Gatwick Airport

Christmas Eve 2013 disruption

Case Study

Gatwick Airport – background

Owned by a group of international investment funds: – New York-based Global Infrastructure Partners – Abu Dhabi Investment Authority – California Public Employees’ Retirement System– National Pension Service of Korea – Australian Future Fund

2013 operating profits were £116.4m but company accounts show Gatwick Airport Ltd (GAL) was funded by £1.4bn debt with repayment costs being £142m

Paid no corporation tax in 2013 as interest repayments drove it into a loss (as was the case in previous year)

Gatwick Airport – facts and figures

World’s busiest single runway airport UK’s second largest airport by passenger traffic (handling approx

25% of Greater London’s market) Operates 24 hours a day, 365 days a year 35.4m passengers passed through Gatwick in 2013 Over 60 carriers operate regularly from the airport, serving over 215

destinations worldwide Largest customer is easyJet (37% of total passengers) with BA

second largest carrier at Gatwick (14% of passenger traffic) 115 aircraft stands, two terminals, 346 check in desks, 69 self-

service kiosks Gatwick Express rail link ensures journeys to Central London in 30

minutes 23,500 on-airport jobs, of which ~2,650 are London Gatwick

employees Operation of Gatwick contributes around £2bn annually to economy

of London & South-East

Incident Summary

Airfield operations were severely affected by adverse weather late on 23 and early on 24 December 2013

Exceptionally heavy rainfall before Christmas caused all local waterways around Gatwick to flood, leading to the closure of the main railway line, M23 motorway and local roads

Electricity sub-stations flooded leading to a power cut at North Terminal Christmas Eve departures, apart from BA, were switched to South Terminal

– the poorly coordinated mass movement of thousands of people was widely condemned as frustrated passengers were stranded with little information

Poor communication between airport partners and passengers led to ‘chaotic’ conditions with the police being drafted in to diffuse public disorder

72 departures and 73 arrivals were cancelled, impacting over 13,000 passengers

Full schedule of flights operated from Christmas Day onwards

Disruption – 23 December 2013

In response to high winds warning, GAL invoked their crisis management process and held a Bronze-level meeting at 15.00hrs. The group agreed no additional staff resource was needed at that stage, but recognised it would be difficult to increase staffing levels if the situation changed due to the holiday period.

GAL instructed airport stakeholders to secure assets but, despite warning, some airfield equipment was dislodged and damaged three aircraft.

High winds made landing difficult resulting in 35 inbound aircraft (affecting nine airlines) being diverted away from Gatwick.

Diversions meant aircraft were out-of-position for the following day’s flight schedules.

Airport’s largest operator, easyJet, was particularly affected and had to develop recovery plan.

Disruption – 24 December 2013

Airfield disruption:– 03.35am: unsecured baggage containers were dislodged by heavy winds causing damage to the

Instrument Landing System– 04.15am: airport received telephone call from the Environment Agency (EA) warning the River Mole

was close to bursting its banks (which it did half hour later)– EA had also copied general flood warnings by fax to Gatwick Airfield Operations at 16.47 & 16.56 on

23 December and 01.28 on 24 December but duty engineering staff failed to see or act on info as they were dealing with ongoing severe weather issues on the airfield

North Terminal disruption (escalation to Silver command):– 05.00am: electrical disruption affected North Terminal (two out of six switch rooms failed) leading to:

• Only two of nine international baggage reclaim belts operating• No power or lights in baggage reclaim hall• No check-in, flight information or telephone systems• Toilet flushing mechanisms on ground and first floors inoperable

– Airport IT basis of flight information system, IDAHO, was inoperable between 05.00 – 10.30 which compromised flight status communications and passenger security screening facilities

24 December flight programme:– Scheduled to handle 260 departures (38,000 passengers) and 300 arrivals (25,000 passengers)– Airlines decided to re-think flight programmes resulting in cancellations to 72 departures (11,300

passengers) and 73 arrivals (5,000 passengers)

Corporate response - GAL

Operational decision to switch check-in of North Terminal passengers with hold luggage to South Terminal was taken (origins of how decision was reached remain controversial)

Once bags had been checked in at South Terminal, plan was then to bus passengers back to North Terminal to board departing flights (only four buses were available to transport thousands)

Previous terminal switchover occurred successfully on 16 October 2013 when on-site construction work caused a power failure in the South Terminal (but only involved 4 departing and 4 arriving cancellations and relied heavily on back office staff – who were lacking this time round due to Christmas holiday period)

Passengers affected by flight cancellations (not those delayed) were offered £100 of shopping vouchers as goodwill gesture

Gatwick Airport – Twitter response

Corporate response - easyJet

easyJet passengers received a text message on 24 December from the airline before 09.00am which led to mass misunderstanding between passengers that flights would be operating out of the South Terminal

The planned flight-by-flight movement of passengers was disrupted as people felt no need to remain in the North Terminal and moved en-masse to the South Terminal

This led to chaotic and unmanageable crowds building up at check-in desks with easyJet and its handling agents, Menzies, processing passengers and their bags very slowly

22 out of 51 planned departures were cancelled after 18.30 with the consequence being 8.000 angry and frustrated passengers needing to be decontrolled from the departure lounge

Suffered a loss of £2m as a result of flooding and power failure

easyJet response

Corporate response – British Airways

Made some early cancellations to flight programme, then continued to operate remaining flights from North Terminal

BA’s systems were incompatible with the South Terminal which is why they decided not to partake in the terminal switchover

Implemented a manual check-in process and baggage handling operations at the North Terminal

Operated some passenger-only flights with bags being repatriated the next day

Corporate response – other airlines

Other airline operators (Emirates, Vietnam Airways, Turkish Airlines) who switched operations ran relatively smoothly due to fewer number of flights involved allowing greater control of passenger movement on a flight by flight basis

Thomson also undertook terminal switchover and decided to reschedule five departing flights for the following day, making arrangements for passengers to stay in local hotels

Timing of Thomson’s decision to reschedule flights was made when many bags had already been checked in which left many passengers without access to luggage until following day

Other agencies

Sussex Police: was called in to deal with public disorder and had to take on responsibility for providing information to passengers. The police said this was because the airport & staff were more focused on resuming the flight schedule and not on passenger safety or welfare

Menzies: passenger handling firm, decided to stop updating a key database and instructed staff to focus on check-in assistance, but this was a significant factor in confusing information being provided to passengers

Public response

Flight Information Display screens were without power and the PA system proved inaudible, leaving passengers without vital pieces of information

Confusion and frustration amongst passengers due to lack of communication & misinformation

Lack of staff on the ground was noticeable which led to irritated & frustrated passengers

Widespread outrage at lack of basic facilities & welfare – very few working toilets and low supplies of food & water at the airport

Police called in to deal with public disorder Mixed reaction to voucher offer

– Some Twitter users expressed surprise Gatwick bosses were apologising for a weather related incident

– Others felt offer was too small or that it should be extended to those who were delayed for hours, but eventually got a flight

Twitter

Media

Contingency planning

Gatwick offered a robust defence of its contingency plan:

“contingency plans are regularly shared and practised with airline partners, who are invited to provide feedback on a regular basis”

easyJet disputed this:

“We have not seen a contingency plan for electrical problems in the North Terminal. Nor had we seen a plan for any similar kind of event, such as the North or South Terminal, or parts of them, becoming inoperable for any other reason. We had also not seen any plan for a single terminal operation. Consequently we had not been in a position to agree a plan.”

Ongoing attention

Lessons learned

INVESTIGATIONS: House of Commons Transport Committee heard from Gatwick and easyJet on 7 January

2014 following media clashes apportioning blame for chaotic handling Review by David McMillan released on 26 February 2014 made 27 recommendations

KEY POINTS: Revision in communications protocol between the EA and GAL – written warnings or

alerts to be followed up by verbal confirmation of receipt Robust GAL contingency plans for snow to be broadened to cover severe weather

disruption GAL’s contingency plans to be reviewed and include buy-in from airlines and ground

handlers with agreed Standard Operating Procedures and checklists Plans to be made available to the entire airport community to increase awareness and

allow everyone to execute the plan No wholesale terminal shift to be attempted unless a thorough assessment of

practicality is undertaken which proves passenger experience would improve Clear status and actions to be communicated in contingency meetings to prevent

misunderstandings between participants

McMillan Report – 27 recommendations (i)

GATWICK AIRPORT’S FLOOD PREVENTION AND ALLEVIATION PLANNING

1. Airport’s proposal to review flood prevention and alleviation plans to be undertaken urgently

2. Existing flood alleviation plans under construction to be prioritised and assessed for earlier completion

3. Consideration to bring forward the Ifield element of UMFAS

4. Reviews of Gatwick flood risk protection plans to include assessment of flooding impact on communities

5. Increase the resilience and redundancy between switch rooms

6. Provision of alternative and back-up power switching for critical systems (such as IT)

7. Electronic monitoring systems deployed in switch rooms to be enhanced and sensitive equipment checked regularly at periods of high risk

8. Sensitive equipment located in basements or areas susceptible to flooding to be moved urgently or protected (where relocation impractical)

9. GAL to consider securing water pumping capacity (both assets and operatives) in addition to its own needs

McMillan Report – 27 recommendations (ii)

GATWICK AIRPORT’S CONTINGENCY AND RESILIENCE PLANNING

10. Review of Airport’s Contingency Plans, in close collaboration with airline and ground handlers to ensure buy in and commitment

11. Entire airport community to be made aware of and have access to the Airport’s Contingency Plans

12. No wholesale Terminal shift to be attempted until it is assessed to demonstrate and improvement in passenger welfare and experience

13. Each crisis management meeting should reach an agreed airport status. In the case of disagreement, GAL to assume responsibility

14. Each crisis management meeting should end with an agreed summary of actions which are shared amongst participants

15. Airport’s crisis management rostering should ensure a member of the airport executive management team is always available; GAL CEO or COO to establish contact with equivalent external stakeholders impacted by crisis

16. GAL definition of Gold, Silver and Bronze to be reconsidered to be in line with industry norms

17. Crisis management meetings should include relevant, informed representatives from all parties

18. Joint disruption plans should be agreed between GAL, easyJet and BA to allow for joint decision processes

19. GAL to review preparation of staff ensuring they are trained, equipped and informed

McMillan Report – 27 recommendations (iii)

PASSENGER WELFARE ISSUES

20. Standby communications systems to be available for deployment in event of power failure (loud hailers, flip charts, whiteboards, review of tannoy system)

21. Crisis management meetings should include detailed review of resources available to all affected parties

22. GAL and airport partners to ensure allocation of sufficient resources to allow for accurate and timely information to be provided across the airport

23. GAL and airport partners to agree in advance protocols for communicating with passengers during a crisis. This should include content and timings of comms to avoid conflicting information

24. There should be greater focus from all airport partners on passenger welfare and airlines should fuflill their obligations, with the airport prepared to provide services where airlines fall short

25. GAL to work with airlines to develop clearer operational protocols for guidance on threshold conditions that would trigger flights being postponed or cancelled

26. Each terminal should have a GAL Passenger Captain whose sole responsibility would be to ensure passenger welfare concerns are properly met. Provide liasion role between conditions in Terminals and crisis management process

SAFETY AND NETWORK ISSUES

27. Direct communication between airport operations centre and Eurocontrol Nettwork management process to be established in event of major disruption affecting air traffic at Gatwick

House of Commons Transport Committee

Conducted an investigation and held evidence sessions with Gatwick and easyJet on 7 January 2014 following media clashes apportioning blame for chaotic handling

Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013 was published on 11 April 2014

Focused on passenger welfare issues, complaints centred on:– Poor & inconsistent provision of information– Lack of clarity about who was in charge – Lack of basic facilities such as working toilets & refreshments– Confusion about reimbursement of expenses, particularly if alternative flights

were arranged

Recommendations mainly directed towards CAA as it holds responsibility for oversight of operational resilience

HoC Transport Committee: Recommendations

The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) should ensure the airport’s contingency plans be developed with airlines and other relevant parties, and for the plans to be properly tested and widely disseminated

CAA should ensure the good practice for meetings being minuted, actions identified and shared with participants be practiced in the future

The CAA should include consideration of the arrangements made for ensuring passenger information is current, correct and consistent

Endorse the appointment of Passenger Champions for each terminal. The CAA should encourage other airports to take similar steps

The Government should review the operational agreements between airlines and airports for when the airport provides welfare and how costs should be allocated

The CAA should bring forward proposals for improving the provision of information on passenger rights at times of disruption

The Govt should push for an amendment to the proposed EU regulation at Transport Council to include electronic alerts & info sharing

The CAA should consider the extension of McMillan report recommendations to other airports

The CAA should inform the Transport Committee of its assessment of operational resilience plans being produced by Heathrow & Gatwick, including proposed actions to address any unsatisfactory elements

Gatwick Airport disruption on 23/24 December 2013