global energy dilemmas

Global energy dilemmas:a geographical perspectivegeoj_375 275..290

MICHAEL J BRADSHAWDepartment of Geography, University of Leicester, University Road, Leicester LE1 7RH

This paper was accepted for publication in June 2010

This paper examines the relationship between global energy security and climate change policy.There are growing concerns about the sustainability of the future supply of hydrocarbons. Theenergy system is the single largest source of anthropogenic greenhouse gases, therefore it is nosurprise that decarbonising the supply of energy services is a key element of climate change policy.The central proposition of this paper is that the world faces a global energy dilemma: can we havesecure, reliable and affordable supplies of energy and, at the same time, manage the transition to alow-carbon energy system? The paper is divided into five sections. The first section considers thecontemporary challenges to global energy security, focusing on the possibility that in the future oilproduction might not be able to meet demand. The second section considers how the perils ofclimate change are forcing us to rethink the very meaning of energy security such that a low-carbonenergy revolution is now called for. The third section explains that while the developed world islargely responsible for the anthropogenic carbon emissions currently in the atmosphere, a globalshift in energy demand is underway and over the next 20 years it is the developing world that willcontribute an ever-increasing share of global emissions. The fourth section introduces the notion ofthe global energy dilemma nexus to explain how the processes of globalisation are the driving forcebehind this global shift in energy demand and carbon emissions. The final section explains how theglobal energy dilemma nexus plays itself out in different ways across the globe. The conclusionssuggest that human geography can make a significant contribution to social science research onenergy security and climate change.

KEY WORDS: energy security, climate change, globalisation, peak oil, low carbon

Introduction

This article focuses on the global energy system,the major source of global greenhouse gas(GHG) emissions and the principal target of

climate change policy. It proposes that we now face aglobal energy dilemma created by concerns about thefuture availability of fossil fuels (energy security) andthe impact of their exploitation on the planetary eco-system (climate change). Put another way, can wehave the energy necessary for economic developmentand, at the same time, manage the transition to alow-carbon energy system necessary to avoid cata-strophic climate change? The aim is to demonstratehow a geographical perspective adds insight to theanalysis of energy security and climate change. Theanalysis combines three relatively disparate sets ofliterature on: global energy security, the economicgeography of globalisation and the politics and eco-nomics of climate change. This article is part of alarger study and deliberately paints a broad picture tohighlight the key issues and drivers. The central

message is that while there may be a single globalenergy dilemma, it is played out in very different waysacross the states that make up the global politicaleconomy and that understanding this is essential toreaching international agreement on climate changepolicy.

The discussion is divided into five sections. The firstsection considers contemporary challenges to globalenergy security, focusing on the possibility that futureoil production might not be able to meet growingdemand. While such concerns provide an obviousmotivation to reduce our reliance on fossil fuels, thesecond section considers how climate changerequires us to rethink the very meaning of energysecurity such that a low-carbon energy revolution isnow called for. The third section explains that while itis the developed world that is responsible for theanthropogenic carbon emissions currently in theatmosphere, a global shift in energy demand is under-way and over the coming decades the developingworld will contribute an ever-increasing share ofglobal emissions. The fourth section introduces the

The Geographical Journal, Vol. 176, No. 4, December 2010, pp. 275–290, doi: 10.1111/j.1475-4959.2010.00375.x

The Geographical Journal Vol. 176 No. 4, pp. 275–290, 2010 © 2010 The Author(s). The Geographical Journal © 2010 The Royal Geographical Society(with The Institute of British Geographers)

global energy dilemma nexus to explain how the pro-cesses of globalisation are implicated in this globalshift in energy demand and carbon emissions. Thefinal section explores how the global energy dilemmanexus plays itself out in different ways across theglobe. The conclusions suggest that while humangeography has much to offer, a new focus and divisionof labour is required to consider the key issues ofenergy security and climate change.

Challenges to global energy security

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA)(2007, 160), ‘Energy security . . . means adequate,affordable and reliable supplies of energy.’ This defi-nition, like the IEA itself, is a product of the 1970swhen the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum ExportingCountries) oil embargo brought about a significantincrease in the price of oil and heralded concernsabout the geopolitical dimensions of energy supply(Yergin 2006). Energy security can be defined in manyways and is increasingly associated with geopoliticsand national security concerns (Yergin 2008); conse-quently, the state sees itself as the guarantor of energysecurity (Cuita 2010). This is because an adequate,affordable and reliable supply of energy is the life-blood of modern society.

Fossil fuel capitalism

The fabric of our economy and, some would argue ourpolitical system (‘carbon democracy’), is dependentupon the plentiful and relatively inexpensive supply ofthe fossil fuels (Homer-Dixon and Garrison 2009;Mitchell 2009). Furthermore, the spatial organisationof the global economy, its component economies andsupporting infrastructure, particularly transport, aremade possible and are dependent upon reliableaccess to relatively cheap energy. However, whenviewed in the span of human history, fossil fuel capi-talism is a relatively short and very particular period ofdevelopment modelled around the industrialisation ofwhat are now the developed market economies of theOrganisation of Economic Cooperation and Develop-ment (OECD) (Smil 1994; Podobnik 2006; Huber2008). As Altvater (2007, 38) notes:

The ‘westernization’ of the world has led to a pattern ofproduction and consumption which builds intensively onthe nearly limitless availability of matter and energy,sophisticated technology, and the existence of natural‘sinks’ in which solids, liquids and gas-emissions can bedumped.

In referring to natural ‘sinks’, Altvater highlights thefact that the energy services provided by the con-sumption of hydrocarbons come with externalities, inthe form of pollution and environmental degradation,the cost of which is seldom bourn by the producer or

the consumer. In fact, the cost of energy remainsrelatively low given the significance of its contributionto economic growth (Ayers and Warr 2005). This‘market failure’ has been essential to keeping energyservices affordable, but it now threatens the planetaryecosystem (Stern 2007).

For most of the twentieth century, the plentiful andinexpensive supply of energy was taken for grantedand industrial societies, of both the capitalist and statesocialist type, grew by consuming ever increasingamounts of energy, predominantly in the form of fossilfuels. As industrialisation (and with it urbanisation)spread in the form of colonialism and, more recently,globalisation so did its fossil fuel addiction. However,a number of factors now challenge the sustainabilityof what Altvater calls ‘fossil capitalism’. In the contextof the continued supply of fossil fuels, it is common-place to divide the challenges to into ‘above-ground’and ‘below-ground’ factors.

The ‘above-ground’ factors relate primarily to theconsequences of the changing ownership and controlof oil and gas resources (coal is more widely distrib-uted and is less susceptible to these forces). The wide-spread nationalisation of the oil industry and thecreation of OPEC broke the hegemony of the OECDand its associated international oil companies (IOCs).The actions of OPEC in 1973 brought a change in thebalance of power between the oil-importing and oil-exporting states. But, despite popular belief to thecontrary, OPEC does not control the price of oil, ratherthere is a global market with a delicate and volatilebalance between supply and demand, characterisedby cycles of boom and bust. The increasing ‘financiali-sation’ of oil complicates the situation as both specu-lative activity and growing physical demand for oilplayed a part in the recent record high oil prices(Labban 2010). In the 1970s the IOCs dominatedglobal oil production and held the majority ofreserves, but by 2007 state-controlled national oilcompanies (NOCs) accounted for 52% of global oilproduction and held 88% of total reserves (EIA2009a). In fact, the challenge for the IOCs today isgaining access to reserves to develop and they areincreasingly forced into extreme environments suchas the deep water offshore (Bridge and Wood 2010)and, as the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexicodemonstrates, this is fraught with risks. For the energy-rich states, control over the rents generated by theirenergy exports is a central concern and some states,such as Russia, have sought to use their energy wealthto promote their foreign policy goals. Some energy-importing states have decried this as ‘resource nation-alism’, a criticism that rings hollow when the UnitedStates and its allies continue to use their militarystrength to protect supplies of oil (Harvey 2003;Jhaveri 2004; Bromley 2005; Klare 2005; Rutledge2006). There is a now view, that the rising tensionsbetween energy-exporting and energy-consumingstates in an increasingly tight supply situation is result-

276 Global energy dilemmas: a geographical perspective


ing in an age of ‘resource wars’ where energy import-ing powers compete for control and influence overenergy exporting states (Heinberg 2003; Klare 2002).

‘Peak Oil’ and ‘the end of easy oil’

The ‘below the ground’ factors relate to the finitenature of hydrocarbon energy resources. The totalamount of hydrocarbons on the planet today is theresource base, but this is not the amount available forhuman exploitation, that is the ‘proven reserve’.According to BP (2009, 6), the ‘proven reserve’ is‘generally taken to be those quantities that geologicaland engineering information indicates with reason-able certainty can be recovered in the future fromknown reserves under existing economic and operat-ing conditions’. The level of proven reserves is neitherstable nor absolute, at any given moment whether ornot a particular deposit or field is developed is con-ditional upon the price that the resource commands(and projections of future price), the technology avail-able and the political, legal and fiscal conditions inthe host country. Confidence in sustained high pricescan open up reserves in high cost locations. Forexample, price hikes in the 1970s made viable theexploitation of oil reserves in the relatively high costlocations of Alaska and the North Sea, thus increasingOECD production and reducing the level of depen-dence on OPEC. Most recently, high oil prices havemade the exploitation of non-conventional oilreserves, such as the Canadian oil sands, economi-cally viable. Equally, a fall in price can bring about areduction of investment in high-cost and/or high-riskfields. Technological change can also increase inresource availability; the current surge in the produc-tion of non-conventional shale gas in the UnitedStates is a case in point. The macro-economic situa-tion also affects energy demand and price and candelay investments in new production. Consequently,there are now growing concerns that once economicgrowth returns demand may quickly outstrip supply,resulting in a price spike that could even trigger asecond recession (IEA 2009; EIA 2010).

This discussion demonstrates that the distinctionbetween ‘above’ and ‘below ground’ factors is notclear-cut and that the future availability of fossil fuelsis difficult to predict. Nonetheless, the advocates of‘Peak Oil’ maintain that the current tightness of oilsupply reflects the fact that the global oil industry isabout to or will soon reach peak production and thatthereafter there will be a substantial decline in achiev-able levels of production (Deffeyes 2001; Hirsch et al.2005). In its purest form, ‘Peak Oil’ is a ‘below-ground’ problem. It is about how much of the reservebase has already been consumed and how much isavailable now and in the future. More specifically, it isabout the maximum rate of production that can beachieved and sustained. The notion of ‘Peak Oil’ ishighly contested because, as noted above, knowledge

of the extent of reserves is limited and the level ofproduction is contingent upon so many ‘above theground’ factors (Mills 2008; Clarke 2007). There arealso very strong vested interests in maintaining a beliefin the continued abundance of affordable hydrocar-bons, not least the IOCs. That said, it is recognised byall that the end of the oil age will come long beforethe world physically runs out of oil. The UK EnergyResearch Centre recently conducted a review of theoil depletion literature and concluded that: ‘the dateof peak production can be estimated to lie between2009 and 2031’ (Sorrell et al. 2009, ix) and that: ‘apeak of conventional oil production before 2030appears likely and there is a significant risk of a peakbefore 2020’ (2009, x).

In the past, the IEA confidently predicted ever-increasing levels of global oil production. However, intheir World Energy Outlook 2008 (IEA 2008, 42),while maintaining that global oil resources are stillplentiful, they warned for the first time that there couldbe no guarantee that new reserves would be exploitedquickly enough to meet the level of demand projectedin their ‘reference scenario’ (business as usual or BAU).Together with IOCs such as BP, Shell and Total, the IEAhas become a proponent of the notion of ‘the end ofeasy oil’. Put, simply, while there is no physical short-age of oil reserves; the problem is that new productionis increasingly more difficult to access (or in somecases is in the hands of less competent NOCs), morecostly to extract and will take more time to reachmarket. As a result, it will be increasingly challengingto match supply with demand. In their Energy sce-narios to 2050, Shell (2008, 8) predicts that by as earlyas 2015 ‘growth in the production of easily accessibleoil and gas will not match the projected rate ofdemand.’ By contrast, the influential consultingcompany IHS-Cambridge Energy Research Associatesmaintains that oil production will be around 115million barrels per day (mb/day) in 2030 with noevidence of a peak in supply before then (IHS-CERA2009). Thereafter, they maintain there will be an‘undulating plateau’, rather than a peak and decline inproduction (this view is heavily dependent of produc-tion from non-conventional sources such as oil sandsand biofuels). The US Energy Information Administra-tion (EIA 2009b, 2) predicts total liquids supply (oiland condensate) to be 106.6 mb/day in 2030. Both theIEA and EIA predict that fossil fuels will still dominatethe global primary fuel mix in 2030. According to IEA’sWorld energy outlook 2009 (IEA 2009, 42), oil’s shareof global demand will fall from 34% now to 30% in2030, but the level of demand will increase from85 mb/day in 2008 to 105 mb/day in 2030. ExxonMo-bil’s (2009, 28) latest Outlook for energy predicts totalliquids supply (including production from oil sandsand biofuels) will reach 104 mb/day in 2030. Thus, themainstream forecasts a daily production level of over100 mb in 2030, considerably above current produc-tion levels.

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The Geographical Journal Vol. 176 No. 4, pp. 275–290, 2010© 2010 The Author(s). The Geographical Journal © 2010 The Royal Geographical Society(with The Institute of British Geographers)

Not surprisingly, the advocates of peak oil considerthese estimates to be unrealistic. Aleklett et al. (2010)maintain that the IEA has significantly overstated theprospects for future oil production and that it puts fartoo much faith in production from ‘fields yet to bediscovered’. Consequently, they believe that world oilsupply in 2030 could be as low as 75 mb/day, whichis significantly lower than current production. In sum,while there is no consensus, there are real doubtsabout the ability of oil production to match demand inthe future (natural gas faces many of the same chal-lenges and is more difficult to transport); but there arealso other pressing reasons why the world shouldreduce its reliance on hydrocarbons.

A new energy paradigm

Anthropogenic climate change has forced the issue ofcarbon dioxide (CO2) emissions onto the energypolicy agenda. Energy is central to climate changepolicy for the simple reason that the consumption ofhydrocarbons to supply energy services is the singlemost significant source of CO2 emissions. The IPCC(Sims and Schock 2007, 253) estimates that fossil fuelenergy has released 1100 GtCO2 into the atmospheresince the mid-nineteenth century. According toBaumert et al. (2005, 41): ‘61 percent of GHGs (andalmost 75 percent of all CO2) stem from energy relatedactivities, with the large majority coming from fossilfuel combustion’. The IPCC’s fourth assessmentreport’s Summary for policymakers (2007, 2, 5) statesthat:

Warming of the climate system is unequivocal’ and that‘Most of the observed increase in global average tempera-tures since the mid-20th century is very likely (emphasisin original) due to the observed increase in anthropogenicGHG concentrations.

Therefore, if one believes that increased anthropo-genic emissions of CO2 are the major cause of climatechange, as the science suggests, and that the burningof fossil fuels is the single largest source of CO2 emis-sions, it follows that climate change policy must aimto reduce the burning of fossil fuels to deliver energyservices. Put another way, energy policy must nowaddress the need to develop low-carbon sources ofenergy. Of course, this could be achieved by findingways of using fossil fuels without introducing largeamounts of CO2 into the atmosphere (Jaccard 2005).But, many believe that there is now a new energyparadigm where, according to Helm (2007, 34), thecentral question is ‘how to design a new energy policywith security of supply and climate change at thecore’. The paradoxical nature of the current energysecurity climate change debate is described byHomer-Dixon and Garrison (2009, 20) as the best-case and worst-case scenario:

The best we can hope for is that we don’t run out of cheapoil, and the worst we have to fear is that we will continueto burn fossil fuels, including oil, as we’ve burned them inthe past.

A low carbon energy revolution

In the introduction to its World energy outlook 2008,the IEA (2008, 37) states that:

It is no exaggeration to claim that the future of humanprosperity depends on how successfully we tackle twocentral energy challenges facing us today: securingsupply of reliable and affordable energy; and effecting arapid transformation to a low-carbon, efficient and envi-ronmentally benign system of energy supply.

Anticipating the Copenhagen UN Climate ChangeSummit (hereafter Copenhagen Summit), the IEA’sWorld energy outlook 2009 focused on the changes tothe global energy system needed to stabilise atmo-spheric CO2 concentrations to 450 ppm, which wouldlimit to 50% the probability of a 2°C global tempera-ture increase. Their report states that:

Continuing on today’s energy path, without any changein government policy, would mean rapidly increasingdependence on fossil fuels, with alarming consequencesfor climate change and energy security.

IEA (2009, 44)

However, the IEA maintains that ‘limiting temperaturerise to 2°C requires a low-carbon energy revolution’.End-use energy efficiency is seen as the largest con-tributor to CO2 abatement in 2030, with big reduc-tions in the role of coal-based electricity generationand bigger contributions from nuclear power andrenewable energy. They also see carbon capture andstorage (CCS), which has yet to be proven on acommercial scale, contributing a 10% reduction inemissions in 2030 compared to today. In the trans-portation sector, where dependence on oil is greatest,improved fuel economy, the use of biofuels andhybrid and electric vehicles will lead to a big reduc-tion in demand. As a result, global oil demand wouldbe 89.25 mb/day in 2030, which is slightly higherthan it is today. However, even in the 450-scenario,fossil fuels still account for 68% of world primaryenergy demand in 2030, but the share of zero-carbonfuels increases from 19% in 2007 to 32%. Thislow(er)-carbon energy revolution comes at consider-able cost; the 450-scenario requires $10.5 trillionmore investment in energy infrastructure and energy-related capital stock globally than in the referencescenario. Clearly, the new energy paradigm and asso-ciated low-carbon revolution require a major politicalcommitment from the international community andindividual states. It also requires a pace of techno-



logical change unmatched in human history (Kramerand Haigh 2009). The legacy and equity issues asso-ciated with climate change mean that the globalNorth (principally the member states of the OECD)must lead the way, if for no other reason than the factthat they are responsible for the vast majority of theanthropogenic GHG gas emissions in the atmosphere(Parks and Roberts 2008). But, it is also the case thatthe global South will have to limit (mitigate) CO2

emissions to achieve the 450-target (Wheeler andUmmel 2007).

The discussion so far has highlighted how the twinchallenges of energy security and climate changecombine to create the global energy dilemma: can wehave adequate, affordable and reliable supplies ofenergy that are also low-carbon? Even without theimperatives of climate change, the age of cheap andplentiful supplies of oil and gas is over. In the near-term, meeting growing demand for fossil fuels will beincreasingly difficult, costly and environmentallydamaging and could trigger further economic crisesand conflict. However, the need to stabilise and thenreduce CO2 emissions means that peak demand forfossil fuels may even come before peak production isreached. The science suggests that even if we couldsecure the fossil fuels needed to meet future demandsfor energy services, the earth’s ecosystem cannotsustain the associated increases in the level of CO2

concentrations without triggering catastrophic climatechange (Kharecha and Hansen 2008).

The globalisation of energy demand

This section considers recent trends in the geographyof energy demand and projections for future demand;the emphasis is on demand, as this is of particularsignificance in the context of the interrelationshipbetween energy security and climate change. Theanalysis uses three sources of information: BP’s Statis-tical review of world energy 2009 that provides dataon the current and past patterns of commercial energysupply and demand; the IEA’s World energy outlook2009 and the IEA’s International energy outlook 2009that both provide forecasts of future demand. Theseforecasts are based on models that make particularassumptions about the key drivers of future demandand they are widely used by both the academic andpolicy making communities (for a discussion ofenergy forecasting see, Smil (2003, 121–80) andJaccard (2005, 31–55). The discussion is based ontheir ‘reference scenarios’ that reflect what wouldhappen if current trends continued and there were nochanges in government policies. Obviously, reality ismuch more complex and energy security and climatechange concerns, plus the impact of global economicrecession, introduce high levels of uncertainty. But,the interest here is with the changing geography ofdemand and here there is general consensus between

the forecasts and the wider literature as to thekey drivers, their dynamics and their geographicalconsequences.

According to the BP statistical review of worldenergy 2009 (BP 2009), in 2008 non-OECD primaryenergy demand surpassed OECD demand for the firsttime. The main driver behind this change is the factthat the non-OECD contribution to global economicgrowth has almost doubled since the 1990s to over40% today, with most of this increase happening sincethe turn of the century (Rühl 2008, 4). Furthermore,the impact of this shift in the locus of economic dyna-mism had a disproportionate impact on energydemand as economic growth in the developing worldis far more energy intensive than in the OECD econo-mies. Consequently, over the past decade, the devel-oping world contributed approximately 90% of thegrowth in total energy demand, with the non-OECDcontribution to energy growth exceeding that of theOECD every year since 2000 (Rühl 2009, 2). Thus, ina relatively short period of time there has been adramatic shift in global energy demand and all of theindications are that this pattern is set to continue.

The IEA’s (2009, 73) reference case forecasts a 40%increase in global energy demand between 2007 and2030 and identifies China and India as the main locusof growth, followed by the Middle East. The keydrivers underlying this growth are population increaseand economic growth, with the associated processesof urbanisation and industrialisation driving demandfor commercial fuels, particularly for transportation(see Table 1). The EIA’s (2009b, 1) International energyoutlook 2009 reference case forecasts that between2006 and 2030 non-OECD energy consumption willincrease by 73% compared with a 15% increase inenergy use among the OECD countries (see Figure 1);with the so-called ‘BRIC’ countries–Brazil, Russia,India and China–accounting for more than two-thirdsof total non-OECD growth. Furthermore, much of thisadditional demand is likely to be met by coal-firedelectricity generation, with non-OECD Asia account-ing for 90% of the increase in coal use (EIA 2009b, 4).At the same time, growing demand for transportationservices means that non-OECD Asia will also accountfor the majority of the growth in demand for oil(Schipper et al. 2001). This geography of new demandgrowth will have a major impact on energy trade andwill also result in substantial new financial flows fromenergy importers to energy exporters.

The consequences for climate change

The Copenhagen Summit in 2009 involved 193 coun-tries, but high levels of energy consumption and theirrelated CO2 emissions are currently concentrated in arelatively small number of countries. According to theWorld Resources Institute (2009, 2), the top 25 emit-ters account for an estimated 80% of emissions. AsFigure 2 illustrates, the top 15 emitters accounted for



85.55% of emissions between 1990 and 2006, whilefive countries alone were responsible for 60% of emis-sions (the 27 EU members states are counted as asingle unit). Looking at these top 15, it is possible toidentify ‘old emitters’, the members of the OECD/EU(plus the core remnants of the USSR–Russia andUkraine) and ‘new emitters’, such as China, India andBrazil. As indicated above, the dynamics of demandfor these two groups are quite different.

Given the role of fossil fuel combustion in climatechange, it is no surprise that both the IEA and EIA

project significant increases in the levels of non-OECD CO2 emissions. The EIA (2009b, 109) suggeststhat:

over the 24-year projection period, the average annualincrease in non-OECD emissions from 2006–2030 (2.2%)is seven times the rate projected for the OECD countries(0.3%).

The IEA’s (2009, 180) projections show the non-OECD world accounting for 67% of total

Table 1 Key drivers of future energy demand 2005–2030

Country

Pop. growthPopulation(millions) GDP growth

Vehicle use(millions)

Energy consumptionper person

% per annum 2005 2030 % per annum 2005 2030 Urban (mtoe) Rural (mtoe)

China 0.4 1310 1460 6.1 23 230 2.6 1.4India 1.1 1100 1450 6.4 10 125 n/a n/aMiddle

East1.7 190 300 4.3 18 75 n/a n/a

USA 0.8 303 370 2.1 160 225 7.6 7.6EU 0.0 489 505 1.8 225 295 3.5 3.7

Source: Wicks (2009, 26)

noitcejorPyrotsiH450.0

400.0

350.0

300.0

250.0

200.0

150.0

100.0

50.0

0.01980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030

OECD Non-OECD

2006

Figure 1 World marketed energy consumption: OECD and Non-OECD 1980–2030Source: EIA International Energy Outlook 2009, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/world.html



energy-related CO2 emissions in 2030, comparedwith 54% in 2007. As a result, by 2030, the non-OECD countries could account for just over half thecumulative emissions since 1890. Furthermore, if thelevel of GHG concentrations predicted by the refer-ence scenario were to become a reality, it could resultin a level of atmospheric concentration of ‘1,000 ppmof CO2 equivalent over the longer term’ and an ‘even-tual mean temperature rise of +6°C’ (IEA 2009, 113).At such levels, catastrophic climate change is a cer-tainty (Stern 2007, 57).

It is important to restate that the reference casescenarios are not a projection of what is most likelyto happen; rather, if anything, they demonstrate theconsequences of inaction. However, it is safe toassume that if current trends are left unchecked, thetwin spectres of resource wars (including those asso-ciated with food security and water security) andcatastrophic climate change become far more likely.This analysis demonstrates that while the legacies ofthe past oblige the OECD countries to take the leadin reducing CO2 emissions, the dynamics of therecent past and the likely future require climatechange policies to address the needs of the devel-oping world, particularly in terms of finance andtechnology transfer, as it is they who will bedemanding an increasing share of global energy

services and generating the largest share of futureCO2 emissions.

The global energy dilemma nexus

So far discussion has focused on energy security andclimate change. It is only relatively recently that theinterrelationship between the two issues has becomethe focus of academic research and policy making.Consequently, much of the literature on the geopoli-tics of energy security still fails to engage with thepotential consequences of climate change (Bradshaw2009). Equally, the climate change literature fails toacknowledge the complexity of reducing our relianceon fossil fuels, not least overcoming the strong vestedinterests supporting the current system. Furthermore,the problems at Copenhagen suggest a need to spendless time on setting long-term targets that few canagree on, let alone achieve, and more time on under-standing the relationship between energy demand,economic growth and carbon emissions. As O’Brien(2006, 3) observes: ‘Climate change . . . is beingaddressed as a pollution problem divorced from itsrelationship to contemporary economic structures,development paths, and powerful interests.’ Theglobal shift in energy demand is centre stage in thecurrent impasse as the global South sees the North’s

Rest of the World

plus South Africa, Brazil, Indonesia

plus Mexico, Australia, Iran

plus Canada, S. Korea, Ukraine

plus Russia, Japan, India

plus EU (27)

USA plus China

USA

The top 15 emitters account for 85.55% of total CO2 emission

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

1 2 3 6 9 12 15 173

Number of Countries

Figure 2 Cumulative carbon dioxide emissions 1990–2006Source: http://cait.wri.org



demand that they must also constrain emissions as athreat to their future economic prosperity. This sectionsuggests that the missing link in understandingthe current stalemate is the impact of economicglobalisation.

There is a huge literature on economic globalisationand I do not intend to review it here (see Dicken 2004,2007); rather the focus is on globalisation processes askey drivers of the demand for energy services. For thepurposes of the discussion, economic globalisation isdefined as: ‘a set of processes whereby productionand consumption activities shift from the local ornational scale to the global scale’ (O’Brien andLeichenko 2000, 225). At the heart of these globali-sation processes is: ‘the widening, deepening andspeeding up of global interconnectedness’ (Held et al.1999, 14). The creation of global production networksand the related increase in international trade isdriving new economic activity that, in turn, is promot-ing economic development in the emerging econo-mies of the world. Economic and population growth,and the associated processes of industrialisation andurbanisation, are increasing demands for energy ser-vices in places previously beyond the reach of globalproduction networks. In many instances, these net-works create high-energy export-oriented enclavesaimed at satisfying consumer demand in the devel-oped world. At the same time, as they develop, theseemerging economies themselves become majormarkets and energy consumers in their own right. But,economic globalisation is a highly uneven processthat generates winners and losers, both within statesand between states (Leichenko and O’Brien 2008).The fact that there are still over 1.6 billion people inthe world today without access to electricity is starkproof of the highly uneven nature of these processes.

Historically, there has been a close relationshipbetween economic development and energy con-sumption. Smil (2003, 65) notes that during the twen-tieth century there was a 16-fold increase in both thelevel of economic output and the level of energyconsumption; however, closer examination of thiscorrelation reveals that it is increasingly complex anddynamic. The forecasts discussed above presume acontinuing close relationship between economicgrowth and increasing demand for energy. The IPCC(Sims and Schock 2007, 263) reports that an ‘analysisof 125 countries indicated that well-being and level ofdevelopment correlate with the degree of modernenergy services consumed per capita in each country’.The ‘Kaya Identity’ described below provides a formallink between economic growth, energy demand andcarbon emissions and plays a key role in the modelsused by the IPCC to forecast future CO2 emissions.

GHG GDP Pop GDP GDP

GDP GHGij

= × × ×

× ×∑ Pop

E E E E

i

i i ij i ij ij

where Pop is population, GDP is gross domesticproduct, and E is energy, and where the subscript iindexes sub-sectors of the economy and j indexestypes of fuels. According to Jaccard and Rivers (2009,288):

The Kaya Identity shows that total GHG emissions in acountry result from the size of the population, per capitaincome (GDP per capita), economic structure (relativesize of different sectors of the economy), energy intensity(the amount of energy consumed per unit of GDP pro-duced in each sector of the economy), fuel mix and GHGper unit of fuel.

Thus, the key drivers are population, per capitaincome, economic structure and fuel mix.

Leichenko and O’Brien (2008, 9) note that:

. . . within both academic literature and policy realms,globalization is generally viewed as separate and distinctfrom global environmental change, with each processhaving its own set of driving factors, each creating unevenoutcomes, and each requiring different types of policyresponse.

Figure 3 presents simple mapping of the key indica-tors of energy consumption, carbon emissions andeconomic development. The visual impression is thatthere is a close relationship between them; butexplaining each of these geographies and the interre-lationships between them is a complex undertaking.Below the global energy dilemma nexus is presentedto bring together the processes, consequences andissues behind global energy security, economicglobalisation and climate change policy. Such anapproach adds value and insight because it focuses onthe underlying processes driving the geographies ofenergy demand and carbon emissions that are theessential components of the Kaya Identity. Further-more, it stresses the highly uneven and dynamicnature of the tectonic shifts currently taking place inthe global political economy that are confoundingglobal agreement on climate change policy. As Liver-man (2004, 737) has observed:

New global institutions are unlikely to produce sustain-able environmental futures to the extent that they fail toaccount for regional difference and transformations thataffect the drivers and impacts of environmental changeand the local political support for national and transna-tional agreements.

Global energy dilemmas

The central proposition is that the nature of the energydilemma facing a particular region, state or worldregion is shaped by the interplay of energy securityconcerns (both security of supply and security of



A

B

C

TPES/Capita (toe)0.00–0.580.58–2.142.14–4.914.91–9.469.46–26.54

tCO2/Capita0.00–2.772.78–7.998.00–14.9714.98–29.9129.92–58.00

GDP/Capita<$1–42314231–1379913799–3204032040–6517665176–117698

Figure 3 (A) Energy consumption per capita, 2007 (total primary energy supply in tonnes of oil equivalent), (B) Carbondioxide emissions per capita, 2007 (tonnes of CO2), (C) Gross domestic product per capita (US$)



demand), the processes of economic globalisation(and the associated drivers of economic and popula-tion growth, industrialisation and urbanisation) andclimate change policy, and also by its ‘position’ in theglobal political economy (after Sheppard 2002). Thetypology presented in Table 2 stresses the interplaybetween the relative position of a particular region orstate in the global economy, its energy endowmentand status as energy rich and energy poor or energyimporter or exporter. The aim here is to provide astarting point for examining the energy dilemmanexus on the basis of groups of countries that facesimilar challenges. To support this argument a sampleof countries is identified in each category. It is under-stood that there is considerable variation amongst thestates and regions within each grouping and that somestates might occupy multiple positions in the typology.The purpose of this section is to illustrate the broadcontours of how the energy dilemma nexus plays itselfout in different ways across the globe, thus defying a‘one size fits all’ approach to the dual challenges ofenergy security and climate change.

Sustaining affluence: energy dilemmas inhigh-energy society

At the start, it is important to recognise that the situ-ation in the developed market economies (OECD) ofthe global North is but one type of energy dilemma,one where the central issues relate to securing afford-able and reliable energy services at the same time asreducing the levels of CO2 generated by ‘high-energy’lifestyles. The majority of these states are net energyimporters. This is most evident among the memberstates of the EU and Japan. The USA occupies theunusual position (as does China in a different cat-egory) of being both energy rich and dependent onenergy imports, reflecting its energy profligacy. Anumber of developed market economies are netenergy exporters: Australia, Canada and Norwaybeing the most obvious examples, which producestensions vis-à-vis energy development and climatechange policy, particularly around the development ofArctic oil and gas and non-conventional energy sup-plies such as oil sands and coal-bed methane. Conse-quently, in addition to addressing the need to reducedomestic carbon emissions, these energy-exporting

economies are increasingly concerned about thecarbon intensity of their exports. More generally, forthese wealthy economies the solution to their energydilemma is being sought through increased energyefficiency, carbon trading, the development of tech-nologies (CCS) to de-carbonise fossil fuel use andelectricity generation and the promotion of renewableenergy and nuclear power. The assumption is thatcapital and technology can be deployed to both guar-antee energy security and reduce carbon emissions.Unfortunately, the results so far have been mixed. Thisgroup accounts for the majority of the Annex I coun-tries that have carbon reduction targets as a result ofthe Kyoto Protocols. The EU-15 maintain that they areon target to meet their target of an 8% reduction on1990 levels, but others, like Australia and Canada,have seen substantial increases in emissions. The USAdid not ratify Kyoto and between 1990 and 2005 itsCO2 emissions increased by 19.9% (World Bank2009, 362). At the Copenhagen Summit the USAoffered to cut emissions by 17% of 2005 levels by2020 or about 4% below 1990 levels. Since then, theUS National Academy of Sciences (2010, 2) has sug-gested a need to reduce US CO2 emission by between80 and 50% by 2050. Clearly, much more drasticaction is required on the part of the developed marketeconomies to stabilise their CO2 by emissions by2020, and then reduce them by the 80% required by2050 to meet the 450 ppm target. Furthermore, thesuccess or failure of the developed economies hasprofound implications for the rest of the world.

Legacies and liberalisation: energy dilemmas in thepost-socialist world

Although they are industrialised, and many aremembers of the EU and some the OECD, the energy-poor states of the former Soviet bloc, primarily inCentral and Eastern Europe (CEE), face a specific set ofproblems and are undergoing a difficult set of ‘energytransformations’ that undermine their energy securityand threaten their economic prosperity (EBRD 2001;ÜrgeVorsatz et al. 2006; Buzarovski 2009;World Bank2010). At the time of the collapse of the Soviet system,these countries faced a number of disadvantages withrespect to their energy economies: as a result of theimposition of a Soviet-style industrialisation strategy

Table 2 Global energy dilemmas: a typology

Energy-rich/exporting Energy-poor/importing

Developed market economies Australia, Canada, Norway USA, Japan, GermanyPost-socialist economies Russia, Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Poland, Czech Republic, UkraineEmerging economies Saudi Arabia, UAE, Malaysia China, India, South AfricaDeveloping economies Nigeria, Venezuela Ecuador Jamaica, Kenya, Philippines

Note: The countries listed in each category are for illustrative purposes only.



they had high levels of energy intensity (energy con-sumption relative to GDP); for some, coal was thedominant energy source in the fuel mix; for most, therewas a high level of dependence on imports from theSoviet Union (predominantly Russia); the state hadtraditionally subsidised energy prices (which acted as abrake against efficiency); there were periodical energyshortages; and the energy sector was a cause of signifi-cant environmental damage (particularly air pollution).The immediate consequence of the collapse of theSoviet system was a ‘transitional recession’ that dra-matically reduced demand for energy, but it alsoreduced investment in the energy sector. The subse-quent neoliberal recipe of privatisation and liberalisa-tion changed the pattern of ownership and control ofmany of the energy systems in CEE; however, thephysical infrastructure has been much slower tochange and many inefficiencies and dependencies stillremain. At the same time, rising energy costs remain asource of economic hardship for many (Buzar 2007).With economic recovery and higher incomes,consumer-led demand for energy services has replacedthe demand previously generated by the smokestackindustries of the socialist era. Overall, energy demandhas rebounded and levels of energy intensity in CEEremain much higher than in West Europe, though someof these states face similar energy dilemmas as thelongstanding members of the EU. For example, theneed to reduce dependence on Russian energy importslessens their reliance on high-carbon energy sourcesand promotes increased energy efficiency. All thisrequires substantial capital investment, which fewstates, businesses or consumers can afford, especiallysince the region has been particularly hard hit by thecurrent global financial crisis (World Bank 2010).However, without such expenditure the windfallenergy demand and emissions reductions that were aconsequence of the collapse of the Soviet system arefast disappearing and the energy importing post-socialist states now face both energy security andclimate change challenges that could force them backonto a high-carbon path, for example by using localcoal deposits, that could see them join the ranks of thefast-growing carbon emitters.

The curse of plenty: energy dilemmas in theenergy-rich emerging world

For the ‘energy-rich’ countries the challenges areagain different and, in the short term at least, relate tomaximising the potential benefits of the income gen-erated by oil and natural gas exports. There is now alarge literature on the ‘resource curse’, the notion thatrather than promoting economic development,resource wealth can actually hinder economic growth(Auty 1993; Karl 1997; Humphreys et al. 2007). Theevidence for this is that resource-rich, and particularlyenergy-rich, economies have tended to develop at aslower rate than comparator resource-poor econo-

mies. The energy-rich states of the post-socialist worldoccupy a somewhat ambiguous position in the energydilemma typology as they are seeking to overcome thelegacies of the Soviet system, while at the same time,hoping to avoid the pathologies of the resource curse(Auty and de Soysa 2006; Ellman 2006). There is alsoa group of energy-exporting developing economieswhere energy wealth is fuelling conflict and poverty.Nigeria is the case that often comes to mind (Watts2008), where the resource curse threatens the securityof energy supplies to global markets and wheredomestically it is associated with violence, depriva-tion and energy poverty. In such a situation, climatechange policy and low-carbon futures are less impor-tant than securing peace and addressing the basicneeds of the population.

At present, many energy-exporting states are expe-riencing rapid increases in domestic demand forenergy services, with related increases in carbon emis-sions. Thus, growing domestic demand needs to befactored into the estimates of the future export capacityof energy-exporting states. For example, the energy-exporting economies of the Middle East and NorthAfrica have some of the fastest rates of populationgrowth and urbanisation in the world and this is drivinggrowing demand for energy services and increasedcarbon emissions. A situation often aggravated byenergy subsidies that provide little incentive topromote energy efficiency. Their energy and petro-chemical sectors are also a major source of emissions.The top four global CO2 emitters on a per capita basisare: Qatar, UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait. Energy-exportingstates such as Saudi Arabia are also increasingly con-cerned that climate change policy will result in sub-stantial fossil fuel demand destruction and loss ofincome from their exports. Thus, if climate changepolicy does result in substantial reductions in demandfor hydrocarbons it will present a major challenge tothose states that currently benefit from energy exports.Interestingly, some, such as Abu Dhabi, are investingheavily in renewable energy as part of a strategy ofeconomic diversification. There is also a growing rec-ognition in the Middle East that the environmentalimpacts of climate change pose a major challenge tothe region, both in terms of physical impact and theincreased risk of violent conflict (Brown and Crawford2009). Not surprisingly, within the G-77, which lobbiesfor developing countries in the climate change nego-tiations (Kasa et al. 2008), there is tension between theenergy-exporting states that want security of demandand high prices for their oil and gas, and the energy-importing states that want security of supply, lowerprices and reduced import dependence (Barnett 2008).

Fuelling growth: energy dilemmas in the energypoor emerging world

The world’s ‘emerging economies’ face a differentenergy dilemma again and it is the rapid growth of



their energy consumption and CO2 emissions thatpose the greatest challenge. For large (in terms ofpopulation and economy), but relatively energy-poorcountries, such as India and China, the critical issue issecuring sufficient energy to fuel their rapidly growingeconomies and the increased demand for energy ser-vices associated with improving living standards. By2030, China and India are projected to account for34% of total global CO2 emissions, with China aloneresponsible for 29% of the total (IEA 2009, 110).China’s recent growth in energy consumption isdirectly linked to its export-led economic develop-ment model (Wang and Watson 2007; Guan et al.2009). As it says on Apple’s iconic i-Pod: ‘Designed inCalifornia and Assembled in China.’ The net result hasbeen in a surge in CO2 emissions, such that in abso-lute terms China is now the world’s largest emitter.This is largely because the majority of China’s primaryenergy demand is met by coal – 70.2% of commercialenergy consumption in 2008 (BP 2009, 41). However,China’s per capita CO2 is still relatively low at4.7 metric tons of CO2 in 2006, compared with19.3 metric tons in the USA (CAIT 2009, 3). This sug-gests that China’s current position is driven by itsenergy mix and industrial production, and less bygrowing domestic consumer consumption. While onecannot deny the Chinese people continued improve-ments in their standard of living, this will inevitablydrive increasing demands for energy services. UnlessChina can improve its energy efficiency and developlow carbon energy sources, it will become even moredependent on imported energy and it will furtherincrease its carbon emissions. Thus, as Hallding et al.(2009, 120) note:

China’s dilemma regarding energy and climate security isclosely linked to its struggle to master low-carbon devel-opment in the midst of rapid industrialization and urban-ization. The development path China will have todiscover lies in truly unchartered territory where nocountry has yet travelled.

One positive sign is that China is making substantialinvestments in renewable energy technologies, suchas wind power, which it sees as both meeting domes-tic needs and as a new export opportunity for thefuture.

China is not alone in facing such a dilemma; Indiafaces similar challenges, as do the more rapidlygrowing economies in Latin America and Asia. Theso-called BASIC group of Brazil, South Africa, Indiaand China that played a major part in the CopenhagenUN Climate Change Summit are all members of thisgroup of emerging economies. Prior to the Summit,China announced that it would cut its CO2 emissionsper unit of GDP in 2020 by 40–45% compared with2005 levels. If the Chinese economy continues togrow at its current pace this will not result in anabsolute reduction in carbon emissions, it will simply

slow the rate of increase. The omission of Russia fromthis group reflects its ambiguous position; it shares theconcerns of the emerging economies that bindingtargets might constrain growth (and demand for its oiland gas), but values the prestige of its G8 status, whichdraws it into accepting the need for aggressive actionon climate change (Charap 2010).

The energy-poor emerging economies pose both athreat and an opportunity to global energy securityand climate change. A threat because at present theylie outside of the emissions reduction framework andif left unchecked their energy and carbon emissionstrajectories will undoubtedly make the stabilisationand reduction of global emissions more challenging.An opportunity, because much of their potentialgrowth in demand for energy services is still ahead ofthem and could be met with greater efficiency andfrom lower carbon sources that could potentially alsoimprove their energy security and also forestallincreased carbon emissions. The challenge is to con-vince them that cooperating on climate change miti-gation will not compromise their future economicgrowth. Despite the promises of financial support andtechnology transfer, their position at the CopenhagenSummit suggests that they remain to be convinced.

Degradation and development: energy dilemmas inlow energy societies

If, as Figure 2 illustrates, the EU-27, plus 14 statesaccount for over 85% of the cumulative CO2 between1990 and 2006, then it follows that 152 countriescollectively account for less than 15% of total emis-sions. The majority of those countries are in the globalSouth. Parks and Roberts (2008, 623) suggest that the136 developing economies together are only respon-sible for 24% of global emissions (including Chinaand India). This glaring disparity is explained in largepart by the fact that worldwide nearly 2.4 billionpeople use traditional biomass fuels for cooking andnearly 1.6 billion people do not have access to elec-tricity (Modi et al. 2005, 1–2). Reliance on biomassfuels is itself a cause of environmental degradation(deforestation); it also places the burden of collectionon women and children and causes ill health (UN-Energy 2005, 3). Analysis also suggests that low com-mercial energy use is correlated with high infantmortality, illiteracy and low life expectancy (Modiet al. 2005, 18). But, as incomes rise so demand forenergy services increases, this is the notion of the‘energy ladder’:

that postulates that household energy use often shows atransition from the traditional biomass fuels (wood, dungand crop residues) through direct use of liquid and solidfuels (coal and Kerosene) to modern energy forms (LPG,natural gas and electricity)

Van Ruijven et al. (2008, 2803)



Put in a less deterministic manner, the increased pro-vision of energy services is central to the developmentprocess. The UN argues that: ‘energy services areessential to both social and economic developmentand that much wider and greater access to energyservices is critical in achieving the Millennium Devel-opment Goals’ (UN-Energy 2005, 1). However,increasing levels of commercial energy demand in thedeveloping world raises concerns about energy secu-rity and climate change. From an energy security per-spective, when energy-poor developing economiesare drawn into the commercial energy system they areexposed to the price volatility of global energymarkets. For example, Barnett (2008, 1) reports that a$10 rise in the price of oil causes GDP to fall by 1.3%in Kenya, by 1.6% in the Philippines and by 2.8% inJamaica. Cumulatively, high oil prices lead to a flow ofwealth out of some of the least developed economies,many of which are already saddled with debt.

In a climate change context, the concern is thatincreasing demands for energy services in the globalSouth will generate increased GHG emissions.Wheeler and Ummel (2007, 9) maintain that it is adangerous fallacy to assume that: ‘the South can utilizecarbon-intensive growth to dramatically increaseincomes – a kind of last-minute, fossil-fuelled devel-opment’. However, it is important to distinguish, as thisanalysis does, between the fast growing emitters of theemerging world and the least developed economies ofthe global South. Martinez and Ebenhack (2008) arguethat in the case of the poorest nations, a small increasein energy availability can support a large increase inhuman welfare. Nonetheless, the World Bank (2009, 4)maintains that the developing economies must starttransforming their energy systems as they grow, other-wise limiting global warming to the 2°C level will notbe possible. The global South has a strong interest inwishing to avoid more extreme levels of climatechange, as they are the most vulnerable to its impactsand the least able to adapt (UNDP 2007, 2).

The interrelationship between energy security,development and climate change in the global South iscomplex (Hulme 2009, 281), but addressing it is essen-tial to climate change policy.The limited success of theClean Development Mechanism and the empty prom-ises of financial assistance by the G-8 have done littleto convince the developing world that the technologyand finance needed to promote a low-carbon path todevelopment will be forthcoming. For the moment, it issufficient to conclude that the global energy dilemmafor the developing economies centres on gainingaffordable access to the energy services needed topromote economic development and poverty allevia-tion without locking them into a high carbon future.

Conclusions

Energy security and climate change are global prob-lems, their inter-connected and uneven nature

means that no single country or region is responsiblefor causing them and, although some are clearlymore important than others, nor can any singlecountry or region resolve them. This analysis hasproposed that the world currently faces a globalenergy dilemma: how to satisfy ever-growingdemand for energy without doing irreparabledamage to the planet’s ecosystem. It is now widelyrecognised that the current hydrocarbon-basedenergy system is unsustainable; first, because it isbecoming increasingly difficult and costly (finan-cially and environmentally) to match the demand forenergy with reliable and affordable supplies; andsecond, because even if it were possible, this wouldresult in catastrophic climate change. This paradoxdemands nothing short of a low carbon energy revo-lution on a scale beyond the first industrial revolu-tion in a much shorter time frame. This is a dauntingprospect that will fundamentally reshape the interre-lationship between energy, economy and environ-ment. This paper demonstrates that a geographicalperspective can reveal how the socio-economic pro-cesses that underlie energy security, economic glo-balisation and climate change policy combine indifferent ways in different parts of the world. Atpresent, the global energy system is experiencing adramatic shift in its centre of gravity, as the emergingeconomies of the global South are increasinglybecoming the locus of both future energy productionand new energy demand. This shift has major eco-nomic and geopolitical implications that are centralto global climate change negotiations because it isonly by accommodating the different positions of theparticipating states that agreement can be reached.But, even if a global agreement on emission targetscan be reached, that is just the beginning of theprocess, not the end. Bringing about the kind ofenergy revolution envisioned by the IEA’s 450 ppmscenario will require huge transfers of capital andtechnology between the North and the South and itwill fundamentally change the meaning of ‘businessas usual’.

Although this analysis has been at an inter-statelevel, energy security and climate change impact andcombine across a multitude of scales. Through adetailed examination of the nature of the differentenergy dilemmas facing countries, regions, cities,communities, households and individuals across theglobe, human geography can make a significant con-tribution to energy security and climate changeresearch and thus inform the policy and investmentdecisions necessary to bring about a transition to alow carbon future. At the same time, human geogra-phers need to consider the consequences of higherenergy costs and the impact of a carbon constrained(and warming) world on the distribution of populationand economy and on living standards and patterns ofconsumption. But to realise this potential requires areconfiguration of the division of labour within human



geography, for example uniting development geogra-phers, urban geographers, economic geographers,political geographers and cultural geographers todevelop an agenda for studying the geographies ofenergy security, climate change and low carbon tran-sition. By rising to these challenges, human geographycan make a significant and original contributionto resolving some of the greatest challenges of ourtimes.

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank the Leverhulme Trust for awardingme a Major Research Fellowship that has providedme time to research and write this paper. As part ofthe same project a book entitled: Global EnergyDilemmas: Energy Security, Globalisation andClimate Change will be published by Polity Press in2012. If you wish to know more about this projectplease contact me at [email protected] or visit myweb pages at http://www.le.ac.uk/geography/staff/academic_bradshaw.html

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