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General Aleksei Brusilov and the GreatRetreat, May–November 1915Jamie H. Cockfield aa Mercer UniversityPublished online: 14 Nov 2013.

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Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 26:653–672, 2013Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 1351-8046 print/1556-3006 onlineDOI: 10.1080/13518046.2013.844522

General Aleksei Brusilov and the Great Retreat,May–November 1915

JAMIE H. COCKFIELDMercer University

General Aleksei Brusilov’s fame rests on his successful offensive in1916, yet he had many other career triumphs. One was his auspi-cious leadership of the VIII Russian Army during the ‘Great Retreat’of 1915, when his skillful generalship was a major factor in pre-venting the total rout of the Southwestern Russian front. Althoughhe retreated with other armies, he took thousands of Austrian andGerman prisoners in doing so and eventually launched at the endof his own offensive, which gave the enemy quite a bloody nose.The successes he had in 1915, which have generally gone unno-ticed by historians, displayed the leadership qualities he so welldemonstrated in his great victory of 1916.

In his history of the Russian Revolution Lev Bronstein-Trotsky opined thatan army is always a copy of the society it serves, adding disdainfully, ‘It isno accident that the [Great] war did not create a single distinguished militaryname in Russia.’1 Trotsky’s premise, that hierarchical societies cannot sus-tain the morale needed for military success, is tempting but not foolproof.Armies of democracies have indeed usually functioned better, with perhapsthe major exception being France’s in World War II, and even in its history,especially in the Revolution-Napoleonic era, France produced in that time ofsocial openness armies that dominated Europe from the Portuguese border toMoscow (‘In every soldier’s knapsack is a marshal’s baton,’ Napoleon said).

1 Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution (New York: Simon andSchuster, 1937), Vol. 1, p. 252.

Jamie H. Cockfield received his doctorate in Russian history at the University ofVirginia and is the Willis Borders Glover Professor of History at Mercer University at Macon,Georgia. He is the author of several books including With Snow on their Boots; The RussianExpeditionary Force in France during World War I .

Address correspondence to Jamie H. Cockfield, Professor of History, Departmentof History, Mercer University, 1400 Coleman Avenue, Macon, GA 31207, USA. E-mail:Cockfield_JH@Mercer.edu

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Yet democracy does not always have to be a prerequisite for military success:Witness the German army in both world wars and the Japanese army in thesecond. Both arose out of highly disciplined, energetic societies that werecertainly not democratic. Moreover, Trotsky’s corollary, that Russia producedno great generals in the Great War, is demonstrably false and is probablynormal anti-tsarism from a radical leftist, who, ironically, commanded manyof the best tsarist generals in the Civil War.

Russia did have more that its share of bad generals, but it also pro-duced a number of good ones as well, and certainly one outstandingone: General Aleksei Brusilov, indisputably Russia’s greatest general sinceAlexander Suvorov, who had led victorious Russian armies as far west asItaly and Switzerland against revolutionary France, and was arguably Russia’sgreatest general ever.2 American journalist Stanley Washburn, who spentmuch time on the Eastern Front and a good bit of it with Brusilov, describedhim as ‘an extraordinary man.’ Looking somewhat mouse-like, Brusilov’sphysical appearance denoted anything but charisma: ‘He was a frail-lookingman,’ Washburn noticed, ‘with a thin, aesthetic and spiritual face . . . . I gath-ered then and verified later that most of his staff were afraid of him.’ Notingthat although Brusilov had a ‘gentle voice,’ Washburn emphasized his ‘pierc-ing eyes that put the fear into everybody around him.3 As for his army, due tohis leadership Washburn felt it was ‘one of the most remarkable fighting orga-nizations that this war has produced on any front.4 His army’s performancein the years before the Revolution would strongly support this opinion.

After a faltering beginning at the Corps des Pages, Aleksei Brusilovrose rapidly in the army, distinguishing himself especially as an instructorof cavalry tactics. He was a strong believer in preparedness, something hestressed to his students, and feeling that war with Germany and Austria wasinevitable, he began preparing early for that eventuality. He was a stern dis-ciplinarian, but he expected no more of the men he commanded than hedemanded of himself, earning himself the sobriquet ‘the Iron General.’ His

2 Although I am currently writing one, there has never been published a biography of GeneralBrusilov in English, although there are several in Russian. Probably the best is Ivan I. Rostunov’sGeneral Brusilov (Moscow: Voen. Izd-vo, 1964) in Russian and a French translation Le Général Broussilov(Moscow:’ Ed. Militaires, 1964). There is a novel based on his life, which follows the facts very closelyby S. Semanov, Brusilov (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1980) and a historical work by the same authorGeneral Brusilov: Dokumental’noe povestovovanie (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo, 1986). More recentlyIU. V. Sokolov’s Krasnaia zvezda ili krest? Zhizn’ i sud’ba generala Brusilova (Moscow: Rossiia molodaia,1994). V. Mavrodin’s Brusilov (Moscow, 1944) is a piece of nationalistic propaganda, but not withoutvalue. There is, of course, Brusilov’s memoir, which has passed through several editions: The two mostrecent are Moi vospominaniia (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo ministerstva oborony SSS, 1963) and Moivospominaniia (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001). There is the English translation, A Soldier’s Notebook (NewHaven, CT: Greenwood, 1971), which is sometimes more a paraphrasing than a translation of one of theearlier editions.3 Stanley Washburn, On the Russian Front in World War I (New York: Speller, 1982), p. 119.4 Stanley Washburn, The Russian Campaign, April to August 1915 (New York: Scribner’s, 1915),p. 289.

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mind and his vision, however, were never set in concrete. A lifelong cavalryman, he nevertheless realized that modern weapons and the airplane weremaking his branch of the service obsolete, and he did not cling to the cavalryout of some blind devotion.

When the Great War erupted, he was placed in command of theRussian VIII Army on the Southwest Front, under the command of GeneralNicholas Ivanov, and he led his men in the Russian conquest of Galicia byDecember 1914, making possible the investing and capture in the springof 1915 of the great Austrian fortress Przemysl by the Russian III Army ofGeneral Radko Dmitrievich Radko-Dmitriev, a Bulgarian general in Russianservice, on his right flank. His troops even penetrated several passes of theCarpathian Mountains entering the plain of Hungary. In the Carpathians, hismen fought valiantly throughout the bitter winter weather, as the Austriansmade desperate attempts to drive the Russians back through the passes.5

By the spring, Budapest was full of refugees fleeing Brusilov’s army, andpanicked, autonomous Hungary, threatening the Austrians with a separatepeace, demanded of Vienna an offensive to push Brusilov back across theCarpathians.6

Moreover, by early 1915 the Central Powers had perceived that theRussians were the weak sister in the Triple Entente, and after a strugglein the German High Command between the ‘easterners’ and ‘westerners,’the leadership decided on a holding pattern in the West in 1915 and a majoroffensive against the Russians in the East, to relieve the Austrian situationin the Carpathians and possibly knock Russia out of the war. After muchconsideration, the Austro-German alliance decided to launch its major attackbetween the Silesian/Polish cities of Gorlice and Tarnow, provoking a rup-ture of the Russian line and inflicting a major defeat which would make theRussians sue for peace.7

General Joseph Joffre, the commander-in-chief of the French armiesin the early years of the war, noticed as early as November 1914 that theGermans were transferring four to six corps to the east, and Joffre proposedattacking in December 1914 in France to prevent further shifting of menagainst their Russian ally.8 Whereas many of the eastward bound troopswere used in offensives in the Polish salient and other places on the front,certainly the majority of them saw action in the Gorlice-Tarnow offensive,but due to the circuitous route by which they were brought eastward, it was

5 For an excellent examination of this campaign in the winter of 1914–1915, see Graydon A. Tunstall’sBlood on the Snow; The Carpathian Winter War of 1915 (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas,2010).6 Washburn, On the Russian Front, pp. 100–101.7 The best work on the Gorlice-Tarnow offensive is Richard L. DiNardo’s Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010); one might also read chap. 8, ‘The Retreat,1915,’ of Norman Stone’s The Eastern Front 1914–1917 (London: Penguin Books, 1998).8 Robert Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War (Cambridge,MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 125, 138, 151, 154, 168.

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25 April before the Russians realized that a sizable force was assemblingbefore Gorlice.9

The major area of inferiority of the Russian army was artillery. In a frontover twice as long as that of its European allies, Russia had only one-sixthof the Western Front’s heavy artillery and only one-fifth of its field artillery.10

One corps commander reported that he had only two guns facing forty-two of the enemy.11 A shortage of shells further exacerbated the shortage ofartillery, and this twin deficiency was felt as early as October 1914.12 A severerifle shortage, which appeared as early as late 1914, further aggravated thisweakness. One historian has estimated that perhaps by December 1914 athird of all Russian soldiers were without rifles.13

The 28 mile front that would bear the worst of the Austro-Germanattack was defended by the aforementioned Russian III Army under GeneralRadko-Dmitriev. His army was understaffed, and he had asked for reinforce-ments, but they were denied him14 since preference for men and artillery wasgiven to Brusilov’s VIII Army in the Carpathians for its planned 1915 springinvasion of Hungary.15 By April the Germans had moved 11 infantry divi-sions to reinforce Austrian units and the German 11th army under GeneralAugust von Mackensen between Gorlice and Tarnow,16 and General Radko-Dmitriev therefore on his own tried to strengthen his line along the DunajecRiver, placing the 3rd Caucasian corps in the Krosno area opposite Gorlice.17

Ten Austro-German divisions in the front lines and the German 11th

Army with reserves and with Austrian support would be falling on fiveRussian ones, and German artillery would be six times more numerous thanthose of the Russians they were attacking.18 The German artillery aroundGorlice had had firing practice at least twice a day for several monthsaffording them a perfect range on every important position in the Russianlines, and from the air the German air force had mapped every mile ofthe Russian trenches that they would be attacking.19 Breaking through theweakened III Army, the Central Powers planned to wheel southward into

9 DiNardo, p. 48.10 A. M. Zionchkovsky, Mirovaia voina, 1914–1918 gg. (Moscow, 1924), p. 32.11 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs (London: Odhams, 1936), Vol. 1, pp. 389–90.12 ‘The Supply of the Russian Army,’ p. 13, Lukomskii Collection, Box 4, Hoover Institution, PaloAlto, CA.13 L. C. Heenan, Russian Democracy’s Fatal Blunder: The Summer Offensive of 1917 (New York:Praeger, 1987), p. 2.14 Sir Bernard Pares, Day by Day with the Russian Army (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1915), pp. 201–7,cited in Sir Bernard Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p. 230.15 Geoffrey Jukes, Carpathian Disaster (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), p. 51.16 Le Prince Koudacheff, 1/14 May 1915, folder: Telegrams, November 1914–September 1915, Etat-Major de l’Armée, 7N1545, Chateau de Vincennes, Paris, France.17 Geoffrey Jukes, Carpathian Disaster: The Death of an Army (New York: Ballantine, 1971), p. 51.18 ‘Golitsii proryv,’ p. 2, typed memoir, Mikhail Arkhipov papers, Bakhmetev Archive, ColumbiaUniversity, New York.19 Stanley Washburn, Victory in Defeat; The Agony of Warsaw and the Russian Retreat (New York:Doubleday, Page and Co., 1916), 14–15.

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Brusilov’s right flank, which they assumed, given his aggressiveness, wouldbe attacking into the Carpathians, leaving his right side unprotected.20

In his memoirs, Brusilov noted that Mackensen struck the III Army’s 10thcorps, which had no reserves and was stretched in a single line of ‘defec-tive’ trenches. Brusilov blamed General Ivanov for the disaster that followed,but Brusilov likewise censured Radko-Dmitriev for the chaotic retreat of hisarmy, for he had known of the buildup of the forces before him and he hadknown that there would be no reserves to come to his aid, so he shouldhave prepared a strategic retreat, which he did not.21

On 1 May 1915, 2000 Austro-German guns, tiered behind one another,poured an intense four-hour bombardment onto the Russian lines,22 in manyplaces totally obliterating the Russian positions. There was almost no counterfire from the Russian artillery. Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener, the BritishSecretary for War, described the assault as ‘so far the biggest artillery concen-tration of the war.’23 The front completely collapsed within two days, witha Russian loss of 69,000 men.24 In many places the Austro-German forcesadvanced over demolished trenches filled with Russian corpses. Radko-Dmitriev compounded the problem by dashing about by automobile fromone crisis point to another, remaining out of touch while sending aides indifferent directions with contradictory instructions.25

Brusilov’s VIII army was, as the Central Powers had planned, put intoimmediate danger. Always an aggressive general, Brusilov had intended tocontinue his advance against the battered Austrians holding the other sideof the Carpathian mountain passes, but now his plan would be impossible.On 7 May, Brusilov wrote to his wife Nadia, indiscreetly revealing informa-tion, something Brusilov often did in correspondence to his wife: ‘Our affairshave become very bad,’ he wrote:

20 Ward Rutherford, The Russian Army in World War I (London: Gordon Cremonesi, 1975), p. 126 ff.In his otherwise excellent military history of Russia, David R. Stone incorrectly states that the main blowfell on the VIII Army, when actually the III Army was the recipient, as we see. David R. Stone, A MilitaryHistory of Russia (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), p. 165.21 Brusilov, A Soldier’s Notebook (hereafter cited as SB), p. 137; 2001 Russian ed., p. 128. By May 10,the Russian 10th corps had been reduced from 34,000 effectives to between 4,000 and 5,000, and the3 Caucasian, loaned from Brusilov’s army, had been badly mauled. Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg(Vienna: Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 1931), Vol. 2, p. 328.22 Washburn, Victory, p. 16. Offensive participant German General Hermann von François in hismemoir Gorlice 1915; Der Karpathendurchbruch und die Befreiung von Galizien (Leipzig: Verlag vonK. F. Koehler, 1922), p. 47, states that the German batteries had only 700 guns, which is probably correctsince he had no reason to minimize the number, and Washburn had no real way of knowing it.23 Sir Bernard Pares, My Russian Memoirs (London: J. Cape, 1931), p. 335.24 David R. Jones, ‘The Imperial Army in World War I, 1914–1917,’ The Military History of TsaristRussia, Frederick W. Kagan and Robin Higham (eds.) (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 235.25 Brusilov, SN , p. 135; Russ. 2001 ed., p. 127. Seeing the danger to their ally, the French and Britishbegan attacks in the west to relieve pressure on the Russians, but these actions seem to have had littleeffect on the Austro-German offensive. Doughty, pp. 160–61.

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‘Radko-Dmitriev . . . [has] lost a battle and the Austro-Germans quicklywent through him . . . . If I stay where I am, they will be in my rear.Therefore I decided to retreat[,] and today at 9 PM my corps began todisengage.’26 ‘The catastrophe of my neighbor has ruined everything . . . .Another advance [by my army] isn’t possible.’27

The III and the VIII Armies tried to make a stand in what is calledthe Battle of Sandok on 8-9 May, but suffered heavy losses. Despite thesuccessful attack by the Russian IX Army against the Austrian general Karlvon Pflanzer-Baltin in Bukovina to the south, by 10 May, the entire front of200 miles was ordered to retreat to the San and Dnestr Rivers.28

Always an outstanding tactician, Brusilov began a skillful withdrawal,first sending his stores and baggage along roads cleared for the purpose sothat they would not then be clogged when his units began to fall back.29

Yet one of his units, the 48th division, commanded by the rash, impulsiveGeneral Lavr Kornilov, who would make himself famous in 1917, began tocause trouble. Kornilov, who had disobeyed orders and advanced too far toretreat quickly, was himself wounded and captured, as was much of his unit.He did manage eventually to escape from Austrian captivity and return toRussian lines, being the only Russian general in the war to do so,30 yet hisinfantry division, the 48th, was decimated, although part of these troops dideventually fight its way back through to safety.31

The remainder of Brusilov’s army retreated in good order from the DuklaPass into the Galician plains. Some units fought rear-guard actions by day andretreated under the cover of darkness. In withdrawal, his forces also madespirited night counter-attacks, one of which late in May bagged 5,000 of theenemy and 20 of its machine guns.32 Only his left remained for a while intheir trenches anchored on the recently created XI Army on his left underGeneral Dmitri Shcherbachev, which was beginning its retreat as well. In sodoing, the XI burned its oil reserves, and it and Brusilov’s left were peltedwith ‘oil rain.’33

26 Brusilov (hereafter B) to Nadia (hereafter N), 24 April 1915, folder: Corres. 1–139, p. 97, Aleksei andNadezhda Brusilov collection (hereafter: Brusilov collection, Bakhmetev Archive, Columbia University,New York.27 Ibid.28 Jukes, p. 53; DiNardo, p. 71.29 B, SN , 140; Russ. 2001 ed., p. 129.30 ‘The Forgotten Army,’ pp. 15–16, by A. S. Lukomsky, Lukomsky papers, box 1, Hoover Institution,Palo Alto, CA. This blunder caused bad blood between the two generals and affected their relations in1917, when Kornilov tried to overthrow the Provisional Government.31 Washburn, Victory, pp. 19–20.32 Telegram, 15 May, reel 1, p. 98, f. 2067, Stab glavnokomandushchego armii iugo-zapadnogo fronta,op. 1, d. 145, Russkii Gosudarstvennyi Voennii Istoricheskii Arkhiv (hereafter cited as RGVIA), Moscow,Russia; see also pp. 102 ff.33 Mikhail Arkhipov memoir, Arkhipov collection, chap. 8, p. 2, Bakhmetev Archive.

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Pursuing relentlessly, on 17 May the enemy attacked Brusilov’s 8thcorps (Odessa) and breeched the line temporarily, but Brusilov rushed inreserves and counterattacked, and after hard fighting, the Russians hadplugged the rupture and driven the enemy from its newly taken positions.At this point he received a telegram from Radko-Dmitriev stating that hisforces, still bearing the worst of the attack, were again broken, and theenemy would probably soon outflank Brusilov.34 Yet the Austro-Germanforces failed to bag Brusilov’s VIII Army due to what Washburn called ‘theskill and brilliance with which Brusilov pulled his men out of the passes.’35

In another memoir later, Washburn described this withdrawal ‘one of themost brilliant of the war.’36

Yet despite Brusilov’s adroit evacuation, a gap developed between his5th Kiev and his 21st corps, creating a dangerous situation. ‘I have alreadythrown everything into the fight,’ he wired the commander of the III Armyand warned him of the danger of a rupture on their front.37 In this parloussituation, he received orders to form a new line from south of the Austrianfortress Przemysl to the small town of Staryi Mesto. This new perimeterwould ‘leave his left flank completely in the air,’ so Ivanov gave him per-mission to anchor his right on the Austrian fortress and the marshes ofthe Dnestr near the Vereshchitsa River on his left.38 With the change, how-ever, he was ordered to hold the fortress itself, which he felt was pointless.It had been a deathtrap for the Austrians in the fall of 1914 and would beone for him. The order had come through Ivanov from the Grand DukeNicholas Nicholaevich, the commander in Chief of the Russian armies him-self. In Brusilov’s words, he described the situation as his having ‘beenhanded a mess he had not made and [being] told to fix it.’39 At the sametime he complained to his wife, ‘They are giving me the most difficult sec-tion [to defend], but they are sending the reinforcements to Radko, since heis not holding out.’40

Early in June, a British observer described the III Army as ‘a harm-less mob,’41 and Brusilov was still complaining that since the III Army hadretreated in the north, ‘We must also fall back to the positions, for which westruggled in the course of October of last year.’42 Brusilov does not seem tohave realized the terrible beating the III Army had received. Moreover, late

34 After receiving the news, Brusilov developed severe chest pains and may have had a heart attack,but he remained, as he told Nadia, ‘Outwardly calm.’ B to N, 4 May 1915, Brusilov Papers, f. Corres.1–139, p. 103, Bakhmetev Archive, Columbia University, New York.35 Washburn, Victory in Defeat, pp. 19–20.36 Washburn, On the Russian Front, pp. 119.37 B to III Army, 12 May 1915, reel 1, p. 7, f. 2067, op. 1, d. 310, RGVIA.38 B, SN , 138; Russ.2001 ed., p. 128.39 Ibid.40 B to N, 4 May 1915, f. Corres. 1–139, p. 104, Bakhmetev Archive, Columbia University, New York.41 Martin Gilbert, The First World War (New York: Henry Holt, 1994), p. 167.42 B to N, 4 May, 1915, Brusilov Collection, f. Corres., 1–139, p. 102, Bakhmetev Archive.

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in May, he had asked Radko-Dmitriev for some help,43 which he could notpossibly have given. As noted above, it seemed to him incomprehensiblethat reinforcements were being sent to the III Army and not to him,44 whichindicates that he did not at this point realize the seriousness of the positionof the III Army. As good a general as Brusilov was, his own army could nothave withstood what befell the III Army.45

Yet now he was being told to hold Przemysl, which the III army, with hisassistance from the south, had invested in the fall of 1914. He told Washburnthat he could have held the Austrian forces there for at least a month,46 butwith the crumbling of the front to his right, it was a lost cause and would costhim men and materiel he could use elsewhere. On 26 May, he wired Ivanovthat his men were ‘physically and morally exhausted’ and that they could not‘hold out.’47 The next day he wired headquarters his belief that defendingthe fortress, the expense of which would be ‘especially costly,’ would notbe worth the price,48 its being a ‘a heap of ruins.’49 Apparently Ivanov hadinformed Stavka of Brusilov’s ‘lack of resolve,’ because the tsar himself wiredhim to defend the worthless position. Caving to imperial pressure, Brusilovwired the tsar back, ‘The demand . . . to defend Przemysl will be fulfilled. . . . The telegram of Your August Highness unites all our energies andself-sacrifice.’ Then, speaking of the superior artillery his men were facing,probably to cover himself for any future blame, he added optimistically,‘This will not prevent our forces from fulfilling their duty to the end.’50.

For several days Brusilov’s army did indeed briefly take some of thepunishment before Przemysl that the III Army had been receiving all alongthe retreat route since 1 May. Yet on the night of 30–31 May, the Podolskyregiment joined Brusilov’s army, and it was immediately thrown into thefight between the San River and one of the Przemysl’s strong points. In thisaction it captured 23 officers and 600 men.51 Yet Brusilov was only barelyable to hold his positions, and he doubted that he could do so for long.Ivanov had even cannibalized four corps from Brusilov’s army, moving unitselsewhere, and then he gave Brusilov the order to attack. To Brusilov, thebest defense was always to attack, but he always tried to avoid sending hismen into a fight in which they had no chance. Brusilov wired Chief of StaffSergei S. Savich that the troops he had under his command ‘will be totallyinsufficient for the holding of the line,’ much less fit to go on the offensive,

43 B to III Army, 12 May 1915, reel 1, p. 1, f. 2067, op. 1, d. 310, RGVIA.44 B to N, 4 May 1915, Brusilov Collection, f. Corres. 1–139, p. 104, Bakhmetev Archive.45 Sir Bernard Pares recorded in his memoirs that Brusilov’s VIII Army ‘had been pounded almost asbadly as the III Army,’ (Pares, My Russian Memoirs, p. 335,), which is clearly not the case at this point.46 Washburn, On the Russian Front, p. 102.47 Tele. B to Ivanov, 13 May 1915, reel 1, p. 2021, f. 2067, op. 1, d. 310, RGVIA.48 B to Sergei S. Savich, 11 (or 14) May, 1915, reel 1, f. 2067, p. 39, ibid.49 Stanley Washburn, The Russian Campaign (London: Melrose, 1915), p. 290.50 B to Tsar, 14 May 1915, reel 1, p. 43 (?), f. 2067, op. 1, d. 310, RGVIA.51 No title, 17th May, 1915, reel 2, p. 161, f. 2067, op. 1, d. 145, ibid.

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and he added, ‘I consider it absolutely necessary [to have back] these fourcorps [you have removed].’52

Yet without the requested reinforcements, Brusilov still followed ordersand went on the offensive on 3 June. Although his men in his left pushedto the Dnestr River, he achieved little real success.53 Moreover, he that dayabandoned Przemysl, apparently without direct orders to do so, to avoid theuseless slaughter of his men. To his wife, he later admitted that his supe-riors had told him to ‘do as you think best.’54 Even in a skillful retreat, hesustained ‘especially bad’ losses. ‘To hold Przemysl any longer was not pos-sible,’ he informed the Supreme Command, adding that ‘all of his] artillerysupplies were destroyed’ and even ‘bread was burnt.’55 Yet he retreated incomplete order, leaving only four guns in the fortress, and all four had beenspiked. On the good side, his retreat shortened his line by 30 versts, thusgiving him a pool of men with which to create a reserve for his army.56

Brusilov felt that had he remained there, ‘It would have been said that‘here Brusilov stands and here he dies.’’57 Brusilov told Washburn that hefelt that it was ‘always a mistake to try to hold temporarily a position onwhich you cannot permanently stand,’ adding, ‘It takes moral courage toretreat, . . . but to fight at the enemy’s time at a poor position is apt to ruinan army . . . .’58

Yet his having to abandon the fortress was bitter medicine, since hefelt he would be blamed for its loss. ‘They passed Przemysl to me whenits defense was factually impossible,’ he complained to his wife, and eventhe ‘higher ups’ had told him that it possessed no military value because ‘itwas no longer a fortress, but a destroyed nest . . . .’59 To Brusilov it was achoice of losing the fortress or losing his army and the fortress as well. He,of course, chose the former.

The famous Russian Civil War general Anton Denikin, who served inBrusilov’s army at the time, commanding a unit with the pet name ‘the IronBrigade,’ remembered these horrible days. ‘The spring of 1915 will remainin my memory forever. Grievously bloody battles. Neither cartridges norshells.’ He had been part of Brusilov’s army that had defended the worthlessPrzemysl, which he remembered as

eleven days of cruel fighting for the Iron Brigade, eleven days of thedreadful boom of German heavy artillery, literally razing whole rows

52 B to Gen. Savich, 20 May 195, reel 2, p. 1094, f. 2067, op. 1, d. 145, ibid.53 B to Supreme Command, 21 May/3 June 1915, reel 1, p. 105, f. 2067, op. 1, d. 310, ibid.54 B to N, 28 May 1915, Brusilov Collection, f. Corres.1–139, p. 106, Bakhmetev Archive. In theRGVIA archives, there appears no telegram giving him this latitude.55 B to S. Command, 21 May 1915, reel 2, p. 111, f. 2067, op. 1, d. 310, RGVIA.56 B, SN , 149–150; Russ. 2001 ed., 128.57 Washburn, On the Russian Front, p. 102.58 Ibid., p. 63.59 B to N, 28 May 1915, Brusilov Collection, f. Corres. 1–139, p. 106, Bakhmetev Archive.

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of trenches along with their defenders. And silence of my batteries.We were unable to answer. There was nothing with which to reply.Nearly exhausted regiments repulsed one attack after another [only] withbayonets . . . .

Then he adds, ‘When after three days of silence, our six-gun batteriesreceived [a pathetically insufficient] fifty shells . . . . All companies breathedmore easily.60

On 10 June Brusilov painted for Nadia a grim picture of the Galicianfront. ‘The III Army is destroyed, and my army is staggering under blows . . . .From May, my army has carried such losses, defending the impossible.’ Yethe did end on an optimistic note: ‘deep down’ he felt that the Russians wouldwin the war,61 and he prepared to make another stand of the San River.

Yet even with Brusilov’s army’s being undermanned, Ivanov continuedto take troops from him. He ordered the 5th Caucasian corps to the IIIArmy and obsessed with his left wing, Ivanov moved the 2nd Caucasus andthe 23rd corps to the XI Army on Brusilov’s left. Brusilov at this point hadonly several cavalry divisions making contact with the remnants of the IIIArmy, and he feared that his right flank might be turned. Getting nowhereby wire, Brusilov sent his chief of staff to Ivanov’s headquarters to pleadhis case, but he found there only chaos and despondency, and he learnedthat there would be no additional munitions and war materiel.62 Still, evenin its weakened state, Brusilov’s army, although unable to make a stand onthe San River because promised reserves did not materialize,63 continuallyharassed the enemy with night counterattacks. The 3rd Caucasians evencaptured 7,000 prisoners in one night bayonet attack.64 His army’s losses,however, were all the more serious because there were no trained troops toreplace them.

Meanwhile, the III Army, which in the words of Radko-Dmitriev had‘lost all of its blood,’65 lost its commander as well. He had asked to withdrawto rebuild his army, a reasonable request under the circumstances, and wascashiered for asking. He was replaced by General L. V. Lesh, who had madea good reputation for himself in the Russo-Japanese War and was regardedan outstanding authority on infantry tactics.66

60 Anton I. Denikin, The Career of a Tsarist Officer: Memoirs, 1872–1921 (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1975), p. 253.61 B to N, 28 May, 1915, Brusilov Collection, f. Corres. 1–139, p. 107, Bakhmetev Archive.62 B, SN , 152–53; Rus. 2001 ed., 136.63 Washburn, With the Russian Army, p. 102. Brusilov told Washburn, that ‘two reserve corps thathad been promised did not come up in time, and I had no alternative to falling back.’64 Pares, Fall, p. 231.65 Pares, Fall, p. 231. Washburn, who was not likely to have been privy to the best statistics, wrotethat of the three center corps of III Army, which had numbered 200,000 at the beginning of the enemyoffensive, were finally pulled together at the San 100 miles or so in the rear two weeks later had then atotal strength of only 12,000. Washburn, Victory, p. 18.]66 Major-General Alfred Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917 (New York: Arno Press, 1971), 1:287; B., SN , 146; Russ.2001 ed., 132; Rutherford, p. 132.

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The Russian armies continued to retreat before the onslaught of theCentral Powers, however, and by mid-June, Brusilov’s back was on L’vov(Lemberg), a city he had taken ten months earlier in his 1914 advance. Hebecame understandably despondent. ‘Here I am [back] again in L’vov . . . ,’he wrote his wife. ‘I’m just sick . . . . What is to be done? Without guns.Without cartridges. Without shells, heavy artillery success isn’t possible.’67

Yet chiefly using Denikin’s ‘Iron Brigade,’ he bolstered retreating units,striking here and there, first moving Denikin into a reserve position, thenthrowing him again into a breach of what Denikin called ‘the scorching hellof battle.’ Its use in such emergencies gained the Iron Brigade the reputationof being ‘the fire brigade of the VIII Army,’ and Brusilov praised it warmlyin his memoirs for ‘always executing honorably the most difficult tasks,’ butthen Denikin added in his remembrances, ‘Always [his italics] but at what acost? My heart aches when I remember those brave men who died.’68

Against the enemy’s superior artillery, the Russian army faced a terriblequandary. Brusilov heard those under him repeatedly say, ‘We cannot fightwith bare hands,’ and to retreat endlessly could only damage the morale ofan army, yet to advance was impossible and even to stand and defend, wouldmean useless slaughter.69 Their stern resistance did not go unappreciated bymany western observers, however, and drew ringing praise from the Frenchcommander-in-chief General Joffre, who called the Russians’ heroic defense‘a beautiful page to the glory of the Russian army.’70 Indeed it was, and itstill remains a page of military history overlooked in what Winston Churchillcalled ‘the unknown war.’71

Washburn, from the still-neutral United States though clearly pro-Entente(he got to the point where he even referred to Russian actions as ‘our’), notedthat given the inequality in arms between the Russians and their enemies,‘. . . the Allies will open their eyes when they know exactly how little theRussians had in the war of armaments to hold off the mass of Germansand Austrians . . . .’72 In another of his publications, he admiringly wrote ofGorlice-Tarnow, ‘The Russians were not routed, as the Germans asserted . . . .They simply stayed and died.’73

Brusilov’s tenacious defense, moreover, was seriously affecting thestrategy of the Central Powers. By the late summer of the offensive, theRussian front was absorbing most of the troops of the Central Powers, with

67 B to N, 2 June 1915, Brusilov Collection, f. Corres. 1–139, p. 110, Bakhmetev.68 Denikin, Career, pp. 239–40.69 F. 162, d. 17, l. 88–89, RGVIA, cited in IU. V. Sokolov, Krasnaia zvezda ili krest? Zhizn’ i sud’bagenerala Brusilova (Moscow: Rossiia molodaia, 1994), pp. 57–58.70 Letter of Joffre attached to Telegram chiffre, 24 May 1915, in ‘Nov 1914–Sept 1915 telegrams,’7N1545, Vincennes.71 Winston Churchill’s account of the war on the Eastern Front was The Unknown War: The EasternFront (New York: Scribner’s, 1931).72 Washburn, The Russian Campaign, p. 215.73 Washburn, Victory, p. 17.

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Germany’s alone having 65 divisions in the East, with only 90 in the West.74

By early July even General von Mackensen’s army in Poland was slowingdown and seemed unable to take Warsaw. His supply lines were stretched,and captured German soldiers complained of exhaustion in their ranks.75 TheFrench somehow obtained a message of General Karl von Pflanzer-Baltin,the commandant of the Austrian 7th army, complaining that the Russiannight attacks were having ‘a tiresome effect on the morale of our troops,’and when they did blunt an attack, the men were never willing to make acounter-attack.76 Had Trotsky considered this reality?

On 20 June, Rava Russka fell to the Germans, thus opening a flank ofBrusilov’s army to an attack. With L’vov, the capital of Galicia, at Brusilov’sback and in danger of falling, the Grand Duke Nicholas ordered the removalof military materiel from the city, and the Battle of L’vov began that same day.With the city behind him, he threw his 8th and 18th corps at the advancingGerman 41st reserve and the Austrian 6th corps, but he could only slow theenemy long enough to evacuate the stores there. On 22 June, the Austriansbroke into the edge of the city, but Brusilov prevented his encirclement byyet another skillful withdrawal77 in ‘neither excitement or confusion.’78

L’vov fell that same day and nearby Halicz soon after, and Brusilov’sarmy retreated eastward across the Bug and the Gnila Lipa Rivers. OutwardlyBrusilov tried to appear optimistic to those around him. He and Washburndined together in July, and the journalist left the meeting with the opinionthat ‘it would be impossible for anyone to be a pessimist after an hour withthis officer.’79 Yet to his wife Nadia, he wrote privately that his ‘heart isheavy and my soul aches.’80 He could, however, tell that his VIII army wasbeginning to recover, adding that ‘I am completely at peace.’81 Even with thealmost total loss of Galicia, Brusilov continued to pursue an opportunity tostand and fight, although he felt it was ‘hard to say at which time we will go

74 S. Semanov, General Brusilov: dokumental’noe povestvovanie (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo,1986), p. 164.75 Knox report, 4 August 1915, War Office (hereafter cited as WO), 106/1067, British NationalArchives, London.76 Extrait du Order du Commandant de la 7 Armée autricienne, 25 June, 1915, folder 15,Grand Quartier Général, 16N12N, Grand Quartier Général, Vincennes. Washburn writes in The RussianCampaign that by June 26, the Russians, even in retreat, had captured 53,000 Austro-German troops, ahighly unlikely figure. The only way Washburn could have obtained this number was either to have madeit up or been given it by the Russians, who most certainly would have embellished what they told him.See p. 215. The Russians did, however, in retreat capture numbers of Central Power soldiers, as has beencited in this article from creditable sources.77 Jukes, p. 54.78 Washburn, The Russian Campaign, p. 292.79 Ibid., p. 293.80 B to N, 11 June 1915, Brusilov Collection, f. Corres. 1–139, p. 112, Bakhmetev Archive.81 B to N, 11 June 1914, op. 3, d. 69, p. 423, f.5972 General Brusilov Fond, Gosudarstvennyi ArkhivRusskoi Federatsy (hereafter cited as GARF), Moscow. I read both the typed and the handwritten letters,and this statement did not appear in the typewritten.

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on the attack.’ Seemingly bitter about the retreat he had to make, he felt that‘History, of course, will expose the guilty.’82

By mid-July his headquarters was at Brodi, not far from the Russianborder.83 Although the III Army on his right was still receiving much pun-ishment, both Brusilov and Shcherbachev of the XI Russian Army on his leftwere holding before a less strenuous Austro-German pressure, and both hadestablished defensive positions 30 to 40 versts behind them to which theycould retreat without endangering the Southwest Front’s strategic position.84

Moreover, the beginning of August still found Brusilov planning an offensivefor the first opportunity and brooding over the fact that he did not have theresources to attack. The Austrians gave him some breathing space early inAugust, which would have been an excellent time to launch an offensive, buthe did not have the necessary arms, shells and cartridges, which he wouldnot have in adequate supply, he had been told, until the fall of the year.‘Again it seems we are not ready,’ he wrote Nadia, adding, ‘and this is thechronic illness of Russia, never to be ready.’ This problem, he feared, wouldmake the war continue for at least another year.85 Both he and Russia shouldhave been so lucky.

Throughout August, the Central Powers continued to advance all alongthe front.86 Warsaw finally fell the first week of the month, and much ofthe Polish salient was cleared of Russian forces in the month that followed.The Russian retreat was so precipitous that the Tsar wrote his wife thatthere was talk of moving Stavka from Mogilev. On his front, the Austriansattacked around Brusilov’s right flank between him and the decimated IIIArmy, breaking through what passed for Russian forces at the city of Lutsk.The only unit opposing them was the newly scraped up 39th corps, com-prised of militia guards, retirees, and whatever else could be found, whohad thought they would be doing only guard duty,87 but in Brusilov’s words‘did not represent any real military strength.’ As usual, he called on Denikin’sIron Brigade to stabilize the front, and it did stop the Austrians for a time.88

With some feinting action, he gave the Austrians the impression that he wasabout to stand, and this action contributed to their decision to halt.89 Yetthe Austrians resumed their advance the next day, pushing toward Lutsk.Whereas the XI and IX Armies to his south retreated, however, Brusilov

82 B to N, 13 June 1915, Brusilov Collection, f. Corres. 1–139, p. 113, Bakhmetev Archive.83 At this point, the VIII Army consisted of the 12th corps, 21st corps, 8th corps, 17 corps, 28thcorps, the 7th corps, and one cavalry corps. Dispatch p. 2, 14 July 1915, WO 106/1065, British NationalArchives.84 Ibid., p. 4.85 B to N, 28 July 1915, p. 120, Brusilov Collection, Bakhmetev Archive.86 Telegram, 14 August 1915, reel 1, p. 1–2, op. 1, d. 79, f. 2003, General-kvartirmeister stavki, RGVIA.87 B, SN , 172–75; Russ. 2001ed. pp. 146–47.88 Denikin, The Career, p. 264.89 B, SN, 174–75; Rus. 2001 ed., pp. 146–47.

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made what was probably a counter thrust, which he told headquarters wasa ‘big action,’90 but then continued his retreat in the direction of Rovno.

In the north, the retreating Russian line began reaching the Prypetmarshes, not real marshes in the true sense, but an area that was swampyand intersected with many small streams. It was not easily passable, so in thepre-war years the Russians had done little to fortify it. As Brusilov retreated,Lesh’s fragmented III Army retreated into this inhospitable place. In with-drawing, Lesh moved to the northeast around the swamps leaving Brusilov’sright exposed. Ivanov then ordered Brusilov to extend his lines to Lutsk,anchoring his right on the marshes.

The Austrians continued to press Brusilov, attacking his weakened rightflank, trying to turn it and driving for the major rail junction of Kovel, whichwould be a major objective of Brusilov in the 1916 offensive. In retreat,Brusilov employed his usual tactics of counter-punching and retreating onlyto strike forward again the next day.91 Unlike the French, however, theRussians had the luxury of being able to trade space for time. As TsarAlexander I had said a century earlier when Napoleon invaded the RussianEmpire in 1812, ‘If fortune smiles on him, . . . . , he [Napoleon] will have tosign the peace on the Behring Strait.’92

By the 1 September, however, the Austro-German offensive was begin-ning to falter all along the front on its own as they became mired in the vastRussian land mass, which has defeated many a Russian invader in times pastand would do so again after 1941. The farther the Austrians and Germansdrove into Russia, the greater became their problems of supply as they wentfarther and farther from their railheads. As the September rains began to fall,they turned the primitive roads into quagmires.

The Russian soldiers also continued to fight like tigers. On 24 September1915, General Max von Hoffman, the German army’s leading Russian expert,noted in his diary, ‘Heavy fighting last night. The Russians are attackingdesperately where they are being outflanked. Alas, we are always just anarmy corps short . . . . .’ He also added to the bad news that they had notcaptured as many prisoners as they had in the past. ‘Our men are exhausted’and that ‘complete chaos [reigns], no telephone lines.’93 Two days later,he lamented, ‘Our offensive is slowly coming to a standstill. The Russiansare defending themselves desperately.’94 The murderous ‘Great Retreat,’ asit came to be known, was finally at an end with the Russian army still

90 Telegram, 15 August 1915, reel 1, p. 5–8, f. 2003, op. 1, D. 79, RGVIA.91 See General-kvartirmeister stavki, f. 2003, op. 1, d. 79, reel 1, for late August–early September,RGVIA.92 Alexis S. Trubetskoy, Imperial Legend (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2002), pp. 96–97. All werenot so optimistic. The French ambassador to Russia, Maurice Paléologue wired Paris, ‘I fear this army willsoon reach the limit of its endurance.’ Doughty, p. 169.93 Max von Hoffmann, War Diaries and Other Papers (London: Martin Secker, 1929), Vol. 1, p. 85.94 Ibid.

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intact and Russia fully committed to remaining in the war. French colonelJacques Langlois, an observer in the Russian army, reported to Paris whenthe retreating had stopped that the Russian forces were ‘neither demoral-ized nor disorganized.’95 The Russians had not been routed as the Germansclaimed: ‘They simply had remained and died.’96

Yet the price for both sides had been staggering, with the Russiansreceiving the worst of it. The statistics on the losses vary widely.General Lukomsky told Sir Bernard Pares that the Russians had sustained3,800,000 casualties since the beginning of the war, 3 million in the first10 months of 1915.97 The French ambassador to Russia, Maurice Paléologue,reported to the French Foreign Office that the Russians had lost on average350,000 men each month for May, June, and July, with 450,000 lost inAugust.98

The reports for the Germans are at equal variance, with one historian’snoting that accounts show that 1,737,000 Austrians and 159,000 Germanshad been captured,99 to say nothing of those killed and wounded. After theRevolution, a Russian newspaper Red Star stated that Brusilov alone hadcaptured the unlikely figure of 312,000 enemy soldiers along with 350 gunsand 600 machine guns,100 Yet he reported early in September that in threedays around Mt. Kremenetsky, he had taken 40,000 men captive, which werethe first report of any POWs in some time.101

As the enemy’s offensive finally stumbled to a halt in September,the situation became ripe for Brusilov’s long-desired counter-attack. Let usremember that when the Austrians bogged down six weeks earlier andBrusilov had wanted to attack, he had insufficient means to do so. Nowhe was receiving the guns and shells in ample numbers to make an advance.He began arranging his units to attack by placing Denikin’s Iron Brigade,‘assisted’ by the unreliable 39th corps, in the center of his army with the30th corps under General Zaionchkovsky, the 7th cavalry, and the 3rdcorps on the right. Denikin was to make a frontal assault on Lutsk while

95 Etat Matériel et moral des Armées russes, Rapports Langlois, 16 September1915, 7N1547,Vincennes.96 Washburn, Victory, p. 17.97 Pares, Russian Memoirs, p. 332; Washburn also uses the same figure as Pares but uses it as earlyas the end of June. Herwig places the number at a lesser and more realistic 1,700,000. Holger H. Herwig,The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914–1918 (London: Arnold, 1997), p. 179.98 Maurice Paléologue to MFA, 31 August 1915, in Le Gén. Maj. Gen. à Monsieur c-in-c, 5 (?)September 1915, 7N1545, Vincennes.99 Prof. E. Messner, Lutskii proryv (New York: Vseslavianskoe izdates’stvo, 1968), p. 23; Frenchfigures put the Russian losses (the numbers of which could only come from the Russians themselves) ata higher figure, Resumé de rensign, 27 March 1916, Russie 17, 16N1211, Vincennes. Washburn cites thehighly unlikely figure of one half to one million Germans alone. Washburn, At the Russian Front, p. 315.100 Vosp. Nadezhda Brusilova, copy of Red Star, 2, op. 1, d. 21-1, l.245, f. 5972, Aleksei Brusilovpapers, GARF.101 Tele., 31 August 1915, p. 39, reel 1, f. 2003, op. 1, d. 79, RGVIA.

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Zaionchkovsky was to wheel around to the northwest in a flanking move-ment and attack the city from there. Having planned this manoeuver, hephoned Ivanov’s chief of staff General Savich and informed him of his plan.Savich replied that he did not think that Ivanov would agree to a majoroffensive, and Brusilov replied that he was not suggesting a major attack,only a limited one to correct the line. Savich then agreed.102

Brusilov unleashed his army on 16 September and in the fighting thatday and the 17th smashed the Austrian lines with heavy losses to the enemy,pushing them back on Lutsk, which the Russians had only recently aban-doned. On 19 September Denikin attacked the Lutsk fortifications in a frontalassault and inflicted heavy losses on the Austrians, taking the first two linesof their defenses. Even the unreliable 39th reached the outskirts of the city.Brusilov then ordered Zaionchkovsky to attack in a flanking movement fromthe north after an all-night artillery bombardment, which Brusilov authorizeddespite a headquarters command to ration shells. In his own order of theday to his troops, Zaionchkovsky opined that Denikin’s forces would not belikely to take the city, and it would be the ‘gallant troops of [his] 30th corps’that would have the honor.103

The next day Denikin entered the city in his staff car and officiallyretook it. He wired Brusilov that the city had fallen. Shortly afterward,Zaionchkovsky entered the city from the north and immediately wiredBrusilov that he had taken the city, when in reality he had not done soalone. Denikin claimed that Brusilov wired back, ‘And no doubt you took[General] Denikin prisoner there.’ For the action Denikin received a fieldpromotion to Lieutenant General, and Zaionchkovsky was awarded one ofthe St. George crosses, although he never somehow actually received it.104

It is unlikely that Brusilov ever made that sarcastic remark toZaionchkovsky. It simply was not his style. He makes no mention of it in hismemoirs, adding only that ‘Sometimes the success of an operation dependson the competition between two generals.’105 The Iron Division had per-formed well, capturing 158 officers and almost 10,000 men. The victory hadbeen costly, however, as Denikin had lost 40% of his effectives. His unit wasonce again pulled from the line for a few days of rest and placed in reserve.106

Three days later, Brusilov duplicated the same maneuver, employingall of his cavalry in the sweep. Again Zaionchkovsky’s 30th and 8th corpsplayed its role, but this time Brusilov gave Denikin an artillery battery tocover his flank. Moreover, to the north, General Aleksei Evert, commanderof the Western Front, attacked, putting pressure on the Austro-Germans so

102 B, SN , 178; Russ. 2001 ed., 148–49.103 For an account of events without the personalities, see Telegram 27 August 1915, reel 1, p. 25,f. 2003, op. 1, d. 79, p. 25, RGVIA.104 Denikin, Career, pp. 264–66.105 Brusilov, SN , 180; Rus. 2001 ed., 149–50.106 Denikin, Career, p. xii.

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that they could not transfer reinforcements southward, an action he wouldhesitate to duplicate the next year when Brusilov needed his cooperationmuch more. With all of this assistance, Brusilov was easily capable ofmaking uninterrupted contact with Shcherbachev’s XI Army to his left.107

Moreover, in retreat, he had left behind some units hiding in the forest toact as partisans and disrupt the enemy’s rear.108 Brusilov also had help fromhis left. Shcherbachev attacked with his XI Army on the Sereth River atTarnopol on 7 September capturing 150 Austrian officers and 7,000 enemysoldiers.109

The small offensive made the enemy retreat somewhat northward,falling back toward the Styr River. Then with his 8th and 30th corps, Brusilovdrove the Austrians beyond Lutsk to the river itself.110 In this maneu-ver Brusilov captured 720 officers, 44,250 men, nine pieces of artillery,and 108 machine guns.111 Once again, the Russians were advancing onPrzemysl. 112

As usual the Austrians called for German help, and German air patrolsbegan appearing over Brusilov’s front, and soon after he learned that theGermans were sending an army corps to attack his right flank near Kolki,a town east of Lutsk. He immediately sent there two divisions of the 30th

corps, reinforcing them with the 4th division sharpshooters and the 7th cav-alry division, feeling comfortable that this rearranging of troops could stopany counter-offensive.113 Brusilov’s 8th and 30th corps, however, drove theAustrians beyond Lutsk to the Styr River. Meanwhile, he discovered thattwo German divisions had moved onto his right flank, and he placed threedivisions as a counter to this threat.114

On what Brusilov called ‘one wretched evening,’ however, at 7:00 PM,he received a coded telegram ordering his right wing, which had been sosuccessful in the recent battle, to abandon Lutsk and retreat to its old positionon the Stubel River and for the 30th to conceal itself in the forest east of Kolki,with the added directive that when the enemy advanced on the Kolki-Klevanroad, these troops were to debouch from the forest and attack the Germansin their left flank. Having then shaken the Germans (Brusilov usually refers

107 Tele. 30 August 1915, reel 1, F. 2003, op. 1, d. 79, p. 29–30, RGVIA.108 Tele., 28 August 1915, reel 1, p. 26–28, f. 2003, op. 1, d. 79, RGVIA.109 Joseph T. Fuhrmann, The Complete Wartime Correspondence of Tsar Nicholas II and the EmpressAlexandra (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), p. 182.110 B to Gen. Quartermaster, 31 August/13 September 1915, reel1, p. 16, f. 2007, op. 1, d. 314, RGVIA.111 ‘Brusilov na Kavkaze,’ in Otkliki, p. 49, f. 162, op. 1, d. 11, RGVIA.112 Fuhrmann, ed., The Complete Wartime Correspondence, p. 182. In this letter it seems that NicholasII had deluded himself in thinking that his leadership had inspired this success.113 B, SN , 180; Russ. 2001 ed., 150. Brusilov gave another account of these maneuvers at a symposiumin 1920. P. V. Cherkasov, ed.. Lutskii proryv (Moscow: Vyshii voennyi redaktsionnyi sovet, 1924), p. 19.114 Cherasov, ed., Lutskii proriv, p. 19.

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to any enemy as ‘the Germans’ whether they were or not), the whole linewould go over on the offensive.115

Brusilov called the entire scheme ‘lunacy.’ The time it would take todecipher the order and then transmit it to the company level would take12 hours. Moreover, the distance from the Styr to the Stubel was 50 ver-sts, and to be remotely effective the action would have to begin at nightand would take more than a day. Moreover, such a maneuver would notpass unnoticed by enemy air observers, so he doubted that the Austrianswould fall for the ruse. He also correctly felt that for his troops to surren-der the gains they had recently made, especially without enemy pressure,would seriously undermine his soldiers’ morale.116 Yet his pleas to Ivanovgot nowhere, so he executed the order as given,117 but he claims that hemade it plain to those under him that this scheme was not his but had comefrom Ivanov. As Brusilov predicted, the enemy did not fall for the trap andmerely occupied the territory that the Russians surrendered.118

If the word was transmitted that the scheme was not Brusilov’s, itsomehow never reached Denikin, or else one of the two men rememberedevents differently years later. Denikin wrote in his memoirs that Brusilovtold him to ‘hide his men in the forest,’ which was the order from Ivanov.Denikin’s men became lost in the woods, and the Austrians regained whatthey had recently lost, as Brusilov pointed out would happen. Not know-ing any better, Denikin blamed Brusilov in his memoirs for this foolishdémarche.119

There was one final coda to this first Brusilov offensive, catalyzedby the enemy itself. On 16 October German forces to the north occupiedChartoryskii, threatening Brusilov’s right wing. This assault was apparentlythe attack for which Brusilov had prepared the previous month, and helaunched a quick preemptive blow with his right wing, which forced theenemy back to the Styr River. The Iron Brigade liberated Chartoryskii withthe left wing and produced a breakthrough 18 kilometers wide and 20 kilo-meters deep. It had been so sudden and unexpected by the enemy thatthe Russians captured much war materiel and enemy baggage, includingarmy mail. Denikin claimed in his memoirs that he called for reserves to behurled into the breach, but that Brusilov, ‘usually so energetic,’ hesitated forreasons of which he did not know. Brusilov did finally dispatch the 105th

division in time to face the Austrian counter-attack, which came on threesides of the recently created salient. These attacks, however, were repulsed.

115 B, SN, 182; Russ. 2001 ed., 150.116 Ibid.117 B, SN, 183; See also Tel. 11 September 1915, reel 1, p. 58, f. 2003, op. 1, d. 79, RGVIA.118 Chekasov, ed., Lutskii proryv, p. 19. His account given at the 1920 symposium contains someslight differences.119 Denikin, The Career, p. 267.

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Brusilov and the Great Retreat 671

Denikin attacked for the last time on 9 November on his whole front, cap-turing 8,500 POWs.120 With this last blow, except for a few narrow attacks,the Eastern Front largely settled down for the remainder of the year. Forthe major check he had given the Austrians, Brusilov was awarded the St.George Gold Cross on 12 October.121

In the Great Retreat, however, we have seen that the Russians had sus-tained enormous casualties. Yet the retreats on Brusilov’s front had beenorderly, and there were no encirclements like those that the Russians wouldsee in World War II, and far fewer casualties. Moreover, with the repeatedcounterattacks without artillery preparation, desperate as many of them were,they cost the Austrians thousands of casualties as well.122 A large factor was,of course, the inferiority of Russian artillery and the shell shortage at thefront. One historian has expressed the view that there was not so much ashortage of shells in the country; it was a question of getting them to thefront where they were needed.123 Yet the Germans in the Russian evacuationof Poland alone captured 5200 pieces of artillery, 3,148 of which were mod-ern, 880 heavy guns, and almost 4,000,000 shells, many of which were laterused on the Western Front.124 These losses would create a major hole in anynation’s ordnance.

Except for Brusilov’s vigorous attacks in September, it is easily under-standable why the Central Powers thought that Russia would no longer be athreat after these staggering losses in 1915, and they turned their attention in1916 to Italy and Verdun, thus leaving themselves more or less exposed in theeast. Several other developments changed the situation, however. GeneralVladimir Sukhomlinov, the minister of war, became a casualty of the deba-cle, and he was replaced by the highly competent General Aleksei Polivanov,whom Knox called ‘a man of energy and ability.’ Maurice Verstraete, a Frenchconsul general in Russia, wrote ‘All the entire country received his nomina-tion with joy,’ He had lost one of his sons in Galicia in 1914, and ‘only victorywould be capable of alleviating his grief.’ Verstraete felt that his task equatedthat of ‘cleansing the Augean stables,’125 but it was a task he completed well.General Brusilov’s great victory the next year came largely in part becauseof Polivanov’s work.126

120 Ibid.121 Alekseev to Ivanov, 29 September 1915, reel 1, p. 41, f. 2067, op. 1, d. 151, RGVIA.122 Denikin, The Career, p. 261.123 Brian D. Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003),p. 77.124 Kevin D. Stubbs, Race to the Front: The Material Foundations of Coalition Strategy in the GreatWar (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), p. 125.125 Verstraete memoir ms, Maurice Verstraete collection, box 1, chap. 39, pages not given, HooverInstitution, Palo Alto, CA.126 Sukhomlinov’s reputation is undergoing a modest historical resurrection. See William C. Fuller,Jr.’s excellent work The Foe Within: Fantasies of Treason and the End of Imperial Russia (Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press, 2006).

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672 J. H. Cockfield

A second casualty, which became a plus, was the replacement of thesluggish Southwestern Front commander Ivanov with Brusilov, whose vig-orous administration doubled the size of the monthly reports to Stavka.127

He is likewise given credit for the tactics of attacking on a broad front thatresulted in his victory in 1916. He abandoned the concentrated artillery bom-bardment in a narrow area, which always telegraphed a punch, and insteadadvanced on a 250-mile front, which kept the enemy guessing, and whenthere was a major rupture, reserves were dispatched where his armies weremost successful. His new strategy resulted in tsarist Russia’s last bit of militaryglory.128

Brusilov’s leadership of his army in the Great Retreat reflected his pastvalues and general military thoughts—preparedness, strong discipline, andthe utilization of attack as the best defense. Yet it must also be said that hewas lucky. He could not have easily withstood the murderous main assaultthat fell on Radko-Dmitriev’s III Army, yet his demonstrated skill at bothtactical and strategic retreat would have preserved his army far better thanRadko-Dmitriev was able to preserve his. Brusilov’s performance, however,given his challenges and resources, arguably earned him the distinction thatTrotsky so blithely begrudged Russia’s generals.

127 As an example of how he took charge, see Prikazy, no. 131, 7 April 1916, l. 180ff, f. 2070,Upravlennie nachalnika voennikh soobshchenii armii iugo-zapadnogo fronta, op. 1, d. 18, RGVIA.128 Actually Joffre had already utilized the broad front tactic to a much lesser degree on the WesternFront in 1915, yet there is no evidence that Brusilov derived the idea from him. It was certainly neverconsidered by other Russian generals. Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory, chap. 4, 153 ff., esp. p. 169.

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