UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

URBANA DIVISION UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

) Plaintiff, )

vs. ) Case No. 16-30061 )

AARON J. SCHOCK, ) )

Defendant. )

GOVERNMENT=S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT SCHOCK’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

The United States of America, by its attorneys, Patrick D. Hansen, Acting United

States Attorney for the Central District of Illinois, and Timothy A. Bass and Eugene L.

Miller, Assistant United States Attorneys, respectfully submits its response to

Defendant Schock’s motion to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct. The government

states the following:

INTRODUCTION

As noted in the government’s response to Defendant Schock’s motion for

discovery regarding use of confidential informant, the charges in this case against

Defendant Aaron Schock were authorized by the former United States Attorney for this

district and the Department of Justice and are the result of an extensive, nearly two-year

investigation conducted by career professionals within the Department and other law

enforcement agencies. In November 2016, the grand jury charged that Defendant

Schock engaged in a years-long scheme to defraud the United States, his campaign

E-FILED Friday, 01 September, 2017 11:44:48 PM

Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

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committees, and others, including his own constituents, made repeated false statements

to the U.S. House of Representatives (House) and the FEC, among others, and, in doing

so, caused a loss of more than $100,000.

A dismissal of an indictment is an extraordinary remedy, which the Supreme

Court has characterized as “drastic.” United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 367 (1981).

From the beginning of the investigation that led to his indictment, however, Defendant

Schock has engaged in a persistent and increasingly aggressive search for some

governmental misconduct claim, initially to preclude the indictment, and now to

dismiss the indictment and avoid the trial altogether. This unsupported search has now

led to the filing of the instant motion to dismiss the indictment for prosecutorial

misconduct and has continued with equally increasing and now extreme inflammatory

rhetoric.

Defendant Schock provides nothing to this Court in support of his outrageous

claims other than bullet-point accusations and isolated and selective excerpts rather

than any of the actual 5,000-page grand jury-witness record. Moreover, Defendant

Schock ignores settled law that negate his claims. It is not the government’s burden to

disprove the unsupported claims, but rather it is his burden to establish flagrant and

substantially prejudicial misconduct. Defendant Schock does not even begin to meet

this high standard because there simply was no misconduct.

We therefore respectfully submit to the Court that Defendant Schock’s

“fundamental” allegations of misconduct are not well-grounded in fact or supported by

existing law, as required by this Court’s local rules. See Local Rule 12.1(c).

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Nonetheless, to remove any question as to the lack of a factual basis for or any merit to

Defendant Schock’s claims of the treatment of the two witnesses whose testimony he

seeks to otherwise suppress, we further respectfully request that the Court conduct an

evidentiary hearing as soon as practicable, limited to the issue of whether any witness

was improperly coerced.

Accordingly, the government respectfully requests that the Court grant the

government’s request for an evidentiary hearing as soon as practicable and thereafter

deny Defendant Schock’s motion to dismiss.

RELEVANT FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. Background

In response to Defendant Schock’s motion for discovery relating to the use of

confidential informant, the government submitted a detailed statement of facts with

substantial supporting exhibits. To avoid unnecessary redundancy, we incorporate

those facts and exhibits and cite to them in this response and supplement them here.1

A. Pre-Grand Jury Investigation

On April 26, 2012, almost three years before the grand jury began its

investigation, Defendant Schock’s Political Director wrote an internal email to a fellow

staffer in which the Political Director stated that:

there is a new campaign finance report coming out that is going to hit the news soon, and it will not be pretty. Eventually, he [referring to Defendant Schock] is going to have to face the music and deal with how he has been

1 Citations to the exhibits submitted in support of the government’s response to Defendant Schock’s motion for discovery regarding use of confidential informant are to their number, e.g. “(Exhibit 1)”; citations to exhibits submitted in support of this response are to their respective letter, e.g. “(Exhibit A)”.

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spending campaign money. It could mean the end of his career . . . I have told [a fellow staffer] that we really need to meet together with Aaron to share our concerns.

(Exhibit A) Five days later, on May 1, 2012, the Washington Post published an article

concerning Defendant Schock’s campaign spending. (See Aaron Schock’s campaign,

PAC have champagne taste, available at www.washingtonpost.com).

On August 30, 2012, the Office of Congressional Ethics (OCE) submitted a

referral to the Committee on Ethics of the U.S. House of Representatives (House)

regarding Defendant Schock. (See www.oce.house.gov/february-6-2013-oce-referral-

regarding-rep-aaron-schock). The OCE Board recommended that the Committee on

Ethics further review the allegation based on its conclusion that there was a substantial

reason to believe the allegation that Defendant Schock may have solicited contributions

for an independent expenditure-only political committee in excess of $5,000 per donor,

in violation of federal law, House rules, and standards of conduct. (Id.) On February 6,

2013, the Committee on Ethics published the OCE report and announced that the

allegation would be further reviewed. (Id.) The matter was not finally resolved until

October 11, 2016, when Defendant Schock accepted a conciliation agreement with the

FEC and agreed to pay a civil penalty of $10,000, well after his resignation from

Congress and the initiation of the grand jury investigation in March 2015. (See

www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/current/118955.pdf).

On February 2, 2015, the Washington Post published a story after one of its

reporters visited Defendant Schock’s newly-remodeled Congressional office. (See He’s

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got a ‘Downton Abbey’-inspired office, but Rep. Aaron Schock won’t talk about it, available at

www.washingtonpost.com.) The article suggested that the reporter was only allowed

into Defendant Schock’s office when at least one staff member was present, was only

allowed to take photographs of the office with his phone, and was “guided . . . to

Schock’s private office” by his interior decorator. (Id.)

Two days later, on February 4, 2015, Defendant Schock’s office decorator repaid

the House $35,000 for funds the decorator had received from the House in December

2014 and January 2015. (See www.disbursements.house.gov/

2015q1/2015q1_singlevolume.pdf); (Exhibit B) Two days after that, on February 6, 2015,

Defendant Schock was interviewed in Peoria and asked about the Washington Post

story. (See Cong. Schock Talks to Reporters at Peoria County Farm, available at

www.youtube.com). During the interview, he described his staff’s response to the

Washington Post reporter’s visit to his Congressional office as a “kerfuffle” and stated

that “my office could’ve handled it much better.” (Id.) Defendant Schock did not accuse

his staff or the reporter of having committed a theft or a crime or invading his

expectation of privacy. Rather, he stated that “there’s nothing to hide”; “I’ve always

been one to engage the press”; “my congressional office is open to my constituents, will

always be open to my constituents”; he has hosted “thousands of constituents” in his

prior Congressional office and “thousands more of my constituents will be hosted in

this Congressional office”; “once she’s [the office decorator’s] done decorating my office

people will be in it” because “that’s what happens with your offices.”

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Meanwhile, further media inquiries led to reports (supported by public

disbursement records from the House of Representatives) that Defendant Schock had

spent over $100,000 in government funds on office decorating and renovations between

2009 and 2014, (see Taxpayers pay thousands for Rep. Schock’s renovations, available at

www.usatoday.com); (www.disbursements.house.gov); and more than $80,000 for

private flights, tickets to the Super Bowl and Country Music Awards and other

expenses. (See The Many, Many Problems of ‘Downton’ Office Congressman Aaron Schock,

(available at www.abcnews.go.com); (www.disbursements.house.gov). In addition,

House disbursement records, public campaign reports, and other media reporting

suggested that between 2010 and 2014, Defendant Schock had requested that the House

and his campaign reimburse him for a total of approximately 170,000 miles that were

driven on his personal car, a Chevrolet Tahoe, even though additional documentation

suggested that the vehicle had only been driven approximately 80,000 miles. (See New

Schock mileage questions: How he got caught, available at www.chicago.suntimes.com);

(www.disbursements.house.gov; www.fec.gov).

Later in February 2015, Defendant Schock announced he had retained the Jones

Day law firm in Washington, DC, and others, including accounting and communication

firms, in connection with an internal audit “to review the compliance procedures in his

official office, campaign, and leadership PAC.” (See Schock Lawyers Up, Politico, February

25, 2015, available at www.politico.com). During a press conference held in Peoria on

March 6, 2015, Defendant Schock announced that he had “asked for a review of his

various office procedures” and that he had “brought on board experts,” including

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“attorneys at Jones Day”; “third party administrators for both the campaign and official

office finance functions”; and a “certified public accountant” to “add an additional layer

of oversight,” that he “anticipate[d] that I will be filing various clarifying amendments

based upon the results of the review,” and that “we are making some major changes

prospectively.” (See Aaron Schock Addresses Recent Controversies, www.youtube.com/

watch?v=f5zXw7AW4yg ) When asked how long the review would take, Defendant

Schock stated that he didn’t know but that the review would be “thorough,” and that

“when I know you’ll know.” (Id.) He stated that he believed that “you have to earn the

trust every day of the voters you represent and that’s exactly what I intend to do.” (Id.)

B. Initiation of Grand Jury Investigation

On March 12, 2015, a grand jury in this district initiated a criminal investigation

of Defendant Schock. (Exhibit 2) The investigation was authorized by the former United

States Attorney for this district and Department leadership. On that date, the grand jury

issued several subpoenas for his financial records, both personal and campaign,

including charge accounts and travel records.

On March 17, 2015, just eleven days after his Peoria press conference, Defendant

Schock announced his resignation from Congress, to be effective March 31, 2015. On

March 18 and 19, 2015, additional grand jury subpoenas were issued to Defendant

Schock’s offices in Peoria and Washington, DC. (Exhibit 5) The subpoena to the Peoria

office was served on the Peoria Office Manager (OM) on March 18. On March 19, the

subpoena to the Washington office was served on William F. Coffield, Berliner,

Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, DC, counsel for Defendant Schock’s Chief of Staff.

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The Washington and Peoria subpoenas were identical to each other and sought the

production of records covering a period of 2010 to the present.

On March 20, 2015, OM agreed to conduct consensually-recorded meetings with

Defendant Schock and three of his Congressional and campaign staff members, as

allowed under federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(c)(2). After internal review by appropriate

officials within the Department of Justice (DOJ), authorization to conduct the

consensual recordings was given by the FBI and the Deputy Assistant Attorney

General. Between March 20, 2015, and March 31, 2015, the OM conducted several

consensual recordings of meetings with Defendant Schock and members of his

Congressional and campaign staff. (Exhibit 7) During the meetings, Defendant Schock

made certain admissions and statements concerning the investigation, predicted what

witnesses would say in the investigation, and made attempts to influence witness

testimony. (Exhibit 7)

During a meeting with staff members on March 20, Defendant Schock stated: “I

can honestly say my bookwork in the campaign and the MRA the official office was

sloppy. My business stuff, have at it. Cause that’s all legit.”(Exhibit 7, 3/20/15 Tr. at 4)

He also stated: “I don’t do any of the finances . . . in the campaign or the MRA at the

official offices, so at the end of the day my name is on the door, I am the one responsible

for whatever happens, but . . . I’m not working with the House Finance Office and I’m

not working with the FEC.” (Exhibit 7, 3/20/15 Tr. at 15) During a later meeting with

the OM, Defendant Schock stated that the mileage: “started with [a Washington staff

member] . . . I’m the one that get’s the money.” (Exhibit 7, 3/20/15 #2 Tr. at 1) He also

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predicted to the OM what his staff members would say, stating: “[staff member A] will

never say that I told her to do what she did, and [staff member B] will never be able to

say that I told her what to do . . .” (Exhibit 7, 3/20/15 #2 Tr. at 4)

During another conversation with the OM on March 30, 2015, Defendant Schock

discussed the investigation, stating that he could “say actually no, you know, there’s

nothing here and that, you know, these were honest mistakes.” (Exhibit 7, 3/30/15 Tr.

at 4) He further referred to a former staff member as “a lunatic” and stated that “DOJ’s

not gonna have his emails.” (Exhibit 7, 3/30/15 Tr. at 4) Defendant Schock also

specifically discussed the grand jury investigation, stating: “the purpose of the grand

jury, is to try and indict me . . . [The government has] asked us for some documents, but

the documents aren’t due until the same day that you guys are supposed to go in.

Which means [the government’s] gonna have no basis for [its] questions so it’s gonna

turn into some giant fishing expedition.” (Exhibit 7, 3/30/15 Tr. at 18-19) He also

predicted what the OM might be asked in the grand jury, stating further: “when you go

into a grand jury, it’s yes, no or I don’t remember . . . because anything you say, and

they’ll get you to lie to a grand jury . . . what they try and do is trip up the witness, trip

up guys like you who have nothing to lose.” (Exhibit 7, 3/30/15 Tr. at 20-21)

On March 31, 2015, Defendant Schock’s last day in office, the government served

him with a grand jury subpoena, authorized and initialed by the former United States

Attorney for this district. The subpoena required the production of the identical records

sought in the grand jury subpoenas directed to his Peoria and Washington offices on

March 18 and 19, 2015. (Exhibit 11)

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All of this occurred prior to the very first grand jury session one week later on

April 7, 2015.

C. Grand Jury Witnesses Represented By Mr. Coffield and J. Steven Beckett. Beginning on March 19, 2015, grand jury subpoenas were served on eight of

Defendant Schock’s House and campaign staff members, including Karen Haney and

Sarah Rogers. During the service of the subpoenas, the government was contacted by

attorney William F. Coffield, of Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, in Washington, DC.

Mr. Coffield advised that he had been retained to represent all eight witnesses. In

addition to accepting service of the subpoena for Defendant Schock’s Washington

office, Mr. Coffield accepted service of the subpoenas for five of the witnesses while the

other three were served personally. (Exhibit C) The government was further advised by

Mr. Coffield and J. Steven Beckett, of Beckett & Webber, P.C., in Urbana, Illinois, that

Mr. Beckett had also been retained as local counsel for those same witnesses. (Exhibit C)

During discussions with Mr. Coffield, the government advised him that: (a) each

of the eight witnesses was a subject/witness of the grand jury investigation (meaning

their conduct was within the scope of the investigation); b) the government believed

that each of the subjects/witnesses may have relevant information about the conduct,

including potentially criminal conduct, of Defendant Schock and one or more of the

other subjects/witnesses; and c) the government would like to discuss with counsel a

voluntary pre-grand jury interview, potentially under a use immunity or proffer

arrangement, the expected grand jury testimony, and the specific status of each of the

subjects/witnesses in a confidential manner without such information being shared

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with other subjects/witnesses or any target of the grand jury investigation. In addition,

based on those discussions with Mr. Coffield, it was the government’s understanding

that: (a) Mr. Coffield was retained to represent these subjects/witnesses following

contact or discussions with an attorney or attorneys with the law firm of Jones Day; (b)

Mr. Coffield’s and Mr. Beckett’s fees were being paid by Defendant Schock's campaign

funds; (c) Mr. Coffield may have continuing contact with Defendant Schock’s counsel

concerning the subject matter of and information learned during the representation of

one or more of the eight subjects/witnesses; and (d) Mr. Coffield may share information

(and may have a professional obligation to do so) with one or more of the

subjects/witnesses concerning information learned from the government, including the

status of a particular subject/witness in the grand jury investigation, and one or more of

the other subjects/witnesses. Given these circumstances, the government advised Mr.

Coffield that it believed his representation of multiple witnesses created a serious risk of

a potential conflict of interest, and that it was obligated to bring the matter to the

attention of the district court in Springfield to conduct an inquiry into the joint

representation of these witnesses. (Exhibit C)

On April 6, 2015, the day prior to the first grand jury session, the government

filed a motion under Fed.R.Crim.P. 44(c) for the district court in Springfield to conduct

such an inquiry. The government advised the court that conflicts of interest may

“impede the effectiveness of the grand jury investigation.” In re Matter of Grand Jury

Empaneled January, 21, 1975, 536 F.2d 1009, 1012 (3d Cir. 1976); see also Matter of Special

February 1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 1262, 1264 (7th Cir. 1978). The government further

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advised the court that it believed that there was at least a serious potential for a conflict

of interest in this joint representation because, given the circumstances, the government

was unable to discuss with counsel a voluntary pre-grand jury interview, potentially

under a use immunity or proffer arrangement, the expected grand jury testimony, and

the specific status of each of the subjects/witnesses in a confidential manner, without

the risk of such information being shared with other subjects/witnesses or any target of

the grand jury investigation. (Exhibit C)

On April 15, 2015, the district court in Springfield conducted a sealed hearing on

the government’s motion and conducted a colloquy with counsel and each of the

witnesses, part of which was in camera. During the hearing, the court advised each

witness of its “finding of a potential for a serious conflict of interest.” (Exhibit C)

Following the colloquy, the court accepted waivers of the conflict from each witness.

The government did not seek disqualification of counsel. (Exhibit C)

Following the hearing, counsel requested and the government provided limited

use immunity agreements for each witness. (Exhibit D) These agreements provided that

the witness was required to provide complete and truthful information to the grand

jury and law enforcement officials regarding their conduct and everything they knew or

had reason to believe about the conduct of others. The witnesses also agreed to produce

any and all documents and physical evidence of any kind in their possession or under

their control that related to the information provided. (Exhibit D) Counsel for the

witnesses advised the government that although they represented all eight witnesses,

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each was independently represented, and counsel represented only those witnesses and

not Defendant Schock.

Beginning in May 2015, the witnesses, including Ms. Haney and Ms. Rogers,

testified before the grand jury. (Exhibit E) Due to the sensitive nature of the

investigation, the government opted to not conduct pre-grand jury interviews with

certain witnesses.2 Some witnesses, including Ms. Haney and Ms. Rogers, were asked

to appear before the grand jury on multiple occasions. This was done with the consent

of their counsel and pursuant to their limited immunity agreements with the

government, and while attempting to minimize inconvenience. During their testimony,

the witnesses were advised of their rights and responsibilities and were allowed to

interrupt their testimony to consult with counsel if they so desired. (Exhibit E) (GJ

Transcripts)

Later in 2015, Mr. Beckett and Mr. Coffield jointly proposed an arrangement to

address the government’s concerns and requested that future interviews of the

witnesses be conducted outside the grand jury in a less formal manner and with counsel

present. This proposal included a suggestion that Mr. Coffield would “recuse” himself

from any interviews, and that Mr. Beckett would represent each of the witnesses in their

respective meetings with the government. They further proposed that Mr. Beckett

would not share information with Mr. Coffield concerning the interviews and would

2 While a decision as to whether, when, and how to conduct a voluntary interview of a witness outside of the grand jury would seem to be completely within the purview of the U.S. Attorney, Defendant Schock suggests that this type of decision should be reviewable by the Court as some sort of “misconduct.”

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not share information provided to the government by one client with another client.

The government agreed to this proposed resolution and therefore did not seek any

disqualification of counsel. (Exhibit F)

Pursuant to the proposal of Mr. Beckett and Mr. Coffield, beginning in

November 2015 the government conducted interviews with various witnesses,

including Ms. Haney and Ms. Rogers, with Mr. Beckett present. The arrangement for

interviews outside of the grand jury was for the express purpose of decreasing any

discomfort to the witnesses and allowing their counsel to be present. The government

submits that Mr. Beckett is prepared to testify that there was no time during these

interviews that the government attorney or agents threatened, harassed, or improperly

intimidated any witness, nor did they question any witnesses about Mr. Schock’s

sexuality. According to Mr. Beckett, the government acted “professionally” at all times.

Shortly after the interviews began without Mr. Coffield, Mr. Beckett was advised

that Defendant Schock would no longer be paying Mr. Beckett’s fees. (Exhibit F)

Payment of fees for attorneys for other witnesses, however, had already been paid in

full or continued. (Exhibit F) The termination of payment of fees to Mr. Beckett caused

difficulty in his continued representation of various witnesses, including Ms. Haney.

According to Mr. Beckett, two of the witnesses, Ms. Rogers and Mark Roman, were

required to retain Mr. Beckett privately. A third witness qualified for court-appointed

counsel. Mr. Beckett continues to represent Mr. Roman. On August 1, 2017, however,

the day Defendant Schock’s misconduct motion was filed, Mr. Beckett advised the

government that he no longer represented Ms. Rogers.

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D. Super Bowl Tickets/Payment of Legal Fees (Reimbursement with Campaign Funds

As alleged in the indictment, prior to entering Congress, Defendant Schock

periodically earned money as a ticket broker. While in Congress, and between 2009 and

2013, Defendant Schock purchased tickets for the Super Bowl and World Series, which

he then resold for a profit. (Indictment ¶46)

In January 2014, Defendant Schock purchased four Super Bowl tickets for $10,025

and caused his campaign committee, SVC, to pay for the tickets by an electronic

payment from SVC’s bank account in Peoria to Defendant Schock’s personal credit card

account. (Exhibit G) He thereafter sold the tickets to a ticket broker in California for

$12,000, resulting in a profit of $1,975. Defendant Schock then kept the entire $12,000

(both the cost and profit) from the sale of the tickets without reimbursing SVC for the

cost and caused SVC to file a false report with the FEC, falsely representing the

purchase of the Super Bowl tickets as “JFC [Joint Fundraising Committee] Event

Tickets.” (Indictment ¶¶46-47); (Exhibit G)

Meanwhile, in late 2013, Defendant Schock accused a former staffer of

inappropriately accessing his friend’s (Karla Gonzalez’s) social media account and

falsely advised the former staffer that the FBI and Capitol Police were investigating the

matter. As a result of Defendant Schock’s accusation and false representation of a law

enforcement investigation, the former staffer retained legal counsel and incurred legal

fees of more than $10,000, which were paid by the former staffer’s father. Defendant

Schock later acknowledged, after being confronted by the former staffer’s father, that

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his statement of a law enforcement investigation was false, stating in an email to the

staffer’s father that “I apologized and offered to take care of things,” and he agreed to

reimburse the staffer’s father for $7,500 of the legal fees. (Indictment ¶¶46-47); (Exhibit

G) (2/23/14 email from Defendant Schock to staffer’s father)

On February 15, 2014, Defendant Schock deposited the $12,000, which he

received from the sale of the Super Bowl tickets, in his CEFCU checking account.

(Exhibit G) At that time, the account had a balance of $1,791.86. Defendant Schock also

had a separate joint savings account with his mother, which had a balance of more than

$100,000. The deposit of the proceeds of the ticket sales into Defendant Shock’s checking

(not savings) account increased the balance in his checking account to $13,941.76.

A little over two weeks later, on March 4, 2014, the check for $7,500 to the

staffer’s father cleared Defendant Schock’s checking account. (Exhibit G) Prior to the

deposit of the Super Bowl ticket proceeds on February 15, the balance in Defendant

Schock’s checking account ($1,791.86) was insufficient to cover the $7,500 check. When

the $7,500 check did clear on March 4, it was largely funded by the deposit of the ticket

proceeds, which eliminated entirely the need for Defendant Schock to fund it through a

transfer of funds or overdraft protection from his own and his mother’s funds in the

savings account. (Exhibit G) This evidence, including the complete bank account

statement (CEFCU document 23), was fully presented to the grand jury. (Exhibit G)

(bank account statement with Bates-number CEFCU_3_00000023 and annotated copies)

On April 21, 2014, Defendant Schock directed Ms. Haney to issue him a check

from the account of another campaign committee, Gen Y, in the amount of $7,500 and

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made payable to “Aaron J. Schock” to reimburse himself for the money he paid to the

former staffer’s father weeks earlier. He then caused Gen Y to file a false report with the

FEC, falsely reporting that the $7,500 payment to Defendant Schock was for payment to

a Washington DC attorney for “PAC Legal Fees.” (Exhibit G) Thus, the result of these

series of events is that Defendant Schock personally received funds from two different

campaign committees to purchase and profit from the sale of Super Bowl tickets and to

pay a personal expense, and then caused those same committees to falsely report the

expenditures to the FEC. (Exhibit G)

E. Purchase of 2015 Chevrolet Tahoe

As also charged in the indictment (Indictment ¶¶56-59; Count 17), the

government is prepared to present evidence that in July 2014, Schock traded in his

personal 2010 Tahoe and purchased a 2015 Tahoe (which he pre-ordered) from Green

Chevrolet for $65,484. (Exhibit H) This vehicle was purchased entirely with SFC

campaign funds. Defendant Schock’s 2010 Tahoe was appraised at $26,000, and since he

was trading in this vehicle personally, as part of the deal, the dealership wrote him a

check directly for $26,000. In addition, the dealership also paid off Defendant Schock’s

personal Tahoe loan at Ally Financial (GMAC) in the amount of $5,621.99. The resulting

“payoff” part of the transaction, written in the sale documents, was “31,621.99,”

representing the $26,000 payment to him and the payoff of his personal loan. The sales

documents clearly reflect this and show the “31,621.99” payoff, the $26,000 payment to

be made to Defendant Schock by mailing it to his address, and the $5,621.99 to be paid

to Ally Financial. Finally, Ally Financial later reimbursed Defendant Schock directly for

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partial overpayment of the payoff from Green by sending him a check for $1,137.57.

(Exhibit H)

To complete the purchase of the Tahoe, Defendant Schock directed Ms. Haney to

bring him a blank SFC check at the dealership. (Exhibit E, Haney 6/1/16 GJ Tr. at 99-

100) He then filled out and signed the check and made it payable to Green Chevrolet in

the amount of $73,896.96. Defendant Schock also signed the retail buyer’s order, which

revealed the $31,621.99 payoff benefit to him ($26,000 directly plus the $5621.99 to Ally

Financial), while Green Chevrolet was only providing a trade-in value credit of $26,000

to SFC. Thus, the $73,896.96 check from SFC allowed Defendant Schock to: (1) purchase

the 2015 Tahoe (paid for by the campaign); (2) receive a check mailed to him personally

for $26,000 from the dealership; and (3) receive the benefit of the dealership paying off

his loan balance at Ally Financial, part of which Ally Financial returned to Defendant

Schock directly. Although the 2015 Tahoe plus the payoff of the old Tahoe was entirely

paid for by the campaign, it was titled in the name of Aaron J. Schock. (Exhibit H)

As further alleged in the indictment, the evidence will show that following the

purchase of the 2015 Tahoe by SFC, Defendant Schock caused two additional false

mileage reimbursement claims to be submitted to and paid by the House for $1,150 and

$1,218 and two additional false mileage reimbursement claims to be submitted to and

paid by SFC and Gen Y for $9,433.20 and $8,921.36. Defendant Schock did not

reimburse SFC and Gen Y for either of these payments. In addition, he caused SFC to

file a false report with the FEC, falsely reporting that the entire $73,896.96 payment for

the purchase of the 2015 Tahoe was for a “transportation expense” of SFC rather than

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for the purchase of a vehicle for the exclusive use of Defendant Schock. (Indictment

¶¶56-59; Count 17)

In June 2015, nearly one year after the Tahoe purchase and three months after the

investigation began, and in response to a grand jury subpoena to Green Chevrolet for

records and an inquiry concerning the $5,621.99 payoff to Ally Financial, Mr. Green

advised that “the payoff amount of $5,621.99 should have been subtracted rather than

added to the payoff.” (Exhibit H) He and other representatives later testified concerning

this alleged “mistake” before the grand jury. (Exhibit H) There was no evidence,

however, that Defendant Schock thought that there was any mistake at the time of (or

since) the transaction, which he initiated, conducted, and controlled on behalf of SFC, or

when he received payment of $1,137.57 from Ally Financial, nor was there any evidence

that he took any corrective action to repay SFC until he sold the Tahoe back to Green

after the investigation began.

F. Karla Gonzalez

Karla Gonzalez, identified by name in Defendant Schock’s motion, is one of the

“friends” referred to in the indictment. (Indictment - Count 1 ¶¶43, 51, 69) She is a

foreign diplomat with diplomatic immunity and was not associated with his

Congressional or campaign office. As alleged in the indictment, there is evidence that

Defendant Schock used $8,054.42 in campaign funds for a private flight from Peoria to

Washington in order to meet Ms. Gonzalez for a subsequent flight to Europe for a

vacation and then falsely reported the expense to the FEC as a campaign expense. In

addition, Defendant Schock accused a former staffer of inappropriately accessing Ms.

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Gonzalez’s social media account, later reimbursed himself for payment of the staffer’s

legal fees, and falsely reported that expenditure to the FEC as a campaign expense.

Finally, the evidence reflects that Defendant Schock repeatedly used the government

travel card to make travel arrangements for himself and Ms. Gonzalez, including for

travel with Defendant Schock. (Exhibit I) It was therefore incumbent upon government

investigators to determine the nature of the relationship between the Congressman and

the diplomat, whether the expenses were accurately reported, or whether the FEC and

House travel reports contained false representations.

As a result, during the course of the investigation, the government questioned

witnesses concerning Defendant Schock’s relationship with Ms. Gonzalez. “[T]he nature

of her relationship with [Defendant Schock] w[as] relevant” to establishing any benefit

he or both received from any improper use and classification of government and

campaign funds for travel or otherwise. United States v. Menendez, 2015 WL 57033199, at

11 (D. N.J. Sept. 28, 2015); see also id. at *12 (“The challenged questions about witnesses’

romantic and sexual relationships with Dr. Melgen are similarly relevant because these

witnesses all benefitted from Senator Menendez's ‘official acts,’ as alleged in the

indictment”); United States v. Dingle, 862 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2017) (evidence relevant to

establish nature of relationship with various parties). At no time, however, did the

government ask any of the more than 100 witnesses in this nearly 20-month

investigation, inside or outside of the grand jury, about Defendant Schock’s “sexuality”

or who he “slept with.” (Def.Mem. at 6, 76-77); see for example (Exhibit J – 4/26/16 GJ Tr.

of Tania Hoerr (Defendant Schock’s sister), stating “And I have told everyone you’ve

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treated me very kindly and I have not had any issues”); (Exhibit J) (excerpts of GJ

testimony of other witnesses; and 8/22/17 email from another witness’s counsel, stating

that “I can confirm that no representative of the government threatened, harassed, or

intimidated [witness]. In addition, [witness] was not questioned about Mr. Schock’s

sexuality, or sexual orientation. To the contrary, you and your agents have been

professional and polite throughout all of our dealings in this matter”); id. (4/25/16

email from Mr. Coffield to FBI Special Agent stating “just about all the clients have

commented about your being a ‘really nice guy.’ Much appreciated”).

G. Scope of Grand Jury Investigation

The nearly 20-month grand jury investigation of Defendant Schock that began in

March 2015 involved two grand juries. The grand jury presentation included 86 witness

appearances (by approximately 50 different witnesses), resulting in more than 5,000

pages of transcripts of witness testimony.3 Beginning in March 2016, Defendant Schock

appealed to the leadership at the Department of Justice in Washington and requested

that they review the matter prior to allowing the indictment. That review continued

beyond the grand jury’s expiration, and it was discharged from further service. The

matter was approved to go forward shortly thereafter. Beginning in August 2016 and

continuing to November 2016, the evidence in the case was presented to a successor

3 There were 13 in-person appearances before the second grand jury by 7 different witnesses. The

remaining 73 witness appearances occurred in-person before the first grand jury. Over the course of the second grand jury’s service in this matter, the government provided copies of witness transcripts from the first grand jury for the second grand jury to review. In addition, the investigation has involved the interviews of a total of approximately 116 potential witnesses.

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grand jury for consideration. The grand jury returned the indictment on November 10,

2016.

ARGUMENT

In his motion, Defendant Schock “simply laundry-lists,” United States v. Waddell,

2016 WL 316377, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 26, 2016), and “bullet-points” numerous (more than

20) instances of alleged misconduct that encompass the entirety of the nearly 20-month

grand jury investigation, even including an allegation of misconduct in the

government’s mere decision to initiate the investigation. Among Defendant Schock’s

more serious or “fundamental” (Def.Mem. at 2) allegations are that the government

made false statements to the grand jury, improperly harassed and abused two (out of a

total of approximately fifty-five) grand jury witnesses, and interfered with attorney-

client relationships, and he even accuses the government of obstruction of justice and

repeatedly questioning witnesses about his sexuality. He does so while selectively citing

to isolated excerpts, but without actually submitting any, of the 5,000-page grand jury-

witness record or witness interview reports to the Court for review. In short, Defendant

Schock submits no evidence to support his extreme claims. Defendant Schock’s claims

are just that – naked claims with inflammatory rhetoric. We therefore respectfully

submit to the Court that Defendant Schock’s entire motion is not well-supported by

facts or warranted by existing law, and that his motion should be denied.

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I. There Was No Prosecutorial Misconduct A. Legal Framework

“To avoid mini–trials on indictments, courts have erected a reasonably high

barrier to [] challenges” to them based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct. United

States v. Waddell, 2016 WL 316377, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 26, 2016). “They presume that the

grand jury has properly determined probable cause (i.e., that the offense has been

committed), so a defendant must rely on a petit jury to sort it all out.” Id. Thus, more

than 50 years ago, the Supreme Court made clear that “[a]n indictment returned by a

legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by the

prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits. The

Fifth Amendment requires nothing more.” Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363

(1956). The Supreme Court explained:

If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that there was inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay would be great indeed. The result of such a rule would be that before trial on the merits a defendant could always insist on a kind of preliminary trial to determine the competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury. This is not required by the Fifth Amendment.

Id.

“[M]any constitutional protections afforded defendants in criminal proceedings

have no application to grand jury proceedings because the grand jury is an accusatory,

not adjudicatory, body.” United States v. Puglia, 8 F.3d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing

United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 49 (1992)). A grand jury “may consider

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incompetent evidence and act on rumor or the grand jurors’ personal knowledge.” Id.

(citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344 (1974)).The Supreme Court “has often

recognized the grand jury’s singular role in finding the probable cause necessary to

initiate a prosecution for a serious crime.” Kaley v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 1090, 1097

(2014). “An indictment fair upon its face, and returned by a properly constituted grand

jury . . . conclusively determines the existence of probable cause to believe the

defendant perpetrated the offense alleged.” Id. “And ‘conclusively’ has meant, case in

and case out, just that.” Id. There is “no authority for looking into and revising the

judgment of the grand jury upon the evidence, for the purpose of determining whether

or not the finding was founded upon sufficient proof.” Id. “To the contrary, the whole

history of the grand jury institution demonstrates that a challenge to the reliability or

competence of the evidence supporting a grand jury's finding of probable cause ‘will

not be heard.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 54 (1992)); see Bank of

Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 261 (1988). “The grand jury gets to say—

without any review, oversight, or second-guessing—whether probable cause exists to

think that a person committed a crime.” Kyley, 134 S.Ct. at 1098.

The Supreme Court has further explained:

It would make little sense, we think, to abstain from reviewing the evidentiary support for the grand jury's judgment while scrutinizing the sufficiency of the prosecutor’s presentation. A complaint about the quality or adequacy of the evidence can always be recast as a complaint that the prosecutor’s presentation was ‘incomplete’ or ‘misleading.’ Our words . . . bear repeating: Review of facially valid indictments on such grounds would run counter to the whole history of the grand jury institution, and neither justice nor the concept of a fair trial requires [it].”

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Williams, 504 U.S. at 53-55 (emphasis added).

Following these clear principles, a “district court [may] dismiss [an] indictment

only if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury’s

decision to indict, or if there is grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from the

substantial influence of such violations.” United States v. Vincent, 416 F.3d 593, 600 (7th

Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Brooks, 125 F.3d 484, 497 (7th Cir. 1997), and Bank of

Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256 (“a district court exceeds its powers in dismissing an

indictment for prosecutorial misconduct not prejudicial to the defendant”)). “In other

words, a district court may not dismiss an indictment for errors in grand jury

proceedings unless such errors prejudiced the defendants.” Vincent, 416 F.3d at 600

(quoting United States v. Brooks, 125 F.3d 484, 497 (7th Cir. 1997), and United States v.

Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78 (1986)).

Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams, a claim to dismiss an

indictment based on “misconduct . . . only arises from the violation of one of those ‘few,

clear rules which were carefully drafted and approved by [the Supreme] Court and by

Congress to ensure the integrity of the grand jury’s functions.’” United States v. Thomas,

2017 WL 56630, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2017) (quoting Williams, 504 U.S. at 46). Stated

another way, “[w]here a defendant alleges prosecutorial misconduct, dismissal of the

indictment is proper only when the defendant demonstrates flagrant misconduct and

substantial prejudice.” United States v. Darden, 688 F.3d 382, 387 (8th Cir. 2012).

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Thus, “[i]t follows that:”

false testimony in the grand jury proceedings is generally insufficient to overcome the presumption of probable cause; there must be a demonstration of bad faith — more than mere inconsistencies in the testimony — in order to defeat the grand jury presumption . . . Stated differently, in order to overcome the presumption of probable cause arising from a grand jury's indictment, a defendant, who bears the burden of rebutting this presumption, must adduce sufficient evidence to erode the premise that the Grand Jury acted judicially. . . It is insufficient to show or allege that a witness provided false information outside of the grand jury; in order to overcome the presumption of probable cause created by a grand jury indictment, a plaintiff is required to rebut that presumption by proving fraud, perjury, suppression of evidence or other misconduct in the grand jury. Where a [defendant's] only evidence to rebut the presumption of the indictment is his version of events, courts will find such evidence to be nothing more than mere conjecture and surmise that the plaintiffs indictment was procured as a result of conduct undertaken by the defendants in bad faith, which is insufficient to rebut the presumption of probable cause.

Waddell, 2016 WL 316377, at *1-*2.

B. Local Rule 12.1(c)

Local Rule 12.1(c) provides that filed motions are required, “after reasonable

inquiry,” to be “well-grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith

argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and . . . not

interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay

or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” See also United States v. Broadnax, 2016 WL

102197, at *1 and *2 n.3 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 8, 2016) (noting that “[a]n unacceptable amount of

judicial and prosecution resources are consumed if suppression motions are reached

that fail to comply with S.D. Ga. Loc. Cr. R. 12.1.1.”; “Enforcement of that Rule spares

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wasteful hearings based on supposed if not imagined ‘facts’ and that “[i]n cases before

the undersigned the Government may move to strike Rule 12.1–deficient briefs and seek

leave to delay any response pending further Court order”)); Cf. United States v. Collins,

796 F.3d 829, 836 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The parties—not the courts—must research and

construct available legal arguments”; “perfunctory and undeveloped arguments are

deemed waived.”).

C. Analysis/Government’s Request for Evidentiary Hearing

1. Ms. Haney/Ms. Rogers

In his motion to dismiss, Defendant Schock’s “fundamental” (Def.Mem. at 2)

claims involve allegations of mistreatment of two witnesses, Ms. Haney and Ms.

Rogers, (out of a total of approximately 55), both of whom were represented for much

or all of the grand jury investigation by Mr. Beckett. Defendant Schock alleges that the

government improperly misled, threatened, harassed, abused and interfered with their

attorney-client relationships. With the exception of a single statement in Ms. Haney’s

affidavit that the government advised her “that the grand jury had raised the possibility

of removing my immunity,” (Def.Mem. Ex.A)4 Defendant Schock provides nothing in

support of these claims. Specifically, he provides nothing from these witnesses or even

any indication to the Court whether: (1) he has consulted with Ms. Haney or Ms.

Rogers; (2) they are willing to testify in support of any of his claims or otherwise submit

4 Mr. Beckett is prepared to testify, if necessary, as to the government’s conduct in this matter. It is notable that Mr. Beckett denies being consulted on any of the allegations made by Defendant Schock regarding events in which he would have been present. They simply did not occur as represented to the Court.

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an adequate affidavit; (3) he has consulted or even made a reasonable inquiry with Mr.

Beckett, the attorney who was present with them during all but one of their interviews

with the government outside the grand jury; or (4) that either the witness or Mr. Beckett

was even aware of these allegations prior to the filing of Defendant Schock’s motion. In

short, it is not the government’s burden to disprove Defendant Schock’s unsupported

but clearly serious claims, but rather it is his burden to establish flagrant and prejudicial

misconduct. This failure to produce actual evidence is no oversight, but rather it is

simply because no misconduct occurred.

In addition, a critical part of Defendant Schock’s “fundamental” argument is his

claim that the government “misled Ms. Haney [and Ms. Rogers] and the grand jury

about Mr. Schock’s bank statements in a faulty attempt to demonstrate intent[.]”

(Def.Mem. at 30-36, 58-61) In support of this argument, Defendant Schock inserts a

document into his memorandum, with a government Bates-stamped number, which

omits any reference to Defendant Schock having a separate account for overdraft

protection with more than $100,000 at the time the reimbursement check to the staffer’s

father for legal fees cleared his bank account. (Def.Mem. 31-32) (“snippet” (Def.Mem. at

31) of document identified as Bates-number CEFCU_3_00000023). He further alleges

that the government “repeatedly presented the grand jury and witnesses before it like

Ms. Haney with [this] screen-shot,” omitting the savings account balance entirely,

because, he alleges, the government’s theory was that he “needed” the Super Bowl ticket

proceeds to fund the $7,500 check to the staffer’s father. Finally, he alleges that the

“presentation of this snippet of the bank statement was false and misleading.”

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(Def.Mem. at 31) This convoluted characterization of the grand jury testimony and

exhibit and the government’s theory are completely wrong:

First, the document that Defendant Schock inserts into his memorandum is not

the document the government presented to Ms. Haney or any other witness or to the

grand jury. It is not a government document, and it was not produced to the defense in

discovery as government Bates-numbered document CEFCU_3_00000023. (Exhibit K)

(affidavit of government paralegal responsible for custody of government documents).

Second, the documents actually presented to Ms. Haney, other witnesses, and the

grand jury are a true and accurate copy of a page of Defendant Shock’s bank statement

with the same Bates number, and an annotated copy of that same page with a “black

circle” and “red” arrow, highlighting the checking account balance of $1,791.86 prior to

the deposit of the Super Bowl ticket proceeds. Both of these documents, the original and

annotated versions, clearly reflect the balance of Defendant Schock’s savings account

with his mother. (Exhibits G and K)

Third, Defendant Schock’s own memorandum conclusively demonstrates the

inaccuracy of the inserted “snippet[s]” he claims were shown and “zoomed” in on for

Ms. Haney. The excerpt of Ms. Haney’s grand jury testimony reflects that when she was

shown the document, she stated “I’m looking at the red circle—the black circled

number.” (Def.Mem. at 34) (Exhibit E – Haney 6/1/16 GJ Tr. at 52) The document

Defendant Schock inserts in his memorandum does not contain any “black circled

number” or “red” highlight. Rather, its coloring is purple and yellow, thus itself

establishing that it cannot possibly be the document shown to Ms. Haney. The only

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document that contains a “black circled number” and “red” highlight is the annotated

copy of government Bates-numbered document CEFCU_3_00000023. This annotated

copy and the Bates-numbered document are the documents shown to Ms. Haney, other

witnesses, and the grand jury. It is simply a bald assertion of Defendant Schock to allege

otherwise, to insert an inaccurate document into his memorandum, and characterize the

details of the government’s presentation to the grand jury (all the way down to

“snippet” and “zoom[ing]), about which he could have no knowledge, without

evidentiary support or an affidavit from a grand jury witness.

Fourth, it was not and is not the government’s theory simply that Defendant

Schock “needed” the proceeds of campaign funds (ticket proceeds) and did not have the

ability to cover the check for $7,500 to the staffer’s father for reimbursement of legal

fees. Rather, the evidence reflects that Defendant Schock had the intent to use campaign

funds that he unlawfully converted, as charged in the indictment, rather than his own

and his mother’s funds, to fund a personal expense and then later reimburse himself with

more campaign funds for that non-existent expense. The facts certainly bear that out.

(Exhibit G) Defendant Schock’s bank records reflect that prior to the deposit of the

Super Bowl ticket proceeds on February 15, 2014, the balance in his checking account

($1,791.86) was insufficient to cover the $7,500 check. When the $7,500 check did clear

on March 4, it was largely funded by the deposit of the ticket proceeds, which

eliminated entirely the need for Defendant Schock to fund it through a transfer of funds

or overdraft protection from his and his mother’s savings account. (Exhibit G) This

evidence, including the complete bank account statement, was fully presented to the

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grand jury. (Exhibit G) (bank account statement with Bates number CEFCU_3_00000023

and annotated copy). What Defendant Schock could have done or had the ability to do

is beside the point. Rather, what is relevant is what he did do. And what Defendant

Schock did was largely fund the $7,500 check to the staffer’s father with ticket (SVC)

proceeds and then, several weeks later, direct Ms. Haney to issue him a check from the

account of another campaign committee, Gen Y, in the amount of $7,500 to reimburse

himself for the money he paid to the former staffer’s father weeks earlier – a

reimbursement for an expense he never personally incurred. Defendant Schock then

caused those same committees (SVC and Gen Y) to falsely report the expenditures to

the FEC. (Exhibit G)

All of these events are charged in the indictment. Defendant Schock’s constant

rhetoric of the government “concocting a theory,” presenting “false” evidence,

“misleading” the grand jury, or “influencing the witness’s testimony” (Def.Mem. at 36)

is completely meritless. His “fundamental” claim of misconduct, which he takes great

pains to develop, merely “boils down to a challenge to the reliability or competence of

the evidence presented to the grand jury.” Bank of Novia Scotia, 487 U.S. at 260-61 (“The

District Court's finding that the summaries offered by IRS agents contained evidence

that had not been presented to the grand jury in prior testimony boils down to a

challenge to the reliability or competence of the evidence presented to the grand jury.

We have held that an indictment valid on its face is not subject to such a challenge”).

That is not a proper argument, as Defendant Schock concedes. See id.; (Def.Mem. at 70)

Similarly, [t]he grand jury . . . need only hear the prosecution’s side of an

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investigation and need not be presented with exculpatory evidence in the possession of

the prosecutor.” United States v. Red Elk, 955 F.Supp. 1170, 1182 (D. S.D. 1997) (citing

Williams, 504 U.S. at 51–52. “A suspect or defendant has no right to have evidence

favorable to him or her presented to a grand jury, just as he/she has no right to testify

him/herself before such a body.” Id. (citing Williams, 504 U.S. at 51. Nor does he have

any right “to present his version of the facts before the grand jury.” United States v.

Bryson, 2014 WL 1653244, at 2 (D. Conn. Apr. 22, 2014) (quoting United States v.

Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 623 (2d Cir. 1979)); see United States v. Lame, 716 F.2d 515, 518

(8th Cir. 1983) (“The grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing or ‘mini-trial’ at

which the defendant is entitled to present his version of the facts”).

In any case, the government did expressly present this allegedly “exculpatory”

evidence to the grand jury. As Ms. Edge, a FBI analyst testified:

Q. So, it’s not that Mr. Schock did not have the ability through

overdraft protection to fund the check to [the staffer’s father], right?

A. Correct.

Q. He had the ability, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. But because the proceeds of the ticket sales were deposited,

that wasn’t necessary; was it?

A. Right.

Q. So the proceeds of the ticket sales funded at least in part the

check to [the staffer’s father] and not Mr. Schock’s money?

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A. Correct.

(Exhibit G, K. Edge 11/3/16 GJ Tr. at 46)

Defendant Schock has not even begun to establish an issue whether the

government knowingly presented “false” testimony that creates a “grave doubt” about

the grand jury’s indictment decision. Menendez, 2015 WL 5703199, at *6 (citing Bank of

Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256. Accordingly, his argument--that is “fundamental” to his

misconduct claim--is simply meritless and therefore so is his motion to dismiss.

Menendez, 2015 WL 5703199, at *6;

In addition to the lack of support for his factual assertions, Defendant Schock

fails to cite to settled law in this Circuit. As the court in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, held

more than 20 years ago:

Overbearing tactics may violate the right of the person being interrogated to be free from coercion. [Defendant] cannot complain that the prosecutors may have twisted [witness's] arm, any more than he can collect damages because they failed to read [witness] Miranda warnings or searched [witness's] house without a warrant.

20 F.3d 789, 794–95 (7th Cir. 1994). Thus, as the court in United States v. Menendez, more recently stated, “Defendants

cannot challenge the alleged violation of a witness’s rights on the witness’s behalf.”

2015 WL 5703199, at *4 (D. N.J. Sept. 28, 2015) (quoting Buckley). Although a defendant

“can challenge, on due process grounds, the introduction of any coerced witnesses’

statements against [him] at trial[,]” id, Defendant Schock, with the exception of a single

statement in Ms. Haney’s affidavit that the government advised her “that the grand jury

had raised the possibility of removing my immunity,” (Def.Mem. Ex.A) (again an

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allegation which the government denies and with which Mr. Beckett has advised the

government he respectfully disagrees), has failed to provide the Court with any

evidence to review any coercion claim. See United States v. Holloway, 778 F.2d 653 653,

658 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Partially because no witness testified that he was coerced to

giving any evidence before the grand jury that was not true and partially because the

affidavits given by the prospective witnesses were largely conclusory in their language,

rather than expressly stating facts from which the court could determine that they were

actually intimidated, we conclude that the facts before the trial court were neither

sufficient to cause the court to dismiss the indictment nor to have a hearing on that

issue”; “there was no showing of prosecutorial misconduct in this case”).

2. Government’s Request for Limited Evidentiary Hearing

We therefore respectfully submit that Defendant Schock’s “fundamental”

allegations of misconduct do not comport with this Court’s local Rule 12.1(c). Due to the

serious and sensational nature of Defendant Schock’s allegations, however, the

government respectfully requests that the Court conduct an evidentiary hearing as soon

as practicable, limited to the issue of whether any witness was improperly coerced. If

the Court allows the government’s request, we intend to present the testimony of Mr.

Beckett, a well-respected member of the bar of this Court and Professor of Law at the

University of Illinois, concerning the numerous allegations made in Defendant Schock’s

motions relating to witnesses that Mr. Beckett currently represents or has represented

throughout the grand jury investigation. Mr. Beckett has requested the issuance of a

trial subpoena, which has been authorized, pursuant to DOJ policy, by the Acting U.S.

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Attorney, in lieu of an affidavit. (Exhibit L) Mr. Beckett has advised that he will testify

that, among other things, (1) he is “troubled” by Defendant Schock’s motion,

particularly the unprecedented effect of the motion to pit the credibility or recollection

of one client (Ms. Haney) against Mr. Beckett; (2) the proffer arrangements and Mr.

Coffield’s recusal were jointly proposed by Mr. Beckett and Mr. Coffield; (3) he was

present with Ms. Haney during the interview mentioned in her affidavit (which doesn’t

mention Mr. Beckett) and respectfully disagrees with her assertions; (4) the allegations

in the motions are “erroneous,” including the allegations made by Defendant Schock

that the government intimidated, harassed, or threatened any witness represented by

Mr. Beckett, all of whom received limited immunity from the government, or interfered

with any attorney-client relationship, or ever asked any witness/client about Defendant

Schock’s sexuality; (5) Mr. Beckett was never consulted about any of the allegations

made by Defendant Schock concerning Mr. Beckett’s clients; and (6) the government

acted “professionally” at all times.

3. Additional Claims Relating to Ms. Rogers/Ms. Haney

As part of his allegations concerning Ms. Haney, Defendant Schock that the

“government repeatedly threatened Ms. Haney with prosecution” and was “hiding

behind a representation that it was the grand jury that was contemplating revoking her

immunity.” (Def.Mem. at 42); (id. at 45) (again characterizing the affidavit that

government “had repeatedly made this very threat”). This is a grossly inaccurate

representation of the only evidence Defendant Schock submits in support of his motion.

The affidavit mentions one alleged statement (“the grand jury has raised the possibility

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of removing my immunity”) (Def.Mem. Ex.A), in one interview, while failing to

mention that Ms. Haney’s (Mr. Beckett). The alleged statement is hardly a threat, let

alone a “repeated” one. Moreover, as noted, Mr. Beckett respectfully disagrees and is

prepared to testify that the government stated the opposite of what is mentioned in her

affidavit – namely, that the government did not want any problems with her immunity

agreement, and that the whole purpose of the interview was to be able to meet with her

outside the grand jury with counsel present.5 Finally, even assuming the statement was

made, it would have been entirely appropriate. There is simply nothing wrong with the

government reminding any witness of their obligation under the law to be truthful,

especially when that obligation is also contained within an immunity agreement with

the government. As the Seventh Circuit held in United States v. Hayward, “[t]here is

nothing wrong with the government informing witnesses of the consequences of

breaking the law.” 6 F.3d 1241, 1257 (7th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds, United

States v. Colvin, 353 F.3d 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2003). “Th[is] procedure . . . even if carried

out in a caustic manner, is no cause to dismiss the indictment against the defendant[].”

Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1257 (citing Holloway, 778 F.2d at 655); see Red Elk, 955 F.Supp. at

1180.

5 Defendant Schock further alleges it was misconduct to supplement an FBI interview report. (Def.Mem. at 44) The supplement accurately documented the government’s discussion with Ms. Haney, confirming that she had not been threatened by the government and, with the approval of Mr. Beckett, confirming her lack of knowledge that her other counsel, Mr. Coffield, had advised Defendant Schock that such threats had been made. Since the report accurately reflected what occurred in the interview, as confirmed by Mr. Beckett, this claim is also meritless.

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The same is true with Defendant Schock’s allegations concerning Ms. Rogers’

grand jury testimony. He claims that the government improperly reminded her twice

(once at the request of the grand jury) of her oath and her responsibility to testify

truthfully. (Def.Mem. 55-58) Defendant Schock alleges that the government “bullied”

Ms. Rogers. (Def.Mem.55) This argument is meritless. Ms. Rogers has made no such

claim, nor do the selected portions of her grand jury testimony remotely support it.

Again, it is proper to remind a witness of their obligation to testify truthfully. Hayward,

6 F.3d at 1257. And it is certainly proper for a prosecutor, like “any other attorney,” to

decline to accept a witness’s statements at face value and press a witness to “flush out

the truth.” Red Elk, 955 F.Supp. at 1181. There was nothing improper about the

government’s questioning of Ms. Rogers or Ms. Haney before the grand jury. Defendant

Schock cannot point to “a single prospective witness before the grand jury [who has]

contended in his or her affidavit [or otherwise] that the so-called ‘threats’ by the

government officials had caused him to testify falsely before that body.” Holloway, 778

F.2d at 657.

Defendant Schock further alleges misconduct regarding the government’s

questioning Ms. Haney about his purchase of the new Tahoe and Ms. Rogers about his

purchase of a Ford Fusion for his District Chief of Staff, both of which are matters

charged in the indictment. He claims that the government “falsely told Ms. Haney that

[he] ‘caused’ Schock for Congress to pay off” his old Tahoe loan in 2014 because Mr.

Green later advised the government in 2015 (after the grand jury investigation had

begun) that the loan payoff was the dealership’s “mistake.” (Def.Mem. at 36-41)

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Similarly, Defendant Schock alleges that the government “misled Ms. Rogers regarding

campaign laws[.]” (Def.Mem. at 61) He claims that the purchase of the car for the

District Chief of Staff was “permissible and disclosed.” (Id.) These arguments are

completely meritless. They are nothing more than a claim that it is serious misconduct

for the government to even investigate him or to not allow him “to present his version

of the facts before the grand jury.” Bryson, 2014 WL 1653244, at 2. Defendant Schock

admits as much when he baldly asserts that “the government persists in charging him[.]”

(Def.Mem. at 40)

In another bullet in his list, Defendant Schock alleges that the government

searched Ms. Haney’s home without her or her counsel’s consent. (Def.Mem. at 42) This

is yet another erroneous allegation. Prior to any search of the residence by the agent to

view the chandelier Defendant Schock had shipped there from his Congressional office,

the government obtained express permission from Ms. Haney’s counsel. We attach a

voice mail from Mr. Coffield, confirming the authorization to speak to Ms. Haney and

enter her residence. (Exhibit M) We further respectfully submit that this type of careless

allegation of misconduct is demonstrative of the lack of merit to Defendant Schock’s

motion.

4. Alleged Questioning of Defendant’s Sexuality

In the most sensational of his claims, Defendant Schock alleges that the

government conducted “inquiries into [his] sexuality.” (Def.Mem. at 76) This allegation

is completely erroneous. We fully agree with Defendant Schock that his sexuality is

completely irrelevant in this criminal matter. As stated in his memorandum, however,

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this issue was the subject of “gossip” in the media that pre-existed the grand jury

investigation. (Def.Mem. at 76) It also was of interest prior to the grand jury

investigation among his friends and staff members. But it was not of interest to the

government, and the government did not inquire about it. Out of the approximately 116

witness interview reports during the investigation and since the indictment, only 4

contain any references to Defendant Schock’s sexuality, and those references were

initiated by the witness, not by the government. Defendant Schock’s attempts to

attribute misconduct on the part of the government based on an issue that he himself

admits pre-dated the grand jury investigation is simply meritless.

Defendant Schock further alleges that the government improperly questioned

witnesses about his sexuality in relation to Karla Gonzalez. This claim is also without

merit. As noted above, and as alleged in the indictment, there is evidence that

Defendant Schock used $8,054.42 in campaign funds for a private flight from Peoria to

Washington in order to meet Ms. Gonzalez for a subsequent flight to Europe for a

vacation and then falsely reported the expense to the FEC as a campaign expense. In

addition, Defendant Schock accused a former staffer of inappropriately accessing Ms.

Gonzalez’s social media account, later reimbursed himself for payment of the staffer’s

legal fees, and falsely reported that expenditure to the FEC as a campaign expense.

Finally, the evidence reflects that Defendant Schock repeatedly used the government

travel card to make travel arrangements for himself and Ms. Gonzalez, including for

travel with Defendant Schock. (Exhibit I)

It was therefore incumbent upon government investigators to determine the

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nature of the relationship between the Congressman and the diplomat, whether the

expenses were accurately reported, or whether the FEC and House travel reports

contained false representations. “[T]he nature of [Ms. Gonzlez’s] relationship with

[Defendant Schock] w[as] relevant” to establishing any benefit he or both received from

any improper use and classification of government and campaign funds for travel or

otherwise. Menendez, 2015 WL 57033199, at *11; see also id. at *12 (“The challenged

questions about witnesses’ romantic and sexual relationships with Dr. Melgen are

similarly relevant because these witnesses all benefitted from Senator Menendez's

‘official acts,’ as alleged in the indictment”); Dingle, 862 F.3d at 612 (evidence relevant to

establish nature of defendant’s relationship with various parties). But the government

did not investigate Defendant Schock’s “sexuality” or inquire about who he “slept

with.” (Def.Mem. at 6, 76-77); see for example (Exhibit J – 4/26/16 GJ Tr. of Tania Hoerr

(Defendant Schock’s sister), stating “And I have told everyone you’ve treated me very

kindly and I have not had any issues”); (Exhibit J) (excerpts of GJ testimony of other

witnesses; and 8/22/17 email from another witness’s counsel, stating that “I can

confirm that no representative of the government threatened, harassed, or intimidated

[witness]. In addition, [witness] was not questioned about Mr. Schock’s sexuality, or

sexual orientation. To the contrary, you and your agents have been professional and

polite throughout all of our dealings in this matter”); id. (4/25/16 email from Mr.

Coffield to FBI Special Agent stating “just about all the clients have commented about

your being a ‘really nice guy.’ Much appreciated”).

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5. The Grand Jury Investigation

Finally, Defendant Schock alleges misconduct in the government’s decision to

even initiate an investigation of him. He baldly claims that “[t]his has been an

investigation of a man in search of a crime.” (Def.Mem. at 6) This is the identical claim

found by the court in Menendez to be “without merit.” 20015 WL 5703199, at *3

(“investigation ‘may be triggered by tips, rumors, evidence preferred by the prosecutor,

or the personal knowledge of the grand jurors.’” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,

344, (1974)). Here, as described above, there was substantially more than tips or rumors

that occurred prior to the grand jury’s first session in April 2015 to suggest potential

violations of federal law, which the government has an obligation to enforce. It would

have been irresponsible in this case not to fulfill that obligation.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the government respectfully requests that the Court

grant the government’s request for an evidentiary hearing as soon as practicable and

thereafter deny Defendant Schock’s motion to dismiss.

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Respectfully submitted,

PATRICK D. HANSEN ACTING UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

BY: s/Timothy A. Bass

Timothy A. Bass, Bar No. MO 45344 Assistant United States Attorney 318 S. Sixth Street Springfield, IL 62701 Phone: 217/492-4450 Fax: 217/492-4044 tim.bass@usdoj.gov

BY: s/Eugene L. Miller

Assistant United States Attorney 201 S. Vine Street, Suite 226 Urbana, IL 61802 Phone: 217/373-5875 Fax: 217/373-5891 eugene.miller@usdoj.gov

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 1st day of September 2017, I filed the foregoing directly with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notice to the following:

Counsel of record

s/Timothy A. Bass Timothy A. Bass, Bar No. MO 45344

Assistant United States Attorney 318 S. Sixth Street Springfield, IL 62701 Phone: 217/492-4450 Fax: 217/492-4044 tim.bass@usdoj.gov

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