MSc International Relations (LSE) 2014

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of requirements of the degree Candidate Number: 30390 Number of Words: 9967 From Wealth to Power: Xi Jinping’s New State and the

South China Sea

Contents 1. Introduction………………………………………………………......1

2. The Weakness of the Black Box and the Return of the State……5 2.1 Classical Realism……………………………………………5 2.2 Neorealism…………………………………………………….8 2.3 Neoclassical Realism………………………………………12

3. Chinese State Power……………………………………………...18 3.1 China and the International System………………………..18 3.2 Chinese Historical State Power……………………………20 3.3 Xi Jinping: Supreme Leader……………………………….24

4. China and the South China Sea………………………………….28 4.1 China’s Claims in the South China Sea……………………29 4.2 The Decision to Move HYSY 981 into Disputed Waters….31

5. Conclusion……………………………………………………….......35 5.1 Future Implications………………………………………...37 Bibliography

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1. Introduction

On the 2nd of May 2014 the Maritime Safety Administration of the People’s

Republic of China (PRC) released a statement on its website that read as, ‘琼航警

14033 南海 5 月 2 日至 8 月 15 日，“海洋石油 981”船在以 15-29.58N/111-12.06E

点为圆心，1 海里为半径范围内进行钻井作业，禁止驶入。 HN0033 SOUTH

CHINA SEA DRILLING WORK BY M/V "HAI YANG SHI YOU 981" IN AREA

WITHIN 1 MILES RADIUS OF 15-29.58N/111-12.06E FROM 02 MAY TO 15 AUG

ENTERING PRIHIBITED HAINAN MSA CHINA’ (Maritime Safety Administration,

www.msa.gov.cn). This short, and slightly misspelt, bilingual press release informed

the world that an oilrig, owned by the Chinese oil company China National Offshore

Oil Company (CNOOC), had been moved into disputed waters in the South China Sea

(SCS), which are claimed by both China and Vietnam.

The decision by the Chinese Government to move the oil platform, with a

flotilla of approximately 80 to 120 vessels (including a number of military vessels), into

disputed waters further exacerbated the tensions in the region, which were already

rather strained due to China’s territorial claim of almost 90% of the SCS and its

increasing assertive behaviour vis-à-vis these claims (Bower and Poling, 7 May 2014;

Vu and Nguyen, 24 June 2014; Pejsova, 2014: 1; Johnson, 2013: 7). Even before the

latest escalation in the region, moving HYSY 981 into disputed waters, it had reached

conventional wisdom status in the media that China had become increasingly assertive

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on a global scale since the 2008-9 global financial crisis.1 Alastair Iain Johnston (2013)

concludes that China had only become newly assertive in relation to the SCS and not

globally in 2010. M. Taylor Fravel (2011) surmises that that any escalation from the

Chinese side would be caused by one, or a combination, of reasons. The scenarios he

thought could create further increases in tensions included: if the bargaining power, or

position, of China declined; if there was an increase in the perceived value of the

disputed territory; or if a stronger China decided to use force, just because it could. It is

from such works that the inspiration for this subject blossomed. Subsequent events

between claimants in the SCS led to the author’s interest gaining a focal point to

investigate the questions; why did the Chinese Government decide to escalate things

further in May 2014? And, why has it chosen to become more assertive in the SCS?

International relations offers two theoretical mainstays as possible explanations

for the questions above – classical and neo- realism.2 Both argue that anarchy, the

absence of a central authority, in the international system presents risks and

opportunities to states, but they differ in fundamental assumptions. Classical realism

assumes that a nation’s relative power determines its national interests. Thus, nations

expand when they can in a rational manner. Proponents of the theory argue that all

states seek control over territory, other states’ conduct, and the global economy; the

difference is that only rich and powerful states have the ability to alter the status quo

(Gilpin, 1981: 23-25). Therefore, classical realists would argue that China moved the

oilrig into disputed waters because it could. Whereas neorealism suggests that the

international system pressures states to seek security maximisation. Neorealists are split                                                                                                                1 For examples of this type of commentary, see Swaine (Summer 2010: 10). 2 Main books that use these theories to explain China’s rise are Mearsheimer (2001), Goldstein (2005), Shirk (2007), and Nathan and Scobell (2012).  

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into two competing camps over why states expand: defensive and offensive realists.

Defensive realists posit that states only expand when threatened. Thus, expansion is a

matter of necessity and not choice. On the recent intensification of the SCS territorial

disputes, defensive realists would argue that the situation was down to a systemic

incentive to react to a threat to their maritime claims and, thus their national interests.

Contradictory to the defensive realist interpretation, offensive realists view the system

in quite Hobbesian terms and believe that security maximisation means power

maximisation. This gives states an impetus to strive for global hegemony or become

the sole regional hegemon. Offensive realists would attribute China’s rationale to the

inevitable conflict narrative, whereby, a rising China is challenging the status quo of the

international order by first opposing the regional hierarchical structure, before

attempting to overall the global order.

However, neither classical nor the two strands of neorealism can completely

explain a state’s foreign policy, instead they more accurately represent two starting

points for a theory of foreign policy. To create a better understanding of state behaviour

one should test hypothesises through a more holistic approach. A school of thought that

does such work is neoclassical realism, or postclassical realism. Fareed Zakaria is one

of the most prominent scholars to advance the neoclassical cause with his branch of the

theory labelled state-centric realism. State-centric realism attempts to put the state back

into realism in conjunction with systemic pressures and decision-makers perceptions.

This essay, in utilising Zakaria’s (1999) theory, argues that it is not China’s relative

national power, but its relative state power that matters when considering its foreign and

security policy decisions.

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Therefore, this article will first prove that state-centric realism is the theory best placed

to answer the questions stated above. It will demonstrate that state-centric realism is

better than the other aforementioned theories by comparing their differing

interpretations of China’s decision to move HYSY 981 into disputed waters. Secondly,

this study will examine why the Chinese’s state’s capacity to use the massively

increased national power of China has ebbed and flowed, since ‘Reform and Opening’

in 1978. Furthermore, section three will explain why China has been able to focus more

of the nation’s actual power on its regional and global interests, since Xi Jinping

became the head of the tripartite of the Chinese state.3 Thirdly, we will look at the

combination of favourable factors – political motivation, strategic opportunity, and

superior state power – that prompted China to renew its efforts to enforce its territorial

claims in the SCS under its new policy of ‘peripheral diplomacy.’ Finally, we will end

with possible practical and academic implications emanating from this piece of work.

                                                                                                               3 Xi is the first Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping to simultaneously hold the positions of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, the President of the PRC, and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, in addition to chairing the newly created National Security Commission and the new body deciding on China’s latest economic reforms – Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms.

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2. The Weakness of the Black Box and the Return of the State

The central dilemma of international relations, according to E. H. Carr (1939:

208-223), is ‘scarcity’ and the ‘problem of peaceful change’ between the ‘haves and the

have-nots.’ Carr’s observation is potent because of the present transitional epoch that

we find ourselves in: the weakening of the unipolar system (Waltz, 1993; Layne, 1993;

Kupchan, 1998; Mearsheimer, 2001; Posen, 2006; Buzan, March 2011). Linked closely

to the changing composition of the international political structure is China’s re-

emergence as a great power, which provokes a considerable amount of worry among so

many, especially its neighbours, because it appears to be taking a staunchly traditional

course that many former ‘rising’ states have taken; simultaneously expanding its

interests with its growing power. Thus, assertiveness is just the sort of behaviour one

would expect from ‘a thoroughly traditional great power’ (Zakaria, 1996: 36). History

has shown that in the long run, states that get richer will have more regional, and by

extension global, influence. Different schools of thought have conflicting notions as to

why this occurs. This section of the article will compare two bastions of international

relations – classical realism and neorealism (defensive and offensive realism) – with the

ever-evolving neoclassical realism.

2.1 Classical Realism

Classical realists assert that a nation defines its interests ‘in terms of power.’

Meaning the amount of existing material resources that the nation holds, which could be

used, if needed, to increase its military strength for its own ends (Morgenthau, 1978: 5).

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According to the theory, the nature of man and the anarchic environment that he resides

in compels the nation to extend its power as far as it can to maximise its control over its

external environment. Based on the rationale that ‘the strong do what they can and the

weak suffer what they must’ (Thucydides, 1972: 402). As proponents of classical

realism believe that all foreign policy originates from domestic sources, the state has

much agency. But, ultimately, the state is a power-maximiser, which leads to the

central hypothesis of the theory; nations expand their political interests abroad when

their decision-makers perceive that a favourable power shift has occurred. Thus, why

statesmen have forever obsessed about who holds the balance of power.

Classical realists think that states are naturally aggressive, which leads to them

being portrayed as pessimists. However, the theory says that states measure risks and

opportunities, in terms of cost-benefits; when the statesman thinks that the benefits

outweigh the costs the state attempts to expand. Conversely, if the costs dwarf the

benefits then a state aims to maintain its relative position. Classical realists predict that

as a nation’s power increases, there is a corresponding reduction in the costs of

expansion and a rise in the value of rewards (Gilpin 1981). The implication for

contemporary China, or any rising state, is that no matter how much it professes to be

‘non-interventionist’ and that it will be a ‘a new type of superpower,’ it is battling

against a resolute presumption: ‘a growing state tends to expand its activities and

interests outward – colliding with the spheres of influence of other states – and finds

itself embroiled in international conflicts, crises, and wars…the more a state grows, and

thus the greater its capabilities, the more likely it is to follow such a tendency’ (Hu,

2011: 15; Choucri and North, 1975: 1).

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Consequently, classical realists would view China’s decision to manoeuvre

against Vietnam, as being provoked by a sense of opportunity among the Chinese

leaders that its capabilities had increased to such an extent that would allow it to have

success. This assumption correlates with the ‘China rise’ narrative because it has

expanded its international interests in correspondence with its growth in wealth and

material capability.4 However, this notion has a discrepancy associated with it; not all

rising states in history have expanded in line with their growth. Classical realists refute

such anomalies with Hans J. Morgenthau (1978: 53; 239) caveat of moral relativism –

‘the restraining influence of moral consensus…that kept in check the limitless desire for

power.’ Morgenthau (1978: 240) believes that the national interest is not simply the

maximisation of the state’s international influence, but as ‘the rational pursuit, within

certain moral limitations, of the power objectives of the state.’ Thus, Morgenthau

assigns the policy maker as the ultimate agent that decides on the state’s moral contours.

Furthermore, he argues that when states pursue their national interest in a rational

manner they form a moral consensus with one another, which maintains the status quo.

States that disregard the morality of their actions are seen to be revisionist.

It is difficult to describe China’s actions as outright revisionist. It may want to

revise the regional security architecture, but it is hardly taking irrevocable unilateral

action to change the power dynamics of the SCS by moving an oilrig into disputed

waters. The problem is that it is only possible to recognise an increase in a state’s

national interest in correlation with an increase in its capabilities, and the identification

                                                                                                               4 A book that gives the best overview of the ‘China rise’ narrative is David Shambaugh (2013).

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of status quo and revisionist powers in hindsight. Furthermore, states’ actions cannot

simply be explained by the claim that they are naturally aggressive; even a

revolutionary and hostile state will only instigate hostilities when certain conditions are

present (Waltz, 1979). Hence, as Morgenthau’s relative moralism alludes to, states’

actions cannot be explained by a single country’s characteristics, instead it results from

the interaction of many states within the international framework.

2.2 Neorealism

Neorealists (or structural realists) disagree with classical realists about what are

the causal factors of a state’s foreign policy: classical realism is part of the Innenpolitik

School, meaning that it assumes that foreign policy emanates from domestic sources,

whereas, neorealists view the intervening variables of the domestic as not as important

as the independent variables of the international system. Proponents of neorealism see

Innenpolitik theories as problematic when explaining state’s foreign policies because

evidence shows that states with similar domestic structures often act differently:

democracies, and other regime types, differ in their level of foreign policy activeness.

To structural realists the system is the most important level of analysis because all states

are confined by the constraints of the international order (Waltz, 1979). The key

assumption in the theory is anarchy, meaning the lack of central authority at the

international level, which forces states to pursue a self-help foreign policy as they

cannot rely on a higher authority to look out for their interests. The theory assigns

survival as the universal national goal. Thus, it differs from classical realism because it

believes that states expand because they must and not because they can, which creates a

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dichotomy between neorealism and classical realism of necessity and want (Waltz,

1979).

Kenneth N. Waltz (1979: 74-77) argues that the international system affects

states in two ways through ‘socialisation’ and ‘competition and selection.’ He believes

that socialisation of states makes them more alike, which corroborates structural

realism’s assertion that the system is composed of unitary, rational states that are

motivated by the need for security (Waltz, 1979). That implies that intervening

variables, like the domestic structure, are not of great explanatory importance to

international politics. However, this does not explain why it was only after Xi had

reformed the state structure that China was able to take advantage of the strategic

opportunity that had, arguably, been present since the mid-to-late 2000s.

According to Waltz (1979), the competition and selection element of neorealism

creates a hierarchical order, which leads to balance of powers emerging. However, his

idea of the balance of power differs from the classical realist’s because he sees

balancing behaviour emerging automatically, without the statesmen’s input. It is the

system’s competitive imperative that splits the neorealist school into two camps over

how to best secure the survival of the state. On the one hand, there are those that

believe that states should pursue a minimalistic foreign policy and only expand when

threatened. They are called the defensive realists. On the other hand, there are those

who believe that if a state does not attempt to maximise its influence, then another will

seize the opportunity in its place. They are aptly labelled the offensive realists.

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Defensive Realism

John Herz (1959) surmises that nations expand their political interests when they

become increasingly insecure. Often defensive realism has been summarised with the

tagline of ‘the search for security’ (Nathan and Scobell, 2012). It is because of these

assumptions that proponents of the theory opine that declining states tend to be more

aggressive; much like a cornered rattlesnake, they will strike when threatened. The

theory looks more favourably on the system and attributes anarchy with having more

security than others believe. Because of their faith in the international order’s ability to

constrain aggressive behaviour – antagonistic conduct would result in other states

balancing, either internally (e.g. increasing its military capacity) or externally (e.g.

forming alliances), to counter such policies – they advocate minimalist foreign policies

to avoid security dilemmas arising. Such an approach should avoid spheres of

influences overlapping and consequent competing national interests arising.

There are real difficulties in proving defensive realist explanations wrong, as the

theory depends on the subjective and often self-serving evidence from decision-makers

to compile its analysis, any action could be construed as defensive for their own ends

(Mearsheimer, 2011). Thus, its objective applicability is impaired because of its

inherent misunderstanding of the international system and its affects on states’

behaviour. Consequently, the theory would explain China’s decision to move the oilrig

into the disputed waters by stating that it was responding to a threat to their national

interest. However, the Chinese Government has never publicly described the SCS as a

‘core interest’ (Swaine, Winter 2011). Therefore, it is hard to argue that China was

reacting to a direct threat to its national interest, which led it to enforce its territorial

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claims. Moreover, this directly impacts the point about the state’s default foreign policy

being moderate in scope, by undermining the theory’s parsimony because its

explanation of states that deviate from the norm. Defensive realism explains anomalies

as being ‘unnatural’ and therefore incorporates domestic factors to explain its systemic

model (Rose, October 1998: 149). It then leaves it up to other theories to explain why

such states change into pathological units. Thus, defensive realism, rather than being a

pedigree explanative model, should belong in the normative category of international

relations theory – it misinterprets state’s actual behaviour for what they should do in

response to the signals sent by the international system. Further weakening its

suitability to answer this essay’s questions.

Offensive Realism

John J. Mearsheimer (2001) accepts Waltz’s (1979) basic premise that

international anarchy forced states to behave in a certain manner, although he believes

that instead of a minimalistic foreign policy, it pushed states to pursue an inflated

foreign policy. Thus, to secure security-maximisation all states should aim for global

hegemony, but it’s obvious that not all states can attain this. So, the goal, according to

Mearsheimer (2001) is to become the only regional hegemon in the world. To preserve

such status, dominant states must prevent other states from reaching the same standing

to maintain their level of security. Consequently, they must contain other states to

prevent them from attaining a preponderant role in their region. Evidently, if true, this

leads to inevitable conflict between dominant and challenging states (Organski, 1958;

Gilpin, Spring 1988). A. F. K. Organski (1958) posits that the dominant state may

initiate a conflict to prevent the challenger becoming too powerful to stop their

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accession to the dominant position. Another possibility is that the rising state may start

a war to hasten its overtaking of the hegemon. However, this theory provides catch-22s

for both the rising and dominant powers (Chan, 2008). If the hegemon decides to

launch a preventative war against the rising state to avert its demise as the number one

global power, then it could, in the eyes of the world, become an illegitimate power,

which could undermine the whole value system that underpins its position in the world.

Also, for the rising state to start a war to quicken its coronation as the dominant power it

risks losing a war and potentially reversing its progress.

Offensive realists would claim that the positioning of the Chinese oilrig is a

stepping-stone to an inevitable conflict with the US and its allies. However, the

decision to move an oilrig into the area is more of a hostile state-corporate takeover

rather than an outright aggressive and militaristic territorial grab. This shows that the

Chinese deliberately chose a method that would not lead to an increased likelihood of

further external conflict. Moreover, all those involved, directly and indirectly, have

shown great restraint in trying to reduce tensions through diplomatic dialogue (Li, July

2014). As a result, pure structural theories cannot account for the events of May 2014.

Hence, we need to augment systemic with domestic approaches to come to a

satisfactory rationalisation of China’s aforementioned actions.

2.3 Neoclassical Realism

As mentioned in the introduction, this article will use neoclassical realism as

analytical framework for its investigation of the recent decision of the Chinese

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Government to escalate the situation in the SCS. The aim is to improve on the easy-to-

access explanations that correlate with the China rise narrative by incorporating

domestic factors with international ones. To do this one must accept a trade-off

between neorealism’s parsimony and neoclassical’s explanatory power (Sørensen, 2013:

368). It is important to note that the term neoclassical realism covers a range of realist

studies and there is no single neoclassical theory. The common thread for scholars in

the neoclassical school is their preoccupation with state-society interactions and how

they impact on a state’s foreign policy. This is a direct challenge to the regressive

dichotomy between system-centred and society-centred approaches to international

relations that ignore the state’s capacity to act independently of social and systemic

factors (Ikenberry, Lake, Mastanduno, 1989: 1). On top of this, scholars have often

disregarded the statesman’s perceptions of power and the state-societal dynamics that

feed into it (Wohlforth, April 1987). Not all threats to a state’s goals, or to decision-

makers’ authoritative survival, are external. This is why such variables must be taken

into consideration to gain a better understanding of political decisions and the

circumstances that they were made.

Neoclassical realism departs from neorealist thinking at the ‘billiard ball model

in which foreign policy positions are seen as being primarily determined by the

interplay of international forces’ (Hill and Light, 1985: 157). The school accepts that

states may, on face value, resemble identical entities as they are afforded the same

rights under international law and are exposed to the same systemic pressures, but they

will react in different ways to such forces. Therefore, it is more accurate to describe the

international system as a game of pool in a rundown bar: some balls are bigger than

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others; they are a mix of colours and patterns; some may have little chips that make

them run differently from the others; and, the cloth is imperfect and therefore produces

unforeseen wildcards in the form of ‘kicks.’ In addition to this we need to take into

consideration the participants in the game; what rules they choose to abide by, their

choice of shot, and their ability to make that shot. Though the balls may react

differently to each shot and the players to changing rules, the game is still played on the

same table. Thus, systemic factors are most important in explaining long-term

international developments. However, it is important to analyse state-societal effects on

the foreign and security policies of states.

This article uses Fareed Zakaria’s (1999) variation of neoclassical realism, state-

centric realism, as an analytical framework for its starting point. Zakaria (1999)

expertly sets out his argument in his Doctoral thesis titled From Wealth to Power: the

unusual origins of America’s world role. In it he successfully reintroduces the state to

realism by recognising that statesmen not only feel pressure from the international

system but also experience constraints on their reactions to it from the state structure.

Zakaria’s (1999) argument follows on from Alfred Marshall’s remark that “the state is

the most precious of human possessions and no care can be too great to be spent on

enabling it to do its work in the best way” (Micklethwait and Woolridge, Jul/Aug 2014:

118). Inline with Marshall’s logic, he identifies the amount of national power that the

state can convert into actual power as being the primary measure of a state’s relative

position in the world. He labels this measure the ‘state power’ (Zakaria, 1999: 38). The

theory maintains the classical realist central assertion, albeit with a slight alteration

(replacing national power with state power), that states try to expand their political

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interest abroad when their top leaders perceive there to have been a relative state power

increase (Zakaria, 1999). This observation is very convincing because as Gideon Rose

(October 1998: 146-7) points out there is no immediate ‘transmission belt linking

material capabilities to foreign policy behaviour.’

The resulting question from state-centric realism’s basic hypothesis is, how to

measure a country’s state power? Zakaria (1999: 38-39) says that it is imperative that

his definition of the variable must be measured along several axes. The first is the

state’s scope: how broadly does the state define its responsibility? For example, a

minimalist state is confined to preserving internal stability, ensuring border security,

and maintaining its basic infrastructure. Conversely a maximalist state interprets its role

to include settling civil disputes, redistribution of wealth, and developing extensive

infrastructure networks (Desch, 1996: 241). In addition to the criteria above, the theory

combines state autonomy and state scope together to constitute a set of important

questions about state objectives. Thus, one must ask, is the state autonomous or does

the creation and pursuit of its goals mirror that of its’ society’s interests (Skocpol, 1985:

9-15)?

The second concerns the central policy-making apparatus: does the state have

enough capacity and is it sufficiently coherent to implement its decisions? A state with

a strong decision-making structure is built upon the foundations of sovereignty,

stability, and a committed and talented bureaucracy. In addition to these basic

underpinnings there are two other factors that demand attention: the state’s ability to

extract wealth and the extent to which the decision-making power is centralised within

16

it (Zakaria, 1999). On the former, Theda Skocpol (1985: 16-17) claims that ‘a state’s

means of raising and deploying financial resources’ informs interested parties more than

any other feature of its actual, and latent, ability to ‘create or strengthen state

organisations, to employ personnel, to co-opt political support, to subsidise the

economy, and to fund social programmes.’ The latter relates to the bureaucratic politics

of a state, which determines the internal balance of power between different organs and

levels of the state. Subsequently, for a state to become a great power it has to have

substantial authority over the national resources, which can then be utilised through a

highly centralised decision-making administration.

It may seem rational that state-societal relations should work in tandem to obtain

the best state architecture to maximise its relative power in the world. However, there is

often great resistance to the sort of institutional reforms that would deliver these gains

(Ikenberry, Lake, Mastanduno, 1989). It is generally only after shocks and crises

(internally and externally) that there is the appetite to launch structural reforms that

would allow the state to extract more of the national power for its own ends. Therefore,

such change is episodic rather than an incremental process (Rose, October 1998).

One may think that this theory is apt for the US or any other democracy but not

an authoritarian regime like China. This is not true. Authoritarian regimes like the

Communist Party of China (CPC) are seen to be all-powerful, but the level of control

that the Government has ebbs and flows over time. Feng Huiyun (2012) saw that

different Chinese leaders hold varying levels of authoritative agency in their political

actions: Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping had more authority because the state structure

17

was built around them, whereas Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao both resided in a weaker

and more decentralised state than their revolutionary predecessors. Jiang and Hu both

had to seek a consensus to implement their aims for China, whereas both Mao and Deng

created the consensus by dispersing with anyone who dared to stand in the way of the

realisation of their plans (Feng, 2012). However, it is only lately, under Xi, that China’s

state is becoming robust enough to move from wealth to power.

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3. Chinese State Power

As Zakaria (Summer 1992: 482) explains ‘a good theory of foreign policy

should first ask what effect the international system has on international behaviour,

because the most powerful generalizable characteristic of a state in international

relations is its relative position in the international system.’ Therefore, an evaluation of

China’s relative state power should begin with the environment in which it currently

finds itself before investigating the state structure under Xi Jinping. Thereafter the

analysis will then focus on the impacts of these factors on Chinese foreign and security

policy decision-making, which will lead onto the subject of the recent decision to move

HYSY 981 into disputed waters.

3.1 China and the International System

The present structure of the international system is currently a hot debate in

international relations. The system appears to be in transition from being dominated by

a single pole to ‘something else.’ Presently, the system resembles that of Samuel

Huntington’s (March/April 1999: 36) assertion of a uni-multipolar world – one

superpower (United States) and several major powers (China, Russia, Brazil, India,

France, Germany, UK, and Japan). Thus, we are in a uni-multipolar epoch, which may

prove to be a ‘moment’ in line with the similar ‘unipolar moment,’ which may act as a

precursor to ‘something else’ (Krauthammer, 1990/1991; Smith, August 2002).

19

Joseph Nye (2002: 23-5) argued that the new power dynamics would be played

on three-dimensional chessboards: military capabilities, economic size, and

transnational relations. On the first board (military) Nye saw a big lead for the US with

it having the largest defence expenditure in the world. The second board (economic)

was more multipolar than the latter. Nye thought the last board (transnational relations)

was much more dispersed. Since Nye wrote his book, 11 years has passed and with

them the balance of power on these boards has shifted. The US still leads on the

military board but it is no longer such an asymmetric comparison between the US and

China. The two countries are the only two that for the foreseeable future could spend

over $100bn annually on defence (Friedberg, 2011). Furthermore, China has since

improved the technological capabilities of its military; its first aircraft carrier was put

into service this year and the People’s Liberation Army has a range of other 21st century

weaponry at their disposal (The Guardian, 2 January 2014). It is predicted that within

the next two decades that its military will be on a par with that of the US, in East Asia

(Christensen, Spring 2001). China is set to become the number one economy by the

end of this year (Giles, 30 April 2014).5 This does not surmount to Chinese economic

domination, but it is a very important event in modern history and provides further

proof of China’s increased national power. China has also become more active

diplomatically bilaterally and multilaterally and has cultivated a lot of strategic

partnerships, which has simultaneously increased its overall influence with other

international actors (Feng and Huang, June 2014).

                                                                                                               5 Calculated by GDP PPP.

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2014 looks increasingly like it will be a seminal year in the global balance of

power, as China’s national power grows ever closer to that of the US, with some already

thinking that China is the world’s most powerful state.6 Because of the changing

composition of global power it looks as if China’s long-held policy of ‘peaceful

development’ is coming to an end (Sørensen, July-September 2013). With power

becoming more diffuse, and the perceived increase in insecurity with it, the applicability

of ‘peaceful development’ is therefore reduced. Thus, giving validity to Avery

Goldstein’s (2005: 38-39) argument that ‘peaceful development’ was always intended

to be a transitional strategy with an ‘expiration date.’ The new strategic doctrine of the

PRC looks to be called ‘peripheral diplomacy.’ On the 24th and 25th of October 2013,

the whole Standing Committee of the Politburo, several organs of the Central

Committee, State Counsellors, the Central Leading Small Group for foreign affairs, and

Chinese ambassadors to strategic countries attended a conference devoted to ‘periphery

diplomacy.’ It was convened to ‘conclude lessons, study, and judge the current

situation, unify thoughts, exploit the future, determine strategic objectives, basic

guideline and overall layout in future five to fifteen years and specify the working

roadmaps and schemes for solving major peripheral diplomacy problems’ (China

Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED), 30

October 2013). The language from the high-level policy advisory board’s website is

intriguing because it indicates that ‘peripheral diplomacy’ is to be peaceful development

whilst making ‘the best use of strategic opportunities’ (Mu, 26 October 2013,

news.xinhuanet.com). Thus, it seems as China’s leaders are finally answering Zhu

Liqun’s (European Union Institute for Security Studies, September 2010: 49-52), and

                                                                                                               6 49% of a global Pew (14 July 2014) survey respondents thought that “China will eventually or has replaced U.S.” as the world superpower.

21

many others,’ calls for China to move from a ‘tide-surfing’ to a ‘tide-making’ role in

international politics.7

What is clear is that China benefitted massively from the unipolar system

(Goldstein, 2005; Ikenberry, May/June 2011). It allowed China to have a free ride by

utilising the minimalist policy of peaceful development to reap the rewards of the liberal

structure protected by American dominance: China’s GDP growth per year since 1978

has averaged approximately 9.9% and over 500 million Chinese citizens have been

lifted out of poverty (World Bank Database; World Bank). However, this free ride

seems to be coming to an end and with it the suitability of ‘peaceful development,’ due

to the gradual weakening of unipolarity.

To summarise, China has closed in on, and in some areas about to overtake, the

US across all of Nye’s chessboards. However, as this study alluded to earlier, it is the

relative increase in state power that matters more than growth in national power. That

is not to say that national power does not matter, it does. But it follows the logic of,

what is the point in owning an Aston Martin if you don’t know how to drive it properly.

For a state to meet its end goals, it is imperative that it can exploit its national assets in

an effective manner.

                                                                                                               7 For a good understanding of the debate on China’s global personality, see Shambaugh (2013: 13-44).

22

3.2 Chinese Historical State Power

Despite China being ruled by an authoritarian regime, the state’s power has

ebbed and flowed over time. As Susan Shirk (2007) reminded us, China is a not a

highly centralised state propped up by an all-powerful Communist party, but in fact is

quite a de-centralised and ‘fragile’ entity; a far cry from being a modern-day

superpower. However, under Mao and Deng the state generally had more capacity to

use the nation’s power for implementing their policy decisions, than during Jiang’s and

Hu’s tenures as leaders. Under Jiang and Hu, China seemed to be suffering from a bout

of the Dutch Disease – 18th Century Netherlands had much wealth but no great

influence on international affairs, as a result it was said to suffer from a sickness, which

prevented it from expanding its interest abroad – during which the gap between national

and state power remained large enough to affect foreign policy decisions and

implementation (Brewer, 1989: xv). It is not until recently, under Xi’s leadership, that

the state has been able to shrink the gap between national and state power to such a

degree, which it can enjoy China’s increase in national power unleashed by Deng’s

‘Reform and Opening’ policy.

Feng Huiyun (2012) noted the two leaders that followed Deng, Jiang and Hu,

were more prone to continue on the path laid out by their predecessors; primarily

because, according to the leaders’ perceptions, the international system’s configuration

remained suitable for the ‘peace and development’ policy to continue (Ikenberry, 2011).

Furthermore, Jiang and Hu had no personal involvement in the Chinese revolution and,

therefore, lacked the founding authority that Mao and Deng exemplified throughout

23

their reign. To legitimise their leaderships, Jiang and Hu had to link their efforts with

the country’s revolutionary past by continuing Mao and Deng’s policies, in addition to

replacing the ideological foundations of communism with nationalism (Li, 2012).

The state under Jiang and Hu became increasingly inept at extracting the

nation’s resources for its own ends. This was a direct result of the Deng’s reforms as it

opened up the state to become more ‘omi-directional’ in its power dynamics; power no-

longer emanated completely from the top-down (Stockholm International Peace

Research Institute (SIPRI), September 2010: 43). This forced Jiang and Hu to seek a

consensus among the Politburo members to implement their decisions and support from

the wider society. This represented a de-centralisation that fundamentally weakened the

state’s ability to make quick decisions and take opportunities in the most favourable of

conditions (SIPRI, September 2010). Moreover, power was further diluted with the

power of the provinces in impacting the foreign policy of the Chinese state (SIPRI,

September 2010). For example, the devolved authority of the Coast Guard led to units

competing with one another to demonstrate their nationalistic credentials, which led to

diplomatic difficulties with maritime neighbours (International Crisis Group, 23 April

2012). The consensual and de-centralised nature of power in the Chinese state under

Jiang and Hu was the embodiment of the PRC’s inability to use the relative increase in

national power to meet its ends. Thus, for a short period China showed all the

symptoms of suffering from the Dutch Disease. This further demonstrates state-centric

realism’s suitability for explaining China’s decision to tow the oilrig into disputed

waters.

24

3.3 Xi Jinping: Supreme Leader

Hu’s time as leader seemed to be more focussed on the idea of ‘peaceful

development’ as it became harder for China to effortlessly cajole others into accepting

their benign intentions (Kurlantzick, 2007). The need to constantly tell other states, and

their leaders, that they did not harbour revisionist ambitions with the rebranding of

‘peaceful development’ to a ‘harmonious world’ became harder as their relative power

and actions alluded to the opposite (Hu, 15 September 2005). As a result, Hu’s time as

leader should not be seen as the peak of ‘peaceful development,’ but as the time it began

to unravel. The timing of the unravelling comes at a transitional phase when the next

generation of leaders, most prominently Xi, were becoming more powerful in the

policy-making apparatus (Cabestan, 2009). In addition to this, China has been seen as

becoming more assertive on a myriad of issues, but most notably in the SCS (Johnston,

2013).

In the domestic sphere, there was a correlation with China’s assertive behaviour

with the belief that corruption was the biggest danger to the CPC’s legitimacy in a

wider atmosphere of pending doom (Holbig, 18 June 2014). These both come under the

banner of Xi’s ‘China Dream:’ his vision of the nation’s “great rejuvenation” is to rid

the country of the open wounds from the ‘Century of Humiliation’ by achieving the

‘Two Centuries’ objectives – to achieve a prosperous society by the centenary of the

foundation of the CPC in 2029 and returning China to its ‘rightful place’ by 2049, the

centenary of the PRC (BBC, 15 November 2012; Fabrizi, 18 June 2014; Holbig, 18

25

June 2014).8 To achieve this he has needed to improve the state’s capacity to

implement its chosen policy to make China a 21st century great power (Micklethwait

and Woolridge, Jul/Aug 2014). At the centre of China’s pioneering new state structure

is Xi himself. Heike Holbig (18 June 2014) has presented Xi as a 21st century

‘paramount leader,’ who is very assertive internally as well as externally. In addition to

cleansing and re-legitimising the party, the ‘anti-corruption’ campaign has enhanced the

state’s power by centralising power through removing institutional and human obstacles

that Xi perceived as barriers to the full implementation of the ‘China Dream.’ Thus, the

end of ‘peaceful development’ spells the end of consensus decision-making.

Xi has removed institutional barriers by placing himself at the head of the

tripartite of the Chinese state – the Party; the State; and the Military. In addition to this,

Xi has placed himself as the chair of both the Central Leading Group for

Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (the central leading group for ‘comprehensively

deepening reform’) and the new National Security Commission (NSC) (Gore, 21 May

2014; CPC, 12 November 2013). Xi’s comments at the Third Plenum, which came a

mere two weeks after the conference on ‘peripheral diplomacy,’ implied that the NSC

would cover both internal and external security issues, to be comprehensive in scope

and to play an integral role in coordinating policy from a ‘top-level design’ (Buckley,

12 November 2014; Holbig, 18 June 2014). Reports from the first meeting talked about

a ‘comprehensive national security outlook’ and suggested that the NSC’s mandate

would cover ‘politics, territory (homeland security), military, economy, culture, society,

science and technology, information, ecology, natural resources and nuclear security’

                                                                                                               8 The concept of the ‘Two Centuries’ was articulated in a presentation by Heike Holbig at the ECRAN Annual Conference 2014 but not included in the online notes.

26

(Zhu, 15 April 2014). The NSC seems to be the means by which the CPC will

implement and coordinate its ‘peripheral diplomacy.’

Xi has pursued powerful figures within the Party, whom, he considers to be

human obstacles to the state’s, and his personal power, through the guise of the anti-

corruption campaign (Chen, 06 August 2014, thediplomat.com). The more formidable

have been labelled as ‘Tigers,’ with the most prominent of these being the former

security chief, Zhou Yongkang (Wang, 29 July 2014). Zhou’s demise is crucial for a

number of reasons relating to the Chinese state as a whole, but also its SCS policy. In

addition to being the former head of the internal security apparatus and member of the

Standing Committee of the Politburo, he was the head of the CNOOC, and had deep ties

to Bo Xilai and the more leftist faction of the CPC (Holbig, 18 June 2014). Each

individual bureaucratic network that Xi weakens Zhou’s significant influence in, aids

Xi’s efforts to improve the state’s ability to use the national power for its own end.

Removing Zhou’s influence on national security increases the NSC’s authority over

such issues; eradicating his presence in oil has obvious ramifications for the state’s

ability to extract the national resources for its own ends, including the moving of

oilrigs; and quashing the weight that he gave to opposing internal Party factions

consolidates Xi’s grip on power. When you take into consideration all of Zhou’s

influence that has been removed from the state’s political organisation, then it becomes

apparent that there is huge political space for someone to move into. Because Xi is the

only one that has the capability to occupy such a vacuum, this assists his attempts to

relocate the locus of control in his hands.

27

When viewing, the institutional reforms and the anti-corruption campaign

together, it is quite apparent how much the Chinese state has grown in stature under

President Xi. It has broadened its scope and increased its capabilities to such a degree

that it can now be acknowledged as an efficient extractor of national power for its own

ends. With the power he has accrued it in an atmosphere of crisis, it only helps him to

enact the reforms that are needed to meet his ambitious ‘China Dream’ foreign policy

goals of returning China to a dominant position regionally, and as a great power

globally.

28

4. China and the South China Sea

The re-emergence of China as a great power and the weakening of US global

dominance has led to discussions about the new regional security architecture of East

Asia. The SCS has always been an important strategic point where states have

struggled over the balance of power in South East Asia, and Asia as a whole (Wang,

Spring 2006). Its location between the Indian and Pacific Oceans means that today it is

an economic nexus point between Asia, Africa, Europe, and Australia. Aaron Friedberg

(Winter 1993-1994: 7) described East Asia as the 21st century’s ‘cockpit of great power

conflict,’ to which the SCS is the epicentre: it is the largest disputed area in the world,

with a host of great powers with significant stakes in it, it is the second busiest sea lane

in the world with over a quarter of the world’s crude oil and over half of the world’s

merchant ship tonnage travelling through its waters annually (Yan, 27 March 1998: 4).

Add the fact that the basin holds an abundance of natural resources – rich fishing

grounds and huge potential oil and natural gas deposits – then the area is ripe for

sovereignty disputes and geo-strategic posturing by all states involved.9

                                                                                                               9 China has viewed the SCS as one of the three main areas (others being the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan) that might trigger military regional conflicts for a long time (Yan, 27 March 1998: 4).

29

4.1 China’s Claims in the South China Sea

Figure 1. (China’s 9-dash line and HYSY 981’s position,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-28322355).

China’s historical claims to the SCS are shown through the PRC’s 9-dash line

(see Figure 1.), which are based on its territorial claims to Taiwan, the Spratly (Nansha)

Islands, and the Paracel (Xisha) Islands. The PRC declares Taiwan as part of Mainland

China’s territory because of the military defeat of the Nationalist Government in 1949

in the Chinese Civil War, which most states in the world see as legitimate through the

‘one-China policy’ (Fravel, 2008: 332). The Spratly Islands, unlike Taiwan and the

Paracels, have never been included in an international agreement, and are claimed

wholly, or partially, by China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei.

The PRC first claimed the Spratly Islands during peace treaty negotiations in 1951

30

(Fravel, 2008: 333).10 The Paracels, which are the primary focus of this article, have a

longer and more contested history than the Spratlys. Before the PRC and Vietnam

publicly contested the islands in the 1950s, China, Japan, and France had claimed them

at various points previously (Fravel, 2008: 334). Such claims have been based upon

territorial administration and historical use – many ancient maps and obscure diaries of

fishermen have been presented in attempts to enhance claimants’ positions.

As mentioned above, both states have historical claims to the Paracels.

However, China currently has administrative control over them through occupation.

The PRC gained control of the islands after it had defeated the South Vietnamese in a

short naval conflict in 1974. The Chinese ostensibly decided to remain in possession of

the islands because of the North Vietnamese’s acknowledgment of PRC sovereignty

over the islands (Fravel, 2008). However, after reunification in 1976, the Government

of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam refuted such claims, therefore producing

conflicting claims. Thus, according to international law, and the 2002 Declaration on

the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), both sides should resolve such

overlapping claims through negotiations in the spirit of good faith (UN, 1982; ASEAN,

2002). However, China refuses to acknowledge the Paracels as disputed territory

because of the combination of historical records, current administration, and the private

deal between the two governments.

                                                                                                               10 Zhou Enlai claimed Chinese sovereignty over the Spratlys, Paracels, Taiwan, and coastal islands during the peace negotiations (Han [ed.], 1988: 444).

31

4.2 The Decision to Move HYSY 981 into Disputed Waters

The decision to move the oilrig into the disputed waters comes amidst the wider

context of the changing international order, an increasingly confident Chinese global

personality, and a change in Chinese regional policy (Summers, June 2014). This

directly affects the region’s political dynamics, which are predominantly competitive, as

China wants to exert more influence while other powers want to maintain the status quo.

All parties’ strategic postures and lack of strategic trust with one another can sometimes

lead to confrontations, such as the stand-off between China and Vietnam throughout the

months of May, June, and July 2014 over HYSY 981. Furthermore, it adds to the

likelihood of miscalculations leading to much more dangerous situations, which could

directly involve the US and the PRC.

Rose (October 1998) suggests that it is often only after single shocks to the

international system that state leaders become aware of the long-term incremental shifts

in power. It is impossible to determine what was the single event which led to the

Chinese leadership becoming conscience of the power shift, but it could have been a

number of things over the last 5 or 6 years; the 2008-9 financial crisis that still impairs

the West and its allies; the inability of the West to prevent Russian incursions in

Georgia and Ukraine; the initial lacklustre US pivot to Asia; Russian, and other states,

bandwagoning with China; or the global and regional weak response to China’s early

assertiveness in its immediate periphery, including the SCS. It is apparent that Xi has

responded to one, or a combination, of these indications to install the more forward

leaning strategic posture of the ‘peripheral diplomacy.’

32

Xi’s public comments on ‘peripheral diplomacy’s’ purpose to “serve the cause

of national rejuvenation” make it difficult for anyone to argue that Chinese actions in

May 2014 were defensive (Mu, 26 October 2013). He said, “China must consolidate its

friendly relations with neighbouring countries and make the best use of strategic

opportunities China now has” and to direct its efforts “to socialize the region to accept

China’s view of its core interests and validated efforts to enforce PRC sovereignty and

territorial claims against rival disputants” (Mu, 26 October 2013; Swaine, Summer

2014: 2). The use of the phrase ‘strategic opportunities’ implies that China will expand

its interests and enforce its territorial claims when her leaders perceive such

advantageous moments. Thus, the decision to move HYSY 981 into disputed waters

seems to be one of these ‘strategic opportunities.’ Furthermore, the SCS plays a

significant role in China’s attempts to quell its insatiable appetite for influence over its

periphery and the natural resources within it. The CPC harbours ambitions to change

the countries energy mix from 3% to 10% natural gas by 2020 to fuel its ‘Two

Centuries’ objectives under the ‘China Dream’ (US Energy Information Administration,

4 February 2014). Under these goals, the SCS plays a crucial role because of the

substantial amounts of natural gas that are possibly deposited there. Thereby, creating a

strategic incentive to secure larger parts of the area for energy security.

Conclusively, the decision to move HYSY 981 into Vietnam’s claimed EEZ was

made because of a combination of Fravel’s (2011) three scenarios for possible Chinese

escalation. Firstly, the SCS has increased in value because of the natural resources

required to continue China’s realisation of its ‘national rejuvenation’ by the ‘Two

33

Centuries’ deadline. Secondly, China’s neighbours have become increasingly

suspicious of their territorial ambitions in relation to their strategic and energy

objectives. Thus, they have become more open to America’s presence in the region as a

security guarantor (The BRICS Post, 21 June 2014). Such moves may have created the

perception that states may eventually pursue hard balancing policies, which would

cause China’s bargaining power to decline in the long run. Finally, and decisively,

China’s relative increase in state and national power has created a moment of

opportunity to capitalise on a regional flux in power. China’s southern periphery has

always been the most likely area for expansion because, to borrow a domestic metaphor,

there are less tigers than flies to the South of China. Ultimately, the two preceding

scenarios both require a strong China to have the ability to enforce its claims. Thus, as

argued throughout this article, this is the crucial variable to when considering why the

Chinese Government decided to escalate things further in May 2014? And, why did it

become more assertive in the SCS?

The decision also matches Xi’s conception of diplomacy to “understand the

trend of time, devise strategy, and plan carefully” (Mu, 26 October 2013). Xi’s remarks

refer to China’s “new situation” in the weakening of the regional and global order

[“trend of time”] for providing the need for the corresponding new ‘peripheral

diplomacy’ doctrine to realise the ‘China Dream’ by the ‘Two Centuries’ [“devise

strategy”], through the NSC’s implementation and coordination role [“plan carefully”]

(CCICED, 30 October 2013).11 It is evident that the NSC is the only body that Xi could

have implemented and coordinated such a sophisticated plan. The NSC’s remit

                                                                                                               11 The first meeting of the NSC was 16 days before the oilrig reached its destination on 15 April 2014.

34

(including territory, security, military, economy, and natural resources), in addition to

its participants, makes it the only institution in the Chinese state capable of coordinating

all the bodies (Chinese Ministries, PLAN, Coast Guard, CNOOC, and the fishing fleets)

involved.

Thus, China decided to escalate and enforce their claims to the waters off the

Paracels because they had the political motivation to do so, spurned on by the need to

right the wrongs perpetrated upon the Chinese during the ‘Century of Humiliation,’ in

addition to the strategic opportunity brought on by an increase in its relative state power

with those in the region.

35

5. Conclusion

The decision to move the HYSY 981 oilrig into the disputed waters between the

Paracels and Vietnam’s coast is indicative of the change that the Chinese state has

undergone under Xi’s short time in the upper echelons of the Chinese Communist Party.

It now seems that an uncomfortable truth for the Chinese people is coming to light that

China is not a ‘new type of superpower,’ but it is acting similar to the ‘barbarians’ that

imposed the ‘Century of Humiliation’ upon the Chinese people. Its ever-growing

military and diplomatic apparatus, its extensive territorial claims, and its participation in

the renegotiation of the regional security architecture all point towards ambitions that

extend further than pure security interests, because it is strong enough to do so. China

is, therefore, currently not an exception to the rule of rising powers; they simultaneously

expand their interests inline with their growing state power.

Classical realism’s main fault over the placing of the oilrig on May 2nd 2014 is

that it doesn’t explain the lag between the increase in China’s national power and its

national interests. It doesn’t recognise that the state is not an autonomous actor; nations

don’t decide and implement foreign policy, governments do. The chief discrepancy

between defensive realism and the events in the SCS is that China’s relative strength in

the region, and globally, has been enhanced, which leads us to the conclusion that

China’s actions have been those of a thoroughly traditional rising power. The

accusation of the US being threatening because it’s camped on China’s periphery is

weak, as this article has demonstrated, China has only benefitted from America’s

dominance. The threat comes when China’s interests expand and clash against those of

36

others. Offensive realists argue that such conditions are fraught with dangers, which

inevitably lead to conflict. However, China is not demonstrating a gung-ho revisionist

spirit, it is still willing to have constructive discussions with other states in how to best

manage its re-emergence as a great power.

As this article has shown, state-centric realism provides a more complete answer

to the question, compared with the three other theories explored, posed at the beginning

of this work: why did the Chinese Government decide to escalate things further in May

2014? And, why has it chosen to become more assertive in the SCS? The utilisation of

state-centric realism indicates that the current atmosphere of crisis within China has

produced the political motivation needed to allow Xi to implement internal and external

policies, which will, it hopes, achieve ‘national rejuvanation.’ Because of the

weakening of unipolarity, the new generation of leaders have been presented with a

unique opportunity to enforce claims on its periphery that were not dependent on US

security, in addition to expanding its interests further afield. Yet, to take advantage of

the national will and strategic opportunity, Xi has had to remove barriers to the state’s

ability to focus national resources to formulate, implement, and coordinate foreign

policy. Xi has done this by reforming the once omni-directional domestic power

structure under Jiang and Hu, into a centralised Chinese state that allows him to focus

its power omni-directionally abroad through the new foreign and security policy,

‘peripheral diplomacy.’

37

5.1 Future Implications

It is important to remember that this article does not have the ambition to predict

future Chinese decisions. Though, it could prove a harbinger for explanations to

potential Chinese actions in its territorial and maritime claims, and possibly wider

actions. The decision to escalate the situation in the SCS further is nothing

revolutionary. However, the level of sophistication and confidence in the Chinese

state’s ability to implement its leaders decision could have further consequences for the

region.

Most worryingly, for all states that have an interest in the SCS, is that China’s

actions seems to confirm America’s belief that its 9-dash line claims all within the

border, instead of islands and their territorial waters. The main concern is that China

will use ‘anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)’ to withdraw the freedom of navigation in the

region and restrict access to the sea-lanes (RAND, 2007). The decision to use dozens of

vessels to prevent Vietnamese ships reaching the oilrig gives credence to many states’

anxiety over China’s ability and willingness to expand A2/AD as their state power

increases. This may give further impetus to America’s flagging pivot. China’s actions

have already caused Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea to sign (or re-

sign) military pacts with the US, Japan to amend its pacifist constitution, and Asian

states to pursue renewed economic ties with the US through the Trans-Pacific

Partnership and bilateral agreements (Thanh, 16 June 2014). Furthermore, there are

reports that Vietnam is reaching out to the US, and other partners, in an attempt to

reduce China’s advantage over them (The BRICS Post, 21 June 2014).

38

Also, China could replicate its actions with HYSY 981. It is no secret that

China has oilrigs prepared off Hainan Island, so this action could provide a test case for

future unilateral exploration of oil and natural gas in the SCS (The Economist

Intelligence Unit, 4 July 2014). The fact that HYSY 981 had to return to port on the

16th of July because of the monsoon season, suggests that this was indeed a test-balloon

for further action. If China had been met with a strong united response against its

actions then it could have used the climate as a pretext to save face. However, all those

involved in the region – mainly ASEAN, the US, and the EU – acted rather feebly to

China’s actions, and may have solidified Xi’s perception of China’s increased status in

the region. Thus, other regional actors may have failed the latest in a series of

credibility tests.

Furthermore, efforts to lessen the fallout from the May 2014 incident like the

proposed binding Code of Conduct and the American’s ‘freeze initiative’ are not

adequate enough to mitigate the underpinning problem with the regional security

architecture.12 A binding version of the 2002 DOC is not achievable for the same

reasons that it wasn’t achievable in 2002; China does not want to sign up to such a

document, which ties its hands in its endeavours to increase its influence in its region.

The American’s ‘freeze’ idea is, at best, a stopgap initiative, which could only prevent

similar escalations in the near future. However, the Chinese have irrevocably dismissed

it by pointing to the 2002 DOC as being sufficient enough to guide future relations in

the SCS (Nguyen, 26 August 2014). To achieve durable stability, the powers in the

                                                                                                               12  US  proposed  a  freeze  on  provocative  acts  in  disputed  waters  in  the  SCS  (Nguyen,  26  August  2014).  

39

region must come to some sort of consensus on what is each other’s role in the peace

and security of the SCS. The question is whether this is achievable whilst everyone’s

interest, bar China’s, is to delay and maintain the status quo. Thus, it remains to be seen

if ‘peaceful change’ in the 21st Century is possible.

The academic implications of this study are that it has shown that neoclassical

realism, specifically state-centric realism, is relevant to non-democratic regimes, their

foreign and security policy strategies, and tactical decisions. For scholars that focus on

China, this study’s hypothesis of the new Chinese state under Xi Jinping being strong

enough that it can implement its assertive foreign policy better, could lead to more

interesting work on China’s strategy to attain its rejuvenation. Yet, they will all need to

accept that China’s wealth has finally begot it the power it craves. Just like every other

traditional rising state in history.

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