foreign aid and conflict - harvard university...foreign aid it is well-known that foreign aid can...

Foreign Aid and Conflict

Nathan NunnProfessor of Economics

Harvard University

October 8, 2018

Nathan Nunn Professor of Economics Harvard University Foreign Aid and Conflict

Foreign Aid

It is well-known that foreign aid can have important benefits.

Foreign aid has been used to build schools, deworm children,provide cash for much-needed businesses or households.

However, there are also a number of concerns associated withforeign aid:

For the typical aid project, evaluation of the impacts of theproject are too often non-existent or poor.Even if evaluated, there may still be unintentionalconsequences that are not measured.


Aid and Conflict?

Anecdotal evidence suggests that humanitarian aid may fuelconflict.


Aid and Conflict?

“Experience shows that even when it is effective in doingwhat it is intended to do. . . aid too often also feeds into,reinforces, and prolongs conflicts. Again and again aidworkers tell how their aid is distorted by local politics andis misappropriated by warriors to support the war. Againand again war victims report that aid is enriching warlordsor strengthening the enemy.” (Anderson, 1999, p. 37)


Humanitarian Aid and Conflict: The Biafran Example

In 1967, Nigerian state ofBiafra tries to secede, led byOdumegwu Ojukwu.

Civil war breaks out betweenBiafra and Nigeria.

By 1968, Biafra’s territorialcontrol shrinks significantly.


Humanitarian Aid and Conflict: The Biafran Example

Biafran leader Odumegwu Ojukwugained income and resourcesbecause of humanitarian aid.

Food aid fed his army, while importtariffs and transportation fees werecharged to aid organizations.

In 1970, Ojukwu flees and Biafrasurrenders.

Some argue the aid caused the warto continued for 1–2 years longerthan it otherwise would have.


Humanitarian Aid and Conflict: The Rwandan Example

Following the 1994 Rwandangenocide, nearly a million HutuRwandese fled to Eastern Zaire(e.g., Goma).

Aid and refugee camps financedand protected Hutu militia.

This allowed them to regroup,strengthen, and undertakeattacks in Rwanda and EasternZaire against ethnic Tutsis.

FR | EN

Blog – Diary of refugeesCultureEconomyJusticeNewsNews analysisOpinion

a-boy-looks-on-at-the-mugunga-displaced-people-camp-november-12-2008

Tweet Apr 24th, 2018 at 13:32 | By Laure Uwase | Category:

Share and Enjoy:

Leave a Comment

Footer Widgets

This is another widgetized area. You can use any kind of Widget to improve your Website. No matter if you use Textwidgets, any other defaultWordPress widget or the fantastic custom Widgets that are included in BranfordMagazine.

About us

HomeSubmit an article

For more news…

NewsOpinionNews analysisSpecial edition Victoire IngabireCultureEconomyJusticeSports

Connection on Jambonews

Log in

Recommend 0


Humanitarian Aid and Conflict: The Rwandan Example

In response, the Rwandangovernment armed ethnic Tutsis(Banyamulenge) in Eastern Zaire,leading to the 1996Banyamulenge Rebellion.

A coalition of Tutsis and rebelsled by Laurent Kabila takecontrol of the Eastern part ofZaire in 1996.

This was the beginning of thefirst and second Congo wars.

Hutu militia (FDLR) remain inthe region today and continue tobe the source conflict.


Humanitarian Aid and Conflict: Concerns and Channels

Aid shipments and other resources are often stolen en route.

Aid recipients can be ‘refugee warriors’.

Even when aid reaches its intended recipients, it may be‘taxed’ ex post.

Aid workers often have to work with rebel groups to distributeaid.

Groups are often hired to provide protection.May be perceived as the ones providing the assistance,increasing their legitimacy.


Questions

How do we know if these stories are representative?

How do we know if these stories are causal?


Challenges facing any statistical analysis

1 The provision of aid is endogenous to conflict:

Need is greater when there is conflict.Delivery is more difficult when there is instability or conflict.

2 Provision is also correlated with things that are related toconflict:

Poor governance, poverty, malnutrition, natural disasters, etc.


Statistical Strategy, Part 1

Focus on U.S. wheat aid.

Exploit variation that is due toweather shocks that affectproduction.

In the years following a wheatboom, government reservesaccumulate, and more food aidis given.

This variation is exogenous tothe conditions in receivingcountries.


U.S. Wheat Production over Time

19711972

19731974

19751976

1977

1978

1979

1980

19811982

1983

1984

1985

19861987

1988

1989

1990

1991

19921993

1994

1995

1996

19971998

19992000

2001

2002

2003

20042005

2006

4060

80U

.S. w

heat

pro

duct

ion

(mil

MT)

1971 2006Year


Wheat Production and Total Wheat Reserves

1971

1972

19731974

1975

19761977

197819791980

1981

1982

19831984

19851986

1987

1988

1989

1990

19911992 1993

1994

19951996

1997

199819992000

2001

20022003 20042005

2006

1020

3040

50In

itial

U.S

. whe

at s

tock

(mil

MT)

40 50 60 70 80Previous year's U.S. wheat production (mil MT)

(coef = 0.503, t = 2.85, N = 36, R2 = 0.19)


Total Wheat Reserves and Wheat Aid

1971

1972

1973

19741975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981 19821983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

199119921993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998 19992000

2001

2002

20032004

2005

200612

34

56

Flow

of U

.S. w

heat

aid

in fo

llow

ing

year

(mil

MT)

10 20 30 40 50 60Initial U.S. wheat stock (mil MT)

(coef = .086, t = 6.25, N = 36, R2 = 0.54)


Statistical Strategy, Part 2

Wheat aid is not distributed toall countries equally.

Some countries are regularrecipients of U.S. wheat aid andothers are not.

Those who tend not to receiveU.S. wheat aid provide anatural comparison group thatcan be used as a ‘control’.


Regular U.S. Food Aid Recipients

1971

1972

19731974

19751976

197719781979

19801981

198219831984

198519861987

1988

19891990

1991

1992

1993

1994

19951996

19971998

199920002001

20022003 2004

20052006

0.1

.2.3

.4Av

erag

e in

cide

nce

of c

ivil

confl

ict


(coef = 0.00385, t = 3.99, N = 36, R2 = 0.32)


Irregular U.S. Food Aid Recipients

19711972

1973

1974

1975 197619771978

1979

19801981 1982

1983

19841985

198619871988

1989

19901991

199219931994

199519961997

19981999

2000200120022003

2004

20052006

0.1

.2.3

.4Av

erag

e in

cide

nce

of c

ivil

confl

ict


(coef = 0.00079, t = 1.23 , N = 36, R2 = 0.04)


Assessing the Magnitudes of the Estimates

If the average country received 10% more U.S. wheat aid, itsconflict incidence would increase by 4%.


Where Does This Leave Us?

Does this mean that we should not give food aid or evenhumanitarian aid?

Not necessarily. . .

For the following reasons:1 We find that our estimates are driven by countries with a

recent history of conflict.

For countries with no history of conflict, food aid does notcause conflict.

2 The estimated effects are for food aid that is ‘in kind’.

Increasingly, food assistance has become cash-based.It is possible that these effects are very different.

3 Effects likely depend on what precautions are taken duringdistribution.



Does this mean that we should not give food aid or evenhumanitarian aid? Not necessarily. . .










For the following reasons:

1 We find that our estimates are driven by countries with arecent history of conflict.






foreign aid and conflict - harvard university...foreign aid it is well-known that foreign aid can...

Documents