future concepts directive part 2:the future air operating...

Future Concepts Directive Part 2: Future Air Operating Concept

15 August 2016

Royal Canadian Air Force Future Concepts Directive Part 2: Future Air Operating Concept

ii

List of Amendments

The official and most current version of the Royal Canadian Air Force Future Concepts Directive Part 2: The Future Air Operating Concept (FAOC) is available electronically on the Director Air Readiness and Plans website at: http://airforce.mil.ca/caf/dairsp/index-eng.asp.

Subsequent to the initial issue of the FAOC, all changes to the document will be made to the electronic version available on the Director Air Readiness and Plans website.

Amendment Date Version Control Number Original 15 August 2016 1.0 Change #1 Change #2 Change #3 Change #4 Change #5 Change #6


iii

Foreword

The Future Air Operating Concept (FAOC) has been written as Part 2 of the Future Concepts Directive. The purpose of the FAOC is to guide force development (FD) over the next two decades within the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), providing an aim point to inform those involved in the change agenda. The FAOC is not a detailed plan and should not be interpreted as such, but it does provide sound conclusions with respect to what air power capabilities will be required in the near future to ensure we can continue to deliver relevant, responsive and effective air power and to allow achievement of the vision of an agile and integrated air force with the reach and power essential to Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) operations. These conclusions, broad in nature given the scope of this capstone concept, will in time inform development of more detailed subordinate functional and enabling concepts. The FAOC’s annex provides an initial look at the emerging FD considerations that can be derived from the FAOC that I expect to be used to focus academic and scientific research, concept development, experimentation and wargaming activities.

M. J. Hood Lieutenant-General Commander RCAF


iv

Table of Contents

List of Amendments ...................................................................................................................... ii Foreword ....................................................................................................................................... iii List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ v

1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1

2 Purpose................................................................................................................................... 1

3 Strategic Guidance ................................................................................................................ 2

4 Timeframe, Assumptions and Risks .................................................................................... 3

5 Description of the Military Problem ................................................................................... 4

6 Need for Balance ................................................................................................................... 4

7 Central Idea ........................................................................................................................... 6

8 Military Integrated Information Infrastructure ................................................................ 6

9 RCAF Operational Concepts ............................................................................................... 6

9.1 Domestic Air Operating Concept ..................................................................................... 7 9.1.1 Aerospace Defence of Canada .................................................................................. 7 9.1.2 Support to Domestic Maritime Forces ...................................................................... 7 9.1.3 Support to Domestic Land Forces............................................................................. 8 9.1.4 Search and Rescue .................................................................................................... 8 9.1.5 Support to Civil Power.............................................................................................. 8

9.2 Continental Air Operating Concept.................................................................................. 8 9.3 Expeditionary Air Operating Concept.............................................................................. 9

9.3.1 Low-Intensity Conflict .............................................................................................. 9 9.3.2 Conventional Conflict ............................................................................................. 10 9.3.3 Non-Combat Military Operations Other than War ................................................. 11 9.3.4 Summary ................................................................................................................. 11

10 Defence and Non-Defence Missions ................................................................................... 11

11 Future RCAF Functional Areas ........................................................................................ 13

11.1 Defending Canada (6 Functional Areas) ........................................................................ 14 11.1.1 Surveillance of Canadian Territory and Air/Maritime Approaches ....................... 14 11.1.2 Aerospace Defence of Canada ................................................................................ 14 11.1.3 Support to Maritime Operations in Canada ............................................................ 15 11.1.4 Support to Land Operations in Canada ................................................................... 16 11.1.5 Search and Rescue .................................................................................................. 17 11.1.6 Support to the Civil Power ...................................................................................... 17


v

11.2 Defending North America (2 Functional Areas) ............................................................ 17 11.2.1 Aerospace Defence of North America .................................................................... 17 11.2.2 RCAF Support to Continental Operations .............................................................. 18

11.3 Contributing to International Peace and Security (3 Functional Areas) ........................ 19 11.3.1 RCAF Operations in Low-Intensity Conflicts ........................................................ 19 11.3.2 RCAF Operations in High-Intensity, A2/AD Conflicts .......................................... 20 11.3.3 RCAF Support to Non-Combat MOOTW .............................................................. 20

12 Necessary Capabilities and Institutional Considerations ................................................ 21

13 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 21

Annex A – RCAF FD Considerations ....................................................................................... 22

Abbreviations .............................................................................................................................. 30

Notes ............................................................................................................................................. 32

List of Figures

Figure 1. Relationship between policy, strategy and the FAOC..................................................... 2 Figure 2. Future RCAF functional areas ....................................................................................... 12


1

1 Introduction

Advanced military air power1 has always been at the forefront of technology, and thus, change has been an enduring constant in the history of its evolution. During times of plenty, the ability of technology-enabled air forces to deliver precise, discriminatory and proportional effects has made air power the force of first resort for political leadership, but the increasing costs of acquiring and operating modern capabilities will prove to be an increasing challenge for smaller air forces. If core capabilities are left unattended, for air forces, “this is the first step in an increasingly one way slide towards irrelevancy.”2 Success for smaller air forces, such as the RCAF in domestic and deployed environments, will require a balanced, integrated and flexible force able to respond to a wide range of contingencies at home and abroad, thus ensuring strategic effect through operational agility and tactical precision.3

2 Purpose

The FAOC is the RCAF’s capstone FD concept. Considering the future RCAF and future air operations, the purpose of the FAOC is to guide FD over the next two decades. Its relationship to Government of Canada (GC) policy and national military strategy is shown in Figure 1. The FAOC, as a strategic concept, describes subordinate operational concepts which, in turn, introduce subordinate functional concepts. Each functional concept is supported by a number of enabling concepts. Low-level concepts, such as enabling and functional, contain greater detail than superior concepts illustrated in the hierarchy.

The FAOC builds on the vision published in RCAF strategic guidance documents, notably in Air Force Vectors (AFV),4 by describing how the future RCAF will provide responsive and effective air power in the anticipated future security and operating environments. It is difficult to be precise in terms of future resources available for the RCAF, but it is expected that the RCAF will not grow appreciably and that the planned force structure (including capabilities identified in the current investment plan) will endure for much of the FAOC timeframe out to 2035. Thus, while thought will have to be given to capability development beyond 2035, the main enhancements to existing capabilities will come through the spiral upgrading of existing platforms with new advanced technologies, networks and weapons as well as through the more effective integration of capabilities and concepts.


2

Figure 1. Relationship between policy, strategy and the FAOC

3 Strategic Guidance

Defence policy is guided by both foreign and national security policies. It is an expression of the priorities for CAF and a broad description of how they will be carried out. The fundamental roles outlined in defence policy and undertaken by CAF and the RCAF, in particular, are listed below and are unlikely to change appreciably:

• defending Canada;

• defending North America in cooperation with Canada’s closest ally, the United States (US); and

• contributing to international peace and security.5


3

The Future Security Environment 2013–2040 sheds some light on the potential threats and operating environments within which the RCAF may have to operate. The broad range of threats varies from unconventional militant groups with limited technological capability to adversarial states possessing advanced military capabilities. The latter threat includes the possibility of encountering Chinese and Russian integrated anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) equipment, reinforcing the requirement to protect our air force and supported forces.6 Each challenge has capability implications for the RCAF that will be introduced below and discussed in greater detail in Annex A.

Chief of the Defence Staff intent was drawn from the vision outlined in the Integrated Capstone Concept and additional capability-development guidance. The challenges posed by the future operating environment “demand approaches that are comprehensive, integrated, adaptive, and networked. Therefore, these attributes must become the tenets that govern the nature of the future force and the requirements for being strategically relevant, operationally responsive, and tactically decisive.”7 These attributes give broad guidance to the development of supporting strategies by the individual services.

Both government direction and the future security environment help shape RCAF strategy and FD. The challenge is to define a FAOC that guides the development of an affordable mix of air capabilities that will meet domestic requirements and, at the same time, provides a meaningful contribution to a coalition across the spectrum of conflict. The FAOC is guided by and builds upon the strategic direction expressed in AFV. The principles of agile, integrated, reach and power will drive considerations of the future operational method for the RCAF in the context of evolving threats, allied conceptions of the future of air operations and evolving technologies.

4 Timeframe, Assumptions and Risks

Although the FAOC timeframe is set to 2035, its validity is tied more closely to its supporting assumptions and conditions that, if changed, would initiate a review process. The FAOC is based on an assessment of the military challenges likely to be encountered in the anticipated future operating environment. A continual analysis of emerging operational trends, changes to GC direction or funding and technological development will determine if adjustments are needed or if the document needs to be rewritten. In other words, the FAOC will remain valid until the conditions driving it change sufficiently to the point where it must be reconsidered and rewritten.

It is assumed that the planned force structure will endure through the FAOC timeframe, that there will not be a significant increase or decrease in defence budgets and funding for capital acquisition, and that the size of CAF and the RCAF will not increase or decrease dramatically. If any of these assumptions proves inaccurate, a reconsideration, and possible rewriting, of the FAOC will be needed.


4

The anticipated future operating and security environments will require that the RCAF fulfil a meaningful role for domestic, continental and expeditionary operations. It is likely that—in most instances outside of those requiring national mobilization—the trend of the RCAF employing small air task forces (ATFs) with capabilities appropriate to the specific operation will continue. However, the challenge will be to find an affordable capability mix that will allow for a valuable contribution as part of a coalition against a near-peer adversary and still prove cost-effective enough to deploy and risk in lower-intensity conflicts.

5 Description of the Military Problem

The nature of the expected dynamic and uncertain security environment complicates defence planning. Still, it is possible to identify a range of military operations in support of a whole-of-government (WoG) effort to protect Canadians and advance the national interest. This spectrum of conflict has very broad technological implications. At one end of the spectrum, one generally will face threats with limited technological sophistication and integration, such as militant groups or non-state actors, and by contrast, the other end will have the highest level of technological sophistication and integration, such as nation states. This is not to say militant organizations do not employ technology but to highlight the general notion that states of regional and global power have a greater capacity and capability to invest in advanced technologies. The RCAF will have to operate across this spectrum of conflict with the distinct possibility of having to operate at both ends either concurrently or nearly so.

At one end, the challenges posed by low-tech unconventional militant organizations will continue to draw Western attention. While militant groups may not be equipped with leading-edge technologies, their regions often have areas with advanced and integrated air defences. Militants also understand Western intolerance for civilian casualties and employ tactics that exploit civilians and civilian infrastructure. Each of these challenges poses its own problems for finding and prosecuting legitimate targets, driving Western forces to seek high-tech solutions to counter such tactics. Moreover, these non-peer adversaries often serve as proxies for, and may be supplemented with advanced weapons and forces of, near-peer states. At the other end of the spectrum are the more traditional, conventional state threats, like Russia, with advanced military capabilities and an overt willingness to use them. Furthermore, the proliferation of missile and other technologies has seen the development of sophisticated A2/AD strategies in regions where the Canadian government has recently expressed an enduring interest. Operating across this spectrum is particularly challenging for smaller air forces.

6 Need for Balance

All of the strategic guidance documents, from GC policy to supporting military strategies, and the range of anticipated military operations described earlier suggest that a degree of balance is required in the current and future RCAF. Balance does not necessarily mean a large air force. Rather, a relatively smaller air force can maintain a balance appropriate to its own threat perception and appreciation of its regional and global ambitions to deter and address aggression. It is also important to note that single services do not win campaigns on their own and that while the national goal might be a balanced armed forces “it will always be necessary to have a balanced air force as an integral element within it. A balanced air force is critical to national security.”8


5

How one measures balance, especially for smaller air forces, is less about numbers of platforms, although numbers still matter, and more about the effects created through the synergistic and synchronous application of the right quantity and type of capabilities to exploit the inherent flexibility and impact of air power across its core capabilities.9 These core air power capabilities are:

• Control of the air or in the case of a coalition operation contribution towards that aim so that other operations can be carried out relatively safely. Control of the air can mean achieving control through air-to-air engagement or through the synergistic application of the other primary air power roles.

• Attack at all levels of war refers to the ability to deliver—with precision, discrimination and proportionality—strikes at the adversary’s centre of gravity from the strategic to the tactical levels.

• Surveillance and reconnaissance (S&R)10 provides the persistence necessary to deny an adversary the initiative and leverages the speed, range and viewpoint of air power to identify hostile intent and enable decision superiority by the commander. To conduct surveillance and reconnaissance with efficiency and effectiveness, something considered a defining feature of air power,11 requires robust command and control (C2) systems as well as integrated and secure communications and data-transfer systems.

• Air mobility is another key feature of a balanced air force—and especially for a country the size of Canada—where movement within the borders is strategic in nature. For the RCAF, the term air mobility normally encompasses general airlift, aeromedical evacuation, air-to-air refuelling (AAR) as well as specialist capabilities such as airborne operations and special-forces insertion and extraction.

• Support to joint operations and the civil power. In terms of support to joint operations, “the RCAF, as an integrated member of CAF, is also responsible for the provision of organic air power to the Navy, Army, special operations forces (SOF) and Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC). Because the provision of air power is critical to the other elements’ success, our support to joint operations and the civil power is a core capability that the RCAF must provide.”12

Common to all core capabilities is the requirement for dominance, in some form, of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). Only a balanced RCAF will ensure strategic effect and relevance through operational agility and tactical precision.


6

7 Central Idea

The FAOC’s central theme or idea explores how the attributes of the RCAF’s vision13 (an air force with agility, integration, reach and power essential for CAF operations) will evolve across the core air power capabilities (control of the air, attack, S&R, air mobility as well as support to joint operations and the civil power) and the government-mandated, non-defence missions14 in each of the operating environments (domestic, continental and expeditionary) throughout the concept timeframe. For example, while agile, integrated, reach and power mean something definitive for the RCAF of today, what those terms will mean for the RCAF of the future must be explored across the domestic, continental and expected range of expeditionary operating environments. Only a balanced RCAF will continue to be viewed as a flexible, effective and valuable instrument of national power.

8 Military Integrated Information Infrastructure

The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) published The CAF C4ISR Strategic Vision, Goals and Objectives, which outlines an enduring strategic joint approach to conceiving, designing and building tomorrow’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities and represents authoritative VCDS capability development guidance for all Defence Team members working within the C4ISR domain.15 It is a clear acknowledgement that CAF is now firmly in the contemporary information age and that—in order to exploit existing and future capabilities to operate successfully in challenging operating environments—there is no longer any option but to transform into an integrated and networked force. This vision will require the RCAF to develop a force with the freedom of action across the air, space and cyber domains and throughout the EMS in order to deliver effective air power in support of Canadian interests.

The CAF C4ISR vision is to provide the right knowledge to the right people at the right time in a secure, reliable and integrated manner in support of CAF operations. The document sets out strategic goals for C4ISR’s four component disciplines of C2, communication and information system (CIS), intelligence (int) and S&R and identifies strategic objectives to attain those goals. RCAF FD activities must align with these objectives. Furthermore, VCDS implementation of a national joint information network, described as the military integrated information infrastructure (MI3) in the CAF C4ISR initiative, is essential to an enhanced RCAF C4ISR capability. The RCAF must not only manage and communicate substantial quantities of data and information to facilitate air power decision making, but it must also do so with the proposed MI3 in the joint, integrated, multinational and public (JIMP) environment.

9 RCAF Operational Concepts

RCAF operational concepts subordinate to the FAOC are illustrated in Figure 2. These operational concepts relate to three RCAF operating environments identified directly from CAF’s three fundamental roles outlined in defence policy and are: Domestic Air Operating Concept, Continental Air Operating Concept and Expeditionary Air Operating Concept. Each of the operational concepts is described below and consists of a number of functional areas16 specific to the operating environment; these functional areas form the basis of separate and subordinate future functional and enabling concepts.


7

9.1 Domestic Air Operating Concept

The defence of Canada is the GC’s first priority. With that priority comes the expectation that CAF will be able to deter and, ultimately, detect and defeat hostile activity both within Canadian territory and externally along its approaches. It is important to differentiate the possible range of missions into purely defence of Canada operations where the DND/CAF has the lead and those government-mandated, non-defence missions where DND/CAF acts in a supporting role. The former includes traditional defence against military aggression directed at Canada through aerospace defence of Canada and supporting domestic maritime and land forces. The latter includes supporting a timely and effective national search and rescue (SAR) capability,17 providing assistance to law enforcement agencies (ALEA), conducting very important person (VIP) transport and delivering air demonstrations. As stated in AFV, each year “over four million flights occur in Canadian airspace and over 800,000 vessels transit Canadian waters.”18 That level of activity across Canada’s vast territory is expected to continue and will likely increase over the FAOC’s timeframe, bringing with it the possibility of more remote areas being routinely accessed by commercial enterprises and private citizens. The RCAF’s organizational and wing posture while at home must be responsive to the domestic security environment, adapting to evolving threats across all domains, commensurate with national law. In both defence of Canada and government-mandated, non-defence missions, air power’s speed, reach and agility are key components of a WoG response.

9.1.1 Aerospace Defence of Canada19

An increasing number of actors—from old adversaries to new rising powers and militant organizations—are likely to exploit aerospace power, resulting in increasing numbers and varieties of threats in, through and from the air and space. The RCAF must have the ability to deal with threats such as advanced long-range hypersonic and cruise missiles or space weapons whose trajectories penetrate Canadian airspace, advanced fighter aircraft, aircraft overtaken or operated by militant organizations within or approaching Canadian airspace, and unmanned aircraft systems.20 Aerospace threats to Canada are addressed not only by the RCAF but also by maritime- and land-based systems. Furthermore, since the aerospace defence of Canada is inextricably linked to the aerospace defence of the continent, effective defences will likely involve Canadian and US capabilities employed through the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) agreement. Therefore, the RCAF must integrate seamlessly with its sister environments as well as the US through NORAD in the defence of Canada and the continent.

9.1.2 Support to Domestic Maritime Forces

The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN)—a medium, global, force-projection navy—is expected to fulfil military, constabulary and diplomatic roles.21 From conducting readiness training to sovereignty patrols to enforcing sea control, the RCN and Canadian special operations forces (CANSOF) at sea rely upon the RCAF to deliver air power effects in and around Canada’s maritime approaches. In this partnership, the RCAF acts as an extension of RCN capabilities through speed, reach and elevation to counter maritime threats. Similar to the aerospace defence of Canada and within the national context, the likelihood of state-level maritime conflict against Canada is low but cannot be discounted. The RCAF must be capable of detecting, deterring and defeating maritime threats above, on and below the surface, of contributing to the common


8

operating picture (COP) and of integrating with the RCN. Conversely, the RCN is expected to provide mutual support in detecting, deterring and defeating air threats. It is, therefore, in the mutual interest of the RCAF and RCN to ensure alignment of their future maritime concepts and capability developments.

9.1.3 Support to Domestic Land Forces

Land forces provide a vital defence and deterrence response capability to any national or international event or threat.22 In this context, land forces include the Canadian Army (CA) and CANSOF. Although conventional conflict on Canadian soil is unlikely, the land forces conduct readiness training and sovereignty patrols, principally as deterrence to attacks on Canadian territory while relying on the RCAF to deliver air power effects. As with the RCN, the RCAF acts as an extension of land force capabilities and must be capable of detecting, deterring and defeating threats to Canada above and on the surface; contributing to the COP and to the total force movement; and integrating with the land forces. On the other hand, land forces are expected to provide mutual support in detecting, deterring and defeating air threats. The compartmentalized and high-readiness nature of domestic counterterrorism places additional requirements on the RCAF which cannot be ignored. It is, therefore, in the RCAF’s, CA’s and CANSOF’s best interest to ensure alignment of their future land-forces concepts and capability developments.

9.1.4 Search and Rescue

The RCAF has primary responsibility for providing domestic air SAR services in the Canadian SAR areas of responsibility. Given the size of the country, the expected increase in commercial and civilian flying operations as well as increased accessibility and seasonal use of the Arctic, determination of optimal SAR posture and capabilities to respond to SAR incidents will be important, especially in the Arctic region.

9.1.5 Support to Civil Power

More likely, and of no less concern, is the confidence Canadians have that should a natural or man-made disaster occur, CAF is ready to respond with effects that will greatly aid first responders and civil powers in dealing with any situation.23 Even in times of civil unrest, it is unlikely that kinetic air effects will be needed, but control of the air (to some degree), air mobility as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) are expected to remain at the forefront in meeting the GC’s goals. Similar air power effects will also be required to support international events hosted in Canada, such as political summits and major sporting events.

9.2 Continental Air Operating Concept

Globalization and a connected society are blurring boundaries between the GC’s three broad geostrategic imperatives—the defence of Canada, cooperation with the US in defence of North America as well as selected contributions to operations meant to maintain international peace and security. Events in other parts of the world frequently have immediate consequences for both Canada and the US. Thus, while the traditional approach of looking at the CAF’s fundamental roles of defending Canada, defending North America and contributing to international peace and security will remain in GC policy, these three roles are no longer as distinct as they once were. In


9

many ways, they have merged and are now interdependent layers in the nation’s and continent’s defence. Domestic security is increasingly related to continental security, which to a degree is contingent on international security. In short, threats target not only individual countries but also the strategic entity that the North American continent has become.24

From aerospace-defence and maritime-warning perspectives, the NORAD agreement will remain Canada’s most important defence arrangement with the US, Canada’s premier security and defence partner since 1958. Threats facing the North American continent are similar to those facing Canada. Although Canada may not necessarily be the target of attacks, adversaries could exploit Canadian territory and airspace in their attacks on the US. As with domestic aerospace defence, the binational capabilities needed to meet these threats include an improved ability for early detection of air, space and maritime threats; a sophisticated means of gathering, processing and disseminating information from a variety of sources; the ability to display an accurate picture on which command decisions can be made; and the means to take precise and proportional action to defeat the threat. In this context, RCAF organizational and wing postures should, depending on assessed threat, reflect those of the US. Similar to aerospace defence of Canada, close integration between military services, specifically between Canada and the US, will be required in the defence of the North American continent. Therefore, the RCAF must be prepared to adapt to the evolving NORAD roles and US multidomain concepts of future air operations.

9.3 Expeditionary Air Operating Concept25

In the context of the expected dynamic and uncertain security environment, it is possible to identify a range of military expeditionary operations in support of a WoG effort to protect Canadians and advance the national interest. The capabilities required for operations at one end of the spectrum of conflict may not be applicable to the other end.26 The RCAF must be able to support RCN, CA, CANSOF, other government departments (OGDs) and other agencies, depending on the situation. The RCAF will need to develop methods to counter asymmetric and conventional adversarial strategies and potentially posture itself differently due to threat proximity. Lastly, the RCAF must be able to respond in accordance with GC direction to the demands for aid and relief to victims of natural and man-made disasters that fall outside the spectrum of conflict but which are central to the execution of government policy. Air power will continue to be a critical component to each operation across this spectrum, but its exact role and utility is situational and dependent upon having the right capabilities employed in the right way at the right time.

9.3.1 Low-Intensity Conflict

The demands of low-intensity conflicts, commonly termed small wars, vary depending on the context. Air power value in counter-insurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism operations lies in its ability to collect information, react swiftly, attack the enemy and support the friendly land force scheme of manoeuvre. The war in Afghanistan showed the value of helicopters in transporting and protecting land forces and their equipment, allowing them to avoid dangerous road movements.27 The RCAF, however, has also shown its ability to collect valuable information in support of, and in conducting, precision attacks alongside coalition forces against militant organizations in the Middle East. The RCAF must continue to adapt to evolving threats in a low-intensity conflict environment in cooperation with Canada’s allies.


10

These abilities are important considerations in all styles of warfare, but particularly so in low-intensity conflicts like COIN and counterterrorism operations where, for example, adversaries exploit modern communications and social media to disseminate propaganda in an attempt to distort the effects of collateral damage.28 Moreover, identifying militants or insurgents who are able to blend into the population is a continuing problem. For example, one “can determine from overhead imagery that a group of peasants have [sic] left their village to travel to a neighboring village, but overhead imagery cannot explain why.”29 Determining why will often come only with the ability to fuse airborne ISR information with signals or human intelligence from other sources in real time to enable appropriate and timely decisions. In order to avoid collateral damage, the effect of advances in precision munitions delivered from the air—in conjunction with effective, persistent ISR and targeting capabilities—will continue to be of great advantage in both conventional—or high-intensity—and low-intensity wars.

9.3.2 Conventional Conflict

Since the end of the Cold War, US military power has been unrivalled. Indeed, the defining feature of the post–Cold War period has been the preponderance of US military, economic and technological strength. Due at least in part to technology investments like stealth aircraft and precision munitions during the 1960s and 1970s, the US developed and enacted its Air/Land Battle doctrine in the Gulf War of 1990–1991. Resulting from these and other technological advances as well as the lack of a near-peer adversary, the past quarter century has seen the US military deploy rapidly, which in turn has assured access almost anywhere in the world. Additionally, the US military enjoyed overwhelming air supremacy and the freedom to manoeuvre that supremacy provides wherever it chose to deploy. Its networks and sensors remained largely beyond reach. That reality has not been lost on a new set of potential adversaries, some of whom have begun to exploit and apply technology to erode those US and allied advantages. However, the expectation of air supremacy is no guarantee it will be achieved.

Both the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and to a far lesser extent Iran’s regular military and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), at the very least, have exploited advanced technologies to deter, disrupt and deny US and allied attempts to project power into their regions. The resulting strategies are designed to limit access to the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf and to make the costs of assuring and maintaining access there prohibitively expensive. Western governments are faced with the strategic choice of either risking access to vital areas by ceding control to adversaries or developing the means to counter these strategies through significant investment in concept and capability development. While the chances of a sustained conflict in an A2/AD environment remain low, the costs of being unprepared should it occur are so severe that preparations to counter them effectively should influence the force structure and capability investment of the RCAF.

For nations with similar regional interests and an interest in being a valuable coalition partner, finding a meaningful role in such a scenario against adversaries equipped with their own next-generation capabilities may prove difficult and expensive. Whatever capabilities are offered to such a coalition must possess an unprecedented degree of interoperability with all US services to avoid being a liability. This in itself will come with significant costs. The US intends on countering A2/AD threats by pursuing a range of advanced capabilities, such as the Next-Generation Strike Bomber, advanced ISR, space and cyber capabilities as well as stand-off


11

weapon (SOW) systems. Those nations not so equipped may find themselves less able to influence campaign strategic goals and planning than those who bring leading-edge capabilities. The US pursuit of other so-called “game-changing technologies”—like hypersonic missiles and aircraft, directed energy weapons, nanotechnologies as well as the next generation of unmanned and autonomous systems—will only aggravate this condition.30

9.3.3 Non-Combat Military Operations Other than War

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) differ from higher intensity conflicts. MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises. MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and non-combat operations in peacetime, conflict and war situations. MOOTW involving combat—such as COIN, counterterrorism and peace enforcement—may have many of the same characteristics of war, including active combat operations and employment of most combat capabilities. For the purpose of this FAOC, MOOTW that involve combat will be considered low-intensity conflict. Examples of non-combat MOOTW include counterdrug, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), protection of shipping and support to civil power.

9.3.4 Summary

Defining and developing an affordable mix of RCAF capabilities that can contribute to operations across the spectrum of conflict, either within or external to Canadian territory, pose significant challenges and will likely continue to face compromises within the FAOC timeframe. Therefore, the FAOC and subordinate concepts will identify capabilities common to various types of operations that, if left unattended, will adversely affect the RCAF’s ability to fulfil its defence roles.

10 Defence and Non-Defence Missions

The future RCAF must maintain the ability to perform all of the pertinent defence missions across each of CAF’s fundamental roles31 and determine the most effective and efficient manner to perform the government-mandated, non-defence missions.

The mission of the RCAF is to provide CAF “with relevant, responsive and effective air power to meet the defence challenges of today and into the future.”32 In achieving this mission, the RCAF’s core air power capabilities have not fundamentally changed since the Canadian Air Force was established, and were described earlier as:33

• control of the air;

• attack;

• S&R;

• air mobility; and

• support to joint operations and civil power.


12

The RCAF is also expected to conduct non-defence missions34 in support of JIMP goals, and it is envisioned that these requirements will continue in the future RCAF. These government-mandated, non-defence missions consist of:35

• SAR;

• ALEA;

• VIP transport; and

• air demonstration.

In support of CAF’s fundamental roles, the future RCAF must be able to conduct operations in a domestic air operating environment, a continental air operating environment and an expeditionary air operating environment. The RCAF’s core air power capabilities and the government-mandated, non-defence missions were used as the lens through which the RCAF operating environments (domestic, continental and expeditionary) were examined, and the result was 11 functional areas shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Future RCAF functional areas36


13

11 Future RCAF Functional Areas

This section describes the 11 future RCAF functional areas which provide the basis for the functional and enabling concepts. Each functional area will be viewed through the AIRPower-lens components, defined as:

• Agile

o The ability to conduct the task in multiple ways

o The ability to adapt to a rapidly changing operating and strategic environment and to maximize the effects and capabilities from available resources to achieve mission success

• Integrated

o The ability to easily (or seamlessly) work with others (e.g., JIMP) as required; not limited to technical solutions (standards), it also includes similar training, languages, etc.

o “full manifestation of interoperability”37

• Reach

o The ability to project air power globally

o The ability to project power in pursuit of national interests across a spectrum of operations and missions

o Enables CAF as a rapid responder, providing critical early-response capabilities

o Ensures the RCAF can deploy on “short notice in Canada or abroad, wherever and whenever the government requires”38

• Power

o The ability to deliver an effect (kinetic or non-kinetic), including deterrent

o Contributes to control of the air, helping to maintain allied air superiority whenever and wherever CAF is deployed

o Maintains the ability to provide close support and surveillance for maritime, land and SOF operations

o Denies any enemy the ability to operate in our air, land and maritime space

o Contributes to the maintenance of Canada’s economic lifelines39


14

A statement of operating intent was developed to help describe each of the functional areas. These statements help focus RCAF capability development and describe how the RCAF vision will be achieved.

11.1 Defending Canada (6 Functional Areas)

11.1.1 Surveillance of Canadian Territory and Air/Maritime Approaches

Statement of operating intent. The future RCAF will contribute to the WoG system-of-systems persistent surveillance of Canadian territory and air/maritime approaches. It will provide capabilities that integrate into the MI3 and enable the detection and tracking of targets (both enemy, neutral and friendly) in sufficient time to allow coherent and timely decisions on how to respond.

The surveillance of Canadian territory as well as its air and maritime approaches is inextricably linked to the seven other functional areas of the Domestic and Continental Air Operating Concepts.

Agile. Surveillance of such a large country, and of the Canadian Arctic in particular, is a challenge. Agility in this context refers to the ability to detect and monitor an evolving situation and to put various surveillance pieces together from multiple sensors and sources into a COP from which effective decision making is possible. The system must collectively have the abilities to conduct wide-area surveillance and to cue other assets for specific missions.

Integrated. This speaks to the need, in coordination with the CAF C4ISR strategy and associated roadmaps, to develop protocols and interoperable systems with those partners who contribute to the development of the high-fidelity picture upon which defence decision making is based.

Reach. Given the threats that may be faced, especially as the Arctic opens, there is a need to expand S&R coverage of Canada. It is unlikely that continual, 24/7 surveillance over all parts of the country is in any way reasonable or likely in the near future, so additional analysis in the context of GC expectation will be needed to determine how much is enough and realistically achievable.

Power. The power aspect of this functional area is its ability to enable all other functional areas. Without timely and accurate information provided through ISR, the aerospace defence of Canada, support to maritime operations in Canada, support to land operations in Canada, SAR and support to the civil power cannot be realized.

11.1.2 Aerospace Defence of Canada

Statement of operating intent. The future RCAF must be capable of a flexible and integrated response to aerospace threats detected through the surveillance of Canadian territory and air/maritime approaches. This response must be seamlessly integrated through the MI3 with other environments and security partners. The RCAF must also be able to react dynamically to unexpected events caused by asymmetric threats.


15

Agile. The future RCAF must improve its ability to deter, detect and contribute to defeating aerospace threats to minimize reaction and engagement times.

Integrated. Integration for the future RCAF will require the ability to seamlessly and continually link systems that share information with the CA, RCN, the United States Air Force (USAF) and other US services as well as information from civilian-radar and air-traffic-management systems. Rapidly moving threats require immediate decisions and actions; therefore, RCAF reactions and procedures must minimize delay. Since the aerospace defence of Canada is likely to be part of the larger continental aerospace defence effort through NORAD, a comprehensive understanding of the evolving US concept of air operations is essential, especially its evolving C2 concepts.

Reach. As the speed and range of weapons available to potential adversaries increase, the requirements for reach also increase. This will have implications for forward adaptive basing; AAR; advanced communications; and weapon systems with the speed, range and capability of addressing potential threats. The term reach is linked to agile and integrated, but for aerospace defence of Canada and the RCAF of the future, reach refers to the ability to move quickly to counter air threats to Canada before weapons can be launched and to destroy attacking aircraft and any launched weapons as far away from Canada as possible. If such a reach implies beyond the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), legal considerations and rules of engagement (ROE) need to be examined.

Power. The term power for the future RCAF and aerospace defence of Canada means that the right capabilities exist in sufficient quantities to serve as a potent deterrent and credible force to potential aggressors and that the defence of Canadian airspace is conducted swiftly and precisely with proportionality and discrimination.

11.1.3 Support to Maritime Operations in Canada

Statement of operating intent. The future RCAF will contribute to maritime operations in Canada by providing a timely and coordinated response to airborne, surface and subsurface targets detected through the surveillance of maritime approaches, thus extending the effective range of RCN platforms with air assets that integrate directly with naval systems and the MI3.

Agile. For support to maritime operations in Canadian waters and EEZ, agility for the future RCAF requires improvements in developing and maintaining situational awareness (SA) on potential maritime threats to Canada, combined with an ability to respond with speed and power to those threats. This underscores the imperative for a balanced RCAF with a range and sufficient depth of capabilities to provide the agility to respond swiftly and with effect to any domestic contingency.

Integrated. Integration for the future RCAF will require the ability to seamlessly and continually link systems for sharing information with the RCN, CANSOF, OGDs as well as information from civilian vessels and radar systems. The platforms that deliver capability must be able to seamlessly communicate, share and move data and be interoperable to a higher degree than in the past with the other CAF environments, the United States Navy and USAF. Since the defence against threats to Canada is likely to be part of the larger continental defence effort between Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and CJOC, a comprehensive understanding of the


16

evolving US concept of air and naval operations is essential, especially its evolving C2 concepts. For the range of non-conventional scenarios, the military will support law enforcement, and thus, close integration—including legal authorities and ROE appreciation—is needed.

Reach. As the speed and range of weapons available to potential adversaries increase, the requirements for reach also increase. This will have implications for ways of extending areas of responsibility far beyond the EEZ as well as for AAR; advanced communications; and weapon systems with the speed, range and capability of addressing potential threats. The term reach is linked to agile and integrated, but for support to maritime operations and the RCAF of the future, reach refers to the ability to move quickly to counter maritime and air threats to Canada before weapons can be launched and to destroy attacking maritime vessels, aircraft and any launched weapons as far away from Canada as possible.

Power. The term power for the future RCAF and support to maritime operations in defence of Canada means that the right capabilities exist in sufficient quantities to serve as a potent deterrent and credible force to potential aggressors and that the defence of Canadian maritime approaches and inland waterways is conducted swiftly and precisely with proportionality and discrimination.

11.1.4 Support to Land Operations in Canada

Statement of operating intent. The future RCAF must be able to provide control of the air, strategic to tactical air mobility and direct support to the CA, CANSOF and disaster assistance units anywhere in Canada. The future RCAF must also provide, through MI3, the appropriate SA, targeting, C2 and communications support to enable land operations in defence of Canada.

Agile. In the context of the future RCAF and support to land operations, the term agile means being able to adapt to a rapidly changing environment and to maximize the effects and capabilities of the resources allocated to land operations to achieve mission success.

Integrated. This term refers to the ability to communicate seamlessly between the air and land components as well as with the lead department or agency being supported. It also refers to discussing the military effects that will be provided to missions in support to civil powers as well as those directly or indirectly supporting land operations.

Reach. Movement in Canada is and will remain strategic in nature. The need for strategic mobility and rapid movement of large and outsized cargo to support land operations carries clear implications for RCAF FD. The RCAF must be able to operate to and from prepared, semi-prepared and unprepared surfaces in harsh conditions, such as the Arctic.

Power. The term power for the future RCAF and support to land operations in Canada means that the right capabilities exist in sufficient quantities to serve as a potent deterrent and credible force to potential aggressors and that air support to land forces in the defence of Canadian territory is conducted swiftly and precisely with proportionality and discrimination.


17

11.1.5 Search and Rescue

Statement of operating intent. The future RCAF will contribute to the WoG SAR capability by providing effective and timely response to reach those in distress anywhere within Canada’s SAR area of responsibility (AOR) on a 24/7 basis. The future RCAF must develop the capability to minimize the time between incident notification and locating persons in distress as well as between rendering assistance and evacuating once the target is found.

Agile. RCAF SAR forces must be responsive to the requirements of the GC and must be able to adapt quickly to the myriad factors that influence any given SAR mission.

Integrated. The RCAF must pursue full interoperability with Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) and OGDs (federal, provincial and municipal) to achieve an effective and coordinated SAR response. Incorporating various commercial and military sensors to trigger a SAR response and locate persons in distress should be investigated.

Reach. SAR forces must have the ability to arrive in the vicinity of any SAR incident anywhere within the Canadian SAR AOR (in order to commence a search of the area) within a reasonable amount of time but no longer than one crew day. Minimum levels of service should be set by GC and be achievable (i.e., Interdepartmental Committee on Search and Rescue).

Power. Along with SAR partners, the RCAF will deliver effective and affordable air SAR services to save lives. Innovative methods of providing this service to Canadians must be explored, such as multirole fleets and use of civilian contractors.

11.1.6 Support to the Civil Power

Statement of operating intent. The future RCAF will provide support to the civil power by delivering effects as part of a WoG effort. RCAF capabilities will be integrated through the MI3 with those civil powers being supported. The future RCAF must rely on its core air power capabilities but must also be able to rapidly accommodate security partner capabilities to facilitate interoperability on such missions. The lenses of agile, integrated, reach and power from the RCAF defence missions will be sufficient for this functional area. Support to the civil power includes ALEA that may be conducted by dedicated RCAF resources or through the tasking of other supporting assets.

11.2 Defending North America (2 Functional Areas)

11.2.1 Aerospace Defence of North America

Statement of operating intent. The future RCAF will integrate seamlessly into the continental aerospace defence system through the MI3 with USAF and other US services. There are two main categories of threat—conventional military and asymmetrical. The future RCAF must contribute to the aerospace surveillance of North America—internally as well as along its air and maritime approaches—in order to deter and prevent threats from encroaching North American airspace. If necessary, the RCAF must be able to classify and engage the threat before it enters North American airspace or take appropriate action (destroy, capture or escort) against those targets that are within that airspace without proper authorization.


18

Agile. The future RCAF must improve its ability to integrate with the US to deter, detect and engage threats to minimize reaction and engagement times.

Integrated. Integration for the future RCAF will require the ability to seamlessly and continually link systems for sharing information with the CA, RCN, USAF, other US services as well as civilian-radar and air-traffic-management systems. Rapidly moving threats with advanced air-to-surface munitions imply the need to minimize delays due to protocol. Since the larger continental aerospace defence effort through NORAD is directly tied to the domestic aerospace defence of Canada, a comprehensive understanding of the evolving US concept of air operations is essential, especially its evolving C2 concepts.

Reach. As the speed and range of weapons available to potential adversaries increase, the requirements for reach also increase. This will have implications for forward basing; AAR; advanced communications; and weapon systems with the speed, range and capability of addressing potential threats. The term reach is linked to agile and integrated, but for aerospace defence of North America and the RCAF of the future, reach refers to the ability to move quickly to counter air threats to both Canada and the US before weapons can be launched and to destroy attacking aircraft and any launched weapons as far away from the continent as possible. If such a reach implies beyond the EEZ of both countries, the legal considerations and ROE need to be examined.

Power. The term power for the future RCAF and aerospace defence of North America means that the right capabilities exist in sufficient quantities to contribute to a potent deterrent and credible force to potential aggressors and that the defence of North American airspace is conducted swiftly and precisely with proportionality and discrimination.

11.2.2 RCAF Support to Continental Operations

Statement of operating intent. RCAF support to continental operations has two distinct facets: first, those operations in defence of the continent against military threats; and second, contributions to civil powers across the continent in response to natural or man-made disasters. The RCAF will, as part of a joint and WoG response, contribute relevant capabilities to deliver precise military air effects in support of deterring, detecting and engaging threats to the continent across all domains. It will enhance interoperability with US forces to do so effectively and will contribute to disaster relief efforts using capabilities of the day.

Agile. The future RCAF must improve its interoperability with the US to deter, detect and engage threats to minimize reaction and engagement times.

Integrated. Integration for the future RCAF will require the ability to seamlessly and continually link systems for sharing information with the RCN, CA, CANSOF, OGDs and US services as well as being intellectually integrated and interoperable in terms of response methods.

Reach. As the speed and range of weapons available to potential adversaries increase, the requirements for reach also increase. This will have implications for ways of extending AORs far beyond the EEZ as well as for AAR; advanced communications; and weapon systems with the speed, range and capability of addressing potential threats. The term reach is linked to agile and integrated, but for support to continental operations and the RCAF of the future, reach refers to


19

the ability to move quickly to counter threats to North America in conjunction with the US before weapons can be launched and to destroy attacking maritime vessels, aircraft and any launched weapons as far away from the continent as possible. Moreover, movement across the continent in support of civil powers is strategic in nature, and the ability to move equipment swiftly to an area affected by a natural or man-made disaster will be a continuing requirement.

Power. The term power for the future RCAF and support to land operations in Canada means that the right capabilities exist in sufficient quantities to serve as a potent deterrent and credible force to potential aggressors and that air support to land and maritime operations in the defence of North America is conducted swiftly and precisely with proportionality and discrimination.

11.3 Contributing to International Peace and Security (3 Functional Areas)

11.3.1 RCAF Operations in Low-Intensity Conflicts

Statement of operating intent. In order to have a decisive effect and a leading role in low-intensity conflicts, the future RCAF needs to project rapidly and sustain forces globally in austere and partially denied environments. Moreover, the RCAF must integrate with the RCN, CA, OGDs and agencies through the MI3 system as part of a WoG response; it must also integrate with coalition partners as well as local and regional powers to ensure desired GC and coalition strategic goals are achieved.

Agile. Since the utility of air power is powerfully situational and will remain so, the RCAF must achieve and maintain a level of balance that ensures the right capabilities in sufficient quantity to respond effectively to a range of low-intensity conflicts. From experiences gained in operations in the Middle East, those capabilities of particular value include ISR, AAR, attack, air mobility and newer critical enablers like airborne communications nodes.

Integrated. Low-intensity conflicts, including COIN operations, require close technological integration through the MI3 system and close philosophical integration that focuses all military effects towards attaining coalition strategic goals and desired end states. Driving considerations for these types of operations are technical integration, interoperability and possessing valuable capabilities which will enable a role in campaign planning.

Reach. Reach enables GC options for responding to crises that occur with little warning. The RCAF is ideally suited to empower the rapid GC response to such contingencies and to provide relevant capabilities on short notice, applying precise military air effects to pre-empt or de-escalate activity as required.

Power. The Western intolerance for civilian casualties in low-intensity conflicts will continue, and thus, restrictive ROE will remain a feature of such operations. The ability to apply precise kinetic and non-kinetic effects with discrimination and proportionality will remain an enduring requirement for this style of warfare.


20

11.3.2 RCAF Operations in High-Intensity, A2/AD Conflicts

Statement of operating intent. The future RCAF must be capable of deploying rapidly and participating in a meaningful way as part of a broader coalition effort in support of higher levels of conflict. RCAF capabilities will have to be fully integrated and complement the overall coalition capabilities while being able to operate in a contested environment. The RCAF must be completely prepared for both offensive and defensive space and cyber warfare, must be able to operate effectively in a heavily degraded environment, and must be able to achieve the freedom to manoeuvre in the air domain as well as across the EMS.

Agile. Continuous air, space and maritime superiority—the traditionally critical conditions necessary for expeditionary warfare—simply will not exist in an advanced A2/AD environment or against a peer adversary. The RCAF must be able to protect its forces, and those it is supporting, from various threats. The RCAF must also be able to exploit critical vulnerabilities and create opportunities to surprise, saturate and overwhelm air defenses. The RCAF must contribute to creating an advantage in which specific objectives may be achieved. The RCAF must be able to exploit the EMS to our advantage, not only to protect our forces but also to further target and degrade the enemy’s.

Integrated. The RCAF must be able to operate in a US/NATO-led coalition while conducting operations in a contested environment. The RCAF must have improved interoperability between other air, sea, land, space and cyber assets as well as resilient C2 strategies to enable independent operations in degraded conditions. The RCAF must be able to adapt current and next-generation capabilities to meet these future requirements.

Reach. The RCAF must be able to project air power and deploy forces into theatre in face of hostile interference and action. Associated with reach, the use of low-observable and stand-off technologies can help in achieving surprise and advantage in such denied environments.

Power. The RCAF must be able to project power into A2 regions to deter, defend against and defeat aggression by potentially hostile nation states. Success in an A2/AD environment will require a philosophical shift in what constitutes an acceptable level of air, space and maritime superiority as well as acceptable levels of risk. Temporary or local control of the air or the sea are much more realistic expectations than complete freedom of manoeuvre in all domains.

11.3.3 RCAF Support to Non-Combat MOOTW

Statement of operating intent. The future RCAF will contribute to non-combat MOOTW by delivering precise military air effects as part of a WoG effort. Its capabilities will be integrated through the MI3 with those civil authorities being supported. The future RCAF must rely on its core air power capabilities but must also be able to accommodate specific additional capabilities when required for these types of operations. As a result, the lenses of agile, integrated, reach and power from all other functional areas will be sufficient for this functional area. For example, the movement of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to a location affected by a natural or man-made disaster will be conducted through tasking air mobility assets already in RCAF inventory.


21

12 Necessary Capabilities and Institutional Considerations

In the design of the RCAF of the future, consideration will have to be made for ensuring a balance in capability and in quantity to enable simultaneous and, in some cases, continual operational need. This also requires that air power be employed efficiently and effectively, since the quantity needed is often simply unavailable in small air forces. This has implications both for capability design and for the RCAF as an institution. The costs of developing the ideal RCAF to meet all of the challenges ahead are likely beyond what defence budgets can afford. The RCAF of the future must be organized in such a way as to facilitate rapid and cost-effective exploitation and implementation of both existing and leading-edge technologies to address emerging threats and to help maintain an advantage over adversaries. The downside is that, over time, leading-edge technologies will become accessible and proliferated by many other state and non-state actors; therefore, the RCAF must remain at the forefront of advanced technology and use it in novel ways.40 Technology alone, however, is only part of a capability. The RCAF’s core air power capabilities are supported by the key foundational elements outlined in AFV: people, leadership, airworthiness, technology and sustainability. The human and process aspects are equally important, so the RCAF of the future must recruit, train and retain the right people with the right skills; establish agile processes; and be organized in such a manner that it can easily adapt to, and sustain its efforts in meeting, future challenges. The RCAF also must continuously review how best to protect its forces at home and abroad, considering evolving threats (e.g., physical, cyber and asymmetric), especially its critical infrastructure, personnel and high-value platforms, all while still accomplishing its missions. To be successful, the RCAF needs to foster a culture of innovation and continuous improvement across all foundational elements. “In other words, should any one of the foundational elements become weak, it will directly impact our ability to progress along one or more of the vectors and, ultimately, prevent the achievement of our strategic objectives.”41 Annex A contains initial RCAF FD considerations that will continue to evolve and be refined as functional and enabling concepts—subordinate to the operational concepts—are developed. These FD considerations are drawn from this FAOC and various other sources, including allies’ future air force concepts with which Canadian air power will need to be integrated.

13 Conclusion

As stated in this document’s title, this strategic concept looks to the future. As such, the FAOC is initially speculative due to the inherent uncertainty associated with predicting the future; it is, however, also founded on military history, trends and operational experience. The FAOC provides overarching guidance based on RCAF roles and core air power capabilities and prescribes statements of desire that provide the RCAF Commander’s intent for further development of functional and enabling concepts. The FD considerations listed in Annex A shed some light on factors the subordinate concepts will most likely have to consider. The FAOC, as with any future concept, must undergo thorough experimentation and examination. This will force the concept to evolve from an untested hypothesis to a validated and reasonably conclusive concept that will provide useful guidance for RCAF FD efforts to meet future defence challenges.


22

Annex A – RCAF FD Considerations

The FAOC outlines the guiding national policy and expectations of the future RCAF. This annex links the FAOC’s strategic implications (i.e., transformational ideas driven by the future operating environment) to more specific RCAF FD considerations that will drive the Conceive-Design-Build process. These RCAF FD considerations are arranged by theme:

• core function;

• improved reliance;

• information dominance;

• interoperability;

• technological enhancements; and

• training enhancements.

References. Many of these FD considerations directly reflect current CAF and allied FD documents, mainly The Future Security Environment 2013–2040, The CAF C4ISR Strategic Vision, Goals and Objectives, the USAF “Air Force Future Operating Concept: A View of the Air Force in 2035” and the RAAF “Plan Jericho Program of Work: Transforming Air Force’s Combat Capability.” Notwithstanding, the RCAF still needs to conduct a top-down approach of FD considerations based upon each of the RCAF’s 11 functional areas in order to update this annex. As such, the order that these considerations appear under each theme do not reflect any FD priority.

1 Core Functions

1.1 Provide the right aerospace capabilities—through sustainment, modernization, recapitalization, readiness and supporting infrastructure—in sufficient quantities and in the right postures to serve as a deterrent to potential aggressors. Domestically, air power missions in the defence of Canadian land, air and maritime approaches must be conducted swiftly and precisely with proportionality and discrimination.

1.2 Maintain the ability to deliver military effects, personnel and supplies globally, often in unstable areas, responding rapidly in a domestic and expeditionary capacity.

1.3 Develop a balanced mix of air and space capabilities composed of sophisticated systems, personnel and munitions for employment in complex domestic and coalition operations. This includes manned systems, unmanned / remotely operated systems and systems with varying levels of autonomy, all of which can operate anywhere in Canada and its approaches.

1.4 Optimize and exploit AAR capabilities to extend RCAF reach and to deliver precision military effects globally, not only on fighters but for other aircraft types as well.


23

1.5 Conduct operations in large, congested urban environments.

1.6 Conduct persistent S&R of the AOR (domestic or expeditionary) as required for mission success. Capabilities to deliver the data when and where necessary will be crucial.

1.7 The ability to project power across all domains into A2/AD regions to deter, defend against and defeat aggression by hostile nation states should be advanced.

1.8 Ensure the ability to gain and maintain the required degree of control of the air to prevent adversary interference with friendly operations. This will almost certainly include both state and non-state adversaries who possess Russian or Chinese military equipment and weapons.

1.9 Resilient installations, infrastructure and operational support capabilities (information operations [info ops], force protection, electronic warfare [EW], int, information management, maintenance, administration and logistics) should be developed that enable the RCAF to project power rapidly, effectively and efficiently at home and as part of a coalition abroad.

1.10 Investigate systems and processes to limit the RCAF’s forward deployed footprint and identify missions and capabilities that could benefit from a reachback concept (processing, exploitation and dissemination [PED] and control of unmanned aircraft systems).

1.11 Capabilities that enable the establishment of and concurrent operation from expeditionary airfields—including those in austere environments and with limited host-nation assistance—should be developed.

1.12 Develop and enhance expeditionary health, aeromedical evacuation, communications and other essential deployed capabilities.

1.13 Update security tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) to leverage innovation and new systems and to account for emergent threats in both the expeditionary and fixed air-base locations.

1.14 Optimize resupply response times and associated delivery systems by integrating logistics with operational C2 systems.

1.15 Advance the Combined Aerospace Operations Centre (CAOC) with appropriate capabilities to support or direct multidomain and NORAD operations.

1.16 Advance doctrine and TTP to coordinate kinetic and non-kinetic effects across joint-force and strategic agencies.

1.17 Contribute to the assured access to space capabilities and to the global commons.

1.18 With minimal supporting infrastructure, conduct operations from prepared, semi-prepared and unprepared surfaces in all environmental conditions.


24

1.19 Increase emphasis on effective, resilient presence in national remote areas while maintaining the ability to transition to a stand-off expeditionary capability that maximizes speed, range and flexibility.

1.20 Employ a diverse range of munitions, emitters and delivery systems capable of providing scalable lethal and non-lethal options.

1.21 Maintain force protection and preservation programmes and activities to protect personnel and infrastructure in deployed or domestic operations and at home wings and bases.

1.22 Force protection measures and institutional robustness should be provided to support OGDs, both domestically and internationally.

1.23 It may be necessary to operate in regions where chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear hazards are present.

1.24 Validate C2 best practices—centralization, decentralization, organization and execution—through study, experimentation and exercise.

1.25 Improve and implement RCAF C2 doctrine.

2 Improved Reliance

2.1 Support the development and maintenance of SA on potential threat approaches to Canada, including the ability to respond with speed and power to those threats.

2.2 Develop a diverse portfolio of capabilities that enable multiple combinations of joint operations (with an emphasis on air and space) in all environments.

2.3 Ensure viable options are available to sustain capabilities provided by space assets in case they are challenged, degraded or denied, particularly for position, navigation, timing, strategic warning and communications functions.

2.4 Methodologies should be developed to protect and control the EMS to lower risk, improve survivability and increase the probability of successful mission execution.

2.5 Incorporate various commercial and military sensors in SAR responses to locate persons in distress.

2.6 RCAF sensors, automated systems, information nodes/connections and human cognition must be integrated seamlessly into a secure, reliable, resilient and high-capacity global information architecture, such as the MI3.


25

3 Information Dominance

3.1 The ability to detect and monitor an evolving situation and increase SA should be improved, in both domestic and expeditionary locations, across full-spectrum operations and all-domain surveillance.

3.2 Requirements and TTP for big data should be defined to permit more efficient and effective RCAF and military operations, particularly cyber and influence activities, in WoG and coalition contexts.

3.3 Live-Virtual-Constructive (LVC) venues should be provided to support EW and cyber domains.

3.4 RCAF capabilities that enable freedom of action and continued operations in physical domains, in cyberspace and across the EMS when systems are compromised, degraded or denied in a contested environment should be strengthened.

3.5 Resilient, survivable, secure, common and enduring architecture should be developed to connect to the MI3 and integrate ISR operations across all domains, ensuring that collection and analytic systems, and users, can collaborate seamlessly.

3.6 Redundancy should be achieved by diversifying the RCAF’s beyond line of sight (BLOS) communications capabilities beyond current/planned satellite communications (SATCOM) capability.

3.7 Methods should be identified that improve capacity (bandwidth) on those networks that support decision making, including improved ability to prioritize operational information across the joint force.

3.8 Organizational capacity and defined workforce requirements should be developed for joint network design and management (communications, datalinks and logistics systems) as well as spectrum-, information- and bandwidth-management resource requirements.

3.9 Support the development of local area networks, base area networks and wide area networks to enable better network integration across the battlespace.

3.10 Ensure that the RCAF contribution to the MI3 is interoperable with the JIMP community, synchronize and integrate PED as well as coordinate collection in collaboration with JIMP partners.

3.11 Pursue automated processing at the sensor level to reduce the transmission of large data sets to only that of mission value.

3.12 Enhance capabilities to detect, monitor, analyse and attribute threats (kinetic and non-kinetic) of adversaries and their support networks.

3.13 Improve target systems analysis to determine the best course of action.


26

3.14 Optimize the relative and combined performance of human operators and systems through improvements in interfaces, compatibility and adaptability, resulting in improved functionality, reduced life-cycle costs and increased mission effectiveness across the range of RCAF missions.

3.15 Doctrine and TTP for compiling and fusing COP information—including synchronizing and integrating joint ISR and EW sensors, assets and associated strategic-to-tactical PED of intelligence products—into the conduct of operations should be developed.

3.16 Flow of data and information should be defined like C2 diagrams.

3.17 Develop systems and processes that assess and assure integrity of RCAF contributions to the joint COP.

3.18 Evolve processes and systems to share strategic, operational and tactical data in real time.

3.19 A cyberspace security-awareness education programme should be developed to ensure cyberspace threats and vulnerabilities are understood and mitigated.

3.20 Wide-area surveillance capability, as well as cueing of own and other assets, should be advanced.

3.21 The ability to degrade or deny SA and targeting information to an advanced adversary should be investigated. This will involve joint and/or combined capabilities in the cyber and space domains.

3.22 Exploit increasingly autonomous/intelligent unmanned systems to support faster decision-making cycles.

3.23 Balance resilient and agile ISR sensors, systems, platforms and processes ranging from low-threat domestic environments to high-threat expeditionary environments and everything in between.

3.24 Define requirements and initiate projects for distributed C2 applications and decision-support tools across all RCAF capabilities from tactical to operational.

3.25 COP networks and tools should be developed to include visualization of EW and cyber status and effects across the joint force.


27

4 Interoperability

4.1 Align RCAF FD activities with VCDS’s C4ISR strategy, policy and objectives to achieve greater integration within and between environments.

4.2 Air-related systems and capabilities should be modular or configurable to allow rapid adaptation or upgrades as well as be interoperable with other joint systems, allies, interagency or multinational partner capabilities.

4.3 Consider the development of flatter, collaborative and agile organizations with vertical and horizontal feedback loops to eliminate information stovepipes.

4.4 Expand the interoperability of RCAF air platforms with the GC and OGD assets through leveraging a systems-of-systems approach for information sharing.

4.5 Improve policies, processes and organizations for obtaining, sharing and releasing pertinent multidomain intelligence with joint, interagency and international partners.

4.6 Concepts and capabilities should be developed that integrate air operations planning and execution as well as decision-support tools with OGDs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other supported agencies.

4.7 Federate or link RCAF with OGD planning systems and develop TTP to incorporate OGD/NGO activity into the national CAOC decision-making cycle.

4.8 Surveillance systems from the CA, RCN, USAF, other US services, Canadian and US OGDs as well as civilian air-traffic-management organizations should be seamlessly and continuously linked with RCAF systems to support domestic and continental COPs.

4.9 Due to the inextricably linked nature between Canadian and continental defence, ensure interoperability with the US remains a primary consideration for RCAF FD, including a comprehensive understanding of the evolving US concept of air operations and associated C2 concepts.

4.10 Technologically integrate with the MI3 system across the full spectrum of conflict and philosophically integrate national strategic goals and desired end states with those of the coalition. The RCAF must provide a valuable contribution to the campaign through various operational and support capabilities.

4.11 Develop strong, mutually beneficial partnerships with an array of joint, interagency, multinational, academic and industrial entities to enrich the RCAF understanding of threats and opportunities.

4.12 Deepen relationships with the joint team, intelligence community, diplomatic institutions, developmental agencies, local governments, businesses, communities and international partners through sustained dialogue; increased training and exchange; and iterative enterprises to codify shared doctrine, tactics and capabilities.


28

4.13 Broaden the RCAF’s ability to support the joint targeting requirements in real time.

4.14 Processes should be developed that enable the RCAF to provide unclassified information directly (or indirectly via the chain of command) to OGD/NGO during training as well as humanitarian operations and disaster relief (HODR). The processes should also enable the RCAF to receive information from those organizations.

4.15 Establish full interoperability with CCG and OGDs (federal, provincial and municipal) to achieve effective and coordinated SAR response.

5 Technological Enhancements

5.1 Execution speed and situational understanding should be improved through advances in human-machine teaming, automated PED, analysis as well as updated C2 and communication capabilities.

5.2 Spectrum-monitoring tools, spectrum-management capabilities, doctrine and TTP for EW and cyber should be developed.

5.3 Research and development (R&D) should emphasize the ability to find, fix, track, target, engage and assess effects against critical target sets in domestic (e.g., northern and maritime) and deployed environments.

5.4 The use of stand-off sensor and weapons capabilities should be investigated in order to detect, track and counter distant threats to Canada and deployed forces.

5.5 Consider the trend towards disposable-type sensors, weapons, communications, etc. when upgradability or modularity is an issue with design.

5.6 Processes to enable modular sensor and communication systems installation—either permanent fit or roll-on/roll-off capabilities to support an integrated, tailorable, scalable and rapidly upgradeable multirole air force—should be implemented.


29

6 Training Enhancements

6.1 Collective training should be conducted in a contested and degraded operating environment.

6.2 Info ops, EW, cyber, distributed C2 arrangements and support capabilities should be practiced regularly.

6.3 Joint-level operational and tactical training should be conducted for air-sea and air-land integration.

6.4 Operational analysis and lessons learned processes should be integrated into all collective training activities.

6.5 ISR planning and operations should be integrated in regular collective training activities.

6.6 Info ops, EW and cyber exercises should be conducted within a COIN and asymmetric collective-training environment.

6.7 Logistics should be exercised as part of joint, collective-training command post exercises.

6.8 Training should be combined across multiple mission sets, including integrated LVC venues and operator-in-the-loop modeling and simulation, to promote agile and robust problem-solving skills, resulting in multidomain solutions to complex problems in uncertain, contested environments.

6.9 LVC ranges or venues should support collective training in a multidomain contested and degraded operating environment.

6.10 LVC should support network-enabled exercises and SOW exercises.

6.11 The RCAF should integrate current and developing systems into a fully networked LVC environment to support joint and coalition collective training.


30

Abbreviations

Abbreviation Term A2 anti-access AAR air-to-air refuelling AD area-denial AFV Air Force Vectors AIRPower agile, integrated, reach and power ALEA assistance to law enforcement agencies AOR area of responsibility C2 command and control C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance CA Canadian Army CAF Canadian Armed Forces CANSOF Canadian special operations forces CAOC Combined Aerospace Operations Centre CCG Canadian Coast Guard CJOC Canadian Joint Operations Command COIN counter-insurgency COP common operating picture DND Department of National Defence EEZ exclusive economic zone EMS electromagnetic spectrum EW electronic warfare FAOC Future Air Operating Concept FD force development GC Government of Canada info ops information operations int intelligence ISR intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance JIMP joint, integrated, multinational and public LVC Live-Virtual-Constructive MI3 military integrated information infrastructure MOOTW military operations other than war NGO non-governmental organization NORAD North American Aerospace Defence Command OGD other government department PED processing, exploitation and dissemination RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force


31

Abbreviation Term RCN Royal Canadian Navy ROE rules of engagement S&R surveillance and reconnaissance SA situational awareness SAR search and rescue SOF special operations forces SOW stand-off weapon TTP tactics, techniques and procedures US United States USAF United States Air Force VCDS Vice Chief of the Defence Staff VIP very important person WoG whole-of-government


32

Notes

1. Space power and space FD were purposefully left out of the FAOC with the intent to have them fully embodied in later versions once the space portfolio has transferred to the RCAF.

2. Sanu Kainikara, “The Future Relevance of Smaller Air Forces” (Canberra: Royal Australian Air Power Development Centre Working Paper 29, 2009), 3.

3. Department of National Defence (DND), The Future Security Environment 2013–2040 (Ottawa: Chief of Force Development, 2013), 118, accessed August 23, 2016, http://cfd.mil.ca/sites/intranet-eng.aspx?page=1869.

4. A-GA-007-000/AF-008, Air Force Vectors (Ottawa: Chief of the Air Force Staff, 2014), 33–34, accessed August 23, 2016, http://airforce.mil.ca/caf/dairsp/page-eng.asp?cid=41.

5. This role is becoming more directly linked with continental and domestic defence. Furthermore, the general assumption that CAF and the RCAF will conduct international operations as part of a coalition is likely to remain valid throughout the FAOC timeframe.

6. Anti-access is defined as “Action intended to slow deployment of friendly forces into a theater or cause forces to operate from distances farther from the locus of conflict than they would otherwise prefer. A2 affects movement to a theater.” Area-denial is defined as “Action intended to impede friendly operations within areas where an adversary cannot or will not prevent access. AD affects maneuver within a theater.” Air-Sea Battle Office, “Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges” (Washington, DC: May 2013), 2.

7. DND, Integrated Capstone Concept (Ottawa: Chief of Force Development, 2013), 53.

8. Ibid., 2.

9. A-GA-007-000/AF-008, Air Force Vectors, 12–15. It is highly unlikely that the RCAF will increase its numbers of platforms to the point that it is no longer considered a small air force.

10. Although not yet identified as such, core RCAF space capabilities could consist of space surveillance, aerospace warning, space-based communications, space-based navigation and space-based S&R.

11. Brad William Gladman, Intelligence and Anglo-American Air Support in World War Two: The Western Desert and Tunisia, 1940–43 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

12. A-GA-007-000/AF-008, Air Force Vectors, 29.

13. Ibid., 33.

14. As discussed in footnote 35, the FAOC takes a broader view of government-mandated, non-defence missions than that provided in AFV.

15. DND, The CAF C4ISR Strategic Vision, Goals and Objectives, Version 1.0 (Ottawa: Chief of Force Development, 10 February 2016).

16. The 11 functional areas are identified in Figure 2 and expanded upon in Section 11, Future RCAF Functional Areas.


33

17. A-GA-007-000/AF-008, Air Force Vectors, describes SAR as an air power mission,

not a core air power capability. The FAOC identifies SAR as a government-mandated, non-defence mission, as it supports the National Search and Rescue Program (NSP).


19. Aerospace is “the environment, meaning the air and space environments, that surrounds the Earth and extends through the air into space from the Earth’s surface.” Defence Terminology Bank record 34894.

20. DND, The Future Security Environment 2013–2040, 113.

21. DND, Leadmark 2050: Canada in a New Maritime World (Ottawa: Directorate of Maritime Strategy, 2016), 12, accessed August 23, 2016, http://rcn-mrc.mil.ca/default-eng.asp.

22. B-GL-300/FP-000, Canada’s Army: We Stand on Guard for Thee (Ottawa: Chief of the Land Staff, 1998), 65, accessed August 23, 2016, http://acims.mil.ca/sp/CADTC_DAD_ AEL/DoctrineLibrary/B-GL-300-000-FP-000_e.pdf.

23. Brad Gladman and Peter Archambault, An Effects-Based Approach to Operations in the Domestic and Continental Operating Environment: A Case for Pragmatism (Ottawa: DRDC CORA TM 2008-033).

24. Brad Gladman and Peter Archambault, “A Role for Effects-Based Planning in a National Security Framework,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 13, no. 2 (Winter 2011).

25. The FAOC uses the term expeditionary to refer to operations outside of Canadian or continental territory and approaches.

26. Brad Gladman, Considerations for Defining the Future of Canadian Air Power (Ottawa: DRDC-RDDC-2015-L223, 2015), 2 and 4–5.

27. “Allies Stunned Canadian Troops Lack Helicopters” National Post, accessed March 20, 2016, http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=9689fab6-ecfd-4bed-8c06-925f8254cd1e (site discontinued).

28. Dr. Christina J. M. Goulter, “Irregular Warfare: The Regular in the Irregular” Proceedings of the 2014 RAAF Air Power Conference: A Century of Military Aviation 1914–2014 (Canberra ACT: Air Power Development Centre, 2014), 142.

29. James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 434.

30. Gladman, Considerations for Defining the Future, 4–5.

31. Defending Canada; defending North America in cooperation with Canada’s closest ally, the United States; and contributing to international peace and security.


33. A-GA-007-000/AF-008, Air Force Vectors, Chapter 3 provides the descriptions of these core air power capabilities.


34

34. A-GA-007-000/AF-008, Air Force Vectors, Table 2 introduces non-defence missions

but does not define them. These missions generally do not involve the traditional application of military force to satisfy military-only purposes. Their value lies elsewhere supporting OGDs or non-warfighting aims such as recruiting, ambassadorship and diplomacy.

35. A-GA-007-000/AF-008, Air Force Vectors, Chapter 3 lists only VIP transport and air demonstration as government-mandated, non-defence missions. However, SAR is not part of the air mobility core capability as it is with other countries, and there is no mention of ALEA in any of the RCAF core air power capabilities. VIP transport capabilities and air demonstration are not considered any further in this FAOC; although, they play an important role for CAF and the GC.

36. Some readers might feel certain areas are missing, such as support to CANSOF and RCAF operations in the cyber domain. The former is considered in two functional areas: support to maritime operations in Canada and support to land operations in Canada as well as the Expeditionary Air Operating Concept. The latter is governed and led at the joint level and spans across all RCAF activities, so the RCAF must ensure it implements processes in line with CAF direction. Future versions of the FAOC may include these and other areas as underlying assumptions and conditions change.


38. Ibid., 39.

39. Ibid., 40.

40. NATO Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Strategic Foresight Analysis 2013 Report, 22–23.


future concepts directive part 2:the future air operating...

Documents