gmpa scrutiny review of policing at manchester airport

Scrutiny Review of Policingat Manchester Airport

Greater Manchester Police Authority

Contents:

Foreword

Executive Summary

Overall Aim and Key Themes

Approach and Methodology

Contextual Information

Overall Impressions

Key Areas for Improvement

ACPO/S and NPIA Guidance for Policing at Airports

Crime Investigation

Counter Terrorism

Firearms

Incident Management/Operational and Contingency Planning

Support to Central Search

Licensing

Public Order

Roads Policing

Training and Development

Performance Management

Neighbourhood Policing

Uniform Patrol

Value for Money

The Development, Agreement and Implementation of the Airport Security Plan and Police Services Agreement

The Airport City Enterprise Zone

Appendix – Contributors to the Review

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I have great pleasure in presenting this report which details the work of the Greater Manchester Police Authority examination of policing at Manchester Airport.

Ahead of the 2012 Olympic Games, my authority colleagues and I were keen to carry out a thorough review of this sphere of policing, appreciating its crucial role in ensuring the safety and security of the public. We recognise that making sure all users of the airport are protected and secure has always been of paramount importance.

Our scrutiny work clearly shows there is a great deal of good work being undertaken by the Manchester Airport Section and we were very impressed with the knowledge, professionalism and pride exhibited by the officers and staff we spoke to. Notably, the many plans and procedures in place for dealing with the wide variety of incidents and situations that arise within the airport setting are well crafted, frequently tested and subsequently improved. Effective partnership working with Manchester Airport plc and the many other agencies which operate from the site is vital and staff acknowledged this throughout our study.

Nevertheless, the review did identify a number of areas for improvement which, if addressed we anticipate will further enhance the work of the Manchester Airport Section. We will be monitoring the progress of the force in addressing these recommendations to ensure that Greater Manchester Police is continuing to provide a high quality service to all those working at and visiting Manchester Airport. This work will form a part of the positive legacy that Greater Manchester Police Authority will pass on to the incoming Police and Crime Commissioner.

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank all those who took part in the review whose input and involvement was of great value and essential to the success of our study.

Foreword“We recognise that making sure all users of the airport

are protected and secure has always been of paramount

importance.”

Christine McGawley JPChair of the Commission

Vice Chair of Greater Manchester Police Authority

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Executive SummaryPolicing at Manchester Airport

Greater Manchester Police Authority’s review of policing

at Manchester Airport was conducted between September

2011 and April 2012. Commission members worked in

teams to gather pertinent information to demonstrate the

effectiveness of GMP in policing the airport and identify

areas for improvement.

Recommendations designed to address the areas for improvement focus on:

The force giving due consideration to the Manchester Airport Section, its

routine and unique needs plus those of its officers and staff

Support for the Police Services Agreement negotiation process

Training for police officers and staff

The effective exchange and communication of intelligence

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In 1974 nine airports were ‘designated’ (i.e. Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Manchester, Birmingham, Prestwick, Edinburgh, Glasgow and Aberdeen) meaning that the airport operator was required by law to meet the full cost of dedicated, uniformed policing. Since that time there have been several reviews which have modernised the general approach to airport security. A key outcome of Sir John Wheeler’s review in 2002 was the introduction of the multi-agency threat and risk assessment process (MATRA). In 2006, the “Independent Review of Policing at Airports” (S Boys Smith) led to the Airport Security Planning Framework, embodied within the 2009 Policing and Crime Act and effective from January 2010. This framework provides a national approach with the flexibility necessary to maintain the balance between national policing standards and local accountability.

The police are one of the control authorities at an airport. At present, the other authorities are the UK Borders Agency (UKBA), Department for Transport – Security and Resilience, the Civil Aviation Authority and the Serious Organised Crime Agency. Policing at airports covers three broad areas.

Policing the border – generally undertaken by Counter Terrorism Unit officers and UKBA.

Protective security – undertaken by uniformed police officers, detective officers and police staff, in partnership with the airport operators’ own staff and contractors.

General policing – usually delivered by uniformed officers, detective officers and police staff who are not attached to the Counter Terrorism Unit.

Commercial pressures are very apparent in an airport environment and as airport operators pay directly for policing they are entitled to hold police commanders to account for the delivery of policing services. This can involve a degree of detail and a level of scrutiny that is different to the examination of policing delivery in other environments. Police airport commanders are accountable to their own chief officer team and also subject to inspection by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC). Airport commanders have an important relationship with the airport Security Executive Group (SEG) and are responsible for the delivery of policing services as specified and agreed in any Police Services Agreement (PSA) with the airport operator.

The 2009 Policing and Crime Act removed the designated and non-designated categories of airport. The underlying principle is that the airport operator should pay for the general policing and protective security identified using the Airport Security Planning Framework, but should not pay for costs arising from policing the UK border.

The Police Services Agreement is the final phase in the security planning process for those airports where it has been agreed that some security measures in the Airport Security Plan should be carried out by a dedicated police presence. The Police Services Agreement should:

(n.b. information taken from “Guidance on Policing at Airports” and related Reference Handbook; ACPO, ACPOS, NPIA February 2011)

Identify the level of policing required;

Define the amount of any payments to be made by the airport operator for that policing, or the manner in which the amount is to be assessed;

Identify the accommodation and facilities that are to be provided by the airport operator to allow the policing service to be delivered.

Background and Context

The Airport Security Planning Framework means that all UK airports should agree a local Airport Security Plan (ASP) with their key stakeholders and ensure that, where a need is identified, the airport operator meets the cost of dedicated policing services.

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The extent to which the policing of Manchester Airport complies with the standards enshrined within the “Guidance on Policing at Airports” (Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS) and the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA), February 2011). The guidance “sets a common standard for policing at airports across the UK”. It specifies areas covering a number of key themes, namely:

Overall Aim and Key Themes

The overarching aim of this scrutiny project was to examine the policing of Manchester Airport and identify good practice, areas for improvement and encompass issues of relevance to value for money.

The work of the review encompassed a number of key objectives and themes. It aimed to identify the following.

Membership of the Scrutiny Commission

crime investigation

counter terrorism

firearms

incident management

support to central search

licensing

operational and contingency planning

public order

roads policing

training and development

performance management

neighbourhood policing

uniform patrol

Where available information allowed, examine issues relevant to value for money in relation to the policing of airports.

The impact on policing of the planned Airport City Enterprise Zone.

Progress in the development, agreement and implementation of the Airport Security Plan (ASP) and Police Services Agreement (PSA).

The membership of the scrutiny commission was as follows:Mrs Christine McGawley JP (Independent Member, Chair of the Commission and Vice Chair of Greater Manchester Police Authority)Mrs Cathy Conchie (Independent Member)Mr Barry Dixon (Independent Member)Councillor Joe Kitchen (Elected Member for Tameside)

Russell Bernstein, Executive Director; Samantha Frenz, Head of Scrutiny and Engagement; Roland Howard, Scrutiny Development Manager and Karen Edwards, Strategic Support Officer were advisors to the Commission.

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The approach utilised in undertaking this scrutiny review was developed in close liaison with the Manchester Airport Section. The key themes of the review and, more specifically, the standards embodied within the “Guidance on Policing at Airports” were examined in detail and relevant Airport Section officers and staff members with knowledge of those specific areas were identified.

The GMPA Members and officers engaged in undertaking the review were split into four teams, each taking responsibility for liaising with different members of airport staff and examining a variety of topics. Each team was provided with a series of questions designed to explore the issues allocated to that team. Using these questions, the teams examined and researched the issues through meetings with the officers and staff identified.

The table below illustrates this further (N.B. Although the same topics appear more than once, different aspects were examined by different teams).

Approach and Methodology

Team A - Visited on 28th February 2012

Team C - Visited on 7th December 2011

Team B - Visited on 21st December 2011

Team D - Visited on 12th January 2012

Areas examined:

Areas examined:

Areas examined:

Areas examined:

FirearmsIncident managementSupport to central searchLicensingRoads policingPerformance managementProgress in the development, agreement and implementation of the Airport Security Plan (ASP) and Police Services Agreement (PSA)

•••••••

•••••••

••••••

••••

•

•

Counter terrorismIncident managementRoads policingNeighbourhood policingUniform patrolCrime investigation

Counter terrorismIncident managementOperational and contingency planningPublic order policingTraining and developmentFirearmsUniform patrol

Crime investigationTraining and developmentRoads policingIssues of relevance to value for money in relation to the policing of airports Progress in the development, agreement and implementation of the Airport Security Plan (ASP) and Police Services Agreement (PSA)Impact on policing of the planned Airport City Enterprise Zone

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Policing Manchester AirportContextual Information

............................................... ............................................... ............................................... ............................................... ..........................

Command

OperationsCommunications

Operational Support UnitOperational Policing Unit

PSA TeamRunway Denial Team

(MANPADS - ACPO TAM funded)

Structure of Manchester Airport Section, Specialist Operations Branch, GMP

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Recorded Crime and DetectionsIn the 12 months ending 31st January 2012, 722 crimes had been recorded. This represents a reduction of 3.9% compared to the same period in the previous year. The most commonly recorded category of crime is ‘miscellaneous thefts’ followed by assaults and public order offences.

The detection rate for the 12 months ending 31st January 2012 was 49.4%. Information from the Home Office i-quanta website which enables comparisons with other airports would indicate that the detection rate for Manchester Airport is higher than Heathrow and Gatwick but slightly lower than Stansted.

12 MONTH DETECTION RATE

REDUCTION IN CRIME

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The Police Authority was impressed with the level of professionalism and knowledge demonstrated by the officers we spoke to. Key policies, procedures and plans are regularly tested, reviewed and further developed when necessary. Although the emphasis on policing is focused on prevention, the Manchester Airport Section is clearly prepared to deal with incidents of a type already experienced or anticipated and is also geared up to tackle situations of a more spontaneous and unusual nature.

Manchester Airport Section is well organised and the impression gained by the Police Authority was that of a “well-oiled machine”, with officers and staff having a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities. Airport officers were able to provide a good deal of evidence and reassurance that the Section is managed effectively and has a well defined set of priorities. The Police Authority was impressed with the degree of openness demonstrated by the officers and staff we spoke to.

The unique nature of policing arrangements at the Airport means the Section has a good deal of autonomy and the Police Authority felt that, in many ways, the ethos within the Section epitomises GMP Force Command’s vision of “doing the right thing.” Officers and staff take a huge amount of pride in their work, acknowledging that the way the Airport Section is run means they have the “time to do a good job.” Conversely, the distinctive and different characteristics of airport policing means that it could potentially be difficult for officers and staff to pick up “normal basic command unit policing” without receiving relevant refresher training.

The importance of effective partnership working between Manchester Airport Section, the airport operator and other agencies was emphasised. As well as ensuring that the airport environment is safe and secure for all, good relationships with partners mean that key pieces of equipment can be borrowed and utilised (e.g. the car parks have a machine that can lift and move vehicles). Having agencies such as the fire and rescue service on site is essential when particular types of incidents take place.

Overall Impressions

Manchester Airport Section is well organised and the impression gained by the Police Authority was that of a “well-oiled machine”, with officers and staff having a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities.

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Key Areas for Improvement

Our review highlighted a great deal of positive work and much good practice and at the same time, the Review Team identified a number of areas for improvement.

The officers we spoke to expressed the view that Manchester Airport Section is “not always seen as a basic command unit”, despite the fact that it is essentially run as a “mini basic command unit”. This means the Airport is sometimes not the top priority in relation to force-wide training and other roll outs and this can be problematic (e.g. there is no access to the Police National Database at the Airport – a situation which the Police Authority would maintain is addressed as a matter of urgency).

The widely varied nature of the police work at the Airport can mean that the Section could be seen as a something of a “jack of all trades.” That being said, officers and staff do recognise that this is in many ways necessary due to Manchester Airport Section’s unique set up and the commercial relationship with the airport operator.

Some of the unique requirements of policing at the Airport can make fitting in with other GMP processes difficult. For example, Manchester Airport Section highlighted issues with estates and planning in relation to the bureaucracy and time involved.

Each year, negotiations between the Section and the airport operator regarding the Police Services Agreement are sensitive and can be protracted, taking up a considerable amount of staff time. The review team would suggest that, where appropriate, additional support be sought from relevant headquarters branches (e.g. Specialist Operations Branch Finance Manager).

Where possible, the budget for officer and staff training should be protected, particularly in order that essential, mandatory training can be delivered in a timely way.

Although the Airport Section has a positive and mature two-way relationship with regard to the exchange of intelligence with the North West Counter Terrorism Unit, officers expressed the view that basic command units and branches within GMP do not always make best use of the Section in terms of the circulation of intelligence about wanted criminals and other matters, stating that this can sometimes be better from external police forces.

Though the establishment of a Hotel Watch Scheme has assisted in this area, officers feel that the relationship they have with the airport hotels might be further enhanced in terms of the flow of relevant intelligence.

Some individuals involved in serious and organised crime will travel abroad and likely use the airport for this purpose. Officers highlighted that the circulation of intelligence relating to organised crime groups and wanted criminals could be improved.

Relationships locally with the UK Borders Agency are positive, however, officers believe that intelligence sharing from national UKBA sources could be improved.

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Areas covered:

Crime Investigation

Counter Terrorism

Firearms

Incident Management / Operational and Contingency Planning


Licensing

Public Order

Roads Policing




Uniform Patrol

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The guidance document was prepared at the request of the Airport Policing Programme Board and developed by the Associations of Chief Police Officers and the National Policing Improvement Agency. It aims to help the managers of aerodromes, police officers and other relevant stakeholders to:

Manchester Airport Section presented and discussed a plan of the geographical area that the Airport Police Unit is responsible for policing. The boundaries on the map are those included in the Airport Security Plan Terms of Reference. An explanation was provided in relation to the background, purpose and meaning of each boundary.

The plan shows the following:

The evidence collected by the scrutiny teams is presented under the checklist headings below.

The ACPO/S and NPIA guidance highlights the importance of crime at airports being investigated to the same standards as crime occurring in any other setting. It also outlines a number of key issues that should be considered when crime investigation is being undertaken.

This section of the scrutiny report provides brief details of the focus of each theme covered within the guidance and an assessment of how well Manchester Airport Section is meeting the standards within each theme.


Introduction

Evidence

Crime Investigation

“understand the diverse resources and range of capabilities police officers can bring to policing an airport.”

Clearly defining geographical boundaries to delineate areas of policing responsibility allocated to the airport policing unit and the neighbouring basic command units.

Liaising with the airport’s Risk Advisory Group (RAG) regarding any security vulnerabilities.

Working closely with commercial organisations and the airport operator to deal with theft effectively.

Making efforts to carry out investigations quickly, taking into consideration the commercial impact of delaying flights and contact with witnesses.

Developing protocols with airlines and the airport operator regarding the employment of covert policing techniques.

Sharing crime data with airport security personnel.

The force has defined the geographical area of policing that airport police units are responsible for.

GMP Airport geographical basic command unit boundary (blue line);

Area patrolled by GMP including parts of Cheshire, under agreement with Cheshire Constabulary (green line); and,

Boundary of Manchester Airport defined by the Civil Aviation Authority (red line).

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The force has procedures in place to investigate crimes committed in flight, theft of freight and travelling Organised Crime Groups (OCG), sharing relevant intelligence with other airports

The force has procedures in place that provide an effective service to transient victims and witnesses

Although, the area for which Manchester Airport Section is responsible for policing has been signed up to in the most recently agreed Police Services Agreement (PSA), Manchester Airport plc have indicated they wish to clarify the position regarding Manchester Airport’s geographical boundaries and the matter is currently under negotiation. Legal counsel has been sought by GMP and the advice shared with the Police Authority.

Manchester Airport plc plans to develop and expand its operations at Manchester Airport and has published a master plan with a growth strategy running up until 2030. The number of people employed on the Manchester Airport site is estimated to rise from 19,000 at present to 26,000 by 2015.

Future accommodation options for the Airport Section could include the development of a fit-for-purpose building possibly including training and conference facilities for GMP.

The force has clear procedures in place that govern the investigation of key crime types, including crimes committed in flight and the theft of cargo and freight. At the time of the scrutiny review, the recently appointed Manchester Airport Section Commander was looking to increase the Section’s focus on organised crime groups including those involved with drugs, sexual exploitation and human trafficking.

An area for improvement identified was the circulation of intelligence relating to organised crime groups and wanted criminals. Manchester Airport Section officers made the point that some individuals involved in serious and organised crime will travel abroad and likely use the airport for this purpose. They felt that opportunities to apprehend these individuals could be enhanced if the flow of intelligence was improved.

Counter terrorism policing at airports encompasses two linked but distinct areas – firstly, protecting the UK as a whole by identifying people involved in terrorism entering the UK and secondly, protecting people who use the airport from terrorist acts, in line with the government’s CONTEST strategy. Although Special Branch officers have primary responsibility for the first aspect, airport police units perform a crucial role in relation to the second.

As nearly all the victims and witnesses the Airport deals with are transient, there is no requirement for a separate written procedure. Providing appropriate care and a quality service to transient victims and witnesses is a key part of the Section’s daily work. Victim needs are assessed in line with the elements of the Victims’ Code of Practice which relate to initial evaluation of crimes.

Our review determined that the officers and staff working within the Manchester Airport Section pride themselves on the level of victim care they provide. A key example provided which demonstrates the degree of victim care focused on a current investigation into a large-scale fraud relating to car hire. Approximately 100 victims were identified, some of whom live as far away as Canada and Australia. The ongoing investigation has involved regular contact with victims over the phone, followed up with statements obtained via email with hard copies posted to Manchester Airport Section from around the world. To facilitate contact with victims and witnesses, the supervisors’ telephone within the crime unit has worldwide direct access dialling due to the volume of such calls that make up the normal workload of the Manchester Airport Section.

Counter Terrorism

Evidence


The guidance underlines the need for the threat of terrorism at an airport to be based on information that is generated and circulated nationally, stressing that any local assessment should only be produced if there is additional evidence or intelligence. This should be discussed fully within airport Risk Advisory Group meetings.

It is clear from discussions with Manchester Airport Section officers that counter terrorism is a priority for the Section. The Airport is an iconic site and therefore a potential target for terrorists. Officers are provided with training around how to identify suspicious situations. This encompasses the things to look for and what action to take. Tasking and coordination meetings take place regularly and there is a good two way flow of intelligence between Manchester Airport Section and the North West Counter Terrorist Unit.

The Executive Director of the Police Authority is an active member of the Security Executive Group (SEG) and has found ample evidence of GMP’s influence and contribution with regard to the Airport Security Plan.

Airport officers feel that although relationships locally with the UK Borders Agency are positive, intelligence sharing from national UKBA sources might be improved. Officers also believe that the relationship they have with the airport hotels could be better in terms of the flow of relevant intelligence. A Hotel Watch scheme is in place and steps are being taken to improve attendance by hotel representatives. It is anticipated that this should help to enhance the gathering and flow of intelligence.

Manchester Airport Section was omitted when the Police National Database was rolled out around the force. This system is vital in terms of officers being able to access and contribute intelligence of local, regional and/or national relevance. The Police Authority believes this situation should be addressed as a matter of urgency.

The force has a strategy relating to counter terrorism which supports and is aligned to relevant ports specific ACPO (Terrorism and Allied Matters) strategies. The strategy is informed by the outcomes from local engagement and consultation and includes plans to divert flights if required. Officers at the Airport reported that the Section is regularly reviewed by ACPO (Terrorism and Allied Matters) and feedback would indicate that the force is performing well in this regard.


Evidence

The force can evidence that airport officers contribute to wider counter-terrorism policing activity through the tasking and coordination process

The force supports and contributes towards the Airport Security Plan by active participation in the Risk Advisory Group (RAG) and the Security Executive Group (SEG)

Airport police forces share intelligence as far as possible with security cleared members of the Risk Advisory Group (RAG) and the Security Executive Group (SEG)

The force considers putting in place an intelligence sharing protocol with other agencies to facilitate flows of information at airports

The force can evidence support for and alignment to ports specific National ACPO (Terrorism and Allied Matters) Strategies, e.g. the Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) Strategy

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The force has procedures in place for making airport staff aware of their roles in preventing terrorism

The force has Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for activations for each type of radiological detection equipment portal

The force has a procedure in place for radiological detection equipment activations that escape from the port

Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment (STRA) reflects the reasons for deploying armed officers at the airport

In conjunction with the UK Borders Agency, the force has a procedure in place for managing firearms entering the UK

The force has an evidence-based procedure in place for the deployment of routinely armed officers

Each year a comprehensive training needs analysis is conducted and, as a part of this process, the training that is essential for airport policing is identified and prioritised. At the top of this priority list is training in relation to counter terrorism. The officers we spoke to emphasised that counter terrorism is probably the key focus of the policing at the Airport. At the time the review took place, the most recent training on counter terrorism issues had taken place in December 2010 and January 2011.

In addition to this, all officers and staff receive regular inputs from GMP Counter Terrorism Branch staff who are based at the Airport. There is a dedicated member of staff responsible for developing a menu of tactical options to use to deal with terrorism. Officers emphasised that the Airport Section does not wait for an incident to happen in order to bring relevant tactical options into play, rather that different tactics are tested and practiced during the year.

Operation Cyclamen is Manchester Airport Section’s plan to deal with detections of radiation. Staff are trained in the specifics of Cyclamen in order that they are fully versed in the action to take if radiation is discovered. In the unlikely event that radiation escapes from the Airport, neighbouring basic command units would be informed as a matter of urgency and would activate their own plans. The officers we spoke to stressed the advantages of having other emergency services such as fire and rescue on site and highlighted that partnership working is key to dealing with the many different types of incidents that occur at the Airport.


Evidence

The role of the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment (STRA) and having a transparent audit trail in relation to the need for firearms officers at an airport is accentuated within the guidance document. The need should be identified by the Risk Advisory Group, included in the Airport Security Plan, and the actual deployment of armed officers should be based on clear evidence. In addition, the guidance highlights the importance of police forces having appropriate protocols in place with UKBA, airport operators and airlines with regard to securing firearms entering the UK. It also points out that firearms tactics may need to be adjusted and practiced to ensure they are appropriate for use in an airport setting.

The Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment (STRA) is carried out annually and is reviewed at each Risk Advisory Group meeting. The Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment links mitigating action to risk, specifying how many armed officers should be deployed for each consideration.

Armed officers are deployed under a standing firearms authority which provides authorisation for officers to routinely carry firearms at Manchester Airport. The Section has a comprehensive standard operating procedures manual for authorised firearms officers working at the Airport. This details a wide range of relevant topics such as working with other operational teams, training, the standing authority, tasking and dealing with prisoners.

It was confirmed that through running their own accredited training at the Airport on behalf of GMP, the Section’s firearms capability was now at full strength including senior officers.

Firearms

Evidence

Local differences in tactics in the airport environment are identified and addressed

There is a plan in place to manage risks imposed by using incapacitants, Taser and other less lethal options in an airport environment

In common with the rest of the force, Manchester Airport Section has standard operating procedures which govern the issue of CS Spray, Tasers and baton guns. During the review, the officers we spoke to could not recall a recent incident where any of the ‘less lethal’ options had been deployed, save one instance where a Taser had been drawn but not fired (n.b. unholstering a Taser is classed as a deployment). Since that time, however, there was a successful actual Taser deployment in June 2012.

With regard to dealing with firearms entering the UK through Manchester Airport, our review identified that primacy sits with the UK Border Agency. GMP officers would only become involved in a specific case if criminal offences were revealed. In any event where the UK Border Agency was unable to check firearms entering the UK, GMP authorised firearms officers would inspect the weapons and certificates. In terms of outbound transport of firearms, the UK Border Agency handle international flights and GMP check all firearms travelling by air within the UK.

The Airport has large open spaces and can deploy officers on foot. To take this into account, exercises are mounted on a regular basis to test the response to various scenarios within this environment (e.g. ‘active shooter’).

Regular checks are undertaken to ensure that policies and procedures relating to the loading, unloading and carrying of firearms are adhered to. A very positive feature is that the Airport has its own armoury and firearms range, thus can carry out training on site. The visible presence of armed police officers is seen as a key measure in terms of preventing crime and disorder at the Airport.

The officer in charge of firearms policing explained that, materially, there are no specific differences in tactics with regard to firearms policing at the Airport. The role profile for authorised firearms officers (AFOs) is the same at the Airport as it is for authorised firearms officers working elsewhere in the force and, for the most part, officers receive the same training (n.b. authorised firearms officers at the Airport receive specific training in Operation Release, the Airport’s hijack plan). The key difference relates to the environment in which firearms policing takes place.


Evidence

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The force critical incident policy is embedded at the airport

The force demonstrates effective operational and contingency planning with partners, e.g. the UK Border Agency and the airport operator

There are contingency plans in place to manage aircraft hijacks, aircraft incidents, large scale flight disruption and the evacuation of a terminal

The guidance document draws attention to the police giving due regard to the commercial demands and “time-critical environment” affecting airport operators. It places emphasis on the need for good partnership working between the public sector and private concerns to ensure effective management of incidents, highlighting the need to test incident plans with a view to improving them.

response. The senior officer we spoke to could not recall having declared a critical incident in recent times but provided an example where suspicious circumstances had necessitated the activation of relevant plans and procedures. It is clear that Manchester Airport Section officers and staff are well versed in responding to full emergency situations and that each such situation could potentially be classed as a critical incident.

As well as having the opportunity to attend a multi-agency table top exercise designed to test the adequacy of national and local plans in place to deal with a hijack incident, members of the scrutiny review team were provided with a valuable input which imparted much useful explanatory information on the nature of such plans, their rationale and the tactics available at various stages. This provided the team with reassurance that the Manchester Airport Section has established and maintained appropriate links with the other agencies involved, is clear about which agencies have primacy at various points and depending on the circumstances, and is fully prepared challenge assumptions and test plans to make sure they are fit for purpose.

The Police Authority enquired how learning from critical incidents and emergencies at other airports is harnessed and used. Officers explained that for specific incidents at other airports the security level would be raised very quickly. Procedures highlighting a menu of tactical options for responding to spontaneous events would be examined so that officers and staff are ready to take pertinent action if required. A key issue highlighted to the Police Authority is that each incident can be very different so it is important to ‘stay ahead of the game’.

There are positive relationships with partner agencies in relation to operational and contingency planning. Manchester Airport Section is an active and influential participant in the Manchester Airport Emergency Planning Committee which meets regularly and has membership from many different agencies including the airport operator, fire and rescue service, relevant local authorities, air traffic control, ambulance service, UK Airlines Emergency Planning Group, Health Protection Agency and the National Health Service.

All of the relevant plans and policies are kept in a secure cabinet within the silver control room at the Manchester Airport Section. This is so that they are at the fingertips of any silver commander directing the operational elements of a response to a critical incident or full emergency. Electronic copies are stored on a shared drive.

These plans cover all manner of critical incidents and emergencies including hijack, aircraft incidents (e.g. if an aircraft is experiencing problems in landing, fuel spillage), large scale flight disruption (e.g. due to poor weather) plus evacuation of terminals and other parts of the airport complex (e.g. the cargo centre, the police station). These plans are informed by the Airport Emergency Orders and are reviewed annually as well as after each occasion they are used. Each plan has a ‘control sheet’ attached to it which is used to record relevant information about how the plan has worked and/or might be amended to improve it.

Much of the training provided to officers and staff working at the Airport is linked to dealing with critical incidents and emergencies. A general awareness is provided along with detailed information about the criteria to apply when providing an appropriate


Incident Management / Operational and Contingency Planning

Evidence

A key issue highlighted to the Police Authority is that each incident can be very different so it is important to ‘stay ahead of the game’.

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The force takes account of commercial issues in delivering effective incident management with partners

The Airport follows the Force’s Gold, Silver and Bronze Command and Control model and has its own Communications and Major Incident Control room. Partner organisations are familiar with the Major Incident Control room and some store their own dedicated equipment within the room.

Manchester Airport’s Crisis Management Centre is adjacent to the Major Incident Control room and during any ongoing incident, the Silver Commander and senior Airport representative liaise closely and have joint debriefs after the incident has concluded.

Evidence

The Committee has a number of sub-groups which focus on specific issues in more detail such as terminal operations and training, airfield operations, airport external agencies and cross border agencies. The Police Authority was provided with copies of agendas and minutes for the main Committee and was impressed with the prominence given to risk, strategic issues and the learning from various incidents and exercises.

Officers also described the regular exchange of intelligence with the UK Border Agency locally, highlighting current work to tackle offensive weapons. This work is being led by one of the inspectors on the Airport Section and, through tasking and coordination and pace-setting meetings, involves targeting particular flights based on intelligence. The work has seen some considerable success in terms of the confiscation of weapons such as side-handled batons and knives. Many such weapons are purchased legally in other countries but then seized on landing in the UK, due to their being illegal in this country. Officers outlined how restorative justice disposals are used in appropriate cases.

It is clear that, on occasions, the Manchester Airport Section’s priorities may not chime exactly with those of the UK Borders Agency, however, the partnership between the two agencies is seen as largely positive and mutually beneficial.

A positive outcome from effective joint working has been the modification of plans to take account of commercial issues. For example, re-entry to buildings and areas after an incident now requires a police and airport representative to jointly manage a controlled return, ensuring security and taking appropriate measures such making sure shop staff are in place before the public are allowed through the cordon.

Manchester Airport Section comprehends fully that the airport is a time critical environment where any unnecessary delay costs money. This is recognised by all officers who provide a level of service rarely found in everyday policing. Where incidents occur in flight, procedures have been developed with the airlines to ensure that witness information can be obtained swiftly from crew members without causing the aircraft to be delayed.

A good example of the level of service is an incident which occurred in May 2010 when protestors breached the airport perimeter and locked themselves onto an aircraft. They subsequently blocked access to the World Freight Centre. Although it took almost two hours to release the protestors from the aircraft and arrest them, airfield operations were suspended for just 44 minutes. During this time, mindful of media coverage and commercial interest, strategically placed vehicles prevented the protestors from being filmed and photographed.

The Manchester Airport Section’s Planning and Policy Manager, together with Forward Planning officers, works very closely with the Airport Emergency Planning Manager and provides valuable practical assistance in the preparation of airport emergency plans. Such plans always give prominent consideration to the airport’s commercial priorities.


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The force can evidence support for, and alignment to, ports specific National ACPO (Terrorism and Allied Matters) Strategies, e.g. the Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) Strategy

The force liaises with the e-Borders programme and has processes in place for dealing with alerts issued by the National Borders Targeting Centre

The force has a strategy relating to incident management which supports and is aligned to relevant ports specific ACPO (Terrorism and Allied Matters) strategies. This includes such issues as how to deal with suspicious packages and the circumstances that would necessitate the closure of one or more of the airport terminals. Again, the strategy is informed by the outcomes from local engagement and consultation.

provide passenger manifests to the national computer some 15 minutes prior to take off. There is no local control with regard to airline compliance.

Other basic command units within Greater Manchester Police do not always provide a package of support around the alerts which can result in Manchester Airport Section officers being unable to prevent people from leaving the airport in certain cases. For example, in some cases of suspected forced marriage, officers are not provided with sufficient information to enable them to take action.

The e-Borders Inspectors’ Guidance document details the procedures to be followed when an alert is issued by the National Borders Targeting Centre. An additional guidance document for Communications Officers provides a summary of actions to be taken by these staff in order to comply with the Inspectors’ Guidance Document. The Communications Manager maintains records of all e-Borders alerts, providing monthly reports to Command. It should be noted that e-Borders work is specifically excluded, by legislation, in determining cost recovery for policing services from Manchester Airport.

The National Borders Targeting Centre issues alerts on a daily basis. Officers expressed the view that the volume of alerts received is difficult to manage and explained that the Airport Section is starting to use a risk-based approach to filter and prioritise the alerts they action. The priority alerts for action are those with a clear link to protecting the public. The officers we spoke to felt that although the e-Borders programme is working, it could easily become overloaded.Compliance with the requirements of the National Borders Targeting Centre by airlines is voluntary. The officers we spoke to indicated that although some airlines are very good, there are others that only


Evidence

Evidence

Airport operators employ staff to undertake searches of passengers and baggage with the main aim of preventing terrorism. That being said, however, such searches will likely uncover other offences. The guidance outlines that police forces should have an agreed policy with airport security staff regarding how their personnel will provide support to search activity and have relevant procedures in place to deal with the eventualities detailed below.


Does the force have procedures in place to manage the following contingencies in central search?

Terrorist weapons found

Material suggesting a person is involved in

terrorism found

Firearms found

Offensive weapons found

Prohibited articles found

Stolen goods found

Drugs found

Large amounts of currency found

Disruptive passenger in central search

Assault on members of central search

Public order offences in central search

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The officers we interviewed maintained that generally, whatever occurs in central search is dealt with in the same way as if it had occurred elsewhere in the Airport and using the same police powers and responsibilities.


Evidence

Prohibited articles found

Large amounts of currency found

Offensive weapons found

• Disruptive passenger in central search• Assault on members of central search• Public order offences in central search

Firearms, stolen goods or drugs found

Terrorist weapons or material suggesting a person is involved in terrorism found

The rules around articles found that are prohibited as a ‘condition of carriage’ are enforced by airport and airline staff.

Unless this was cash, of a value equivalent to £1,000 or less, suspected of being obtained though the proceeds of crime, in which case it could be confiscated, Manchester Airport Section would not get involved. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs would generally deal with large amounts of currency being brought into the country or taken from the country.

The force has a clearly defined policy with regard to situations where offensive weapons are found at Manchester Airport. The policy aims to assist with the decision making process by outlining the philosophy which shapes the approach, whilst at the same time highlighting the overriding desire to keep staff and passengers safe from the threat or use of offensive weapons. The philosophy emphasises the importance of considering the circumstances in which items are found and other pertinent information to guide the appropriate use of discretion. Officers’ decisions and the rationale behind them must be recorded on the force incident handling system to ensure consistency and proportionality are considerations in relation to the circumstances encountered. The policy also includes a requirement for supervisors to check the assessment of the circumstances and the decisions made.

Depending on the nature of an individual’s behaviour, a disruptive passenger may be advised by officers to prevent escalation of the incident. If police were called to deal with a disruptive passenger about to board an aircraft, or having done so, it would be the airline staff who would determine under the ‘conditions of carriage’ if the passenger would be permitted to fly. Police would only be present to prevent a breach of the peace from occurring. Assaults and public order offences would be dealt with in the same way in central search as they would in any other location.

When such items are found in central search, they are dealt with in the same way as if they were found in any other location.

In the event that either of the above was discovered, the GMP Counter Terrorism Branch would immediately become involved and take primacy, supported by airport officers.

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Bar Watch

The Bar Watch scheme has been established to ensure that premises selling alcohol to persons who go on to be disruptive passengers are identified and appropriate action taken. The scheme runs alongside the Problem Flight Initiative during the summer months to provide a visible presence and support bar staff in identifying persons who are drunk and causing anti-social behaviour, and to warn individuals about the offences relating to boarding an aircraft whilst drunk. An electronic briefing site is in place which tasks officers to visit relevant airside bars and update the records with their findings.

When carrying out patrols at recognised vulnerable points, all officers include the outlets that sell and/or serve alcohol, ensuring they provide a highly visible presence to deter any anti-social behaviour and give reassurance to employees and others using the facilities. Officers are asked to make themselves aware of the yellow card scheme and put it to use appropriately.

The checklist outlined within the guidance under this heading links to the role of alcohol in incidents with disruptive travellers. It highlights that police forces should give thought to working closely with airport concessions supplying alcohol and the airport operator to inform passengers of the physical and other consequences of drinking too much and then travelling by plane.

There are a number of effective mechanisms in place to deal with the supply of alcohol at the airport. These include:

Our scrutiny work determined that there are no specific licensed premises that have been identified as being consistently linked to alcohol sales and disruptive passengers. In the main, drunkenness problems appear to arise from individuals who consume their own duty free alcohol in the bar areas. People found consuming their own alcohol are reminded of the fact that they will not be permitted to board an aircraft if drunk.


Licensing

Evidence

The force has agreed a multi-agency procedure to identify and deal with people who are drunk before they board an aircraft

Premises which consistently supply alcohol to people who go on to be disruptive passengers are identified and appropriate action taken

The force should consider having an alcohol and flying awareness strategy in place

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Public order incidents affecting airports can be varied in nature, develop rapidly and may elicit more attention from the media and the public than incidents in other locations. Incidents can range from groups of angry passengers in overcrowded terminals, planned protests where negotiation has taken place between the police and the protestors, to spontaneous incursions onto the airfield.

Public Order


Yellow Card Scheme Alcohol and Flying Awareness Strategy

This scheme involves issuing an advisory notice, in the form of a yellow card, to persons who appear to be intoxicated and are intending to board an aircraft.

The yellow card is completed by a police officer or police community support officer. The officer will record the name of the person, airline and flight number on the card and hand it to a member of the airline in question. A copy is handed to the passenger as it includes information setting out the offence of entering an aircraft when drunk and the possible sanctions which may follow.

The airline will then make a decision as to whether the person is fit to fly, based on the information contained on the card and the appearance of the passenger.

The information is also passed to the Manchester Airport Section’s Operational Policing Unit for recording and intelligence purposes.

Examples:

An alcohol and flying awareness strategy is in place and focuses on a multi-agency approach. Consultation with members of the Flight Support Group has seen the introduction of a revised and updated “Know your limits” posters which are displayed prominently in the bar areas, retail outlets and toilets.

Incident Record XXXX refers to a drunken male issued with a yellow card who was being loud at Terminal 1 Check In. The flight was delayed but the male had sobered up after his warning and was allowed to travel.

Incident Record XXXX refers to a group of 20 males in Terminal 1 Check In area, one of whom was being generally disruptive. The male was immediately pulled from the queue and spoken to by officers. The individual was identified and checked on the Police National Computer using his passport as identification verification. Crew were advised to ensure that the party was split up to reduce the likelihood of any further incident. Bars airside in Terminal 1 were visited, advised about the group and agreed to limit the sale of alcohol. The male in question was issued with a yellow card and intelligence submitted.

1

2

IT IS AN OFFENCE TO ENTER AN AIRCRAFT WHILST UNFIT THROUGH DRINK OR DRUGS OR TO BE DRUNK WHILST ON AN AIRCRAFT

KNOW YOUR LIMITS

YOU MAY BE DENIED ACCESS TO THE AIRCRAFT BY POLICE CREW OR SECURITY

YOU MAY BE REMOVED FROM THE AIRPORTYOUR FLIGHT TICKETS CAN BE CANCELLED WITHOUT

COMPENSATION

Drunk or disorderly behaviour could keep you grounded

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The force has sufficient police officers and staff trained in airside driving


Operation Elba is Manchester Airport Section’s response to pre-planned, notified public order events (e.g. planned protests) and has been used quite extensively. Recent protest activity has focused around the planned expansion of the airport and there has also been a ‘climate camp’. The operation has involved positive and successful negotiations with representatives from protest groups about suitable areas in which to stage their protest.

In terms of the response to spontaneous events (e.g. incursions onto the airfield; protestors chaining themselves to the wheels of aircraft), officers have access to a menu of tactical options via the shared drive and can also call upon specialist advice from tactical (TAC) advisors. A number of officers at the Airport are trained in bronze and silver command roles and the silver control room is set up ready for use at any time.

The guidance outlines two key differences with regard to roads policing at airports. Firstly, driving within an airside environment requires specialist instruction. Although most airside collisions will likely be investigated by the airport operator’s airfield operations unit, the requirements of both road traffic law and relevant airport bylaws may necessitate investigation by the police.

Manchester Airport are keen to limit the issue of Airside Driving Permits to those police officers who actually drive on the critical part on a regular basis. (n.b. The critical part is the part of an airport, other than the manoeuvring area (as defined by the International Civil Aviation Organisation) intended to accommodate the loading and unloading of passengers and cargo, the refueling, servicing, maintenance and parking of aircraft, and any movement of aircraft, vehicles and pedestrians necessary for such purposes). To acquire a permit there is a requirement to spend a month in company with an experienced driver after first passing a specific airside driving test. The critical part is constantly changing and Airside Directives and Airfield Safety Bulletins inform users of such changes. In the rare event that there are insufficient qualified airside drivers available from the force, airfield operations can provide escorts.

Evidence

Roads Policing

Evidence

The force has a contingency plan in place to manage protest at the airport

The force has a contingency plan in place to manage public disorder at the airport

The force has a contingency plan in place to manage an airside incursion by protestors

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The importance of police officers and police staff being equipped with the requisite skills and knowledge through training is underlined with the guidance, as is the role of the UK Airports Commanders Group (UKACG) conferences and workshops in providing induction and continuation training for staff with supervisory responsibilities.


The force has procedures in place to investigate airside collisions or to support partner agencies in doing so

The force has completed an aviation training analysis for its officers and staff

The force provides regular training to officers and staff in line with aviation training needs analysis

The force works closely with the operator to ensure effective traffic management at the airport

Manchester Airport Section submitted the Aerodrome Manual 2011 as evidence of the procedures in place for dealing with airside collisions. Manchester Airport Airfield Operations investigate airside collisions in the main. GMP provides assistance as and when the incident constitutes an offence under criminal law and is not being investigated by Airfield Operations or the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Such incidents could include crashed aircraft with loss of life or serious injury.

Minor or routine occurrences are not dealt with by GMP as there is no police jurisdiction to deal with matters that are the responsibility of the airport operator under health and safety at work regulations. Airports are excluded from decriminalised parking enforcement and any change to this would need a change in legislation as well as the Chief Constable’s consent.

The main car parks on the airport site are covered by Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) technology and the Section employs a number of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) with a specific traffic remit.

Officers from the Manchester Airport Section attend daily car park meetings at which issues relating to traffic flow, congestion and security are discussed, actual and potential risks identified and mitigating actions planned. Amongst the issues recently identified were problems with poor signage around the Airport complex and a key issue concerning double yellow lines. Manchester Airport Section staff are working with the airport operator to address these issues.

An annual training needs analysis is undertaken in January to inform the training programme for the coming financial year. Some elements of the analysis are ‘givens’ (e.g. counter terrorism, firearms, training linked to different types of incidents and emergencies, search techniques) whereas others are more specific to particular staff needs and linked to individual achievement records.

The outcomes from the training needs analysis are examined, mandatory elements prioritised, and an annual plan put together. This is then translated into a series of five week plans. The annual plan is necessarily flexible in order to accommodate force level training requirements and unplanned events. Staff attendance at training is closely monitored and a comprehensive record is maintained for each staff member. This helps to inform the Airport Section when refresher training is required and fill any gaps in terms of training that officers need to undergo. The plan for 2012-13 features aspects of policing the Olympic Games that will impact on the Airport. It is clear that the resources available for training will be limited and prioritisation of essential training will be even more important than before. The Police Authority was

Evidence

Evidence

Evidence

The officers we spoke to report having a good relationship with taxi operators and taxi drivers frequenting the airport, clearly acknowledging how important this is and recognising the contribution that this group can make in terms of intelligence.


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Supervisors and key post holders new to airport policing attend the UK Airport Commanders Group (UKACG) training workshop

Senior officers and staff attend the UK Airport Commanders Group (UKACG) conference

provided with a copy of the most recently updated annual training plan and an example of a five week plan.

The officers we spoke to said that the possibility of undertaking joint training with the airport operator had been explored with the operator’s training manager, however, it became clear that the differences in knowledge requirements were too sizeable to make any such arrangement worthwhile. Although joint training with other airports is not carried out, the Airport Section has very good links with outside airports and there is a regular exchange of intelligence and good practice. For example, firearms officers from Manchester Airport Section have visited Stansted Airport, in its capacity as a ‘designated hijack airport’, to gather good practice.

The Police Authority was interested to find out about the training provided to officers and staff new to the Airport Section. New officers arrive fairly regularly and benefit from a minimum of a two-day induction programme. They are also provided with relevant material via the Section’s 3T computer package. Following the induction, which includes a comprehensive tour around the site with the neighbourhood team, each new officer is put in company with a Procedures Officer. These postholders perform a similar role to that of a tutor constable on a geographical basic command unit, are well-versed in the workings of the Airport and have extensive knowledge of relevant policies, plans and procedures. Due to the unique and specialised nature of policing the airport environment and the different types of incidents that arise, it is not considered a suitable posting for student officers.

At the time of the scrutiny review, the most recent UK Airport Commanders Group training workshop had taken place between 5th and 7th April 2011. Attendees from GMP Manchester Airport Section were the Airport Commander, Deputy Airport Commander, the Police Services Agreement Team Manager and Police Services Agreement Coordinator.

The UK Airport Commanders Group conference took place on 28th September 2011. Attendees from GMP Manchester Airport Section were the Airport Commander, Deputy Airport Commander, the Police Services Agreement Team Manager and Police Services Agreement Coordinator. The conference covered a variety of pertinent topics including attack methodologies, an update on the aviation security review, threat assessment and response plus a guide to relevant content within the Police OnLine Knowledge Area (POLKA).

It is clear from the information provided about the specific individuals who attended the above events that there have been significant changes in leadership at the Airport. A new Section Commander took up post recently and in addition, a new head of Specialist Operations, the Branch to which the Manchester Airport Section belongs, started on 1st March 2012.

Evidence

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Sharing information on performance in a transparent way with the airport operator and members of the Risk Advisory Group (RAG) and Security Executive Group (SEG) is a key thrust in this section of the guidance. It highlights the importance of developing and maintaining an effective performance management framework aligned to force policy and procedure plus relevant elements of the work of the Risk Advisory Group and the Security Executive Group.

There is a clear emphasis within the guidance on the fact that the principles of neighbourhood policing are just as pertinent and applicable in an airport setting as they are elsewhere. That being said, however, there is a recognition that airport operators will need to be convinced of the value added by neighbourhood policing and that the model adopted will link to the size of the airport. Forces should ensure that neighbourhood policing staff are conversant with the Airport Security Plan and the Police Services Agreement and “can deliver protective security while engaged in neighbourhood duties.”

needed around the force’s customer service strategy, in particular in the area of follow up with victims of crime.

This has now been included within the performance regime. Anti-social behaviour has also been identified as a priority.

As mentioned above, the manner in which performance is reported to the airport operator has recently been transformed. As the operator monitors Airport Section performance closely, with a focus on ensuring that airport policing represents value for money, the Section has developed a pack that reports performance in a manner that suits their needs. This has been well received by the airport.

Manchester Airport Section generates a monthly pack which covers key areas of performance including recorded crime, detections, attendance at grade 1 and grade 2 incidents, sickness and other human resources indicators. The pack has been further developed in recent months to ensure that the information meets the needs of both the airport operator and the Section. The chief inspector meets with each inspector every five weeks to discuss performance. The Airport Commander meets with the airport operator once a month to review performance.

Our review indicated that to help improve performance a cultural change had been needed in terms of the way that performance was monitored by the Manchester Airport Section. There has been a move towards an “honest conversation” with staff, building in action planning to improve performance and develop staff capability. The efforts of officers and staff who consistently do the job well are recognised by allowing them to represent GMP, for example, on visits to benchmark Manchester Airport Section against other airport sections such as Gatwick. Good-performing officers also get the opportunity to act up to the next rank on a rotational basis. Sickness action plans have also been introduced. These changes have resulted in a number of officers being set action plans to improve their performance.

The outcomes from the most recent Airport Section priority setting process identified that work was




Evidence

There is a performance management framework in place

There is an agreed process for sharing performance data with the airport operator

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There are procedures in place to guide armed officers attending incidents that do not require them to be armed


Neighbourhood policing is very much seen as ‘business as usual’ at the Airport. Key individual networks (KINs) have been developed and the information and views they provide are used to inform priorities. The airport operator is a key influence with regard to the neighbourhood policing effort and a driver behind the need for the Airport Section to provide services of the highest quality to its customers.

Officers reported that, although the Section aims to have unarmed officers available, as there are only a certain number on each team at the Airport, it is unavoidable that authorised firearms officers attend ‘regular’ incidents. If time permits officers should disarm or store their weapons so as to attend the incident unarmed. In some instances, however, this is not possible and officers follow a standard operating procedure which governs how they should carry their weapon. In some airports, all officers are armed and this lack of unarmed capacity has been criticised.

The officers and staff we spoke to emphasised that patrol regimes are very much risk-based, focusing on the locations and times that are assessed to be the most vulnerable (e.g. car parks, cargo areas).

A seven point plan has been developed to govern the introduction of the second phase of the force’s new policing model (known as PMIT 2).

Evidence

Evidence

Evidence

A unique feature of airport policing is the predominance of armed officers. The guidance stresses the importance of establishing appropriate procedures and policy with regard to the attendance of such officers at incidents which do not require an armed presence. Also highlighted is the need for patrol regimes and the workforce mix to consider the outcomes of risk assessments carried out by the Risk Advisory Group and Security Executive Group to support the Airport Security Plan plus the roles performed by the airport operator’s own security personnel.

Uniform Patrol

Shoplifting (including the unique problem

posed by travelling thieves)

Rough sleepers and begging

Vulnerable people

Crime in the hotels (n.b. a Hotel Watch scheme

has been established)

Theft in cargo areas

Theft of and from vehicles

Issues picked up and addressed through neighbourhood policing include:

Policing at the airport supports the force neighbourhood policing strategy

The airport neighbourhood policing model take the operator’s views and needs into account

There are risk-based and locally appropriate integrated patrol regimes for:

• Landside roads• Airport rail and bus stations• Airport car parks• Terminal landside areas• Cargo areas• Fuel farms• Security restricted area and critical part• Airport perimeter fence

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Savings had been made in a numbr of areas including:

The Police Arbitration Panel decision will affect the cost of policing at the airport e.g. shift allowances, special priority payments, pensions changing etc. It is widely expected that costs will reduce as a result.

Value for Money

A key element of our scrutiny review examined issues of relevance to value for money in relation to the policing of airports. The commercial relationship which exists between the force and the airport operator is very influential and there is an imperative on the force to make savings each year when negotiating the Police Services Agreement.

Manchester Airport Section submitted copies of financial information included the 2011-12 Police Services Agreement budget forecast and year to date spend, answering questions in relation to the individual budget heads.

It was explained that information regarding costs under Police Services Agreements at other airports is not freely available and is subject to commercial confidentiality clauses within the Police Services Agreement contracts between the relative airport operators and the respective police authorities.

Queries were raised in relation to Airwave, Automatic Number Plate Recognition maintenance and the Corporate Department recharge. The Corporate Department Recharge amount is based on a percentage of the total workforce costs.

Evidence

in uniform costs, achieved through the introduction of a more stringent authorisation process;

Purchase of a minibus (annual hire charges were higher than the purchase price)

Firearms (ammunition savings)

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The Police Services Agreement is the last element of the security planning process for airports where it has been agreed that some security measures in the Airport Security Plan should be carried out by a dedicated police presence. The Police Services Agreement should:

Our review examined progress in the development, agreement and implementation of the Airport Security Plan (ASP) and Police Services Agreement (PSA) in relation to Manchester Airport.

The Development, Agreement and Implementation of the Airport Security Plan and Police Services Agreement

As mentioned earlier, all UK airports should agree a local Airport Security Plan (ASP) with their key stakeholders and make sure that, where a need for dedicated policing services is identified, the airport operator meets the cost of those services.

Identify the level of policing required;

Identify the accommodation and facilities that are to be provided by the airport operator to allow the policing service to be delivered.

Define the amount of any payments to be made by the airport operator for that policing, or the manner in which the amount is to be assessed;

The Airport Section gave an update on the Airport Security Plan (ASP) and Police Services Agreement (PSA). Following some considerable negotiation, the Police Services Agreement for 2011-12 had been signed by the airport operator.

Following a substantial review, the proposals for the Agreement for the year commencing 1st April 2012 had been submitted to Manchester Airport plc and a comprehensive presentation explaining the rationale for resourcing and funding different policing functions provided. The response received from the airport operator would indicate they believe there is still scope for negotiation in relation to the 2012-13 proposals.

The scrutiny review team established that GMP has worked hard to ensure that the process adheres closely to that outlined within the Airport Security Planning Guidance (i.e. develop a risk register; determine mitigating measures; pull together the Airport Security Plan and police services required to meet that plan; negotiate the Police Services Agreement based on the service requirements).

Evidence

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Assess the impact on policing of the planned Airport City Enterprise Zone

Logistics supporting the expansion of the World Freight Terminal

Business space including office accommodation, advanced manufacturing, research and development and health related uses

Science and research

Other uses including hotel, leisure, retail and residential development.

The Airport City Enterprise Zone is not within the geographical boundary covered by the current Police Services Agreement, nor are there any proposals to bring it within the area routinely covered by GMP resources based at Manchester Airport. It is actually located within the South Manchester Police Basic Command Unit area.

Manchester Airport Section acknowledged that potential criminal and terrorist activity would have an impact on Manchester Airport. Meetings have been scheduled with the South Manchester BCU Commander to develop appropriate strategies and contingencies to deal with such activity during development.

Manchester Airport Section also submitted a report by the Counter Terrorist Security/Crime Reduction Advisor to the Authority on the Airport City proposals.

The Airport City Enterprise Zone

This development is a private sector led project, jointly owned by Manchester Airport Group, Manchester City Council and the developers, Goodman. The development of Airport City within 12 months has been announced. As an Enterprise Zone, much of the site will be subject to simplified planning applications using Local Development Order Powers, resulting in quicker planning to building development and completion.

The Airport City site is expected to include:

Evidence

Proposed AirportCity Site

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Appendix

Greater Manchester Police

Superintendent Phil Davies

Superintendent Robert Lomas

Chief Inspector Mike Miskell

Detective Chief Inspector Gill Mellor

Inspector Jon Percival

Inspector Paul Nield

Inspector Angela Bradley

Sergeant Janet Metcalfe

Sergeant Debra Rasmussen

Sergeant Dave Pawsey

Acting Sergeant Peter Naden

Detective Sergeant Ian Greenhalgh

Constable Phil Gleave

Constable John Harte

Detective Constable Andy McNab

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Contributors to Review

gmpa scrutiny review of policing at manchester airport

Documents