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Sailing Full Steam Ahead MohamadHerySaripudin   

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Sailing Full Steam Ahead : Fostering Maritime Cooperation in the ASEAN’s Post‐2015 Vision  

MohamadHerySaripudin Director of the Centre of Policy Analysis and Development  for the Asia Pacific and African Regions, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia 

As ASEAN Community is just around the corner, some might wonder what is the next chapter of the regional organization and how it can take the cooperation among its 10 member states to the next level. The Nay Pyi Taw Declaration on the ASEAN Community’s Post 2015 Vision stipulates that one of the central elements of the vision is to “strengthen maritime security and promote maritime cooperation in the region and beyond through the strengthening of ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms”. This is clearly in conformity with President Jokowi’s hallmark doctrine of transforming Indonesia into a global maritime fulcrum. In the last East Asia Summit, following the ASEAN Summit, President Jokowi outlines the five pillars of the maritime fulcrum. The pillars are

rebuilding Indonesia’s maritime culture; managing marine resources; developing maritime infrastructure and connectivity; and developing maritime defense forces. The president is well aware that as sea constitutes more than two third of his country’s territory, it is impossible for Indonesia to shrug the sea off. Just as Indonesia cannot turn its back on its sea, neither can ASEAN. Land only makes up for less than half of South East Asia’s 5 million miles territory1. The sea of South East Asia is immensely strategic.

                                                                            1http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/556489/Southeast‐Asia accessed on March 3rd 2015 

Sailing Full Steam Ahead MohamadHerySaripudin   

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The Strait of Malacca is now the world’s second busiest waterway, the amount of oil which passes the strait is around 19 times that passes through Panama Canal and more than 4 times greater than the volume which goes through Suez Canal2. The Malacca Strait along with Sunda and Lombok strait are accountable for almost half of world’s total annual seaborne trade tonnage3. South East Asian water also has gargantuan pool of resources. South China Sea holds proven oil reserves of at least 7 billion barrels and an estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas4. The share of South East Asia fishery production skyrocketed in the global market from 6.7% in 2010 to 21.7% in 20125. With the humongous opportunities that the sea has to offer comes also ominous menace. Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing remains pervasive in the region, the cost of this crime for Indonesia alone is estimated to reach as much as US$ 20 billion6. The sea has also become the means for people smuggling and human trafficking. Indonesia alone host over 10 thousands asylum seekers and refugees7 most of whom reached our shores by the sea. Most gravely, with the dispute over the South China Sea, the sea in South East Asia is a potential flash point that can ensnare the whole region into blazing conflagration. Simply put, the strategic value of the sea in South East Asia could instead be a major                                                                             2 Tomas Hirst, “The World’s Most Important Trade Route? “ https://agenda.weforum.org/2014/05/world‐most‐important‐trade‐route/   accessed on March 3rd 2015 

3 ibid 

4BeinaXu, “South China Sea Tensions” http://www.cfr.org/china/south‐china‐sea‐tensions/p29790 accessed on March 3rd 2015 

5 SEAFDEC Statistical Bulletin 2011 and 2012  

6WijiNurhayati “Menteri Susi: KerugianAkibatIllegal Fishing 240 Triliun” http://finance.detik.com/read/2014/12/01/152125/2764211/4/menteri‐susi‐kerugian‐akibat‐illegal‐fishing‐rp‐240‐triliun accessed on March 3rd 2015 

7 UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e488116.html accessed on March  4th 2015 

liability unless ASEAN decides to promote the maritime partnership for the common good of its member states. Maritime cooperation has been deliberated upon within ASEAN mainly through the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) and ASEAN Expanded Maritime Forum (AEMF). Moreover the maritime issues are also scrutinized in numerous other ASEAN platforms including ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting, ASEAN Ministers Meeting on Transnational Crime, ASEAN Connectivity Coordinating Committee, ASEAN Sectoral Working Group on Fisheries and ASEAN Fisheries Consultative Forum. In addition, ASEAN cooperation with its dialogue partners has also taken maritime issues into account. Notwithstanding such commendable endeavor, it might be perceived that maritime cooperation is not yet a major priority for ASEAN. The main venue for maritime cooperation in ASEAN are AMF and AEMF which are forums for senior officials unlike other ASEAN key priorities which are addressed in ministerial-level platforms. Apart from that, some key maritime challenges for Indonesia have not been adequately dealt with in ASEAN. First is pertaining to maritime connectivity, although ASEAN already has the Master Plan on Asean Connectivity but its implementation seems to stall. For instance a part of the plan to invigorate the Malacca-Dumai shipping route is only planned to start more than four years after the plan’s adoption8. IUU fishing is another predicament which ASEAN has not managed to resolve. It is deeply regrettable that many of the fishermen who are responsible for our staggering loss as the result of IUU fishing hail from our fellow ASEAN member state. On top of everything, ASEAN has not fully succeeded in pushing for early conclusion of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea with lingering distrust among the state parties. With the absence of the CoC, the rift over the                                                                             8 Dimas Muhamad, “Maritime Connectivity Within ASEAN” http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/12/maritime‐connectivity‐within‐asean.html 

Sailing Full Steam Ahead MohamadHerySaripudin   

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disputed territory remains the most lethal threat for regional peace and stability. In moving forward, Indonesia will be steadfast in earnestly and vigorously advancing maritime cooperation through ASEAN including by striving to elevate maritime cooperation as a key priority for post 2015 ASEAN community. In this regards it might be worth considering for Indonesia to propose the upgrading of AMF and the AEMF into ministerial level platforms. It would provide greater vigor and effectiveness for maritime cooperation as they will have more authority to overcome maritime challenges in the region. Indonesia may also endeavor to encourage the adoption of a regional comprehensive maritime cooperation agreement that encompasses political security, economic as well as social-cultural elements. It would be the significant foundation as well as guidelines for maritime cooperation in ASEAN. Indonesia would also bolster the already ongoing maritime cooperation. For instance with regard to maritime connectivity, Indonesia may encourage ASEAN to identify major maritime infrastructure projects to be prioritized after 2015 in line with the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity. For instance Indonesia would focus on developing three main Ro-Ro lanes namely Dumai-Malacca, Belawan-Penang-Phuket and Davao/General Santos-Bitung. To cope with the lack of funding, we already have ASEAN Infrastructure Funds which is projected to grant loans of $300 million per year. However, the infrastructure needs in the region stands at $60 billion per year. It needs to expand its capital base, this can be done for instance by working together with fledgling Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as well as developing solid framework for public private partnership in the region. Indonesia may also support the expansion and deepening of cooperation with ASEAN dialogue partners for maritime cooperation. ASEAN can utilize the dialogue partners’ trust fund to support infrastructure development across the region. Considering the merit of cooperation

with the dialogue partners, it might be the time for ASEAN to lift its moratorium on embracing new dialogue partners. Concerning the extremely delicate dispute over the South China Sea, Indonesia would continue to fight too and nail for the early conclusion of the CoC and would urge all parties to refrain from any provocative measures.

In sailing ahead towards becoming a global maritime fulcrum, Indonesia cannot paddle its own canoe, we need ASEAN on the deck as well. To this end, maritime cooperation should be a spotlight for ASEAN’s Post 2015 Vision which would be a boon not only for our country but also for our region and beyond. MohamadHerySaripudin is the Director of the Centre of Policy Analysis and Development for the Asia Pacific and African Regions, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia. The opinions expressed in this article are personal and do not represent the view of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia. 

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Liberalizing ASEAN Security Architecture YandryKurniawan   

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  political conflicts. The ASEAN Charter, where these principles were stated, was the first precedence where the regional countries agreed on avoiding the use of military force as a mean to solve disputes. From a paradigmatic point of view, the realist’s tradition prevailed at this stage. The national sovereignty and non-interference principles imply that the ASEAN members did not acknowledge the existing of any supra-national entity that might dictate the behavior of regional countries and that ASEAN countries recognized the anarchic nature of the international system. Therefore, regional countries are expected to respect the sovereignty of each other by not interfering into other countries’ domestic affairs. The second stage was “neutralizing the neighborhood.” After its creation in 1967, the already existing security challenge faced by ASEAN was the Cold War rivalry. With the triumph of communists in Indochina and the presence of the US military power in other parts of the region, the outbreak of large-scale regional war was always an eminent security threat in Southeast Asia. Against this backdrop, ASEAN established a set of codes of conduct for every country that had interest in the region. The most significant treaties for this purpose are the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOFPAN), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SANWFZ). These treaties seek to establish regulations for ensuring regional stability. Although the source of security is highly conventional as the result of super powers rivalry in a bipolar international setting this indicates the first normative paradigm shift from realism towards liberalism. In the liberalist’s tradition, the classical argument for achieving and maintaining security is through the establishment of “law-regulated international relations” (Navari, 2008: 31). The earlier ZOFPAN, TAC and SANWFZ treaties aim for this exact purpose, to regulate international relations within Southeast Asia. The third stage was “taming the giants.” For this purpose ASEAN establish the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. The logic behind the creation of ARF was the uncertainty in the region with regard to the pattern of big power relations, and their role and intensions in Southeast Asia. ASEAN realized that the stability in Southeast Asia depended on security dynamics in larger East Asia, shaped by interactions between the US—China—Japan as well as, to a lesser extent, Russian and India. Thus in order to “tame these giants”, ASEAN sought to engage them in a cooperative security mechanism,

the ARF. Here the cooperative security should be achieved by promoting confidence building measures and developing preventive diplomacy and conflict mechanism. Hence, the creation of ARF indicates a further step towardsthe liberalist’s idea in maintaining security. From this liberalist’s perspective, the ARF should be able to evolve as a “community of law security system” (Navari, 2008: 42) in the long run. The fourth and latest stage was “toward a security community.” For this purpose, ASEAN established the ASEAN Political-Security community (APSC) as a part of the larger ASEAN community in 2003. This community is expected to start functioning in 2015. Under the APSC, ASEAN envisions a secure Southeast Asia with three key characteristics as indicators of achievement. The characteristics are: 1) a rules-based community of shared values and norms; 2) a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security; and 3) a dynamic and outward-looking region in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009). Theoretically, the formation of a security community always aims to make any use of organized violence as a mean to settle inter-state disputes irrelevant. These four stages show that ASEAN’s led regional security arrangement is constantly moving towards a more liberalist’s tradition. However, the realist’s thinking remains predominant shaping the cognitive prior and security culture at the national level. Consequently, the gap between the imagined security cooperation and the actual security practice leaves predicament to create a thriving regional security community. Predicaments and Possible Remedies The establishment of a security institution should aim at mitigating the actual and the potential security threat. In Southeast Asia, the sources of insecurity revive around the conventional and non-conventional threat. Concerning the conventional threat, Southeast Asia witnesses that, peaceful mechanism to settle disputes prevail, the pragmatic economic-liberalization policies push ideological conflict aside, the danger of state-sponsored nuclear proliferation is marginal andthe possibility for inter-state war diminishes.

Liberalizing ASEAN Security Architecture YandryKurniawan   

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  However, unresolved (but bracketed) territorial disputes remain on the table. In some occasions, this becomes a source of tension and leads to a military standoff or gunboat diplomacy like the one involving Indonesia and Malaysia in Ambalat maritime area. Additionally, some observers are worried about the increasing conventional weapons procurement leading to (regarding) the unfolding of a regional arms race (Bitzinger, 2004). As far as the non-conventional threats in Southeast Asia are concerned, the existence of transnational terrorism networks, the growing concern regarding the connection between separatism and international crimes, security risks related to fragile democratization process, problems related to international migration and cross-borders environmental issues have also mark the regional security environment. To meet these security challenges, however, ASEAN countries only halfheartedly subscribe to a liberalist’s security agenda while realist’s notions remain predominant in the Southeast Asia security discourse (Rüland, 2005). The paradox between liberalist’s intention and realist’s practice within the ASEAN security arrangement is indicated by the ASEAN inability to move from “proto-regime”—certain common principles (Aggarwal, 1993)—declarations to more binding agreements. ASEAN countries continually prefer to deal with the existing security challenges nationally, instead of formalized and collective regional efforts. This national-based security action is predominant within the ASEAN countries despite the fact that the dominant threats are non-conventional in nature with trans-border consequences. This realist’s tradition continues in shaping the Southeast Asian security culture, regardless the establishment of various ASEAN-initiated security institutions like ARF, ASEAN Plus Tree, CSCAP, ASEAN-ISIS, and now the APSC. Remedy for such predicaments does not rest in ASEAN but the member states. First, and foremost, ASEAN countries should design their security policy in accordance with the ASEAN security community. ASEAN national leaders should accept the idea that security is a common good and non-conventional threats are answered by regime buildings. If the APSC is perceived as the manifestation of security regime in Southeast Asia, then the member states should see APSC as both, an institution and as regulative norms for promoting their common (security) interest.

Second, the ASEAN countries should openly acknowledge that ASEAN’s pathway in building regional security architecture has shown gradual evolution toward liberalist’s tradition. Therefore, national statesmen in the ASEAN countries should end demonizing liberalism as something bad, as sort of negative influence from the West without local historical and social root. In fact, if ASEAN determines to establish a thriving security community in the region, liberalism is actually “a set of political ideas and meanings” that are important for such a community. This set of ideas and meanings include “the role of government, tolerance, the duty of citizens, and the rule of law” (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 40) that may build transnational identity among ASEAN community. If ASEAN strives for a security community, then the Association and its member states should not hesitate to pursue a liberal security trajectory.   

References Acharya, A. 2013. “ASEAN 2030: Challenges of Building a Mature Political and Security Community”, ADBI Working Paper Series No. 441. Aggarwal, V. 1993. “Building International Institutions in Asia‐Pacific”, Asian Survey 33(11): 1029–1042. Bitzinger,  R.  2004.  “The  Asia‐Pacific  Arms Market:  Emerging Capabilities,  Emerging  Concerns”,  Asia‐Pacific  Center  for Security Studies, Vol. 3 No. 2, March. Fitriani,  E.  2014.  “ASEAN  and  EU  in  Comparison”,  ASEAN Insights, Vol. 6, December. Jetschke,  A.  and  J.  Rüland.  2009.  “Decoupling  Rhetoric  and Practice:  The  Cultural  Limits  of  ASEAN  Cooperation”,  The Pacific Review 22(2):  179–203. Rüland,  J.  and  A.  Jetschke.  2008.  “40  Years  of  ASEAN: Perspective, Performance and Lessons for Change”, The Pacific Review 21(4): 397–409. Rüland,  J.  2005.  ”The  Nature  of  Southeast  Asian  Security Challenges”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 36 No. 4. ASEAN Secretariat. 2009. ASEAN Political‐Security Community Blueprint. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. Navari,  J.  2008.  “Liberalism”,  in  Williams,  Paul  D.  Security Studies: An Introduction. London and New York: Routledge.          

YandryKurniawan  is  a  lecturer  at  the  Department  of  International Relations  Studies  at  the  University  of  Indonesia.  He  completed  his doctoral  study  at  the  Department  of  Political  Science,  Albert‐LudwigsUniversity of Freiburg, Germany, in winter 2014.

ASEAN Updates       

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ASEAN Updates       

 

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ASEAN Plus Three to Heighten the Ebola Preparedness and Response BANGKOK, 16 December 2014 - The ASEAN Plus Three Health Ministers

ASEAN Announced Winners of Stamp Design Contest  To celebrate its 48th anniversary and to commemorate the establishment of ASEAN Community 2015, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) organised a stamp and postmark design competition. A total of 55 designs from ten member countries were chosen, including 30 stamps and 25 postmarks. In addition to receiving a prize of US$ 1,000 and US$ 500 for stamp and postmark designs respectively, the winners’ design will also be produced as a joint issue stamp which will be used throughout the ASEAN region in 2015. The competition involved judges who are postal representatives from ten countries, as well as three judges from neutral organs, namely Universal Postal Union (UPU), Asian-Pacific Postal Union (APPU) and ASEAN Secretariat. The result was announced at the Grand Postal Building, Bangkok. On this occasion, Vietnam won the first prize for both stamp and postmark designs. The postmark design bears the ASEAN emblem in the middle, which is circled by 3 lines referring to the 3 objectives of ASEAN Community, namely political stability, economic stability and social and cultural ties. Meanwhile, the stamp represents the 10 flags of ASEAN members arranged in the form of a flower, with a pigeon located in the background symbolizing peace in the region, and a handshake at the lower level of the flags symbolizing the friendship among Southeast Asian people. The stamp will be issued on 8 August 2015. (Source: ASEAN Secretariat News).

ASEAN Builds Capacity of Disaster Management Training Institutes Network  On  11‐12  February,  ASEAN  organised  a  two‐day  Training Needs  Assessment  (TNA) Workshop  on Damage  and  Loss Assessment  (DaLA) and Disaster Recovery. The workshop was held  in collaboration with Pacific Disaster Center  (PDC) and  in partnership with  the U.S.  PROGRESS  and Australian Department of  Foreign Affairs  and  Trade  (DFAT).  In  this workshop,  PDC  presented  the  existing  standards  and  contents,  identified  gaps,  and  provided  recommendations  for subsequent development  into ASEAN Disaster Management Training Institutes Network’s (ADTRAIN) standard training curricula.  In  addition, ASEAN’s  key  stakeholders  in disaster management  such  as  the national disaster management agencies, practitioners, civil society organisations and academia were also given the opportunity to provide inputs into the methodology,  review  the  standardized guidelines,  share  relevant experiences, and provide  recommendations  for the draft course outlines. PDC will continue compiling the feedbacks and finalize the outlines for DaLA and Recovery. The outlines will  then be  submitted  to national agencies  for approval before being utilised as course material  in  the Training of Trainers.   (Source: ASEAN Secretariat News)