Gov 1295: Comparative Politics in Latin AmericaFinal Exam Study Guide, Spring 2006

Jason's Study Tips: Study the syllabus by weeks, not every reading. Some readings are more important than others. Generally, those readings were highlighted in class or section, but not always. Broad, comprehensive theories are more important than details. However, you should, in studying, go back and make sure to know well at least 2 cases that you can draw upon to answ

Week 1: Introduction (February 1)

Gary Wynia, The Politics of Latin American Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 46-101.

● Players in the Latin American political game include those who try to gain public office or influence those who do – political parties, wealthy landowners, unions, military officers, peasant leaders, multinational corporations, and foreign governments are all examples. Important to note are: 1. Who are the people involved and what are their common economic, social, and political

interests? 2. What do they want from politics? 3. What resources do players have at their disposal and how do they use them to influence

authorities? 4. Which set of rules do players prefer and how successful are they in getting rivals to live by

them? ● Rural elites: the oligarquia – includes latifundistas and modern farmers

Wealth has traditionally been concentrated with rural elites on large estates in the Latin American countryside. Although industrialization has reduced their power in nations like Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, elites are willing to exercise whatever power they can to resist 1. losing access to cheap labor, and 2. losing land to agrarian reform.

Landowners are strongest politically at the local level and in nations of Central America and the Andean region, but in more industrialized countries, they compete with an array of other powerful urban groups.

The elite is less homogeneous than it used to be, comprised of both owners of inherited estates and those purchased them with new wealth found in commerce and finance. Estates have varied productivity and purpose: they can be divided into latifundios (traditional estates) and large, modern farms characteristic of most capitalistic economies. ■ Latifundios rely on traditional methods of abundant cheap labor rather than new technology

and are a social institution that preserves oligarchic control over peasants. They are more self-contained economically, and wield political leverage due to their importance to national economic growth. Although they still exist, many have been split up due to land reform; wealth, social status, and local power however, allow them to defend their lifestyle. ● Latifundistas desire little from politics and aren't very involved in government operation.

They exchange favors with and bribe local officials to maintain mutually beneficial relationships often used to halt law enforcement in their favor.

● Because it takes a strong, organized bureaucracy to penetrate local Latin American political systems, insecure governments have difficulty dislodging local elites.

● They prefer weak or elitist constitutional or autocratic governments because these do not work to limit the power of local elites.

■ Modern farmers are capital intensive and production-oriented; the concept of commercial farming is not new, but the heavy reliance on technology is. They often look to external

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markets and government help (guaranteed prices and sales). ● They are more integrated into the economic sector than local elites and are a diverse

group.● Modern farmers desire policies that promote high prices for produce, cheap

transportation and storage, and lobby against land taxes and agrarian reform. Like US and European farmers, they have created groups to represent them in government; they may support some political parties but are more concerned with influencing officials who make policy directly in order to win on specific agrarian issues.

● They wield political strength because the economy depends on them: agricultural exports are necessary for foreign exchange especially with high foreign debts; growing urban populations need to be fed. Thus most governments depend on them, and meet their demands.

● Farmers prefer governmental stability over any one government type; rules are a means to an end to them, as they are to latifundistas.

● Business elites Who belongs to the elite? All firm owners, large and small, have the potential to be players in

the political game. Ownership: Native investors own some large firms, but so do foreigners and governments. They

both compete and collaborate; they work together to preserve capitalist economies, but native industries may compete with multinationals which often steal markets.

Relationship between rural and business elites – how much do they conspire? The more industrialized an economy, the harder it is for the two to be one ruling class. In Brazil, for example, they are only united by the opposition to any tampering to the status quo national economic structure.

Most business elites began under tariff protection, and so do not crave free markets. They prefer the help of the state, in contrast to academics who favor free markets. Industrialists favor the subordination of labor, and fight labor organizations and social reforms; unions have often overcome these forces with votes and government assistance (lin in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela). Industrialists fear radicals, favor the status quo, and have turned to the military to evict presidents who didn't favor their interests.

Business elites have organized political representation but are the group most interested in appealing to specific policymakers often with bribes and favors. Their role in the developing economy gives them political power; their threats yield favorable policies. However, government rules involving tariff protection and utility prices make businesses simultaneously subject to government power.

Small and large businesses differ on policies favorable to them. They tolerate democracy as long as it doesn't interfere with their enterprises.

● Middle sectors Primarily professionals without much economic clout who had to ask the government to improve

their well-being by supplying public education, subsidized private industry, and public employment. For the middle sector (unlike Europe's “middle class” which used economic power to gain political influence) politics is a means to affluence.

Due to their origin in elite-run societies and reliance on political influence rather than economic success for power: ■ Middle sectors have little class consciousness uniting them■ They have not changed their societies as much as middle classes have changed European

ones; they have been focused (but not as much, recently) on joining the oligarchic class rather than empowering their own

■ Their unconventional route to economic development created economies largely dependent

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on government help; many middle sector members joined politics. The result is a modernizing economic heavily dependent upon governmental support.

Most pro-reform party leaders of the 60s were middle sector members, as were the military officers ruling in the 70s; they are a diverse group.

Their political preferences vary and are fickle: Though middle sector led radical parties of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay were extremely devoted to constitutional democratic practices, Mexican middle sectors supported one-party government, and in Brazil they were content with elite-dominated regional politics.

Over time, their preferences have also varied: at times when democracy was accompanied by conflict and economic uncertainty, middle sectors were quick to support strong government. They support reform only when it does not cause wealth redistribution with higher taxes, wages, or inflation: when their economic self-interest conflict with their political ideals, they favor the former.

● The masses They are NOT a homogeneous community: race, region, and economic self interest divide the

Latin American poor; their differences have been exploited by elites obstructing mass resistance to their authority.

Few belong to representative organizations; the views of union and peasant leaders don't always reflect the views of the masses.

Organized Labor: became a particularly important force after the 1930s with the rise of industries and the public sector. The Latin American labor movement is very different from that of the United States. ■ Latin American unions gave up much of their autonomy, rather than gaining any, when they

accepted the paternalist populist politicians as their leaders after the Great Depression. ■ Corporatist governmental practices made it necessary for unions to be recognized by the

government to operate, and ministries of labor controlled collective bargaining.■ When the will of organized labor clashed against that of populist presidents, the presidents

often used their hold over government to win the conflict. Even after the populist era, state control over organized labor survived and remains in most Latin American countries today.

■ Organized labor represents only the elite of the working classes; the majority of workers are actually unorganized and without a political voice. Unions focus on specific issues like wages rather than elevating the general welfare of the working class.

■ Unionized workers exercise power through 1. offering their huge number of votes to political candidates (although elections are the exception rather than the rule) and 2. through their vital role in the national economy. They can also use strikes and violence against weak presidents who fear military intervention.

■ Organization is key to labor movements because labor leaders need the masses to back them up in order to wield any influence; disunity encourages divide-and-conquer tactics from antilabor classes. However, over-organization is also harmful because it makes union leaders less sensitive to members' needs.

■ Rather than necessarily supporting democratic government (as one might expect), labor is more concerned with the government simply fulfilling its promises and serving as labor's ally, whether it is democratic or authoritarian (think of how labor movements gained a voice – during the populist era).

Campesinos – the rural poor; “the mestizo, indigenous, and Negro farmers and laborers who populate rural Latin America”■ Although agrarian reforms have brought about impressive improvements in Mexico, Cuba,

Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Peru, most of the rural poor survive barely at subsistence level, with or without land reform and mostly without any capital or technology to develop it.

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■ They fall into four important groups: colonos (workers on estates, sharecroppers, tenant farmers), wage laborers (on commercial farms), plantation workers (more like factory workers in a highly organized setting than their fellow campesinos), and small landowners

■ Because they are such a diverse and marginalized group, their political desires have not been heard often. Their basic desire is an increase in their standards of living, and their demands are more specific and local than broad-based and ideological. Although numbers are in their favor, the poor's votes usually belong to their landowners/local elites or employers. Only with the modern political parties of Venezuela and Mexico has their participation affected electoral outcomes.

■ In organizing, the poor are usually inhibited by physical separation and lack of communication (ethinicity and regionalism), which are exploited by those above them.

■ As the threat of their emancipation increases, so does repression by the military against them; they often abandoned entire villages to escape being massacred.

■ Reform parties have tried to break the hold local elites have over the poor by integrating them into politics and having them vote against their opponents; in Venezuela, the Accion Democratica did this in the 1940s. However, democratic reformism doesn't always work because reformists' promises are often left unfulfilled.

■ Campesinos can also resort to violence – examples are Zapata during the Mexican Revolution, Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and insurrectionists under Castro in Cuba. These were the campaigns of “urban-bred idealogues” representing the peasantry.

■ Campesinos face both the lack of powerful allies in government and the risk of being coopted upon forming alliances.

● The Military Most have gone from unsophisticated to to professional, modernized, and highly trained.

They are important because when not ruling directly, they exert influence on on civil authorities.

Possible reasons for the military's extensive involvement in Latin American politics include: ■ its hierarchical organization allows it to carry out coups■ Early on, military officers were connect to the oligarchy and so intervened on their

behalf, but this is no longer the case; the military is now largely comprised of middle and lower middle class members. Rather, the military shares with oligarchy the interest of preventing radical change.

■ Military education isolates military officials from the ways of civilian politics, giving them low tolerance for it.

■ The military has taken on the mission of national defense and protecting the national way of life. It also has become involved in promoting national economic development.

Through revolutions, guerrilla movements, and human rights violations convictions, militaries have gained paranoia about self-preservation; the result is a stubborn, entrenched military bureaucracy

Because very few civilians are trained and willing to serve in governments' defense ministries, military officials have to do it, which works in the military's favor; they win disputes with the government because there is no capable of rebuking them.

Foreign military technology and ideology (US anticommunism for example) have had an impact on Latin American militaries.

Today, militaries do more than protect the oligarchy; they strive towards national economic development, fear radicalism, and distrust most civilian politicians.

● The Roman Catholic Church The clergy has shifted alliances and critics over time – it used to be criticized by reformers

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for using spiritual ideology to placate the masses suffering beneath the oligarchy, while conservatives now criticize the church for abandoning its message of salvation to advocate for more earthly, radical changes.

Revised theology in the 1960s generated conflict between conservative bishops and reformers within the church in Latin America

Parish organizations called comunidades de base promoted innovation within the church. They became the targets of assassins working for local elites, who felt threatened by the “self-help” these parishioners were teaching the Latin American masses.

The church was able to stand up to the military authoritarian governments of the 1970s and denounced human rights violations.

The church's efficacy is limited by a lack of organization and agreement on earthly goals. While it is powerful, the church cannot singlehandedly change national politics.

● Government bureaucrats This category includes technocrats, who are well-educated (abroad) but often lack political

skills. The increase in government responsibility due to the rise of the public sector has made

bureaucrats an increasingly important force. Both technocrats and military officials promise to reduce government inefficiency and

corruption in response to renewed interests in strengthening the state, but the seldom fulfill these promises.

Bureaucrats desire to 1. expand their influence on policy, 2. administer their programs with little interference from political authorities, and 3. dominate those who depend on their good will.

Bureaucrats are supposed to act as the civil servants of politicians, but politicians often find themselves to be the captives of their of their bureaucrats; program implementation depends entirely on bureaucrats.

● Foreign players Includes those who represent other governments, those who work fo rinternational agenceis,

and those employed by private businesses. US has employed methods like financing anticommunist election campaigns, training

paramilitaries, and promoting economic reform and respect for human rights in the region to undermine the political Left (and communism) and gain US allies.

The US's goal of access to Latin American resources and markets has led it to prefer the status quo to rapid political change – antiAmericanism/communism would prevent this sort of access.

The US government takes advantage of Latin American reliance on US markets and uses direct intervention through covert action to influence Latin American governments; the CIA helped overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Direct military intervention is also always a threat.

Multinationals, a huge part of Latin American economies, are under criticism in the region for bribery, resisting regulation, and driving domestic businesses out of the market. They desire stable economic rules and governments that aren't hostile to foreign investors, and they exert influence through the resources and products they provide to the region.

Many economists, consumers, and industrialists believe that foreign firms can be helpful to Latin American economies.

MNCs played a large role in lending to Latin America after oil price increases created wealth that banks were eager to lend out. However, in exchange for its loans in Latin America, the IMF imposed strict guidelines involving unpopular expenditure cuts; Latin

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American governments were subject to the mandates of foreign organizations. These loans played a prominent role in Latin American economics and politics from the 1980s to the present.

Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 1-10; 13-66.

● Scholars attribute the political turn to authoritarianism as a result of economic development (drastically different from the Western tradition of a turn to democracy) in Latin America to two sets of answers: one focused on Latin America's Spanish/Portuguese, Roman Catholic, Iberian tradition that largely included the concept of “strong-man rule”; the other focused on the economic “dependence” on the first world that Latin America experienced. This led to the creation of the cultural and dependency theories, discussed in lecture during

Week 2. ● Chapter 1 is a history of Latin America's European colonization; it provides an introductory context

for Latin America's Iberian tradition. After Spanish America gained independence from its colonizers in the 1820s, its nations faced

economic disaster because of the violence's aftermath and war debt. It also had been integrated into world trade by Europe and relied on exportable surplus from its agricultural and mining production for economic survival.

The post-independence commitment to liberalism brought free trade to Latin America, and European manufactured goods began to replace domestic products.

Social mobility was limited; mestizos who had led military establishments retreated to their haciendas and government was left largely to caudillos (usually soldiers or ex-soldiers) who took power by force.

From the 1850s to the 1880s, the era of the caudillos gave way to that of administrators, whose prime task was national unification and further integration into the world economy; administrators also increased national infrastructure to aid transport and economic development.

● Chapter 2 Industrialization in Europe caused Latin America's post-1880 economic changes; it served

Europe's increasing need for food and raw materials and was accompanied by an increased in imported manufactured goods from Europe. Foreign investments flowed in. The rise of liberal ideology justified this import-export integration into the world economy, but Latin America lacked the social structure that had nurtured liberalism in Europe, creating a different outcome in Latin America.

1900-1930 saw the consolidation of the export-import economic model in Latin America, which created a distinct, educated, urban middle sector. The influx of immigrant workers in some countries (not Mexico, which had a large indigenous Indian population for cheap labor) created a large working class that started labor unions; they didn’t gain much political influence until later on. All of this contributed to the growth of large cities.

Liberalism in Latin America ended up being an example of “failed cultural borrowing” because it didn’t have the economic foundations for it that Europe did.

The 1930s to the 1960s were characterized economically by Import-Substituting Industrialization (ISI). The Great Depression’s initially catastrophic events for Latin American economies led them to develop their own alternatives to foreign manufactured goods. Politically, many Latin American governments suffered military coups as a result of the depression. The state’s role in the economy increased as it created means of fostering domestic industry such as high tariff barriers. Co-optative democracies and the broad-based populist movements were two political phenomena of this era.

The 1960s to the 1980s saw the stagnation in ISI because this form of industrialization was

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structurally incomplete, there were uneven terms of foreign trade (Latin American raw materials could purchase less and less foreign capital goods), domestic demand was limited, job decline occurred due to the increase in technology,

The need to undertake anti-inflation policies made authoritarian governments take a heavy hand against labor and its protests. Military groups blamed economic problems on incompetent politicians and claimed themselves to be “antipolitical.”

Bureaucratic-authoritarian states, which granted public office to people with bureaucratized careers (military, civil service, corporations, etc.), excluded the working class, and identified problems as “technical” rather than political, emerged as a consequence. They sought to consolidate ties with international economic forces to revive economic growth (ex. Chicago boys in Chile).

Mexico and Cuba were exceptions to this path. The 1980s to the 2000s are characterized by crisis, debt, and democracy. The debt crisis caused

Latin America to face the mandates of the IMF and the “Washington consensus.” Debt grew and GDP declined. Latin America turned toward democracy during this era. By the early 1990s, growth picked up and inflation fell, but huge problems like instability in foreign investments and grave poverty remain.

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WEEK 2: Points of Departure I: Lecture Summary Theories of Latin American Politics

Modernization Theory (Lipset)The belief that the more industrialized, urban, and modern a society became, the more social change and improvement were possible as traditional patterns and attitudes were abandoned or transformed; used as a blueprint for development in Latin America. Modernization theory is a socio-economic theory, sometimes known as (or as being encompassed within) Development theory, which highlights the positive role played by the developed world in modernizing and facilitating sustainable development in underdeveloped nations, often contrasted with Dependency theory

Cultural Approaches (Wiarda): highly static, run the risk of falling into cultural relativism.. An "automatic" way of

defining the imaginary lack of boundaries separating all of mankind’s different forms of expression (or ways of life). Automatic, because defining a lack of boundaries is already setting one down, a naive and amateurish approach to definition.

The Dependency School A theory that seeks to explain the continuing problems of Latin American underdevelopment and political conflict by positing the existence of an imperialistic, exploitative relationship between the industrialized countries and the developing nations of Latin America and other developing regions. Not international vacuum, LA must be understood in the context of global society

Crucial Dependency Theory (Gunder Frank): development of core takes place directly at the expense of the periphery

Sophisticated Dependency Theory (Cardoso): dropped the idea that dependent countries cannot develop, but that development constrained by international economic conditions (development in periphery is uneven, more fragile, international base, MNCs rely on repression, authoritarianism to keep in place, development less stable and thereby more vulnerable to fluctuations in the economy.

Institutional Approaches (Design and Strength): Institutions determine the parameters of the political game. Institutional design concerned with how different arrangements effect political outcomes (parliamentary vs. presidential systems)and institutional strength: not only form but the the durability of the institutions is key. Advantageous as less deterministic, helps to account for differences across countries with similar cultures, economies, politics

Structural vs. Voluntarist Approaches… Structuralism is a general approach in various academic disciplines that explores the interrelationships between fundamental elements of some kind, upon which some higher mental, linguistic, social, cultural etc "structures" are built, through which then meaning is produced within a particular person, system, culture. Stresses the causal importance of deeply entrenched cultural and social conditions (little room for human agency). Voluntarist: focuses on political leaders who make decisions, leadership best explains political outcomes

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The oligarchic period (laissez faire, export-led models)The political model (exclusionary regimes: few people voting)

Constitutional oligarchy (Chile, Argentina, Brazil): parties, laws and elections respected (BUT not full democracies as sufferage is restricted) Oligarchic parties made dominant owing to control over peasants

Strongman rule (Mexico and Venezuela) Single-man dictatorshipsIncorporation of middle classes

Middle sectors pushed their way to power, activist state preferred, movement challenging oligarchic power Reactionary dictatorships: conservative reactions leads to democratic breakdown as a result of weak conservative stronghold

ISI to avoid dependency: shift from laissez faire model to that of activist state: price controls, wage controls, own sectors of economy, state firms, state has larger role in redistribution

II: Summary of Readings

● Howard Wiarda, Politics and Social Change in Latin America: Still a Distinct Tradition?INTRODUCTION● Attitudes towards Latin America changed after Castro’s revolution in Cuba/ revolutions in

Nicaragua and El Salvador—Latin America no longer so marginal (Threat: “entire Hemisphere would fall prey to Castro-Communist takeovers?”)

● Strict dichotomies not viable in Latin America; reform vs. revolution, democracy vs. dictatorship, fail to hold.

● “Latin American systems do, in fact change and modernize. The social and economic transformations occurring in Latin America are considerable”…not dependent on Northwest European-North American Experiences …

● Essay seeks to present: “an understanding of the historical and cultural conditions and determinants of Latin American social and political behaviour that shows also the implications of these factors for understanding concrete contemporary issues of political change and social and economic development.”

● Cultural approach: Latin America is a fragment of a Catholic, corporate, Roman, semifeudal, medieval society…and represents an alternative to the Northwest Europe and Untied States model, not an “undeveloped” version of it.

● Western models of development are insufficient to convey the Latin American Experience: Timing and context entirely different The sequences of development are distinct International settings are entirely changed “Traditional institutions” in Latin America have remarkable persistence and staying

powerLatin America distinct from 1st world, 2nd world, 3rd world categorization = distinctCONTINUED p. 315

1. Cultural theory: Latin America remains locked in a traditional pattern of values and institutions (moral idealism, religious and philosophical unity, sense of historic continuity, family centered, patron-client relationships could be called patrimonialist, organic-corporate conception of state and society).

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2. Nations grounded in Thomistic-inspired hierarchy of laws, orders and estates 3. Dominant Iberic-Latin political culture has meant that change ahs been limited and

structured4. Iberian and Latin Americans rooted in newer and reformist currents (Catholic and

secular writers)5. Must consider Iberian origins/ key features

1. Political sociology of corporatism2. Organic-statism3. Patron-client networks (now organised on a national scale)4. Iberic-Latin patterns of state-society relations5. Future of LA lies in countries like Brazil and Argentina (most forward-looking

and modern of the LA nations)6. Perhaps future will not be bright BUT a ‘mosaic of discord’, as system of

endemic conflict occasioned by the gradual decline of an older society

● Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics: Defining Democracies in Latin America (look for those that have not had fairly constant

dictatorial rule) Primary concern is the social conditions (e.g. education) that serve to support basic

democratic foundations) Social measures of democracy: average wealth, degree of industrialization and urbanization,

level of education Education particularly significant as the philosophy of government has sen increased

education as the basic requirement of democracy (correlation: higher education, more likely one is to believe in democratic values)

Economic development and the class struggle: (by permitting those in the lower strata to develop longer time perspectives and more complex and gradualist views of politics, develops a belief in secular reformist gradualism)

Lipset explores multivariate cahracer of relationships in a total social system: does not attempt a new theory, but only the formalizing and empirical testing of certain sets of relationships implied by traditional theories

● Andre Gunder Frank, “The Development of Underdevelopment” Core dependency theoryOrigins lie in a refutation of modernization theory: rebuts the main precepts of

modernizationists, their emphasis on the endogenous factors as the main cause for the region’s “underdevelopment”

For Frank: Capitalism incorporated LA into the world economic system BUT also, through capitalism, a series of asymmetrical, metropolitan-satellite relationships exploited the region by draining resources and surplus capital from the periphery and moving it toward the core areas.

● Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela: “Modernization and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin American Underdevelopment.” Fundamental Questions: why was there such a stark contrast in the developmental

experience of a few Western countries and most of the rest of the world? Spawned much literature

Delineation of modernization and dependency viewpoints Lipset concentrates primarily on explaining economic underdevelopment as a function of

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the lack of adequate entrepreneurial activity. The lack of instrumental behaviour, weak achievement orientations, and the disdain for the pragmatic and material have prevented rise of risk-taking business sector

Cultural theory: a “new corporatism” as an effort is being made to explain economic, social and political feature of Latin American countries by stressing the durability of Catholic and Thomistic values

Wiarda stresses (cultural theorist) the importance of studying LA on its own terms, without advocating the desirability or inevitability of change along US or Western European lines

Dependency Theory: the focus is on explaining LA underdevelopment, and not the functioning of capitalism…

Much work needs to be done with dependency perspective: clarification of concepts and causal interrelationships, and asses its capacity to explain social processes in vaious parts of peripheral societies.

Dependency has advantage over modernization theory—open to historically grounded conceptualization in underdeveloped contexts (not locked into an illustrative methodological style)

● Eliana Cardoso and Ann Helwage: “Import Substitution Industrialization.” ● ISI: an attempt to achieve industrial self-sufficiency Arguments in favour of ISI

1. Volatility of primary commodities prices (hence, the concentration of export in primary goods is risky)

2. Declining terms of trade (hypothesis of a structural tendency for the terms of trade of developing countries to deteriorate because of the concentration of their exports in primary commodities)

3. Dynamic nature of resource endowment (may have abundant natural resources and labour but developing countries are capital poor—distinct from resource endowment—thus, the government must attract investment in factories and equipment

4. Infant industry…efficiency improves with experience 5. Linkages (industries have positive spillover effects)6. Elasticity (offers a solution to the balance of payments deficits in the short run..real

devaluation effects the trade balance in the medium run)Limitations of ISI: protection leads to overvalued exchange rates (slow export growth), ISI exaggerated industrial growth at the expense of agriculture, subsidies to industrial development put pressure on the government Criticisms of ISI:

1. Uneven protection (high levels of protection and overvalued goods contributed to situation in which domestically produced goods were often priced well above world prices), overcapacity (exceeded domestic demand), agriculture hurt, budget deficits (subsidies added to expenditure), interest rates (use of low interest rates to encourage investment was excessively capital-intensive and savings rates were low), labour (untapped resource/high unemployment), foreign direct investment (capital-intensive plants employed few skilled workers from LA)

III: Important terminology:

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State: a set of permanent, administrative, legal and coercive systems that maintain a monopoly over legitimate use of force in a given territory. Only in conditions of civil war does state dissolve

Regime: set of rules, system and procedures by which power is organized (country suffers military coup = regime change)

Government: particular people in power at a given time…changes frequentlyCaudillo (strongman rule e.g .Mexico and Venezuela): regional/ military leader (usually

with authoritarian tones). Technocrat: New type of bureaucrat; intensely trained in engineering or economics and

devoted to the power of national planning; came to fore in offices of governments following World War II. (Reference: occawlonline)

Civil society: Non-profit, organised groups, clubs and associations in society that operate independently from government and the state. Examples of groups in civil society include universities, non-governmental organisations, environmental movements, indigenous peoples' associations, organised local communities and trade unions. Civil society can be organised at the local, national and international level.

Laissez faire state vs. OligarchicLaissez-faire (French, "leave alone"), in economics, is the doctrine that the best

economic policy is to let businesses make their own decisions without government interference.

Oligarchic model existed prior to laissez faire model—power concentrated in the hands of a few (16th century) colonized by Spain and Brazil. Soldiers, priests, colonial bureaucrats, granted haciendas (the traditional elite), coerced the population (e.g. into working in mines/ indigenous people decimated).

Export-led economic model: A macroeconomic strategy focusing on expansion of the export sector --such as through export subsidies or competitive devaluation --as a way of boosting economic growth while avoiding the inflationary consequences of higher domestic spending.

Constitutional oligarchy: has all the appearances of a democracy (parties, law, elections—therefore is ‘respectable’) yet sufferage is restricted.

Clientelism: Personal relationships that link patrons and clients together in a system in which jobs, favors, and protection are exchanged for labor, support, and loyalty.

Import Substitution Industrialization: A strategy for development that calls for governments of developing countries to develop large domestic markets ensuring technologies of production are mastered by local manufacturers or supplied by foreign investors (initial

stages are easy, but exhausted after a while/ domestic market becomes saturated)

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Gov 1295 Study Group Submission-WEEK 3-Denise

*there were multiple handouts (especially concerning parties and populism) this week that I recommend reviewing*

READINGS:

-Conniff: in populism, charisma is important, well “charismatic leaders who win election”-1) change from old oligarchic period where leaders had small, sure base

-now charisma is supposed to move the masses…?-2) mass appeal (participation, usually through elections)

-weak definition b/c often democracy has democratic leaders too-populism comes from the big changes going on at the time and place-refutes those that say that modernization theory fails (fails because organization towards democracy should come with urbanization, and populism doesn’t follow)

-Conniff says they just must be at the beginning stages of it (can then you can compare to the uncharacteristic machine politics of the U.S.)

-it’s a different path: didn’t organize as class-based parties-if it’s because of a leader, then leadership could be determinant

-conclusion: in the long run, it’ll work out (these are the early stages of what is ultimately the right path)

-Di Tella: importance of class: “status incongruence”-lots of possibilities for control of the working class->elitist?-timing & sequence matter: populism arises as demonstration effect with rising expectations

and status incongruence

-Malloy: like Di Tella, except espouses the idea that it’s always the middle class controlling the working class

-modernization theory may not be working to explain populism because of structural difference

-weaker and smaller middle class? = different class coalitions and different politics?

-Collier & Collier: corporatism: looking at systems of representation that don’t compete and are sanctioned, subsidized and supervised by the state

-disaggregate corporatism to see the power & politics relationship between the state and organized labor

-inducements vs. constraints (see graph)-inducements: that extended by state to win groups’ cooperation-constraints: the ways in which the state directly controls those groups-not opposed phenomena: think of co-optation, etc.-in square chart, shows that state corporatism is a point of both high levels

of inducements & constraints (for example, as opposed to repression, which is point of low inducements, high constraints)

-Erickson: most anti-populism; has 2 models for how things can go; he wants something more

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Marxist, dealing class consciousness-worker in populism sees himself as part of the consumer vs. producer dynamic-1) class consciousness: Marxist-Leninist ideology (changes in worker consciousness) while

populism is more pragmatic-populism changes what workers demand

-2) Marxism vs. Leninism: key difference between Leninism and populism is organization-author would like a strongly organized party with autonomy -populism, however, is not well organized because there is no

structure (just a charismatic leader)-more Leninism would give more control over leaders

Case readings (read 1 of 3): -(1) Hellmann: Mexico, (2) Horowitz: Argentina

-(3) Ellner: Venezuela: populism centers on Betancourt’s movement & AD (Democratic Action party) of which he was a founder in aim of the multi-class party; following his coup of the office in 1945, became obvious that instead of the AD revealing its socialist leanings (considering he was a social emocrat at his roots) now that it was finally in power, it had become populist

-in party formation, he temporarily united with the Communists as part of the National Democratic Party (PDN); got control, distanced himself from socialism, AD emerging for the masses

-party used symbols, good oratory skills, etc. but failed to address issues of the black population, give a good historical interpretation

-Trienio: peak years of populism with extensive reforms, organizational progress for peasants, workers & students

-1948, AD toppled by military, then returns in 1958-Betancourt maintains better relations with COPEI (putting the Punto Fijo

Pact in the works…)-AD compared to Peru’s APRA: Venezuelan populism was less manipulative, more

independent from the U.S., workers were the vanguard in the party, isolated itself during the Trienio (“partisan aloofness”)

LECTURE NOTES/THEMES:

Lecture 1: 6. Industrialization, the rise of the working class, and the “social question”7. Populism

1. Populists as entrepreneurs and brokers1. seeking power in face of big enemies 2. middlemen: threaten oligarchy (pressure), put fear into radical workers

(control)2. Working class incorporation

1. economic incorporation: corporatism 1. officially sanctioned, non-competitive compulsory social groups (unions,

etc.)2. reconciling the lack of resolution of the “social question”

2. political incorporation: populist parties3. 3 populist paths

1. labor populism: no peasants, just workers, oligarchy stays in power: Argentina & Peru

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2. conservative populism: opposite of radical, more controlled, no peasants or land reform, led to polarization w/ an oligarchy maintaining strength: Brazil & Chile

3. radical populism: mobilize workers & peasants for extreme reform & destruction of the oligarchy: Mexico & Venezuela

8. 2 cases of labor populism1. Argentina

1. conservative restoration (1930-43): oligarchic rule becoming unsustainable w/ rapid industrialization

2. rise of Peron (1943-45) & first Peron government (1946-55)1. labor law: one confederation (CGT)2. direct appeal to poor with wealth redistribution3. 1952: economic stagnation

3. Peron’s overthrow and the “impossible game” (1955-66)1. Military restricted democracy2. “impossible game”: Peron has 1/3 of the electorate, secret dealings for

support, Frondizi goes into pact promising to legalize Peronism again if elected & betrays them

4. the legacies of Peronism2. Peru

1. Leguia’s overthrow and the emergence of APRA (somewhat like Peronism), Cerro takes over, Haya doesn’t win in ‘31

2. abortive populism (1945-8): in trouble but survives, 3. APRA’s brief period in power until 1948 coup4. the ban on APRA (post-Odria) and political instability

1. party is banned for 21 of its 25 years2. stalemates politically3. ban led to dysfunction of party itself amidst instability

Lecture 2:I. Radical Populism

● Overview: Key features: peasant mobilization, land reform/weakening of oligarchy (peasant

support generated w/ weakened landed elites) Legacies: short term polarization; longer term: integrative party system/regime stability

● leading parties moderate & converge● labor & peasants remain aligned with popular parties going center

● Cases Mexico:

■The 1910 Revolution: Madero & Constitutionalists, Zapata & Pancho Villa radicals, then Carranza, CAlles

■The Cardenas Period (1934-40)● Radical reform, including oil nationalization and land reform (return to the

ejido system) Immensely popular in countryside Broke the back of the oligarchy

● Creation of the Mexican Revolutionary Party (later PRI)■Post-Cardenas Legacies:

Integrative party system; stable one party dominant regime

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Labor wedded to partyPUN: Catholic party, mere 15-20%

Stable economic growth, 1940s-1970s (though stability is not democracy…) Venezuela

■The birth of AD (progressive Betancourt) and the Trienio (1945-48), populism’s heyday of reform

● Radical reforms, including land reform (huge redistribution), worker & peasant confederations, etc.

● Conservative (church, business, etc.) reaction and coup COPEI not enough, resort to military AD underground

■The Pérez Jimenez Dictatorship (1948-57): rolls back unions, all kinds of reform gone, etc.

■AD Moderation and the 1958 Punto Fijo Pact w/ AD, COPEI, business, labor, military, etc. cooperating and moving to center

■Post-1958: Integrative party system and democratic stability ● left will maintain property rights as concession to business● right will allow a larger role of the state

II. Conservative PopulismA. Key Features

Minimal labor mobilization; tightly controlled from above Limited reforms; no land reform--oligarchic power left intact Labor incorporated under authoritarian regime: initially, no populist party

B. LegaciesShort term: conservative democracy

Oligarchic power left intactPopulist parties, labor get “raw deal” as Congress blocks reforms

Longer term: polarized party systemRight remains strongLabor/left radicalizes

● Cases Brazil

■Getulio Vargas and the Estado Novo (1937-47) *see identification below for details*

■Post-1945: Conservative democratization● PTB joins coalition government, but Congress blocks reforms● PTB and labor become increasingly radicalized

Chile■Initial incorporation under Ibanez■1932 “Socialist Republic” and creation of (populist) Socialist Party■1932-52: Conservative Democratization: Socialists join coalition governments but

fail to achieve reforms■Post-1952 Polarization: Socialist Party radicalizes

IDENTIFICATIONS:

● Corporatism – (vs. pluralism) officially sanctioned, non-competitive compulsory social groups; legally recognized, protected and subsidized by the state; unions highly regulated by the state (have a say over leaders and spending, allowing strikes, etc.); usually only one group is

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then officially sponsored by the state; double-edged sword for labor: they get a seat at the negotiating table at the cost of autonomy; different under democracy and dictatorship-benefits offered by party platforms but can also have conservative backlash

● Lázaro Cárdenas – “Pragmatic leftist” Mexican President 1934-1940. Of modest background, he was drawn into politics around the Mexican Revolution. He supported Calles (being of the Party of the Mexican Revolution to become the PRI), who became president and made Cárdenas a governor, becoming known for his progressive social programs. Calles supported Cárdenas as the presidential frontrunner (in hopes of controlling him like he did others). However, Cárdenas, being strict with honesty in his work, arrested and deported Calles and others for corruption. He also halved his own salary, making him popular. He organized corporatist structures in Mexico (trade unions, peasants, the middle-class, etc.) and nationalized the petroleum (which also expropriating the assets of foreign companies) while supporting labor, subsidizing unions, etc. so that wages went up. He was hugely popular in the countryside (returned the ejido system, see below for details) and managed to break the oligarchy’s back in Mexico. Known to be only PRI president who didn’t make himself rich from the presidency.

● Getúlio Vargas/The Estado Novo – Getúlio Vargas was Brazil’s President from 1937-1945, and again in 1951 until his death. The “estado novo” was his new state, his authoritarian government modeled on that of Portugal’s. A communist plan had been denounced in order to facilitate the takeover of the government. Vargas closed Congress, got himself a new constitution that allowed him to control the legislature and judiciary, and then he decreed all political parties dispersed. Some unsuccessfully tried to depose him. He stressed structure and professionalism in the state and its intervention in the economy towards industrialization. He made use of a controlled press and propaganda but also did such things as stabilizing jobs and regulating work. The end of World War II favored democracy again and he was deposed by a military movement in ’45.

● Punto Fijo Pact – After AD has been toppled and goes underground in Venezuela, they realize that they need to moderate and negotiate with business, the church, and the center-right COPEI. The product was the work of AD leader Betancourt and COPEI leader Caldera in 1958: the Punto Fijo Pact. It protected all the major players and was created so that the Venezuelan government would better be able to control development (minimum gov. program, less radical than AD because property rights were maintained for business, and then less agrarian reform which shows the center-shifting of the parties) though it would allow certain crucial parts of the economy to remain in the private sector’s control while allowing for moderation and power-sharing. The military got pay raises and no one would be tried for human rights violations, power would be shared in gov. and state job contracts, etc. There would be no AD hegemony, COPEI didn’t want another coup, and so a cooperative two-party system sprouted. This cooperation in moderation among the two parties, business, labor and the military became the foundation of an integrative party system (see details below) in Venezuela.

● Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre/APRA - Founder of the Peruvian APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, which bears a resemblance to Peronism, and also considered responsible for the regional Aprisma movement) as a student leader in the universities. It was the first working class party, and the best organized (bordering on cult-like), thought itself the savior of Peru. Haya ran but did not win election in 1931, losing to Cerro. APRA took over Trujillo, killing members of the military, who then kill thousands, leading to bad blood between the groups. Cerro is assassinated; APRA is banned (which strengthens it on the inside). It

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survives and is briefly powerful in the 1940s; however, another coup in 1948 gets is banned again. It stalemates politics and polarizes deeply.

● Integrative party system – A system associated with longer-term stability. It includes having the leading parties moderate and converge at the center; the popular sector then centers and reconciles with the elite. Secondly, labor and peasants remain aligned with the popular parties that are moving to the center. Thus, it produces moderate, multi-class party system that reduces/limits polarization (no strong right or left) while protecting the key players’ interests (earns the confidence of the economic elite while maintaining the support of labor and peasants because both sectors have a stake in the system)=stability.

● Salvador Allende – Socialist party (co-founder of the party in Chile, which was mass-based from below and collective, anti-elite, primarily of urban workers, revolutionary with aims to replace capitalism with socialism in Marxist fashion) politician of Chile. The 1964 election chose Christian Democrat Frei, who turns toward the right in the later 1960s. In 1970, Allende—as the candidate for the Popular Unity coalition—won with a slim margin in a run-off election with Alessandri. He faced opposition from extreme socialists while he sought alliance with Christian Democrats, etc. He aimed for radical redistribution and also nationalized some sectors of the economy (copper). The U.S. disliked socialist Allende from the start and pulled out aid even as the Chilean economy was booming domestically; polarization deepened, strikes were rampant, and Allende’s pact offer in 1973 was too little too late. September 11, 1973, the military under General Pinochet, overthrew Allende, whose body was found in the ruins of La Moneda.

● The Ejido System – Process in which the government takes land that is privately owned and then uses it as communal land shared by people of a community, which was replaced by the encomienda system. That was abolished by Constitution in 1917, though results were not to be seen until President Lázaro Cárdenas in 1934 actually restored the ejido system to give land back to the people and provide more food. The land was owned by the government but is supported by a national bank, which pays for the upkeep. Those who work the land are then paid.

];

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The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Left in the 60s and 70s

NOTE: I covered all of the key ID terms in the lecture notes and readings – everything is here.

Lecture Notes 22 February 2006

● The 50s and 60s had unprecedented growth in Latin America (average 4.5%), and there was a great deal of democratization; modernization theorists saw these years as their greatest evidence.

● There was a broad consensus that supported “developmentalist” economic policies, which had basic ISI features but eliminated radical populist and redistributive measures in order to court increased foreign investment – Levitsky called it mildly Keynesian.

● There was a large growth in the middle class, many of whom disagreed with radical populists and conservatives; they formed new reformist moderate parties like Acción Democratica (AD in Venezuela), the Christian Democrats (Chile), and Popular Action (Peru). These leaders were viewed as progressive democrats, and Kennedy supported them.

● Growth was uneven; inequality was constant or worsening, and tens of millions were in poverty. Oligarchies blocked reform. A new generation of leftists, who were not bound to the traditional Marxist model and not dependent on Moscow, emerged to oppose developmentalist policies.

● The left pursued 2 roads to socialism: armed revolutionary and democratic. Chile was the best example of the democratic transition to socialism; the Chilean Socialist

Party sought to achieve power within democratic electoral rules. Salvador Allende was the presidential candidate in 1964 and won almost 40% of the vote, and won the election in 1970, the first socialist in history to be elected. He protected the media and civil liberties, but he was unable to meet the demands of the conservative opposition or his radical followers, and Pinochet led a coup on September 11th, 1973. For Latin American leftists, this reinforced the idea that democracy was a sham, and that socialism could only be pursued through violent means. They argued that the bourgeoisie controlled the media, the elections, and the military, so democratic attempts to start socialism would only instigate coups.

For the armed left, revolutions promised to destroy the landed oligarchy, radically redistribute wealth, deconstruct the military, and kill/exile dissidents who disagreed with the revolutionary cause.

Cuba didn’t fit the Marxist model of a country that would transition to socialism, and the revolution wasn’t even led by the lower classes; Cuba was wealthier and had less inequality than many other Latin American nations.

On the Cuban Revolution:

● Cuba was a sultanistic regime during the Batista years, which made it especially prone to collapse; in sultanistic regimes, the leader controls virtually all state institutions, so when the leader loses control or is deposed, the state collapses. Especially in Cuba, rule was very personalistic and state institutions rotted from within.

● The Cuban Revolution was initially led by middle-class radicals, led by Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, and Castro’s brother Raul; it started as a guerilla movement until massive sectors of the army and populace joined them.

● Castro and Co. went far beyond populism; peasants lived in communal farms, old leaders were jailed and killed, healthcare and education were made universal, all foreign industries and lands were nationalized, wages increased, and basic food was subsidized; Cuba became far more

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egalitarian. They wanted to create a “new man” who worked for moral incentives rather than material exchanges.

● The Cuban regime was nationalist, anti-imperialist, and pro-Soviet. In the first 3 years after Castro took over, they led the Bay of Pigs invasion, started a trade embargo, and led assassination attempts; Cubans nationalized businesses, aligned with the USSR, and started the Cuban Missile Crisis. Cuba also instigated and supported leftist movements in other nations. The embargo made sustainable development impossible. The armed road to leftist power entailed confrontation with the US and the wipeout of almost an entire social class.

Other Important stuff

● Castro and Cuba look like dinosaurs now. For many Latin Americans, Cuba represented a beacon of hope and an alternative to ISI and developmentalism, reducing poverty while avoiding conservative backlash. On a more basic level, the Cuban revolution transformed the Latin American left by showing that radical change was possible. Many of the leftists came from university students. These students saw rapid economic growth with immense poverty and inequality, and dominating political elites; they saw ISI as a model that perpetuated inequality and poverty. The new left did not wait for social conditions to be right; the Cuban Revolution had not happened according to Marx.

● For the radical youth of the 60s, Cuba and Che Guevara became icons. Guerilla movements abounded; in Venezuela, the youth wing of AD started the Movement of the Revolutionary Left started a guerilla movement; Peru had the rebel APRA, the ERN in Colombia, the Rebel Armed Forces in Guatemala, and the Sandinista Liberation Front in Nicaragua, and the Montoneros in Argentina.

● Che tried to repeat his feats, first in Africa and later in Bolivia. It became known as foco strategy; small groups went to the mountains or countryside to gain peasant support. The idea was that peasants were inherently revolutionary because they were so exploited. This theory turned Marxism on its head by making socialist revolution without Marx’s catalyst, the working class. Across Latin America in the 1960s, all of the guerilla movements failed. Che’s movement failed to recruit 1 peasant, and Che was captured and executed in 1967 by the Bolivian Army. The central assumption of foco theory was wrong; peasants are hard to mobilize. Most of the time, peasants avoid taking risks for fear of losing what they had. Most guerillas also knew very little about the peasants they were trying to mobilize, and they knew little about rural culture; in indigenous areas, they did not even speak the language of those whom they were trying to recruit. Revolutionaries rarely sparked peasant rebellions; they only gained peasant support outside of embedded patron-client parties, after they had been removed from the land. Even where guerillas were able to mobilize peasants, the regimes were very different than Batista’s (not sultanistic, and at least semi-democratic; Che said that guerilla movements were unlikely to work against democratic governments). Other regimes had highly professional armies; peasants and university students were routed. Revolutions require the disintegration of the state, and poverty, injustice, and a few peasants couldn’t do it.

● Three conditions had to exist: 1) peasants had to be already mobilized or dislocated, 2) a broad anti-regime coalition had to include the urban poor, peasants, middle classes, etc, and 3) revolutionaries had to confront a sultanistic regime whose downfall could disintegrate the state. It happened 20 years later in Nicaragua. Most Latin American nations did not meet those conditions; revolutionaries in other nations were wiped out, and Che’s death marked the end of this revolutionary period.

● In the late 60s and early 70s a new revolutionary guerilla movement took shape in the Southern Cone. They carried out sabotage against the government; the guerillas increased in size, and

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carried out bombings and kidnappings. Urban guerilla movements were present in Uruguay (called the Tupamaros), Argentina, Bolivia, etc. The Tupamaros started with bloodless acts that robbed banks and redistributed money in poor neighborhoods; they were seen as nice university kids playing Robin Hood in poor neighborhoods. In late 1971, the government turned the task of combating the Tupamaros to the military, and launched a counterinsurgency plan that destroyed the Tupamaros and Uruguayan democracy. The Montoneros were nationalist and Catholic Argentine students, and they were primarily Peronist. Many had little in common with Peron and the union leaders; they decided that to reach the lower classes, they had to be Peronists. They took advantage of Peronism’s ideological ambiguity and reinvented it. Peron supported them because he wanted to use any possible means to take down the military dictatorship. Peron declared admiration for Che, Castro, and Mao. He helped mobilize Argentines in favor of bringing himself back and taking out the dictatorship. Tens of thousands of university students started launching resistance against him. The Montoneros also triggered violence and repression that destroyed themselves and Argentine democracy. They were more influential and effective than the foco strategists, but they failed to build broad, multi-class coalitions and they faced powerful armies. They were violently wiped out.

Summary: in the early 60s, a set of radical left alternatives grew, led by middle class university students, and the catalyst was the Cuban Revolution. The two roads were democratic and armed. The experience of Latin American revolutionary movements gave us a paradox; the left should have thrived there, and Latin America has given birth to several leftist movements; 3 of the 6 social revolutions were in Latin America (Cuba, Mexico, and Nicaragua). The leftist movements of the 1960s incurred brutal responses from the conservative right.

READINGS

Eckstein: Cuba under Castro

Limits and possibilities of socialism in Cuba:Cuba was historically a sugar producer and not well adapted to the new form of radical

socialism Castro wantedThe legacies of slavery tended to kill ideas of equality for everyoneHe tried to instill the ideals of the “new man” in everyone – nonmaterialistic, selfless, etc

Global stuffCastro was never a complete pawn of Moscow, but he was forced to buy into the alliance

significantly because of the US embargoThe USSR/Cuba relationship (interestingly!) followed market patterns; there was never a

communist international relationship, and sugar/other stuff production was exchanged on a market basis

Structural factors that led to the Cuban Revolution – see aboveCastro’s transformation of the state

He was extremely charismatic and drew a great deal of support from lower + lower-middle classes, and stripped everyone else of power

Castro created various civil society groups after the revolution was completed (in a corporatist model) – these decayed by the late 80s. Actual democratization was impossible because a) oligarchic tendencies in higher levels of the state apparatus, and b) general bureaucratic resistance.

He relied on role models and charismatic disciples – often international athletes – to demonstrate selfless service to the state and to the lower classes

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Castro restricted but never formally outlawed religion; he disliked it from a Marxist standpoint, but also because of Catholicism’s hierarchy and the island diocese’s anti-Communist stance.

Cuba became heavily militarized under Castro; as much as 10% of the population was involved in a citizen militia or in the military itself, and it had weapons and planes capable of nuclear delivery.

Castro pushed for utopian communism at the end of the 60s, but had to “retreat to socialism” because of structural impossibilities; Cuba couldn’t escape from social or governmental materialism.

Castañeda: Utopia Unarmed

● The Cuban Revolution was an inspiration for the Latin American left that lasted until the Sandinistas lost the election in Nicaragua.

● There were 6 defining characteristics/tenets of the Cuban Revolution: it was hemispheric (ie native to Latin America), socialist, carried out under force of arms, led by strong leaders from the “petty bourgeoisie”, rejected alliances with preexisting institutions and actors, and refused to validate preexisting communist parties as legitimate revolutionary instruments.

● In the early stages, the Cuban Revolution was more democratic, spontaneous, driven from below, and disorderly than the Russian Revolution, but socialist Cuba emerged to look like the Soviet model.

● See above regarding foco system, the Tupamaros in Uruguay, and Che’s influence in fomenting small rebellions abroad.

Wickam-Crowley: This is a rehash of what was covered in lecture, but he makes one notable point. Three sets of conditions were necessary for making guerilla movements work, which were only present in Cuba and Nicaragua:

The guerillas had to have clearly defined ideologies, media access, and urban links; they shouldn’t have rivals.

The government had to have fraudulent elections, minimal reforms, little civil military action, and little presence in rural areas.

The guerillas had to have high cross-class support and the government little cross-class support.

Valenzuela: This was brought up in lecture extensively, and Walt has something already written that he will send along ASAP. Read the lecture notes on Allende for the critical parts. I had (and some of this is covered above):

The Chilean Socialist Party was originally a populist party created and led by Marmaduke Grome. They were in a coalition that won the presidency in 1938. Eventually, the socialist party decided to change course. In the early 1950s, they had several changes; the new leader was the Marxist Allende. The socialists abandoned populism and moved to the left, and the party had a more grassroots orientation, and replaced the vaguely populist ideology and replaced it with a leftist one. Allende called for a total transition of Chilean society. All of this would be done within the framework of Chilean democracy; Chile had a framework of democracy, more or less, since the 1830s. There appeared to be only the electoral road to power in Chile. The Socialists never won more than 10% of the vote in the 1950s, but over time they grew in strength. They aligned with the communist party to form the Popular Action Front, and Allende won nearly 40% of the vote in 1964. In 1970, Allende won (the first democratically elected Marxist president in the world). He attempted to transform society in the next 3 years, with basic civil liberties protections and free media. It failed. Allende was overthrown and killed in 1973 in a military coup, which reinforced the idea that democracy was a

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sham, and elections were the games of the bourgeoisie. They argued that the bourgeoisie controlled the media, elections, and the military, and that a democratic attempt to start socialism would just instigate another coup.

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Mac Bartels May 15, 2006Gov. 1295 review

Week 5 Review

Lecture BlueAuthors and Readings GreenKey Terms (that are included in 50 terms list) Red (three from Week 5)Terms Bureaucratic-authoritarianism, Augusto Pinochet, Salvador AllendeSection notes Orange

Key points of the lectures (February 27 and March 1)February 27 lectureMilitary transition to institution in the mid-1960’sBureaucratic-authoritarianism (from section) top-down system; need for capital and skilled labor; foreign investment and educationMilitary coups right wing and anti-labor

Coups would have happened no matter who was in charge and what decisions they madeMexico no coupVenezuela no coupChess board simile to democracy economically elite and organized labor needed to sustain and keep the chess board stable, unions can’t tip over the chess table on their own, but unions can make it difficult to play (union protests, etc.)- Argentina and Peru conflicts between populists and anti-populists- Chile conservative groups- Mexico and Venezuela produced integrative party systems and protected interests of economically elites

Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay experienced extreme polarizationBrazil, Chile left eventually came into powerThe final outcome was a military coup in all four countries

Authors and Readings (lecture)Wiarda (not in this week’s reading) coups were no surprise at all, liberal democracy was culturally foreign to Latin America, and coups were essentially a return to the cultural norm

Alfred Stepan argues with better and more responsible leaders, the coups could have been avoided

Guillermo O’Donnell Argentinean and lived through collapse of democracy; leader of modernization theory critics; structuralist; believed BAs arose from advanced stages of ISI (countries paid more for imports than they made from exports during the “easy stage” of ISI (both business and labor benefit from higher wages), which led to inflation, a deficit, and growth slowed); believed solution was to deepen industrialization (automobiles, refrigerators, etc.), but most countries did not have the ability to make the jump to build such goods, so countries opened to foreign investment, so countries had to make a business-friendly environment because foreign countries governments did not like populist governments or unions

Popular sector becoming increasingly mobilized; spread of factories meant more workers, promoted unionization; push for higher wages

A gap evolves (policy makers shift to the right, but unions are making demands to the left) polarization occurs; serious threat to the capitalist system

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O’Donnell wrote about technocrats they wanted to depoliticize societyO’Donnell’s theory seemed to predict the coups; his theory had a few problems; ISI deepening was

abandoned

Cases in lectureBrazil populism had been conservative

After Brazil democratized in 1945, politics became more polarized; conservatives continued to dominate congress; by 1960, a majority of unions had ties to the communist party

Vargas shot himself in 1954Juscelino Kubitschek succeeded Vargas; pretty successful president; made Brasilia the new

capitol; tried austerity measures, kept wages downJanio Quadros charismatic governor from the UDN; conservative; attacked politicians from all

parties as inefficient; opposed to labor on the left; made little effort to create allies in congress; inherited a difficult economic system; created tough austerity system; quit the presidency and resigned in August, 1961

Joao Goulart left leaning, vice-president under Quadros, succeeded Quadros; did not have power (power was in congress quasi-parliamentary system)

77% of Brazilians voted to give Goulart back his powers as presidentInflation continued to rise (80% inflation rate); the pie was shrinkingPopular mobilization was increasingJoao Goulart 1963, mobilized peasant unions and called for land reformsLeftist strategy land reform; mobilize popular sector to neutralize conservative reactionThe March Rally 150,000 peopleMilitary disposed Goulart military would rule for the next twenty years

Chile1950s conservative right and increasingly leftPopular Unity (UP)Allende MarxistContinued to have literacy requirements to voteConservatives decided to back Eduardo FreiFrei no right-winger; Christian democrats (a third way), promised a “Revolution in Liberty”,

land reform, greater state control over land mines, moderate wage increased, but rejected radical change put forth by Allende; he wanted to reform democracy, not throw it away

Frei Chileanized copper; 15% of all land was expropriated goal was to give it out to peasants; reforms created strong opposition from left and right

Polarization pulled the rug out from under FreiPopular mobilization in the late 1960s reached unprecedented levelsThe center collapsed in effectSeptember 4, 1970 popular unity candidate Allende won with 36% of Chilean vote; long march

by the left was completedAllende idealist; embarked on a track for socialism; massively unpopular within the poorMassive wage increases; wages for all but the wealthy nearly doubledGovernment expenditures had nearly gone up to 70%More than 500 large agricultural states had been expropriatedIncreased control over copper and other profitable industriesFearing nationalization, businesses pulled out of Chile US efforts to isolate Chilean economy

(“make the Chilean economy scream”)Middle-class grew hostile to Allende

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A massive trucker strike 700,000 peopleBy 1973, inflation rate hit 500%1973, business leaders, land owners, and conservative leaders gain to call for a coupBy mid-1973, Christian democrats had also joined the coup coalitionChilean military was a highly organized and disciplined coupAugusto Pinochet launched a coup in June, 1973Allende killed himselfCIA was heavily involved in the Chilean coup

Questions:Could these coups have been avoided?Could more moderate leaders have saved Chile?

March 1 lectureArgentina

Military took power in 1966, then again in 1976Became wealthiest country to suffer a military coupPerónist and anti-Perónists1955-66, military tried to create democracy with Perónism500,000 Argentines belonged to unions in 1945, then grew six-fold by the 1960sPeriod of the “Impossible Game”Military banned all political partiesJuan Carlos Ongania success was short-livedPerón praised Castro and Che Guevarra; sought to ride the leftist wave back to the presidency1969, the military regime crackedThe “Cordobazo” workers and students took over the city for 48 hours; 13 people diedMilitary announced plans to give up power and hold electionsMilitary legalized Perónism and ended Perón’s exilePerónists now included everything from Socialist left to the Fascist right; then they turned on

each otherLeftist moltineros; unions were in the middle; and the fascists were on the right77-year-old Perón was allowed to run for president after 18 years in exile; he won with 62% of the

voteArgentina had become a caldron of social mobilizationPerón moved back to the center centrist strategy centered on working with business and labor to

work together in what was called the “social pact” successful, inflation went down, economy grew rapidly in 1974

Perónist party was not institutionalized like the AD or the PRIPerónists are like cats; when they look like they are fighting, they are actually reproducingPerón called the moliternos the “bearded ones”July 1, 1974 Perón died; left presidency in his wife’s hands (Isabel Perón)Jose Lopez Rega created right wing Anti-Communist Alliance (AAA)Largest labor movement in Latin America in 1975Unions essentially took over the Argentine government, but did not have a clue how to run a

governmentArgentina was in chaos; the economy collapsed; inflation was at 3,000%; social mobilization

continued; looked like the whole capitalist quarter was coming apart at the seams; business groups organized mass lock-outs; “closed in defense of our survival”

General feeling in Argentina was that a coup was inevitable

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Armed forces took control of the country in March, 1976

Mexico and VenezuelaCivilian regimes survivedBoth had integrative party system stabilize economy and limit polarizationMexico austerity measures were well implementedNo labor-based left or oligarchic right oligarchies had been weakened by populismAD and CopeiPopular mobilization and radical were fairly limitedEnjoyed relatively steady growth

VenezuelaAD and Copei agreed to cooperate on all major issues of the dayPunto Fijo Pact created an integrative party systemUnion cooperation helped to prevent polarizationOil revenues helped pay for the Venezuelan government; government could dole out subsidies to

churches and other organizations; helped sustain the integrative party systemsShaped as Latin America’s model democracy as its neighbors were suffering from military coups

MexicoSustained stable civilian regime in the 1960s and 1970sPRI positioned itself in the center (to balance labor and economic elites)Lowest inflation rate in Latin America; never fell into recession in the post-war periodSmooth transition to industrializationPRI won elections with overwhelming majoritiesThe Tlatelolco Massacre government responding with brutal repressionMobilization and violence did not escalate in MexicoPRI hegemony remained in tactCooptation rather than oppressionLuis Echeverria PRI moved to the left; raised wages; social spendingPRI was able to dampen polarizationNo economic crisis, no polarization, and no coupPRI was highly centralized in the executive’s hands

Coups were reactions against socio-economic reforms that were seen as going too far.Militaries took it upon themselves to carry out reforms; “revolutions from above”

PeruDiffered from the different casesPopulist period was impartial; within a couple of years, populism was repressed; oligarchic power

was never really challengedLima one Peru; economic and political power was concentrated; Andean highlands were another

PeruState remained small and national industry remained weakOil, etc. were controlled by multi-nationalistsOligarchy remained dominant in the countrysidePolitics remained in the hands of a pretty small eliteAPRA had been repressed between the 1930-50s; in mid-1950s, full-scale shift to the rightFernando Belaunde created AP

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Haya vs. Belaunde election Haya won; then military cancelled the election, and Belaunde won the next election

Belaunde lacked the majority in congressTwo key failures international petroleum company; Belaunde promised greater controlBelaunde unable to make a treaty with the IPCBelaunde’s land reform never got off the ground led to peasant uprisingsCenter for Advanced Military Studies (CAEM)APRA blocked reforms submitted by the Belaunde government1968, military leaders took it upon themselves to carry out the reforms; political parties were

bannedJuan Velasco full-scale military regime; left wingLike Brazil’s BA coup in 1964, Peru’s left wing coup became a model in Latin AmericaMilitary governments would carry out land reforms and increase the role of the state in government

affairsMilitary populism was in response to entrenched oligarchic powerMilitary regimes reformist, inclusionary, and relatively mild in terms of their repression

Section NotesEffects from the breakdown of democracy polarization; extreme left and right gained strength in

Latin America; the “good years” of the populist cycle ended; inflation began to grow; most countries became dictatorships by the late 1960s

As the popular sectors became more radical, the right reacted and countered the left movementIntegrative-party system when you are involved in the regime, there is less likelihood of a coup

and polarizationDefense of the structural argument there are so many political figures (Allende, Goulart, etc.)

that it’s difficult to say they all caused the military coupsThe dictatorships were pretty successful in resisting opposition to the policies

Readings (mostly taken straight from the articles)“Toward an Alternative Conceptualization of South American Politics” by Guillermo O’Donnell

Exclusionary tactics: “involves an intentional decision to reduce the number of persons who have a significant voice in determining what goes on at the national political level” Argentina and Brazil are “excluding”

Incorporating political system: “defined as a political system that purposely seeks to activate the popular sector and to allow it some voice in national politics”

Argentina and Brazil: From Incorporation to Exclusion “increased urbanization and industrialization changed the distribution of political power and provided the basis for a broad “populist” coalition coalition was against the oligarchies, the highly visible foreign-owned firms mediating between the international and the domestic market, and the policies of free trade with which the old rulers had traditionally been associated new coalition agreed on industrialization and the expansion of the domestic market populist coalition was build around this dynamic core of rapidly expanding domestic industry enemy was the export-oriented sector, which was the provider of international currency

Since the 1930s the expansion of industry was “horizontal” or “extensive”Vargas and Perón encouraged workers’ unionization, in part because it provided allegiance for

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them and in part because it facilitated governmental control over the newly incorporated segments of the popular sector both leaders used their control of governmental resources for

gaining power over existing labor unions and for creating new onesHorizontal economic growthThe “exhaustion” of the “easy” stages of industrialization the end of the period of extensive,

horizontal industrial growth based on substitution for imports of finished consumer goodsInflation was on the average very high in Argentina and BrazilHorizontal industrial growth advanced much farther in Argentina and Brazil than in other South

American countries but severely limited and of short duration left a heritage that included the breakdown of the populist coalition, new policy issues, a profoundly modified social structure, and many shattered illusions

Active presence of the popular sector in the great urban centers was perceived as profoundly threatening by most other social sectors political isolation of the popular sector

Demand-performance gapThe increased differentiation of the social structure means greater social complexityTechnocratic Roles high modernization involves the emergence of more technocratic roles in

more social sectors and activitiesRobert Dahl’s “polyarchy” a function of decreasing cost of tolerance and increasing costs of

suppression (“exclusion”)Authoritarian systems of high modernization the growth of organizational strength of many

social sectors, the governmental attempts at control by “encapsulation,” the career pattern and power-bases of most incumbents of technocratic roles, and the pivotal role played by large (public and private) bureaucracies…

Both Argentina and Brazil belong to the “South American high-modernization” both countries are the most highly modernized South American countries

All South American countries have very limited influence in international affairs; at most they can hope only to attenuate the internal effects of international events and the decisions of the great subject to the virtually undisputed military, political, and economic hegemony of the United States; they are all dependent on scarce foreign capital; and they are all dependent on technologies that have originated in countries that are capital-rich and labor-scarce, and from which many of their role-models, consumption expectations, and ideological influences have been derived.

The problem of economic dependenceThe exhaustion of “horizontal” industrializationVargas and Perón periods referred to as populist authoritarianisms expansion of the domestic

market based on a still homogeneous industrial sector, weakening of the traditional ruling sectors, and expropriation of the most visible symbols of foreign presence

“Overview of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model” by David CollierPeriod of “post-populist” politics characterized by the appearance of repressive authoritarian

governments that seek to resolve these earlier tensions by eliminating the popular sector as an important participant in the national political arena and by enforcing a regressive movement of income away from this sector

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Guillermo O’Donnell’s approach to describing different types of political systems focuses on: the structure of the national political regime, the class and sectoral composition of the dominant political coalition, and certain crucial public policies whether the system is “incorporating” or “excluding”

O’Donnell oligarchic elite of the primary-product export sector (based on minerals and agricultural products) dominates the state and orients public policy around its needs; neither incorporating nor excluding, because the popular sector has not yet been politically activated

O’Donnell populist clearly “incorporating”; based on a multi-class coalition of urban-industrial interests, including industrial elites and the urban popular sector

O’Donnell bureaucratic-authoritarian “excluding” and emphatically non-democratic; central actors in the dominant coalition include high level technocrats – military and civilian, within and outside the state – working in close association with foreign capital; this new elite eliminates electoral competition and severely controls the political participation of the popular sector; public policy is centrally concerned with promoting advanced industrialization; should not be confused with German and Italian Fascism

O’Donnell argues that political transformations derive from the social and political tensions produced by industrialization and by changes in social structure at both the elite and mass level

O’Donnell crucial aspects of socio-economic modernization industrialization, increased political activation of the popular sector, and growth of “technocratic occupational” roles in public and private bureaucracies

O’Donnell bureaucratic-authoritarianism derives from a complex set of reactions to the problems that emerge with the completion of the consumer goods phase of import-substitution

“Zero-sum” economic situation arises from increasing deficits in the balance of payments, foreign indebtedness, and inflation policy-making elites commonly attempt to shift to more austere “orthodox” developmental policies that de-emphasize distribution to the popular sector

Activation of the popular sector shift to orthodox economic policies; increasingly powerful popular sector is likely to challenge the new policies; result is a gap between demands and performance, widespread strikes, stalemate of the party system, and severe political and economic crisis

Technocratic roles increasing communication among the military and civilian technocrats and their growing frustration with existing political and economic conditions encourages the emergence of a “coup coalition” that ultimately establishes a repressive “bureaucratic-authoritarian” system in order to end the political and economic crisis

O’Donnell suggests there is not just an affinity between advanced industrialization and bureaucratic-authoritarianism in Latin America, but, borrowing a phrase from Weber, an “elective affinity”

Bureaucratic-authoritarianism regimes often face grave problems of authority and legitimacy

“The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion” by Alfred StepanNew Professionalism vs. Old ProfessionalismSamuel Huntington classic definition of old professionalism (please check page 322 of the first

big sourcebook) military was functionally specific and unconcerned with domestic political events

Interrelationship between the two spheres (political and military)The “new professional” military man was highly politicizedNew professionalism inevitably led to some degree of military role expansionTable 2.1 on page 324 of sourcebook some differences between old and new professionalismBrazil ESG (Escola Superior de Guerra) had developed its key ideological tenet: the close

interrelationship between national security and national development new professionals

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believed that they now had constructed the correct doctrines of national security and development, possessed the trained cadres to implement these doctrines, and had the institutional force to impose their solution to the crisis in Brazil

New professionalism in Peru

“Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil” by Alfred StepanMarch 31, 1964 Brazilian military overthrew the president of the country, Joao Goulart began

to construct an authoritarian political regimeMilitary authoritarian control of Brazilian society slowly widened1964 can be characterized as not merely a coup against a government but a breakdown of regime“Macro-political” level and “micro-political” levelWhat brought the regime to the breaking point was the quality of the political leadership of

President Goulart increasing rate of political and economic demands made on the government, a decreasing extractive capability due to the decline in the growth of the economy, a decreasing political capability to convert demands into concrete policy because of fragmentation of support, and an increasing withdrawal of commitment to the political regime itself

Social mobilization and economic decline inflation occurredDecreasing capacity to convert demands into policy: fragmenting patterns of supportWithdrawal of civilian commitment to the political regimeThe impact of political and economic crises on the military: the growth of institutional fears and

new military ideologiesPolitical leadership and regime breakdown in Brazil: the realm of the noninevitableThe March 13 Rally and civil-military afterwards widely televised, Goulart launched a campaign

for broad structural and political reforms that came to be known as the “Basic Reforms”Reaction to March 13—Erosive Effects on Factors Impeding a CoupQuestioning the authenticity of the lawThe naval mutiny galvanized the active plotters, both civilian and military, into action against

GoulartGoulart his ambiguity and indecisiveness enraged and demoralized his military supporters; it

was often hinted he was personally and politically ineffectualCombined with structural weaknesses in the regime, Goulart helped pave the way for the final

breakdown of the Brazilian regime in 1964.

The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile (pg. 81-110) by Valenzuela-

The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability by Peter KornbluhPresident Richard Nixon ordered the CIA to initiate a massive covert intervention in Chile the

goal was to block Chilean President-elect Salvador Allende from taking and holding officeAllende well-known and popular politician in ChileHenry Kissinger make the Chilean economy screamOne CIA propaganda group tried to turn Chilean voters away from Allende and toward Eduardo

FreiFrei main appeal to Chilean voters was his policy of “Chileanization”—partial nationalization of

the copper industryAllende’s new coalition, Unidad Popular (UP)White House unyielding commitment to undermine Chilean democracy; in a long-term,

expanded effort to destabilize the Chilean government—economically, politically, and

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militarilyPresident Ford statement regarding U.S. intervention against Allende “in the best interests of

the people of Chile and certainly in our best interests”“Cool but correct” posture masking continuing efforts to subvert the Chilean government, Nixon

determined, would guide U.S. policy against AllendeU.S. policy makers confronted an unpleasant reality: Allende’s government was democratically

electedNational Security Decision Memorandum 93, “Policy toward Chile”U.S. sought “to maximize pressure on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation”Covert destabilization economic strangulation and diplomatic isolationPresident Nixon “five principal elements” of the CIA’s “Covert Action Program—Chile:” 1)

political action to divide and weaken the Allende coalition 2) maintaining and enlarging contacts in the Chilean military 3) providing support to non-Marxist opposition political groups and parties 4) assisting certain periodicals and using other media outlets in Chile which can speak out against the Allende government 5) using selected media outlets [in Latin America, Europe, and elsewhere] to play up Allende’s subversion of the democratic process and involvement by Cuba and the Soviet Union in Chile

Since 1962, the Christian Democrat Party had been a leading recipient of CIA political operations in Chile as a beacon of democracy; after Allende’s inauguration, the Agency poured covert funding into the party to transform it into a pro-coup force

CIA funneled significant funds to PDC, PN, and the smaller Democratic Radical Party in the April 4 municipal elections

The “El Mercurio project”The Chilean military remained the “essential” player in Chile’s futureGeneral Augusto Pinochet in his words, he now believed “that Allende must be forced to step

down or be eliminated” “only alternatives”The CIA-ITT ScandalThe façade of the Nixon administration’s “cool but correct” diplomatic posture toward Chile was

destroyed(Please refer to this article if you want a more in-depth analysis of the events leading up to the

coup)

“Peru’s Ambiguous Revolution” by Abraham F. LowenthalOctober 1968 coup led by General Juan Velasco Alvarado toppled President Fernando

Belaúnde TerryThe Peruvian regime is generally seen not as the typical Latin American caudillo government but

rather as an essentially institutional effort although a government of force, it is widely regarded as relatively unrepressive although led by staunchly anti-Communist officers, many with considerable training in the United States, the Peruvian government has established friendly relations with several Communist nations as part of its campaign to escape external “domination,” particularly by the United States

Peruvian military the nation’s force for order; promoted substantial changePeruvian regime emphasized its aim to promote a drastic change in national values, to create a

“new Peruvian man,” one dedicated to “solidarity, not individualism”Peru’s military regime has unquestionably put the country on the world political map.The Brazilian regime promotes capitalist expansion, national and foreign, but the Peruvian

government announces its aim to move away from capitalism.Within Peru, however, the military regime’s program is not so widely acclaimed.SINAMOS The National System to Support Social Mobilization; established in 1971 partly to

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organize support for the government, has instead been the object of intensifying attack from all sides, and even of some backbiting from within the regime

In the economic sphere, the regime’s most obvious accomplishment has been to expand and fortify what had been one of South America’s weakest states.

The government has vowed to destroy the traditional political system dominated by special interests and to replace it with one open equally to the influence of all citizens, a “social democracy of full participation.”

The military regime has systematically undercut almost all organizations politically influential in Peru before 1968 except the church and, of course, the armed forces.

In foreign policy, the Peruvian regime is widely acknowledged to be inventive and imaginative.In 1968 Peru was poor—probably the least developed of the larger Latin American countries, not

just in per capita income but also in urbanization, literacy, mass media exposure, and other aspects of social development.

From 1945 on, Peru experienced striking economic growth, urbanization, and general social mobilization.

Things were changing in Peru by the late 1960s, but ever so slowly.The Peruvian regime proclaims itself and is generally accepted as an eminently institutional

“government of the armed forces.”The “revolution” has become radicalized, albeit within limits one important cause has

undoubtedly been the leadership of President VelascoVelasco his skill in holding the military coalition together and assuring that discrepancies and

divisions are kept internal is increasingly recognizedCOAP has clearly been central to the regime’s development; COAP’s role in initiating and

staffing out reform measures; provides more consistency to government policy than would otherwise occur; COAP’s effect has been to shift the government’s center of policy-making gravity somewhat to the left (this may be because of its membership)

The influence of technocrats has consequently increased

“Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela” by Terry KarlTentative reemergence of democracy in Latin America in the first half of the 1980sVenezuela has now become the political darling of the development set“Venezuela is a textbook case of step-by-step progress”Interaction between petroleum and political pacts it can illuminate the dynamic relationship

between structure and statecraft in moments of regime transition this relationship is the focus of a central debate in political analysis: To what extent is a successful democratic outcome the product of structurally determined factors arising from the world capitalist economy, the international system of states, or the process of dependent development

The contention here is that democratic transitions are best understood by systematically relating socioeconomic and political structures, at both national and international levels, to purposive political action.

Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) and Guillermo O’Donnell (1973) O’Donnell’s choice of “capital deepening” as a key casual variable in the rise of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes and the ensuing debate over his work demonstrated the necessity for moving beyond the mere specification of stages of industrialization when carrying out political analysis (Collier 1979).

Petroleum, it is argued here, is the single most important factor shaping the structural conditions for the breakdown of military authoritarianism and the subsequent creation of a reformist political space.

Petroleum leading export in VenezuelaThe central hypothesis underlying the argument presented here is that a mode of development based

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on the production of commodities for export yields distinctive social configurations and political interests that, when located in a historical context, affect the propensity for various regime types to emerge.

Venezuela a democracica pactadaIn Venezuela, the set of negotiated compromises embodied by pacts establish political “rules of the

game” for competition among elites, but they also institutionalize the economic boundaries between the public and private sectors, provide guarantees for private capital, and fix the parameters of future socioeconomic reform—a reality that is often overlooked.

The Structural Determinants of Regime ChangeJuan Vicente Gómez seized power through a U.S.-backed coup in 1908; in power from 1908-

1935; a caudilloOil initially protected this oligarchic alliance from the disruptive strains of industrialization.The petroleum economy hastened the decline of Venezuela’s stagnating agriculture. Overvalued

exchange rates induced by oil destroyed the international competitiveness of coffee and other traditional exports while the country’s high import capacity for foodstuffs hurt the domestic market for agricultural products.

The oil-induced decline of agriculture profoundly affected both the social structure and the political behavior of Venezuela’s elites, a particularly small and weak class by South American standards.

By the 1950s, petroleum helped to cement a close set of relationships between foreign capital, urban local capital, and the state, while removing the incentive for landed elites to maintain authoritarian control or even commercialize rural areas (Rangel 1970; Sullivan n.d.).

The social and political impact of agriculture’s demise was extensive at the mass level as well.The growth and transformation of urban Venezuela provided fertile ground for a reformist

democratic regime.Oil played a decisive role, creating the first internal market as well as the urban social forces that

have historically provided the backbone for party systems in Latin America.Of necessity, the aspirations and demands of these capas medias dominated the political arena.The oil economy fostered the emergence of an inverted pyramid of social classes.The industrialization took the prospects of democracy a step further. While the decline of

agriculture and the creation of new urban social classes undermined the old regime, manufacturing provided the necessary material base for a qualitatively new alliance.

Acción Democrática (AD) the outbreak of World War II boosted AD’s industrial visionCatholic-based Comité de Organización Electoral Independiente (COPEI)The trienio government of 1946-1948 was a premature eventThe Politics of Transition: 1957-1958Vibrant oil-led industrial boom of the 1950s ripened Venezuela for a regime changeAs elite civilian support crumbled, the military became the focus of the regime’s decay.Divisions within the military created their own dynamics.Negotiating democracy: the political and economic pacts of elitesThe nature of Venezuela’s new democracy was profoundly affected by the manner in which the

authoritarian regime broke down.Ironically, the oil industry that underwrote the arrangement for social peace became a key source of

pressure for the limitation of reform. The foreign oil companies, fearful of social unrest that might lead to nationalization, threatened to transfer their operations to the Middle East if disruption continued.

The Pacto de Punto Fijo bound all signatories to the same basic political and economic program, regardless of the electoral outcome; the political spirit of the pact was institutionalized in the Constitution of 1961 the president became the supreme national arbiter

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In the long run, pacts may hinder the prospects for the future democratic self-transformation of the society, economy, or polity, thereby producing a sort of “frozen” democracy.

Furthermore, pacts may adversely affect state efficiency in the long run.

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Week 6: Military Rule and its Legacies (March 6, 8)

Readings SummariesKaren Remmer: Military Rule in Latin America (425)

Given the wide disparities in ideology, class alliances, policies, structure, and durability that exist just within Latin America, generalizing about military rule is problematic

One truism: the military acts to protect its institutional interests; competing conceptions of the military’s political role are invariably defended in terms of institutional needs. Coup supporters and opponents alike thus claim to be protecting the corporate self-interest of military officers

Inclusionary versus Exclusionary AuthoritarianismInclusionary (or “populist”) military regimes attempt to create a popular base of support for military

rule by mobilizing new sets of political actors around reformist and nationalist projectsThe popular sector, which encompasses the lower middle class and lower urban and rural

class, is thereby drawn actively into politics- often for the first timeEx: Juan Person- organized Argentine workers into powerful political force by establishing

new social benefits for industrial workers, introducing new labor legislation, encouraging the reorganization and expansion of the trade union movement, and intervening in the collective bargaining process. The Peronist loyalties and organizational strength of the Argentine working class a lasting tribute to the efficacy of his efforts. Peron’s other principle base of support was local industry, which welcomed high tariffs and other policies designed to enhance national economic independence, whereas his leading opponents represented export-oriented agricultural interests and international capital (though not all instances of reformist militarism come as close to the extreme inclusionary end of the political spectrum as the Argentine)

exclusionary military regimes represent the opposite end of the continuum. Instead of incorporating new social elements into the political arena, such regimes attempt to limit popular participation and physically repress trade unions and other vehicles for lower-class political activity.

Their central thrust is demobilizational rather than mobilizationPopular-sector groups thus become a principle source of opposition to military rule, rather

than a base of supportExclusionary auth is built instead on a foundation of middle-and upper-class support, and

internationally oriented economic interests dominate the governing coalitionAs a result, reactionary, rather than reformist, impulses guide public policySuch an orientation does not preclude major policy change, but the economic nationalism

and concern for social inequity that shape policy under inclusionary military rule are scuttled in favor of closer ties to the international economy and an overriding concern with efficiency

Ex: Pinochet in ChileExclusionary rule is not the product of a single level of modernization or capital

accumulation- both well-industrialized and unindustrialized. Whether or not a regime is personalist or institutional, or based on a professional or unprofessional

military, has little to do with the basic distinction between exclusionary and inclusionary authoritarianism

Explaining Regime Differencesthe extent to which a military regime approximates the inclusionary rather than exclusionary

end of the political spectrum hinges on the social class coalition supporting military ruleexclusionary rule presupposes a process of class polarization that pits popular-sector groups

against propertied interests and their international allies; inclusionary rule, on the other

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hand, requires a lack of solidarity among dominant class groups and the formation of political alliances that cut across class liens and include popular-sector elements.

Product of 3 sets of factors: the socioeconomic structure of a nation, the dynamics of its political process, and specific international conjunctures

Figure 1.1 on page 428 in the course pack***two dimensions- Dahl

● are distinct such that high levels of competition may coexist with limited popular participation in politics. Similarly, regimes that place strict limits on political opposition may nevertheless encourage political involvement

■ relationships according to the graph discussed on pg. 4291. socioeconomic modernization neither increases nor decreases the probability of competitive or

democratic rule2. as socioeconomic modernization produces a society that is increasingly urbanized, industrialized,

and literate, the probability that a competitive regime will assume an exclusionary or oligarchic form steadily declines in favor of inclusionary democracy

until recently, oligarchic democracy was the norm in LA, due to region’s high level of socioeconomic inequality created enormous incentives and opportunities for political exclusion. People at the bottom of the socioecon pyramid have everything to gain from a change in status quo, whereas those at the top have everything to lose. Moreover, inequality concentrates resources in the hands of the few political inclusion is therefore problematic. Exclusion, however, does not require authoritarianism with its attendant legitimacy costs can be achievable equally well under competitive political arranges, esp with lower levels of literacy, industrialization, and urbanization

The elite dominance of competitive institutions proved comparatively easy until the 1960s, particularly in Andean countries: inegalitarian agrarian structures allowed landowners to manipulate sizable blocs of rural votes, as well as by literacy requirements, the overrepresentation of rural areas in legislative bodies, controls on peasant organization

But declined dramatically during 1960s due to rapid urbanization, increased literacy, and sociopolitical transformation of countryside

By mid-1970s, most of the continent was ruled by militarymaking credible the arguments that socioeconomic modernization under conditions of dependent development produces dictatorship, not democracy. An equally dramatic shift away from military rule occurred in late 1970s and early 1980s- more inclusionary

These recent trends indicate that democracy is neither a purely cyclical phenomenon in LA nor a form of governance destined to vanish in the face of socioecon modernization

3. the relationship between socioeconomic modernization and exclusionary auth in LA is curvilinear, such that exclusionary military regimes are most likely to emerge at relatively low and advanced levels of industrialization, urbanization, and educational attainment. Inclusionary military regimes, on the other hand, are most likely to emerge at middle levels of socioeconomic modernization

at low levels of socioeconomic modernization, privileged social elements have few incentives or opportunities to form alliances with the popular sector. Without industrial development, the interests of elites are comparatively homogenous, trade unions are unlikely to be powerful or easily organized, and low levels of literacy and communications development create obstacles to mass political mobilization. Exclusionary forms of rule consequently predominate over inclusionary ones, esp under conditions of high social inequality

Increased urbanization and industrialization establish a basis for a change in this situation

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Incentives develop for industrialists and other nontraditional elite groups to enter into alliances with popular-sector elements in order to challenge established oligarchies, foreign interests, and the policies associated with their dominance

Such alliances develop strains however, as the political strength of the popular sector grows and begins to pose a threat to privileged groups across society

Inclusionary democracy remains a political option, but as allegiances to political parties and trade union organizations solidify, mobilizing popular support for military rule becomes increasingly difficult

To the extent that social conflicts cannot be accommodated through competitive institutions, the stage is thus set for social polarization and the emergence of an authoritarian regime that attempts to exclude the political voice of the popular sector

Guillermo O’Donnell- Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism“In contemporary South America, the higher and lower levels of modernization are

associated with non-democratic political systems, while political democracies are found at the intermediate levels of modernization.”

Singled out the “easy state of import substitution” as the phase of industrial development most conducive to inclusionary rule, of either the competitive or authoritarian variety, and the exhaustion of this stage as the critical juncture shifting the odds toward exclusion.

In his formulation, the first phase of import substitution, which is characterized by the expansion of consumer goods production and the growth of domestic market, creates the basis for political coalitions incorporating lower middle-and working-class groups. As the possibility of further growth on the basis of consumer goods production declines, the viability of these coalitions diminishes. Inflation, foreign exchange shortages, and other developmental bottlenecks generate pressures for major policy shifts. At the same time the strained economic situation leads the popular sector to become increasingly active in defense of its interests, accelerating its political isolation. Propertied sectors come to perceive its demands as an obstacle to further growth and as a serious threat to existing social arrangements, including the class structure and international alignment of the country. Argued that the resulting political polarization highlights the strong class of the situation exclusionary military rule, or “bureaucratic-authoritarianism”

The difficulty in O’Donnell’s argument is the socioeconomic determinism-, which exaggerated the fit between stages of economic growth and forms o political domination. Failed to recognize that the initial phase of industrialization in LA occurred under a variety of political conditions other than populism. Also treated BA strictly as a product of advanced socioecon development, ignoring parallels between repressive modes of political domination in Central and South America

Also treats competitive rule as a product of a particular phase of the industrialization process rather than as a form of governance that represents an alternative to authoritarianism at all phases.

4. The probability that a democratic or authoritarian mode of political domination will prevail at a given level of modernization and industrialization is conditioned by four major sets of factors: the structure of social inequality, mode of international economic integration, international political conjunctures, and the dynamics of the political process established over time in response to these other factors.

The more the US is involved in the hemisphere, rallying local allies against the dangers of leftist movements, the smaller the chances of inclusionary military.

Democratization in LA has characteristically occurred in waves- the prospects for democratic consolidation also appear to be influenced by such cycles

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Traumatic international events and the exercise of US hegemony in the hemisphere have influenced these patterns- the lack of any consistent US foreign policy trajectory, except that pertaining to inclusionary authoritarianism, consequently has produced a constantly sifting political environment that undermines the stability of all forms of political domination

The Dilemmas of Military RuleThe central dilemma of military regimes is that they alter the conditions favoring their

emergence and thereby risk undermining their own viability. The risk is particularly serious in inclusionary- conflicts among privileged groups that create political stalemates allow for the emergence of regimes rising above dominant class interests

Such stalemates, however, are typically short-lived. As inclusioanry authoritarianism threatens privileged groups and strengthens popular-sector forces, social polarization begins

Inclusionary military consequently tends to be both a rather unusual and precarious form of rule

Exclusionary military regimes also confront central predicament- over time the social polarization associated with their emergence tends to wane, reversing the prior political dynamic. As a result the regime’s base of social support narrows, divisions widen within the governing coalition, and opportunities grow for linking up opposition agenda to cracks within the state apparatus. The vulnerability of exclusionary military rule to such developments, however, varies widely- some have collapsed after short periods- other longer.

Hector E. Schamis- Reconceptualizing Latin American Authoritarianism in the 1970s: From BA to Neoconservatism (437)

● Disaggregating BA- its basic dimensions Deepening- seeks the “deepening” of the “productive structure [by means of] the growth

and maintenance of private investment [in particular the transnational corporations], as well as increasing the quantum and multiplier effects of public investment. First, the populist model of development became exhausted. Higher rates of capital accumulation, necessary to integrate industrial production and thus avoid external strangulation provoked by the need for imported inputs, would be achieved by BA military regimes- promote the “deepening” of the productive structure by means of new capital goods industries. To a great extent, the BA model of development signals the most sophisticated and, in retrospect, the last phase of import-substitution

Increasing bureaucratization- under BA rule, the most important gov positions are occupied by persons who come to power after successful careers in large bureaucratic orgs, private or public. The increase in bureaucratization constitutes a strategy of development in itself. The state intensifies its role in the economy.

Political exclusion of previously included and activated groups- in BA regimes, political order- necessary to promote investment- means exclusion of the popular sector from the decision-making arenas where it had previously exercised representation- political society and economic policymaking.

■ 1. Excluding subordinate groups from the political arena 2. more subtle- the incorporation and encapsulation of trade unions into corporate arrangements, where the myriad of issues related to their interests is highly controlled by state bureaucracy. It may seem contradictory since here the popular sector is included rather than excluded. Yet included in order to be controlled, deactivated, and deprived of access of decision-making arenas. In reproducing a state corporatist

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pattern of political action, the BA regimes confirm a paradox: in order to exclude they must incorporate

Economic exclusion depoliticization In a nondemocratic regime, technocratic elites play an important role in demobilizing

popular groups- as part of this process, they turn previously political issues into technical matters

The “Trio”- through BA, for the first time the armed forces rule as an institution. They so do in order to guaranteed the stability of BA’s dominant coalition: the state, foreign capital, and the domestic bourgeoisie. At the beginning the BA regime is supported just by a “duo”, the state and TNCs. After a certain point, and in response to some of the tensions involved in the original coalition, the national bourgeoisie joins in.

● The 1970s: Departing from BA● Neoconservative Economics in the 1970s● What was at Stake in the 1970s?● Looking for a Theoretical Basis: Neoconservative Theories

Patricia Fagen: Repression and State Security (449)9. Background to Military Rule10. Waging Wars Against Ideas

1. National Security Through Counterinsurgency Capacity2. Repression to Purge Ideological Infection3. Total War with the Left

11. States of Exception and Laws of National Security1. Brazil2. Argentina

12. Establishing Professional Antisubversive Forces1. Reorganization of the Security Forces2. Training the Military for Social Control3. Power and Corruption

13. Reorganizing Society for Repression1. Sustaining Terror Secretly and Publicly2. Economic Individualism3. Privatizing Social Life

Julio Cotler: The Peruvian Experiment- Continuity and Change under Military Rule (515)

Abraham F. Lowenthal- The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered (535)

● 1. Although most authors stress the Peruvian experiment’s shortfalls, Lowenthal argues that Peru’s military rulers largely succeed at what they set out to do when they took power in 1968.

● 2. Although most authors argue that Peru since 1975 has been returning to the conditions and policies that preceded military rule and that the whole period (1968-1980) thus underlined fundamental continuities, he emphasizes that Peru has changed significantly during the period, both in ways the military sought and in ways they did not.

Peru’s military rulers claimed at various times that they would accelerate Peru’s economic growth and radically improve ties distribution; restructure society on the basis of equity and of new concepts of property and other social relationships; expand

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political participation; end class strife; transform national values and create a “new Peruvian man”; overcome external dependence; and make Peru a Third World leader.

But the regime’s aim to spur Peru’s economic growth clearly failed- Except for some features of the agrarian reform, none of the regime’s innovative social

and economic experiments, announced with such breathlessness, has survived intact into the 1980s

SNAOMOS, the social mobilization agency that was supposed to build new means to channel effective popular mobilization, has disappeared with hardly a trace.

Having pronounced “full participation” a major goal, Peru’s military leaders fond themselves first dismantling participatory organizations and eventually being repudiated at the polls by a public that never embraced the experiment.

And having vowed to end class strife in Peru the military left behind (Cotler) a country affected more than ever by labor unrest, and dependency increased

Yet Lowenthal argues that judging by a different standard, Peru’s military leaders largely succeeded- “if one defines the Peruvian experience as the core program of nationalist affirmation, economic modernization, anti-oligarchical reform, and systematic state-building supported institutionally by the armed forces in 1968, the agenda was implemented to an impressive degree

It was widely understood that Peru needed to redistribute land and other property; to extend more widely education, suffrage, and political participation; to create a stronger state and to undertake national planning; to establish controls in order to assure that foreign investment would better serve the country; and to reduce Peru’s external vulnerability. But overwhelming agreement on these points among professionals, intellectuals, politicians, technocrats, labor leaders, and industrialists had not produced action. The power of a few families to keep agrarian reform from being undertaken, even after all major political parties had endorsed the concept and in the face of mounting peasant violence in some parts of the country, contributed importantly to the Peruvian a army’s sense that its own intervention was needed. The military’s successful, if limited, experience with an agrarian reform in the La Convencion region during their temporary rule in 1962-1963 reinforced their perception that “reform from above” under military auspices could prevent the emergence of a national security threat from a mobilized peasantry

Almost immediately, Peru’s military rulers resolved the IPC impasse, and the armed forces acted with similar decisiveness in other realms

By the time Peru’s armed forces relinquished power in 1980, much of its initial “core” program had been achieved- the country’s land tenure system had been substantially and permanelty altered. Althought he state’s growth had been more rapid than could be effectively managed, a significantly stronger public apparatus had been created

National planning had been institutionalized- the number of Peruvians actively participating in the national policy- the growth of the potential and actual electorate- had vastly expanded, thanks in large measure to the military’s decision to extend suffrage to the illiterate- (539)

A Nation of Enemies: Chile Under Pinochet: Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela● The War● Army of the Shadows● The Technocrats

LECTURE NOTES – WEEK 6

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Immediate goals of each of BAs was economic and political order Stabilizing economy, bringing down inflation In all 3 of Bas, orthodox stabilization programs

■Tight monetary policy● entails limiting supply- printing less money- higher interest rates

■fiscal austerity● spending cuts particularly in area of social spending

■wage austerity● keeping wages down

often led to recession; because they were not popular and hit the poor hard, leaders wouldn’t won’t win elections, and thus democratic govs usually unwilling to carry these out

The military destroyed left and deactivating popular sector■no more strikes, demonstration, guerillas, factory takeovers

massive repression- armed forces go to war with own sector of population in state of internal war with Marxist subversion militaries declared war on left, and on opposition in general regimes literally became police states- basic legal rights suspended Torture- routine method of interrogation

Repression: several objectives Wipe out Marxist threat Also had economic objective- weakened left in order to implement OS program, and so

they wouldn’t resist austerity policy All Bas succeeded foreign capital began to flow into the countries The left was no match- labor in Argentina- once the most popular- became dormant Economic restructuring- particularly in Chile- dismantle IS I and replace with free

economic model Psychologically- create climate of fear- of terror in which even an association with

opposition activity could get in trouble Institution reform- change rules of game- aimed at making democracy safe for military

economic elites Certain policy areas out of political arena- central banks could be transformed into

autonomous institutions run by autocrats- limit pres’s power to hire/fire bank pres- economic power- can’t print money- can’t create inflation

“protected” democracy- all of Bas shared characteristics but also differences

■differed in level of repression- Argentines and Chileans most repressive- went in trying to eliminate old political order- all structures of political participation were shut down indefinitely

■Brazilian regime less destructive- allowed 2 parties to compete- Brazil’s congress remained in operation

■Differed by the institutions by which they governed■Militaries responded diff- Chile new constitution that was approved by

referendum■In Brazil- regime tried to maintain legitimacy by keeping congress open and

allowing election■Bas also differed economically- pursued successful OS program

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■Orthodox stab- tight monetary policy, austerity, etc.■But does not necessarily mean change of economic model- not privatization or

dismantling ISI■Dismantle ISI and replacing with market oriented model■Chilean replaced with ISI- liberalized Chilean economy■Argentines moved partway down that direction but reversed course■Program of state-led industrialization- Brazil

ChileExtreme repression and radical economic reformPinochet army declare war on left “hand of god”- moral cleansing of chilewithin months all political activity silenced- dead, imprisoned, exiledDINA- mission was total extermination of MarxismWith that power effectively transformed into police stateMiddle and upper middle classes did not feel repression- Chileans were deeply divided over

Pinochet- savior who liberated Chile from socialism, others as fascist killerUnion activity virtually ceased- strikes, union members decreaseCatholic church was only institution to voice even mild opposition“protected demo”- democracy in which free markets were protected form politicslegalized key non-democratic features- gave power to Pres to declare a state of emergency,

legislation would be appointed, not elected, national security council- veto power10% of copper revenues into military- cooper #1 exportPinochet rule for 8 year term- a referendum would be held whether would stay on for another 8 year

term- until 1997Gave Pinochet legitimacyConstitution approved with 67% of votePlebisciteIn economic realm, Pinochet undertook radical free market experimentAlthough all Bas implemented---dismantled ISIA team of young, foreign trained economists- technocrats- Chicago boysSergio de Castro- pinochet’s finance ministerDebated a bunch of different policy directionsRadicalization liberalization of economyProgram began with OS- cut spending- public health care spending cut in half, wages pushed down.Economic team began to get more ambitious- state’s role in economy radically changed- trade and

tariff barriers lowered than USRather than focusing on domestic industry- shifted focus back to exportsEngine of growth was the export of agricultural goods- particularly specialized agricutlral products-

leading exporter of food, vegetables, and wine- began to specialize in summer foods during winter in US

By 1970s, was most free market economy in LAChilean BA was pretty successful: weakened left, sustained growth

Dramatically changed leftLeft behind institution that greatly strengthened military and rightSo entrenched the new free market model even socials prove unwilling and unable to

remove it

ArgentinaNowhere as successful as Chile

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● Not dominated by single leader● Highly factionalized- military● The “proceso”- censored journalists, universities and courts purged● The “dirty war”- all out war on subversion● Indiscriminate- became virtually any union member or student jailed or killed● no political institutionalization● unlike Pinochet- never drew up constitution- stayed in chaos for long time● affected many more families- much of middle-class grew into opposition● arguably argentine military regime left 3 legacies

economic mess- ISI was neither dismantled Chile nor deepened as in brazil- in just as bad shape when left as when it took power in 1976

change in Argentine class structure- social economic power became concentrated in small number of industrial conglomerates- captains of industry- but working class decimated- most powerful labor movement was industrial unions- working class literally shrank- lost up to half their membership- weakened Peronism as well- had been core of base

important change in values in argentines- and cultural shift- not the change in values Videla sought- particularly young argentines appreciate human rights and democracy

Brazil- BA that deepened ISI rather than dismantlingDiffered in 2 critical ways

Economic- Started out just like other Bas- orthodox stabilization- O’Donnell’s ISI deepening Continued repression of labor, wages down to attract foreign investmentsGradual shift to more export oriented mode. Unlike Argentina and Chile, process was

gradual, selective and partial. Key industries continued to be protectedBrazilian miracle- became industrialized country1985- when military left- 8th largest economy in western at forefront of world’s most successful developing economiesgrowth was uneven- prosperous south- northeast stagnatedmore militant labor movement- new unionismmore radical, independent of state, grassrootsbrazil’s new pres- lula- emergedwould play major role in push for democratization

politicalba’s similar to others- civil liberties suspended- gov filled with military officers and

technocratsunlike in chile where Pinochet- pres was rotated every 5 years among generalsPolitical- never tried to wipe out old political class

Peru- mobilized popular sectors rather than repressed themThe coup was different from other BasRather than in response to left, was to civilian govs that did not go far enoughNationalist, anti-oligarchic, and reformist regime emerged- Juan Valasco- Peru had one of weakest states- even tax-collecting was contracted out to private sectorattempted to create new institutions that would channel popular sector’s participation-

sought to control from above- national system of social mobilization- SINAMOS---

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all pre-existing social organizations were dissolved- new orgs were then allowed to form but had to register with SINAMOS

Left 2 imp legacies: strengthened Peruvian state, permanent reshaped power structure of

Orthodox Stabilization—Economic stabilization policies. Typically involved the IMF, aimed at curbing spending and fighting inflation. Usually 1) Cuts spending 2) Devaluates by increasing tariffs on imports and encouraging exports 3) Freeing prices i.e. removing price controls 4) Liberalize trade 5) Raise interest rates 6) Lowers real wages

Monetarist Policy—The goal of such a policy would include 1) Eliminating the business cycle 2) Stable and low rates of inflation 3) Maximization of the usage of productive capacity and maximum employment rates 4) High growth of GNP and worker productivity. Rather than supply-side economics, monetarists try to reduce or encourage demand on goods and services to maintain steady and consistent growth.

Neoliberalism—Neoliberals typically refer to themselves as libertarian. This entails fighting against government interference in the marketplace and free trade in both the domestic and international spheres.

Protected Democracy—Democracy that is “protected” against anti-democratic forces. Such a government would not allow a Communist party to run in an election, for instance. In some cases, these rules are enforced by the military, though they are typically also included in the constitution.

Augusto Pinochet—Military dictator of Chile from 1973 to 1990. For the purposes of this section, it is important that Pinochet instituted radical neoliberal policies and that after his reign terminated in 1990, Chile became a protected democracy.

DINA—The Chilean Secret Police, DINA stood for National Intelligence Directorate (in Spanish). DINA was extensively involved in Operation Condor, which was an secret attempt to silence political opponent coordinated by governments in the southern cone.

Chicago Boys—A group of about 25 economists who worked under Pinochet. Sergio de Castro was the Minister of Finance until 1982. These economists were all strongly influenced by the work of the University of Chicago and Friedman, giving them strong monetarist and neoliberal tendencies.

Jorge Videla and Roberto Viola—Videla was president of Argentina from 1976-1981, and Viola served a brief term after Videla before being ousted in a military coup. They were part of the military junta that performed a number of various human rights violations. They also tried to pursue a strong neoliberal policy though they were at least partly thwarted by the rest of the military regime which was in favor of social spending and against privatization of industries.

Jose Martinez de Hoz—Martinez was the economic advisor to the abovementioned presidents. He was strongly in favor of neoliberal policies and eliminating debt.

The Proceso—I’m not sure what the Proceso is unless it’s the Mexican left-leaning magazine founded in 1976.

The Dirty War—The secret campaign against political dissidents in Argentina under the regimes of Videla and Viola. The Dirty War refers to a program of a state-sponsored war on domestic citizens in response to strikes, social unrest, violence or subversion. The US State Department knew about the program.

Generals Humberto Castelo Branco, Emilio Medici, and Ernesto Geisel—Generals in Brazil. Branco became President in 1964, and Medici in 1969, and Geisel in 1974.

ARENA and MDB—The National Renewal Alliance Party (ARENA) was the conservative political party of the military regime. The Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) was the opposition party. Both of these parties were set up by the military regimes.

The Brazilian Miracle—The ‘miracle’ was the astonishing rate of growth achieved by the military regime during the early 70s, at one point having the highest in the world. This was achieved through neoliberal policies, but eventually fizzled out and had negative effects on income

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distribution.New Unionism—I wasn’t able to find a clear answer as to what exactly this means. It appears that

unions in Brazil underwent a serious weakening as a result of market liberalization, and were maybe reinvigorate by incorporation into the government, but not necessarily in the old corporatist sense.

Juan Velasco—General who ruled Peru from 1968 until 1975. Leftist leaning, he nationalized entire industries and generally pursued leftist policies.

SINAMOS—The Nationalized System for Social Mobilization. This program was implemented to relocate large numbers of people who were ‘squatting’ in Lima to the outskirts of Lima and to provide them with hospitals, schools and etc.

Francisco Morales Bermudez—Deposed Velasco in 1975. After proving unable to control the grave situation facing Peru, he was in turn deposed and Peru returned to civilian control.

Carlos Andres Pérez—President of Venezuela from 1974 to 1979 and from 1989 to 1993. In his first term, he nationalized industries and was leftist in nature, whereas in his second term he became more conservative and worked with the IMF to end Venezuela’s debt. The “Great Venezuela” could be equated to LBJ’s Great Society, plus it was similarly a failure.

José López Portillo—President of Mexico from 1976 to 1982. He tried to boost Mexico’s economy with new oil revenues. He also nationalized the entire banking system.

Medellin Bishops Conference—A conference in 1968 in which Latin American Catholic bishops came out in favor of a more liberal approach to Catholicism and so-called Liberation theology.

Liberation Theology—This theology teaches that social justice is theologically desirable and that action should be taken towards social equality and the empowerment of the poor and disenfranchised.

Ecclesiastical Base Communities—Catholic followers of Liberation theology, these groups allegedly helped leftist guerrilla groups and helped organize the masses.

Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo—A group of Argentinean women whose children ‘disappeared’ during the military’s regime, primarily during the Dirty War. They are powerful and high-profile human rights activists.

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WEEK 7

Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, by Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter

“Hard liners” and “Soft Liners” Hard liners adopt a position of indifference on long term political projects. They are

preoccupied with their own survival. They reject and try to eliminate all forms of democracy Soft liners in contrast try and institute some form of electoral legitimacy. They proclaim that

some form of democracy is the necessary outcome of an authoritarian episode.

Context for transitional openings In almost all cases the reasons for launching a transition are domestic, internal factors.

International factors can only add in accelerating matters not cause authoritarian regimes to collapse.

What brings down a democracy is not the inverse of those factors that bring down an authoritarian regime.

Mobilization and organization of large numbers of individuals is crucial in explaining the democratization of authoritarian regimes.

There is no transition whose beginning is not a direct or indirect consequence of divisions between hard liners and soft liners.

Where dissent is high and regime self confidence low, the transition will be imposed by a mobilized opposition. Latter will have more influence in rules of transition

Where dissent is low, a transition is not likely to occur when it does rules and issues are controlled by authoritarian rulers.

Fearing the Present Fear that after installing political democracy a coup might be attempted. Hard liners fear the transition and may be prepared to return to the good old times at any cost. In avoiding a coup, there is crucial convergence and cooperation amongst the main actors in

society

Playing Coup Poker This is the foundation of pacts between soft liners and those in the opposition who are interested

in instituting democracy. Despite the enormous risks it poses the least worst strategy is to muster the political courage to

impose judgment on human right violators of the previous regime.

Negotiating Pacts (Ch. 4) It’s a situation in which competing groups are interdependent. These are not always likely or

possible, but where featured it increases the probability that the process will lead to political democracy.

Pacts establishing limited democracy will last longer than the military pacts which sponsor the transition to liberalized authoritarian regimes.

Socio-economic pact: the bourgeoisie want to ensure that their property rights will not be jeopardized, and workers and various salary groups need to be satisfied that their demands for compensation and social justice will eventually be met.

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Political democracy is produced by stalemate and dissensus rather than by prior unity and consensus. It emerges from interdependence of conflictual interests and diversity of ideals.

Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America, by Terry Lynn Karl

Democracy is defined as “a set of institutions that permits the entire adult population to act as citizens by choosing their leading decision makers in competitive, fair, and regularly scheduled elections which are held in the context of the rule of law, guarantees for political freedom and limited military prerogatives.”

Democracy involves contestation, participation of the citizenry, accountability of rulers and civilian control over the military.

Authors mention several preconditions to democracy: certain degree of wealth, system of beliefs and values where political action is imbedded, historical conditions and some external influences.

In LA the preconditions of democracy are better conceived as outcomes of democracy. During pact making, structural and institutional constraints determine the range of options

available to decision makers and predispose them to choose a specific option. Modes of transition:

Compromise ForceElite Ascendant Pact ImpositionMass Ascendant Reform Revolution

● Foundational pacts are generally: comprehensive and inclusive. They are substantive and procedural i.e. initially emphasize rule making in the process of compromise.

● The two critical tasks facing democratizers in LA: consensus about the rules of the game and establishment of a new civil military relation.

● Some democracies such as Argentina, Chile, Peru and Ecuador faced problems of sheer survivability. On the other hand others like Venezuela, Costa Rica, Brazil, Uruguay were relatively consolidated. In latter countries in particular extension of citizenship and equal political rights must take place.

● The problem is that the modes of transition which enhance initial survivability may limit future democratic transition.

● Pacted democracies are more likely to reflect flexible institutions for future bargaining than those where transition is unilaterally imposed (Brazil).

● Democracy by imposition is likely to yield conservative democracies and not deal with equality issues. Pacted transitions are likely to produce corporatist democracies. Reform is likely to bring about competitive democracies and revolutions tend to result in one party dominant democracy.

Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez Linan, “Latin American Democratization since 1978: Democratic Transitions, Breakdowns, and Erosions.” In Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring, eds. The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks (Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 14-47 and 56-59.

- 1978-92: Burst of democratisation- 1992 : Stagnation of democratisation

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- They attempt to analyse why – and run contrary to conventional wisdom, stating that theories of democracy based on modernisation, class and economic performance are poor explanations of post-78 democratic transformation.

- Instead, focus on regional political environments, decreasing polarisation and strong commitment of political elites to democracy.

- Impasse of democratisation explained by weak international actors, poor economic growth hampering structural changes that would be useful to democracy, and the weak performances of democracies in some LA countries.

- Definition of democratic:o Free and fair electionso Good protections for civil libertieso Electorate included most of the adult populationo No military encroachment

- According to Huntington: “A wave of democratisation is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specific period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction.”

- Transitions to democracy became more frequent after 1977- Semidemocratic and democratic regimes have endured for more time- The authors go into a lot of complex quantitative work, primarily using the rare event logistic

regression (RELogit) to conclude that key factors of democratisation (in order of importance) are (1) regional environment that is more favourable to democracy, (2) decreased party polarisation, (3) commitment of political elites to democracy.

- LA countries learnt from each other through the ‘diffusion effect’ – news and tactics travelled fast. In the Third Wave of democratisation, the international ideological context has been relatively favourable to democracy in LA. This favourable ideological context does not guarantee that specific countries will become or remain democratic, but it enhances the likelihood of democracy. They are significant but rarely sufficient to alter the odds for or against democracy.

- Changes in the Catholic Church affected the regional political environment and until the 1960s, the Church often sided with totalitarians. However, since the 1970s, the Church supported democratisation and promoted transitions.

- Democratic transitions and breakdowns can be thought of as ‘tipping games’ in which different actors bet on a regime change, continue to support the existing regime, or remain on the sidelines. External actors (like the US) affect the likelihood of coups by:

o Moral suasion that changes attitudes of domestic actorso Symbolic statements to embolden/weaken particular actorso Sanctions against governmentso Conspiracieso Military action

During most of the post-1977 period, the US supported transitions to competitive regimes and opposed breakdowns of such regimes. Carter was active in criticising authoritarian governments (Chile, Uruguay) and supporting democratic transitions in Ecuador and Peru.

- The proximate cause of most breakdowns of democratic and semidemocratic regimes has been intense political polarization, and a proximate cause of the greater durability of democracy after 1978.

- In general, the changing attitudes towards democracy in LA were very important and enabled the post-1978 transformation in LA. The Left particularly changed their attitudes to democracy – from regarding it as a bourgeois formalism to gradually accepting it. Progressive intellectuals also became more convinced of the necessity of democracy.

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- This wave of democratisation is by far the longest lasting and broadest that Latin America has ever experienced. Openly authoritarian regimes finally became a rare exception.

- The burst of democratisation defied many expectations in the broader literature (because theories of democracy based on modernisation, class and economic performance are poor explanations of post-78 democratic transformation).

- Regional specificities are very important when looking at LA.- In LA, regime survival has depended far more on political factors that on the level of development or

economics. Structural variables such as per capita income and the share of the labour force in manufacturing and regime performance variables are not important factors in explaining the increase in the durability of competitive regimes or the increased vulnerability of authoritarian regimes after 1978.

Authoritarianism and Democratization: Reform Through Rupture and Democratization in Argentina by Munck

Argentina’s transition was triggered by deepening of the political crisis when General Galtieri became president in 1981.

This increased societal pressure caused military to behave erratically and they invaded the Falkland/Malvinas islands in April 1982. Argentina surrendered and the outcomes were the turning point. Elected authorities took power by December 1983

Protest movements were the first sign of the deteriorating power of military rulers. During Viola’s tenure (before Galtieri) society pressed military on the party front and labor front.

Mass demonstration organized by the CGT on March 30 1982 was a landmark event. It was the first time all major opposition groups backed a protest demanding democracy. This surge showed the extent to which the military power had deteriorated. The destabilization was manifest in these protests, however they originated a year earlier when Viola was president.

It was in this context that the military made the choice to invade the Falklands. The swift defeat hit the military hard. They were too divided to continue backing the institutional rules set up in 1976. The junta essentially collapsed. Thus a political crisis gave way to transition.

Impact of the mode of transition: militaries weakness meant that transition would be controlled by the opposition. Secondly, there would be little uncertainty concerning the completion of a successful transition because the military was so weak.

In a last hope to grant themselves amnesty the military approached the Peronists who had won every free election in Argentina since 1946.

In contrast Raul Alfonsin the UCR (radicals) presidential candidate presented himself as the champion of the human rights cause and a break away from the past.

On October 30th 1983 Alfonsin was nominated president. He best understood the dynamics of transition and his message was attractive to the 5 million new voters under 28 who did not have strong Peronist ties. The same applies to women.

Transitions in Brazil, by Kinzo

The established after the 1964 coup did not suppress all mechanisms and procedures of representative democracy. The congress and judiciary were not closed, even though their

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powers were limited and several members purged. An artificial two party system was created in 1966.

Military rule could be characterized by periods of repressions alternating with periods of political relaxation and some political crises which ended in repression.

MBD or the Brazilian Democratic Movement was the legal opposition party created in 1966. In the economic realm the Brazilian miracle 1967-73 was characterized by stabilization policies

earlier on followed by consolidating the import substitution model. Until the 1980s it had good economic growth. However the main causes on intervention in 1964- inflation and economic stagnation remerged with greater intensity during the process of transition. Oil shocks were an important factor for this.

The transition embodied 3 stages: 1974-82, 1982-85,1985-1990.The first phase saw some signs of freer elections and revocation of press censorship. However,

these created 2 problems. First the hard lines objected to the political relaxation. Second, the opposition demanded further democratization. Geisel successfully neutralized both problems.

However, political decompression limited the government’s ability to tackle the economic problems which began emerging.

In 1979 Figueriedo passed a bill allowing a return of most of the exiled parties. A new party law was implemented where the two dominant parties changed their names and three additional parties were created. The governments intention was to divide the opposition.

The third phase (1985-90) saw the election of Tancredo Neves and Jose Sarney in January 1985. But Neves died and Sarney became president. The death of the person who was supposed to lead made democracy more complicated. Therefore civilian rule was fragile and had to face mounting economic and social crises.

In the socio economic realm the post 1985 period was traumatic. Between 1986-1994 Brazil had four different currencies and 7 different stabilization plans. The Plano Real the last plan was partially successful.

Politically Brazil had free elections and a rebirth of a constitution. Inauguration of Fernando Collor de Mello in 1989 marked a symbolic end of Brazils 16 year democratic transition.

Brazil has many achievements in its transition: Political participation was significant. Intensification of agrarian reform is prominent. The press and media hold representatives morally and politically responsible. The political system is demilitarized.

The limitations deal with the quality of public contestation and participation of the citizenry but also with the effective operation of a democratic and representative government. Brazil has extreme social inequality which is limits the deepening of democracy.

The traditional role of the state has been eroded due to economic crisis and the states inability to tackle high rates of inflation.

Lack of political and financial strength in sub national governments is one of the causes of government’s inefficiencies.

Philip Mauceri, “The Transition to 'Democracy' and the Failures of Institution Building," In Maxwell Cameron and Philip Mauceri, eds. The Peruvian Labyrinth (Penn State University Press, 1997).

- Basically traces the Peru case study as shown in lecture.- Transition in Peru was an elite-controlled process in which timetables and rules were negotiated

behind closed doors by traditional party leaders and military officers.- Yet it involved an elected Constituent Assembly charged with writing a new Constitution (1979), and

that Const would include the vast social reforms carried out during military rule, agrarian reform, workers’ rights, social inclusion.

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- But actors on the Left and Right took maximalist political strategies and were never fully committed to the political, social and economic system embodied in the 1979 constitution.

- Mauceri argues that many of the weaknesses of Peru’s democratic order stem from the failure to create an institutional framework to which all actors felt committed.

- The Peruvian transition to democracy was politically conservative even though civil society had become increasingly radical.

- Efforts to modify the Constitution were thwarted during the Belaunde regime and the election of populist Alan Garcia in 1985 suggested that such changes were unlikely to be endorsed by the electorate.

- The breakdown of the authoritarian regime of Alvarado was due to poor restructuring plans, opposition from the Left, growing factionalism and weakening military leadership.

- After the removal of Velasco, there was a move to end the authoritarian regime. In 1976, the Bermundez government promised to hold elections for a Constituent Assembly. Leftists picked their most visible leaders, and prominent members of peasant and union federations.

- Coordination between APRA and PPC saw that the regime avoided major conflicts between the Assembly and the military during the one-year period established to write a constitution.

- In contrast to the conservative character of the transition popular protest during the late 1970s demonstrated a radicalisation and mobilisation of civil society. Peru was rocked by numerous strikes during the process.

- While the organisation of labour had flourished under Velasco, with an average of 295 new unions recognised per year, the effort languished under Bermudez.

- Institutional rules designed during the transition left many social actors increasingly dissatisfied during the 1980s. The new social movements continued to use social methods of the 1970s, but were less successful in achieving their goals.

- Persistent personalism, clientelism and corruption during the 1980s testified to a general lack of democratic leadership and norms among the political elite.

- The 1979 constitution delegated extensive powers to the executive. Indeed, Peru witnessed extraordinary Presidentialism.

- There was a large change in the party system (the Left grew dramatically in political clout, especially at a municipal level) but little change in party structures.

- Transitions to democracy tend to be conservative nd, when they are elite-driven, top-down processes, they often reflect the interests of powerful groups in society who seek to protect their interest and carefully circumscribe the limits of political participation.

- During most of the military regime in Peru, rulers sought to undertake a radical transformation of the state and society (unlike other repressive LA countries)

- Peru’s different authoritarian experience has an impact on the nature and goals of its democratic transition.

- Tensions existed between the military’s intent to quickly extricate itself from governance, the traditional political elite’s desire to restrict participation in the transition by new social actors and reassert its pre-1968 dominance, and the popular sector’s wish to assert a new role in society and politics.

- The transition left many unsatisfied – the economic elites disliked the inability to revise economic reforms of the 79 constitution, popular sectors felt that the new institutions of democracy that emerged from the constituent assembly did not represent their interests.

- The transition to democracy largely provided a framework for the military to extricate itself from power rather than providing strong institutional framework for a new democratic order.

- Far from being inclusive, the transition remained an elite-oriented process revolving around the negotiations and understandings reached by the APRA-PPC majority in the assembly and the military. The Left used protest tactics, rather than institutional methods for social change.

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- Peru’s transition put into place a weak institutional structure for the consolidation of democracy. The marvel perhaps is not that the structure would easily be swept away 12 years later but that it lasted as long as it did.

Chappell Lawson, “Mexico’s Unfinished Transition: Democratization and Authoritarian Enclaves,” Mexican Studies 16, No. 2 (summer 2000), pp. 267-287.

- Popular mobilization has pushed forward a halting, protracted process of political transition in Mexico.

- The victory of Vicente Fox in Mexico’s July 2000 elections represented the culmination of a long process of political reform in Mexico. Mexico’s one party system has finally broken down, and democratic institutions have definitively taken its place.

- Mexico’s new political order comprises a series of authoritarian enclaves in which the old rules of the game still operate.

- Minimalist definitions of democracy emphasize competition for national offices – that is, holding regular, free and fair elections. But scholars agree that the extent or quality of democracy depends on other aspects of governance besides elections – including institutions like courts and bureaucracy, which ensure implementation.

- Mexico’s judiciary and federal bureaucracy are democratically lacking- Despite elections, the country cannot be called fully democratized.- Historically, the main problem with elections in Mexico was an array of old-fashioned tactics

designed to protect the PRIs hold on power – but these have largely been removed through revisions to the electoral code

- There is still huge geographical unevenness of electoral transparency, but on the whole Mexico’s system measures up as democratic.

- Regardless of its party system or electoral rules, Mexico will almost certainly remain a presidential system with a bicameral legislature. There is always a risk of overweening executive power.

- The democracy remains dominated by adherents of the ruling party. Until the mid1990s, the high level bureaucrats had to be PRI members – now it is largely de facto.

- The highest court was appointed by PRI members, the law requires a 2/3 majority in the court which makes it difficult for opposition groups to take advantage of the judicial route to conflict resolution, and recent rulings (in 2001) show that the count decisions are erratic, invoking social criteria rather than specific laws.

- So while partially democratized, Mexico still has a bit to go for full democratization.

Constable and Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies, Chapter 12

- This is a largely prosaic account of what Levitsky talked about in lecture, accounting the ‘rebirth of’ the Chilean nation and the fall of Pinochet. The authors talk about the tense plebiscite vote (enshrined in the 1980 constitution), the fear of the opposition of a rigged vote, and the eventual victory of the Opposition.

Lecture: 03/13/2006

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Opposition had to convince military that human rights and private property rights would not be threatened. However this de-legitimizes democracy. Otherwise military and elite have an incentive to kick over the board.

Several Changes in the International Environment have accounted democratization:1. Major shift in US government policy. Was fighting communism not promoting democracy.

This changed in the late 70s under Carter.2. Collapse of the Soviet Union undermined BA regimes. Ended reason for anti communist

dictatorships. 3. 1982 debt crisis. Huge economic crises all across LA. Primary claim to legitimacy of BAs

was economic performance which they were unable to deliver. 4. Globalization: huge leap in IT, communications, TV, fax etc which was useful in promoting

democracy. Also gave rise to transnational human rights movements.

Domestic Changes: Military had a legitimacy problem. Church left right all became more democratic. The left had fundamental changes after the severe repression from BAs. They viewed democracy differently and were not as radical. The right, which constituted of economic elites, felt they did not have much access to making policy proposals. They felt they would have more influence under democracies.

ArgentinaIn 80s economy did terribly. Vidella left and Viola took over. He was less repressive but still

controlled virtually everything. 1981 palace coup where Viola replaced by Galtieri who was a hardliner. 1982 debt crisis where inflation was in triple digits. April 2nd 1982 Argentina military occupies Falklands. Argentina easily defeated and Galtieri forced to resign. Regime collapses.Alfonsin wins elections in 1983 over the Peronist party. After elections Argentina one of most

democratic countries. Put military officers on trial. Legacies: Military so powerless couldn’t even protect leaders. Due to speed of transition no pacts

were created. Military failed economically (400% inflation).

Brazil14. Transition lasted 11 years. Military dictated pace of transition. Tightly controlled from above. 15. Geisel put an end to hard line repression.16. 1974 elections fair and MDD (opposition) won overall senate vote which stunned military but it

still remained in control of transition process. 17. Late 70s and early 80s saw an economic downturn. The new labor movement which arose from

heavy industry was militant. Mass protests in 80s demanding presidential elections. 18. 1985 military allowed civilian president to be elected. Neves became president. But military’s

1967 constitution remained in place. They also enjoyed cabinet in the new civilian government. 19. After Neves died Sarney took office. He was believed to be pro military and conservative. He

did not institute any major reforms. There were also no military trials like in Argentina. It can be characterized by only a partial transition to democracy.

Lecture 03/15/2006

● Before the coup the Chilean opposition was polarized between the socialists and the Christian democrats. The Christian democrats sought a temporary coup for Allende to leave.

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● Following the coup, Socialist leaders went into exile where they learned in order to get back into power they needed to moderate their ideologies. Return to democracy was paramount.

● Big change in Allende’s party which accepted Pinochet’s free market reform. This helped opposition to gain support of middle class and business who had done well economically under Pinochet.

● 1988 Plebiscite for Pinochet to stay until 1997. If ‘NO’ vote won then presidential elections to be held in 1989. No defeated Yes by 55% to 45% on Oct 5th 1988

● This was the first time government was forced to negotiate with opposition. The ban on Marxist parties was lifted. The national security body’s powers were weakened. However, in return the opposition had to accept some of Pinochets terms. The military and central bank remained autonomous. Military protected by amnesty laws and the supreme court was packed with Pinochet’s men.

● 1989 Patricio Aylwin becomes president. But many problems: 9 appointed senators on senate. Pinochet head of armed forces and no human rights trials.

Peru In Peru, the military tried to mobilize the popular sector that emerged stronger than ever from

the regime. Peruvian left radicalized. Was revolutionary and not interested in questions of democracy. General Velasco removed and replaced by General Bermudez who generated a large austerity

program. Huge protests followed which peaked in 1977-78. Lot of pressure on military who get ready for a transition and try to control constitution writing

behind the scenes. APRA played a leading role in negotiations and the new constitution. But the pact was flawed and key players were not on board. The left did not accept the outcome

of the new constitution. Belaunde won 1980 election. The left was divided into the democratic wing and the

revolutionary wing (Shining Path and MRTA) The Shining Path insurgency took the lives of 50,000 Peruvians in 12 years.

Mexico Mexico had the longest transition which ended in 2000 with election of Fox. Regime was inclusionary and the PRI ruled with cooptation. It maintained the window

dressings of democracy. But things began to conspire against the regime:

1. Modernization2. stronger civil society not linked to or dependent on PRI3. Mexico City earthquake in 1985 which generated a slow and ineffective response

from the government4. Nationalization of banks which made businesses loose confidence.5. 1982 Debt crisis where painful austerity measures were implemented.

● Cardenes broke with PRI and set up PRD which almost caused a democratic transition in the 1988 elections.

● But Salinas was declared the eventual winner with 51% of the vote. The PRI remained strong despite being on the brink of collapse. Main reason: Opposition divided. Conservatives were frightened of Cardenes. Economy revived under Salinas. Also the US did not lift a finger which regard to the suspected fraudulent elections. The next PRI president was Zedillo who was a Yale graduate.

● It was only in 2000 that the PRI was voted out of office. PAN candidate Vicente Fox elected President. He defeated Cardenes and PRIs candidate (forgot name?)

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● Similarities and differences between cases: In Mexico unlike Brazil and Chile, the military played no role in the transition. The opposition played by PRIs rules. The slow transition cost Mexico 10 years of democracy but when it occurred it was a smooth process.

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Week 8

Problems of Democratic Transition and ConsolidationLinz and Stepan● Distinguish b/w liberalization and democratization

There can be liberalization without democratization● Transitions may begin that are never completed, even though a new authoritarian regime does

not assume power● Characteristics of consolidated democracies:

Political situation where democracy is “only game in town”■ No significant political group seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic

regime or secede from the state■ All actors become habituated to the fact that political conflict will be resolved

according to the established norms and that violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and costly

Behaviorally, no significant national, social, political or institutional actors that try to create a non-democratic regime

Attitudinally, strong majority of public opinion holds belief that democratic procedures are best way to govern

Constitutionally, governmental forces become subjected and habituated to resolution of conflict within specific laws, procedures and institutions

Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings Valenzuela● 2 transitions in government: (1) leads to installation of democratic government, (2) leads to

consolidated democracy where there is an effectively functioning gov.● The fighgrst installation might need to be revamped b/c it might not allow consolidation of the

new govt.● Stability does not mean that democratic consolidation will occur● 8 institutional requirements: (1) freedom to form/join organizations (2) freedom of expression

(3) right to vote (4) eligibility of public office (5) right of political leaders to compete for support (6) alternative sources of info. (7) free/fair elections (8) institutions that makes govt. dependent on votes and preferences

● Minimalist approach to democracy; develop organizations, parties, interest/lobbying groupsopinions can be expressed

● Virtuous institutionalization: permits the reproduction of minimal procedures of democracy● Perverse institutionalization: undermines democracy

Tutelary powers: attempt to exercise broad oversight of govt. and policy decisions while claiming to represent vaguely formulated fundamental and enduring interests of the nation-statethis undercuts democratic arenas of negotiation and compromise (Chile and PinochetNSC)

Reserved domains: remove specific areas of governmental authority and substantive policy making from purview of elected officials—may have facilitated first transition, but must be undone for consolidation

● Free elections must be the only possible means to get into government

Democracy by Undemocratic MeansHagopian● By providing guarantees to the minorities who stand to lose from democracy, fragile

democracies can become stronger

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● Pacted Democracies (Brazil): political system may be compromised; to get the successful military regimes out, they must still have a stake in the govt.

Military can have a huge role in civilian politics and social/econ. issues● Elected governments must be conducted without being influenced● Talks about how Brazil truly wasn’t very democratic…under the façade of democracy were

perverse institutions that allowed the military to have an enormous influence● A smooth transitions doesn’t mean that there is will be a successful democracy● Pact geared towards securing nominal exit of military, they failed to resolve major difference

dividing the proponents of democracy● Fragile democracies cannot be consolidated and extended by political pacts alone● Elite pact-making doesn’t produce democracy by undemocratic means

Between Confrontation and Accommodation: Military and Govt. Policy in Democratic ArgentinaPion-Berlin

● Brazil and the other pacted transitions appease the military● Alfonsin period was an unstable equilibrium, where military-civilian relations were strained● Governments political tactics and the military reactions to these helped shape this unstable

equilibriumthings good for civilians alienated the military● 3 important components to consider: (1) Alfonsin’s military budget (2) human rights trials (3)

new defense law● Attitudes must be reshaped and they must have something to do b/c of their reduced role in

government affairsif not, they will meddle; new norms must be followed so subordination occurs; more professionalized, the less perilous it becomes for civilians to grant the military autonomy; government must balance b/w disciplining military w/ concessions

● A strong previous regime will allow the armed forces to exit confidently, imposing limits on the new democracy…and the opposite is true

● Failure of military regime gave Alfonsin massive support● EVERYONE hated the military● Reduced military autonomy, and military size, but institutional reform didn’t happen● Heterodox plans failed, and they completely demoralized the armed forces● Alfonsin government prosecuted participants of the Dirty Warofficers felt disgraced and this

had a corrosive effect on the military● De-professionalization of the armed forces● Over-prosecution of officers led Alfonsin to submit a bill that exonerated all officers below rank

of lieutenant colonelAlfonsin lost A LOT of credibility● NSD (National Security Doctrine): new law that gave military more power

Politicians against SoldiersWendy Hunter● How did the Brazilian military remain powerful? Why did military decline under democracy?

Remaining enclaves of military autonomy● Main Point: electoral competition creates incentives for politicians to reduce the interference of

a politically powerful and active military and that electoral victory enhances their capacity to do so.

● Driven by imperatives of democratic competition and bolstered by popular backing, politicians have challenged military

● Electoral motivations affected sufficient number of politicians to yield decisions that would not have been expected on the basis of ideological leanings and political affiliations

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● Electoral competition has prevented the military from bargaining effectively for federal funds. Competitive dynamic of democracy militated military in favor of projects with high electoral potential. Presidents are more willing to yield to military (spending).

Continuity or Change? Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Argentina, Chile, and PeruWendy Hunter (CASE-STUDIES)

● Modes-of-transition Argument (continuity thesis): expect persistent military influence based on institutional structures that are frozen into place during the regime transition

● Military influence has diminished in Brazil because of unrestrained electoral competition.● Electoral Dynamic Argument: politicians will compete for votes and gain widespread support

and eventually erode military influence● 3 Cases:

Chile: constrained by authoritarian incumbents, military had prerogatives; organization strength of parties allowed the center-left governing coalition to coordinate its members around a strategy of reducing military influence that is deliberate and assertive, yet at the same time careful to uphold the collective interest in democracy’s survival by not pushing the military beyond its tolerance. The Pinochet regime penetrated all aspects of the government and had an enormous amount of influence in its affairs. Aylwin gradually weakened military. Due to the need for electoral support, center-right parties backed policies that weakened military. Cut military budget in favor of social programs. Originally no human rights trials but eventually, some were prosecuted (Contreras affair). Aylwin’s amnesty law applied to all cases before 1978.

Argentina: Alfonsin undercut military spending, allowed human right’s trials, curbed military political involvement. Menem reduced military political influence, repaired economy, lowered military budgets, etc. Human rights prosecution by curbed eventuallyLaw of Due Obedience (if you were just following orders, you can’t be prosecuted)

Peru: Belaunde did little to rein in armed forces, Garcia reduced their autonomy, and Fujimori used military as a foundation of personal rule. We all know what happened.

● Weak political institutions (particularly undisciplined parties) cut both ways: under non-crisis conditions they generate especially strong incentives for electoral politicians to downgrade military influence. Yet because such inchoate systems are also highly prone to political and economic instability, politicians may soon face the irresistible temptation to rely on the armed forces for support

● The more distant the transition from authoritarianism becomes, the less the armed forces’ standing at the outset of democracy shapes the civil-military balance

3/20 NotesDemocratic consolidation?

State in which there is a broad consensus among elites that democracy is only game in town, nobody thinks about kicking over the chessboard

Keys: Doesn’t necessarily translate to successful democraciesTwo key post-transition problems

Democratic Survival (Preventing another coup)Key challenge: Left had to be tamed, while right protectedProtect right:

Pacts, Moderation of left, Labor ceased to be a threat, electorally viable political parties, Protect military

Democratic Completion: dealing with authoritarian enclaves

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Elimination of authoritarian legacies and full civilian control over military4 authoritarian enclaves (legacies):

Military autonomy/lack of civilian controlDirect military influence over politicsRestriction in policy-making arenaPersistence of authoritarian elites power

Cases: (1) Argentina: military diasappeared, democracy rules (2) military brought back into arena and democracy is never consolidated and is destroyed

3/22 Notes● The Debate over Eroding Military Influence

Pessimists (Hagopian, Valenzuela): fear of long term “perverse institutionalization”■ Institutions put in place during transitions are likely to be locked in■ If military can set up enclaves during transition, they will linger■ Feared that Brazil and Chile would remain tutelary democracies

Optimists (Hunter): electoral competition will induce politicians to chip away at military power

■ Military power is likely to be eroded by the logic of democracy■ Electoral competition would induce all parties to reduce power of military

The international dimension: did the post-Cold War international context take away the military’s “coup card,” thereby rendering it a paper tiger

■ Collapse of communism, and change of US policy, coups became a lot harder to get away with

■ As long as civilians fear a coup, they can use the fear to maintain power● Cases

Brazil under Collor and Cardoso: from tutelary democracy to full democracy Chile under Frei and Lagos: a slow road to civilian supremacy Venezuela: A Case of Democratic “De-Consolidation” in the 1980s

■ No polarization, no popular sector threat, elite remained committed to democratic rules of games, system failed to adapt, no major actor tried to knock over chessboard

■ Partyarchypeople didn’t voteCaracazo Riot’92 Chavez coup’98 Chavez election

TERMSRaul Alfonsin: Assault on military power, but pushed them into corner. Completely democratic, cut military spending, civilians in charge of militaryThe National Defense Law: Re-defined role of military (Restricted legally to national defense and Prohibited acting in internal affairs. Human rights trials (allowed trials but limited them eventually when they became excessive)Passed Law of Due Obedience: no officers lower than colonel could be prosecuted. Everything eventually went bad (rebellion/econ. problems)

Carlos Menem: Military pardons, and the establishment of civilian control. Tranformed military: Pardoned Vidella and other top generals/Released Monteneros leaders, “National reconciliation.” 4th military uprising and Menem ordered the army to use force and crush themNo more military uprisings after 1990. Slashed military spending, Reduced size, Ended military draft

The Law of Due Obedience: Human rights abuses in Argentina there were excessive trials (so many officer were being prosecuted), so Alfonsin got this law passed where no officers lower than colonel could be prosecuted

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Alan Garcia: Beluande’s successor, from APRA, tried to fight Shining Path with Death Squadrons—large scale human rights violation in clumsy effort to fight Shining Path, COMPLETE economic collapse

The Shining Path: Maoist, brutal, clandestine, disciplined, ideological, Roots in Ayacucho, Founder was Abimael Guzman = “Presidente Gonzalo.” Developed a long-term plan for a war--1960s focused on education, so this was perfect for getting people into the Shining Path—got students from University of Huamanga. Guzman believed that old society had to be destroyed in order for a new society to emerge. So he destroyed economy, infrastructure, make poor poorer so they will join, wipe out civil society (killed teachers, doctors, community leaders, social workers, grassroots leaders)killed and thus alienated it from peasants

Partyarchy: Due to the Punto Fijo Pact of 1958, COPEI and AD dominated everything—“Partyarchy”. There was a massive increase in size of state and government jobs, which were obtained through party. Good: Integrative party system avoided polarization. Bad: (1) Cooperation and party-sharing eventually came to be viewed as collusion (cartel which kept others out), (2) Citizens had few independent ways to express their views, (3) parties unresponsive to people’s needs

The Caracazo: 1989massive urban protest erupt in response to neoliberal reform. Met with massive repression and at least 300 killedbeginning of end for democracy

Hugo Chavez: Nationalist and leftist (from military), who promised to wipe away corrupt political system and replace with authentic “bolivarian” democracy. Elected in 1998 and wiped away all democratic institutions. Called referndum to close Congress and dissolve Constitution (passed). Fifth Republic wins and dominates. He caused sever polarization

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Study Guide Week 10:

Sebastian Edwards

● He talks about the shift during the 1980s and early 1990s from ISI to neo-liberal open-market economic orientation based on competition and openness.

● There was basically a convergence of views and a consensus reached about the value of having and open market based on competition and openness and targeted social programs.

● The first step was the failure of the ISI model and growing poverty.● This transformation in view can be attributed to several factors including the failure of

heterodoxy in Brazil, Argentina, and Peru, the stellar example from the East Asian economies, Spain and Chile, multilateral institutions, technocratic reform teams, and the collapse of the USSR.

● Up until the 70s, the ISI import-substitution model was the major economic policy in Latin America, but this created an inward-looking economy with industries protected by tariffs. During the 60s, this ran into the ground because the basic domestic goods had all been substituted.

● Chile-In the 1970s under Pinochet, Chile launched a process of neo-liberal reform which was first disregarded by regional observers, then criticized when Chile sank into economic crisis in 1982, then as Chile began to grow vigorously by the late 80s, it was deemed a success.

● Role of multilateral institutions deals with the IMF, World Bank, US Treasury, and Washington Consensus, primarily. Edwards says these institutions were important, but not central, in encouraging neo-liberal reform.

John Williamson

20. He details what neo-liberal reform actually means in the eyes of Washington. He gives 10 policy instruments which are considered important by a consensus in Washington.

● Fiscal Deficit-countries must exhibit fiscal discipline. Large and sustained fiscal deficits are bad.

● Public Expenditure Priorities-Expenditures considered fine by international institutions are military, education, health, and public infrastructure investment. However, the latter three should not be bloated. Subsidies are always deemed a good area in which to reduce expenditures.

● Tax Reform- Increased tax revenues are the viable alternative to reducing expenditures when attempting to reduce fiscal deficit.

● Interest Rates-The general belief is that interest rates should be market-determined, and that real interest rates should be positive.

● Exchange Rate-Must have appropriate exchange rates. A competitive real exchange rate is an essential component of an outward-oriented economic policy.

● Trade Policy- Free trade should be followed, and domestic markets should not be heavily protected.

● Foreign Direct Investment- There should be no restriction on foreign investment. ● Privatization- Based on the belief that private industry is managed better than state enterprises,

Washington places an emphasis on privatizing industries. ● Deregulation-Promotes competition.● Property Rights-They must be secure.

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Barbara Stallings

She argues that international institutions are crucial in explaining the economic policy shifts in the 70s, 80s, and 90s.

Regarding dependency theory, she basically gives an account of the basic tenets of the theory, as well as the major shortfalls, which include a lack of specificity, a neglect of domestic forces, and the positive impact that international institutions have had in places like East Asia.

The ways that foreign countries impact developing countries in Latin America are by markets, linkage networks, and the direct use of power to achieve desired results, which is called leverage.

Developing countries generally export to the great industrial powers, and the extent of trade and process are thus established by these powers. This determines what kind of market will be for the developing countries. Linkage has to do with links between internal and external actors, like technocrats and military men trained abroad, wealthy have education and travel abroad,. Leverage is the direct use of force by international institutions like the IMF and World Bank to produce desried results.

During the 1970s, there existed a borrowers market in which the countries of Latin America borrowed heavily form international actors.

Then in the 80s, when the debt crisis began, the countries could not pay back their loans, and some countries decided to adopt neo-liberal reforms, others turned to heterodoxy.

Kurt Weyland

He investigates why neo-liberal reforms were successfully implemented under seemingly democratic regimes, even though common logic would dictate that voters would be extremely hostile to these measures.

He brings forth two potential explanations, the first is the compensation hypothesis and the second is the rescue hypothesis.

The compensation hypothesis explains that along with neo-liberal reforms came a series of targeted social programs. These programs targeted the poor, and they help to elicit votes for the government amongst poor voters in the clientalistic vein.

There is evidence which shows that this may be inaccurate, and that people will not simply negate in their minds the negative effects of neo-liberal reforms because of the positives they receive under targeted spending.

This helps explain the rescue hypothesis, which states that people are willing to accept tough and harsh measures if they believe it is necessary to prevent or alleviate an even worse situation. Such was the case in the countries in Latin America which adopted neo-liberal reform.

He concludes through empirical evidence that the compensation hypothesis is flawed, because opinion polls show that the hope to eliminate future losses (rescue hypothesis) is much stronger than the satisfaction with social programs amongst those who accept neo-liberal reforms.

Social gains do not sufficiently make up for the losses suffered, and so emergency social spending is not necessary or sufficient for instituting neo-liberal reform.

This entire debate of compensation vs. rescue hypotheses is really part of a bigger question of government control over popular reaction to painful reform; Compensation says the government has control, and Rescue says it does not.

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Denise Dresser

● She provides an explanation for why Mexico successfully implemented neo-liberal reforms without inciting social unrest and chaos.

● Mexico’s success was based on a new type of statism that was implemented, which basically created an enhanced role for the state that relies on a lean interventionist and redistributive philosophy. This is embodied in PRONASOL.

● Through the ISI period, Mexico developed a political system relying on the hegemony of the PRI and its power to co-opt various interests, including the private and informal sectors.

● PROSANOL had as one of its primary tactics the concentration of power in the executive, which was Salinas, and that allowed him to create an extremely close personalistic association between himself and PROSANOL.

● PROSANOL redefined the traditional corporatist class distinctions and instead made everyone a consumer of PROSANOL distinguished by which benefits they received in a horizontal classification system- electricity, paved roads, etc.

● This encompassed many of the outside interest groups and informal sector workers who had been marginalized under the ISI corporatist establishment.

● Mexico backed up PROSANOL with much funding, and its reforms are dominated by technobureuacrats who have the technical training necessary but also have close ties to the popular sector.

● PROSANOL may have undermined democracy because it effectively destroyed the opposition to the PRI. The opposition party’s main objective was to dole out more reform than the PRI. However, once PRONASOL was implemented, that became unnecessary and so there was really no viable opposition to the hegemony of the PRI.

● PRONASOL has shortened the divide between the government and the people, and has alleviated some of the distrust that people had for the government.

● There is the fear amongst some PRI members that PRONASOL may become a political force in its own right.

● The symbiotic relationship between PRONASOL and the PRI can only continue if PRONASOL can continue to provide the people with the benefits they now receive. Like in traditional corporatist scenarios, Mexicans will shift their support immediately if another entity seems more capable of providing them with what they want. In this way, PRONASOL effectively undermines democracy by marginalizing political institutions, parties, and the political class.

● The personalistic connection between the president and PRONASOL is helping shift Mexico’s economic policies from national populism to the new ideological framework of social liberalism.

● PRONASOL tends to contradict the neo-liberal platform which calls for an end to social benefits for those in the ISI-populist coalition. PRONASOL has established its own coalition and maintains aspects of patronage and benefits for its coalition members on a horizontal, consumer-based method. This can be maintained while still undergoing neo-liberal reform as long as there is economic growth.

Moises Naim

Every country in Latin American underwent some form of neo-liberal economic reforms in the 80s and early 90s. According to Naim, there is a second stage of reform which must follow in order for the neo-liberal reforms to be successful.

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The first stage was carried out by dramatically reducing the role of the state in the economy, getting rid of many of the interventionist policies, and simply allowing the market to guide the economy. The executive branch carried out many of these objectives itself.

During the economic crisis, many of the public-sector institutions were neglected and left to rot through lack of funding, attention, and interest. The state was then all but abandoned in the 80s when the restructuring of the economy began to take place.

Once the first faze of executive-driven painfully harsh but simply executed economic reforms was completed, the second stage of public-sector institution building became necessary.

The enormous changes which must be undertaken include a much larger degree of privatization, more efficient tax collection, banking supervision, social security and labor regulation, and closer management of the judiciary and civil service.

All of this must be accomplished while still maintaining economic balance and stability with the new neo-liberal and open-market economic policies.

By dismantling its interventionist capacities, the government is weakening itself, especially the executive, but that is better for long term stability.

Latin American governments have been notoriously bad at performing the state functions which would be necessary for a sound economy. Their history of irresponsible spending, inefficient tax collection, and insufficient payment of competent workers has made the institutions extremely corroded.

The state’s organizational structure is not the only problem-in fact, its processes are just as outdated and inefficient. Budgets, policy planning, personnel practices, information systems, etc must also be fixed.

WEEK 10 LECTURE NOTESNeha Gupta

Lecture 1 – 4/3/06Changes in Class Structure

- Decline of the industrial working class – began to erode; manufacturing fell into decline; traditional smokestack industries/bluecollar jobs disappeared

- Classical working class began to shrink - Some replaced by service sector jobs – retail stores, supermarkets- Other workers were pushed in INFORMAL SECTOR – economic activity lies OUTSIDE THE FOR-

MAL ECONOIMCYo Sweatshops, nannies, prostitutes, street vendors o All have in common – WORK OFF THE BOOKS – no taxes, labor laws, unionso Some informal sector members become quite wealthy – Peru o MOST informal sector workers barely made a living; most lived in poverty o LA always had large informal sector, but huge recently o Today approx 50% of economically active population in most LA countires is located in infor-

mal sector- REASONS FOR GROWTH OF INFORMAL SECTOR

o URBAN MIGRATION: peasants moved to cities looking for jobs As ISI expanded, urban migrants got factory jobs; as ISI exhausted, formal sector jobs

got harder to come by, leaving little choice but to join informal sector o ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 1980s: millions lost jobs, like urban migrants, little choice but to

move into informal sectoro CONSEQUENCE OF MARKET ORIENTED REFORMS OF 1990s: millions of layoffs, priva-

tization, govt workers lost jobs and also turned to informal economy to make a living - IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICS – informalization changes nature of working class

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o Working class is a relatively homogeneous lot; paid same wage, etc.; easy to form UNIONS – same factories, industrial zones; easy to understand how/why blue collar workers share interests and identities

o HOWEVER informal sector workers are spread all over; work on their own and impossible to organize; no unions; don’t’ even really belong to working class

Do nannies, housekeepers, street vendors care about minimum wage? Not covered by these laws

May be poor, exploited, but have different interests from those of blue collar workers Street vendors may see themselves more as entrepreneurs More fragmented, dispersed; unlikely/unable to act collectively

THIS RESULTS IN- LESS MOBILIZATION, LESS UNION MEMBERSHIP

o UNIONS NO LONGER A MAKJOR PLAYER IN POLITICS- PARTIES CHANGED – AD, APRA, CHILEAN SOCIALISTS had to find new allies/voters or face de-

cline- Just as growth of working class reshaped balance of power in early 20th century, - Domestic markets became saturated, industries failed to innovate, LA remained inward oriented rather

than looking to global economic activity; exports were increasingly critical to economic growth- Economic growth was becoming more competitive due to rise of southeast Asia – LA products were nei-

ther good nor cheap, so could not compete, and industries stagnated - Severe fiscal crisis

SOLUTIONS: - like Chile – dismantle ISI state altogether

o this would throw people into the streets – very politically costly - MOST LA GOVERNMENTS avoided important economic choices by TAKING FOREIGN LOANS

o Came from oil shocks of 1970s – price of oil skyrocketed, which brought OPEC countries vast amounts of wealth

o Invested in international banks lots of money to loan “PETRO DOLLARS”; banks were ea-ger to lend money

o LA had grown steadily, so it seemed like a good investment for banks; LA governments which were facing a crisis, were happy to receive loans

o 70s SAW MASSIVE FLOW OF LOANS o IN THE SHORT RUN, THIS SOLVED GOVERNMENT’s PROBLEMS; in long run, countries

accumulated HUGE FOREIGN DEBTSORIGINS OF THE DEBT CRISIS

- global economies saw multiple shocks in 70s PROFOUND IMPACT ON LAo increase in inflation everywhereo to control inflation, world’s leading economies tightened money supplyo US Fed boosted interest rates to a 50year high – this succeeded in the US, but PUT BREAKS

ON ECONOMIC GROWTHo US AND EUROPE SLID INTO RECESSION IN 81 and 82 SUNK LA INTO A DEEP RE-

CESSION o Fed hiking interest rates pushed up LA interest rates – DEBT INTEREST RATE SKY-

ROCKETED; nearly doubled from 10 to 18%o Happening at same time as LA in recession – gov’ts have less money, AND making HUGE

DEBT PAYMENTSo THIS MADE DEBT PAYMENT IMPOSSIBLEo MEXICAN GOVT ANNOUNCED NO LONGER ABLE TO MAKE PAYMENTS in 1982

SHOWED THAT LA WAS NO LONGER A SAFE PLACE TO LEND, SO FOREIGN LEND-ING IN LA WAS OVER

Exhaustion of ISI Growth slowed hard to finance ISI state in 70s, foreign loans helped govts avoid

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choices 80s, loans were over fiscal crisis even worse than before b/c of recession and enormous debt payments

- Initially, LA govts tried to fix the problem by PRINTING MONEY INFLATION- GLOBAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN CAUSED LA GDPs to FALL - “STAGFLATION” – deep recession and very high inflation- LA WAS POORER AT END OF 80s than at beginning – “LOST DECADE IN LA”

Status Quo was unsustainable – a fork in the road; Governments could only turn to INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDING – IMF

- this was a lender of last resort, but really the only lender in town at the time- IMF had more leverage than ever in history- IMF pushed for changes in economy policy

o In return for credit, IMF CONDITIONALITY was born - IMF DEMANDED – orthodox stabilization policies like those of BAs

o Bring down inflationo Get governments fiscal houses in order so they’d have enough revenue to pay their debto Tight monetary policy, keeping wages down, eliminating price controls, increasing price of

public transportation, water, fuel, electricity These policies tend to hurt people, especially the POOR People had trouble getting loans, which slowed economic activity People lost jobs

- ORTHODOX STABILIZATION POLICIES ARE USUALLY NOT POPULAR, THEY CAUSE A LOT OF SHORT TERM HARDSHIP ESPECIALLY FOR THE POOR

- Much of LA was BEGINNING DEMOCRATIZATION at the time – fragile new governments; widespread belief at the time was that democratic governments would never be able to impose or-thodox stabilization

o Because people can protest and vote the government out of office if hurt by policieso So democracies, it was believed, would be highly reluctant to carry out stabilization; earlier in

history it was the military who had conducted stabilization - GOVERNMENTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES FACED PROBLEM – push in the direction of ORTHO-

DOX STABILIZATION; on the other hand, new stability could be threatened by protests and massive unrest in response to these policies

- ANOTHER OPTION WAS STANDING UP TO THE IMF AND REFUSE TO PAY THE DEBT – this would impose huge costs on western banks; this may force foreign countries to renegotiate debt pay-ments, and ease crisis, and there would be less need for harsh austerity – safety net for those suffering the most under austerity

o A DEBTORS CARTEL among LAo WHY DIDN’T IT EMERGE? LA govts faced a huge COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMo While foreign countries could act together through IMF, LA had no such common ground;

couldn’t cooperate o IMF offered incentives to certain LA countries to prevent LA cooperation against IMFo One by one, any potentials for LA unity fell apart; countries that individually stood up to the

IMF were burned - of the 6 cases, only 2 that did Orthodox Stabilization were CHILE AND MEXICO - others: elected govts decided that costs of orthodox stabilization was too costly; did HETERODOX

STABILIZATION POLICYo policies aimed at controlling inflation through less painful and less market oriented meanso based on the view that inflation was NOT rooted in loose monetary policy but rather in

EXPECTATIONSo inflationary spirals were seen as a vicious circle in which all businesses expected others

prices to rise so they raised their own

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o rather than clamping down on money supply they CREATED NEW CURRENCY, IM-POSED SIMULTANEOUS PRICE AND WAGE CONTROLS IN AN EFFORT TO BREAK INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONS – hinged crucially on NEGOTIATIONS WITH LABOR AND BUSINESS – CONCERTATION with the merging of social paths

o Strayed from orthodox patterno Governments initially got IMF to go along with heterodox measures; in Peru, heterodoxy

allowed entirely breaking with IMF

Cases share:1. carried out by relatively fragile gov’ts facing strong leftwing parties/labor movements in opposition2. ultimately failed

ARGENTINA’S HETERODOXY EXPERIMENT- ALFONSIN – inherited an economic mess in 83, recession, inflation- Had run on policy of staunch opposition to military regime, so he positioned himself on center left - He went to working class neighborhoods speaking about reopening factories that closed in the 70s- Strongly against orthodoxy for ideological and pragmatic reasons

o Deemed orthodoxy unfeasible – had long history of failed stabilizations and coups; his own party had been toppled by coups 3 times in last century

o Had to deal with powerful PERONIST party in opposition which controlled senate and had a strong labor movement; conflict with labor and peronists was NOT what government needed

o Alfonsin created AUSTRAL PLAN – had elements of orthodoxy; tight monetary policyo Didn’t want to fight unions so tried to AVOID PUSHING WAGES DOWN; tried to break infla-

tion by CREATION OF NEW CURRENCY SIMULTANEOUS PRICE AND WAGE CONTROL – negotiated cooperation with biz

and labor needed; but his movement LACKED STRONG TIES TO EACH OF THESE GROUPS – labor was tied to peronists, and biz had no affiliation

- both biz and labor began to push for adjustments within Alfonsin’s policies- biz would push up prices, labor pushed for wages- government eventually had to use more austerity measures, but these triggered labor opposition

CYCLE- Finally, pressure was too much, causing plant o collapse- In 88, government suspended its debt payment and Argentina was done in global economy HYPER-

INFLATION, economy went into freefall - MASS LOOTING broke out in major cities; argentina reached bring of abyss- As 89 elections approached, peronist MENEM rose; he was a long time populist; said he’d REFUSE TO

PAY THE DEBTo RUMORS OF A COUP by MENEM began to circulate

BRAZIL- Sarne began presidency with low legitimacy, fragility- CRUSADO PLAN – created a new currency, sought to bring down inflation through wage and price

controls rather than through orthodox austerity o Rather than pushing down wages, he began with an 8% wage increase, economy grew modestly,

inflation down BUT SARNE LACKED TIES TO BIZ AND LABOR, difficult to maintain their cooperation

o Government unable to maintain fiscal austerity; control was supposed to be temporary but too weak to carry out necessary spending cuts

o 87 – plan FELL APART; 89 – inflation reached 1800% ANOTHER NEW CURRENCY- when sarne left office in 1990, he was the most unpopular Brazilian president ever

controls effective for a year or two, but then collapse into hyperinflation

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PERU’S EXPERIMENT – most dramatic situation - BELLAUNDE – cut social spending and cut social utilities real wages fell in 80s, economy fell into

recession- GDP collapsed by 13%- Both Bellaunde and orthodox policies grew in unpopularity- PERUVIANS TURNED LEFT – TWO OPTIONS

o UNITED LEFT – coalition of Marxist parties; Marantez was Peru’s Allendeo APRA – after de la Torre’s death, united left stole APRA’s popular sector base; APRA appeared

to be on the road to extinction 82, APRA came back to life, electing GARCIA as new leader – highly charismatic

o Garcia was leading presidential candidate – pushed APRA BACK TO THE LEFT one of the region’s most vocal critics of IMF

Vowed to replace IMF policies with job creation, etc. Wanted to cease debt payments POPULIST APPEAL HELPED APRA WIN BACK MUCH OF ITS POPULAR SEC-

TOR BASE- GARCIA ELECTED PRESIDENT – after more than 50 years, APRA WON PRESIDENCY- Garcia announced ceiling on debt payments – serious challenge to international financial system; GAR-

CIA BECAME A HERO - RANGE OF LEFT=CENTER POLICIES

o Increased wages, increased social spending, established ambitious social programs like noe to create temporary jobs for informal sector workers and unemployed – initially successful

o ECONOMY GREW BY 9%, WAGES INCREASED BY 20%o PROBLEMS EMERGED – 86 – IMF CALLED PERU AN INELIGIBLE BORROWER

both external finance and foreign investment dried up o COMBO OF BIG INCREASE IN PUBLIC SPENDING AND LACK OF FOREIGN INVEST-

MENT GOVT PRINTED MONEY AND CREATED INFLATION- In 87, GARCIA NATIONALIZED THE BANKING SYSTEM

o Capital poured out of country, and PERU had no source of external credito In 88, economy hit the wall o Inflation reached 7000%o Worst economic crisis of its historyo SHINING PATH MADE FINAL ADVANCE ON THE CAPTIAL

- GARCIA FAILED – Peru cut off from international finance, faced with brutal inflation

BY 89 -HETERODOXY TOTALLY FAILED IN LA

Instead of pushing only ORTHODOX STABILIZATION, began to think about what PINOCHET did – replacing ISI WITH A FREE MARKET ECONOMY – NEOLIBERALISM- Neoliberalism went way beyond OS – its embrace was reinforced by several factors:

o Part of a worldwide ideological economic shift to the right – collapse of communism suggested that liberalism was way to the future

o US trained economistso Neolib boosted by SUCCESS OF CHILEAN ECONOMY – the first LA country to adopt NE-

OLIB in the 70s; Chile was steadily growing while others failed; Chile seen as a MODEL - but ideas are rarely divorced from power – IT WAS PUSHED BY THE IMF AND OTHER FINAN-

CIAL INSTITUTIONSo IMF had huge control of LA govts in 80s and 90s

WHAT IS NEOLIBERALISM?- transition to a market based export oriented model

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- lowering trade barriers, opening to foreign investment, eliminating price control, subsidies, privatization, trimming state bureaucracies, eliminating many state jobs

- fundamental change in the role of the state – shift from development model where state regulated indus-try to one in which MARKET PREDOMINATES and state is limited

- NEOLIB entailed a shift from an inward oriented model to one that FOCUSED ON EXPORTS; domes-tic consumers no longer the focus of growth

- LA FIRMS HAD TO BE GLOBALLY COMPETITIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION HAD TO BE SLASHED TO ALLOW FOR CHEAP GOODS

- LIBERALIZATION CAN BE TRAUMATIC – brings intense competition; firms are likely to go under, people lose jobs, salaries fall, unemployment up

- Steep price hikes for basic consumer items; cost of daily living increases dramatically - These reforms are challenging in democracy – road blocks to neolib reforms

o Elections, voters, congress o In the short term, al ot of workers, peasants, businesses stand to lose out they could VOTE

OUT GOVT, take to streets to PROTEST, may LOBBY IN CONGRESS AGAINST RE-FORMS, MAY STRIKE

o On eway to deal with opposition is to REPRESS IT, like CHILEo But there were no BA’s in the 90s, so LA had to deal with opposition

HOW DID THEY DEAL WITH OPPOSITION WITHOUT OPPRESSION? - organized labor was weaker in the 90s: with repression and crisis, movements had shrunk

o while in the 60s, unions had huge powers, in the 90s this was less clear- CRISIS OF THE LEFT – no real ideological agenda; Marxist marginalized; some moved center

o Even center was in crisiso After Garcia, no left of center party even attempted populist policies for more than a decade

- Still, voters were skeptical of neoliberalism, and people tried to stall- HOW CAN NEOLIB BE IMPLEMENTED IN A DEMOCRATIC CONTEXT?

o During 90s, LA govts were filled with technocrats, advised by world’s leading economists – useless unless packaged and sold politically

o NEOLIB NEEDED MECHANISMS THAT MADE THEM POLITICALLY FEASIBLE/SUS-TAINABLE

o MUST LOOK AT POLITICAL CONTEXT

- (3) POLITICAL CONDITIONS FACILITATING NEOLIBERAL REFORMo STABLE PARTY SYSTEM PROVIDING PRESIDENT MAJORITY IN CONGRESS; when

pres has strong party behind himo Ties to organized labor and other groups which stood to lose out with neoliberalism

Populist parties had an easier time because they were integrated parties – “Nixon to China phenomenon” Nixon was first US pres to establish relations with China; conser-vatives trusted Nixon, so his move generated less opposition

Populist parties have strong ties to unions, lower classes – populist parties can persuade their union allies to go along in the way that other parties can’t

Leave supporters without a viable alternative If leftwing party is the one pushing conservative, neoliberalist reforms, it means that the

other parties are even more conservative, leaving voters/unions with nowhere else to go o HYPERINFLATION – traumatic, destroy everyday life, prices double overnight, paychecks be-

come worthless, lose life savings, unlivable situation – particularly hard for poor b/c can’t send money abroad

People who are living under this will often accept ANY OTHER POLICY, even harsh austerity, if it means an end to hyperinflation – it changes people’s preferences

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If a president can end hyperinflation, he becomes a savior, giving him the political capi-tal necessary to carry out other reforms

- when governing parties were weak in congress, lacked links to labor, and didn’t have hyperinflation – harder

- (2) additional conditions facilitating NEOLIBERAL REFORMo Compensatory social policies – can make economic reforms more palatable (MEXICO)o Presidents used fairly AUTHORITARIAN MEANS – circumvented congress, doing reforms by

decree, one president shut down congress/packed supreme court Violated civil liberties – sent union leaders into the jungle

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Week 10, Lecture 2 – 4/5/06

Cases of sweeping reform

ARGENTINA

- Menem won in 1989 – poor loved him, elite hated him- When he took over, economy was in crisis Menem became a NEOLIBERAL REFORMER;

struck an alliance with most conservative party - Had political conditions working in his favor:

o HYPERINFLATION – convinced argentines that some kind of reform was necessary, even if it was harsh austerity

o NIXON-CHINA SYNDROME – Menem was a PERONIST – it was a powerful subculture and identity; strong working class loyalty to peronism was constant

o Maintained close ties to unions; peronists and unions had worked together trying to get peron back; Menem had been in prison with them – they had loyalty to him

He reinforced this with cooptation – gave them a stake in the government-this is similar to integrative party system

o HAD MAJORITY IN CONGRESS

- fast, extensive reforms o tariff rates fell rapidly – protectionist economy became openo privatized state enterprises - RRs, highway, water, social securityo downsized federal bureaucracyo CENTERPIECE: 1991 CONVERTABILITY LAW – pegged the peso with the US dollar

Central bank in Argentina could only print as many pesos as it had dollars to back it up Prevented the government from printing money – took monetary policy out of politi-

cians hands “placed on autopilot” If politicians couldn’t mess with this, investors would have greater faith in the economy

– Harvard educated guy came up with this April 1, 1991 was when it went into effect INFLATION FELL TO ALMOST ZERO

o foreign investment poured in, economy picked up btwn 91-94o middle class argentines went on a buying spree; Menem and Caballo were HEROES AR-

GENTINA BECAME POSTERCHILD FOR MARKET ORIENTED REFORM- COSTS OF THIS

o UNEMPLOYMENT highest ever in Argentine historyo PERONISTS WERE SHOCKED – MENEM BETRAYED PERONIST IDEALS

Group of 8 peronist congressmen abandoned the party, claiming that Menem had be-trayed them

But he succeeded in implementing his project because the bulk of the labor movement cooperated with his reforms

The CGT – labor movement – had striked against Alfonsin, but led only ONE against Menem despite the fact that Menem was MUCH MORE ANTILABOR THAN AL-FONSIN

1989: CONGRESS PASSED EMERGENCY LAW ALLOWNIG MENEM TO DEREGULATE, PRIVATIZE much of the economy

- MENEM’S UNDEMOCRATIC METHODSo Imposed things by DECREE – unconstitutionalo Packed the supreme court; he was worried the court would say he was unconstitutional so he

passed night laws “automatic majority”; struck down legal challenges to menem’s authority

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- MOST IMPORTANT REFORMS WERE PASSED BY CONGRESS – never made a state of emer-gency, never restricted speech – ARGENTINA REMAINED A DEMOCRACY THROGHOUT

- PERONISTS CONTINUED TO WIN ELECTIONSo 1991 elections: Peronists were challenged – radicals were staunchly ANTINEOLIBERAL,

group of 8 ran, but Menem wono Group of 8 failed to elect even a single member of congress o 1995 – Menem elected again in a landslide

- MENEM’S SUCCESS WAS ROOTED IN CONVERTABILITYo Poor people continued to vote peronist o Without support of labor and unions and poor, his reforms would not have succeeded o Convertability eventually ran into trouble, but in the 90s, Argentina was a model for economic

reform; it liberalized and opened markets faster and more efficiently than any other LA democ-racy

MEXICO- differed from other cases: argentina, peru and brazil were all new democracies in the 80s but mexico was

a stable authoritarian regimeo government of Madrid was filled with US TRAINED TECHNOCRATS GOV WAS MORE

RECEPTIVE THAN MOST TO ORTHODOX IDEAS COMING OUT OF CONGRESS- US and IMF put together rescue package for Mexico, but in turn for a TOUGH AUSTERITY PRO-

GREM de la Madrid did this o Cut public spending, eliminated spending on goods, pushed down real wageso Earned mexico title of MODEL DEBTOR in 85

- moved towards economic liberalization – privatized, lowered trade agreements, signed GATT FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

- these policies were not popular – public support for PRI went down; when SALINAS RAN FOR PRES IN 88 – challenged from left by CARDENAS who ran on an ANTINEOLIBERAL PLATFORM

- PRI WENT INTO LEGITIMACY CRISIS- Salinas took office in a very weak state, facing a major legitimacy crisis, but he pushed forward and had

some things in his favoro MEXICO REMAINED AUTHORITARIAN – could keep dissent at bay, media was not inde-

pendent, union leaders could be beaten up/arrestedo VIOLENCE AGAINST THE LEFT was takeno RUBBER-STAMP CONGRESS – Salinas could get all his major policy initiatives through o PRI’s CONTINUED CLOSE TIES TO ORGANIZED LABOR – led by FIDEL VELASQUEZ

– controlled the CTM; didn’t like neoliberalism, but was devoted to PRI and kept the labor movement in line

- PERMITTED ECONOMIC SOLIDARITY PACTS – UNIONS AGREED TO COOPERATE WITH GOVERNMENT POLICY

o But these were not enough – needed the URBAN POOR, which currently supported CARDE-NAS

o Goods/services to urban poor areas – local people formed solidarity committees and submitted proposals for improvements – resources were channeled directly from president to local areas, cutting out corrupt local officials

o w/in 3 years, there were a ton of solidarity committees and tons of projects – THIS GOT SALE-NAS THE URBAN POOR BACK FROM CARDENAS EVEN THOUGH THEY DIDN’T LIKE NEOLIBERALISM

- SALENAS WAS A TECHNOCRAT, but created political conditions – like solidarity pacts – that made him successful; he was like Menem in his success

o 88-94 – further liberalized/privatizedo Ended the encido system that Cardenas had done in the 30s with land reform LAND COULD

BE FREELY BOUGHT AND SOLD

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- NAFTA GRANTED MEXICO PRIV ACCESS TO US MARKETS AND LOCKED MEXICO INTO NEOLIBERALISM

o NEOLIB was written into the government and international policyo Inflation fell, economy grew o Reforms were also successful politically – salinas’s successor won a rel. clean pres electiono Cardenas finished in 3rd

MEXICO WAS LIBERALIZATION WITHIN A SEMI-AUTHORITARIAN REGIME

PERU- reforms carried out by some guy who was from outside- HE LED A COUP in 92- 1990: APRA’s POPULIST EXPERIMENT HAD FAILED, leaving inflation and economic crisis, and

INSURGENCE OF THE RIGHT BEHIND JOSA (novelist, but terrible politician)o Stupid enough to openly campaign on a neoliberal platform, said that Peruvians should prepare

themselves for shock therapyo ALTERNATIVE WAS FUGIMORE

He was vague in his plans but claimed he’d avoid the the shock – ANTISHOCK CAN-DIDATE

- PROBLEMS IN OFFICE – inherited inflationary economy cut off from international lendingo Had no alternatives but SHOCK THERAPY

- ORTHODOX SHOCK PROGRAM CALLED THE FUJI SHOCK PROGRAMo Steep price increaseso Economic minister was scared

- STEEP NEOLIBERAL REFORMS- PROBLEMS:

o Had NO MAJORITY IN CONGRESS o Allen GARCIA EMERGED AS HIS OPPONENT o HE TRIED TO RULE BY DECREE BUT THIS WORSENED HIS CONFLICT HE

CLOSED CONGRESS!! Sent Garcia into exileo Ruled by decree until 95 when new elections happenedo THIS WAS WHEN HE CONSOLIDATED HIS AUTHORITARIAN REFORMS 92-95

- 93-97 – economy grew; 95 – FUJIMORE WON REELECTION- He made effective use of social p rograms targeting the poor – DID NATIONAL COMPENSATION

AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT FUND – investing money in schools, housing, infrastructure for poor-est of PERU

- Used privately raised revenues to increase social spending – this was rare among neolib reformers, this boosted his popularity

- Finally, HE DID THIS UNDER AUTHORITARIANISM – no congress, no labor, no constitution – made his life easier

PERUVIAN ROAD TO REFORM WAS AUTHORITARIAN – F had no ties to labor, no majority in congress, led a coup and ruled without congress; he never built a political coalition that was storng enough to carry our neolib reforms within a democracy, he needed a military

Politics of his rule in a couple of weeks

VENEZUELA AND BRAZIL – FAILED NEOLIBERALISM

VENEZUELA - shouldn’t the AD have been able to do NIXON-CHINA? Perez tried

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o he spent money, everything was subsidized in the 70so Ven economy slumped in the 80so Perez made a comeback in 88 b/c he was associated with the old days of the oil boom, he was

popular and won the 88 electiono AD also had a majority in congress – he was in Menem’s position; did SAME ABOUT FACE –

THE GREAT TURNAROUND – as Menez- NEOLIBERAL REFORMS – BIG PACKAGE

o Spending cuts, eliminated price controlo PEREZ DIDN’T GET AWAY WITH IT – MASS RIOTS BROKE OUT

- GOV DECLARED STATE OF EMERGENCY B?C OF RIOTS – Perez never recovered, AD turned against him and blocked his reforms

- Although eeconomy recovered in 90-91, public opposition to neolib soared - Rebellion failed, but CHAVEZ WAS HERO AMONG POOR – coup- Perez was impeached in 93; failed miserably- 93 election – COPEI LEADER CALDERA WAS ELECTED ON ANTINEOLIB PLATFORM – he

moved in a populist direction initially, but was FORCED TO DO NEOLIBERALISM in 96 – orthodox austerity program; highly unpopular

- 98 – CHAVEZ ELECTED AS ANTINEOLIB – moved economy back

Why did NEOLIB fail in VENEZUELA? Diff from Argn and Peru- never had hyperinflation, never had terrible status quo- HAD OIL – Venezuelans though the country couldn’t be all that poor - They never thought extreme reform was that necessary, so no ven politican was able to mobilize people

for neoliberalism; the antineolib candidates always won

BRAZIL- highly fragmented party system, brazilian politicians operate largely on pork barrel politics – presidents

have to deliver things like jobs to their consitutents- politics are complicated – lots of negotiation; messiness and size and fragmentation of Brazilian political

process makes sudden change like other nations very difficult- de Mello attempted radical reform in the early 90s and failed

o he was out of nowhere and made his own party; he had few than 10% of seats in congress o both labor and left were in opposition to Coller; he inherited a deep economic crisis and inflation

LAUNCHED MOST DRASTIC ANTIINFLATION PLAN BRAZIL HAD EVER SEEN - like Menem and fujimore he tried to do things in one sweep, but this got him into trouble

o much of economic process was stalled in congresso trade liberalization and deregulation were achieved, but the reforms didn’t really improve the

economy o whereas Menem and F saw their popularity soar, Coller’s popularity fell; congress was at war

with Coller, like in Peruo CONGRESS WON THE WAR AGAINST COLLER – he was impeached

His experiment failed- FRANCO TOOK OVER – inept populist- Inflation went back up; appointed CARDOSO AS FINANCE MINISTER – he was good

o New currency pegged to the dollaro Brought inflation down from 50% a month downt o 2% per month in 94; month of elections

CARDOSO RAN - 94 elections: CARDOSO VS LULA – inflation down, and Cardoso got more popular, so he was elected

o Stabilizing the economy helped him win o He won again in 98

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- btwn 94-2002 Cardoso moved towards reform; he was one of few social scientists who was also a good politician; needed leg support

o he lacked a majority in congress, so he built a center-right coalition; maintaining a 3-party coali-tion was a messy process requiring constant bargaining, lots of pork – but gave him a STABLE MAJORITY IN CONGRESS

o RATHER THAN IGNORING CONGRESS, HE WORKED WITH THEM AND BACKED DOWN ON SOME REFORMS

Failed to fix pension, tax system, didn’t cut gov’t spending, privatization bills were buried in congress

Hardly a sweeping set of neolib reforms, but he did achieve som important success- Cardoso continued gradual trade liberalization and opening to foreign investment, and privatization

o Privatized mining, telecommunicationso Fixed state bureaucracy

In contrast to Coller’s attempt to rule by decree, Cardoso muddled through negotiations with congress within his 3 party alliance; no sweeping reforms, Brazil is STILL not neoliberal; state still plays a role in economy

Muddling through is at least democratic; Cardoso strengthened democracy and maintained a broad coalition behind reform

DEMOCRACY AND MARKET REFORM- 90s were a decade where Las simultaneously accepted democracy AND opened markets – it’s not really

like that- In some places, Dem was sacrifieced for neolib reform, while in others, dem prevented radical reform- Only Argentina combined democracy and radical reform – no happy ending there either

How has LA faired under NEOLIB? Mixed record- Inflation: neolib succeeded in bringing it down - Econ Growth: 90s better than 80s; less than in previous decades

o In 60s/70s – heyday of ISI – LA averaged higher growth rateo Outside Chile, growth has been modest

- Social conditions: Poverty is worse than it has been in the past - Inequality: worse from 80s 90s; got a little better in Mexico- Beginning in 97, things in LA got worse – NO GROWTH FOR 5 YEARS

o Mexico and Chile barely grewo Brazil – 0 growtho Arg, Peru, and Brazil – NEGATIVE GRWOTHo PCGDP down – another lost half-decadeo Poverty, inequality, unemployment went down PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NEOLIB went

down o Barometer survey showed that in 98, LAs thought state should lead economy; only Chileans

thought differently

DRAMATIC COLLAPSE IN ARGENTINA- had been one of the leading economy reformers- 99 – Conservative Heritage Foundation said Argentina was tied with Chile for best economic policy - 98 – foreign investors pulled out after ASIAN financial crisis – RECESSION- MENEM LOST PRESIDENCY TO ALLIANCE FOR JOBS, JUSTICE, AND EDUCATION (De La

RUA of radical civic union)- Argentina’s opposition had moved right – Rua accepted privatization and tradie liberalization, and tried

to maintain convertability, but this would be a big problem for this government - CONVERTABILITY PEGGED ARGENTINE PESO TO US DOLLAR

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o Gov could onlyu print as much money as it had dollars in the central banko Gov couldn’t devalue the currency o exchange rate and mone policy out of gov hands; to foreign investors this was good

- in the early 90s, it worked, investment poured in, but it was a straightjacket- impossible to change it – b/c it had succeeded in ending hyperinflation, almost all argentines supported

it, so no politician would publicly oppose it taboo to oppose convertability - RUA INHERITED FIXED EXCHANGE RATE – seriousp roblem

o This is ok as long as economy is growing, but when economy is in recession – problemo EXTERNAL SHOCKS:

ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS – investors pulled out US dollar strengthened – PESO BECAME OVERVALUED – ARGENTINE EX-

PORTS BECAME LESS COMPETITIVE BRAZIL DECIDED TO DEVALUE ITS CURRENCY – ARGENTINE EXPORTS

GOT 30% more expensive than BRAZILS EXPORTS – major blow to Argentine ex-ports

- these threw argentina into huge recession- ARGENTINA’S FOREIGN DEBT DOUBLED UNDER MENEM, and INTEREST RATES WERE

RISING- RECESSION, HUGE DEBT, RISING INTEREST RATES ????- MOST GOVERNMENTS COULD:

o DEVALUE CURRENCY – Brazi ldid it; Arg couldn’t do thiso Monetary Expansion – the US Fed can lower interest rates to increase money supply; Argentina

couldn’t do thiso Fiscal Expansion – increasing gov’t spending to boost economy; IMF and Int’l Bond Holders

opposed deficit spending; they were attached to fiscal restraint; bond holders saw this as a sign that argentina couldn’t pay its debt and bonds would go sour

Keynesian countercyclical policices were ruled out- Rua was screwed – no tools to combat recession- IMF SAID CUT SPENDING – but this would only deepen recession, so Rua couldn’t do this; he had

few options other than to do this though HE CUT SPENDING o 7 austerity measures launched DEEPENED THE RECESSIONo Argentina’s economy remained stagnant from 99-2000s

- CAVALLO APPOINTED ECONOMIC ADVISOR – but he refused to do it; he tried to solve the crisis without abandoning convertability

o Launched HUGE AUSTERITY PACKAGE – zero deficit policy o Cut pensions and public sector salarieso ARGENTINES WERE FURIOUS; alliance crushed in 2001 elections; Rua never recovered

major disaster lay ahead, so MONEY FLEW OUT OF The COUNTRY - Gov turned to US and IMF looking for help like Mexico; Bush said no on grounds of moral hazard- In end of 2001, US and IMF DID NOTHING

o Collapse of banking system – CAVALLO FROZE BANKING – people couldn’ take money outo ARGENTINA EXPLODED IN REVOLT, Rua resigned

- Interim president resigned- Peronist senator Eduardo Devalde – 2002 took over

o US/IMF did not helpo IMF continued to call for spending cutso DEVALDE ENDED CONVERTABILITY MORE CHAOS, prices up, real incomes down,

economy ground to a halt; contracts broken, no economic exchangeo Argentina fell into depression

How did things get this bad???

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- consequence of neoliberalism, others say argentina didn’t reform enough (remained corrupt and irre-sponsible) THESE ARE BOTH WRONG

- ARGENTINE COLLAPSE WAS BECAUSE OF:o Series of external shocks like Asia crisiso Convertability o Crisis occurred at a time when US and IMF were particularly averse to bailouts

NEOLIBERALISM’S MIXED SUCCESS?- neoliberalism itself;but what was the alternative? Sticking with ISI sucked

- others say they didn’t reform enough, but these were pretty radical reforms- others argue that free market reforms need to be accompanied by SECOND STAGE REFORMS

o strengthening legal system, lowering corruption, promoting educationo capitalism requires more than free markets so that property rights, etc can be protected; capitalist

growth doesn’t just happen in a vacuum – it needs an effective stateo EFFECTIVE STATES ARE NOT EASY TO COME BY – nobody knows how to make effec-

tive lega/tax/civil service systemso In Europe it took bloodshed and wars – it will take decades in LA

How free market economies will bear the absence of a strong institution system – not well?

- when yhou open economies they become more vulnerable to GLOBAL ECONOMY o investors putting money in – goodo 97 – 2002 – investors not doing it, bad economy

NEOLIB PERHAPS JUST BRINGS GREATER VOLATILITY

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF NEOLIBERALISM- public opinion is antineoliberalism POLITICAL REBIRTH OF THE LEFT- since 98 – wave of leftwing and populist victories surpassing any other period in history - began with Chavez in 98; Lavez pres of Chile in 2000, Lula in Brazil

(((many left wing victories))) more left candidates in electiosn to come

- not since 60s has politics been this far on the left

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR POLICY?- Centrist/Social-Democratic Path: left wing gov’ts opt towork withint he neolib model; accept privatiza-

tion, maintain conservative fiscal/monetary policy, good relations with US and IMFo Seek to carry out progressive social reforms in health education and poverty alleviationo Far from socialism of Allende/Populism of Garciao HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL – CHILE IS A GOOD EXAMPLE

Chilean socialists stayed inside Pinochet’s Neoliberal model, but they invested in using social policy to make the neolib model more equitable “GROWTH OF EQUITY” – Chilean economy grew, so they had the resources to go about doing this Emphasis on health and education Launched several new programs aimed at combating poverty and were pretty successful – poverty fell; nearly 2 million people lifted out of poverty

Lula in Brazil adopted a similar Centrist policy – he inherited massive debt, jittery bond markets; lacked majority in congress so in order to govern he had to built a coalition with center/center right politics

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Lula’s predecessor had been conservativeLula was conservative; maintained fiscal surpluss; at first had little growth but was able to invest recently in social programs

Venezuela – Chavez went on a different path; ASSAULTED NEOLIB reforms; torn up oil contracts, seized land/factories/mines/oil fields turned over properties to state-sponsored cooperatives

Moving private stuff to public sectorExpanding state’s role in economy Forcing banks to loan to poor; state owned companies and supermarketsChavez invested in social programs for the poorALL FINANCED THROUGH OIL REVENUES

Questionable as to whether this is sustainable – but for now Chavez is a hero/model on the left, but it’s doubtful that Chavez’s socialism can be replicated b/c Chavez has mad resources

Washington Consensus has broken down in LA, but no viable alternative model has emerged – without oil, the free market model is the only game in town in LA right now

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WEEK 11POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE I

Contents:

● Summary of week 11’s lectures● Thorough lecture notes for April 10 and April 12● IDs from week 11 (IDs that are also on the list of exam IDs are in bold) ● Brief summaries of readings

1. Summary of Lectures

Presidentialism is a problem in multi-party systems where the president’s party has only 20% representation in congress. In countries with fragmented congresses and weak political party systems, presidentialism can lead to chaos, coups, and rule by decree. Only 4 presidentialist countries have survived without coups for more than 41 years: the U.S., Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela. All had 2-party systems. No multi-party presidentialist system has lasted longer than 41 years. Chile from 1932-73 holds the record.

The election of neopopulist political outsiders is a problem because they often have little respect for democratic institutions and are liable to dissolve congress.

Party systems are therefore crucial. Where parties are strong, democracy works better: congress works and the relationship between the president and the legislature is smoother. Where parties are weak, it is more likely that you will see minority presidents, outsider candidates, and deadlock between the president and congress. These phenomena increase the risk of democratic crises.

Electoral rules in Latin America encourage the emergence of many weak parties. Parties are likely to get weaker and multiparty presidentialism is likely to endure. But democracy is not entirely doomed. Impeachment has emerged as a peaceful substitute for coups and presidents have begun to build multiparty coalitions more frequently in order to govern effectively.

Remember, however, that governability and good governance are not the same and are sometimes at odds. Corruption is sometimes the glue that holds things together.

2. Thorough lecture notes

April 10

Institutions I: The Perils of Presidentialism?

The shining achievement of Latin America democracies in the 1980s and 1990s is that they survived despite economic crises.

They have not, however, thrived. They have suffered constitutional crises, premature presidential resignations, and coups. But this has been the most democratic period in Latin American history.

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I. Institutional Crises in Contemporary Latin American Democracies

A. Problems of governability—governments were not able to get things done or maintain order due to:

● Mass protest● No clear majority in congress paralysis and logjams● Presidents forced out of office prematurely

B. Problems of accountability/O’Donnell’s “delegative democracy” Vertical accountability: the accountability of governments to voters Horizontal accountability: the accountability of executives to congress, the judiciary,

and other institutions (checks and balances) Institutions were regularly trampled upon. Many Latin American presidents dissolved supreme courts and stacked them with

allies or bought them off. O’Donnell calls democracies delegative if presidents are only vertically accountable

and are elected or “delegated power” every few years and then become free to rule in whichever way they please almost like dictators. Presidents often rule by decree, change policies abruptly, and rule personalistically. They run messianic electoral campaigns in which they present themselves as saviors of their countries. When they fail, they find themselves utterly unpopular and alone and are often forced out of office.

O’Donnell says Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Peru were delegative democracies at times during the 1980s and 1990s.

Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica were representative democracies. Many Latin American presidents dissolved supreme courts and stacked them with

allies or bought them off. In delegative democracies, presidents do not respond to the peoples’ demands. They are prone to making big mistakes since they make dramatic policy changes

overnight and consult nobody. Presidents circumvent parties and legislative debate. Presidents can abuse power since there is little public oversight. Corruption Authoritarianism Weaken opposition

Important: There is sometimes a conflict between governability and accountability. When presidents do not have control over congress, their policies can be blocked. Sometimes congress wins the battle and removes the president. Sometimes the president wins and shuts down congress. Sometimes the military steps in.

II. Explaining Presidential Crises in Latin Americaa. Cultureo Some people argue that delegative democracy is the result of Latin American respect

for authority and strongman ruleo No word in Spanish for accountabilityo But, while all Latin American countries share that tradition, only some have

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delegative democraciesb. Economic crisiso Presidents circumvent power and rule by decree in times of economic crisis due to

urgencyo Often this concentration of power is widely supportedo Crises lead people to seek out strong leadersc. Institutions

III. A (Re)Introduction to Institutions and Institutionalism

Definition of institutions: The rules of the game; constitutions and legal systems; parties and party systems; electoral systems; congress; judiciary; they determine the parameters of the political game; tax systems redistribute wealth; property rights limit the redistribution of wealth; institutions define the incentives faced by political actors.

Institutionalism came into vogue because institutions changed very drastically in the 1980s and 1990s. Most countries Latin American countries wrote new constitutions. This led political scientists to become more interested in observing how different kinds of institutions affect political behavior. Some focus on institutional design, others on institutional strength.

A. Institutional Design School (dominant)o How the structure of institutions influences incentives

B. Institutional Strength Schoolo Stability and enforcemento Constitutions in Latin America often not respected. Argentina’s constitution said

since the 1950s that judges would have life-long terms; every president since has packed the courts with cronies and purged it of opponents. Peru’s 1993 constitution said that Fujimori could not run for a third term. He did so anyway. He fired judges who opposed him.

o Rules are not institutionalized in Latin America. Institutional design is only part of the story. The problem is getting institutions of any design to take root.

IV. Presidentialism in Latin AmericaMajor differences between Presidential and Parliamentary systems

Presidentialism: Executive and Congress elected separately; for fixed termso All Latin American countries have presidentialist systemso The president is directly elected by the peopleo The congress is also directly elected by a separate voteo There are two distinct elected powers. Neither has primacy over the other; neither can

remove the other. Political scientist Juan Lin calls this “dual legitimacy.” o Fixed presidential terms of 4, 5, or 6 years.Parliamentarism is different o Executive selected by Parliamento No fixed terms. If presidents lose favor at any time during their office, parliament

can remove them through a vote of no confidence.o The government either has a majority or it falls. Parliament is almost never

dominated different party from that represented by the president.

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o Almost all European countries have parliamentary systems.o The U.S. and every Latin American country is presidentialist.

The Presidentialism vs. Parliamentarism debateargues that presidentialism is the wrong way to go for 3 reasons: ● zero sum game / winner-take all system: whoever wins, gets the presidency;

whoever loses risks losing all representation and thus losing his/her stake in the system, which could lead them to overthrow the system

● divided government: encourages the election of minority presidents, presidents who do not have majorities in congress. In the 1990s, Latin America’s presidents’ parties had congressional majorities only 20% of the time. Divided governments are not always bad. They can serve as checks and balances on executive power. In Latin America, however, divided governments have triggered severe institutional crises. Congress and the executive have tried to bring one another down, each representing itself as the more legitimate representative of the people and each blocking the other’s plans. Coups are 5 times more likely under divided government.

● fixed terms: presidents experience wild swings in popularity. Often their approval

ratings fall into single digits. It is then difficult for them to govern because presidents lose credibility. They become lame ducks. This often happens in a president’s 2nd or 3rd year. But presidential terms are 5 or 6 years, so the lame duck effect lasts for 2 or 3 years and government becomes characterized by deadlock and crisis. Many presidents in such situations resigned, were overthrown by the military, were impeached, or committed suicide. In Peru, no minority presidents have ever made it to the end of their terms.

b. The Parliamentary alternative According to Linz, more political parties have a stake in the system because they

have the chance of building up a majority in congress There is never a serious conflict between the congress and the president There is no lame duck effect and no need for a coup because the congress changes

and elects new presidents. Cabinet instability is not the same as regime instability. Congress may change

frequently, but democracy may survive nevertheless. c. The case for Presidentialism6. Mainwaring and Shugart make the case for Presidentialism7. Presidentialism provides a greater degree of vertical accountability. Voters know

who to blame and directly elect presidents. When government consists of many parties, voters don’t know whom to blame.

8. Presidentialism may bring gridlock, but it provides some semblance of checks and balances. Majority parties may gain enormous parliamentary majorities and become tyrannical in parliamentary systems.

9. When presidentialism is fused with a system in which there are one or two strong parties, governance may be quite stable and smooth. In a two-party system, the president may have a majority or a near-majority and may be quite effective at getting policies pushed through.

C. Specific Problems with Latin American Presidentialism

a. Constitutional powers of the president

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o Presidents in Latin America have far more constitutional power than most other countries.

o Constitutions give the executive the power to introduce legislation. Some give the executive sole authority to introduce legislation on some issues, like budgets.sd

o Constitutional authority of presidents is high in Chile and Brazil; less high in Peru; and low in Mexico.

o On paper, Chile should have been the most delegative democracy and Mexico should have been representative. In truth, however, it was the other way round. That is why Levitsky says the design of institutions often didn’t matter in Latin America. Their strength and institutionalization was far more influential. Weldon and Siavelis in the week’s readings explain why you get these different outcomes.

b. Institutional weakness of legislatures and judiciaries Institutions aren’t naturally endowed with authority Congress needs professional legislators They need oversight and investigation procedures They need resources, libraries, committee systems, infrastructure, computer systems,

databases Often in Latin America Congress is filled by incompetent legislators who are

appointed through nepotism When this is the case, nobody is prepared or able to debate the president’s policies In Argentina and Peru, fewer than 1 in 5 legislators is re-elected. In Argentina, the

average legislator serves for 3 years. In Peru and Venezuela, the average is 5 years. This means that legislators don’t have much of a stake in developing effective

institutions They also don’t build up the necessary skills How should this be changed? It will require resources and time. In Latin American countries, congresses have been closed by coups. When congress is in the hands of the opposition, it is more likely to devise means of

oversight. Divided government often strengthens congress. But it seldom lasts long enough to do so.

Legislatures haven’t had the time to develop into powerful bodies. The judiciary is also weak. This may have to do with the rules of appointment. Lifetime tenure security should

lead to judicial independence. Many Latin American countries give judges lifetime tenure on paper, but not in practice. Governments find ways to remove opposition judges. Chavez dissolved the Venezuelan Supreme Court and packed it with allies. Fujimori did the same. This has been going on for centuries. Between 1960 and 2000, U.S. SC judges served an average 13 years. Argentine Supreme Court judges served an average of 4 years; in Mexico 2 years; in Ecuador 1.3 years.

Judges keep on good terms with the government because they fear the will be fired otherwise. The rules preventing judges from being fired are weakly enforced. When presidents become weak, the start backing the candidate they think will be the next winning horse.

A former Bolivian president once said that he put Bolivia’s constitutions in his pockets because nobody rules Bolivia but him.

V. The Re-Election Debate

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Most Latin American countries banned re-election because their most notorious past dictators had themselves re-elected again and again.

There are downsides to banning re-election. It doesn’t give presidents much time to get things done. It causes policy instability, which is associated with poor economic growth. It causes them not to think about the long-term results of their policies. It gives them less of an incentive to govern well. Re-election enhances vertical accountability.

Re-election may not be problem in countries with strong democratic traditions and institutions. In Brazil it worked well. On the other hand, where democratic institutions are weak, re-election may allow for executive abuse of power. Fujimori changed electoral rules so that he could run for a third term and there is speculation that Hugo Chavez will do the same.

VI. Segue to Wednesday: The Problems of Multiparty Presidentialism.

April 12

Parties and Party-Systems

I. Why Parties Matter21. Parties are critical to democracy22. provide clear choices for voters23. organize legislatures24. recruit and socialize people into the political system25. give economic and political actors a stake in the system26. help politicians act collectively27. discipline politicians28. give politicians experience29. prevent the election of inexperienced outsiders who appeal directly to the people and

oppose the whole political system (neopopulists)

II. The Phenomenon of “Neopopulism” A. Neopopulism versus “old” populism: major differences

a. No class bases: appeal to unorganized (often informal) poor, not working classb. Less emphasis on economic redistribution (some are neoliberals)c. Less emphasis on mass mobilization/greater use of television appeals

B. Characteristics of neopopulisma. Outsiders (Menem, Fujimori, Chavez)b. Anti-political establishmentc. Personalistic appeals—not ideological or programmatic (Menem’s slogan: “Follow me”)d. Popular among the poor, especially the informal sectorse. Don’t like political parties. Prefer direct relationships with voters. Sometimes they have

disorganized, personalistic parties. Fujimori created and destroyed 4 parties. He just created a 5th.

C. Why outsider politics is (arguably) bad for democracya. Democracies need party politicians who have experience, know how to negotiate and share

power, and respect democratic institutions because they are the source of their careers.

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III. Party Systems in Latin AmericaA. Comparing Party Systems

By Number: 1. Two party systems (U.S., Honduras) 2. Moderate multiparty systems (Chile, Uruguay)3. Extreme multiparty systems (Brazil, Peru, Ecuador)

By Institutionalization1. Institutionalized Party Systems: Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay (Mexico maybe too)

1. Parties have deep roots in society2. They have existed for many years 3. They are seen as fixtures in society4. Voters have strong party identities5. Identities are passed down through generations6. Electoral results are relatively stable

2. Inchoate Party Systems: Brazil, Peru, Ecuador1. Lack clear programs and principles2. Short-lived3. Personalistic4. Few people have strong party 5. High levels of electoral volatility: drastic changes in party strength and

popularity6. Parties sometimes invented anew at every election

There is a strong relationship between party institutionalization and problems of governability and democracy. Delegative democracy, attempts to close down congress, premature presidential resignations: all are more likely in inchoate party systems. These problems are rarely seen in countries with strong, institutionalized party systems.

How do you get to a strong party system?

B. Explaining Party System Size and Strength

1. Institutional approachi. Electoral systems: plurality versus proportional representation

a. Plurality systems: one member of congress may be elected from each district. Usually, this happens when electoral districts are small. In plurality systems, you have to win to be elected. You are much more likely to know individual candidates.

i. Reduce the number of parties. The correlation between plurality systems and two or three party systems was first observed by French political scientist, Maurice Duverger and is called Duverger’s Law.

ii. How does this work? The only parties that win seats are those that come first in their districts. Therefore, outsiders have little chance of election, so they join the bigger, more established parties. Plurality systems result in the marginalization of small parties and the survival of two or three big parties.

iii. Pros: fewer, stronger parties; more effective congress; legislators are more accountable to their districts.

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iv. Cons: exclude small parties and create many losers who then sabotage the whole system; allows for representation based on principle rather than on individuals and the interests of individual districts; major parties often moderate, converge, and become indistinguishable; low level of ideological representation.

b. Proportional representation: parties are given representation in congress according to the percentage of the vote they win. Parties choose congress members. Usually, this happens when districts are larger. Parties create lists of candidates. Barrier to entry to congress is much lower.

i. Encourage the emergence of small parties. ii. How does this work? Even if parties only get 2% of the vote, their

members can become members of congress and may even enter governing coalition. Fragmented party systems are the most likely outcome.

iii. Cons: voters cannot hold individual candidates accountable; too many parties.

c. Some electoral rules and their effects on the number of partiesi. Some countries deal with the problem of fragmented party

systems by enforcing rules that state that parties can only enter congress with 4% or 5% of the vote. This creates moderate multi-party systems. Peru just passed such a vote and cut the number of parties in half.

ii. If the presidential race is held at the same time as the congressional race, plurality systems are less likely to result in the election of minority candidates. Concurrent elections influence one another and cause the same party to be elected.

iii. A majority runoff system: if no presidential candidate has 50%+ of the vote, then there is a runoff between the two top candidates. This rule leads to the proliferation of parties because candidates from small parties think they may be able to make it to the second round.

d. Resultsi. It is therefore not surprising that countries like Peru, Brazil, and

Ecuador have fragmented party systems. They have runoff systems, elections at different times, proportional representation, and no minimum threshold.

ii. Why don’t they change?iii. A problem of institutional change is that the people with the

power to change the rules are always the ones who have benefited from the rules.

iv. But even if parties change their electoral rules, this may not be enough. Electoral systems are not the whole story. Other countries with the same rules have 2 or 3 party systems.

e. Structuralist Alternative: party systems as rooted in historical conflict.i. Strong and enduring parties emerged out of major conflicts like

civil wars years ago, intense mobilization, or repression. They have strong identities. Most Peronists cannot imagine voting for other parties. They are unwaveringly loyal.

f. The situation now

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i. We don’t know how to create strong partiesii. There is evidence that established parties are declining and voter

loyalties are eroding. New parties have failed to take root.iii. AD and COPEI both collapsed.

IV. The Contemporary Crisis of Party Systems in Latin AmericaA. Causes

a. The economic crisis—established parties have ruled during times of great economic crisis. They have thus lost credibility.

b. Social structural change: the rise of the informal sector has undermined the class bases of traditional labor-based populist parties; the decline of agriculture has eroded the support base of conservative parties.

c. The rise of media politics. TV: In the past, politicians needed organizations to reach voters. Now, candidates do not need organizations. They can reach millions over the TV. Brazilian president Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-2) is an example of a TV politician. He doubled his standing in the polls with one TV appearance because he was a soccer club boss and was very good looking.

B. Effects: unstable, media based parties; fragmented party systems; electoral volatility; weaker parties and less stable party systems than seen in the past; Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, Peru all have multi-party presidentialism which leads to delegative democracy and democratic crises. Are they doomed?

VI. Democracy is not doomed. How has multiparty presidentialism adapted and what are the effects of each adaptation?

A. Impeachment: legislatures in some countries impeach presidents who cannot govern; imperfect system but peaceful substitute for coup

B. Coalition-Building (Brazil, Uruguay): several presidents how have not had majorities in congress have recently forged multiparty coalitions; presidents have learned that they need these coalitions in order to govern effectively; this will be critical to governability in the years to come

C. Governability versus “Good Governance”: do not confuse the two. Governability = getting things done. Good governance = clean governance. The two are sometimes mutually exclusive. Coalition building usually involves dispensing cash, jobs, bribes, and perks. Corruption is sometimes critical to governability in Latin American.

3. IDs

Vertical and horizontal accountability:Vertical accountability: the accountability of governments to votersHorizontal accountability: the accountability of executives to congress, the judiciary, and other institutions (checks and balances)

Delegative democracy: O’Donnell calls democracies delegative if presidents are only vertically accountable and are elected or “delegated power” every few years and then become free to rule in whichever way they please almost like dictators. Presidents often rule by decree, change policies abruptly, and rule personalistically. They run messianic electoral campaigns in which they present themselves as saviors of their countries. When they fail, they find themselves utterly unpopular and alone and are often forced out of office.O’Donnell says Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Peru were delegative democracies at times during the 1980s and 1990s.

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Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica were representative democracies.

Juan Linz: Professor of Political Science at Yale best known for his theories on authoritarian systems of government. He is the author of Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes and wrote an essay called “The Perils of Presidentialism.” He believes that the problem with democracy in Latin America is the presidential system.

Parliamentarism versus presidentialism:

Presidentialism Executive and Congress elected separately for fixed terms All Latin American countries have presidentialist systems The president is directly elected by the people The congress is also directly elected by a separate vote There are two distinct elected powers. Neither has primacy over the other; neither can remove the other.

Political scientist Juan Lin calls this “dual legitimacy.” Fixed presidential terms of 4, 5, or 6 years.Parliamentarism Executive selected by Parliament No fixed terms. If presidents lose favor at any time during their office, parliament can remove them

through a vote of no confidence. The government either has a majority or it falls. Parliament is almost never dominated different

party from that represented by the president. Almost all European countries have parliamentary systems. The U.S. and every Latin American country is presidentialist.

Multiparty presidentialism: Presidentialist systems in which there are many small parties and the president’s party is only likely to have a small percentage of representation in parliament. This leads to gridlock. In such cases, democratic crises are likely. Presidents dissolve parliament, parliament removes the president, or the military takes over both.

Neopopulism: Government by personalist outsiders (Menem, Fujimori, Chavez) Anti-political establishment Personalistic appeals—not ideological or programmatic (Menem’s slogan: “Follow me”) Popular among the poor, especially the informal sectors Don’t like political parties. Prefer direct relationships with voters. Sometimes they have

disorganized, personalistic parties. Fujimori created and destroyed 4 parties. He just created a 5th. Different from old populism No class bases: appeal to unorganized (often informal) poor, not working class Less emphasis on economic redistribution (some are neoliberals) Less emphasis on mass mobilization/greater use of television appeals

Institutionalized versus Inchoate Party Systems:

Institutionalized Party Systems: Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay (Mexico maybe too) Parties have deep roots in society They have existed for many years They are seen as fixtures in society

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Voters have strong party identities Identities are passed down through generations Electoral results are relatively stable Inchoate Party Systems: Brazil, Peru, Ecuador Lack clear programs and principles Short-lived Personalistic Few people have strong party High levels of electoral volatility: drastic changes in party strength and popularity Parties sometimes invented anew at every election

Electoral volatility:Drastic and frequent changes in party strength and popularity.

Plurality versus proportional representation (PR) electoral systems:Plurality systems: one member of congress may be elected from each district. Usually, this happens when electoral districts are small. In plurality systems, you have to win to be elected. Voters are much more likely to know individual candidates. Proportional representation: parties are given representation in congress according to the percentage of the vote they win. Parties choose congress members. Usually, this happens when districts are larger. Parties create lists of candidates. Barrier to entry to congress is much lower. Small parties still get representation.

District Magnitude: The size of a district in a plurality system from which one member of congress is elected.

Duverger’s Law: The relationships between plurality systems and two or three party systems was first observed by French political scientist, Maurice Duverger and is called Duverger’s Law. Plurality systems tend to create fewer, stronger parties since there are weak incentives for small parties to run in a winner-take-all system.

4. Summaries of Readings

- Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy”

Defines delegative democracies (DD) DDs are not as developed as representative democracies (RD) or polyarchy But also not quite caudillismo, or populism Describes the impact of institutions as Levitsky did in lecture DDs emerge from economic crisis because parties lose credibility and people seek strong leaders Under DD, judiciary and other institutions decline

- Arturo Valenzuela, “Latin American Presidencies Interrupted.”

5. 1980s and 1990s are an age of Latin America democratization6. But democracy remains flawed and unpopular7. Examples of democratic crises and failed presidencies: coups, interrupted presidencies, and

premature presidential resignations

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8. Democracy has been established but not consolidated9. Says presidentialism may be the cause of failed presidencies because it is conflict-prone10. Argues that presidentialism should be replaced by parliamentarism11. Says that if presidentialism is not replaced, it should at least be improved through, for example,

concurrent elections

- Mathew Soberg Shugart and Scott Mainwaring: “Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate”

Defines presidential democracy The case against presidentialism is overstated Present the case for presidentialism Presidentialism exists in Latin America Parliamentarism exists in Europe If parliamentarism has been more successful than presidentialism, it may have nothing to do with the

systems themselves parliamentarism would not fare better in Latin America Under presidentialism there is more vertical accountability Checks and balances. Executive abuse of power constrained by congress Majority parties may gain enormous parliamentary majorities and become tyrannical in

parliamentary systems. When presidentialism is fused with a system in which there are one or two strong parties,

governance may be quite stable and smooth. In a two-party system, the president may have a majority or a near-majority and may be quite effective at getting policies pushed through.

- Scott Mainwaring, “Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: the Difficult Combination”

Argues that the combination of presidentialism and multipartism makes democracy difficult to sustain (for the reasons laid out in lecture)

Institutional combinations are important Multiparty systems make democracy less stable in presidentialist systems They can go together if institutional design encourages compromise Among these are concurrent elections and minimum thresholds for party entry into congress A change to parliamentary systems would be beneficial in many countries

- John Carey, “Presidentialism and Representative Institutions”

Presidential systems are doing better now than before but still are still problematic. Examples of democratic crises But some improvements through institutional reform Multiparty coalitions improve stability Primary elections for presidential candidates strengthen vertical accountability Removal of prohibitions on re-election would be beneficial Of course, it is not political scientists but rather politicians who must engineer institutional reforms

- Peter M. Siavelis, “Executive-Legislative Relations in Post-Pinochet Chile: A Preliminary Assessment”

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The Chilean presidency has extensive constitutional powers For the moment, however, the Chilean democracy is not as delegative a democracy as it seems on

paper The success of the current and preceding governments make institutional reform seem less urgent It is not permanent Electoral reform, strengthening Congress and limiting executive authority are necessary A parliamentary system may be more appropriate

- Jeffrey Weldon, “Political Sources of Presidencialismo in Mexico”

In Mexico, the president has limited constitutional powers and the division between powers is supposed to be guaranteed

Yet Mexican society is presidentialist and authoritarian and the party often centralizes power in the party leadership or presidency

Presidentialism in Mexico depends on presidential powers, PRI hegemony in Congress, party discipline, the link between ruling party and president.

Zedillo was president without being head of the PRI. He was perceived as weak and Salinas still controlled the party.

- Maxwell A. Cameron, "Political and Economic Origins of Regime Change in Peru: The Eighteenth Brumaire of Alberto Fujimori"

Growth of informal economy caused party fragmentation Why did Fujimori conduct his autogolpe (self-coup or dissolution of congress) and then change the

constitution to allow for his re-election? Had contempt for judiciary, Congress, and parties Feared threat of military officer interference Wanted to remain in power longer Had little direct control over legislature Political parties lost credibility and popularity, so Fujimori could gain near-absolute power

- Bolívar Lamounier, “Brazil: An Assessment of the Cardoso Administration”

Brazil needs institutional reform Why? Weak party system, many parties, poor executive-legislative relations, low levels of

accountability. But reform has stalled because it didn’t seem urgent while Cardoso was governing relatively well

(economic stabilization; inflation ) and when Collor was peacefully impeached.

- Michael Coppedge, “Venezuela: Popular Sovereignty versus Liberal Democracy”

In the 1970s and 80s Venezuela suffered a series of democratic crises and a crisis of governability that culminated in Chavez’s introduction of an illiberal and ungovernable regime

Not completely doomed: opposition parties have some influence and press is sometimes critical Chavez’s government controls all three branches of power and many other institutions and

organizations—full authoritarianism cannot be ruled off the cards He might be more dangerous to democratic institutions if he loses popularity—he might cling to

power or attempt a coup if he loses support

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- Steven Levitsky, “Argentina: From Crisis to Consolidation (and Back)”

Argentine democracy is eroding despite its fairly strong foundation Economic crisis, U.S. disinterest, potential for mass mobilization: all threaten democracy IMF and U.S. should have prevented economic crisis and protected democratic institutions Now, external assistance is necessary. Without international assistance Argentine democratic

institutions will collapse. Levitsky proposes bailout that props up democratic institutions at the expense of economic

orthodoxy Argentine democratic institutions have been built up over 20 years and should not be allowed to

fall apart.

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WEEK 12 STUDY GUIDEReadings:

Mainwaring/Scully: “Party Systems in Latin America”Weyland: “Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America”Carey: “Institutional Design and Party Systems”Levistky/Cameron: “Democracy without Parties?”Coppedge: “Strong Parties and Lame Ducks”Roberts: “Social Polarization and the Populist Resurgence in Venezuela”Snyder/Samuels: “Devlauing the Vote in Latin America”Munck/Bosworth: “Patterns of Representation and Competition” [Chile]Dresser: “Mexico: From PRI Predominance to Divided Democracy”

Terms to KnowMario Vargas Llosa/Democratic Front (FREDEMO) – MVL = Peruivan novelist who tried to run for president – neoliberal platform = very unpopularVladimiro Montesinos – political mastermind behind Alberto FujimoriJavier Pérez de Cuellar/Union for Peru.The Law of Authentic Interpretation – Fujimori’s way of circumventing his 1993 Constitution: he was elected before the constitution, so he could run for re-election despite the term limitsAlejandro Toledo – winner of 2000 election against Fujimori; less authoritarian but still a personalistic outsider; presidency = disaster – example of difficulty in rebuilding parties in post-Fujimori eraLourdes Flores – ran for Peruvian president in 2006Ollanta Humala - now in runoff against Alan Garcia in Peruvian 2006 elections – shows bleak prospects

for party system rebuildingHugo Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement (MRB-200)Irene Saez – former Miss Universe, ran against Chavez in 1998, but lost momentum, didn’t make it to runoffHenrique Salas Romer – made it to runoff against Chavez in 1998, AD and COPEI threw support to him,

but Chavez won in a landslide – shows complete breakdown of party systemFifth Republic Movement/Patriotic PoleFrancisco Arias CalderonVenezuelan Workers Confederation (CTV) and Fedecámaras – premier labor union, subordinate to ADBolivarian CirclesDemocratic Coordinator and SumátePedro Carmona – represents opposition to Chavez – not favored to win

Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully. “Party Systems in Latin America.”

5 arguments:● Parties channel political participation/express interests, are crucial actors in democratic process.

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● Institutionalization of competitive party systems = the critical difference among LA party systems.

4 conditions for institutionalization■stability in rule/nature of interparty competition■major parties must have stable roots in society

● parties consistent in relative ideological positions■major political actors accord legitimacy to the electoral process/parties■party organizations established, not subordinated to leaders/personalism

● Differences in degrees of institutionalization among LA party systems Venezeula, Costa Rica, Chile, Argentina? = institutionalized

■Low electoral volatility, low difference btwn presidential and legislative votes, strong connection of interest groups to party system

■Argentina = not clear-cut; Peronism = strong, other party linkages have eroded Peru, Bolivia, Brazil = inchoate, not institutionalized

■Peru = breakdown of party attachment; Brazil = attachment never there; both = weak linkages btwn parties and social orgs

■Easier for populists to take overrules of game more easily violated (Sarney, Garcia, Fujimori)

Mexico, Paraguay = hegemonic party systems in transition■Attachment to parties, but partly due to authoritarian order, party dominated

social organizations● Institutionalizing a party systems is important to the process of democratic consolidation

Fosters legitimacy, respect for rules of game, etc. ● In presidential systems, institutionalization occurs in the absence of extreme

multipartyism/ideological fragmentation

Kurt Weyland. “Neopopulism and Neoliberalism n Latin America: Unexpected Affinities.”

Menem (Argentina), Collor (Brazil) and Fujimori (Peru) = examples of neopopulism coexisting with neoliberalism

If populism is defined as a purely political concept, then it can co-exist, even ally with, neoliberalism, especially in countries reeling from hyperinflation

Hisory of neopopulist neoliberalism1. Alan Garcia (Peru) – first neopopulist—appealed to informal sectors, pursued heterodox

economic policies hyperinflation2. Same story for Sarney in Brazil (Cruzado Plan) – herterox measures weren’t disciplined

enough to improve economy

3. New wave of neopopulists used their power to effect neoliberal economic change – Menem, Collor, Fujimori

1. Rose to power through appealing to masses, informal sector, via TV, etc. 1. Once in office, pressured by external institutions, economic crisis, and

used economic hardship to political advantage to institute reforms

Affinities between Neopopulism and Neoliberalism1. Both appeal to masses – neopopulists reach out to the marginalized, neoliberals to those

who they think will eventually benefit from their system2. Both don’t like most special interest groups, middle, working and business classes

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1. Neopopulists: those groups are the beneficiaries of current system2. Neoliberals: those groups are market-distorting rent seekers

3. Both see political class as enemy to mass representation (neopopulists) and economic efficiency (neoliberals)

4. Both employ similar political strategies, autocratic methods of policy representation (top-down approach)

5. Distribution of costs and benefits: costs hit working and middle classes the worst, end of hyperinflation most favorable to poor and informal classes

1. Targeted benefits: neopopulist neoliberals create social programs to benefit poor –fulfill both populist and neoliberal goals

*caveat: neopopulism and neoliberalism ARE often divergent; usually only come together in times of great economic crisis

John M. Carey: “Institutional Design and Party Systems”

Thesis: party label not the only indicator of political behavior – insititutional design also matters Institutional design impacts regime support and governability

1. Regime support can be undermined if rules prevent large numbers of people from expressing their opinions

2. Governability undermined when rules of competition create parties that are unable to collaborate/form coalitions and produce viable policies

3. Also affects internal cohesiveness of parties themselves Electoral systems: district magnitude = most important in affecting disproportionality,

distribution of seats1. Smaller district magnitudes higher disproportionality2. Quotas, thresholds also important

Executive electoral formulas1. Two types: plurality and majority runoff2. MRO encourages more candidates than does plurality greater 1st round fragmentation

also affects legislative elections, as spillover of political momentum1. MRO, instead of encouraging election of president w/ true popular mandate,

usually creates more divisiveness, less incentive for coalitions, b/c of fragmentation

3. Some systems combine the two: can automatically win in the first round w/ a 40, 45% vote share – majority not required encourages initial coalition building

Electoral Cycle1. Concurrency of presidential and legislative elections increased salience of executive

electoral formulas b/c of spillover 1. Fragmentation lowest under plurality executive electoral formula/concurrent

elections2. Fragmentation highest under MRO runoff/concurrent elections3. When elections are asynchronous, institutional design less of a factor

2. Increased party representation of winning president’s party in concurrent elections – voters vote for president + party

3. Asynchronous elections shape executive-legislative elections—more likely to be tense Politicians and Parties

1. Some institutional arrangements encourage legislators to promote personalism, while others, collectivism

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1. Regime type and election rules that determine degree of personalism1. Degree of control that party leaders exercizeexercise over use of the party

label (more control = less personalism)2. Number and type of votes citizens cast in any given election (closed party

lists = less personalism)3. Degree to which votes cast for a given candidate from a party contribute

to the party’s electoral fortunes (pooled votes = less personalism)4. District magnitude and intraparty competition

1. No intraparty competition: higher magnitude in closed PR systems = less personalism

2. Intraparty competition: lower magnitude = less personalism2. Mixed systems – single member districts w/ PR: depends on strength of party

leadership

Steven Levitsky and Maxwell Cameron. “Democracy without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori’s Peru.”

Abstract: “Political parties are critical to Latin American democracy. This was demonstrated in Peru, where an atomized, candidate-centered party system developed after Alberto Fujimori’s 1992 presidential self-coup. Party system decomposition weakened the democratic opposition against an increasingly authoritarian regime. Since the regime collapsed in 2000, prospects for party rebuilding have been mixed. Structural changes, such as the growth of the informal sector and the spread of mass media technologies, have weakened politicians’ incentive ot build parties. Although these changes did not cause the collapse of the party system, they may inhibit its reconstruction.”

1990s = decomposition of Peruvian party system – candidate-centered parties that lasted for little over an election cycle, 1992 autogolpe

party decomposition ultimately a product of publicly condoned autogolpe, w/ help from structural crisis of 1980s politicians realized that public was did not have faith in formal institutions

Even though there was public support for autogolpe, democracy lost out on a formalized opposition with party disintegration – no horizontal accountability

Post-Fujimori Peru: prospects not that bright for rebuilding democracy – structural changes = inhibition

Parties make democracy “workable” and viable for society, contribute to stability, contribute to governability, hold leaders accountable to democratic institutions – provide a framework that checks politicians and executive power, recruit and socialize democratic elites (limit political outsiders), train leaders, facilitate collective democratic action essential to achieving, maintaining and improving the quality of democracy

Democratic Breakdown and Party System Collapse in PeruParty crisis lay in expansion of urban sector, deep economic crisis, brutal insurgency of Shining

PathBreakdown started w/ Ricardo Belmont’s “Obras” movement – was a radio host who was

elected mayor of Lima

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1990 election: top 2 = Mario Vargas Llosa (novelist) and Alberto Fujimori (complete outsider) AF wins

majority runoff system contributed to victoryFujimori – ill-equipped to handle economic crisis and political crisis in a democratic

manner, b/c he was an outsider and lacked Congressional support opted for an autogolpe

Autogolpe = successful and accepted by public b/c of timing: Fujimori had stabilized economy, captured Abimael Guzman of Shining Path

Public did not support la oposicion, weren’t interested in preserving democratic institutions

Most politicians followed AF’s lead and distanced themselves from existing parties, didn’t provide horizontal accountability to Fujimori regime

Fujimori established disposable parties that were candidate-centered vehicles: Cambio 90, Nueva Mayoria, Vamos Vecino, Peru 2000 imitated by many other politicians

Candidates relied on media, not parties, for exposure and votes

Party Weakness, Caesarism and the Failure of the Democratic OppositionLack of meaningful opposition – due to weakness as well as to everyone giving up on partiesGrowing authoritarianism – Law of Authentic Interpretation re-election, removal of independent

judges, overall weakening of horizontal accountabilityFujimori removed judges of the Constitutional Tribunal who voted against the Law of

Authentic Interpretation, blocked a referendum on itOpposition was fractured, could not channel public disapproval of AF’s actions, some

opposition did not want to challenge Fujimori2000 campaign – AF runs again, opposition: how to challenge him? – late 1999: scandal involving

Peru 2000’s forged signatures in applying for party status coverup, nothing done opposition tried to unite, but Alberto Andrade, most influential opposition leader, said

no; failure to act collectively = product of so many independents, party weaknesses Alejandro Toledo emerges from pack, but AF refuses to grant a runoff AT drops out,

AF wins uncontested mass protests, election observers nullify election, but AF survives until video clip of Montesinos, his political mastermind, paying a bribe surfaces in August, 2000 exposure of corruption destroys regime AF resigns interim president, 2001 elections, Toledo beats Garcia (AT = pretty personalistic, relative outsider, no legislative majority problems!)

Prospects for Party Rebuilding in Peru optimists: fall of autocratic regime means that opposition and parties will come backinstitutionalists: changes need to be made: 1st step = multimember districts effects till unclear pessimists: historical background of party breakdown means it will be hard for them to come back –

history is reinforced by structure change = difficultauthors: pretty much take third approach: rebuilding is going to be challenging and it doesn’t seem

successful yet (Toledo presidency = disaster)

Michael Coppedge: “Strong Parties and Lame Ducks.”

Partyarchy = democracy in whcihc political parties monopolize the formal political process and politicize society along party lines

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Parties control all nominations for public office. Electoral laws limit citizen’s choices in an election to a vote for a party. Strong party discipline forces legislators to vote as a party bloc Most existing organizations are deeply penetrated by political parties. The media are either owned and operated by the parties or reproot the views of party

spokepersons. Political rights like suffrage, freedom of speech, formal institutions, etc. still remain. Closest example to a partyarchy = Venezuela

Venezuela:o National Executive Committee of Accion Democratica has power to choose virtually all

of the party’s candidates for the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies CEN ranks candidates submitted by sectional executive committees selects

local and state-level candidates, tooo Voters cast two different kinds of ballots until1989 ballot reform: Venezuelans could

actually vote for individual candidates for governors and mayorso Party discipline = virtually perfect; almost NO ONE strays from the party line on

Congressional voteso Venezuelan political parties have penetrated almost all other private organizations, save

for the church, military and business organizations Why? Political parties “founded in an organizational vacuum” political

parties created their own social organizations, co-opted existing ones or created parallel organizations that drew members away from independent orgs.

o AD also controls CTV (Confederacion de Trabajadores de Venezuela) through veto its Labor Bureau’s veto power, party loyalty by unionists, etc, benefits of being part of AD, etc. labor ultimately can’t do anything more than suggest policies to AD – politicians have final say

o Media: all newspapers have editorial writers who present AD and COPEI views; everything that the parties do = newsworthy, parties promise seats in Congress to publishers in exchange for favorable coverage

o Pros and Cons of Partyarchy Pros: partyarchy promotes stability Cons: stability doesn’t correspond with quality of democracy

channels for ordinary people and diverse concerns are closed off COPEI and AD don’t differ enough b/c of Punto Fijo pact

o Consensus lubricated by oil – but when wealth decreases, problems resurface

Kenneth Roberts. “Social Polarization and the Populist Resurgence in Venezuela.”

Venezuela’s rise of Hugo Chavez also signifies a “repoliticization of social inequality in Venezuela” – deviates from the rest of Latin America, where “party systems have become increasingly detached from underlying structural inequalities”

30. political cleavages moved into greater alignment with social cleavages that progressively deepend as a result of an unresolved economic crisis

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31. Class cleavages had eroded in Venezuela, especially post-1958, as AD moderated, oil increased wealth

-         But during 1980s and 1990s, economy went down, poverty and inequality up, fragmentation of civil cosiety, disillusionment w/ corruption of AD and COPEI, "new unionism" that was anti-CTV, more radical

 -         Most other nations had neoliberalist movements thtat weakened expression of class cleavages

– Venezuela resistant to neoliberalism b/c they thought it was unnecessary considering the amount of oil in the country (ex: Caracazo protests)

 o       1992: Hugo Chavez's coup attempt 1993: president Perez impeached political

system in turmoil Caldera govt = neoliberal, but steadily lost support, Venezuelans abandoning parties throughout 1990s.

o       1998 elections: Chaves vs. Irene Saez IS drops in polls, Romer = runoff candidate, but HC wins in landslide

HC = representative of neopopulist movement in LA? Not very pro-labor, but core constituency = working and lower classes mobilized constituency along class lines

Personalistic style antagonized elites mobilized working and middle classes

Venezuela = "striking example of the enduring vitality of populist formulas in Latin America"

Richard Snyder and David Samuels. “Devaluing the Vote in Latin America.”

High levels of lower-chamber malapportionment (discrepancy between share of legislative seats and share of population held in electoral districts in lower chambers of Congress) troubling practical consequences for LA democracy● Distinct rural and conservative bias in legislatures (overrepresentation)● A tendency toward estrangement between the executive and legislative branches

(national vs. subnational interests)● A growing capacity for subnational political actors to hold national governments hostage on

important policy issues that have regional implications● Proliferation of subnational authoritarian enclaves● general challenge to quality and fairness of democracy

● levels of malapportionment in LA lower chambers = much higher than those of the rest of the world – Argentina has highest, Peru has lowest

low levels of malapportionment in advanced nations indicate that govts have implemented reapportionment measures (US: redistricting)

LA has not implemented such measures

● Malapportionment = formal institutional flaw in LA democracies Has not attracted much attention b/c it’s not as obvious as a way to rig elections Civil rights and free elections does not mean that a democracy is fair

● Strategies for change Judicial oversight of reapportionment

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Electoral reform ■ Reapportionment, single member districts, or mixed electoral system w/ tiers

Gerardo Munck and Jeffery Bosworth. “Patterns of Representation and Competition: Paties and Democracy in Post-Pinochet Chile.”

Most important elements of continuity and change between the pre- and post-Pinochet periods Positive elements

1. Revival of institutionalized tripartite party system (continuity)1. Left, center-left, and right (multiple parties in each section)

2. Reduction of ideological polarization (change)1. Due to Pinochet experience – left moderated in order to bring down the right

Negative elements1. Distance between parties and societal interests/weakness of social actors

1. Due to television (reduces party’s role as intermediary), party elites2. Designated senators and skewed electoral law

1. Majoritarian binomial electoral law – two seats in each district – favors second place winner (usually conservatives)

Conclusion: Chile’s system presents a mixed picture: sources of strength but also problems

Scott Mainwaring. “Brazil:Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy

● Brazilian parties = singularly fragile, do not endure Only 2 parties remain from 1966 – Communist Party of Brazil and Popular Socialist

Party (both renamed, splintered off)● Brazilian party system = too changeable

Two-party one-party to multiparty two-parties under mil. rule transition period multipartyism

● Consequences of continuing party fragility in post-1979 era Problems for democratic governance Helped sustain an inegalitarian social order Severely limited quality of democracy

● Three kinds of parties Programmatic and highly disciplined (leftist: PT, PPS, PC do B) Moderately disciplined and programmatic Loosely organized

■ Catchall parties fall in second two categories, candidates run individualistic campaigns and raise own money undermine party

● Parties also weak in comparison to strong state

● Problems preventing positive change Economic decline Presidential system – favors multiparty coalitions or antiparty candidates Open-list PR system Television Dominance of state over parties

● Opportunities

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High degree of competition and ideological choice Massive social changes – urbanization Exhaustion of strong state/developmentalism Political reforms

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WEEK 13

LECTURES

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I. Introduction: Decline of Corporatism and Rise of “Neo-Pluralism”-strengthened labor and peasant organizations with state resources-neoliberalism called for smaller role for state, thus reducing corporatism, state spending

A. Optimistic View: Popular Sector Revitalization-less state control, no more cooptation of group leaders,self-controlled, follow own strategiesB. Pessimistic View: Popular Sector Demobilization-no more state support; -harder for survival and political influence

II. Post-Corporatist Forms of Popular Sector OrganizationA. New Social Movements of the 70s and 80s

1. New social movements versus “old” (labor, peasant) social movements-autonomous from state, no financial support-not class-based; organized around new IDs and issues2. Examples

a. Ecclesial base communities-liberation theology = Christianity incompatible with social hierarchy and inequality; necessary to challenge govs; minority tendency but powerful impactb. Neighborhood associationsc. Post-Materialist social movements-not as influential; environmental, gay rights, etc

3. Limitations of new social movements-lacked strong org and had little access to state-movements completely autonomous from state have hard time delivering

B. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)1. Explaining rise of NGOs in 90s-materialist, well-financed, connected to state2. Advantages of NGOs

a. More efficient than state in policy implementation?-distribute food, medicine, clothing, adviceb. International ties: finance, technology, training-US, EU, World Bank championed NGOsc. More compatible with neoliberal state-private actors that provide goods and services

3. Costs of NGOsa. Dependent on foreign assistanceb. Low accountability-no elections or decision-makingc. Depoliticizingfrom pol standpoint, push people out of pol realmd. Bandaid for the neoliberal state?-playing role that state should play

C. Materialist Social Movements-composed largely of poor people

1. Landless Movement in Brazil

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-less than 3% controls 2/3 of farmland-1984 MST launched; mostly landless farmworkers-decided to take land for itself; “occupation is the only solution”-compelled Cardoso gov to step up land reform-effective social movement; closely aligned with PT (Lula)2. Argentine Workers Congress and Piquetero Movement-opposed to Menem gov, which was successful in ec, so CTA not as noticed-by late 90s up to 20% unemployed; piquetes = road blocks; spread across Argentina

D. Transnational Advocacy Networks-brings togethers NGOs, union activists, students, boycotts, politicians

1. Boomerang effect and changing balance of domestic power-gov ignores or threatens a group at home; group turns to int media and allies; int media and groups bring issue to attention of US/EU-forces govs to make policy change in favor of initial group2. Examples: human rights, environment, indigenous movements

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I. Rise of Indigenous Movements in the 1980s and 1990sA. The Absence of Ethnic Politics in Latin America before the 1980s-indigenous people treated as non-citizens for 400 years-in early 20th century, when mobilized, incorporated along class lines (peasantry)-Guatemala, Chile, Paraguay, MexicoB. Indigenous Demands:

1. Land2. Cultural autonomy

C. Explaining the Rise of Indigenous Politics1. The Domestic Story: decline of corporatism and the rise of neoliberalism-decline of unions; erosion of class identities created space for ethnic identities-ejido system disrupted by neoliberalism; ind communities hit hard2. The International Story: the rise of transnational indigenous rights network-environmental and Catholic Church began to sponsor ind rights

D. Two Problems Facing New Indigenous Movements1. Combining cultural and material demands-material needs continue to be most pressing issues2. Ambiguity toward democracy-many ind groups have viewed electoral politics as imposed from outside and have supported coups for power; threat to democracy

E. Cases of Ethnopolitics in the 1990s-ind movs have displaced peasant and labor orgs in center stage of politics

1. Ecuador: CONAIE and Pachakutik-after winning referendum in 1995, CONAIE changed course and in 1996 founded the Pachakutik party; became 3rd largest party2. Bolivia: From Katarismo to Evo Morales-more than 70% ind; excluded from politics until 1952 revolution-Katarismo (ind mov) formed during this time; against Bolivian State-Evo Morales led MAS (Movement to Socialism) moderate; stood for right to coca production-2005 Morales promised to do away with neoliberalism, aligned himself with Chavez,

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worst nightmare for Bush admin, protection of coca3. Peru: The Absence of Ethnopolitics-no org ind groups due to civil war in 1980s which had terrible effect on civil society/orgs; Shining Path = no place for ind rights in ideology

F. Toward Multiethnic Societies? Indigenous Rights and Constitutional Reform in 1990s throughout Latin America

II. The Future of Social and Political Representation of the Poor: Alternative ScenariosA. The Optimistic Scenario: Associative Networks-decline of corporatism will allow transnational networks to flourish-associative networks: of activists, NGOs, int orgs on specific issues (land, rights)B. The Pessimistic Scenario: Demobilization, Clientelism, and a Return to Oligarchy?-only source of power for poor is organizing in numbers, collectively – did so through mass parties and labor orgs-poor people will be left alone and become distanced from politics-local clientelist networks: power brokers exchange services (food, water, etc) for votes; power brokers end up supporting cons leaders

READINGS

1. Oxhorn: Is the Century of Corporatism Over?-corporatism in Latin America corresponded to periods of significant economic growth and decline-arguably “less effective compared with the distinctly noncorporatist experiences of countries such as Chile and Uruguay, where political parties have traditionally been much stronger”-“prolonged authoritarianism can help lay the foundation for neopluralism” due to repression which contributes to fragmentation of civil society-trend towards neopluralism throughout region

2. Chalmers: Associative Networks: New Structures of Representation…”-“associative networks are transforming popular representation, but only partially as well as unequally across countries, regions, and policy arenas”-the wider access to media and information resources has helped associative networks form and spread-failure of mass mobilization seems to have led people to explore alternatives other than a return to party mobilization-this is a very boring article

3. Keck: Activists Beyond Borders-networks are forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange-major actors include:

-international and domestic research by NGOs; -local social movements; -foundations; -the media; -churches, unions, intellectuals; -regional/international intergovernmental organizations; -and parts of the executive/parliamentary branches of government

-these networks seek political influence

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4. Auyero: Poor People’s Politics-differences between the wealthy and the poor are increasing-unemployment, poverty, inequality, violence very much present in Argentina despite glitzy restaurants, boutiques and hotels-polarization between highly developed areas and shantytowns“informal networks of survival and political networks become overlapping and locate the notion of brokerage”-the Peronist problem-solving network has become more important recently-two basic functions are resource control and information hoarding

5. Yashar: Contesting Citizenship in Latin America-???

6. Brysk: Turning Weakness Into Strength

-“International relations are an increasingly important determinant of domestic social change, while transnational alliances play a growing role in social movement activity.”-“The Indian rights movement was able to act globally because it acted as a new social movement based on identity and consciousness rather than objective material position.”-these movements use resources from the international community, such as media and financial and political help

7. Brysk: From Tribal Village to Global Village-“greater impact is associated with stronger Indian rights movements that are more engaged in identity politics and in internationalized situations”-indigenous peoples essentially seek “land, life, and language”

IDs

Neopluralism: corporatism strengthened labor and peasant organizations with state resources; limited autonomy of these groups due to dependency on state. Neoliberalism called for smaller role for state, thus reducing corporatism, state spending, etc. This caused a steady decline in union membership and support for unions, so smaller, more fragmented organizations competing with the state have replaced labor/peasant groups.

Associative networks: the decline of corporatism will allow associative networks to flourish. The world has changed: market economies, decentralized public policy. Political party has to be localized and decentralized and may be more democratic and responsive to people’s needs. Grassroots part will take place through associative networks of activists, NGOs and, international organizations coming together on specific issues (land, rights, etc).

Transnational advocacy networks: bring together NGOs, union activists, students, boycotts, politicians, etc. The “boomerang effect” is created by these networks. The effect is that when the government ignores or threatens a group at home, the group then turns to international media and their allies, who help the group by bringing the issue to the attention of the US, EU, UN, etc. This will then force the government to make policy changes in favor of that group. Examples of these are human rights, environmental, and indigenous movements/groups.

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CONAIE: National Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador. This group demanded cultural autonomy and recognition of Ecuador as a multiethnic state. It also called for bilingual education, protection of archaeological sites, and material demands for land and infrastructure improvements.

Ejido system: under this system, the land was collectively owned and farms were supported by state subsidies. This was the case in Mexico after Cardenas brought about immensely popular land reforms in the 1930s. However, this system was greatly disrupted throughout Latin America with neoliberal policies which allowed land to be bought and sold freely. As a result, many indigenous movements have called for a return to the ejido system.

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WEEK 14

Week 14 Lecture 1: The Role of the State in Latin AmericaRemember: A state is asset of legal, coercive systems with the ability to control over a body (and military).Levitsky’s new thesis concerning the state: Note enough just to have institutions, must have STRONG institutionsTwo dimensions: Size and Capability (Levitsky focuses on the latter)Big size does not equal strong; strong is the ability to get people to carry out the tasks of the state (Capability)Ex: Taxes sometime get collected in ArgentinaLecture now focuses on why state strength matters and countries that have large bureacricies (interventionist states) but inefficient capability and strength (weak state), i.e. Peru, BrazilII. Why State Strength MattersEconomics—invisible hand theory is a myth; it breeds chaos, instead we must have a system of regulations, legal framework to sustain capatalism.Political—citizenship rights (O’Donnel and Holston/Caldeira readings) must be enforced on a national level, solution is not to just have government stop killing people--democratization can prevent atrocities, but there needs to be an effective state to uphold a rule of LAW to protect the contsitutional rights; make them more than just words on paperIII. State Weakness in Peru, Columbia, and BrazilLimited Tax Capacity, violent crime—rule of law by gangsters as seen in City of God, Shining Path penetrating the poor in Peru; and territorial unevenessResult: Citizens may opt for dictatorship (Fujimora in Peru) to protect them where democracy can’t“Brown Areas” (O’Donnel’s term and one to know for Exam)Defn: Poor, often frontier slum region of countries such as Peru and Brazil where there is an absence of a rule of law enforced by the state and where government institutions do not even exist, or if they do, are totally weak and ineffective. Protection of the state’s citizens’ rights are nil. Note: O’Donnel says it is uneven territorially and by class as well.Paradox: “Brown Areas” coexist with democracy; one can vote in these regions for progressive labor and peasant laws that CAN’T be enforced in the region that needs it.Examples:1. Peru—current example in 2004!—under Toledo, saw lynching of mayor in Ilave, Peru with no one chargedAfter the collapse of Fujimora’s regime in 2000, all of expanded police force and justice collapsed as well, leaving state weaker than it had been during time of Shining Path2. Rural Columbia—drug cartels such as Pablo Escobar’s mafia, Guerilla movements, or Paramilitary forces in the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia control power in municpalitices, NOT STATE3. Favelas in Brazil—shantytowns under control of druglords as in City of GodKnow “Brown Areas” for the exam

Final Lecture:As a note, Levitsky got crazy near the end of this lecture, like about to have an anerism crazy—he really hates problems in Latin America. Crazy hates it.It was pretty entertaining.Final Look at all cases:Chile: success story—market rests on strong legal and economic institutions; copper and non traditional industries flourishing, military power finally totally eroded; Bachelet—2nd women Pres. In Latin America

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Three nations muddling through: Brazil, Mexico , and ArgentinaMexico: successes—pretty robust market econ0my, NAFTA giving them US market; politically, the party system is a success and the election system in better than even USChallenges—parties struggling without dictatorship of PRI; Fox is seen as weak, so next President could come with “strong hand”

BUT..even a neopopulist such as Obrador, who leads polls, is constrained by strong court, party system, and institutions (and Obrador is a level-headed politician, not outsider like Fujimora)BIG Problem—industrialized North v. Impoverished, clientalistic SouthBrazil: Successes—political and economically liberalized, pretty much successful market, Lula has support in polls—shows left supportBUT, only 35% of entire population supports Democracy—it has not reached Brown AreasArgentina: Four years ago total chaos, but in 2003 Kirshner, peronist, has steadily brought economy back, restored legality of democracyLong-term—when will down cycle come because Argentina has never had a strong institution to sustain this—Congress still weaker like beforeCrisis StatesPeru: economic growth centered on a few export industries, no institutional strength to redistribute--Congress an courts rotted to the core under Fujuimora, so majority now support democracy with “strong hand”—which would be represented by an Umala victory over Alan Garcia in the coming election (Umala—support of Chavez, noooo!!)Venezuela: Most Dramatic case of failure—oil allowed Ven. To muddle through as Chavez concentrated all power to dominated military, courts, etc.He has poor and military power, so even though all opposition (media, parties, etc.) against him, Ven. Has become a dictatorship under ChavezLatin America’s Left TurnLeft died in 1989 with death of Allende, cumulated with Garcia’s failure in Peru—and final with debt crisisTURN in 1998—with economic downturn and then left attained “anti-incumbency vote”Run of victories—Lagos in Chile in 2002, Lula in Brazil, then 2004 more victoriesLevitsky’s explanation: Economic stagnation in late 1990’s, then US policy to neglect Latin AmericaIssues for FutureInsitutional weakness, elite-mass gap, and the problem of inequalityThese problems produce three realities: 1) consolidated, stable party democracies 2) Populist left leads, causing democratic decay 3) Morales movement—for indigenous movement, WITH 1 very unlikely!

Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America (Centeno)Political failure in weakened states are part a result of authoritarian enclaves perpetuating, but also, the lack of legitimacy and obedience of orders (taxes, police failure) is a major problem.Institutional dead-weight—bloated ineffective state—plauging Latin America.Focuses on war-centered approach to rise of nation states—in Latin America, a limited war producing a divided domestic front (divided elite, class discrimination) as the origin of the state, results in problems for the future that we see now.This article is an attempt to represent the historical underpinnings of the state in Latin America to explain the above failures.

On the State (O’Donnel)Argentina, Brazil, and Peru are suffering through serious social and economic crisis, but, moreover,

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there is a profound crisis of the stateCrisis exists in three dimensions: of the capability of the state, of the effectiveness of the law, and

of the corruption of the state.Big and small mean nothing; scope instead of size should be the focus (scope=strength, how far out

you are capable)Brown areas—where very low or nil level of state presence functionally and territoriallyDemocratic and authoritarian state mixed in brown areasSpread of brown areas—social and economic disintegration—results from this social and economic

failure but also from crisis of the state, meaning its loss of effedctive legality to legitimize the common interest

Ex: high and erratic inflation in thesee countriesMust strengthen institutions to fix this problem

Democracy, Law and Violence (Holston and Caldeira)● Echoes what O’donnel states, that citizenship rights and rule of law fail in Brazil, as there is a

disjunction between those who reap the benefits of democracy and those that fail to receive state support in Brazil (cities v. favelas (as seen in City of God)

● “disjunctive development of democracy” (263)● All problems that result from this—privatization of justice (corrupt courts, gangs), violent crime

and police abuse, criminalization of the poor, and mass support for authoritarian solutions will be difficult or impossible to change in this article’s view.

● It is a difference in the opinion of O’Donnel; this article posits that the rampant social and cultural problems and inequalities breed these problem’s to contiunue; a government strengthening institutions, as the only solution, will not solve the problem.

● And Once rights have been violated, Brazilians can not expect redress in courts because they are also corrupt. So police justice fails, and then the court’s execution of the justice fails as well.

● All of this, the problems of justice, brown areas, and loss of citizenship rights, most importantly, DELEGITMIZES political democracy

Economist articleThroughout Latin America, support for Latin American democracies in 2001 reached a low—countries support decreased all the way to, for example, 30 percent in BrazilProves that Latin America’s still relatively young democracies have not proven themselves.This decline is related to the economic weakness, except in Mexico, that plagued Latin America at this time

Case Studies:Chile, Patricio Silva--depoliticisation of Chile under Pinochet regime and current Conceracion governments. While this process caused repression, fear, and a lack of participation under Pinochet, marketisation of Chilean societ ysince military regime have weakened the desire of citizens to participate (not forcing, but an effect of market economy)--Politicians are now weaker, press and media are where decision of governance now made--Political deactivation first seen in Pinochet government—and this was forced, but it was also strengthened under neo-liberal policies since late 1970s. Individual competition now trumps collective actions, industry, business, exports (making money) a bigger player in politics now than politicians themselves. --Moderation of left wing forces after the imposed transition of Pinochet also created this depoliticized state because they did not want to repeat the Allende experience and military backlash that followed, so

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parties less important as everyone was centrist. The parties were already weakened after Pinochet effectively destroyed the system in 1973.--Lavin in 1990s shows that new consumer-citizens, versus politically-minded citizens, vote for those with prestige to office; he was charismatic in media, so won—communicating through media and T.V. now most important thing

Argentina Weathing the Storm, Levitsky and Murillo2001—changed Argentina from poster child to “basket case”Rallying behind the slogan Que se vayan todos (everyone out)—protesters descended on the three branches of government to protest the downfall of Argeninan economy. Downturn came as a result of convertibility crisis from 1999-2001.Turnaround: 2003 elections, political meltdown did not occur, as protests would have expected, instead, voted for an established politician—Kirshner—brought democracy backAmazing that it survived, but crisis still heavily weakened democratic institutions in ArgentinaNeed change in this aspect, for these weak institutions combined with short-sighted politicians will cause another economic crisis in the future.Kirchner must rebuild institutions by building coalitions with Peronist governors and working with Duhalde’s party machine and prompt political elites to improve economic and political institutions, obviouslyDilemma: Is change real change? For 75 years, a Pres has packed a court after crisis, is Kirshner doing anything different?

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