general military strategic, doctrinal, operational, and leadership concepts

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General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

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General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts. Agenda. Key Theorists Principles of War Facets of the Operational Art Forms of Maneuver METT-TC Strategy Strategic Leadership. Key Theorists. Clausewitz Jomini. Clausewitz. Carl von Clausewitz - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and

Leadership Concepts

Page 2: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Agenda

• Key Theorists

• Principles of War

• Facets of the Operational Art

• Forms of Maneuver

• METT-TC

• Strategy

• Strategic Leadership

Page 3: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Key Theorists

Clausewitz

Jomini

Page 4: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Clausewitz

• Carl von Clausewitz– Prussian officer born in 1780– Resigned his commission in

1812 and joined the Russian Army to fight Napoleon

– Ideas on war were heavily influenced by the mass popular warfare of the French Revolutionary period and Napoleon’s Prussian adversary Gerhard von Scharnhorst

– Died in 1831 and his wife published his On War in 1832

Page 5: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Clausewitz

• War is neither an art nor a science– It is a continuation of “policy” (or “politics”) by

other means.– A form of social intercourse

• War is like a wrestling match– It is “an act of force to compel our enemy to

do our will.”– But it is not unilateral. It is a contest between

two independent wills.

Page 6: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Clausewitz

• Used a trinitarian analysis consisting of (1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; (2) the play of chance and probability; and (3) war’s element of subordination to rational policy – Often loosely expressed as “the people, the military, and the

government”• Analyzed “absolute war” or “war in theory,” but then

noted that factors such as poor intelligence, chance, friction, etc make war in practice different than war in the abstract

• Argued one should focus his military efforts against the enemy’s “center of gravity” (“Schwerpunkt”) – Very important concept in American military doctrine

Page 7: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Jomini• Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869) was a

Swiss military theorist who sought to interpret Napoleon

• Published the Summary of the Art of War in 1838– Became the premier military-educational text of

the mid-nineteenth century and greatly influenced Civil War generals.

– “Many a Civil War general went into battle with a sword in one hand and Jomini’s Summary of the Art of War in the other” (General J. D. Hittle)

• Product of the Enlightenment• Very geometrical and scientific approach to

war– Stressed interior lines

Page 8: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Interior Lines

InteriorLinesExterior

Lines

Page 9: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Principles of War

Page 10: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Principles of War

• British military officer J. F. C. Fuller developed a list of principles based on the works of Clausewitz and Jomini for use by the British Army in World War I

• The US Army modified them and published its first list in 1921– Objective – Offensive – Mass – Economy of force – Maneuver – Unity of command – Security – Surprise– Simplicity

Page 11: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Objective

• When undertaking any mission, commanders should have a clear understanding of the expected outcome and its impact. Commanders need to appreciate political ends and understand how the military conditions they achieve contribute to them. – Ensure that all actions contribute to the goals of the

higher headquarters. – Example: Pemberton is going to have difficulty

determining if his objective is to defend Vicksburg or defeat Grant’s army

Page 12: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Offensive

• Offensive operations are essential to maintain the freedom of action necessary for success, exploit vulnerabilities, and react to rapidly changing situations and unexpected developments.– Offensive actions are those taken to dictate the

nature, scope, and tempo of an operation. – Offensive action is key to achieving decisive results; it

is the essence of successful operations.– Example: Both Pemberton and Johnston are

defensively minded generals. Grant is exactly the opposite.

Page 13: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Mass

• Commanders mass the effects of combat power in time and space to overwhelm enemies or gain control of the situation. – Time: applies the elements of combat power against

multiple targets simultaneously– Space : concentrates the effects of different elements

of combat power against a single target– Example: McPherson will fail to mass his forces at

Raymond, instead piecemealing them into the battle as they arrive.

Page 14: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Economy of Force

• Commanders never leave any element without a purpose. When the time comes to execute, all elements should have tasks to perform.– Economy of force requires accepting prudent risk in

selected areas to achieve superiority in the decisive operation.

– Economy of force involves the discriminating employment and distribution of forces.

– Example: Pemberton will leave two divisions guarding Vicksburg that could have been of better use to him at Champion’s Hill.

Page 15: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Maneuver• As both an element of combat power and a principle of

war, maneuver concentrates and disperses combat power to place and keep the enemy at a disadvantage. It includes the dynamic, flexible application of leadership, firepower, information, and protection as well. – Achieves results that would otherwise be more costly– Keeps enemies off balance by making them confront new

problems and new dangers faster than they can deal with them. – Example: One of the main themes of this course is that the

brilliance of Grant’s generalship is not the siege of Vicksburg itself, but the maneuver that makes it possible.

Page 16: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Unity of Command

• Unity of command means that a single commander directs and coordinates the actions of all forces toward a common objective.– Develops the full combat power of a force– Usually requires giving a single commander authority– Example: The Confederate departmental system will

hinder unity of command (and effort) at Vicksburg. On the other hand, Grant and Porter will achieve great unity of effort in a joint operation.

Page 17: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Security

• Calculated risk is inherent in conflict. Security protects and preserves combat power.– Does not involve excessive caution– Measures taken by a command to protect itself from

surprise, interference, sabotage, annoyance, and threat

– Example: Threats to the Federal lines of communication from Van Dorn and Forrest will markedly influence Grant’s conduct of the campaign.

Page 18: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Surprise

• Surprise results from taking actions for which an enemy or adversary is unprepared.– It is only necessary that the enemy become aware too

late to react effectively. – Contributions to surprise include speed, information

superiority, and asymmetry.– Example: Grant’s preliminary efforts to take

Vicksburg between Dec 1862 and Apr 1863 are all failures, but they do serve to keep Pemberton guessing as to the ultimate Federal intent.

Page 19: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Simplicity

• Plans and orders should be simple and direct. Simple plans executed on time are better than detailed plans executed late.– Clear and concise plans cut down on

misunderstandings– Example: The frontal assault is the simplest, but

often the most costly, form of maneuver. Lawler successfully used the frontal attack at Big Black River.

Page 20: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Facets of the Operational Art

Page 21: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Facets of Operational Art

• Synergy

• Simultaneity and depth

• Anticipation

• Balance

• Leverage

• Timing and tempo

• Operational reach and approach

Page 22: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Facets of Operational Art (cont)

• Forces and functions

• Arranging operations

• Centers of gravity

• Direct versus indirect

• Decisive points

• Culmination

• Termination

Page 23: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Facets of Operational Art

• Synergy– Seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve

concentrations in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimum casualties

– Example: Grant’s efforts will combine pressure on Vicksburg from both land and naval forces.

• Simultaneity and depth– Place more demands on adversary forces than can be handled

both in terms of time and space– Example: Grierson’s raid against the Southern Railroad east of

Jackson will cause Pemberton to almost completely ignore Grant’s move down the west side of the Mississippi River.

Page 24: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Facets of Operational Art

• Anticipation– Remain alert for the unexpected and opportunities to exploit the

situation– Example: Pemberton completely misjudges Grant’s intentions

and fails to anticipate Grant’s crossing at Bruinsburg.

• Balance– Maintain the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a

manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness

– Example: Pemberton completely fails to achieve balance by being constantly distracted by Grant’s diversions.

Page 25: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Facets of Operational Art

• Leverage– Gain, maintain, and exploit advantages in combat

power across all dimensions– Example: Grant’s siege of Vicksburg caused

Pemberton to have to deal with not just military, but civilian considerations as well.

• Timing and tempo– Conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that

best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the adversary

– Example: Once Grant crosses the Mississippi he moves with such speed that Pemberton is left paralyzed.

Page 26: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Facets of Operational Art

• Operational reach and approach– The distance over which military power can mass

effects and be employed decisively– Example: Grant’s decision to cut loose from his base

of supplies allows him to fight a war of maneuver.• Forces and functions

– Focus on defeating either adversary forces or functions, or a combination of both

– Example: Grant’s victory at Jackson isolates Pemberton from any potential support from Johnston. Grant effects both Confederate forces (reinforcements) and functions (logistics).

Page 27: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Facets of Operational Art

• Arranging operations– Achieve dimensional superiority by a combination of

simultaneous and sequential operations– Phases: Deter/engage, Seize initiative, Decisive operations,

Transition– Example: Grant’s preliminary attempts, his maneuver, his

assaults on Vicksburg, and ultimately the siege combine to produce a logical line of operation.

• Centers of gravity– Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from

which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight

– Destroying or neutralizing adversary centers of gravity is the most direct path to victory

– Example: Grant cuts Pemberton’s lines of communication to supplies and reinforcements.

Page 28: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Facets of Operational Art

• Direct versus indirect– To the extent possible, attack centers of gravity directly, but

where direct attack means attacking into an opponent’s strength seek an indirect approach

– Example: Grant’s preliminary attempts such as the Yazoo Pass are all indirect approaches that try to avoid directly confronting Vicksburg’s strong river defenses.

• Decisive points– Usually geographic in nature, but can sometimes be key events

or systems– Give a marked advantage to whoever controls them– Keys to attacking protected centers of gravity– Example: Victory at Champion Hill guarantees Grant’s success

in the campaign by forcing Pemberton to withdraw to Vicksburg.

Page 29: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Facets of Operational Art

• Culmination– Point in time and space at which an attacker’s combat power no

longer exceeds that of the defender or the defender no longer can preserve his force

– Example: Grant starves Pemberton into submission through his siege.

• Termination– Military operations typically conclude with attainment of the

strategic ends for which the military force was committed, which then allows transition to other instruments of national power and agencies as the means to achieve broader goals

– Example: The surrender of Vicksburg gives the North control of the Mississippi River. Grant agrees to parole the 30,000 Confederates so as not to encumber his lines of communication with prisoners and to conclude the siege before Johnston might arrive to support Pemberton.

Page 30: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Forms of Maneuver

Page 31: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Forms of Maneuver

• The five forms of maneuver are the – envelopment,

– turning movement,

– infiltration,

– penetration, and

– frontal attack.

Page 32: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Envelopment

Page 33: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Envelopment

• The envelopment is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to avoid the principal enemy defenses by seizing objectives to the enemy rear to destroy the enemy in his current positions.

• Envelopments avoid the enemy front, where he is protected and can easily concentrate fires.

• Single envelopments maneuver against one enemy flank; double envelopments maneuver against both. Either variant can develop into an encirclement.

• Example: Gregg attempts an envelopment at Raymond but is confused and overwhelmed by McPherson’s larger force

Page 34: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Turning Movement

Page 35: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Turning Movement

• A turning movement is a form of maneuver in which the attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy's principal defensive positions by seizing objectives to the enemy rear and causing the enemy to move out of his current positions or divert major forces to meet the threat.

• A major threat to his rear forces the enemy to attack or withdraw rearward, thus "turning" him out of his defensive positions.

• Turning movements typically require greater depth than other forms of maneuver.

• Example: Grant turns Grand Gulf by crossing at Bruinsburg and seizing Port Gibson

Page 36: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Infiltration

Page 37: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Infiltration• An infiltration is a form of maneuver in which an

attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy rear while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires

– Typically, forces infiltrate in small groups and reassemble to continue their mission.

– Infiltration rarely defeats a defense by itself. Commanders direct infiltrations to attack lightly defended positions or stronger positions from the flank and rear, to secure key terrain to support the decisive operation, or to disrupt enemy sustaining operations.

– Example: Running the gauntlet (?) (Probably better described as a penetration)

Page 38: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Penetration

Page 39: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Penetration• A penetration is a form of maneuver in which an

attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system.

– Commanders direct penetrations when enemy flanks are not assailable or time does not permit another form of maneuver. Successful penetrations create assailable flanks and provide access to enemy rear areas.

– Because penetrations frequently are directed into the front of the enemy defense, they risk significantly more friendly casualties than envelopments, turning movements, and infiltrations.

– Example: Porter successfully runs the gauntlet of the Vicksburg batteries and takes a position south of the city to support Grant’s operation.

Page 40: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Frontal Attack

Page 41: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Frontal attack• The frontal attack is frequently the most costly form of maneuver,

since it exposes the majority of the attackers to the concentrated fires of the defenders.

– As the most direct form of maneuver, however, the frontal attack is useful for overwhelming light defenses, covering forces, or disorganized enemy resistance.

– It is often the best form of maneuver for hasty attacks and meeting engagements, where speed and simplicity are essential to maintain tempo and the initiative.

– Commanders may direct a frontal attack as a shaping operation and another form of maneuver as the decisive operation.

– Example: Grant will make two failed frontal assaults on Vicksburg before resorting to a siege.

Page 42: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Maneuver and Tempo of Operations

1862

Oct Nov Dec

1863

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun

EndTN/KY

Campaign

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paign

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Raymond JacksonChampion

Hill

BigBlackRiver

1 May 12 May 14 May 16 May 17 May

Bayou ExpeditionsFirst Offensives Siege

Page 43: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Milliken’sBend

Young’sPoint

Port Gibson

Rodney

Jackson

Raymond

EdwardsVicksburg

N

Bruinsburg

Snyder’s (Haynes’) Bluff

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r

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Grand Gulf Willow Springs

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Campaign Overview

Scale(miles)

0 10

Route ofGrant’s Army

Page 44: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Scale(miles)

0 10

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N

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Page 45: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Scale(miles)

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Page 46: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Scale(miles)

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Page 47: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Scale(miles)

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Page 48: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Scale(miles)

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Page 49: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

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Page 50: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

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Page 51: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

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Page 52: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

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Page 53: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

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Page 54: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

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Page 55: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

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Page 56: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

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Page 57: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

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Page 58: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

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Page 59: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

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Page 60: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

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Campaign of Maneuver15 May

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Page 61: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Scale(miles)

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Campaign of Maneuver16 May

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Page 62: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Scale(miles)

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Campaign of Maneuver17 May

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Page 63: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Scale(miles)

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XX

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Page 64: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

XX

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Siege of Vicksburg

10 Miles

N

Stockade RedanFort Hill

Railroad Redoubt

3d Louisiana Redan

Page 65: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

METT-TC

Page 66: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

METT-TC

• Mission

• Enemy

• Terrain and Weather

• Troops and Equipment

• Time

• Civilians

Page 67: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Mission

• Seize Vicksburg in order to control the Mississippi River and separate the Confederacy in two

Page 68: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Enemy

• Pemberton– Five divisions totaling 43,000 effectives

• Pemberton fell under Johnston’s Department of the West– Represents some potential for a relief force

• No ironclads and only a few wooden gunboats

Page 69: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Terrain

• Vicksburg located astride the railroad that linked Shreveport, LA (and thus the three states west of the river) to the eastern transportation network

• Line of bluffs that dominated the river favored defense

• Northeast and west of Vicksburg was wetland that would inhibit offensive movement

Page 70: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Troops

• Army– Grant has a maneuver

force of ten divisions (44,000 effectives)

• Navy– Porter’s Mississippi River

Squadron has about 60 combat vessels of which 20 to 25 would support the Vicksburg operation at any one time

Page 71: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Time

• Pemberton has ample time to prepare his defense

• Grant needs to attack before his supplies run out and before Johnston can reinforce

• Once the siege begins, time benefits the offense

Page 72: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Civilians

• About 5,000 live in Vicksburg

• Pemberton is responsible for their well-being

• Other civilians along the Mississippi River pose a guerrilla threat to the Federal Navy

• Potential source of intelligence

Page 73: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Strategy

Page 74: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Strategy

• Strategy is the pursuit, protection, or advancement of national interests through the application of the instruments of power

• Instruments of power (DIME)– Diplomatic– Informational– Military– Economic

Page 75: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Strategy

• Strategy is about how (way or concept) leadership will use the power (means or resources) available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends) that support state interests

• Strategy = Ends (objectives) + Ways (course of action) + Means (instruments)– Ways to employ means to

achieve ends

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Strategy

• End– Deny Federal use of the Mississippi River

• Way– Interdict river traffic at Vicksburg

• Mean– Pemberton’s force at Vicksburg

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Traditional Military Strategies

• Attrition– The reduction of the effectiveness of a

force caused by loss of personnel and materiel

• Exhaustion– The gradual erosion of a nation’s will or

means to resist

• Annihilation– Seeks the immediate destruction of the

combat power of the enemy’s armed forces

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Strategic Leadership

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Strategic Leadership Skills

• Interpersonal Skills– Communicating– Using Dialogue– Negotiating– Achieving Consensus– Building Staffs

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Strategic Leadership Skills

• Conceptual Skills– Envisioning– Developing Frames of Reference– Dealing with Uncertainty and Ambiguity

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Strategic Leadership Skills

• Technical Skills– Strategic Art– Leveraging Technology– Translating Political Goals into Military

Objectives

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Strategic Leadership Skills

• Interpersonal Skills– Communicating

• “When you first reached the vicinity of Vicksburg, I never had any faith, except a general hope that you knew better than I, that the Yazoo Pass expedition, and the like, could succeed. When you got below, and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join General Banks; and when you turned northward east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now which to make the personal acknowledgement that you were right and I was wrong.”

– Lincoln to Grant

Page 83: General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

Strategic Leadership Skills

• Interpersonal Skills– Using Dialogue

• Pemberton prefers to command behind the scenes and has little direct communication with his soldiers or subordinate commanders

– Negotiating• Grant and Porter are able to achieve Army-Navy cooperation in the

absence of a hierarchical command relationship

– Achieving Consensus• Pemberton’s superiors, Davis and Johnston, do not achieve

consensus on the proper strategy and give Pemberton conflicting guidance

– Building Staffs• Grant will draw great benefit from his logistical staff that will keep

him resupplied after he “cuts loose” from his base

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Strategic Leadership Skills

• Conceptual Skills– Envisioning

• Success at Raymond convinces Grant to shift his decisive point from the Confederate railroads to Jackson, which will allow him to isolate Vicksburg from reinforcements.

– Developing Frames of Reference• Pemberton brings from Charleston a dictum that he must not

do anything to leave Vicksburg vulnerable.

– Dealing with Uncertainty and Ambiguity• This is Pemberton’s chief failure. He is continually left

guessing by Grant’s diversions and maneuver and is always a couple steps behind.

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Strategic Leadership Skills

• Technical Skills– Strategic Art

• Control of the Mississippi would separate the Confederacy into two halves and controlling Vicksburg would give the North control of the Mississippi

– Leveraging Technology• At the time of the Vicksburg Campaign, the Confederacy has

no ironclads. The Federal Mississippi River Squadron included thirteen ironclads.

– Translating Political Goals into Military Objectives• The Anaconda Plan was rejected as a military strategy

because it failed to meet the political objective for a quick, offensive war.

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Impact of Mexican War

• Limited War

• Turning Movement

• Technology

• Junior Officers

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Limited War: Winfield Scott

• Epitomized the professional officer– Served in War of

1812, brevetted to major general

– Studied European tactics

– Became general-in-chief in 1841

• Selected by President Polk to lead a second major campaign in Mexico (Zachary Taylor’s was the first)

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Limited War: Objective• Objective as a principal of war

– When undertaking any mission, commanders should have a clear understanding of the expected outcome and its impact

– Commanders need to appreciate political ends and understand how the military conditions they achieve contribute to them.

• Winfield Scott saw Mexico as a war of limited objectives, to be waged by limited means

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Limited War: Objective• Based on this belief, Scott developed a

largely political strategy • Believed that Mexican political life centered

around Mexico City so completely that capturing the capital would paralyze the country and oblige the Mexican government to sue for peace in order to remain a government at all

• Therefore his objective was to capture Mexico City, not to destroy the Mexican army

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Limited War: Treatment of Civilians

• Scott conducted his campaign with strict regard for the rights of the Mexican citizens, making every effort to confine bloodshed and suffering to the Mexican army rather than the civilian population.

• He scrupulously regulated his soldiers’ conduct and interaction with Mexican civilians, reducing contact to the minimum necessary for the sustenance of his army and the morale of his troops.

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Limited War: Treatment of Civilians

• “But, my dear Sir, our militia & volunteers, if a tenth of what is said to be true, have committed atrocities—horrors—in Mexico, sufficient to make Heaven weep, & every American, of Christian morals, blush for his country. Murder, robbery & rape of mothers & daughters, in the presence of the tied up males of their families, have been common all along the Rio Grande…. Truly it would seem unchristian & cruel to let loose upon any people—even savages—such unbridled persons—freebooters, &c., &c….”– Scott writing the Secretary of War after visiting Taylor’s army

(Weigley, “History,” 187-188).

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Limited War

• Scott will carry his ideas about limited war into the Civil War with his Anaconda Plan

• Many Federals, such as George McClellan, will advocate a strategy of conciliation toward the Confederacy

• Such an approach will be rejected and the Civil War will become increasingly total– Pope’s General Orders– Emancipation Proclamation– Conscription– Suspension of some civil liberties– Sherman’s March to the Sea

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Limited War: Changing Times

• “… while Scott was the preeminent military strategist of the first half of the nineteenth century, he occupied a lonely plateau in more senses than one: that at the zenith of his powers he was already a museum piece, a soldier of an age gone by whose perceptions of war and strategy had little influence on most of the very West Point graduates whose service in Mexico he so fulsomely praised, because the young graduates inhabited a new world of very different values from Scott’s, the military world of Napoleon” (Russell Weigley, American Way of War, 76).

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Turning Movement

• Scott conducts amphibious landing at Vera Cruz and must then move by land to Mexico City along a predictable, well-defended avenue of approach

• Wants to avoid frontal assaults by maneuver

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Turning Movement

• Maneuver– As both an element of combat power and a principle

of war, maneuver concentrates and disperses combat power to place and keep the enemy at a disadvantage

– Achieves results that would otherwise be more costly– Keeps enemies off balance by making them confront

new problems and new dangers faster than they can deal with them

• The form of maneuver that Scott is going to rely on in Mexico is the turning movement

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Turning Movement

• In a turning movement the attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy's principal defensive positions by seizing objectives to the enemy rear and causing the enemy to move out of his current positions or divert major forces to meet the threat.

• A major threat to his rear forces the enemy to attack or withdraw rearward, thus "turning" him out of his defensive positions.

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Turning Movement: Cerro Gordo

• Scott wants to avoid a costly frontal assault so he has Robert E. Lee and other engineers recon a possible route around Santa Anna’s flank

• Lee finds a way to outflank the defenders, and Scott executes the first of several flanking movements in his march to Mexico City.

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Turning Movements and the Civil War

• “The Mexican War created an informal, unwritten tactical doctrine—to turn the enemy.” (Archer Jones)– Civil War battles and campaigns that involved

turning movements include the Peninsula Campaign, Second Manassas, and Vicksburg

• Nonetheless the Civil War will also include many costly frontal attacks such as Fredericksburg and Pickett’s Charge

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Technology: Rifles

• Two things that make these frontal attacks so costly are the rifled musket and the Minie Ball– A few volunteer units

like the Mississippi Rifles had rifles in Mexico, but the Regular Army stubbornly held to smoothbore muskets

At Buena Vista, Jefferson Davis commanded the Mississippi Rifles to “Stand Fast, Mississippians!”

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Technology: Changing Times

• By the time of the Civil War, the rifled musket and the Minie ball will cause a change in military tactics– The defense will gain strength

relative to the offense– Artillery will loose its ability to

safely advance close to the enemy and breach holes in defenses

– Close-order formations will become dangerously vulnerable

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Technology: Other Examples

• Steam-powered ships

• Ironclads

• Telegraph

• Railroads

• Balloons

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Junior Officers: Rehearsal for the Civil War

• Approximately 194 Federal generals and 142 Confederate generals previously served in Mexico

• Lee, Jackson, Hill, Pickett, Longstreet, Beauregard, Bragg, etc

• Meade, Grant, Kearney, McClellan, Hooker, Pope, McDowell, etc

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Junior Officers: Impact of West Pointers

• In 1817, Sylvanus Thayer replaced Captain Alden Partridge as superintendent of West Point and began reversing the damage Partridge had done.

• Thayer broadened and standardized the curriculum, established a system to measure class standing, organized classes around small sections, improved cadet discipline, created the office of commandant of cadets, and improved military training.

“The Father of the Military Academy”

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Junior Officers: Impact of West Pointers

• By the time of the Mexican War, Thayer’s reforms had produced a generation of men who would fill the junior officers’ ranks in Mexico.

• These lieutenants and captains stood in sharp contrast to the older officers who had not benefited from a systematic military education and training.

• The impact of Thayer and West Point was readily apparent in Mexico.

West Point was founded in 1802 and was instrumental in training engineers in the 19th Century

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Junior Officers: Impact of West Pointers

• Winfield Scott called his West Pointers his “little cabinet”

• Scott was unwavering in his acknowledgement of West Pointers declaring,– “I give it as my fixed opinion that but for our graduated

cadets the war between the United States and Mexico might, and probably would, have lasted some four or five years, with, in its first half, more defeats than victories falling to our share, whereas in two campaigns we conquered a great country and a peace without the loss of a single battle or skirmish.”

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West Pointers in the Civil War

• West Pointers will play a key role in the Civil War– 151 Confederate and 294 Federal generals

were West Point graduates– Of the Civil War’s 60 major battles, West

Pointers commanded both sides in 55– A West Pointer commanded on one side in

the other five

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Grant and Pemberton

• “A more conscientious, honorable man never lived. I remember when a general order was issued that none of the junior officers should be allowed horses during marches. Mexico is not an easy country to march in. Young officers not accustomed to it soon got foot-sore. This was quickly discovered, and they were found lagging behind. But the order was not revoked, yet a verbal permit was accepted, and nearly all of them remounted. Pemberton alone said, No, he would walk, as the order was still extant not to ride, and he did walk, though suffering intensely the while.” – Grant’s recollection of Pemberton in Mexico

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Grant and Pemberton

• Grant claimed that his recollection of this incident would convince him at Vicksburg that Pemberton would not easily yield. – “This I thought of all the

time [Pemberton] was in Vicksburg and I outside of it; and I knew he would hold on to the last.” Grant as a lieutenant in Mexico

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• Confederates Forces

Illinois State Memorial

Mississippi State Memorial