ColonialApproachestoGovernanceinthePeriphery:DirectandIndirectRuleinFrenchAlgeria

AdriaLawrence,AssociateProfessorDepartmentofPoliticalScience

YaleUniversityadria.lawrence@yale.edu

Preparedfor“ColonialEncountersandDivergentDevelopment

TrajectoriesintheMediterranean,”HarvardUniversityDecember1,2016

Draft:Pleasedonotcirculatewithoutpermission

Abstract:WhentheBritishandFrenchexpandedintoAfrica,Asia,andtheAmericas,theybeganrulingdiversepopulationsthatdifferedfromthemalongethnic,linguistic,andreligiouslines.Tomanagethisdiversity,theyarticulatedtwodistinctideologies:directandindirectrule.Advocatesofdirectruleenvisionedacolonialprojectthatwouldmodernizeandtransformcolonialterritories;proponentsofindirectrulefavoredpreservingtraditionandworkingwithlocalauthorities.Recentscholarlyworkonthelegaciesofcolonialrulehascodeddirectandindirectruleinformercolonies,arguingthatthetypeofcolonialrulehasimportantlong-termconsequences.Thispaperexamineshowtheconceptsofdirectandindirectrulehavebeendefinedandmeasuredinthesocialscienceliterature.Itarguesthatthedistinctionbetweenthetwohasbeenoverstated.DrawingonthecaseofcolonialAlgeria,itpointstoagapbetweencolonialrhetoricandactualcolonialgovernance.ThroughconsideringtheAlgeriancase,itsuggestsnewwaysofunderstandingwhyandhowcolonialstrategiesvariedovertimeandplace.

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“TheRomansaccomplishedlessinAfricain200yearsthantheFrenchhavesincetheconquest”–GeneralDaumas,speakingtotheLegislativeCorpsinAlgeria,1861.1

In1830,KingCharlesXofFrance,hopingfortheprestigeofaswiftmilitaryvictory,

sentanarmyof37,000mentoAlgeria.ThearmytookAlgiers,buttoolateforthe

unpopularCharlesX,whoseregimecollapsedinthe1830JulyRevolution.Althoughthe

originalimpetusfortheconquestwasgone,FrancewouldremaininAlgeriaforthenext

130years.HowdidFrancegovernAlgeria?Specifically,whatkindsofstrategieswere

employedtogainthecomplianceoftheconqueredBerberandArabpopulationsofAlgeria?

The“nativequestion,”asMamdani(1996)calledit,affectednotjustAlgeriabut

nearlytheentireAfricancontinentastheEuropeanpowersdividedandseizedAfrican

territoryinthe19thandearly20thcentury.Europeanapproachestogoverningpopulations

thatdifferedfromthemalongracial,ethnic,religious,andlinguisticlineshavesincebeen

characterizedasfallingintooneoftwocontrastinglogics:directorindirectrule.Advocates

ofdirectruledefendedandjustifiedcolonialismasa“civilizing”projectthatwould

modernizeandtransformcolonialterritories.Theconqueringstateprovidedthemodelto

beemulated:Europeanbureaucracies,laws,andmodesofeconomicexchangewouldbe

transplantedtothecolonies.Above,GeneralDaumasspeaksofthetransformativenature

ofcolonialrule,just30yearsaftertheFrencharrivedinAlgeria.

Incontrast,proponentsofindirectruleframedthecolonialprojectin

preservationistterms.Theyfavoredworkingwithlocalauthoritiesandmaintaining

indigenoustraditions,notreplacingthemwithacentralizedauthority.Indirectrule

impliedlimitedcolonialintervention.1L’AlgérieetleDécretdu24Novembre,1861.CentredesArchivesNationalesd’Outre-Mer.BIBB2374.

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Asthe19thcenturygavewaytothe20th,indirectruleappearedtobecomethe

preferredapproach.SirFrederickLugard(1922)formallydescribedthesystemofindirect

ruleduringhistenureinnorthernNigeria,althoughindirectrulecharacterizedearlier

rulingarrangements,includingtheresidencysysteminIndia.EventheFrench,knownfor

theircentralizedapproachtoimperialrule,beganspeakingof“association”insteadof

“assimilation.”Indirectrulewaspromotedasacorrectiontotheperceivedproblemsof

directrule:itscosts,aswellasthedifficultyofabsorbingpopulationsthatcametoseemtoo

culturallydistanttobe“civilized.”AsSirDonaldCameron,governorofTanganyika,wrote

soonafterarrivingathispost,“Itisourdutytodoeverythinginourpowertodevelopthe

nativeonlineswhichwillnotWesternizehimandturnhimintoabadimitationofa

European”(quotedinMamdani1996,80).Indirectrulewasthuschampionedon

normativegrounds,defended“asadeferencetonativeagencyand,inmoreenlightened

self-descriptions,asaformofcosmopolitanpluralism,onethatrecognizedthespecificityof

nativesociety”(Mantena2010,6).Italsohadpracticaladvantages.JulesFerry,speaking

aboutthenewlyestablishedprotectorateinTunisiabeforetheFrenchChamberofDeputies

onApril1,1884,statedthatpreservingtheOttomanBey’ssovereignty“freesusfrom

installingaFrenchadministrationinthiscountry,whichistosayitfreesusfromimposing

significantburdensontheFrenchbudget.Itallowsustosupervisefromabove,togovern

fromabove,toavoidtakingon,inspiteofourselves,responsibilityforallthedetailsof

administration”(quotedinLewis2013,62).Governingfromabovehadtheaddedbenefit

ofdeterringrebellionsinceindigenouspopulationswereexpectedtobelesslikelytorebel

againsttheirownleadersthanoutsiders.

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Thesetwostrategiesformanagingconqueredpopulationswerearticulatedand

defendedattheelitelevel,bycolonialofficersandgovernors,aswellasproponentsof

empireinEuropeancapitals.Buthowweretheycarriedoutinpractice?Evenasthe

overarchingaimsofandjustificationsforcolonialismshiftedfromatransformativelogicto

apreservationistone,empirically,imperialstrategiescontinuedtovaryacrossandwithin

territoriesthroughoutthecolonialperiod.2

Scholarsworkingindifferentdisciplineshaveaddressedthisvariationinopposing

ways.Politicalscientistsandsociologists,particularlythoseconcernedwiththelegaciesof

colonialrule,havetendedtotreatthecategoriesofindirectanddirectruleasempirical

realities,codingcolonialterritoriesbyusingmeasuresdesignedtocapturethedirectness

ofcolonialrue.3Incontrast,inrecentwork,historianshavequestionedthecorrespondence

betweenthesecategoriesandactualcolonialpractice,arguingthatindirectanddirect

strategieswereoftenlargelyrhetorical,capturingcolonialaspirationsandjustifications

ratherthanday-to-daycolonialgovernance.Inpractice,colonialofficersand

administratorsweretoobusyrespondingtoimmediatechallengesandconcernsto

implementaconsistentoverarchingstrategy,andthusmuchofcolonialruledepended

upontheman-on-the-spot.Inthisview,therewasfarmorevariationinrulingstrategies

thanthetermsdirectandindirectruleimply.4

2SeeHerbst(2000,81–89)ontheextenttowhichcolonialapproachesvariedacrossAfrica,regardlessofwhichEuropeanstatewasincontrol.3Forexamples,seeGerringetal(2011);Hariri(2012);Lange(2004);Wucherpfennigetal(2015).4SeeAgeron(1991,22);Porch(1982),addcites.Herbst(2000,82)alsoemphasizesthedifferencebetweencolonialtheoryandpractice:“somuchof“colonialscience”wasmadeupinthefaceofparticularexigenciesandoftenbythemanonthespotratherthaninthecolonialcapital,muchlessinEurope…Thehallmarkofcolonialtheorieswastheirextremeflexibilityattheexpenseoftheory.”

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Oneoftheaimsofthisprojectistoadjudicatebetweenthesecompeting

understandingsofhowcolonialgovernanceoccurred,drawingoninsightsfromboththe

recenthistoricalandsocialscientificliteratures.Fromthehistorians,Itakethepointthat

characterizationsofdirectandindirectruledonotcorrespondwellwithcolonial

governance.Indirectanddirectcharacterizationsobscureavarietyofdifferent

arrangementsthatcolonialactorsreachedwithlocalpopulations.Itisinaccuratetoposit

thatvariationincolonialstrategycanbemeaningfullyplottedalongasingledimensionof

thedirectnessofcolonialintervention.Inthenextsection,Iexaminetheconceptsofdirect

andindirectruleandtheirusageinthesocialscienceliterature,andarguethatgreater

attentionneedstobepaidtothespecificandmultiplewaysthatcolonialstrategiesvaried.

Yetcolonialrulewasunlikelytobeashaphazardashistoriesofparticularcasesmay

suggest.Thenotionthatcolonialagentshadtorespondtolocalactorsandconditionson

thespot,withoutmuchguidancefromafar,isausefulcorrective,forpreferencesfor

indirectordirectrulehadtobeinterpretedandmodifiedtothesetting,andlocal

populations’responsesandreactionsdoubtlessshapedthewillandcapacityofcolonial

actorstoact.Theconstraintsandpressuresthatcolonialagentsfacedmay,however,have

beensimilarinmanysettings,makingitpossibletoformulategeneralclaimsabouthow

andwhycolonialapproachesvariedovertimeandplace.Thispaperthusdrawsfromwork

onthepoliticaleconomyofcolonialism;likethosepapersitproposestestableexplanations

forvariationincolonialstrategiesofrule.

Iarguethatunderstandingthisvariationrequiresinvestigatingthepoliticsofthe

period.Specifically,imperialstrategieswereoftenafunctionofcompetitionandconflict

amongdifferentactorswithincolonialstates.Colonialrulerswerenotaunifiedgroup,and

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Iexaminehowdisagreementsbetweenmilitaryandcivilianofficers,betweenthoseinthe

coloniesandthoseinthemetropole,andamongthosewithdifferentpoliticalorientations,

ledtoparticularviewsabouthowcolonialruleshouldoperate.Inaddition,Isuggestthat

securityconcernsaffectedcolonialstrategy.Ilookathowcolonialviolenceandfearsof

rebellionaffectedthechoicesofcolonialactorsandtheirwillingnesstoempower

indigenousleaders.

Theseargumentsdifferfromtheexistingliterature,whichclaimsthatstrategiesof

indirectrulewereemployedwhereverfeasiblebecausetheywerecheaperandmore

acceptabletolocalpopulations,whiledirectruleoccurredwheretherewerenumerous

settlersandweakpre-existingstateinstitutions.Colonialpolitics,Iargue,weremore

importantinshapingthetypeofrulethantheattributesofthecolonialterritoryitself.

IdrawprimarilyonthecaseofAlgeriatoillustratetheplausibilityofmyarguments

andthelimitsofexistingexplanations.TheAlgeriancaseisusefulintworespects.First,the

Algeriancasedemonstratesthedifficultiesofcharacterizingasinglecolonyasgovernedby

eitherdirectorindirectrule.TheFrenchhaveoftenbeenassociatedwithdirectrule,in

contrasttotheBritish,whoaresaidtohaveruledmoreindirectly.AlgeriawasFrance’s

prizecolonyandthelevelofinterventionwasextremelyhigh.Itisoneoftheparadigmatic

casesofdirectrule.IfAlgeriacannotbeadequatelycategorizedasacaseofdirectrule,it

raisesthequestionofwhichcaseswouldcount.Second,theAlgeriancase,withitslengthy

andcomplexcolonialexperience,providesanopportunitytoconsiderthemeritsof

competingexplanationsfordifferentcolonialstrategies.ThediscussionofAlgeriais,

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however,preliminaryandincomplete.5Thepurposeistoprovideaninitialexaminationof

empiricalevidenceatanearlystageofthisproject.

Thenextsectiondiscussesconcepts.Thesecondsectionlooksatsubnational

variationincolonialapproachesinAlgeria.Thethirdsectionlaysoutthetheoryand

hypotheses.

I. Concepts:DirectandIndirectRule

Theliteraturesuggeststwowaystoconceptualizedirectandindirectrule.Thefirst

reflectsthetheoryofindirectruleaslaidoutbythecolonialiststhemselves.Itseesindirect

ruleaslessdisruptivethandirectrulebecauseitpreservedlocaltraditionsandpractices

byworkingwithalready-existingauthorities.Incontrast,directruleimposedEuropean

leaders,laws,andinstitutionsonindigenouspopulations.Indirectanddirectrulethushad

oppositeeffectsonpre-colonialstructuresofpower:indirectruleaimedtopreservethem,

whiledirectrulewasintendedtoeradicateandreplacethemwithanewcolonialorder.

Againstthisview,MahmoodMamdani(1996)arguesthatindirectruledidnot

preservepre-colonialauthoritybutwasinsteadjustasdisruptive,ifnotmoreso,than

directrule.“Inspiteofitsclaimstobeingamorebenignformofrule,onethattendedto

reproduce“nativecustom”inapermissivefashion,indirectrulewasthemorehegemonic

assertionofcolonialpower.Unlikedirectrule,itaimedatchangingthepreferencesofthe

massofthecolonized,notjustanarrowelite”(Mamdani1999,862).Indirectrule,

Mamdaniargues,didnotmaintainlocalauthorityasithadexistedbeforecolonialconquest,

5Atthisstage,IamworkingonanalyzingarchivaldatacollectedattheArchivesNationalesd’OutreMerinAix-en-Provence,withfurtherdatacollectiontooccuroverthenextyear.IlaidoutmyresearchplansandinitialhypothesesinLawrence(2016).

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butaltereditbyempoweringlocalleadersinspecificways;itmadetheirauthoritylike“a

clenchedfist”(ibid.,874).Mamdani(1996)thuscharacterizeddirectandindirectruleas

“centralizeddespotism”and“decentralizeddespotism.”

Mamdani’sclaimsraiseimportantquestionsforexistingcharacterizationsof

colonialrule:cantheexistenceandcontinuationofpre-colonialtraditionsandleadership

betakenasagiven,aspartofwhatdefinesindirectruleandsetsitapartfromdirectrule?

Ordidindirectrulealter,notpreserve,priorformsofpoliticalauthorityasMamdani

suggests?Ifso,howdiddirectandindirectrulediffer?

Numerousstudiestaketheviewthatcontinuityfromthepre-colonialerasets

indirectruleapartfromdirectrule.ScholarsofcolonialNigeriaoutlinedseven

characteristicsthatdefineindirectrule,thefirstofwhichisthecontinuityofthepre-

colonialdynasty(inFisher1994,5).Herbst(2000,83)arguesexplicitlythatMamdani

overstatedtheextenttowhichBritishindirectruledisruptedpre-colonialarrangements,

writing:“Insomeways,theBritishmanagedtoduplicatemanyaspectsofpre-colonialrule,

includingtheincompletedominationofthesubjectpopulationthatwasinevitablewhen

foreignerstriedtorulethroughlocalstructures.”Recently,Gerringetal(2011)have

offeredathoroughanalysisofdirectandindirectrule.Theyarguethatindirectrulewas

morelikelytobeemployedwherestate-likestructuresofauthorityalreadyexisted.They

conceptualizeindirectanddirectruleasacontinuum,ratherthantwodistincttypes.This

continuumrepresentstheamountofpowerdelegatedtolocalintermediarieswhorulefor

apowerfulcentralactor.Theydefineindirectruleas“amoredecentralizedframeworkin

whichimportantdecision-makingpowersaredelegatedtotheweakerentity”(Gerringet

al.2011,377).

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Notably,thesestudiescharacterizetheroleoflocalintermediariesdifferentlythan

Mamdanidoes.ForGerringetal,amongothers,indirectruleimpliespower-sharingwith

localelites,whileunderdirectrulepoweriscentralizedinthecolonialadministration.In

contrast,Mamdaniarguesthatthepowerofintermediariesstemsnotfromtheirpre-

existingstatus,butfromtheirrelationshiptotheEuropeancolonialstate.Indirectruleis

notaconcessiontothepoweroflocalelites,butservestocreateandaugmenttheirpower.

Putotherwise,forGerringetal,thepoweroflocalelitescausesthemtobecome

intermediaries,whileforMamdani,itistheirroleasintermediariesthatcausesthemto

becomepowerful.

Thetensionbetweentheseaccountsliesintheirrespectivedefinitionsofindirect

anddirectrule.ForMamdani,independentauthoritywasnotthedefiningfeatureof

indirectrule.ForGerringetal,thepoweroflocalleadersvis-à-vistheconqueringpoweris

definitional:greaterindependentauthorityimpliesindirectrule,greaterdependenceon

theconquerorimpliesdirectrule.AlthoughGerring’setaldefinitionisintuitive,

parsimonious,andpermitsvariationalongacontinuum,Isuggestthatitisproblematicin

threeways.

First,atapracticallevel,itisdifficulttooperationalize.Thepoweroftheeliteswho

ruledonbehalfofcolonialpowersvariedtremendouslyinwaysthatarenotcapturedbya

singlecontinuum.6Forinstance,localrulerscouldhaveindependentauthority,yet

6Recognizingthetremendousempiricalvariationinindirectrulearrangements,NaseemullahandStaniland(2014)offeratypologyofindirectruleinwhichthepoweroflocalintermediariesvaries.Theydescribeasuzerainsystem,inwhichlocalrulersmaintainahighdegreeofautonomy,adejuresystem,inwhichthestatemonopolizesimportantfunctionsbutdelegatescoercivepowerstolocalintermediaries,andahybridsystem,inwhichthestateandlocalintermediarieshaveoverlappingspheresofcontrol.Theytakeanimportantsteptowarddisaggregatingdifferentindirectrulearrangements,butcasesmaystillmovebetweenthesecategories,renderingcategorizationdifficult.

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exerciseitondifferentscales.AsHerbst(2000,81)writes,“insomeBritishareas,indirect

rulemeanttheappointmentofacouncilofelderswhosewritdidnotextendmuchbeyond

avillage,whileinotherareas,itmeanttherecognitionofanalreadypowerfulrulerwho

hadauthorityoverhundredsofthousandsofpeople.”Rulerscouldalsoexercisea

significantamountofpowerbutthenfindthemselvesdismissedbythecolonial

administration,whichretainedtherighttoremoveleaders.Fittingcasesontoacontinuum

ofpowerisnotaneasytaskiftheabilityoflocalleaderstoactindependentlyfluctuated

overtimeandspace.Measuresofpowerarealsodifficulttoobtainsincelocalrulers

exercisedpowersindifferentdomains,suchaspolicing,taxcollection,andthe

administrationofjustice.Measurementsofoneofthesemaynotreflecttheirpowerin

otherdomains.

Second,therequirementthatlocalleadershaveindependentauthorityomitscases

inwhichconquerorsruledvialocalleaderswhowerenotpowerfulbeforethecolonialera.

Gerringetalexplicitlydiscountindirectruleviachiefswhoarelargelycolonialcreations

fromtheirdefinition.ThewarrantchiefsinAfricaare,theysuggest,aformofpseudo-

indirectrulebecausetheyhavelittleindependentauthority.7Thispracticeofinstalling

chiefsispuzzling,however.IfGerringetalarerightthatthisisfakeformofindirectrule,it

raisesthequestionofwhytheBritishdidnotsimplyruledirectly.Whatusewerelocal

intermediarieswhodidnothavetheirownpowerbases?Whatdifferencediditmakethat

Moreover,liketheGerringetaldefinition,theimplicationthatdirectruleequateswithmorepowerforthestate,whileindirectentailspower-sharing,requiresempiricalvalidation.7Thewarrantchiefsarenottheonlyexamplesofthis;Wucherpfennigetal(2015)positthatFrenchindirectrulewasdifferentfromBritishindirectrulebecausechiefswhoworkedwiththeFrenchtendedtohavelessindependentpowerthanthechiefsinBritishcolonies.Ochono’s(2014)studyofMiddleBeltNigeriaalsoshowsthattheBritishoutsourcedcolonialruletoHausa-Fulanioutsiders,ratherthanusinglocalchiefsorrulingdirectly.

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rulerswerelocalsratherthanEuropeansiftheiractionsweredictatedbythecolonial

power?ForGerringetal(2011,388),thiswasamisstep;anattempttoconstructindirect

rulewhereitcouldnotsucceed.InMamdani’sframework,thesechiefswereuseful,not

becauseofanypriorlegitimacyorpower,butbecausethecolonialpowers’delegationof

themaschiefswasitselfasourceofpower.Reconcilingtheseviewpointsrequires

consideringwhyEuropeanssometimesworkedthroughleaderswithminimalindependent

authority.

Third,andperhapsmostimportant,definingindirectruleasapower-sharing

arrangementeffectivelyassumesawaysomeofthemostinterestingandpressingquestions

aboutwhatitwasthatindirectanddirectrulewereintendedtoaccomplish.Ifwetake

Mamdani’spositionseriously,directrulemaynothavegiventhecolonialstatemorepower

overindigenouspopulationsthanindirectruledid.Indirectrulemayhavebeena

particularlyeffectivewaytoextendEuropeanpowerandachievecolonialobjectives,orit

mayhavebeenaconcessiontoexistingpower-holders,asGerringetalsuggest.Mediating

betweenthesepointsofviewrequiresaninvestigationintothereasonswhyparticular

colonialactorsadvocatedfordirectorindirectrule.Italsorequiresabetterunderstanding

ofthepowersofandconstraintsonthelocalintermediarieswhoruledonbehalfof

Europeanstates.

ItiseasytoseewhytherelativepowerofEuropeanandindigenousactorshasbeen

consideredanimportantdifferentiatingcharacteristicbetweendirectandindirectrule.

Continuitywithpre-colonialtraditionsandthepreservationoflocalauthoritywasthe

overarchingtheoreticalgoalarticulatedbythecolonialiststhemselves.Butitisamistake

totaketheirwordforit;inpractice,thiscontinuitywasvariable.Ratherthanaccepting

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eitherthatcolonialrhetoricaccuratelydescribedarrangementsonthegroundorthat

indirectrulealteredandaugmentedthepoweroflocalelites,itmakessensetothinkof

theirpowerasavariable,notadefiningfeatureofonetypeofcolonialrule.Empirically,

bothGerringetalandMamdaniarecorrect;colonialrulersdidsometimessharepower

withlocalelites,butothertimes,theyempoweredlocalactorswhowereoutsidersorwho

hadlittlepriorauthority.

Ifwerejectaconceptualizationbasedonpower,andturnthedisruptivenessof

colonialruleintoaquestionratherthanadefiningfeature,howthenshoulddirectand

indirectrulebedefined?Definingthesetermsiscomplicatedbecausetherearemultiple

dimensionsalongwhichindirectanddirectrulearesaidtodiffer.Onecommon

understandingofthedifferencebetweenthemistheuseoflocalsincolonial

administration.Somehavesuggestedthatanyuseoflocalsqualifiesasindirectrule,8but

placescommonlyconsideredunderdirectrulealsoemployedlocalsasinterpreters,clerks,

andtaxcollectors;theyreporteddirectlytothecolonialadministrationbuttheyalso

sometimeshadconsiderableindependentauthorityandinfluence.9Useoflocalswas

ubiquitousinthecolonialperiod,sobythisdefinition,fewcaseswouldcountasdirectrule.

Itmaybemoreaccuratetosaythatitisnotthegeneraluseoflocals,butwhetheror

nottheyaregivennominalrecognitionasleaders.10Nominalrecognitiondoesnotimply

thatleaderswieldaparticularamountofpower,butitdoesacknowledgethemasofficial

8SeethediscussioninFisher(1994,5–6).Doyle(1986)suggeststhatunderdirectrule,onlythelowestlevelsoftheadministrationareentrustedtoindigenousactors.9Onthis,seeDerrick(1983),whonotesthatclerkssometimesheadedcolonialofficesduringlongabsencesbyEuropeanstaff;theyalsohadconsiderableprestigeandaccesstoinformationthattheycouldleverageoverbothcolonialadministratorsandthelocalpopulation.10Fisher(1994,6–7)writesthattheexternalpowerrecognizes,atleasttosomedegree,thesovereigntyofthelocalstate.

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authoritiesdesignatedbythecolonialpower.Thiscriterionsetsaparttheemploymentof

localsfromtheirdesignationasleaders;underdirectrule,localsmaybeemployedand

delegatedspecifictasks,butthenominalrulersareEuropeans,eveniflocalssometimes

standinontheirbehalf.

`Anothercommoncriteriontodistinguishindirectfromdirectruleisthesystemoflaw.

Directrulesuggestsasinglesystemoflawsetbytheoccupyingpower.Thatsystemdoes

notimplyfairnessorrights;itoftenestablishedunjustlawsforindigenouspopulations,but

itwasacentralizedlegalstructure.Legalpluralismcharacterizesindirectrule.Areasof

indirectrulearegovernedbycustomarylaw,whichmaydifferfromregiontoregion,or

eventribetotribe;thelegalcodeoftheoccupyingpowerisreservedforEuropeansand

selectothers(Mamdani1996,17).

IfitwerethecasethatplacesclearlyfellundereithercustomaryorEuropeanlaw,

thiscriterionwouldbeusefulforcodingandclassification.Indeed,statisticalworkhas

oftenusedcustomarylawasanindictorofindirectrule,regardlessofhowitisdefined(see

Gerringetal.2011;Hariri2012;Lange2004).Yet,customarylawoftengovernedsome

domainswhileEuropean-basedlawgovernedothers,orcustomarylawwasalteredsuch

thatitwasnot,infactcustomary.Forexample,Lewis(2013)showshowthedecisionto

havedifferentlegalsystemsforTunisiansandFrenchcitizensinTunisiaunderthe

protectoratewasexceedinglydifficulttoimplement,andendeduprequiringasignificant

FrenchpresenceinthecourtsthatweresupposedtoberunbyTunisiansforTunisians,

renderingproblematictheideathatthisformofrulewasmeaningfully“indirect.”The

troublewasthatdiscerningwhocouldandcouldnotbeconsidered“French”or“Tunisian”

itselfrequiredadjudication,asclaimantsmanipulatedidentityclamsinordertoappearin

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thejudicialsystemthattheypreferred.Inpractice,decidingwhetherandwhenthereisa

customarylegalsystem,versusaEuropeanlegalsystem,maybedifficulttodetermine,and

manycasesmayhavebothtypesofsystemsdependingontheregion,areaoflaw(criminal

versuscivilforexample),orconstituentstatus.

Otherinstitutionsmayalsobeimplicatedincommonunderstandingsofdirectand

indirectrule.TheextenttowhichthepoliceareEuropeanorindigenous,therationof

Europeanpersonneltoindigenouspersonnelinthecolonialadministration,thesystemof

education,andthepresenceofEuropeansettlercommunitieshavealsobeendescriptively

linkedtothetypeofcolonialrule(Hechter2013;Hechter2000).

Insum,theconceptsofindirectanddirectrulearenoteasilydifferentiablealonga

singleaxisofthe“directness”ofcolonialoversight.Itisnotjustthenamingofindigenous

actorstoleadershippositionsthatsetsareascommonlyconsideredunderindirectrule

apartfromareaslabeleddirectrule.Theinstitutions–legal,criminal,andadministrative–

mayalsodiffer,andtheremayormaynotbeasignificantEuropeanpopulation.

UnderstandingthecausesandeffectsofEuropeanstrategiesthusrequiresgreater

specificityaboutwhatpreciselydifferedacrosscolonialspace,sothattheconsequencesof

specificcolonialpoliciescanbeconsidered.Thenextsectionillustratessomeofthese

issuesthroughdiscussingcolonialAlgeria.

II. MilitaryandCivilianRuleinColonialAlgeria

FrenchcolonialruleistypicallyconsideredmoredirectthanBritishcolonialrule.

TheFrenchcolonialmodelwasexplicitlyinterventionist.Francehadacivilizingmission:it

aimedtoassimilateitscolonies.Further,France’sJacobincentralizingpoliticaltradition

meantthatcolonialadministrationwouldbedirectedfromthecenter(Kudo2010,21).

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Algeria,France’smostimportantcolonialterritory,wasnotjustacolony,butconsideredan

integralpartofFranceitself.In1848,thethreedivisionsofBone,Constantine,andAlgiers

weredesignatedFrenchdepartments,likedepartmentsinFrance.Algeriaisacasethatwe

mightexpecttobeeasilyclassifiableasdirectrule,butthissectionshowsthatcolonial

governancevariedovertimeandplaceinAlgeria,makinganassertionofthetypeof

colonialrulefortheentirecolonyinaccurate.LargeareasofAlgeriaweregovernedinways

thatwetypicallythinkofasindirect,andthetypeofrulevarieddependingonwhowasin

charge.Further,controlfromthecenterwasnotuniformandcolonialofficers,settlers,and

civilianleaderswereabletoactindependently,sometimesignoringdirectivesfromthe

centeroractingontheirowninitiative.

AlgeriaundertheJulyMonarchy,1830-1848

France’sfirstdecadeinAlgeriawascharacterizedbyuncertainty(Lorcin1995).

Proposedpoliciesintheearlyyearsincludedwithdrawal,alimitedoccupationofcoastal

citieswithnativechiefsgoverningtheinterior,exterminatingorexpellingindigenous

populations,andfullconquest.

ForseveralyearsafterthecollapseofCharlesX’sregime,thegeneralsinAlgeria

werelargelylefttoformulatetheirownpolicies,althoughtheywerefrequentlyrecalled–

thereweretendifferentgovernor-generalsduringthefirstdecade.Theseearlygovernors

tookdifferentactionstowardtheindigenouspopulation.Thesecond,forexample,General

Clauzel,soughttoworkwithMuslimchiefswhohehopedwouldassisttheFrench;he

proposedinstallingTunisianbeystoruleatOranandConstantineandsignedasecret

treatywiththeTunisianrulingfamilybeforebeingrecalled(Ageron1991,11).General

Savary,thefourthgovernor,andaformerministerofpolice,usedmoreviolenttactics,

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exterminatinganentiretribe,assassinatingseveralArabchiefs,andrulingbrutallyinthe

townofAlgiersbeforedyinginoffice(ibid).Subsequentgovernorsoscillatedbetween

brutalityagainstindigenousgroups,andformingallianceswithlocalleaders.Thistwinuse

ofviolenceontheonehand,anddelegationtolocalauthoritiesontheother,became

characteristicofmilitaryruleinAlgeria.

GeneralBugeaud(governorfrom1841-1847),initiatedasystematicapproachto

nativeadministrationwhenhere-establishedtheDirectionofArabAffairsin1841.

Bugeaudinitiallymeanttomodelthemanagementoftheindigenouspopulationafterthe

Ottomanmakhzansystem.ButDaumas,thedirectorofArabAffairs,studiedtheexisting

administrationofAlgerianleaderAbdel-Kader,andpersuadedBugeaudthatasystemof

indirectgovernmententrustedtoArabchiefsfromthemilitaryandreligiousnobilitywas

thebestexampletofollow:“Thearistocracystillhavegreatpowerandinfluenceoverthe

natives,andmustalwaysbegivengreatconsideration”(inAgeron1991,22).Themilitary

thusdidnotabolishtheprevioussystemofgovernment,buttookovertheorganizationit

hadfound(ibid.,23).

TheDirectionofArabAffairsoversawlocalbureauxarabes,whichwerecharged

withadministeringtheindigenousAlgerians.EachincludedFrenchandindigenous

personnel:FrenchmilitaryofficerswhospokeArabic,knewthearea,andcoordinatedwith

thecadi(localjudgeandnotary),khodja(arabsecretary),andFrenchandindigenous

soldiers.ThepurposeoftheArabaffairsbureauswas“abovealltoassuresecuritythrough

intelligencecollection,surveillance,andtiestonotables.”11

11CAOM,Gouvernementgénéraldel'Algérie.Bureauxarabesdel'Oranie-Registres(1841/1913),histoireadministrative.

16

TheFrenchofficersofthebureauxarabesactedasintermediariesbetweenthe

Frenchmilitaryleadershipandthenativechiefs(Ageron1991,23).KnownasArabists,

theyspokeArabic,claimedknowledgeoflocalpeopleandcustoms,andtendedtohave

experienceinAlgeria.Theysawthemselvesasvastlymoreenlightenedwhenitcameto

indigenousadministrationthancivilianrulers.12

Civilianrulewastheexceptionduringthe1830-1848period;onlysmallurban

pocketswereunderciviliangovernment.Intheseareas,Frenchcivilservantsand

magistratesbehavedasiftheywereinFrance,applyingFrenchmetropolitanlaw.In1847,

civilianareasweredividedintocommunes,thebasicunitsoflocalgovernmentinFrance,

headedbymayorswhosesalarycamefromtaxescollectedfromthesubjectpopulation

(Ageron,26).BythetimeBugeaudleftin1847,therewere109,400settlersinAlgeria.Of

these,about15,000hadsettledinthemilitaryruledareasofthecountryside;therestlived

inthecitiesofthecoast(ibid.).Theseearlysettlershatedthemilitaryofficersofthe

bureauxarabes,whotheysawassidingwiththenatives(Ageron,24).

Themilitary’sapproachtonativeadministration,whichmorecloselyresembles

indirectthandirectrule,wasnottheonlystrategythemilitaryfollowedduringtheseyears.

Alongsidetheirclaimstounderstandandrepresenttheinterestsoftheindigenous

populationofAlgeria,themilitaryalsousedconsiderableforce.Bugeaudadvocated

conqueringAlgeria“byploughandbysword.”Accordinglyevenasadministrativeoffices

wereestablishedtoadministerlocalpopulations,theFrencharmyengagedinatrocious

actsofviolence.TheFrenchemployedatactictheycalled“razzia,”atermtakenfromthe

Algerianwordforraiding.Theyusedthetermtoimplythattheirattacksagainst12OnthebureauxarabesandtheSaintSimonianideologythatguidedmanyofitsofficers,seeAbi-Mershed(2010);Pilbeam(2013),add…

17

recalcitranttribeswereconsistentwithlocalnormsofviolence,butthelevelofbrutalityof

theFrenchpracticewentbeyondtheterm’soriginalusage(Gallois2013,2–4).In1845,

BugeaudcommentedontherecentasphyxiationofalocaltribebyFrenchsoldiers,“Itisa

cruelextremity,butahorrifyingexamplewasnecessarytostriketerroramongthese

turbulentandfanaticalmontagnards”(inBrower2009,22).

Themilitaryprincipleinplacewastheaggressiveuseofforcetooverwhelmthe

enemyandcrushresistance(ibid.,23).LieutenantColonelLucien-FrançoisdeMontagnac

described“howtomakewarontheArabs”inthefollowingway:Killallthemendownto

theageoffifteen,takeallthewomenandchildren,putthemonboatsandsendthemto

MarquesasIslands,orsomewhereelse;inaword,annihilateallwhowillnotgrovelatour

feetlikedogs”ibid.,22).DuringBugeaud’sterm,FranceexpandeditsreachintoAlgeria,

attackingtheresistanceleaderAbdel-Kader,towhomtheyhadearliercontemplated

delegatingpower(Ageron1991,18–19).

AlgeriaundertheSecondRepublic(1848-1851)andtheSecondEmpire(1852-1870)

Theperiodfrom1848to1870sawmultipleshiftsinauthorityinAlgeria,ascivilian

areasgrewandconsolidated,whilethemilitary’sauthoritywaxedandwaned.The1848

RevolutioninFrancebroughtinarepublicangovernmentthatsettlershopedwouldfavor

theirdesiretoexpandciviliancontrolofAlgeria.TheConstitutionof1848statedthat

AlgeriawasanintegralpartofFranceandpromisedtoextendthelawsofFrancetoAlgeria.

ItwasatthistimethatAlgiers,Bone,andConstantinebecamedepartments,thebasicunits

ofprovincialgovernmentinmetropolitanFrance.Ineachofthethreedepartments,there

wereareasundercivilianandmilitarycontrol.Inthecivilianareas,thedepartmentswere

dividedintoarrondissements(districts)andcommunes,justastheywereinmetropolitan

18

France(Ageron1991,29).Themilitaryzonesweredividedincerclesandcommunesand

thebureauxarabescontinuedtoshapepolicytowardtheindigenousAlgerians.

Withineachdepartment,therewerethreetypesofcommunes:communesdeplein

exercise,whichwerelargelypopulatedbysettlersandwereadministeredverysimilarlyto

communesinFrance,communesmixtes,wheretherewerebothsettlerandindigenous

populations,andcommunesindigènes,whichwerelargelyindigenous.Thisspatial

variationprovidesanopportunitytobetterunderstandthecausesandconsequencesof

differentcolonialapproaches.Sincethequestionhereconcernsthecolonialpolicies

towardindigenouspopulations,Iamparticularlyinterestedinthecomparisonbetween

mixedcommunesunderbothmilitaryandciviliancontrol.Iamstillintheprocessof

compilingsourcesonhowtheseareasweregoverned;belowIprovideapreliminary

discussionofthemotivationsofcivilianandmilitarycolonialagents.

In1852,NapoleonIIIcametopower,establishingtheSecondEmpireinFrance.

Withthereturnofmonarchy,themilitaryagaingainedtheupperhand.Inaletterwritten

in1863,NapoleonIIIstated“Algeriaisnot,strictlyspeaking,acolonybutanArab

kingdom.”Thisstatement,alongwiththeclaimthatthenativesofAlgeria,likethesettlers,

hadanequalrighttoNapoleonIII’sprotection,infuriatedthesettlers.13Thebureaux

arabesimplementedtheemperor’sprogram,establishingMuslimcourtsofjustice,

reopeningKoranicschoolsinmilitaryterritory,andintroducingArab-Frenchprimary

schoolsincertainurbanandtribalareas.Incivilianareas,settlerspushedbackagainst

policiesfavoringtheindigenouspopulation.Theymadestridestowardthepolicyof

13QuotedinAgeron(1991,38).

19

cantonnement,whichdelimitedpropertyrights.Inpracticethispolicyforcednative

Algerianstocedetheirlandstothestate.

Theinfluenceofthebureauxarabesbegandecliningafter1870,whenareasunder

militarycontrolbegantobetransferredtocivilianrule.In1875,therewere1,418,315

millionpeoplelivingundermilitaryrule,including7,055Frenchsettlers;while1,047,092

wereundercivilianrule,including136,826Frenchsettlers.By1902,numberofpeople

livingundermilitaryruleinthethreedepartmentshaddeclinedto588,691(andonly

3,245Frenchsettlers),whiletherewere4,134,534peopleunderciviliancontrol,including

354,884Frenchsettlers.14Thetransferofcommunesfrommilitarytocivilianruleprovides

anotheropportunitytoexplorethereasonsforandconsequencesofchangingcolonial

policies.

ThispreliminarydiscussionofthefirstfortyyearsofcolonialisminAlgeriashows

thattheFrenchapproachisnoteasilyclassifiableasdirectorindirect.TheFrench

implementeddifferentstrategiesindifferentplaces,andtheirapproachchangedovertime.

EventhoughAlgeriahasbeenconsideredaquintessentialcaseofdirectrule,theFrench

militaryempoweredlocalelites,retainedlawbasedonthesharia,andsupported

indigenouseducationinArabic.TheFrenchmilitaryalsoattackedsomelocalchiefs,rather

thanempoweringthem,engaginginhorrificviolenceastheconquestcontinuedintothe

Algerianinterior.Insomeareas,FrenchrulewasverysimilartoFrenchruleinFrance,with

metropolitanlawsandadministration,butthemajorityofthecountrywasundermilitary

rulethatdidnotincludemetropolitaninstitutions.Therewasnosingleoverarchinglogicof

colonialruleinAlgeria;themilitaryandcivilianshadapproachesthatwereatoddswith

14TableauGénéraldesCommunesd’Algérie,1875&1902.CAOM.

20

oneanother.Inthenextsection,Iconsiderwhyactors’approachestocolonialgovernance

differ.

III.Theory:Whofavoreddirectandindirectruleandwhy?

Competitionbetweenmilitaryandcivilianactorswascorefeatureofcolonialrulein

Algeria.Civilianadministratorsandsettlersinsistedthattheirapproachwassuperior,that

theultimategoalwastheadministrativeassimilationofAlgeriatothemotherland.15They

wantedtodestroythenativearistocracyandreplaceitwithaFrenchbureaucraticsystem.

Theyaccusedthemilitaryof“despotismbythesword,”pointingtothecontinuedreliance

onviolenceasaweaknessofthemilitary’sapproach.16Inresponse,proponentsofthe

military’sapproachdefendedtheuseofindigenouschiefsandthemaintenanceofnative

institutionsandpractices,decryingcivilianruleasineptandunjust.17GeneralHanoteau,an

officerofthebureauxarabes,criticizedthesettlersinthecivilianzones,stating,“Whatour

settlersdreamofisabourgeoisfeudalisminwhichtheywillbethelordsandthenatives

theserfs.”18BothsidespresentedthemselvesasbettersuitedtogoverningAlgeria;

defendingtheirownbureaucraticinterestsinthecolony.

15Theyfavoredadministrativeassimilationandtheimportofmetropolitanlawsforsettlers,nottheassimilationofindigenousAlgerians;settlersvehementlyopposedcitizenshiprightsofAlgerians.OntheprospectsofassimilationforAlgerians,seeLawrence(2013).16Forexamplesoftheseviews,see:Morsly,DocteurT.ConseillerMunicipaldeConstantine.«ContributionàlaQuestionIndigèneenAlgerie.»Constantine:ImprimerieJéromeMarleetF.Biron,1894CAOMB3932;«UnProgrammeAlgérien»DiscoursdeM.Marchal,vice-présidentduConseilGénérald’Alger,membreduConseilSupérieur.Alger:ImprimerieC.Zamith,1898.CAOMB7721;Foucher,Vitor.LesBureauxArabsenAlgérie.Extraitdela«RevueContemporaine»t.XXXIV31Octobre1857,pp.209-230CAOMB3931.17See«Alger:SituationPolitique1860»GouvernementGénéralCivildeL’Algérie.BureauPolitiques.FRANOMGGA11H1;LeblancdePrébois,François(ex-représentantdel’Algérieen1848),«BilanduRégimeCivildel’Algérieàlafinde1871».Paris:E.Dentu,1872CAOMB7059.18QuotedinAgeron(1991,39–40).

21

Twofactorshelpedshapewhetherthemilitaryorthecivilianleadershipdominated

atparticularpointsintime:thestanceofthegovernmentinParis,andthesecurity

situationinAlgeria.TheFrenchgovernmentchangedhandsoverthecourseoftheperiod;

withciviliansgenerallybettersupportedbyrepublicanactors,whilethemilitarywas

favoredbymonarchy.Butthisalonecouldnotgiveonepartytheupperhand.Akeyissue

wasalsotheongoingneedforsecurity,aconcernsharedbybothciviliansandthemilitary,

butwhichwastheprimaryjobofthemilitary.Rebellionsandthethreatoftherebellion

ensuredthatthemilitaryretainedanimportantroleingoverningAlgeria.

Butwhywasitthatthemilitaryfavoredastyleofrulethatmorecloselyresembles

indirectrule,whilethecivilianleadershipwantedtoimportFrenchinstitutions?This

sectiondevelopsageneralargumentfordifferentapproachestocolonialgovernance,

layingouttheimplicationsthatstillrequireempiricalinvestigation,bothinAlgeriaandin

additionalcases.

Indirectruleandthemilitary

Iarguethatindirectrulewasusefulforthemilitaryinpartbecausetheprimarytask

ofamilitaryengagedinconquestistoestablishorder.Securityistheforemostconcernfor

ageneralengagedinoperationsoverseas.Indirectrulehelpedsolvethisproblem:it

allowedcolonialmilitariestodelegatetheuseofforcetoindigenousleaderschargedwith

maintainingstabilityandpreventingdisorder.Disordercouldtaketheformofoutright

revolt,butitcouldalsoinvolvelessovertformsofresistance,suchastherefusaltoprovide

laborforcolonialprojectsortaxevasion.Bydelegatingauthoritytolocalrulers,the

actionstheserulerstookcouldbejustifiedasconsistentwithindigenouscultureand

traditions.Theabilitytopassoffthecoercionexercisedbylocalintermediariesasa

22

manifestationoftraditionconvenientlydistancedcolonialactorsfromthebrutalityof

colonialrule;itprovidedawaytodeflectdirectresponsibilityforcoercionthatwasuseful,

orinsomeinstancesessential,tothesuccessofthecolonialproject.

Byportrayingthecoerciveactsoflocalintermediariesasalamentableby-productof

indirectrule,colonialactorscouldaccountforviolencetodomesticaudiencesinthe

metropolewhooversawcolonialrulefromafar.Proponentsofindirectrulewerethus

carefultonottopubliclycondonetheuseofbruteforce,andEuropeansretainedthe

prerogativetoinvestigatesuch“abuses”whentheyoccurred.Inpractice,however,

brutalitywasexpectedtoaccompanyindirectrule.AsC.L.Temple,thelieutenantgovernor

innorthernNigeriafrom1914-1917explainedinNativeRacesandtheirRulers,“Toputthis

policyintoeffectmeansfirstofallthatyoumustshutyoureyes,uptoacertainpoint,toa

greatmanypracticeswhich,thoughnotabsolutelyrepugnanttohumanityarenevertheless

reprehensibletoourideas…youhavetomakeupyourmindthatmenarenotallequal

beforethelawandcannotbesotreated”(quotedinSmith1970,16).Inthisview,indirect

rule,withitsrelianceonmultiplesystemsoflawostensiblybasedontradition,requireda

degreeoftoleranceforunrestrainedleadership,uptoanunspecifiedpoint.

Theneedforcolonialofficialsto“shuttheireyes”tobrutalpracticescouldbetaken

toimplyanecessaryabsenceofaccountabilitythataccompaniedthedelegationofruleto

localleaders.Indeed,Gerringetal(2011,414)suggestthatindirectruleentailsatrade-off

betweenaccountabilityandtheeffectivenessoflocalrulers,writingthatinterferencemay

threatenthelegitimacyofthedesignatedrulers.Yetpracticesthatwerejustifiedas

unwelcomeaccompanimentstoindirectrulemay,infact,havehadutilityforcolonial

actors.Insteadofconceptualizingtheuseofforceasaproblemofaccountability,the

23

absenceofaccountabilityanddirectoversightcouldbeadvantageous,notonlybecauseit

distancedthecolonialpowerfromviolencecarriedoutbyintermediariesandallowedthem

toavoiddirectresponsibility,butalsobecausecoercionitselfwasusefulfordeterringand

dealingwithactsofrebellionandforjustifyingthecontinuedneedformilitaryoversight.

MartinThomas(2012,2)hasdirectedourattentiontotheutilityofpolicingforthe

economicaimsofcolonizingpowers,pointingtotheuseofrepressionagainstworkersin

industriesandplantations.Thisrepressionisnotaby-productofcolonialrule,butpartof

“whatcolonialpolicewerecalledupontodo.”Totakeanexample,incolonialGambia,the

Britishnotonlytoleratedcoercionbychiefs,theyexpectedchiefstowield“strongpowers”

inordertofullycontroltheirdistricts(Ceesay2014,29).

Militaryactors,byhabitus,arelikelytoprioritizeorderandtofavormethodsthat

reducerestrictionsontheuseofforce.Inareasofindirectrule,forcecouldbedelegatedto

localactors,butadditionally,indirectrulegavethemilitaryitselfsignificantfreedomof

action.InAlgeria,themilitarycarriedoutnumerousattacksonunconqueredareas,and

alsobrutallyputdownrebellionswhentheyoccurred.Theviolenceofthemilitaryin

Algeriastandsincontrasttotheirroleasthe“defender”oftheindigenouspeopleandthe

civilianclaimthatthemilitaryofficersinAlgeriaputthenativeaheadofthesettler.Itis

indeedremarkablethatFrenchmilitaryofficersbothbrutallyattackedandvehemently

defendedindigenouspopulations,andthisapparentcontradictionmakesmoresenseifw

positthattheabilitytowieldviolencewasamorefundamentalpartoftheappealof

indirectapproachesthanrespectforindigenousnormsandinstitutions.19

19OnekeyproblemthatconfrontedcolonialofficersinAlgeriawasthatalthoughtheywishedtorelyonlocalchiefs,theirnotesandcorrespondencesuggestthattheyoftenhadtroublebelievingtheycouldtrustlocalchiefsbecauseofthehistoryofFrenchviolenceinthecolonies.Thearchivessuggesta

24

Severalempiricalimplicationsfollowfromhypothesizingindirectruleasan

authoritarianprojectaimedatestablishingorder.First,theargumenthasimplicationsfor

thekindsoftraditionsthatmightbetoleratedunderindirectrule.AsSuzanneRudolph

(2005,9)writes,“traditionisnotanunbreakablepackage.”Customarylawcodifiedsome

practicesandomittedothers;colonialrulerslikewisetoleratedsomecustoms,but

outlawedothers,astheeventualabolitionofslaverysuggests.Theargumentheresuggests

thatindirectrulewouldtendtopermitelementsoftraditionthatwereusefulfor

maintainingautocraticcontrol.Therazzia,forexample,mentionedabove,was

appropriatedbytheFrenchandusedagainstrecalcitranttribes.Bugeaudstatedexplicitly

in1841thattherazziawas“systematizedbecauseofitsusefulness”(quotedinGallois,p.

3),suggestingthattheFrenchwereselectiveaboutwhichelementsof“traditional”culture

theyused.

Asecondimplicationisthatweshouldobservevariationinthekindsofcoercion

employed.Specifically,inareasthatwereruledmoreindirectly,colonialofficersandlocal

leadersshouldhavehadafreerhandtoengageinpracticessuchascollectivepunishment,

imprisonmentwithoutdueprocess,confiscationofproperty,andviolentpunishmentof

offendersthaninareasofdirectrule.Totakeadifferentexample,inGambiain1919,when

“theUpperSaloumChiefburntdowntheentirevillageatBantantoforcingitsinhabitantsto

seekrefugeinnearbyNianijadistrict,asubsequentinquiryexoneratedthechief.Itstated

thus:“Thecrimeswereverycommon,andwerenotcrimesintheeyesofhispeople…In

fact,theywerecommittedtoshow‘power’”(Ceesay2014,34).Inareasofdirectrule,the

lingeringsuspicionthatleadersmightdefectatanypointbecausetheconquesthadbeensobrutalthatitwouldbedifficulttoforgiveandforget.

25

legalcodeinplace,includingtheNativeCodesthatestablishedpunishmentsspecificto

indigenouspeoples,shouldprovideamoreuniformsetofpenaltiesandrestrictions.

Athirdimplicationisthatindigenousleaderswhowerenotsignificantpower-

holdersduringthepre-colonialeracouldstillperformaneffectiveintermediaryrole.The

opportunitytousecoercionundertheguiseoftraditionallowedleaderswhowere

appointedbythecolonialpowertoconsolidatecontrolevenwhentheylackedalegitimate

pre-colonialleadershiprole.Wemightexpectthattheseleaderswouldneedtorelyon

forcemoreheavilythanleaderswhoalreadyhadestablishedrolesbeforethecolonial

period,atleastinitially.Themovetoappointleaderswholackedtheirownindependent

powerispuzzlingforexistingaccountsofdirectandindirectrule,butifthepowersthat

theyweregrantedhelpedtoestablishtheircontrol,theycouldstillfulfillausefulrolefor

colonialactors.

CivilianAdministrationandDirectApproaches

AreaswherecivilianswereinpowerinAlgeriawerehardlymorebenevolentand

justthanareascontrolledbythemilitary.Thecivilianzoneswerenotviolence-free,butthe

formsofviolenceandtheytypesofpenaltiesthatAlgeriansfaceddiffered.

Myargumentisthatcolonialbureaucratsandsettlersconceptualizedorder

differentlythanthemilitarydid.Forthem,ordermeantruleoflaw.20Themissionof

colonialbureaucratsdifferedfromtheirmilitarycounterparts;forthem,thekeygoalwas

toinstallanadministrationcapableofgoverningnewlyconqueredareas.Thisimplied

20AsThomas(2012,7)arguedforcolonialpoliceofficersacrossEuropeancolonies,differentactorsmayhavetheirownstandardsforhowtheworldoughttobe.

26

implementingabureaucraticstructurethatwouldroutinizeandregulaterelationsbetween

Europeansandthecolonializepopulation.21

Thisunderstandingoforderdidnotimplyrightsforthecolonizedpopulation.Often,

itcarriedwithitasetoflegalpenaltiesandrestrictionstargetedspecificallyatthenative

population.ItprovidedrightstoEuropeansinthecolony,butestablishedaninferiorlegal

statusforthewiderpopulation.Settlersthushaveoftenbeenassociatedwiththe

establishmentofdirectrule;theywereeagertomaintaintheircitizenshiprightsand

preventtheconqueredpopulationfromgainingsimilarrightsinordertopreservetheir

privileges.Bothsettlersandadministratorscanbeexpectedtofavortheinstallationofa

legalcodethatwouldofferuniformityandclearlydelineatethelawsgoverningbehavior.

Theestablishmentofaunifiedlegalcode,withrightsforEuropeansandselected

groupsamongthecolonized,affectedtheformofcollectiveactionthatoccurredin

responsetocolonialrule.AsIhavearguedelsewhere,theinitialresponseofindigenous

activistsintheFrenchcolonieswastousethelegalcodetomakedemandsupontheFrench

administration.RebellionagainstcolonialismintheFrenchEmpirewasguidedbythelaws

andrightsinplace,asactivistspointedtothehypocrisyofasystemwhoseaimwasto

“civilize”nativepopulationsbutwhichrefusedtoextendtothemthesamerightsthat

Europeancitizensenjoyed.Activiststhussoughttoextendtherightsthatwereprovidedto

EuropeansettlerstothelocalpopulationandworkedtodismantletheNativeCodesthat

setthemapartfromEuropeans(Lawrence2013).Directrulewasthusnotalways

illegitimatebecauseoftheidentityofthecolonialrulers,butbecauseofthelawsandrules

thataccompaniedit.

21OnEuropeanwaysofseeingandbringingordertoacolony,seeMitchell(1991).

27

CompetitionandColonialGovernance

ThehypothesesIhaveoutlinedfocusontheinterestsofparticularcolonialactors.

Theyreflectinsightsfromhistoriansabouttheimportanceofstudyingtheinteractionsthat

occurredduringthecolonialperiod.Colonialpolicywasnotdecideduponinimperial

centersandthenimplementedsurgicallyfromabove.Colonialactorshadopposingideas

andintereststhatledtodivergentviewsabouthowcolonialgovernanceshouldbe

approached.Competitionbetweendifferentcolonialagentsledtoshiftsinstrategyover

timeandplace.Andtheactionsoftheindigenouspopulationalsomatteredbecausethe

prospectofrebellionempoweredsomecolonialactorsoverothers.

Theseargumentsdifferfromexistingexplanationsfordirectandindirectrulein

waysthatrequiregreaterelucidation.Theprimaryalternativesfocusontwofactors:the

costsofdirectversusindirectrule,andthesuitabilityofeachtypeofruleforparticular

locations.Indirectruleissaidtobelesscostlyandthereforemoreattractivetocolonial

powerslookingtoreducethecostofempire.Yetindirectrulecannotbeimplementedinall

settings;Gerringetal(2011),forexample,arguethatitisonlypossiblewherethereare

pre-existingleaderscapableofrulingfortheimperialpower.Forlackoftimeandspace,I

donotdiscussthesealternativeargumentshere.Itisworthwhiletoadd,however,thatIdo

notintendtosuggestthatthesefactorswerenotimportant,butthatthepoliticsofthe

periodmaybeequallycrucial,ifnotmoreso,forexplainingwhycolonialstrategieswere

adoptedandwhytheychangedovertime.

28

Conclusion&Implications

Thispaperhasofferedapreliminarylookatvariationincolonialgovernance,witha

focusoncolonialAlgeria.Itispartofanongoingprojectthatseekstoinvestigatedifferent

colonialstrategies,demonstratesubnationalvariationthatisoftenignoredinmacro

characterizationsofcolonialrule,andconsiderwhycolonialapproachesvaried.

Studyingindirectanddirectruleduringthelatecolonialperiodisimportantfor

understandinghowEuropeansruledoverdiversepopulationsatgreatdistancesfrom

imperialcenters.Recentscholarshiphasshownhowimperialiststhoughtaboutand

defendedbothformsofcolonialrule.22Myaimistocomparedifferentmodesofruleand

describehowtheyworkedontheground.

Thistopichasimplicationsforunderstandingtheeffectsofthecolonialperiod.The

ideathatcolonialrulehadlong-termconsequencesmakessense,giventhatcolonialrulers

oftenclaimedtobeinthebusinessoftransformation.Evenwherecolonialinterventions

weresupposedtobeindirectandlimited,rulersactedinwaysthatchangedlocal

economiesandpatternsofauthority.Agrowingbodyofworkhasfoundpersistentlegacies

ofthecolonialera.Directandindirectruleinparticularhavebeenlinkedtonationalist

resistance,theempowermentofprivilegedgroups,economicunderdevelopment,and

autocracy,23yetthemechanismsremainunclearbecauseknowledgeofanddataoncolonial

practicesislacking.Abetterunderstandingofhowimperialgovernancevariedcanpoint

topotentialproblemswithcurrentwaysofmeasuringandinterpretingcolonialera

variables.

22SeetherecentstudiesbyMantena(2010)andPitts(2009).23Forrecentexamples,seeAcemogluetal(2014);Hariri(2012);Hechter(2000;2013);Kohli(2004);Lange(2004);Wucherpfennigetal(2015).

29

Further,strategiessuchasindirectrule,ordivide-and-rule,continuetobeinvoked

incontemporarycasesofoccupationandstateexpansion.24Thisprojectsuggeststhatthese

approachesareunlikelytobeimplementedinthewaysthatproponentsenvision.Indirect

rulemaynotbeeffectivebecauseofitsuseofindigenousleaders,asissooftenassumed,

butbecauseoftheviolencethataccompanieditsapplication.Acloserlookatthecolonial

periodmaythushaveimportantlessonsforthestudyofcounter-insurgencyandconquest

morebroadly;bylookingatthegapbetweenwhatcolonialrulerssaidaboutwhatthey

weredoingandwhattheyactuallydid,itispossibletoidentifystructurallimitationsthat

thwartpolicyimplementation.

24SeeFisher(1994,3–4)andNaseemullahandStaniland(2014).

30

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