy areas.
If more than one policy area, we evaluate whether a regional government also exercises
constitutive or coercive authority, i.e. authority that lies close to the core of state sovereignty.
Does the regional government control the police? Is it responsible for the organization of local
government? Does it exercise residual powers: i.e., is the regional government responsible for
policies that are not constitutionally mandated for the central government? Can the regional
government determine its own institutional set-up, including, for example, the timing of
regional elections and electoral rules?
The final category taps whether a regional government co-exercises authority over membership
in its community, i.e. in immigration and citizenship policies. Authority over who can be a
member of a self-governing community is conceptually prior to authority over the provision of
collective goods to that community. In most countries these competencies are ‘fundamental
sovereign attributes’ and it is expected that regions which meet this high hurdle will also meet
the criteria for category three.
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This dimension estimates the range of policies for which regional governments make
authoritative decisions. So we discount policy responsibilities that are not exercised
independently by regional governments.
Fiscal Autonomy
No measures of regional authority appear as promising as public spending and tax revenues.
None are more complex and deceiving (Rodden 2004; Treisman 2007). The problems one
confronts in using these data as proxies for regional authority are that the absolute amount or
share of public spending or tax revenues does not tell us a great deal about how much discretion
a subnational government exercises; the available OECD and IMF data cover a limited number
of countries and few time points; these data are not broken down by level of government.
Subnational tax revenues as a share of general government revenues - defined by the OECD as
tax sharing agreements, excluding transfers received from other levels of government - do not
do much better because the amount does not tell us which government decides on the level and
composition of revenues. Central governments are induced to shift responsibility for collecting
taxes to subnational governments, while severely limiting their discretion. As our discussion of
the fundamental distinction between deconcentrated and decentralized government suggests, it
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is one thing to receive taxes, it is another to decide about taxes. Measures of the amount or
proportion of subnational taxes are only weakly correlated with measures of tax authority or
tax discretion.
Our cure is to assess a regional government’s fiscal authority independently of its revenues or
spending. We draw on the OECD’s schema for evaluating subnational government discretion
over revenue. This schema distinguishes two notions of authority (control independent from
central government, and shared rule with central government), and three areas of control (tax
base, tax rate, and revenue split) (OECD 1999).
We simplify the schema in three ways to produce (a) an annual (not decennial) measure, (b) for
particular levels of government (not aggregated across all subnational levels) that (c) is
conceptually close to the thing to be measured: i.e., authority on fiscal matters. We assess a
regional government’s tax portfolio as a whole by distinguishing between major and minor
taxes and within these, between the capacity to control base and rate, or rate only. Here, we
estimate a regional government’s capacity to determine its revenues unilaterally (self-rule), and
below we estimate a regional government’s ability to influence the distribution of national
revenues as one component of shared rule.
Fiscal authority is operationalized as tax autonomy, co-decision on national tax regimes, and
intergovernmental grants (Swenden 2006). It does not include a region's authority to set fees or
charges in return for specific services, such as fees for the preparation or deposit of official
documents, bus charges, public utility fees, etc., which nearly always make up a negligible part
of a regional budget.
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An assembly is defined as a self-standing institution with a fixed membership using
parliamentary procedures to make decisions. This encompasses all regional assemblies that call
themselves such, and excludes ‘committees’, which are subordinate bodies.
We code the predominant principle in regional assemblies, where some legislators are directly
elected and some indirectly selected. Indirectly elected assemblies are scored 1 when the
selectors are subnational.
We define an executive as a decision making body that has the task of putting laws into effect,
and we assess whether the head of a regional executive is appointed by central government, the
regional government, or both.
The intermediate category encompasses only cases where it is meaningful to speak of a dual
executive, that is, where both the central and regional appointees have executive authority.
SHARED RULE
A regional government may exercise authority by co-determining decision making at the
national level. We distinguish four avenues. First, a region may participate directly in making
national law. This requires that it is represented in the national legislature, usually in the upper
chamber. Second, a regional government may share executive responsibility with the national
government for implementing policy in the region or in the country as a whole.
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Third, a region may co-determine the distribution of tax revenues in the country as a whole.
Finally, and most importantly, a regional government may exercise authority over the
constitutional set up in the country. The first, second and third avenues of power sharing
concern the role that regions play in national decision making and each scores a maximum of
2 points; the final avenue concerns the extent to which regions write the rules of the game, and
this scores up to 3 points.
Law Making
The variation to be detected here concerns the role of regions in national legislation. The items
on this dimension assess whether regions, qua regions, are represented in a chamber of the
national legislature, whether regional representatives constitute a majority in that chamber, and
whether the regionally constituted chamber has authority to veto ordinary legislation.
If there is a legislative arena in which regions and their governments directly influence national
law, it is usually the upper, or second, chamber of the national legislature. Most upper chambers
came to serve as bulwarks against one man (one person), one vote. They represented groups
that had traditional claims to authority, i.e. lords temporal and spiritual or territorial
communities that existed prior to the state. Whereas several upper chambers that survived
liberal democracy represent territorial communities, most commonly regions, representation in
lower chambers is almost always based on the principle of individual representation.
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Regions can shape a legislature in two ways: regions may frame the principle of representation,
or regional governments themselves may be directly represented in the legislature.
Executive control
Regional governments may share executive authority with central government in the context of
intergovernmental meetings. To score positively on this scale, such meetings must be
routinized, not ad hoc, and to score the maximum 2 points, such meetings must be
authoritative―they must reach decisions that formally bind the participants.
Fiscal Control
Shared rule on taxation is a special case of legislative or executive shared rule. Yet fiscal
extraction and allocation are consequential enough to be considered separately. Regional
governments may influence the distribution of national tax revenues, including
intergovernmental grants, directly in the context of intergovernmental meetings, or indirectly
via their representatives in a legislature with regional representation. If regional governments
negotiate over the distribution of tax revenues via either channel they score 1; if they have a
veto, they score 2.
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To score 1 via the legislative route to shared rule on taxes, the legislature in question must have
authority over the distribution of tax revenues. If the representatives of a regional level
constitute a majority in a legislature and the legislature has a veto on the distribution of tax
revenues, this scores 2.
Constitutional Reform
Constitutional authority is a special kind of authority, for it concerns control over the rules of
the game. The schema distinguishes between regional actors (i.e. electorates or regionally
elected representatives) and regional governments. If the assent of regional electorates or their
representatives is necessary for constitutional change, this scores 1 point; 2 points are scored if
regional governments can raise the barrier for constitutional change; and 3 points if regional
governments can veto constitutional change.
We score zero where regional actors or regional governments cannot formally veto or raise the
hurdle for constitutional reform. We score 1 where regional governments cannot block
constitutional reform, but regional voters or their representatives can. The latter requires that
preferences are aggregated on the principle of regional, not individual, representation.
Regional governments must get into the act to score 2 or 3. This reflects the basic difference
between regions as arenas and regions as governments.