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Forces for ChangeInformal economy organisations in Africa

War on Want fights poverty indeveloping countries in partnershipand solidarity with people affected byglobalisation.We campaign forworkers' rights and against the rootcauses of global poverty, inequalityand injustice.

War on WantDevelopment House56-64 Leonard StreetLondon EC2A 4LTT: +44 (0)20 7549 0555 F: +44 (0)20 7549 0556E: [email protected]: www.waronwant.org

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The Workers Education Association ofZambia was formed in 1997 by theZambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)to provide education not only to formalworkers but also to the educationally,economically and socially disadvantaged.

The Alliance for Zambia InformalEconomy Associations was formed in2001 by 12 informal economy workersassociations to promote and protect theinterests of informal economy workers.

Workers Education Association of Zambia andAlliance for Zambia Informal EconomyAssociationsSolidarity House, P.O. Box 20652Oxford Road, Kitwe, ZambiaT/F: +260 (0)2 222607E: [email protected]

Overall Project Coordinator and SupervisorGuillermo Rogel, Director of International Programmes,War on Want

Research Project Coordinator and EditorWendy Willems, Research Officer,War on Want

Country ResearchersGhana: Vitus Azeem, with assistance from Gladys Ohene-Darko and Ama Blankson-AnamanMalawi: Ignasio Malizani JimuMozambique: Raul Chambote, with assistance from Boaventura Veja and Ilidio NhantumboSouth Africa: Sarah MosoetsaZambia: Chomba Mulenga, Mutale Makasa, Malama Chongo and Julius Mulenga

Published in May 2006

All photos taken by War on Want

ISBN 0-905990-00-5 ISBN 978-0-905990-00-2

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Cover photo: Market vendors in Maputo, Mozambique.

Back page photos:Products for sale in a market in Maputo, Mozambique (left, right).Market vendor in a market in Maputo, Mozambique (centre).

List of acronyms .........................................................................................................................................................3List of tables .................................................................................................................................................................5List of appendices ......................................................................................................................................................6Foreword........................................................................................................................................................................7Introduction..................................................................................................................................................................9

1. Theoretical aspects of the debate on the informal economy.....................................................13Conceptualising the link between the informal and formal ‘sector’ ..........................................................13Towards an official definition of the ‘informal sector’ ...................................................................................13From informal enterprise towards indecent work ........................................................................................14Conclusion ...............................................................................................................................................................16

2. Growth of the informal economy .............................................................................................................17Washington Consensus ........................................................................................................................................17Ghana’s Economic Recovery Programme ........................................................................................................18Malawi’s structural adjustment loans.................................................................................................................18Mozambique’s Economic Recovery Programme.............................................................................................19Structural adjustment in Zambia ........................................................................................................................20Conclusion...............................................................................................................................................................22

3. The size of the informal economy ............................................................................................................23The informal economy in Ghana........................................................................................................................23The informal economy in Malawi .......................................................................................................................24The informal economy in Mozambique ............................................................................................................24The informal economy in Zambia ......................................................................................................................25Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................................................26

4. Characteristics of informal economy organisations ........................................................................27Organising workers in the informal economy: SEWA, StreetNet International and SEWU................27Overview of research on organising in the informal economy in South Africa......................................29Overview of organisations in Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia ..................................................30Conclusion ...............................................................................................................................................................32

5. Organisational and advocacy strategies of informal economy organisations .....................35Case study 1: StreetNet Ghana Alliance...........................................................................................................35Case study 2: Local Market Banana Sellers Association................................................................................37Case study 3: Malawi Union for the Informal Sector ....................................................................................38Case study 4: Limbe Street Vendor Association..............................................................................................40Case study 5:Association of Informal Sector Operators and Workers - ASSOTSI...............................43Case study 6:Association of Informal Sector Traders and Importers - Mukhero..................................45Case study 7:Alliance for Zambia Informal Economy Associations ...........................................................46Case study 8: Cross-Border Trader Association.............................................................................................50Analysis and conclusion ........................................................................................................................................51

Table of contents

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6. Central government policy towards the informal economy .......................................................53Arguments for and against government intervention in the informal economy.....................................53Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers ...................................................................................................................53Ghana’s ‘Golden age of business’........................................................................................................................54The Poverty Alleviation Programme in Malawi ...............................................................................................55Mozambique’s Reduction of Absolute Poverty ...............................................................................................57PRSP in Zambia.......................................................................................................................................................57Conclusion ...............................................................................................................................................................58

7. Local government policy towards the informal economy ............................................................61Local government policies towards the informal economy.........................................................................61Local government policies in Ghana..................................................................................................................61Street vendors and local government in Malawi ............................................................................................62Local government and the informal economy in Mozambique...................................................................63Managing the markets in Zambia........................................................................................................................63Conclusion ...............................................................................................................................................................65

Conclusion and recommendations .................................................................................................................67

Bibliography ...............................................................................................................................................................69

Government sources .............................................................................................................................................72

Notes .............................................................................................................................................................................73

Appendix 1: Basic characteristics of organisations.................................................................................81Appendix 2: Relations with central and local government and other organisations .............87Appendix 3: Membership details of organisations ..................................................................................91Appendix 4: Democratic practice, funding and staffing of organisations ....................................95

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AMA Accra Metropolitan AssemblyASSOTSI Associação dos Operadores e Trabalhadores do Sector Informal (Association of

Informal Sector Operators and Workers)AZIEA Alliance of Zambian Informal Economy AssociationsCASE Community Agency for Social EnquiryCBD Central Business DistrictCOMESA Common Market of Eastern and Southern AfricaDACF District Assemblies Common FundDEMATT Development of Malawian Traders TrustERP Economic Recovery ProgrammeESAF Enhanced Structural Adjustment FacilityFRELIMO Frente de Libertaçâo de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front)GHC Ghana cedisGDP Gross Domestic ProductGNP Gross National ProductGTUC Ghana Trade Union CongressHIPC Heavily Indebted Poor CountryICC International Coordinating CommitteeICLS International Conference of Labour StatisticiansIFWEA International Federation of Workers' Education AssociationsILO International Labour OrganisationILO-ACTRAV International Labour Organisation - Bureau for Workers' ActivitiesIMF International Monetary FundINERP Interim New Economic Recovery ProgrammeJCE Junior Certificate of EducationLMBSA Local Market Banana Sellers AssociationLSVA Limbe Street Vendor AssociationMACs Market Advisory CommitteesMARDEF Malawi Rural Development FundMCTU Malawi Congress of Trade UnionsMFRC Malawi Rural Finance CompanyMIRTDC Malawi Industrial Research and Technology Development CentreMKW Malawi kwachaMMD Movement for Multiparty DemocracyMPSD Minister of Private Sector DevelopmentMRA Malawi Revenue AuthorityMSCE Malawi School Certificate of EducationMSMEs Micro, Small and Medium EnterprisesMUFIS Malawi Union for the Informal SectorMZM Mozambique meticalNBSSI National Board for Small-Scale IndustriesOTM Organização dos Trabalhadores de Moçambique

(Organisation of Workers of Mozambique)

List of acronyms

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PAP Poverty Alleviation ProgrammePARPA Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute PovertyPRES Programa de Reabilitação Econômica e Social

Economic and Social Recovery Programme PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy PaperSADC Southern African Development CommunitySAEMA Shama Ahanta East Metropolitan AssemblySALRI Southern African Labour Research InstituteSALs Structural Adjustment LoansSEDOM Small Enterprise Development Organisation of MalawiSEWA Self-Employed Women’s AssociationSEWU Self-Employed Women’s UnionSGA StreetNet Ghana AllianceSMEF Small and Medium Enterprises FundSMEs Small and Medium EnterprisesSMMEs Small, Medium and Micro EnterprisesSSNIT Social Security and National Insurance TrustTHPAZ Traditional Healers' and Practitioners' Association of ZambiaTLA Textile Labour AssociationUDF United Democratic FrontUNIP United National Independence PartyWEA Workers' Educational AssociationWEAZ Workers Education Association of ZambiaWIEGO Women in Informal Employment: Globalising and OrganisingWoW War on WantZAEDD Zambia Association of Employment and Development for the DisabledZANAMA Zambia National Marketeers' AssociationZCCM Zambia Consolidated Copper MinesZCTU Zambia Congress of Trade UnionsZKW Zambia kwachaZPA Zambia Privatisation AgencyZULAWU Zambia United Local Authorities Workers Union

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Table 1: Basic economic and development indicators

Table 2:Type of employer for urban population in Ghana aged 15-64 years, by sex

Table 3: Proportion of labour force aged 12 years and above employed in the informal economy, bysex and location, 2002-3

Table 4: Proportion of labour force aged 12 years and above employed in the informal and formaleconomy, by sex and location, 2002-3

Table 5: Population in selected cities for survey of informal economy organisations

Table 6: Local government structures and administrative regions

List of tables

5

6

Appendix 1: Basic characteristics of organisations

Appendix 2: Relations with central and local government and other organisations

Appendix 3: Membership details of organisations

Appendix 4: Democratic practice, funding and staffing of organisations

List of appendices

This report is the result of a collaborativeresearch project between War on Want(WoW), the Workers Education AssociationZambia (WEAZ) and the Alliance for ZambiaInformal Economy Associations (AZIEA).Thereport seeks to provide an insight into theorganising and advocacy strategies of informaleconomy associations in Ghana, Malawi,Mozambique and Zambia, as well as shed lighton the way they have interacted with local andcentral government. Furthermore, the reportaims to provide a background to the reasons forgrowth of the informal economy, and discussesthe extent to which local and centralgovernment have attempted to address theneeds of workers in the informal economy.

This report is based on country reports thatwere produced by researchers in five countries:Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and SouthAfrica.We would like to thank all theresearchers for their hard work in preparingthese reports. Of course, the report would nothave been possible without the support ofrepresentatives of various informal economyorganisations as well as local and centralgovernment officials who have generouslydonated their time and patience to participatein this research project.

Special thanks to Francis Owusu (InformalEconomy Desk, Ghana Trade Union Congress),Davies Chimombo (Malawi Union for the InformalSector, MUFIS),Albertina Simango (Associaçãodos Operadores e Trabalhadores do SectorInformal,ASSOTSI, Mozambique), Jose Ubisse(Associação dos Operadores e Trabalhadores doSector Informal,ASSOTSI, Mozambique), BrendaMachila (WEAZ), Gwyn Kabelu (WEAZ), ElvisNkandu (AZIEA),Violet Mumba (AZIEA),Humphrey Fumpa (rapporteur), Michel Saraiva(interpreter) and Pat Horn (StreetNetInternational) who all participated in either theresearch planning seminar in Kitwe, Zambia in

November 2004 or the final research seminar inLusaka, Zambia in December 2005, or in both, andprovided assistance and useful comments andsuggestions on the set-up of this research projectand on the first draft of the final report.

Dave Spooner (International Federation ofWorkers' Education Associations, IFWEA),Martha Chen (Women in Informal Employment:Globalising and Organising,WIEGO) andChristine Bonner (Women in InformalEmployment: Globalising and Organising,WIEGO) gave useful comments on the firstdraft of the final report.

We are also grateful to Gladys Mponda, GraceMponda,William Haji, Diana Taulo and MwandaChiwambala from MUFIS and Gwyn Kabelu,Mutale Makasa,Victor Phiri and Mr Chisengafrom WEAZ/AZIEA for their assistance to theresearch project coordinator during herrespective visits to Malawi and Zambia.Volunteers and staff at War on Want haveassisted in various ways during the course ofthis research project.

Last but not least, we would like to thankComic Relief for their financial support.

We hope you will enjoy reading this report andmore importantly that it will contribute tobetter working conditions for informal economyworkers in Africa and elsewhere!

Louise RichardsChief Executive,War on Want

Mike ChunguExecutive Secretary,Workers EducationAssociation of Zambia

Lameck KashiwaGeneral Secretary,Alliance for Zambia InformalEconomy Associations

Foreword

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Thousands of Zambians have been pushed out offormal employment due to the severe economiccrisis and the widespread privatisationprogramme of the 1990s.They are now making aliving from selling goods in overcrowded marketsor on the streets in unprotected and veryinsecure conditions.The Zambian government isreluctant to recognise the enormous difficultiesfaced by marketeers, street vendors and otherinformal economy workers and has failed toadjust its policies to their needs. During theperiod of structural adjustment in Zambia in thelate 1990s, informal economy associations havebeen formed in the markets and the streets tovoice their concerns and needs to thegovernment.

In response to the formation of these informaleconomy associations, a participatoryconsultation process was organised from Marchto October 2001 by War on Want (WoW)’spartner organisation, the Workers EducationAssociation of Zambia (WEAZ).WEAZ wasformed in 1997 by the Zambia Congress ofTrade Unions (ZCTU) to provide education notonly to formal workers but also to theeducationally, economically and sociallydisadvantaged.

The consultation process sought to strengthenthe voice of informal economy workers andduring the process, existing grassroots informaleconomy associations resolved to promote unitythrough the formation of a national alliance, theAlliance for Zambia Informal EconomyAssociations (AZIEA), which was formallylaunched in October 2002.AZIEA can best bedescribed as a new social movement of streettraders and market vendors. During theconsultation process, a need for further researchon informal economy issues was identified inorder to:

• better understand government policy indifferent countries regarding the informaleconomy in order to promote effectiveparticipation of informal economyassociations in policy formulation processes;

• learn from the experiences of different streetand market vendors organisations to improveeffectiveness of strategies for organising andadvocacy within Zambia;

• build links with other informal economyorganisations in Africa.

This collaborative research project aims tocompare the experiences of informal economyassociations in Zambia, Ghana, Malawi,Mozambique and South Africa.The followingcriteria were used to identify the countries to beresearched:

• presence of a large informal economy;• presence of some form of organisation of

informal economy workers;• existence of potential for strengthening links

between Zambian informal economyorganisations;

• existence of different forms of organisation,i.e. organised by a trade union, affiliated totrade union, self-organisation and no affiliationto unions.

Introduction

F O R C E S F O R C H A N G E 9

Participants duringthe research

project planningseminar in

November 2004in Kitwe, Zambia.

In November 2004, a research planning seminarwas conducted in Kitwe, Zambia which soughtto decide on the final remit of the researchproject. It was decided that the research projectwould consist of four components:

1. Review of international and in-countryliterature on the informal economy andinformal economy organisations in Ghana,Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa andZambia.

2. Overview of number and characteristics ofstreet trader and/or market vendororganisations in Ghana (Accra and Takoradi),Malawi (Blantyre and Mzuzu), Mozambique(Maputo) and Zambia (Kitwe and Mansa).

3. In-depth case study of organisational andadvocacy strategies of eight organisations:• StreetNet Ghana Alliance and Local

Market Banana Sellers Association inGhana;

• Malawi Union for the Informal Sector(MUFIS) and the Limbe Street VendorAssociation (LSVA) in Malawi;

• Association of Informal Sector Operatorsand Workers (ASSOTSI) and Associationof Informal Sector Traders and Importersin Mozambique (Mukhero);

• Alliance for Zambia Informal EconomyAssociations (AZIEA) and the Cross-Border Trader Association in Zambia.

4. Overview of local and central governmentpolicy towards the informal economy, streettraders and/or market vendors and streettrader and/or market vendor organisations inGhana, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia.

Because there was significant literature availableon informal economy associations in SouthAfrica, it was decided not to conduct fieldworkin South Africa but to draw upon the existingliterature to inform the situation in the othercountries. For the overview of informal economyorganisations (component 2), structuredinterviews were conducted with representativesfrom the organisations in the following periods:Ghana (December 2004 and January 2005),Malawi (December 2004, January 2005 and May2005), Mozambique (December 2004) andZambia (October 2005)

For the case studies of informal economyorganisations (component 3), semi-structuredinterviews were conducted with representativesfrom the organisations in the following periods:Ghana (April 2005), Malawi (March 2005),Mozambique (January 2005) and Zambia(September 2005)

For the overview of local and centralgovernment policy towards the informaleconomy (component 4), semi-structuredinterviews were conducted with governmentofficials in the following periods: Ghana (April2005), Malawi (March 2005) and Zambia(September 2005)

The first draft of the final report was discussedduring a research seminar in Lusaka, Zambia inDecember 2005. During the seminar, countryresearchers and representatives of variousinformal economy organisations providedvaluable comments on the first draft of thereport.

Chapter outlineChapter One will outline the theoretical debateon the concept of the informal sector andinformal economy as it has taken place since the1960s and 1970s. It will give an overview of the

1 0 I N T RO D U C T I O N

Participants during the final researchseminar in Lusaka, Zambia in

December 2005.

main issues dominating the debate.

Chapter Two will provide a brief history of theorigins of the informal economy and causes of itsgrowth in the four countries that were part ofthis study: Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique andZambia.

Chapter Three will look at the current state ofthe informal economy in the four countries. Itwill provide statistics on the contribution theinformal economy makes towards the economiesof our four case study countries, and it will shedlight on the extent to which the informaleconomy provides employment to people in thevarious countries.

Chapter Four will offer a brief overview of thecharacteristics of informal economyorganisations in selected cities in Ghana, Malawi,Mozambique and Zambia.

Chapter Five will discuss in more detail theorganisational and advocacy strategies of eightcase study organisations.

Chapter Six will examine the presence or lack ofgeneral government policies towards theinformal economy in the context of changingpractices at the International Monetary Fund(IMF) and World Bank.

Chapter Seven will consider policies andregulations at the local government level inGhana, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia.

F O R C E S F O R C H A N G E 1 1

Conceptualising the link between theinformal and formal ‘sector’Debates on the informal economy have oftenevolved around the relationship between theinformal and formal ‘sectors’.With regard to thisrelationship, Chen (2002: 6) makes a usefuldistinction between three schools of thought: thedualists, structuralists and legalists.

The dualists view the informal economy as atotally separate sector which is not directlylinked to the formal sector.1 They conceptualisethe informal sector as a sector that includes thepoor and unemployed. In their view, economicgrowth has not materialised and therefore failedto absorb all people into formal employment,hence the existence of an informal sector.Dualists tend to deny any direct links betweenthe formal and informal economy, and argue thatwith the growth of the economy informalworkers will be automatically absorbed into theformal sector.

The structuralists on the other hand view theinformal sector as subordinate to the formalsector.They emphasise that corporations in theformal sector often seek to erode employmentrelations in order to reduce their labour andinput costs.They mainly focus on vested interestsin the formal economy that promote informalarrangements.Whereas dualists focus on theself-employed, structuralists focus on informalwageworkers.

The legalists view the existence of informalbusinesses as rational responses by smallenterprises to over-regulation by governmentbureaucracies.2 They argue that informalenterprises often find it impossible to complywith the cumbersome, complex, costly and time-consuming bureaucratic procedures associatedwith registration of their businesses. Legalistsargue that the regulatory framework of

governments towards businesses tends to favourlarge firms instead of small enterprises. In theirview, the legal framework is therefore the causeof the existence of informal businesses whichcompels these businesses to remain small andhidden without any legal protection of theirinvestment by the state.These factors tend tocreate disincentives for growth and capitalinvestment.

As we will see in the next section, theInternational Labour Organisation's (ILO)conceptualisation of the relationship betweenthe formal and informal sector has drawn uponthese various schools.

Towards an official definition of the‘informal sector’The term ‘informal sector’began to be used in ILOreports on Ghana and Kenya,prepared under the WorldEmployment Programme in theearly 1970s.3 In 1972, the firstILO mission that arrived inKenya found that the mainproblem in developingeconomies was notunemployment but “theexistence of working poorstruggling to produce goodsand services without theiractivities being recognised,registered or protected by public authorities”.The concept of the ‘informal sector’ was takento cover those small-scale income-generatingactivities which took place outside the officialregulatory framework.The ILO mission foundthat contrary to earlier beliefs the ‘informalsector’ had expanded significantly although thiswas not acknowledged by policy makers andgovernments.The ILO’s thinking in the 1970svery much corresponded with the dualist view

1. Theoretical aspects of the debateon the informal economy


In 1972, the first ILOmission that arrived inKenya found that the mainproblem in developingeconomies was notunemployment but “theexistence of the workingpoor struggling to producegoods and services withouttheir activities beingrecognised, registered orprotected by publicauthorities”.

discussed above.The organisation assumed thatthe ‘informal sector’ would disappear with theincidence of economic growth.

The debate on the ‘informal sector’ wasreinvigorated in the 1990s when it was explicitlyput on the agenda of the 1991 InternationalLabour Conference.4 It was the first time thatthe topic was discussed during a majorinternational conference.The discussiondocument of the conference ‘The dilemma of theinformal sector’ acknowledged that the ‘informalsector’ was not going to disappearspontaneously with economic growth.Thereport actually expected the sector to grow forexample due to the increasing trend towardsurbanisation.The report also narrowed down theILO’s definition of the informal sector as mainlyan ‘urban’ one.Although it was acknowledgedthat informality existed in rural areas, the ILOfelt that the causes and context of the ‘informalsector’ in urban areas was different. It thereforefelt it was more useful to use the concept in anurban context.

The dilemma as it was positedin the report was between onthe one hand encouragementof the ‘informal sector’ so thatit could ‘absorb’ unemployedpeople and provide income-generating opportunities, andon the other hand regulationand provision of socialprotection to workers in the‘informal sector’ which could

potentially reduce the employment-creationcapacity of the ‘informal sector’.

A second important event in the 1990s was theinclusion of the ‘informal sector’ on the agendaof the 15th International Conference of LabourStatisticians (ICLS) in January 1993.Theconference concluded on a definition to be usedin measuring the size of the ‘informal sector’. Itagreed that the ‘economic unit’ or enterprise-based definition of the informal sector was themost appropriate measurement unit.5 In thisdefinition, informal enterprises are the unit of

analysis instead of individuals who work ininformal conditions.The 1993 ICLS definitionthus excluded employees hired on a casual basisby formal enterprises.

From informal enterprise towardsindecent workAlmost a decade later, the ‘informal sector’ againformed the main topic during the 2002International Labour Conference in Geneva.However, the ILO’s concept of ‘informal sector’had significantly changed from an enterprise-baseddefinition of the ‘informal sector’ to a moreemployment-based definition. In its discussiondocument entitled Decent work and the informaleconomy, the ILO recognised that the concept ofthe ‘informal sector’ was no longer consideredadequate, as there was no separate sector in thesense of a specific industry group or economicactivity.6 The ILO suggested the term ‘informaleconomy’ was more applicable as it encompassedthe heterogeneous group of workers in both ruraland urban areas operating informally.

The report further acknowledged an “increasingflexibilisation and informalisation of productionand employment relations”.7 In the 1990s,investors faced with increasing globalcompetition shifted their production tocountries with lower labour costs or started toimplement more flexible or informalemployment arrangements. Subcontracting andoutsourcing became common strategies for firmsto cut costs.When multinational corporationsrelocated to developing countries, they often didnot observe appropriate labour legislation suchas complying with health and safety regulations,and providing environmental and socialprotection to workers. Including these types ofinformal employment arrangements in the ILO’snew concept of the ‘informal economy’ served toinclude both informal work arrangements informal businesses as well as in informalenterprises.Whereas the concept of the‘informal sector’ implied the existence of aseparate sector, the concept of informaleconomy encompassed any type of informalemployment relationship, whether in formal orinformal enterprises.Through this new definition,

1 4 T H E O R E T I C A L A S P E C T S O F T H E D E B AT E O N T H E I N F O R M A L E C O N O M Y

The discussion document ofthe 1991 ILO conference‘The dilemma of theinformal sector’acknowledged that the‘informal sector’ was notgoing to disappearspontaneously witheconomic growth.

the ILO therefore combined the view of dualistsand structuralists: while the informal economyincluded those involved in self-employment, italso comprised those employed informally in theformal sector.

Whereas the 1991 ILO conference still posited adilemma between growth of the informaleconomy on the one hand and social protectionon the other hand, the 2002 ILO conferenceagreed that every worker is entitled to ‘decentwork’.According to the 2002 discussiondocument, workers in informal employmentarrangements are denied seven essentialsecurities:8

• labour market security (adequateemployment opportunities through high levelsof employment ensured by macroeconomicpolicies);

• employment security (protection againstarbitrary dismissal, regulation on hiring andfiring, employment stability compatible witheconomic dynamism);

• job security (a niche designated as anoccupation or ‘career’, the opportunity todevelop a sense of occupation throughenhancing competences);

• work security (protection against accidentsand illness at work, through safety and healthregulations, limits on working time and soon);

• skill reproduction security (widespreadopportunities to gain and retain skills, throughinnovative means as well as apprenticeshipsand employment training);

• income security (provision of adequateincomes); and

• representation security (protection ofcollective voice in the labour market throughindependent trade unions and employers’organisations and social dialogue institutions).

The ILO’s new strategy aimed to promote‘decent work’ along the entire continuum, fromthe informal to the formal end of the economy.The organisation proposed a three-fold strategyto promote these objectives. In the immediateterm, it aims to recognise those who currently

work in the informal economy in the law, providethem with legal and social protection andrepresentation and voice. In the short andmedium term, the strategy seeks to enable thosein the informal economy to move into moreformal work arrangements by ensuring thatworkers and entrepreneurs have the capacity,flexibility and conductive legal and policyframeworks to do so. In the long term, thestrategy advocates creation of formalemployment opportunities for all workers andemployers.Whereas in 1991 the ILO stillconsidered encouragement of job creation in theinformal economy as a strategy, the 2002conference focused unequivocally on socialprotection and ‘decent work’.

The international research-policy network Women inInformal Employment:Globalising and Organising(WIEGO) has together withthe ILO been advocating for amore employment-baseddefinition.The network wasestablished in 1997 and “seeksto improve the status of theworking poor, especially

Tailor at work in one of Maputo's markets

Informality in the newemployment-based 2003ICLS statistical definition ofthe informal economy refersto the conditions of allworkers - whether inhouseholds, formal orinformal enterprises - whoare not recognised, recorded,protected or regulated bypublic authorities.


women, in the informal economy through betterstatistics, research, programs, and policies andthrough increased organisation andrepresentation of informal workers”.9 Asopposed to the 1993 ICLS definition,WIEGOrecommended a definition that would include “allemployers of informal enterprises, all self-employed person (except self-employedprofessionals and technicians) and all wageworkers who work without minimum wage,assured work, or benefits, whether they work forformal or informal firms (including employees ofinformal firms, domestic workers, casualworkers, home workers, temporary and part-time workers, and unregistered workers)”.10 In2003, the ICLS adopted a broader definitionduring its 17th Conference.11 The new definitiondefines “informal employment as comprising thetotal number of informal jobs, whether carriedout in formal sector enterprises, informal sectorenterprises, or households”.12

While the 1993 ICLS enterprise-based definitionis helpful when calculating national accounts, the2003 ICLS employment-based definition is usefulin policy terms, e.g. when considering who totarget and how to finance social protectionpolicies.13 Informality in the new definition refersto the conditions of all workers who are notrecognised, recorded, protected or regulated bypublic authorities.

ConclusionWhereas in the last few years the ILO’sconceptualisation of the informal economyincreasingly came to refer to both non-wageemployment and wage employment, this studymainly focuses on the first type of employmentfor the following reasons. Firstly, in Africa 70percent of informal employment (outsideagriculture) is self-employment.14 Secondly, themembers of the organisations that were part ofthis research project are predominantly self-employed, e.g. street vendors, market traders,hawkers, carpenters, tailors, fishermen, visualartists and cross-border traders.

1 6 T H E O R E T I C A L A S P E C T S O F T H E D E B AT E O N T H E I N F O R M A L E C O N O M Y

In Chapter One, we have seen howconceptualisations of the informal economyhave changed over time.Whereas dualists sawthe ‘informal sector’ as strictly separate fromthe formal sector, the ILO’s new definition asspelled out in the Decent work discussiondocument sought to emphasise the existence ofinformal employment in both the formal andinformal economy. Chapter Two serves tohighlight this link further by looking at thecauses of the growth of the informal economyin the four countries that are part of thisreport: Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia.The chapter will conclude that macroeconomicpolicies targeted at the formal economy have amajor effect on the size of the informaleconomy.All the countries, which form a part ofthis study, have been subjected to structuraladjustment policies in the 1980s, which provedto have drastic consequences on the size of theformal sector.

Washington ConsensusIn the 1980s, the International Monetary Fundand the World Bank reached a consensus inWashington on the content of structuraladjustment policies and decided that theseprogrammes should aim to reduce government

expenditure in order to alleviate balance-of-payment deficits, to switch expenditure from theindustrial to the agricultural sector in order toencourage agricultural production, and toimprove the efficient allocation of resources inthe economy through reduced intervention ofthe state in the economy in order to stimulateeconomic growth.The extremely negativeconsequences of structural adjustment for themajority of populations in Africa have beenwidely documented. Enterprises in many Africaneconomies could not compete with theirforeign counterparts after their economies wereopened up and were faced with a liberalisedtrade regime.This resulted in the closure ofmany companies or the reorganisation andslimming down of industries. Reduced publicsector investment in basic social services suchas health and education made these servicesinaccessible to large number of people.Downsizing of the public sector meant that thenumber of jobs had to be reduced.Theprivatisation of state-run enterprises led todismissals and reorganisations that sought to cutdown labour costs.The following sections aimto discuss the impact of structural adjustmenton the private and public formal sector inGhana, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia.

2. Growth of the informal economy


Ghana Malawi Mozambique ZambiaGDP in $US 6.2 billion 1.7 billion 4.3 billion 4.3 billionGDP per capita in $US 2,3002 158 222 398Total population 20.3 million 10.9 million 18.8 million 10.5 million3

Average life expectancy (years)male/female 56.2 57.1 39.7 39.6 41 42.8 37.9 36.9Average HIV prevalence rate(adults, 15-49) 3.1 14.2 12.2 16.5Illiteracy rate (adults, 15+)male/female 37.1 54.3 25.1 46.0 37.7 68.6 324

Table 1: Basic economic and development indicators1

Sources: United Nations Statistics Division,World Bank, UNAIDS (see endnotes 1-4 for more details).

Ghana’s Economic Recovery ProgrammeIn Ghana, the government launched its EconomicRecovery Programme (ERP) in 1983 which wasintended to lead to economic growth and animprovement of the country’s balance ofpayments.The main strategy behind thisprogramme was to encourage exports throughthe introduction of economic incentives and toreplace direct state control with a greaterreliance on market forces.5 In order to generaterevenue, the government started to impose feeson education and health services, increase taxeson petroleum, abolish subsidies on agriculturalinputs and increase the retrenchment of publicsector employees.

Although Ghana’s structuraladjustment experience hassometimes been described asa success because of theaccelerated rate of economicgrowth that the countryachieved after 1983, this wasnot accompanied by a growthin the number of privatesector jobs.Whereas totalformal sector employment

was 333,000 in 1960, it declined to 186,000 in1991.This is in spite of the fact that the activelabour force, which was estimated at 2.7 millionin 1960 increased to 5.7 million in 1991.6

As already mentioned, the decline in formalsector employment could partly be attributed tothe downsizing and retrenchments in Ghana’spublic sector. In 1989, 13,937 civil servants wereredeployed and according to the Trade UnionCongress, this number had risen to 150,000 in1994.7

However, the decline of jobs in the private sectorwas even greater.The liberalisation of trade led todumping of cheap and second-hand commoditiesin Ghana and the crippling of the few localbudding manufacturing firms.The number of jobsin the private sector dropped from 149,000 in1960 to 31,000 in 1991.8 In 2000, private sectoremployment accounted for only 15 percent oftotal employment in the formal sector.

The retrenchments, the casualisation of labourand the inability of the formal sector to absorbthe increasing economically active population inthe country resulted into the expansion of theinformal economy.The loss of jobs in the formalsector accompanied with the high populationgrowth rates forced many to make a living in lesssecure conditions.

Malawi’s structural adjustment loansIn Malawi, the government accepted threestructural adjustment loans (SALs) between 1981and the end of the 1980s which mainly aimed tostimulate agricultural exports.9 Theseadjustments involved raising the producer pricesof smallholder farmers to promote exports,eliminating consumer price and fertilisersubsidies, exchange and interest rate adjustment,higher fees for public utilities and services andcuts in public expenditure.

The programme also sought to restructure andimprove the management of state-ownedenterprises through liberalisation.Therestructuring and privatisation of statutorycorporations created serious job losses anddesperation. For example, Press Corporation, asemi-state enterprise that controlled about 40percent of Malawi’s economy in the early 1980slaid off about 20 percent of its workforce in thelate 1980s and early 1990s.10 However, efforts toderegulate and privatise state-owned firms havebeen firmly resisted by civil society organisationsin Malawi, for example in 1996 when the PublicEnterprises (Privatisation) Act was passed. By2001, only 26 of the 99 public enterprises hadbeen privatised.11 The privatisation of state-owned enterprises has also been controversialbecause of allegations of corruption and lack oftransparency in the process of selling off shares.

Most industries in Malawi are supply-based,processing agricultural products destined forexport markets.There are few demand-based orimport substitution industries producing goodsfor the domestic market.As statistics indicate,the share of industry in Malawi’s economy hasgrown slowly from 11 percent in the 1960s to12.5 percent in the 1980s and 13.6 percent in

1 8 G ROW T H O F T H E I N F O R M A L E C O N O M Y

The retrenchments, thecasualisation of labour andthe inability of the formalsector to absorb theincreasing economicallyactive population in Ghanaresulted into the expansionof the informal economy.

1998, and industry’s share of formal employmenthas ever remained low at 15 percent of the totalworkforce in formal employment.12 Most ofMalawi’s formal employment is therefore outsidethe industrial sector.

As a result of opening up of the economy part ofthe structural adjustment policy change, severalindustries offering employment to urban peoplewere forced to downsize operations and anumber closed down completely.The enhancedliberalisation of the economy since the mid1990s exposed local businesses to stiffcompetition from foreign goods.Whilemanufacturing grew by 3.3 percent per annumfrom 1987 to 1995, it stagnated between 1996and 1999 and since then several industries eitherstopped domestic production or closedcompletely.13 By 1999, the textile industry hadshrunk by 44 percent compared to 1996,shedding over 70 percent of its workforce sincethen. Large firms such as Lever Brothers(manufacturers of soap, detergents and oils),David Whitehead (textiles) and British AmericanTobacco have stopped their domestic productionaltogether. Other industries like the poultryindustry and agricultural estate giants like theChamwavi Group, and the General Farming andPress Agricultural have all collapsed.14

On the one hand,market liberalisationresulted in job lossesin the manufacturingsector which wasfaced with foreigncompetition.This

forced workers to seek alternative means ofsurviving such as in the informal economy.National survey data shows massive expansion ofthe informal economy following marketliberalisation in the 1990s.A government studyon small and micro-enterprises indicated that thenumber of enterprises start-ups rose from20,000 to 100,000 between 1992 and 1999.15

However, on the other hand, the opening up ofthe economy also created new opportunities forsmall-scale enterprises. Liberalisation of the

foreign exchange system and cross-border tradeled to a growing number of small-scaleentrepreneurs going to Zimbabwe and SouthAfrica to purchase goods, most of which endedup being sold in the streets of Blantyre andother major centres in Malawi.16 To crown thesignificance of liberalisation of the economy tothe growth of the informal economy in Malawi,the former president Dr Bakili Muluzi hailed thestreet vendors in a speech in the NationalAssembly for taking advantage of theliberalisation of the economy. He was quoted ina newspaper as saying:“I am proud to say thatthose who are doing small-scale business asvendors or hawkers are prospering in ourliberalised economy”.17

Mozambique’s Economic RecoveryProgrammeMozambique won itsindependence from thePortuguese colonial regime in1975.The exodus of mostPortuguese and Asian traders,subsequent adoption of centralplanning and nationalisation ofmajor enterprises, and the internal armedconflict, resulted in the collapse of production,the destruction and deterioration ofinfrastructure and public services, and a heavydependency on foreign aid. Mozambique’scentral planning apparatus began to bedismantled in the late 1980s. In 1987, theMozambican government launched theEconomic and Social Recovery Programme(PRES, Programa de Reabilitação Econômica eSocial), which sought to achieve a turn-around inthe economy by reactivating industrialproduction, which was followed in 1992 by asecond part, PRES II, which sought to broadenthe reforms implemented in the first part of theprogramme.After the 1992 peace settlement,the government introduced further market-based economic policies, including privatisation,market determination of prices and theexchange rate, rationalisation of publicexpenditure and fiscal balance, and reform ofthe public sector and the civil service.


According to researchconducted by trade unionsin Mozambique in mid-1998, privatisation hasmade more than 100,000workers redundant.

National survey data inMalawi show massiveexpansion of the informaleconomy following marketliberalisation in the 1990s.

According to research conducted by tradeunions in Mozambique in mid-1998, privatisationhas made more than 100,000 workersredundant.18 Mozambique also expected around14,000 redundancies as a result of therestructuring of its port and rail systems, whichthe World Bank approved to finance in 1999with a $77 million loan to the government ofMozambique.19

The growth in the informal economy ofMozambique can also be attributed to theSixteen Years War (1976-1992) which sped upmigration from the rural to the urban areas. Inthe 1990s, many refugees relocated to the urbanareas, which were not able to employ all ofthem.This forced migrants to find their source ofremuneration in the informal economy.20 Inaddition, repatriation of refugees fromneighbouring countries and militarydemobilisation after the war added to thegrowing numbers of unemployed people in citiesin Mozambique. Before independence, theinformal economy provided supplementaryincome to formal economy workers’ basicsalaries. However, after independence, with theincreased liberalisation of a formerly plannedeconomy, the informal economy became analternative source of income for many instead ofa supplementary form of revenue.This alsomeant that increasingly men became involved ininformal economy activities while this field hadpreviously been mainly an area in which womencould supplement their incomes.

Structural adjustment in ZambiaStructural adjustment policies were graduallyimplemented under President Kenneth Kaundafrom the United National Independence Party(UNIP) in the mid-1980s during Zambia’s SecondRepublic (1972-1991).21 Policy changes includedthe abolishment of price control on basic goods,removal of price subsidies on maize and fertiliser,adoption of a foreign exchange auction system,liberalisation of agricultural marketing, publicsector reform and reduction in civil serviceemployment.The policies led to a devaluation ofZambia’s currency and prices of essentialcommodities rapidly shot up as a result of the

removal of price controls.Widespreaddiscontent with the economic reforms led to anumber of strikes and in May 1987 PresidentKaunda cancelled the agreement with the IMF.The IMF programme was replaced with theInterim New Economic Recovery Programme(INERP), which introduced some of the controlsthat were in place before the reforms.

Although INERP resulted in impressive GDPgrowth rates, mainly as a result of a bumperharvest, the economic crisis deteriorated and inearly 1990, Zambia agreed to a new packagewith the IMF that would involve further reforms.In the same year, the growing opposition fromthe Movement for Multiparty Democracy(MMD) to the UNIP, which had ruled Zambiasince Independence in 1964, forced PresidentKenneth Kaunda to sign a constitutionalamendment that would mean an end to the one-party rule.With elections coming up in 1991, theUNIP government requested that the IMFpostpone new reductions in maize mealsubsidies, as it feared this could lead to somerioting before the elections and also would notmake UNIP very popular during the elections,especially with the increasing competition fromthe MMD.The IMF refused and all financialdisbursements to Zambia were suspended.

Zambia’s first multi-party elections were heldand both presidential and parliamentary electionswere convincingly won by the MMD.The newMMD government under President FrederickChiluba (also known as Zambia’s Third Republic)continued with the implementation of thereform package that the IMF and the UNIPagreed in 1990. Reforms included pricedecontrols of all products and inputs (exceptmaize), elimination of exchange rate restrictions,liberalisation of export and import trade, reformof civil service and parastatals and a privatisationand liquidation of state enterprises. It was arguedthat reform of state-owned enterprises wasrequired in order to eliminate corruption andnepotism within these enterprises and improvetheir efficiency. Criticism was levelled particularlyat the way in which these enterprises handedout jobs to political appointees as a reward for


their political loyalty rather than based on theirexpertise and experience.

The opening up ofthe Zambianeconomy tointernationalcompetition had adisastrous effect onlocal industries asthey were not able

to compete. Many manufacturing companieswere forced to close and employment inmanufacturing fell from 75,400 in 1991 to 43,320in 1998.22 However, trade liberalisation also gaverise to investment by multinational corporationsheadquartered in South Africa. Zambia hassometimes been described as a hugesupermarket for South African capital.

In 1992, the government enacted thePrivatisation Act, which established theinstitutional and legal framework for theprivatisation of all state-owned enterprises. It setup the Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA) whose

mandate it was “to plan, implement and controlthe privatisation of state-ownedenterprises inZambia in cooperation with the government, byselling them off to those who are morecompetent to run them and who have therequired capital to do so”. Starting off with aportfolio of 289 state-owned enterprises, theZPA listed 150 companies on its first divestitureplan.

Employment in Zambia’s mining industry which islocated in the densely populated CopperbeltProvince was particularly affected.As part of theprivatisation exercise, the state-owned ZambiaConsolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM)conglomerate was split up into several smallercompanies.23 New investors acquired the miningassets and laid off many workers in order tooperate the mines with lower costs. In 1991/92,employment in the ZCCM mines stood at56,582. It declined to 31,033 in 1997/98 andcurrently is estimated to be around 22,000.24 Theprivatisation of the mines also affected the socialinfrastructure that was part of the ZCCM. Newowners of the mines were not interested in


The opening up of theZambian economy tointernational competitionhad a disastrous effect onlocal industries as they werenot able to compete.

An informal enterprise involved in construction of coffinson a former ZCCM mine outside Kitwe, Zambia.

continuing to run the schools, shops, hospitalsand clinics that existed on the mines and used tobe run by the ZCCM. By July 2000 well over100,000 jobs had been lost through the sale andliquidations of state-owned enterprises.25 By July2005, 262 out of the planned 284 state-ownedenterprises had been privatised.26 Remainingparastatals such as Zambia National CommercialBank, Zambia Electricity Supply Company andthe Zambia Telecommunication Company areexpected to be privatised though this has beenfirmly contested by the labour movement,churches and women’s organisations.

According to government data, there has been ashift of employment from the manufacturing andmining sectors to agriculture and trade.27 Theproportion of the active labour force working inagriculture shifted from 16.8 percent in 1990 to37.5 percent in 2000. In the trade sector, thepercentage more than doubled from 6.5 percentto 13.2 percent. However, the proportion ofpeople employed in mining declined from 16.9percent in 1990 to 9.7 percent in 2000 whereastotal employment in mining dropped from 10.3percent in 1990 to 6.4 percent in 2000.

Parallel to privatisation was the public sectorreform programme which the government wasimplementing in the name of making the public

service ‘lean’, ‘efficient’, and ‘affordable’.Thecumulative effect of these policy measures hasbeen to create massive unemployment throughprocesses euphemistically described as‘retrenchments’, ‘redundancies’, ‘lay-offs’ or ‘right-sizing the public service’. Public sector reformshave reduced employment from an estimated150,000 in 1992 to 120,000 in 2004. However,the government is determined to reduce thisnumber further to 80,000.28

ConclusionIn summary, it can be stated that apart fromrapid increases in population growth rates andprocesses of urbanisation, structural adjustmentpolicies have significantly contributed towards arapid growth of the informal economy in Ghana,Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. Increasingforeign competition due to trade liberalisationhas forced local companies to cut their costs andto either close their business or to retrenchsome of their labour force. Privatisation of stateenterprises as well as reforms of the publicsector resulted in more retrenchments. Lastly,the removal of state subsidies on basiccommodities and agricultural inputs reducedpeople’s real wages and sometimes forced thosein formal employment to supplement theirincome with informal economic activities.


Chapter Two has shown how macroeconomicpolicies have contributed towards the growth ofthe informal economy in Ghana, Malawi,Mozambique and Zambia. Chapter Three willdiscuss the size of the informal economy inthese four countries.

The informal economy in Ghana According to a 1997 Core Welfare IndicatorSurvey carried out by the Ghanaian government,employment in the informal economy as part oftotal employment was estimated to be 89percent.1 The survey defined people in theinformal economy as those who definethemselves as being in the informal sector at thetime of the survey.2 The survey covered thewhole country, including paid domesticemployees and persons aged 15 years and over.

According to a 2000 government survey, 71.4percent of women in the urban areas in Ghanaengage in non-agricultural self-employment.Table2 illustrates that whereas 25 percent of men areemployed in the formal private sector in theurban areas, only 6 percent of women haveformal jobs.

In terms of its contribution towards GrossNational Product (GNP), the informal economyin Ghana was estimated to contribute 38.4

percent towards GNP in 1999/2000.3 Theinformal economy in Ghana is made up of small-scale businesses, which are predominantly familybusinesses that engage mainly family memberswho earn inadequate incomes for a living butwhich are substantial in aggregate terms.Theurban informal economy comprises small-scaleindustries or producers and their employees,the self-employed engaged in various economicactivities, and those working in commerce,transport and other service-related areas.Informal workers are also found inmetalworking, food and wood processing,textiles and garments, including batik tie-dyeproduction.

Studies conducted on theurban informal economy inGhana grouped a wide rangeof informal operations inservices, construction andmanufacturing.4 The servicesector comprises urban foodand other traders andprocessors, health andsanitation workers, domestic workers, who arealso predominantly women, repairers ofwatches, refrigeration equipment, radios,mechanical or electrical/electronic equipment,auto mechanics, sprayers, welders, auto

3. The size of the informal economy


Main employer UrbanMale Female All

Self employment (agriculture) 22.0 16.2 18.8State owned company 17.5 6.5 11.4Private formal 25.0 6.0 14.5Private informal and self employment (non-agriculture) 35.5 71.4 55.3All 100.0 100.0 100.0Sample size 1195 1472 2667

Table 2:Type of employer for urban population in Ghana aged 15-64 yrs in the last 7 days,by sex (percent)

Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2000). Ghana Living Standards Survey - Report of the Fourth Round(GLSS 4) 2000. Accra: Ghana.

According to a 1997 CoreWelfare Indicator Surveycarried out by the Ghanaiangovernment, employment inthe informal economy aspart of total employmentwas estimated to be 89percent.

electricians, graphic designers, audio-visualworkers, hairdressers, barbers and privatesecurity men. Prominent among these are alsostreet vendors who sell along the streets in themain cities of Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi as wellas the young men and women who sell at trafficlights. Construction workers comprise masons,carpenters, steel benders, small-scale plumbers,house-wiring electricians, and carpenters.Manufacturing workers are mainly factoryworkers of firms, which engage in foodprocessing, textile and garments, woodprocessing and metal works, some of whom arecasual and part-time workers.

The informal economy in MalawiThe formal sector only absorbs 12 percent ofthe total labour force in Malawi, and this includesworkers in the estate agricultural sub sector andthe formal industrial sector.The remaining 88percent get their livelihood from smallholderagriculture and other informal economyactivities.5 A survey conducted by the NationalStatistical Office of Malawi concluded that microand small enterprises contribute income toabout 25 percent of Malawian households, andemploy 1.7 million people which is equivalent to38 percent of the total Malawian labour force.Furthermore, it found that women account for42 percent of total employment in micro andsmall enterprises, and micro and smallenterprises contribute about 15.6 percent toGDP.6 The World Bank estimated thecontribution towards GNP of the informaleconomy in total at 40.3 percent in Malawi in1999/2000.7

Another survey of 2,022 low-income householdsin Blantyre and Lilongwe in the early 1990sfound that 30 percent and 22 percent of thehouseholds in Lilongwe and Blantyre,respectively, were involved in informal economyactivities.8 The survey noted that many of theactivities were casual and seasonal and oftencarried on alongside a range of other livelihoodactivities.

In both rural and urban areas in Malawi, trade isthe dominant form of informal economy

activities.Yet, in ruralareas it is the non-poor who have suchbusinesses becausethey have sufficientcapital to cover thecosts. In urban areasstreet vending is thecommon activity andit appears that it is the poor who are thevendors.9 In terms of the characteristics, informaltrading and vending mainly involves sellingclothing, shoes, groceries and hardware items,cooked and uncooked foods, fruits andvegetables, second-hand clothes, motor spareparts, most of which are imported fromZimbabwe and South Africa.

According to a survey conducted in Mzuzu City,which is located in northern Malawi, most streetvendors only sold fruits and vegetables prior to1992.10 Most of the vendors currently operatingin Mzuzu are newcomers; only 15-25 percent ofthe street vendors had been operating in the cityprior to 1992.The survey also found that 80percent of the street vendors in Mzuzu are self-employed, whereas 13.7 percent work ascommission vendors.The majority of streetvendors in Mzuzu attended secondary education,80 percent had a Junior Certificate of Education(JCE), 15 percent had no formal education and 5percent with primary and Malawi SchoolCertificate of Education (MSCE).

The informal economy in MozambiqueIn Mozambique, it isestimated thatbetween 30 and 40percent of urbanhouseholds aredependent on theinformal economy.11

The World Bank estimated the contributiontowards GNP of the informal economy in totalat 40.3 percent in Mozambique in 1999/2000.12

In Mozambique, 65 percent of workers in urbanareas are employed in the informal economy,77.9 percent of women and 50 percent of menin the urban areas are informal workers.13 Very

2 4 T H E S I Z E O F T H E I N F O R M A L E C O N O M Y

The formal sector in Malawionly absorbs 12 percent ofthe total labour force, andthis includes workers in theestate agricultural subsector and the formalindustrial sector.

In Mozambique, it isestimated that between 30and 40 percent of urbanhouseholds are dependenton the informal economy.

few women are therefore employed in formaljobs.A survey among market vendors was alsocarried out in Maputo and Beira in 199614 andanother one among 100 market women inMaputo in 2000 as part of the ILO’s Feminisationof Poverty Project.15 The 1996 study found thatthe modal monthly income for market vendorswas US$ 50-100 for Maputo. Interestingly, overhalf (60 percent) of those surveyed in Maputoindicated that they preferred their presentoccupation in the informal economy and wouldnot prefer a waged job.

There is currently a lack of thorough research inMozambique on the exact size and measurementof the informal economy. However, the NationalInstitute of Statistics in Mozambique announcedin September 2005 that it is going to conduct anational survey on the informal economy inorder to “determine or capture the impact ofthe informal economy, in terms of the labourforce involved, the activities covered by thesector, and its production and consumption, aswell as its distribution across the nationalterritory”.16

The informal economy in Mozambique was atfirst dominated by women who began to sellagricultural products on the streets.Subsequently, men invaded the sector, mainlyunemployed youngsters who sold goods andoffered several kinds of services. Nowadays, bothwomen and men work in the informal economy,although a larger percentage of women work inthe informal economy than men.Temporarystructures have been transformed from placeswhere vegetables and basic food products weresold into out-of-doors supermarkets.The goods

sold in such markets oftencome into Mozambiquethrough informal cross-bordertrade.

The informal economy inZambiaIn Zambia, structuraladjustment policies broughtabout a cut in the share of formal sectoremployment from 17 percent in 1991 to 10percent in 1998.17 The World Bank estimated thecontribution towards GNP of the informaleconomy in total at 48.9 percent in Zambia in1999/2000.18 According to a household surveycarried out by the government in 1993, 2.3million people in Zambia were employed in theinformal economy, which represented 80.7percent of total employment.19 A survey on livingconditions in Zambia that was carried out in2004 found that 83 percent of all employedpersons in Zambia were engaged in the informalsector (see Table 3).20 The survey definedinformal employment as “employment where theemployed persons were not entitled to paidleave, pension, gratuity and social security andworked in an establishment employing 5 personsor less”.21 Table 3 shows that informal economyemployment was more common among females(91 percent) than males (76 percent).22

Table 4 demonstrates that only 9 percent ofwomen in Zambia have jobs in the formal sector.In addition, the survey found that almost 54percent of those households that reported tooperate a non-farm enterprise were involved intrading.23


A survey on living conditionsin Zambia that was carriedout in 2004 found that 83percent of all employedpersons in Zambia wereengaged in the informaleconomy.

Residence/ Share of Share of male Share of female Total Stratum/province informal informal informal number of

employment employment employment employedAll Zambia 83 76 91 3,517,371Rural 93 89 96 2,571,153Urban 56 47 71 946,218

Source: Government of Zambia (2004). Living Conditions Monitoring Survey Report 2002-2003, Lusaka:Living Conditions Monitoring Branch, Central Statistical Office, Government of Zambia, p. iii.

Table 3: Proportion of labour force in Zambia aged 12 years and above employed in theinformal economy, by sex and location, 2002-3 (percent)

ConclusionWhile most governments have not kept exactstatistical data on the contribution of theinformal economy towards GNP, the World Bankhas provided some estimates which lie between38 and 49 percent for the countries which formpart of this study. In addition, governments ofGhana, Malawi and Zambia have conductedhousehold sample surveys in order to calculatethe share of informal employment as part oftotal employment.24 In September 2005, thegovernment of Mozambique announced that it

will also conduct surveys on the informaleconomy in the near future.The majorconclusions drawn from surveys carried out inGhana, Malawi and Zambia is that informaleconomy employment is estimated between 70and 90 percent of total employment in mostcountries. Informal employment is usually higherin rural compared to urban areas.Whilerelatively more men are employed in formal jobs,the majority of women work in the informaleconomy.

2 6 T H E S I Z E O F T H E I N F O R M A L E C O N O M Y

Number Numberof people of people Total

Sex and employed in Share of employed in Share of number ofresidence formal sector formal sector informal sector informal sector employedAll Zambia 597,953 17 291,9418 83 3,517,371Males 441,813 24 139,9076 76 1,840,889Females 150,883 9 152,5599 91 1,676,482Rural 179,981 7 239,1172 93 2,571,153Urban 416,336 44 529,882 56 946,218

Table 4: Proportion of labour force in Zambia aged 12 years and above employed in theinformal and formal economy, by sex and location, 2002-3 (percent)

Source: Government of Zambia (2004). Living Conditions Monitoring Survey Report 2002-2003, Lusaka:Living Conditions Monitoring Branch, Central Statistical Office, Government of Zambia, p. iii.

In recent years, various initiatives have beentaken that sought to address the issue oforganising workers in the informal economy.Trade unions have begun showing interest in theinformal economy.1 Due to structural adjustmentand globalisation, their membership of formallyemployed workers significantly dropped.Apartfrom potential membership in the informaleconomy, some unions also felt they had aresponsibility to advocate for the improvementof working conditions in the informal economy.

The final resolution of the 2002 ILO conferenceon Decent work and the informal economyspecifically included the need for representativeorganisations in the informal economy. One ofthe conclusions adopted by the conferencerecommended that future ILO work andactivities should be aimed at removing obstaclesto the formation of organisations of workers andemployers in the informal economy and assistingthem to organise.2 These initiatives were to asignificant extent inspired by the success of theIndian organisation the Self-Employed Women'sAssociation (SEWA).

Against this background, Chapter Four will givean overview of organisations in the informaleconomy in selected cities in Ghana, Malawi,Mozambique and Zambia.The Chapter will startwith a brief history of various initiatives aimed atorganising workers in the informal economy aswell as research carried out in South Africa inthe late 1990s on informal economyorganisations.

Organising workers in the informaleconomy: SEWA, StreetNet Internationaland SEWUThe Indian organisation, the Self-EmployedWomen’s Association (SEWA), has often beencited as a successful example of how to organiseworkers in the informal economy. SEWA was

established in 1972 as a trade union for poorself-employed women. It was based inAhmedabad, Gujarat and grew out of theWomen’s Wing of the Textile Labour Association(TLA), which was established in 1954, initially toassist women belonging to the households oftextile workers. However, the scope of TLA'swork expanded in the 1970s when other groupsof informal women workers approached theunion for protection.

The first struggle of SEWA was to gainrecognition as an official trade union. This wasan innovative concept since self-employedworkers had no real history of organising. TheLabour Department of the Indian governmentinitially refused to register SEWA because theyfelt that since there was no recognised employer,the workers would have no one to struggleagainst. However, SEWA’s argument was that aunion was not necessarily meant as defendingworkers' interests against an employer but morebroadly aimed at uniting workers, irrespective oftheir employment relationship. Finally, in April1972, SEWA won its argument and wasregistered as a trade union. It grew continuouslyfrom 1972 to establish itself as the largest tradeunion in India.

SEWA's goals were focused on organisingwomen in the informal economy to achieve fullemployment, i.e. work security, income security,food security and social security (health care,child care and shelter).They describedthemselves as both an organisation and amovement and provided living proof of how theworking and living conditions of low paidinformal workers could be improved throughcollective action. Many studies have revealed howSEWA’s activities and interventions increased thesecurity of women working in the informaleconomy.3 In the 1990s, SEWA began to establishinternational links and their successes and

4. Characteristics of informaleconomy organisations


achievements began to serve as a blueprint forsimilar movements and organisationsinternationally working to organise andrepresent the interests of informal womenworkers.

SEWA was an important driving force behind theprogressive voices in the ILO 2002 Decent Workdiscussions and in 2003, the organisation hostedthe first International Conference on Organisingin the Informal Economy in Ahmedabad, India.4

The organising committee of the conferenceincluded representatives of member-basedorganisations of informal workers and tradeunions such as HomeNet Thailand,Trade UnionCongress Ghana, StreetNet International and theNigeria Labour Congress.The conferencemandated the organising committee to continueits coordinating role in ensuring increasedrepresentation and voice of informal economyworkers, and this resulted in the establishmentof the International Coordinating Committee(ICC). One of the key priorities of thiscommittee was to ensure increasedrepresentation of informal economy workers atthe ILO 2004 Conference and to draw up a planof action for building increased cooperationbetween informal economy organisationsglobally.

SEWA's work inspired various initiatives aroundthe world such as the establishment in 1997 ofthe international research-policy networkWomen in Informal Employment: Globalising andOrganising (WIEGO); the foundation in 1994 ofHomeNet which (now defunct) was a networkof home-based workers’ organisations; and theformation of StreetNet International, aninternational alliance of street vendororganisations in November 2002.

StreetNet International is particularly importantin this study as it has played a central role -which will be discussed further in Chapter Five -in facilitating and supporting the development offederations of informal economy workers'organisations in Ghana and Southern Africa,influencing their internal policies (e.g. theinsistence of women in leadership positions) as

well as through these national umbrellaformations gaining representation and voice in awider national and international arena.

StreetNet International was formally establishedin Durban, South Africa, in November 2002.5 Itis an alliance of membership-based organisations(unions, co-operatives and associations) directlyinvolved in organising street vendors, marketvendors and hawkers. StreetNet aims topromote the exchange of ideas and informationon vital issues facing these workers and alsoadvises on practical organising and advocacystrategies. It enables member organisations togain a wider understanding of the commonproblems of street vendors, and facilitates thejoining of international campaigns to promotepolicies and actions that can contribute toimproving the lives of vendors around theworld. StreetNet held its first InternationalCongress in March 2004, attended by 58delegates from 15 organisations at which anInternational Council was elected for a three-year term. To date, over 15 street vendororganisations – with a combined totalmembership of over 275,000 members - haveaffiliated with StreetNet.

Apart from inspiring the formation of globalnetworks, SEWA also served as modelorganisation for the launch of the South Africanorganisation, the Self-Employed Women's Union(SEWU), which was established in Durban in1994.6 Following a visit to Ahmedabad anddiscussions with leaders from SEWA, womenwith a background in trade union organisationreturned to South Africa to establish SEWU.SEWU was launched as a trade union, initially inthe Durban region, and later as a nationalorganisation.The general scope of SEWU closelyfollowed that of SEWA in that it also defineditself as organising informal women workers. Inits early organising, SEWU was concerned withtwo main groups of women workers, streetvendors and home-based workers, with amajority coming from the first group. By 1997,SEWU had approximately 4,000 members inboth urban and rural areas. However, in 2004,SEWU was force to dissolve itself due to a

2 8 C H A R AC T E R I S T I C S O F I N F O R M A L E C O N O M Y O R G A N I S AT I O N S

financial crisis as a result of a claim made by twodismissed staff members.7

Overview of research on organising in theinformal economy in South AfricaThe 2002 International Labour Conference onDecent work and the informal economy wasaccompanied by an international research project‘Organising in the informal economy’ which waslaunched in 2001 by the ILO.The project wasaimed at gaining insights into the organisationalstrategies of informal economy actors in fivecountries: Bolivia, Colombia, Pakistan, Peru andSouth Africa.The project sought to “acquiredeeper insights into the nature of membership-based organisations in the informal economy,their strengths and weaknesses, with a view tounderstanding the incentives and rules thatshaped their creation and function, and theconstraints that hamper their potential aseffective ‘voice’ institutions”.

The study in South Africa was conducted by theILO together with the Community Agency forSocial Enquiry (CASE) and the Southern AfricanLabour Research Institute (SALRI). Case studieswere carried out in four different sectors:clothing industry, construction sector, streettrading and the transport industry.8 The study onstreet traders, which is of particular interest toour research project, analysed the organisationalstrategies adopted by street traders in SouthAfrica's informal economy. It focused on threeorganisations: Informal Traders ManagementBoard (ITMB), the Gauteng Hawkers Association(GHA) and the Self Employed Women’s Union(SEWU).

The report concluded that all threeorganisations emerged as a response fromstreet traders themselves rather than fromexisting workers’ or employers’ organisations.The organisations were established in order torepresent traders as a group and facilitatedialogue with local government authorities.None of the organisations belonged to anational confederation, e.g. a trade unionfederation. Membership in all organisations wasrelatively small and confined to a specific

geographical area.Apart from one organisation -SEWU which was an organisation exclusivelyfor women - leadership positions werepredominantly held by men.All organisationsexperienced severe financial constraints andwere mostly unable to employ staff.They mainlyhad to rely on the collection of membershipfees which often proved difficult. In terms ofachievements, organisations have managed toprotect their members against harassment oreviction from public spaces and have securedtrading sites for their members. In addition,local authorities have increasingly recognisedthem.

The School of Development Studies, Universityof KwaZulu Natal also conducted a researchproject between 1998 and 2000 in order tostudy street vendor organisations in SouthAfrica in more depth.The final research reportby Lund and Skinner provided a profile of 13street vendor organisations in South Africa andselected 8 organisations as case studies.9 Thestudy subsequently identified a number ofbarriers that often prevented street tradersfrom joining, forming and building organisationssuch as:

• economic barriers: investing time in work fora street vendor organisation often means aloss of income for street vendors as timecannot be spent on trading;

• previous experience of organisations: streettraders are often suspicious of organisationsthat they were involved in before and theymight have had bad experiences;

• corrupt practices with e.g. collection ofmembership fees;

• political barriers: fears to join an organisationfor political reasons;

• environmental barriers: lack of proper officespace in which to discuss issues;

• psychological and cultural barriers: womenexperience problems as organisations arefrequently dominated by men.


It then made a number of recommendations thatwould improve the work of street vendororganisations:

• need for a democratically constitutedorganisation which is accountable to itsmembers;

• need for organisations to be membership-based instead of service delivery-based;

• need for transparency about policyformulation, decision making, financial controland accounting;

• need for women to have positions ofleadership in organisations;

• need for women to engage in negotiationwith local government, formal sector andtrade unions;

• need for a clear analysis of why women arenot participating effectively in organisations;

• need for a clear analysis of the effects ofglobalisation on changing patterns of work.

Apart from the work at the University ofKwaZulu Natal, the Centre for Policy Studies inJohannesburg recently published a report onstreet traders in Johannesburg.10 This reportformed part of a multi-country study on localpopular organisations and political participationin cities co-ordinated by the Centre for theFuture State at the Institute for DevelopmentStudies, Sussex University.The main aim of thisstudy was to investigate to what extent informaltraders use their ‘citizenship rights’ to attempt toinfluence the policies that affect them.Theirfocus was in particular on the Gauteng TradersAssociation and the Yeoville Traders Association.The conclusion of the paper was a rathernegative one, namely that traders’ associationsoften show low levels of participation and

leadership accountability. Despite the often weakdemocratic character of organisations, the studydoes conclude with a few reasons for optimismas some organisations have honoured aspects ofdemocratic practice by holding regular electionsand meetings and making their leadershipaccountable. In addition, some organisations havealso made attempts to influence government andto represent the interest of their members.

Overview of organisations in Ghana,Malawi, Mozambique and ZambiaAs part of the overview of organisations inGhana, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia in thisstudy, structured interviews were held throughquestionnaires with leaders of a variety oforganisations in the following cities:Accra andTakoradi (Ghana), Blantyre and Mzuzu (Malawi),Maputo (Mozambique), Mansa and Kitwe(Zambia).

The main aim of this survey was to get anoverview of the various organisations that wereoperating in these cities. Chapter Five willprovide a more in-depth insight into theorganising and advocacy strategies of 8 specificorganisations. In Ghana, representatives from 33organisations were interviewed, 16 in Malawi, 4in Mozambique and 9 in Zambia.While the list oforganisations interviewed and detailed findingscan be consulted in Appendix 1, 2, 3 and 4, thissection seeks to summarise some of the findingsof this survey.

Basic characteristics of organisations (see Appendix 1)Most of the organisations in this survey wereestablished fairly recently, in the early-mid 1990sor early 2000s. However, in Ghana, someorganisations originate from the 1960s and


Ghana Malawi Mozambique Zambia (2000) (2003) (1997) (2000)Accra Blantyre Kitwe

Population 1,658,937 646,235 Maputo 363,734in selected cities Takoradi Mzuzu 989,386 Mansa

175,438 119,592 41,059

Table 5: Population in selected cities for survey of informal economy organisations

Source: http://www.citypopulation.de/Africa.html (last accessed: 14 March 2006)

1970s such as the Ghana Electrical ServicesTechnical Association and the GhanaHairdressers and Beauticians Association, as wellas several organisations located in KaneshieMarket close to Takoradi (Charcoal SellersAssociation, Plantain Sellers Association, SpicesSellers Association and Yam Sellers Association).

The majority of organisations have apredominantly local focus, i.e. they tend tooperate in a specific city only. Often, they wereestablished in a particular locality, e.g. a marketor a street vending area. However, the StreetNetGhana Alliance (SGA),Alliance for ZambiaInformal Economy Associations (AZIEA), ZambiaNational Marketeers' Association (ZANAMA),the Association of Audio,Video and CD Dealersin Zambia and more recently ASSOTSI inMozambique and the Malawi Union for theInformal Sector (MUFIS) have expanded theirorganising efforts to the national level.The SGAand AZIEA are umbrella bodies of different kindof informal economy associations.ASSOTSI andMUFIS are organisations that started organisingin a particular city and have gradually expandedtheir membership to other cities. In all casesexcept ZANAMA and the Association of Audio,Video and CD Dealers in Zambia, thesenationally oriented organisations receivedassistance from trade unions or trade unionsplayed important roles in the formation of theorganisations.

Regarding the main activities of theorganisations, these can be classified as follows:

• training: organisation of workshops andseminars, education on products, training inleadership and business skills;

• conflict resolution: mediate in cases ofconflicts between members, settling disputes;

• social welfare: provide assistance in cases ofbirths, funerals, illnesses and marriages;

• representation: protect interests and welfareof members, protection against harassmentfrom local authorities, represent members atmeetings with local authorities, liaise withpolice on theft cases in the market, liaise withlocal authorities to ensure security and

cleanliness of markets;• provision of security: employment of security

guards in markets;• allocation of vending space: collaborate with

local authorities in allocating space to newvendors;

• political mobilisation role: mobilise membersfor political party functions.

As already mentioned, the majority oforganisations were established in specificmarkets or trading areas and have been dealingwith urgent issues arising in these locations, suchas harassment faced from the police and solvingdisputes and conflicts among vendors.The socialwelfare role has been very important as well.People often make contributions towards thehigh costs of funerals or income losses as aresult of illnesses. In the absence of socialsecurity schemes provided by the state, theseorganisations have tried to fill this gap bysupporting each other.

Relations with central local government and otherorganisations (see Appendix 2)Most organisations in Ghana are reported tohave no relationship with central government.Those that had links with central governmentdescribed them predominantly as‘engagement/negotiation’. Regarding therelationship with local government, the majorityof organisations in Ghana reported these as


Market vendors in Maputo, Mozambique.

‘cordial’ or ‘engagement/negotiation’ in someinstances. None of the organisations in Ghanafelt government interfered with their operations.In Malawi, organisations reported to have goodrelations with local government, some describethem as ‘engagement/negotiation’. Street vendorassociations in particular emphasised havingconfrontational relations with local governmentand felt that government was sometimesinterfering in their operations. In Mozambique, allorganisations had cordial links with centralgovernment while they described interactionwith local government as‘engagement/negotiation’. In Zambia, relationswith central and local government were mostlycharacterised by 'engagement/negotiation'.

Many organisations surveyed in Ghana reportedto have links with trade unions.The Ghana TradeUnion Congress has been very actively involvedin encouraging its affiliates to organise in theinformal economy. It has also allowed otherorganisations in the informal economy to affiliateto the trade union federation.Whereas theMalawi Union for the Informal Sector (MUFIS)has close links with the trade movement, unitedin the Malawi Congress of Trade Unions(MCTU), other organisations did not have linkswith any other associations. In Mozambique,ASSOTSI had close links with the trade unionfederation, Organização dos Trabalhadores deMoçambique (OTM, Organisation of Workers ofMozambique). In Zambia, several organisationsreported to have contacts with NGOs and somewith trade unions.

Membership details of organisations (see Appendix 3)The majority of organisations in Ghana, Malawi,Mozambique and Zambia had procedures toregister members and charged membership fees.It was only in Malawi where a few organisationswere reported not to charge any fees and didnot have a specific procedure for people wishingto become members. Membership fees rangedfrom 2,000-50,000 cedis (£0.12-£2.89) permonth in Ghana, to 120 kwacha (£0.60) per yearin Malawi, 5,000 meticais (£0.12) in Mozambiqueand 5,000-25,000 kwacha (£0.83-£4.15) inZambia.12 As far as the size of membership, most

trading associations in Ghana have between 30-100 members. Street vendor organisations inMalawi had relatively large membership of 2,500-3,000 people. In Zambia, membership variedfrom 17 to 3,050.

Democratic practices, funding and staffing oforganisations (see Appendix 4)Most organisations in Ghana, Malawi,Mozambique and Zambia reported to holdelections in order to elect leadership, althoughsome trader associations in Ghana mentionedthat they appointed their leaders. Organisationsoften had executive committees in place thatwere responsible for making important decisionswithin organisations. Others involved membersin more participatory ways of decision making.Although women often occupied leadershippositions, men still dominated executivecommittees in many organisations. Nearly allorganisations depended on membership fees assources of income, though several organisationsin Malawi reported not to have any source ofincome, and other organisations in Zambiareceived external donor grants. Nearly allorganisations included in this survey did notemploy any paid staff although some employedsecurity personnel to protect goods in themarkets.

ConclusionIn summary, it can be argued that the surveyconducted as part of this research projectbrought similar conclusions to the survey doneon organisations in South Africa.Although theinformation generated from our survey onlygives limited information on the characteristicsof the organisations and it is problematic togeneralise, it appears we can safely argue thatmost of the organisations:

• have objectives that balance betweenrepresentation and conflict resolution on theone hand, and fulfilling a social welfare roleand provision of training on the other hand;

• are locally based, confined to a specificgeographical area and with links mainly tolocal government;

• have been formed only recently, especially in


the late 1990s;• do not have major links with other

organisations, operate on their own, with theexception of nationally oriented organisationsthat have strong links with the trade unions;

• rely on membership fees as their main sourceof income although a few organisationsreceive external donor grants;

• do not tend to have paid members of staff;• hold elections and have executive committees

in place;

• have women involved in their leadership butmen still dominate in numbers.

While these characteristics gave us a basic ideaof the type of organisations that exist in thecities that we have selected in this researchproject, Chapter Five will discuss eightorganisations in more depth and will particularlyhighlight the organising and advocacy strategiesthat they have used.


Chapter Four provided a brief overview of thecharacteristics of informal economyorganisations in selected cities in Ghana, Malawi,Mozambique and Zambia. Chapter Five willdiscuss in more detail the organisational andadvocacy strategies of eight organisations.

Case study 1: StreetNet Ghana Alliance

Organisational history The StreetNet Ghana Alliance (SGA) wasestablished in February 2003, following aninternational conference in South Africaorganised by StreetNet International. Based onthe recommendations made at this conference,Ghana decided to form a national alliance ofstreet vendors, market vendors and hawkers.

The formation of this alliance was initiated andpromoted by the Informal Sector Desk of theGhana Trade Union Congress (GTUC).TheGTUC realised the need to work with informaleconomy workers as its membership wasdwindling as a result of the structural adjustmentprogramme of the 1980s and its accompanyingredundancies and privatisation. It called for aredefinition of trade union membership and theintroduction of different categories and levels ofmembership to introduce flexibility thataccommodates informal economy workers.TheAlliance owes its existence to the GTUC andcontinues to be housed in the offices of theGTUC and uses its facilities.The nature of theAlliance’s relationship with the GTUC is perceivedby some people (Takoradi respondent) as limitingthe freedom of the Alliance, as they cannot maketheir own decisions. It delays decision-making, asthey must always wait for the GTUC.Althoughthe SGA currently is dependent on the GTUC forits work, it is expected that the association willbecome a fully independent organisation in thefuture and also an affiliate member of the GTUC.

Although the SGA is still in its formative years, ithas already organised some vendors, hawkersand traders in Accra and Takoradi, the majorityof whom are women. Previously, there was nonational organisation that brought traderstogether to work to educate them on theirrights and to promote such rights and theirinterests.

According to the Constitution, SGA’s aims andobjectives comprise the following:

• to expand and strengthen market and streetvendors’ networks at national, regional anddistrict levels in the country;

• to build and strengthen the capacity andleadership of women market vendors, streetvendors and hawkers throughout thecountry;

• to build an information base on the numbersand situation of market vendors, streetvendors and hawkers in Ghana;

• to document and disseminate information oneffective organising strategies for promotingand protecting the rights of market vendors,street vendors and hawkers;

• to prioritise the upliftment of the poorestmarket vendors, street vendors and hawkers;

• to prioritise the interests of low-incomemarket vendors, street vendors and hawkersby focusing on stopping the exploitation ofsuch vendors by high-income vendors,intermediaries and wholesalers;

• to empower members to gain anunderstanding of their common problems andopportunities, develop new ideas forstrengthening their organising and advocacyefforts, and join national campaigns topromote policies and actions that cancontribute to improving the lives of marketvendors, street vendors and hawkers;

• to work in partnership with nationalfederations and centres of trade unions;

5. Organisational and advocacystrategies of informal economyorganisations

F O R C E S F O R C H A N G E 3 5F O R C E S F O R C H A N G E 3 5

• to work in social partnership with NGOswho work with and in support of marketvendors, street vendors and hawkers andwho support the goals and constitution ofthe StreetNet Ghana Alliance.

The SGA has a membership of nineteen traders'associations with a total of 5,810 individuals.1

Apart from trader associations, eight tradeunions which have all been organising in theinformal economy have become members of theSGA.2 All off these unions are also affiliates ofthe GTUC.

Main activities and organising strategiesThe SGA dialogues with government to see tothe welfare of its members. On the local level,SGA’s main activity is negotiating with the cityauthorities for places to operate from and onthe taxes members pay.The SGA aims to createawareness among traders and enable them tofully appreciate that they are part of theeconomy and that without them the nationcannot go forward.This is done throughworkshops so that they can negotiatethemselves with the city authorities.The SGAalso sensitises its members on the need to betogether and to develop their capacity to dobusiness.

In efforts to recruit members, the SGA hascoordinators in the field who market the Allianceto the associations but other associations comeon their own accord, especially when they haveproblems.The SGA notes that it is difficult toorganise workers in the informal economy.People are scattered and generally do not havetime for meetings.Their survival is based on thesale of their wares on a daily basis, so onlyworkshops with compensation for days lostattract them. One cannot, therefore, keep themfor more than two days at workshops.

Most of the individual members of theorganisations are females.The market vendorsand street vendors comprise about two-thirds ofthis membership while hawkers comprise aboutone-third of the membership.At the moment,only a few of the associations pay membership

dues. Members of the SGA pay membership feesbased on their numerical strength.This is,however, through negotiation and not animposition. In Takoradi, each market paysaffiliation fees of 300,000 Ghana cedis. However,membership has decreased because theorganisation is not able to reach out to itsmembers while some people are not paying duesand, therefore, drop out.

With regards to organising strategies, theAlliance initially planned to give its memberstraining but this could not be done on a largescale because of lack of funds.The lack ofsupport has made it difficult for them tocontinue and expand the training.Anotherimportant strategy to capture the informaleconomy is to give members financial support inthe form of loans.This is of particular interest towomen because they do not have the necessarycollateral which would enable them to accessloans.

The government could also put in place policiesthat would help the SGA to recruit moremembers, for example the provision of socialprotection, such as putting in place a suitablesocial security system and a pension scheme forthe informal economy.A policy that wouldrecognise the role of the informal economy inthe economy and enable informal economyworkers to obtain soft loans would assist theSGA to recruit more members and keep them.Also, re-establishing the ordinary people’sfinancial institutions such as the Post OfficeSavings Scheme and the Credit CooperativeBank would enable members to save theirmonies and also secure loans from theseinstitutions that do not demand the collateralthat the commercial banks demand.

Lobbying and advocacyThe SGA sees lobbying and advocacy as essentialfor the achievement of the aims and objectivesof the organisation. Negotiations can sometimestake months or even years, such as the impassebetween street hawkers and the AccraMetropolitan Assembly (AMA) where the AMAagreed to designate specific places for them to

3 6 O R G A N I S AT I O N A L A N D A DVO C AC Y S T R AT E G I E S O F I N F O R M A L E C O N O M Y O R G A N I S AT I O N S

sell their wares. However, the AMA insists thathawkers must register through their Associationto qualify to sell at these designated places.Issues that are still being fought include places tosell and social protection. However, in Takoradi,the Alliance has been able to organise thewomen to participate in the health insuranceforum to make their position on it known.Also,about sixty women now participate in the SocialSecurity and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT)pension scheme, which has previously been thepreserve of formal sector workers.A total of300 members have now registered in theScheme.

The SGA took part in the National EconomicDialogue where the general public interactedwith government.Their regional representativeswere also invited for meetings in connectionwith the taxes and lorry fares that wereproposed as part of the budget.Also, stakeholdermeetings are sometimes held with thegovernment, which enable the Alliance to providean input and understand government’s stance onpolicy issues. It also enables them to get respectfrom government. However, there are certainpolicy-making occasions the Alliance does nothear about but if they get to know about it thenthey seek to participate.This is not satisfactory,as they should be represented in all discussionsthat affect them.At least there should be someconsultation. Representation will mean constantinteractions with the authorities.There are noformal mechanisms or statutory procedures orforums in place for negotiations.They are mainlyad hoc.

The SGA expects government to come out witha national policy on the informal economy thatwill guide everybody on social protection,provide laws to regulate the operations of thesector and institutionalise lobbying and advocacywith government. Government can also assistwith workshops to bring stakeholders togetherto deliberate on the role they play and what theyneed and assist them.The strategy adopted bythe Alliance is based on the belief that there isthe need for dialogue with authorities. Ittherefore prefers negotiations with the

government rather than confrontation as “youcannot meet fire with fire” and that dialogue andnegotiation is preferable to confrontation.Through dialogue they also make the authoritiesaware that harassment will not succeed and theyhave understood that.As such there is usuallyinteraction when problems arise.

Case study 2: Local Market Banana SellersAssociation

The Local Market Banana Sellers Association(LMBSA) consists of eight banana wholesalers inGhana, who encountered problems with thesource of supply of their wares.The group wasformed under the umbrella of the GTUC, whichsuccessfully negotiated new terms with theirmain supplier and got them their supplies on aregular and satisfactory basis.The main aim of theorganisation was, therefore, to have an organisedvoice, first to ensure regular and adequatesupplies of their wares, and then to continue tobargain with other stakeholders for betterrelationships and to promote their interests.

Members of the organisation pay 2,000 Ghanacedis a month in dues to the GTUC, like anyother member, but also contribute for their ownwelfare activities. In addition to helping eachother in the case of business problems such aslosses as a result of bananas going bad.They alsohelp each other in times of bereavement,childbirth and marriage.The Association is notopen to other members at the moment. LMBSAhas no constitution and no official leadershipstructure, although the oldest woman amongstthem acts as the President.

The main challenges and problems facing themembers of the Association are financialconstraints and the frequent power cuts, whichcan lead to the destruction of their wares, lackof a permanent place for their container(warehouse) and harassment from governmentofficials.The organisation would appreciate if thegovernment gave them a permanent place fortheir container where they store their bananas.However, the LMBSA has not made any attemptto negotiate with the government on their own


and do not plan to do so.The GTUC interveneson their behalf and they are satisfied with theGTUC’s performance so far.

Case study 3: Malawi Union for theInformal Sector

Organisational history The Malawi Union for the Informal Sector(MUFIS) was formed in 2001 when the MalawiCongress of Trade Unions (MCTU) felt therewas a need to organise people in the informaleconomy, as well as widows, sex workers,retirees and the unemployed.3 It took MUFISthree years before it was allowed to registerwith the government in 2004. In order toregister, the government requested that MUFISinclude only informal economy workers in itsconstituency.The organisation was not allowedto organise widows, sex workers, retirees andthe unemployed.

During the three years that MUFIS’ registrationwas in limbo, it lost most of its appeal to thosewho had expressed an interest in joining itsranks.The current MUFIS president KenWilliams Mhango, who used to be president ofthe MCTU, reported that in its early existenceMUFIS had gathered a membership of over7,500 members, among them 3,000 vendors,3,500 widows and 1,500 pensioners.4 Most ofthese people left the union during theinsecurities around MUFIS’ registration.Therefore, when MUFIS was registered in mid2004, it had virtually no grassroots members.However, from late 2004, the organisation hasstarted to form five branches in the BlantyreDistrict and has managed to elect branchcommittees. MUFIS plans to expand itsorganising efforts into Malawi’s Central andNorthern Region.

MUFIS is currently run by an interim committeeof 12 members of which 7 are men and 5 arewomen.The members are drawn from theinformal economy and some including thepresident and general secretary have experiencein the trade union movement. Once theorganisation has a presence in the whole of

Malawi, it intends to organise a NationalCongress during which a final executivecommittee will be elected.

MUFIS has applied for affiliation to the MCTU.According to MUFIS leadership, affiliation to thetrade union federation would give themrecognition among the well-organised labourmovement in Malawi and offer them a betterbargaining position. However, there is currentlydisagreement within the union federation andaffiliates whether there should be a separateunion that organises people in the informaleconomy, or whether existing unions shouldorganise informal economy workers if their typeof work relates to the type of trade the unionsrepresent, e.g. the transport union could startorganising bus drivers and conductors in theinformal transport sector. MUFIS feels it is notalways being included as a stakeholder inprogrammes on the informal economy carriedout by the MCTU.

The aims and objectives of MUFIS are to train itsmembers in business management skills, lobbyfor soft loans for its members, protect andadvance the interests of its members and offerits members an opportunity to learn from eachother. MUFIS aims to uplift the status of informaleconomy operators, in particular street andmarket vendors, cross-border traders and othersmall-scale businesses.

The process of becoming a member commenceswith attending awareness meetings at whichthose who are in the informal economy andmotivated by the goals of MUFIS are allowed tocomplete a membership form.The annualmembership fee is 200 Malawi kwacha payableon registration.At the moment, MUFIS has atotal membership of 1,000 signed up membersof which 200 are paid up members. 60 percentof the members are women while 40 percentare men.Whereas 90 percent of the membersare market vendors, street vendors make up 10percent of the total membership. MUFIS doesnot currently have members in the cross-bordertrade category. MUFIS’ total potentialmembership is estimated at 30,000.


Organising and advocacy strategiesThe main strategy pursued by MUFIS to recruitmore members is the organisation of awarenessmeetings.Through awareness meetings, MUFIS isable to raise the interest of various categories oftraders in the informal economy.Awarenessmeetings have been a success so far becauseMUFIS has mobilised 1,000 traders within a yearand managed to establish five branches inBlantyre District. However, the leadership ofMUFIS acknowledges that holding awarenessmeetings is a slow and taxing processconsidering the resource constraints theorganisation is experiencing.The other strategythat MUFIS has experimented with is holdingconsultations with existing informal economyorganisations such as the Limbe Street VendorsAssociation.They are yet to establish a workingrelationship.

Although MUFIS has been establishing its ownbranches in various markets and towns inBlantyre District, it also works together with theexisting market committees that are in place inmost of Malawi’s markets.The role of thesecommittees is e.g. to control prices in themarket, to collect contributions from vendors tocover funeral expenses, to inspect food hygienepractices and to ensure the cleanliness of themarkets.

MUFIS does not always agree with the way inwhich these committees run the market. It feelsthey are often politicised. However, theorganisation agrees that it is crucial to try towork together with the existing committees.MUFIS makes it clear to the committees that itdoes not intend to replace them. However, whatMUFIS is able to offer is to take up issuesaffecting market vendors at national level.As anew organisation, it is not always easy for MUFISto convince potential members of the tangiblebenefits of joining the organisation.

MUFIS has not been able to try a variety ofalternative strategies to mobilise andconscientise informal economy operators.Thelocal authorities in Blantyre do not know MUFISformally. MUFIS' leadership notes that

bureaucratic deficiencies at registration delayedand paralysed the effectiveness of theorganisation. Due to a limited financial resourcebase, MUFIS does not have office structures andpaid staff.

MUFIS’ members have shared aspirations such astraining opportunities, improved access to loansand protection from harassment.At the momentMUFIS does not have the capacity to deliver onthese three aspects, and therefore risks losing itsappeal to members.The credibility gap betweenwhat MUFIS stands for and what it is able toobjectively offer will determine the kind ofconflicts that will emerge with the passage of


Through drama and theatre, MUFIS aims toraise awareness on issues of workers’ rights in

the informal economy.

time.As a precautionary measure, MUFISemphasises the need for awareness andconscientisation of the members and on theneed for realistic expectations.

Based on the trade union example in Malawi,MUFIS aims to establish a separate Women’sWing and separate Women’s Committees in itsvarious branches.Women within MUFIS feel thatthis will enable them to talk freely about issuesthat affect them. Joining the main wing is oftendifficult for women as they do not feelcomfortable to speak out.At the moment, theinterests of women centre on financialempowerment in terms of access to loans,adequate protection of their business interestsfrom harassment by local governmentauthorities, and discrimination on the basis ofgender. One of the goals of MUFIS is to ensurethat its members have access to credit fromvarious lending institutions. MUFIS intends tolobby financial institutions to consider providingcredit to vulnerable women on moreconcessionary terms. It also intends to opennegotiations with the City Assembly in Blantyreon how to enhance the protection of women’sinterests in the informal economy.

Case study 4: Limbe Street VendorAssociation

Organisational historyThe Limbe Street Vendor Association (LSVA) hasbeen in existence for over a decade. It cameinto being around the 1993-5 period, which wasa time when Malawi went through a politicaltransition from one-party rule to multipartydemocracy.As an earlier report on theemergence of street vendors’ associations inBlantyre concluded,“This coincidence impliesthat a discussion of the street vendors’ politicsis inseparable or can be better understood aspart and parcel of the transformations ofMalawi’s politics”. The transition to multipartypolitics provided the context in which streetvendors could mobilise and organise in ameaningful way to advance with one voice theirneeds and interests. In the one-party state,street vending was repressed without recourse.

Although street vending is not allowed underthe prevailing legal framework of market andpeddler by-laws, street vending is tolerated inthe current political dispensation, though notliked.

Although the LSVA has been in existence for thelast 10 years, its legal status is ambiguous. It isnot registered with the authorities.The LSVA’sorganisational structure is made up of acommittee of fourteen members who are allmale.The association does not have a writtenconstitution, but it is not devoid of rules andregulations that are communicated to newentrants.As the chairman put it:

We do not have a written constitution.Weare guided by a general code of conduct,which is partly informed and in line with theprovisions of the by-laws handed to us by theCity Assembly.We inform new membersabout our code of practice and rules such ascleanliness, honesty and diligence.We wouldwish to have a written constitution but wecannot afford the legal advice that may berequired.

Despite its lack of registration, the LSVA isrecognised and sometimes consulted by localgovernment authorities as a legitimaterepresentative of the street vendors operating inLimbe Central Business District (CBD), which isa town adjacent to Blantyre. Because of itsproximity to Blantyre, the LSVA has strongbonds of cooperation with the members of theBlantyre Street Vendors Association.The closeassociation between these two street vendorassociations is also due to the fact that theyoperate under the same local authority, Blantyreand Limbe merged into Blantyre City in 1966.Hence, they are subject to similar by-laws andlocal government prerogatives.

The LSVA’s main aim is to mobilise streetvendors for collective action with the view ofimproving the status of all street vendors.Theassociation has plans to form a national umbrellacommittee to serve the interest of all streetvendors in major urban areas in Malawi.


Other objectives of the organisation can besummarised as follows:• to represent the street vendors’ interests at

different levels including at local government(City Assembly);

• to be a focal point for any course of actionintended to promote the interest of thestreet vendors;

• to provide leadership in all matters affectingstreet vendors;

• to promote cooperation and mutualassistance among the street vendorsespecially in times of sickness andbereavement;

• to enhance security and stability in thestreets by cooperating with the police in theenforcement of law and order;

• to promote the image of street vendors aslaw abiding citizens;

• to encourage cleanliness in the places streetvendors conduct their trade.

New vendors who wish to sell goods in Limbe’sCentral Business District need to askpermission from LSVA’s chairman to set up astall or to use space in a particular street as itsbusiness premises.Vendors will have to pay a feeof 1,000 Malawi kwacha upon registration andallocation of a business space.After the initialregistration fee, vendors are not required to payfurther fees, neither to the LSVA nor to theCity Assembly. One could therefore argue thatthe LSVA has in this case to some extent takenover the role of local authorities in allocating

vending space to new vendors. In March 2005,the organisation had around 4,000 signedup/paid up members.This represents an increaseof over 1,000 members from 2,957 members inNovember 2002.6 The majority of vendors inLimbe are male. Roughly, males constitutebetween 60 and 70 percent of the streetvendors. However, these figures exclude mobilestreet vendors, that is, those without a specificoperating space.

Whereas most female street vendors sellfoodstuffs such as rice, maize flour, fruits andvegetables, male vendors tend to sell hardwareproducts, clothing (both new and second handclothes), shoes, groceries and electricalappliances (e.g. radios, cassette players and audioand video tapes, CDs, cellular phone chargers).Arandom sample survey of 100 street vendors inBlantyre found that 28 percent of the streetvendors were selling foodstuffs, 33 percentclothing, 8 percent electrical products, 6 percenthardware products, 2 percent books andnewspapers and 23 percent an assortment ofproducts.7

Organising strategiesThe principal activity of the LSVA is to representthe interests of the street vendors in LimbeCBD. Representation is intended to foster theinterests of the vendors, in particular access tovending spaces and freedom from harassment bythe city authorities and the police. In this regard,another major activity is protection of the streetvendors from relocation.The major problemsexperienced by street vendors in Limbe are lackof appropriate infrastructure to protectmerchandise from damage due to extremeweather conditions like intensive heat and heavyrain, harassment by Asian shop owners whoresent street vendors operating on the verandasof their shops, lack of capital and limited accessto credit.Women engaged in makeshiftrestaurants need protection from City Assemblyhealth inspectors who often criticise restaurantoperators for unhygienic practices and forfacilitating the spread of food borne diseasessuch as cholera and typhoid.

Stalls of street vendors in Limbe.


The LSVA committee holds two meetings perweek during which critical issues are discussedand reported to the rest of the street vendorpopulation.Another strategy is consultations tosolicit views that may enhance the effectivenessof the association. Both strategies, meetings andconsultations, have been successful asmechanisms for mobilising support andenhancing the interests of the street vendors.Through consultations, the committee is able toestablish and pursue matters of interest to thestreet vendors. Some of the issues includethreats of relocation from the street, collectionof refuse and garbage by city authorities,indiscipline and theft cases.

Meetings are also a medium through which thecommittee communicates its agenda to themembers and obtains views, and gaugespopularity of certain courses of action.A sharedperception is formulated as a yardstick of what isto happen or not.To promote the good image ofstreet vending, the committee collaborates withthe police in curbing theft cases on the streetsand oversees the behaviour of vendors towardsclients. In a few cases, the committee has beenable to mobilise the street vendors todemonstrate against relocation. Demonstrationsare organised as a show of power againstunpopular policies, especially attempts to enforcelaws that prohibit street vending.

The LSVA relies on membership fees as its onlysource of funding.The organisation does nothave paid staff or office structures. LSVA’sleaders are chosen through voting.At least onemember of the City Assembly or Member ofParliament for the area oversees the elections.However, there is no time frame for holdingelections.The last election was held in 2001.Thechairman of the committee has been in office forthe past 10 years. Most of the committeemembers have served for more than five years.Elections are only held when the members showdissatisfaction with the manner in which thecommittee is running their affairs.

From the leaders’ perspective, the relations withthe members are cordial.They have cooperation

from the members although sometimesproblems do exist. However, in a similar studyconducted in 2000, it was observed that there isoften mistrust between the leadership of LSVAand the members. The members accused theleadership of abuse of power, harsh treatment ofstreet vendors suspected of minor offences andundue fines in the form of money and extortionwere reported.To a good number of streetvendors interviewed, their leadership was a toolof oppression and they were often perceived asagents of the ruling party.The chairman of theLSVA is also the chairman of the local UnitedDemocratic Front (UDF) branch.Although theleadership has not changed, the recent change ingovernment appears to have a remarkable effecton the manner the leadership conducts itself. Itappears there is a degree of separation betweenpolitical party loyalties and street vendors’issues.

Lobbying and advocacyThe Limbe Street Vendors Association bargainswith the Blantyre City assembly and the policeon various issues including sanitation refusecollection, community policing and relocationfrom the streets. One of the strategies that hasworked to the advantage of the street vendors isaligning themselves with the vested interests ofthe politicians, the ruling party in particular.Another strategy that has also worked well isstubborn resistance when city authorities deployarmed police officers to enforce relocation. InNovember 2002 there were street battlesbetween the police and street vendors inBlantyre CBD.

One of the most remarkable achievements isthat despite a lack of enabling legislation, thestreet vendors have over the years gainedtolerance.As previously stated, street vending istolerated though not liked by the city authoritiesand the national government.The leadership ofthe LSVA is of the view that the local andnational government could do better to improvethe working conditions of the street vendors andother people in the informal economy bydeveloping enabling legislation, providingnecessary infrastructure in the markets and


facilitating access to business loans.Theleadership also noted that agreements betweenthe LSVA and local authorities are often notsigned which means that agreements are notkept despite reminders.The introduction ofstatutory negotiations could improve theconsultation between street vendors and localauthorities.

Case study 5:Association of InformalSector Operators and Workers - ASSOTSI

Organisational historyThe 'Associação dos Operadores eTrabalhadores do Sector Informal' (Associationof Informal Sector Operators and Workers,ASSOTSI) was launched during a seminar inMaputo in November 1998 which was organisedby Mozambique’s trade union federation, OTM,which played an important role in the foundationof ASSOTSI. By April 1999, the organisation waspresent in 16 markets.The Mozambicangovernment also supported the organisationthrough a donation of 5 million Mozambiquemeticais towards the foundation of ASSOTSIfrom the previous Mozambican PresidentJoaquim Alberto Chissano.

ASSOTSI is a full affiliate of OTM and has itsheadquarters in the OTM premises in Maputo.ASSOTSI enjoys a good relationship with OTM.They have the same rights as other affiliates andas one of the last affiliates to join the federation,ASSOTSI feels it benefits from exchangingexperiences with older affiliates. OTM frequentlyadds representatives from ASSOTSI to itsdelegation at international events. However,sharing office accommodation with OTM is notalways ideal and the organisation has expressedinterest in having its own office, including havingaccess to its own fax, computer and photocopier.

One of the reasons why ASSOTSI wasestablished was to avoid police harassment.Theexpression ‘dumba nengue’, which literally means‘trust your feet’ in the local language Ronga, wasoften used by informal economy workers torefer to activities in the informal economy.Theauthorities associated these activities with

illegality and used harsh measures to repressthem.

ASSOTSI's main aims are:• to protect the interests of market vendors;• to assist in the management of the markets;• to provide improvements to infrastructure in

the markets.

ASSOTSI currently has 26 branch committeeswithin 59 markets in Maputo. In 2005,ASSOTSIhad 4,870 paid-up members and an additionallarge amount of members (estimated at 37,000,three quarters are women) who were unable topay their monthly fees.Vendors who want tobecome members need to fill in a form and pay5,000 Mozambique meticais per month.ASSOTSIrepresents both self-employed marketeers andemployees of vendors.

Because of an alleged incident of diversion offunds in a particular market in Maputo, someASSOTSI members reported that they prefer topay cleaners and security guards directly ratherthan through ASSOTSI as they are not sure howthe money is being used. However,ASSOTSImembers in Chikhelene Market on the other handhad more confidence in the management of feescollected from ASSOTSI members.This market ishighly organised and basic hygiene rules arerespected. It is also through traders established inthis market that ASSOTSI was founded.


Lack of garbage collectionin one of Maputo’smarkets.

The Municipal Council also collects levies frommarket vendors. It employs a number of officersin each market who are responsible forcollection of revenue. For example in EstrelaVermelha Market in Maputo, the Council ischarging vendors 2 Mozambique meticais persquared meter.Apart from having revenuecollectors in the market, the Council alsoemploys security guards.

ASSOTSI is organised through an ExecutiveSecretariat that is responsible for budgetmonitoring and the organisation is headed by apresident. Elections take place every five yearsthrough a secret ballot. In October 2005,ASSOTSI launched its national organisationalstructure.Whereas it was previously mainlybased in Maputo, the organisation now has apresence in other provinces such as Gaza,Inhambane, Sofala, Manica, Zambezia,Tete,Nampula. Provincial Assemblies were organisedduring which delegates that were going toparticipate in the National Assembly wereelected.The National Assembly was attended by70 delegates from all provinces except CaboDelgado and Niassa.Various governmentrepresentatives also attended such as theMinister of Industry and Trade, the Minister ofLabour, the City Governor of Maputo.

Organising strategiesASSOTSI’s organising strategy comprises settingup a ‘Núcleos de Base’ through the formation ofa ‘Constituency Centre' in the various markets.These branch committees comprise fiverepresentatives from the market vendors: achairman, an organiser, a mobilisation officer, afinance officer and a social issues officer.Thebranch committees hold regular meetings(weekly or fortnightly) during which variousissues are discussed, e.g. conflicts betweenvendors about debts and even marital disputes.In most markets,ASSOTSI employs its ownguards who provide security overnight.

In order to make it attractive for members tojoin ASSOTSI, the organisation offers torepresent market vendors in disputes against thegovernment, assist them with credit optionsthrough negotiating with banks, mediate insituations of conflicts between marketeers, andassist marketeers should they end up in prison.

ASSOTSI also organises workshops on healthissues such as tuberculosis, diarrhoea andHIV/AIDS.Workshops are organised with theassistance of HIV/AIDS activists trained by OTM.ASSOTSI also has a partnership with theNational Council towards the Fight AgainstHIV/AIDS which is a governmental body.As away to raise awareness,ASSOTSI invites theatregroups in certain markets to raise awarenessabout health issues, and the organisation plans tohave its own theatre groups as well.

Each branch in the market also has its ownWomen’s Committee that deals with childcareissues, the establishment of crèches in themarket and provision of training for women suchas lessons in sewing. In some cases, women assisteach other in establishing small businesses in themarket.A group of women then each contributea small amount of money that will assist awoman new to the business to set up a stall. Shewill then have to pay back the other womenlater.

Although women dominate as members ofASSOTSI, they occupy marginal positions in the


Ramos Marrengula,President ASSOTSI, at the

office in Maputo.

leadership of the organisation, both at thenational level and at the level of the 'Núcleos deBase'.Women interviewed in Fajardo Market,Xipamanine Market, Red Star Market andMandela Market 1 and 2 reported that they feelexcluded from taking part in the elections.Theyfeel they also have a right to occupy keypositions in the organisation because they makeup the majority of ASSOTSI.Women in thesemarkets felt it would be better to set up theirown organisations that would cater for theirneeds instead of joining a male-dominatedorganisation. By contrast, women in ChikheleneMarket felt that women should be included inthe direction of the commissions at local levelbut they would prefer not seeing them involvedin the leadership.Women in this particularmarket thought it would be better if womenwere involved in sales instead of wasting time ondiscussions and resolutions of peripheral issues.

Lobbying and advocacyASSOTSI has a good relationship with local andcentral government.When problems have arisenfor the traders, there has been an opportunityfor ASSOTSI to negotiate.ASSOTSI has tried tolobby government in order to build coveredmarkets and the organisation has managed toimprove water and sanitation services in themarkets and build toilets. Some of ASSOTSI’sleaders in the Xipamanine and Fajardo marketsin Maputo are also representatives from theruling party Frente de Libertaçâo deMoçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front,FRELIMO) at the local level.This has meant thatASSOTSI has therefore often been perceived asbeing closely linked to FRELIMO.

However, this close relationship has sometimesgiven them the advantage to be able to influencepolicies affecting market vendors. FRELIMOcouncillors who are also ASSOTSI members haveon several occasions been able to highlight theproblems which market vendors are facing inMozambique. For example, in 2003,ASSOTSIorganised a strike in Maputo in response togovernment comments that a cholera outbreakwas caused by the existence of informal markets.Market vendors were furious and agreed for two

days not to pay any levies and vendors were notmanning their stalls.This forced the governmentto come to the negotiating table and towithdraw its comments.A medical officer wasasked to look into the matter and things wererectified. One of the conclusions of theinvestigation was that the lack of governmentaction on water provision was causing theproblem.As one of ASSOTSI’s members said:“Inthe informal economy, we don’t need to march,we just need to stop paying levies and thegovernment listens”.

Case study 6:Association of InformalSector Traders and Importers - Mukhero

Organisational historyThe Association of Informal Sector Traders andImporters, better known as Mukhero (whichliterally means 'to carry'), was established in1999 and legally recognised in 2004. Mukhero’smain objectives are:• to defend the interests of informal importers

(meaning those who do not have officialimport licences);

• to organise and improve the activities ofimporters in the informal economy;

• to end the violation of visa regimes betweenMozambique and neighbouring countries andabolish tax evasion practices.

The practice of mukhero refers to the trading ofa variety of goods, vegetables, fruits, clothes andsmall home appliances brought in from otherparts of Mozambique and neighbouring countriesin order to be sold in markets in Maputo. Most'mukheristas' are women and revenues are oftenused to buy goods in South Africa, Swaziland andother neighbouring countries, and are all sold inMaputo.The government has tried to controland regulate borders and trading in various waysbut people have used various strategies tocircumvent these controls. Cross-border tradersoften operate without official travel documents.For example, Mozambican traders arrive at theborder. In order to cross the border to enter aneighbouring country to buy goods for trading,they strike a deal with the customs officers whothey pay a small fee in order to be allowed to


enter the country. In this way, the tradermanages to enter the country to buy the goodshe/she wishes to trade.

Mukhero’s members are mostly based in Maputoand estimated to be 476 at present, 70 percentare women and 30 percent are men. Mukherorepresents informal traders and importers aswell as other people who are involved inbusinesses related to cross-border trade such ascarriers, dealers, warehouse workers, guards andothers. Each member is expected to contribute30,000 Mozambique meticais per month.Mukhero has a fixed office in Maputo andemploys some seasonal staff. Its leadershipstructure comprises 5 men and 1 woman.Mukhero considers lack of capacity and technicalassistance in economic and legal affairs to be oneof its weaknesses.

Lobbying and advocacyMukhero values lobbying and advocacy as animportant activity. Mukhero aims to lobby withthe government for improvement of the importregulations that its members are subject to, e.g.access to reduced visa fees and reduction ofcustom duties and import taxes.According toMukhero’s president, this would in the long runresult in:• improvement of the Human Development

Index in Mozambique, considering that small-scale cross-border trade represents asignificant percentage of international trade inMozambique;

• a better supply of goods which are notprovided by national producers;

• higher levels of employment, as cross-bordertrade involves many people who do not haveaccess to formal employment.

The organisation regularly has meetings atnational government level. For example in May2005, Mukhero was reported to have met withthe Minister of Industry and Trade inMozambique.10 In the meeting, the organisationcomplained of what they regarded as excessivelyhigh customs duties, difficult forms of paymentimposed by customs officials and delays inclearing their, often perishable, goods through

customs. In order to address some of theseissues, the Minister promised to set up acommission that would involve informal tradersand members of the National Directorate ofTrade to investigate ways that would reducetransaction costs at the borders.At first thegovernment saw Mukhero as an opponent as itperceived some of its members as tax evaders,and thought that it was against development.However, the government increasingly seesMukhero as a partner.

Case study 7:Alliance for Zambia InformalEconomy Associations

Organisational historyFully supported by StreetNet International,AZIEAwas formally launched in October 2002 with theassistance of the Workers Education AssociationZambia (WEAZ) and in partnership with theZambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU).Aconsultative process between and among informaleconomy associations,WEAZ and the ZCTUpreceded the launch of AZIEA in 2002.

WEAZ was crucial in the formation of AZIEA,and remains important up to this day.Theformation of WEAZ was the result of apartnership between the ZCTU and theWorkers' Educational Association (WEA) -England and Scotland, which started in 1995.Thispartnership aimed to examine the opportunitiesfor developing education programmes forworkers who were retrenched and forced tofind resort in the informal economy as a resultof the privatisation of the mines in theCopperbelt area. Subsequent to the numerousretrenchments, the Zambia Informal EconomyWorkers' Education Project was created inorder to enable WEAZ to undertake structuredconsultations between and among informaleconomy associations at a local, national andinternational level.The final consultative reportwas discussed during a seminar organised inOctober 2001 by WEAZ in partnership withWEA - England and Scotland.

During this seminar, thirteen attending Zambianinformal economy organisations began to


explore the possibilities of forming a nationalalliance in order to promote unity andstrengthen representation of informal economyworkers in Zambia.The seminar was alsoattended by representatives from the Self-Employed Women’s Union from South Africa, theGhana Trade Union Congress, StreetNet, theUganda Public Employees Union,ASSOTSI fromMozambique and the Ishmael Nedziwe Collegeof Labour Studies from Zimbabwe.

AZIEA’s mission is to promote full participationand protection of informal economy workers incommunity and national development.The mainobjectives of AZIEA as described in their leafletare:

• to organise the unorganised and allassociations engaged in the informal economyin Zambia;

• to promote local and national solidaritybetween informal economy workersorganisations;

• to fight for recognition by advocating for theestablishment of bargaining forums betweengovernment and informal economyrepresentatives;

• to secure substantial representation of streetand market vendors and hawkers in nationaland international forums;

• to educate workers and members in theinformal economy on their civil, social andworkers’ rights;

• to lobby government on legislation or policiesaffecting the interests of members and toprovide support or oppose such legislation orpolicies and make representation to publicand other bodies;

• to promote democratic and effectiveleadership in all structures of the Alliance.

AZIEA’s nine affiliated member organisationsrepresent different types of workers in theinformal economy such as market traders, streetvendors, hawkers, carpenters, fishermen,craftsmen, cross border traders, tinsmiths andfence wire makers.12 All associations in theinformal economy can apply through the GeneralSecretary to join AZIEA.Affiliated members are

required to pay 100,000 Zambia kwachaaffiliation fee and a monthly subscription fee of25,000 Zambia kwacha. Not all organisationslisted above are fully paid up members.Thoseorganisations that have not contributed theiraffiliation fees are unable to participate in allactivities organised by AZIEA, e.g. trainingworkshops, nor will they have voting rightsduring the convention. In total,AZIEA’s affiliatesare estimated to have 48,300 members and apotential membership of 4 million.Womenrepresent the majority in the membership ofmost of AZIEA’s affiliates.

AZIEA is a member of StreetNet Internationaland this alliance of street vendor organisationsplayed a crucial role in the establishment of theorganisation. Furthermore, the organisation is anassociate member of the ZCTU, which meansthat it does not have voting rights as comparedto full members.According to AZIEA memberorganisations, the relationship with the ZCTUcould be strengthened further. It was felt thatZCTU does not always take up issues affectingworkers in the informal economy in the variousfora in which it participates. Representativesfrom informal economy organisations are notpart of the official ZCTU delegation to the ILOAnnual Conference and they are not alwaysbeing invited to attend workshops on theinformal economy organised by e.g. the ILOBureau for Workers’ Activities (ILO-ACTRAV).

AZIEA members feel that the ZCTU could domore to bring up the needs of informal economyworkers as represented by AZIEA, and torecognise AZIEA as a major stakeholder in issuesto do with the informal economy. Being affiliatedto ZCTU gives AZIEA a public profile andvisibility as the ZCTU has a direct platform withthe government and is able to put issues on theagenda. However,AZIEA feels that ZCTU as atrade union federation does not alwayssufficiently represent AZIEA and informaleconomy workers in general. In the past, theZCTU has organised workshops on the informaleconomy and not invited representatives fromAZIEA or other informal economy organisationsto these.AZIEA would also like to be part of a


tripartite forum in the same way as other ZCTUaffiliates are.

AZIEA also has links with other civil societyorganisations in Zambia such as Jubilee Zambiaand has recently forged an alliance with theZambia United Local Authorities Workers Union(ZULAWU). Many of ZULAWU’s members havebeen laid off in the past as part of structuraladjustment policies implemented by thegovernment of Zambia that sought to slim downlocal government.

Organising strategiesAZIEA provides a platform for all informaleconomy organisations in Zambia. It aims torepresent informal economy workers at anational level. In this respect, the organisationlobbies with local and national government forthe improvement of conditions in the informaleconomy and to demand a social dialoguemechanism in order to ensure full participationof informal economy workers in policyformulation processes.Apart from arepresentative role,AZIEA also aims to build thecapacity of affiliated organisations throughprovision of training workshops, together withWEAZ in the areas of leadership and negotiationskills.Through exchange visits between itsaffiliated members,AZIEA also attempts toestablish a sense of solidarity among differentinformal economy organisations in Zambia.

AZIEA has an office in Kitwe which is located inZambia’s Copperbelt Province.The organisationemploys three people at national level and fourorganisers at district level (Kitwe, Mansa, Lusaka,Kalulushi).AZIEA’s structure also includes aWomen’s Subcommittee to cater for the specialneeds of women in the informal economy.However, the Subcommittee has not been fullyoperational. It is composed of 10 members butcurrently only 7 members have been appointed.It is expected that elections of the positions inthis committee will take place at AZIEA’s secondconvention in October 2005.Although two outof four committee members part of AZIEA’sNational Executive Committee should be womenaccording to the Constitution, some women feelother leadership positions should be occupied bywomen as well.

The role of the Women’s Subcommittee is toshare ideas, mobilise women and to initiateincome-generating projects. Some women withinAZIEA have been exposed to exchange visitswith other organisations such as ASSOTSI inMozambique and the Self-Employed Women’sAssociation (SEWA) in India.They have becomeaware of facilities in the market in thosecountries such as for example a clinic, nurseryand a bank. SEWA is also providing adulteducation and women are eager to replicatethese activities in Zambia.

AZIEA is an umbrella body that links up differentkinds of associations. For example, the ZambiaNational Marketeers' Association (ZANAMA)which is an organisation that was established in1999 and which has an estimated potentialmembership of 1 million marketeers. Bycontrast, the Tinsmith’s Association in LubarmaMarket in Lusaka which is also affiliated toAZIEA currently has a membership of 21members.The smaller organisations present inAZIEA sometimes feel undermined by thedominant role of ZANAMA in the coalition.Leadership of AZIEA partly overlaps withleadership of ZANAMA and this could lead tofurther conflicts within the organisation. Some ofthe smaller organisations find it difficult todistinguish between ZANAMA and AZIEA and

Members of AZIEA’s Women’s Subcommittee.

O R G A N I S AT I O N A L A N D A DVO C AC Y S T R AT E G I E S O F I N F O R M A L E C O N O M Y O R G A N I S AT I O N S4 8

argue that they are one and the same.

One of the main problems that members ofAZIEA’s affiliates cited is lack of access to credit.Current banks and other credit deliveryinstitutions charge high interest rates, requirepotential lenders to have collateral or demandrepayment soon after disbursement of loans.Some credit institutions catering for small-scaleentrepreneurs such as Pride Zambia would onlyoffer credit to groups. Informal economyworkers, however, often prefer to get individualloans as group loans can lead to problems incase one member of the group defaults onpaying. Other members of the group then end uppaying for that member.

Lobbying and advocacySince AZIEA’s establishment in 2002, theorganisation has increasingly been recognised byboth local and central government.AZIEA hasmanaged to bring to the national level some ofthe issues facing market vendors and otherinformal economy workers in Zambia.Accordingto AZIEA, the most pressing issues on its agendainclude:

• lack of effective representation in policy-dialogue and decision making both at local

and national government levels;• lack of social security and legal protection;• lack of recognition by the authorities;• absence of a conducive policy framework for

the informal economy.

With regard to the changes in the administrationof markets in Zambia,AZIEA has called on thegovernment to speed up the implementation ofthe Market Task Force which was commissionedby government to review, among other issues,management of the markets in Zambia.TheMarket Task Force, comprising a wide group ofstakeholders, was formed in 2003 following thedemand by AZIEA that the governmentintervene to resolve the problem of arbitrarylocal government increases in market levies andreplace outdated colonial market regulation.

AZIEA presented a position paper on theorganisation’s vision on management of themarkets in Zambia during a meeting withPresident Levy Mwanawasa in July 2004.Theorganisation has also urged government torepeal or amend old laws in order to improveprotection and recognition of informal workers.The Market Act which is currently in place datesback from the 1930s.

As a result of holding several public meetingsand events,AZIEA has managed to strengthenits representation. In some instances,AZIEA hasexperienced resistance from local governmentduring meetings. On several occasions, localauthority refused AZIEA to use Council venuesduring their public meetings, and on oneoccasion even instructed staff at the city squareto cut off electricity in order to disturb thepublic address system. However, in anothertown the Mayor has been very grateful forAZIEA’s initiative in holding a meeting and urgedAZIEA leaders to show leadership.The Mayoradmitted to the failure on the part of theCouncils to provide services to the communityand the absence of dialogue between the twoparties.

AZIEA is now generally recognised because ofpublications such as leaflets, posters, radio and

4 9

Members of ZANAMA inSoweto Market in Lusaka.

F O R C E S F O R C H A N G E

TV interviews, press conferences and pressreleases commenting on national issues.Therehas also been less harassment of street vendorsand better delivery of services in the markets bythe Council. Because of the increasing visibilityand strength of street vendors, there have beenfewer clampdowns on street traders. Servicesthat are supposed to be delivered by the CityCouncils have improved, e.g. garbage now tendsto be collected more frequently.

Local government ministers and Councillors passby AZIEA to get their views on issues and tohave meetings together. However, not allmeetings are always held in a formal way andAZIEA has complained about that.Town clerkshave a different way of working which is notalways formal.AZIEA hopes this will improve inthe future so that the organisation is morefrequently consulted in a formal and moresustained way.The organisation is activelylobbying for the establishment of a collectivebargaining forum to ensure the government isconsulting informal economy workers on theissues affecting them.

As an umbrella body,AZIEA also protects anddefends its affiliated member organisations. Forexample, in mid-2004 Kitwe and Ndola CityCouncil blamed one of AZIEA’s biggest affiliates,the Zambia National Marketeers' Association(ZANAMA) of being the biggest hindrance tomaintenance of the markets. ZANAMA wascriticised for collecting its own market levies andthe Council appealed before the ParliamentarySubcommittee on Local Governance and ChiefAffairs to deregister the association.AZIEAsubsequently organised a press conference onthe issue in which it strongly condemned thederegistration of ZANAMA and argued thatZANAMA was justified in collecting subscriptionfees from its own members. It also demandedfrom the Clerk of the National Assembly todefend AZIEA’s position on the planned de-registration of ZANAMA before theParliamentary Subcommittee which it wasgranted in July 2004.The de-registration wassubsequently called off.

Case study 8: Cross-Border TraderAssociation

Organisational historyThe Cross-Border Trader Association wasestablished in 1995 in Lusaka. Many cross-bordertraders were experiencing harassment fromimmigration and custom officials. In theirjourneys to surrounding countries, traders wouldsometimes fall ill or even die in some cases.TheZambian embassy would not always take care ofthe traders in these instances and this is wherethe need for an association arose.Also, cross-border traders were confronted with highcustom levies at the borders to enable them toimport their goods.As these levies were veryhigh, the response of traders was often to evadepaying these taxes.The establishment of anassociation would enable traders to set up adialogue with government about these issues inorder to lobby for changes in import levies thatwould be friendlier towards small-scale cross-border traders. In summary, there was a clearneed for an association that could representcross-border traders and assist them in case ofemergency.

The Cross-Border Trader Association currentlyhas 35,000 members. Out of this membership,8,000 people have a presence in the Cross-Border Trader market in the city centre ofLusaka and in other areas in Zambia.TheAssociation currently has 40 branches and apresence in over 15 markets in the CommonMarket of Eastern and Southern Africa(COMESA) region.Traders originate fromdifferent countries in the region and sell a widevariety of goods such as jewellery, watches,clothes, blankets and music tapes. Somemembers go as far as Dubai and China to sourceproducts. In many cases, a group of traders putmoney together to enable one of them to travelabroad.

Apart from representing cross-border traders innegotiations with government, the Associationalso provides training on HIV/AIDS issues.Cross-border traders are very vulnerable interms of HIV/AIDS as they are travelling long


distances within the region, often taking liftsfrom truck drivers.This exposes them to the riskof HIV/AIDS and the Association therefore sawthe need to raise more awareness on this issue.Through leaflets and posters in buses and trains,the Association also provides its members withinformation on the legislation that guides cross-border trading. In the event of policy changes,the Association organises public meetings inorder to provide members with up-to-dateinformation.The Association has a social welfarerole in that it provides assistance to relatives ofdeceased cross-borders for funeral expenses. Italso assists with the costs of repatriation ofbodies from surrounding countries. Because ofthe different languages that people speak in theCOMESA zone, the Association introducededucation programmes in basic business languageskills to enable different traders to communicatewith each other. If traders have been robbed ontheir journeys, the Association provides somesort of insurance against losses made. Lastly, theAssociation helps members in acquiring traveldocuments.

Lobbing and advocacyOne of the first successes that the Associationachieved was the establishment of a market inLusaka exclusively for cross-border traderscoming from Zambia and surrounding countries.The Association managed to buy land from theCouncil and the market became a reality in 1999and brought most cross-border traders underone roof. People who wish to sell their productsin the market can apply for space with theAssociation.They have to contribute 120,000Zambia kwacha in membership joining fee and80,000 Zambia kwacha in renewal fees.The factthat the market in Lusaka brought all cross-border traders under one roof also made iteasier for the Association to educate theirmembers on various issues, for traders tosupport each other and to ensure they wouldnot be intimidated.

The Association lobbies the Ministry of HomeAffairs on immigration issues and the Ministry ofFinance on custom duties. It strongly feels thereshould be special custom levies for small-scale

traders. Currently, both small-scale and large-scale traders are subject to the same rules interms of payment of custom levies, often 40percent of the estimated value of good plusvalue-added tax. However, the profit margins oflicensed importers are much higher than that ofsmall-scale cross-border traders.The Associationtherefore lobbies government on a custompolicy that is friendlier towards smaller traders.At the moment, most cross-border tradersevade taxes through various strategies whichmeans that government is not collecting anyrevenues.A more suitable policy towards cross-border traders could potentially reduce taxevasion and motivate traders to contribute. Sofar, the Association has managed to negotiate arebate on some products.Another problem thatcross-border traders face is the fact that thevarious currencies in the COMESA region arenot directly convertible. Currencies also need tobe converted to US dollars first.The Cross-Border Trader Association feels there is a needfor direct convertibility between currencies inthe COMESA region.

Analysis and conclusionThis chapter has provided a number of casestudies on eight organisations operating in theinformal economy in Ghana, Malawi, Mozambiqueand Zambia. It has discussed the various ways inwhich they try to organise themselves andbecome more vocal on issues affecting theirmembers. It has also described the various waysin which these organisations have interacted withlocal and central government.

With respect to organising, organisations haveused a variety of strategies. Many organisationsare confronted with trying to find a balancebetween representing their members towardslocal and central government, and deliveringservices in order to attract and keep members.They feel it is necessary for them to offertangible benefits to their members in order toconvince them to become members and remaininterested in the organisation. On the otherhand, they do not want to give false expectationsto their members which they know they areunable meet.As a result of low sources of


income, offering services such as education andmicro-credit is difficult. In addition, it alsorequires capacity from the organisation in termsof organising delivery of these types of services.

Within the case studies discussed in this chapter,we can distinguish between different types oforganisations. First of all, umbrella bodies ofdifferent informal economy associations such asthe StreetNet Ghana Alliance (SGA) and theAlliance for Zambia Informal EconomyAssociations (AZIEA).These organisations wereset up as part of initiatives taken by local tradeunion federations and also in close cooperationwith StreetNet International, an internationalnetwork of street vendor organisations in Africa,Asia and Latin America.Their aim was to providea platform for informal economy organisationsand to bring the issues to national level. Often,these organisations have also participated inexchange visits with other similar organisationsin Asia and Latin America.These are very recentinitiatives but some successes have beenachieved e.g. in Zambia where AZIEA isincreasingly recognised by government officialsand is invited to participate in various forums.The link with trade union federations is oftenperceived as posing both advantages anddisadvantages. On the one hand, it facilitates therecognition of organisations at national level. Onthe other hand, it is sometimes argued that closelinks can slow down decision making processesas was mentioned by one respondent in Ghana.

The second type of organisations are those thatstarted working together with existing marketcommittees in specific markets in towns such asthe Malawi Union for the Informal Sector andASSOTSI in Mozambique. Gradually, they haveexpanded their organising efforts and now areon the way to become more nationally orientedorganisations.Whereas SGA and AZIEA workwith different type of informal economyorganisations,ASSOTSI and MUFIS mainly tendto work with small-scale market vendorcommittees.

In terms of advocacy strategies, we have alsoseen how some organisations have used closelinks with local government officials as a way toachieve objectives. In the case of Mozambique,the government was involved in setting up theorganisation and it has had an ambivalentrelationship with the ruling party FRELIMO,where it has criticised them on some occasionsand tried to become more involved in theiractivities in other instances.The Limbe StreetVendor Association has been using similarstrategies, where the chairperson of theassociation is also the chairperson of the localpolitical party branch. Markets have often beenhubs of political activity; marketeers are animportant political constituency.This can also beseen in Zambia where political partiesestablished branches in the markets or tried toestablish organisations. Marketeers often feelthey have been used in party politics and this hasbeen an important reason for the establishmentof organisations such as ZANAMA. By organisingmarket vendors into an organisation, ZANAMAaimed to prevent party 'cadres' from extortingmoney from vendors with the threat of violence.

Advocacy strategies were mainly targeted atlocal government to address issues such asimprovement of market infrastructure,harassment by police officials and complaintsabout levies in the markets. However, otherorganisations such as Mukhero and the Cross-Border Trader Association have looked at overallgovernment policies towards the informaleconomy.They have particularly been vocal aboutthe way in which current policies disadvantagesmall importers and are mainly drawn up forlarge-scale importers.Although governmentshave victimised cross-border traders for evadingtaxes and import duties, Mukhero and theCross-Border Trader Association have lobbiedfor policies that are friendlier towards small-scale importers.The next chapter will discuss inmore detail the extent to which centralgovernments have tried to address the needs ofworkers in the informal economy.


Chapter Six will provide an overview of thepresence or lack of general government policiestowards the informal economy in the context ofchanging practices of the IMF and World Bank. Itwill then conclude with an analysis of the variousways in which governments have approached thedebate for or against government intervention inthe informal economy.

Arguments for and against governmentintervention in the informal economyThe question of whether the government shouldintervene in the informal economy has beenapproached from various angles.1 Some haveadvocated for a withdrawal of the governmentfrom the economy. Neo-liberal economists wouldargue that intervention of governments in theinformal economy would distort operations andcreate inefficiencies.They assert that the informaleconomy will disappear with time as long aseconomies achieve sufficient growth which willlead to job creation. Others have contended thatit is impossible to regulate the informal economybecause the people working in the sector areeager to avoid regulation and taxation.Theyconclude that the informal economy is thereforebeyond government control.

Those who feel that there is a strong role for thegovernment in the informal economy have putforward a number of reasons for thisintervention.2 Firstly, for equity reasons, becauseinformal economy workers do not have sufficientskills or because they are vulnerable and notinsured against unemployment, illness, thegovernment should step in to protect informalproducers and provide them with equalopportunities to those formally employed.Thoseworking in the formal economy have benefits suchas collective bargaining, medical aid, maternity andsick leave, and unemployment insurance fundbenefits. However, informal economy workershave limited or no benefits and protection.

Secondly, for efficiency reasons, others haveadvanced the argument that the informaleconomy makes a large contribution to GDP, itprovides goods to middle and low-incomegroups and absorbs a large part of the labourforce due to its labour-intensive character.Governments should therefore invest in theinformal economy in order to promote itsproductivity and growth.

The third argument acknowledges that contraryto neo-liberal arguments of state withdrawalgovernments do actually intervene in markets inorder to support large industries and enterprisesat the expense of smaller entrepreneurs. Inresponse to neo-liberals, they argue that becausegovernments are already intervening in theeconomy to support big corporations, there isno reason why they should not intervene in theinformal economy to support smaller businesses.

Poverty Reduction Strategy PapersSince the late 1990s, overall policy frameworksof the four countries which form part of thisstudy have been strongly influenced by changingpractices of the World Bank and the IMF.Whilein Chapter Two, we saw how the 1980s and early1990s were characterised by structuraladjustment policies in Ghana, Malawi,Mozambique and Zambia, the ‘buzzword’ in thelate 1990s and early 2000s became ‘PRSP’(Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper). Before therole of these changes in relation to policies onthe informal economy will be discussed, a briefbackground to PRSPs will be provided.

Since 1999, developing countries need to submita PRSP in order to be eligible for concessionalloans and debt relief under the Heavily IndebtedPoor Country (HIPC) initiative which is a jointWorld Bank-IMF scheme. In their PRSP, countriesare expected to quantify the extent anddimensions of poverty in their countries, and to

6. Central government policy towardsthe informal economy


suggest macroeconomic, structural and socialpolicies that will result in a reduction of poverty.

In September 1999, the IMF launched the so-called 'Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility'which aimed to “make the objectives of povertyreduction and growth more central to lendingoperations” and replaced its Enhanced StructuralAdjustment Facility (ESAF). In the same year, theWorld Bank created the 'Poverty ReductionSupport Credit'.3

The majority of countries eligible for debt reliefunder the HIPC scheme are located in Africa(34), 3 are in Asia, 4 in Latin America and one inthe Middle East.All four countries part of thisstudy were eligible for debt relief and havesubmitted their PRSPs in the last few years.4

According to the World Bank and the IMF, PRSPsshould not be drawn up by governments in atop-down manner but should evolve from aparticipatory consultation process organisedwithin countries. In their view, this would thenensure that development strategies are country-

driven rather than donor-driven. PRSPs were supposedto correct weaknessesidentified and criticised inearlier structural adjustmentpolicies, namely lack ofpoverty focus and poorcountry ownership of thereforms.The World Bank andIMF felt that economicrecovery in developing

countries could not take place unless civilsociety organisations were involved in the policymaking process, particularly in the formulation ofmacroeconomic policies.This has been quite newfor many countries as they have so far notregarded civil society as a stakeholder.

However, the PRSP processes have beencriticised for several reasons. Firstly, because theywere prepared rapidly and did not sufficientlyinvolve civil society.A recent report, for example,pointed out the neglect of trade union voices inPRSP processes.5 Similarly, the ILO has produced

a report that sought to encourage inclusion ofemployment-related issues such as the ILO’sDecent work agenda into PRSPs. Under thepretext of country-ownership and civil societyparticipation of PRSPs, it has been argued thatthe World Bank and IMF were trying to“engineer consent for structural adjustment-type-of-policies” from developing countries.7

Some critics have contended that instead ofencouraging dialogue between governments andcivil society organisations, preparing a PRSPbecame an end in itself. Others have argued thatPRSP processes seriously violate the sovereigntyof borrowing countries since it has given the IMFand World Bank the power to approve anddisapprove the entire macro-economic policyframework of a country, formulated under thepretext of popular participation.

Ghana’s ‘Golden age of business’In its National Medium-Term Private SectorDevelopment Strategy 2004-2008, the governmentof Ghana articulates its commitment to facilitatingprivate sector growth to lead Ghana into a‘Golden Age of Business’.8 In order to stimulategrowth, the government seeks to removeinstitutional and legal bottlenecks that impede thedevelopment of the private sector, improveprivate sector access to capital, encourage andfacilitate the provision of public services by theprivate sector and facilitate innovation andentrepreneurship within both the formal andinformal economy to enhance factor productivity.

The document acknowledges that Ghana has alarge number of small and micro firms with 70percent of enterprises employing less than fivepeople.The document states that most of themicro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs)operate at the informal level which hinderstheir ability to invest and grow.They lack accessto land and cannot, therefore, use land ascollateral to secure loans. One of the tasks ofthe newly established Ministry of Private SectorDevelopment has been to raise funds tosupport small and medium enterprises (SMEs)with loans and to urge banks to provide themwith loans.

5 4 C E N T R A L G OV E R N M E N T P O L I C Y TOWA R D S T H E I N F O R M A L E C O N O M Y

Under the pretext ofcountry-ownership and civilsociety participation ofPRSPs, it has been arguedthat the World Bank andIMF were trying to “engineerconsent for structuraladjustment-type-of-policies”from developing countries.

In his State of the Nation Address to Parliamentin February 2005, the Minister of Private SectorDevelopment (MPSD) outlined several measuresthat aim to incorporate Ghana’s informaleconomy into the formal economy such as “tofacilitate basic courses for the informal sector toawaken individuals and enterprises of the sectorto the potential benefits of basic disciplines suchas bookkeeping, banking and otherentrepreneurship skills”.9 The Ministry has alsoset up a Business Development Unit, which willcarry out programmes aimed at improving thecapacity of the informal economy to helpmigrate to the formal sector. It will offer variousbusiness support services targeted at theinformal economy such as training, mentoring,capacity building as well as provision of credit.

In this respect, the MPSD recently budgeted 5million Ghana cedis to carry out trainingprogrammes through agencies like Empretec andthe National Board for Small-Scale Industries(NBSSI) to improve the capacity of smallbusinesses in the informal economy such asdress-makers and carpenters.10 Currently, theNBSSI grants credit, offers advice and counsellingand conducts training (entrepreneurial,managerial and technical) for informal economyoperators. However, the NBSSI deals only withinformal economy operators in themanufacturing and service sector and not thosein commerce or trading. It also deals withenterprises and not individual workers and so ittrains the workers only where they are lackingcertain skills in an enterprise.

In summary, Ghana’s policy towards the informaleconomy has been mainly geared towardsformalising businesses instead of catering for theneeds of informal workers.They are required toformalise their businesses in order to haveaccess to capital instead of credit deliveryagencies becoming friendlier towards informaleconomy workers.This does not address theproblems informal businesses experience if theyhave to formalise their operations.

In addition, the government’s view of the SMEsoften refers to those small and medium scale

enterprises that are in theformal sector, which, bydefinition, comprises mainlythose enterprises that areregistered with thegovernment’s appropriateauthorities and pay taxes.Assuch, most government policies aimed ataddressing the private sector do not sufficientlytarget the micro enterprises or self-employedindividuals but are biased towards slightly biggerand formalised businesses.

While Ghana’s overall economic policy has triedto cater to supporting smaller businesses, itseems they have not targeted the self-employedindividuals which are members of the informaleconomy organisations that were discussed inChapter Four and Five. However, thegovernment of Ghana has been implementingsome encouraging policies in the area of socialprotection. For example, the governmentestablished social security agency, the SocialSecurity and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT)has now instituted measures to include informaleconomy workers into a security scheme andencourage them to contribute to it so that theycan benefit when they stop working. However,the problem here is the lack of job securitybecause the SSNIT system requires acontribution for 240 months (20 years) for acontributor to derive full benefits when theyretire. Informal economy workers often do nothave this security.The newly established NationalHealth Insurance Scheme will also cater for thehealth needs of the informal economy althoughthe scheme has not fully taken off yet andnobody can predict its benefits.

The Poverty Alleviation Programme inMalawiAlthough there is recognition of the importanceof the informal economy, the government ofMalawi does not have a comprehensive nationalpolicy framework that addresses all challengesconfronting the informal economy. In its PovertyAlleviation Programme (PAP) and Vision 2020,the government of Malawi considers the informaleconomy and the existence of micro and small

Ghana’s policy towards theinformal economy has beenmainly geared towardsformalising businessesinstead of catering for theneeds of informal workers.


enterprise (MSEs) as a vital solution to thecountry’s growing unemployment problemamong the poor.11

The poverty alleviation programme policyframework identifies several constraints to theinformal economy such as:12

• limited access to credit due to lack ofcollateral;

• lack of business management skills andtechnical know-how;

• lack of access to appropriate technology;• lack of suitable business premises;• stiff competition from large firms and among

informal entrepreneurs themselves;• policy and legislative obstacles;• severe market limitations due to lack of real

purchasing power, particularly in rural areas;• lack of raw materials.

Recognising the crucial role of the informaleconomy, the government of Malawi in the samepolicy framework for poverty alleviation hassuggested the following strategies to promotethe informal economy:13

• increase and improve access to credit inshort term;

• provide management, entrepreneurial andtechnical skills training;

• provide suitable premises and infrastructurefor industrial estates, village centres and fleamarkets;

• development of markets and improved accessto markets through promotion ofcooperatives, associations and clubs;

• review restrictive legislation, policies andpractices and introduce new conducive ones;

• address gender issues through specifictargeted policy interventions by supportinstitutions e.g. credit and training by supportinstitutions;

• promote use of appropriate technologythrough relevant institutions like MalawiIndustrial Research and TechnologyDevelopment Centre (MIRTDC), theuniversity and private companies;

• institute credit guaranteeing schemes and

revolving fund arrangements;• encourage the formal sector to assist the

informal sector by sub-contracting smallenterprises.

With reference to the PRSP process in Malawi,there has been significant involvement of civilsociety organisations.Trade unions federationssuch as the MCTU were invited to participate inthe consultation. However, MUFIS has criticisedMCTU for not sufficiently consulting MUFISabout the needs of informal economy workers.This was also hampered by the fact that MUFISis not an official MCTU affiliate.

As Ghana’s overall policy framework, Malawi’sPRSP underscores the importance of micro,small and medium scale enterprises (MSMEs) asa tool to enable the poor to generate their ownincomes. Malawi’s pro-poor growth strategy, asoutlined in its PRSP, mainly focuses on agriculturealthough “efforts will be made to diversify,especially though MSMEs into natural resources,manufacturing, tourism and small-scale mining”.14

According to the Malawi’s PRSP, the developmentof MSMEs has been hampered by “a lack ofbusiness skills and technological expertise, lackof capital, and inadequate supportiveinfrastructure for efficient production andmarketing”.15 The government of Malawitherefore intends to provide more support forMSMEs in the areas of training, micro credit andskills development.

Because of similar business support initiativesthat have failed in the past, Malawians have beensceptical about these kinds of programmes. Inthe 1980s and 1990s, several institutions wereestablished by the government to cater for someof the needs ofsmall and mediumenterprises such asthe SmallEnterpriseDevelopmentOrganisation ofMalawi (SEDOM),the Development ofMalawian Traders

5 6

Although there is recognitionof the importance of theinformal economy, thegovernment of Malawi doesnot have a comprehensivenational policy frameworkthat addresses all challengesconfronting the informaleconomy.

C E N T R A L G OV E R N M E N T P O L I C Y TOWA R D S T H E I N F O R M A L E C O N O M Y

Trust (DEMATT), the Small and MediumEnterprises Fund (SMEF) and the Malawi RuralFinance Company (MFRC).Whereas the SMEFand MFRC offer credit, other institutions such asDEMATT focus on the provision of management,entrepreneurial and technical skills training.

However, access to loans from the aboveinstitutions has been very minimal amonginformal economy operators.Also, the schemeshave been criticised. It has been argued thataccess to loans was often dependent on politicalconnections instead of the soundness of businessproposals.As a result, most clients were not ableto pay back their loans and at the moment theinstitutions do not have the capacity to respondto the capital needs of the business community.

In January 2005, the government announced anew 5 billion Malawi kwacha loan scheme that,through the Malawi Rural Development Fund(MARDEF), would provide small loans to groupsof 10 individuals.16 As a result of corruption inprevious schemes, many Malawians - includingsome Members of Parliament - have beensceptical about this initiative.There is a concernthat lack of clear guidelines may result in poortargeting, political interference and lack ofsustainability.

Mozambique’s Reduction of AbsolutePovertyMozambique’s PRSP which is also known as theAction Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty(PARPA 2001-2005), is virtually silent on theinformal economy.Whereas OTM was part ofthe consultation in Mozambique,ASSOTSI didnot directly participate in the PRSP process.Although Mozambique's paper argues that “Apro-poor growth strategy also requires a policyclimate which stimulates the private sector toaccelerate job creation and increase incomegenerating opportunities through self-employment”, it does not mention in great detailhow this can be achieved.17 The document brieflymentions the need for better support servicesto the MSME sector in the form of credit. It alsohighlight the need for technical-vocationaltraining to improve the skills of the self-

employed as entrepreneurs.However, it considersagriculture and ruraldevelopment as priority inpoverty reduction as morethan 70 percent ofMozambique’s population isconcentrated in the rural areas.

PRSP in ZambiaAlthough Zambia does not currently have acomprehensive policy framework towards theinformal economy, its PRSP does make relativelymore explicit reference to the existence of aninformal economy than we have seen in Ghana,Malawi and Mozambique.18 It is also worthnoting that the government of Zambia has in thepast actively acknowledged the existence of theinformal economy, although perhaps not for theright reasons.When the informal economy inZambia in the early 1990s started to growrapidly and increasingly became visible on thestreets of many cities in Zambia with largeramounts of street vendors, President Chilubadecided to establish a special Vendors’ Desk atState House.A full-time Deputy Minister wasalso appointed to be in charge of street andmarket vendors’ affairs.Whereas localgovernment in, for example, Lusaka was eager todiscourage street vending, traders and vendorswere effectively protected bycentral government ministersand even the State President.Although one can argue thiswas mainly done in order tosecure votes and use vendorsas a political force, it perhapsdoes say something about thelevel of acceptance of theinformal economy in a country like Zambia.

Zambia’s PRSP recognises that 70 percent of theZambian population operates in the informaleconomy. It acknowledges that wages are lowerthan in the formal economy and the governmenttherefore feels people should be taken out ofthe informal sector by encouraging expansion ofthe formal sector through economic growth.More or less in agreement with the ILO’s Decent


Mozambique’s PRSP whichis also known as the ActionPlan for the Reduction ofAbsolute Poverty, isvirtually silent on theinformal economy.

Zambia’s PRSP recognisesthat 70 percent of theZambian populationoperates in the informaleconomy and acknowledgesthat wages are lower thanin the formal economy.

work strategies that we discussed in ChapterOne, the government of Zambia advocates thatwhile people are operating in the informalsector, they must be supported. Means ofsupporting the informal sector include microcredit schemes, the provision of marketing andtechnological information to improveproductivity, and the development ofinfrastructure.

As we have seen in the PRSPs of Ghana, Malawiand Mozambique, Zambia also stresses theimportance of development of MSMEs. Zambia’sPRSP explicitly mentions the need to support'producers of all scales', meaning smallenterprises as well as larger-scale operations. Itsstrategy focuses on training in entrepreneurship,the encouragement of linkages between MSMEsand larger-scale enterprises, the development ofindustrial estates to be leased to MSMEs, theremoval of legal impediments to MSMEs or ofwomen/youth access to productive resources,fostering the procurement of goods and servicesfrom MSMEs, and facilitating the acquisition ofland titles, among others.

With respect to the PRSP process,AZIEA feltthat this was dominated by well-funded NGOsrather than grassroots representativeorganisations. Participation in the processdepended on whether the organisation was akey player in civil society in Zambia.AZIEA alsonoted that the consultation process itself wasnot very friendly to more community-basedorganisations as it involved submission ofdetailed position papers. Grassrootsorganisations do not always have the capacity tocomply with these regulations. However, despitethese weaknesses, civil society did get moreinvolved into policy formulation at the nationallevel during the PRSP consultation process.

ConclusionIn this chapter, we have seen how the process ofpreparing Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers(PRSPs) to become eligible for debt relief underthe Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC)initiative came to play an increasingly importantrole in determining the overall macroeconomic

policy framework of the countries included inthis study.Whereas we have seen in previouschapters the important role the informaleconomy plays, it does not feature in a majorway in various PRSP documents.Where it ismentioned, governments part of this studymainly intervene to support the informaleconomy for reasons of efficiency, i.e. becausethe informal economy currently providesemployment to the majority of people in Ghana,Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia.

Other reasons for government intervention havebeen to adjust the previous bias towards largeindustries. In this respect, all governments arecalling for the introduction of support schemesthat favour micro, small and medium enterprises(MSMEs).Although these developments shouldbe commendable, there is a need to ensure thatthese schemes favour disadvantaged self-employed individuals instead of better-off smalland medium enterprises. In a recent study on theimpact of the first ten years of South Africa’ssmall, medium and micro enterprise (SMME)programme, it was observed that thisprogramme tended to be biased towards groupsof small and medium-sized enterprises, whereasit bypassed micro enterprises in the informaleconomy.19 In the case of Malawi, previousschemes have also often resulted in corruption.

In addition, it can be concluded that none of thegovernments except for Ghana have intervenedin the informal economy because of equityreasons. It has only been the Ghanaiangovernment that has paid attention to the socialprotection of informal economy workersthrough the introduction of a social securityscheme. Other governments have not yet lookedinto this matter.

Lastly, it should be noted that whereas the PRSPprocess has called for an active involvement ofcivil society into the formulation of macroeconomic policies, none of the informal economyassociations mentioned in Chapter Four and Fivehave been able to participate in a meaningful wayin drawing up the papers in their respectivecountries.While we have seen in Chapter Two

5 8 C E N T R A L G OV E R N M E N T P O L I C Y TOWA R D S T H E I N F O R M A L E C O N O M Y

that the informal economy contributes in majorways towards countries’ GNP, the voice ofinformal economy workers has remained largelyunheard in the consultation process leading up

to the finalisation of a PRSP.This seriouslyquestions the presumed participatory nature ofPRSP processes in these countries.


Chapter Six looked at how central governmentaddressed the needs of workers in the informaleconomy. Chapter Seven will discuss policies andregulations at the local government level inGhana, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia.

Local government policies towards theinformal economyAll countries, which form part of this researchproject, are currently undergoing processes ofdecentralisation where responsibilities areincreasingly transferred from central to localgovernment. In Malawi, the first local governmentelections took place in November 2000 and inMozambique in June 1998.

In the four countries concerned, localgovernment has been responsible for bothregulation of street vending and maintenance andmanagement of municipal markets.Through by-laws, local authorities make attempts to containstreet trading and ban vending from certain areaswhile tolerating it from others.Within themarkets, representatives from local governmentcollect fees and levies from market vendorswhich is considered as an important source ofrevenue. Health inspectors carry out inspectionsto investigate hygiene practices in foodpreparation and overall health standards.However, all important policy decisions are takenat the central government level. Local authoritiesare merely implementing central policies, and areunable to contradict these.

Local government policies in GhanaIn January 2005, the Accra MetropolitanAssembly (AMA) initiated a programme todecongest the streets of Accra of unauthorisedtraders who crowd the Makola Market area andcause vehicular congestion. One of the proposalswas to allocate certain streets to them to selltheir wares on specific days where vehicleswould not be allowed to use such streets.TheAMA has spent about one billion Ghana cedis toimprove some markets to make the operationsof the traders easier. In return, the AMA imposeslevies on market vendors and requires them toobtain operating permits at a fee.The AMA alsoputs up decent markets for the vendors to selltheir wares and provides them with bathroomand toilet facilities in the markets. In somemarkets the Assembly provides day care centresand security personnel to protect the tradersand vendors.The steps to improve the currentsituation include the rehabilitation of themarkets and provide other services that will helpin the functioning of the markets.There are alsoefforts to keep the markets clean for theiroperation.

The Shama Ahanta Metropolitan East Assembly(SAEMA), which includes Takoradi, assists theinformal economy with loans from the PovertyAlleviation Fund to improve and expand theirbusinesses and provides scholarships for thetraining of artisans.The SAEMA provides newmarkets and rehabilitates existing ones with the

7. Local government policy towardsthe informal economy


Ghana Malawi Mozambique1 Zambia10 regions 3 regions 11 provinces 9 provinces4 metropolitan assemblies 3 city assemblies 23 municipalities (cities) 4 city councils10 municipal assemblies 8 towns assemblies 10 municipalities (towns) 14 municipal councils

1 municipal assembly124 district assemblies 27 district assemblies 54 rural district councils

Table 6: Local government structures and administrative regions

Source: Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF), Country Profiles,http://www.clgf.org.uk/index_profiles.htm

aim of decongesting them and resettling themarket traders in other markets.The SAEMAprovides all the necessary facilities such as lorryparks and day nurseries and uses itsdevelopment budget, the District AssembliesCommon Fund (DACF), for these projects.Where members of the informal economyorganise themselves the Assembly assists themwith loans.

The Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA)consults informal economy organisations in itspolicy making prior to its annual fee-fixingresolutions, which determine the fees and leviesto be charged during the year.Theseconsultations are statutory and they are donethrough meetings and the departments involvedare the Budgeting and Rating Department, theTreasury Department and the Internal AuditDepartment, all of the AMA.

In summary, local government authorities inGhana have made attempts to improve thesituation in which street vendors and markettraders work. In Accra, a license system has beenintroduced in order to regulate street trading.The Assembly has invested in the markets inorder to provide infrastructure such as day carecentres and nurseries, and in Takoradi it hassought to assist vendors with loans.Improvement of infrastructure has beensignificantly aided with grants provided by centralgovernment through the District AssembliesCommon Fund. It is estimated that in Ghanacentral government transfers comprise 69percent of total revenue of local governmentwhereas taxes, user fees and charges only makeup 31 percent.2 In addition, informal economyorganisations are being consulted on a statutorybasis in Accra’s annual fee-fixing resolutions.

Street vendors and local government inMalawiIn Malawi, relations between local governmentand street vendors have often beenconfrontational. In November 2002, there weremany clashes between street vendors andofficials of the Blantyre City Assembly. Scarcity ofvending space appears to be one of the serious

problems encountered by the street and marketvendors. Few places have been earmarked forinformal trading, forcing many informal traders tooperate outside the produce markets and morevisibly in the streets. In almost all townshipssecondary or un-gazetted markets haveemerged.

One strategy the city authorities in collaborationwith the national government have experimentedwith is to construct flea markets.At themoment, the national government has aprogramme to construct six flea markets in themajor urban areas: two flea markets each inBlantyre and Lilongwe and one flea market eachin Mzuzu and Zomba. So far three markets havebeen completed: one each in Blantyre, Lilongweand Zomba. However, street vendors oftenrefuse to occupy the markets for severalreasons, e.g. some of them being inadequatespace to accommodate all the street vendors,high market rates/fees, limited space for storage,insecurity, poor design, fear of poor patronageand loss of business once in the market and fearsabout witchcraft.

Although local authorities in the two cities aremandated to provide infrastructure, they reportthat they often do not have the financial capacityto do so, yet when they see people trading in thestreet they feel obliged to relocate them with orwithout consultations. Local authorities arehandicapped by financial deficiencies andincongruence between the mandates and theirobjective situations.Very often, local authoritiesare at loggerheads with informal economyoperators, in particular the street vendors.

Consultations with the informal economyworkers are not institutionalised in the by-laws.Of course this does not prevent the localgovernment authorities in both cities fromconsulting the leaders or representatives of theinformal economy workers but the consultationprocess is limited in the sense that the informalworkers are not directly involved in theformulation or review of by-laws.The procedureis that the City Assemblies develop by-laws,which are then displayed for inspection by the

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public for a period of 14 days, after which theyare forwarded to the Minister of LocalGovernment for approval (Local GovernmentAct (1998) Section 104 sub section 2).

Therefore, consultations between the localgovernment authorities and various informaleconomy organisations have been ad hoc. In theabsence of proper policy guidelines, consultationswith the street vendors, particularly in Blantyre,have with few exceptions been done in bad faith.

Local government and the informaleconomy in MozambiqueIn Mozambique, the government, and localgovernment in particular, has only recently beganto acknowledge the informal economy and itscontribution.While in the past local governmenttended to carry out so-called ‘mirror operations’in order to remove street vendors from thestreets, they have come to realise theimportance of consulting informal economyassociations such as ASSOTSI as stakeholdersbefore embarking upon another ‘clean-up’operation.This also became apparent duringefforts on the part of local government toincrease market levies.ASSOTSI requested anexplanation from local government for theincrease in levies. However, the organisation feltthey were not able to explain these changesproperly, particularly because the conditions inthe markets have not improved in recent years.Intervention by ASSOTSI has forced localgovernment to respond, and will perhaps providean incentive to them to consult informaleconomy workers in the future.

Managing the markets in ZambiaIn Zambia, local government has been severelycriticised by market vendor organisations such asZANAMA for not making improvements to theinfrastructure of the markets.While marketvendors are charged levies, they feel this has notresulted into visible improvements in themarkets.The government has acknowledged thisand hired an Italian consultant in 1996 in orderto investigate the causes of the main problems inthe markets.The consultant found that Councilbudgets for the markets often only include

salaries of people employed in the markets butthere is no provision for maintenance of physicalinfrastructure and garbage collection.Whereaswe have seen in other countries such as Ghanathat central government provides a major sourceof income to local government, this is not thecase in Zambia. Only 3 percent of total incomeof local government is made up of nationalsupport. 59 percent of total income consists oflocal taxes and 18 percent comprises fees andchanges.3

The consultant found that it is often assumedthat markets manage themselves as they areraising income.There is also inadequateinformation on the income and expenditure inmarkets.The consultancy bureau concluded thatthere is an urgent need to restructure


Overcrowded section ofSoweto Market in Lusaka.

management of the markets in Zambia in order“to ensure the commercial viability and self-sustainability of market while at the same timebeing cost-effective in the delivery of services toboth the marketeers and the residents”.4

In order to address the problems in the markets,President Mwanawasa appointed a Market TaskForce in April 2003 that comprisedrepresentatives from the Ministry of LocalGovernment and Housing, City Councils andmarketeers' organisations such as ZANAMA.Amongst the responsibilities of the task forcewere to review the Market Act and otherlegislation that affected the management ofmarkets, to make recommendations on a bettermanagement system of the markets and toimprove relations between differentstakeholders, i.e. market vendor organisationsand the Council.

ZANAMA and AZIEA have been activelycampaigning for a revision of the current MarketAct and accompanying byelaws, which date backfrom the colonial era.The organisations have alsobeen critical of the 'Fast-Track Court' which wasintroduced by the Lusaka City Council in orderto prosecute street vendors in breach of certainbye-laws immediately through the imposition offines or even a prison sentence.

In their final report that was presented to theMinistry of Local Government and Housing inJuly 2003, the Market Task Force concluded thatthe Market Advisory Committees (MACs) hadbeen unsuccessful as the committees wereheaded by Councillors with political interests,the committees had failed to reinvest marketlevies into development of the markets andmarketeers were insufficiently involved inmanagement of the markets.5 MACs wereestablished in 1994 and were composed of theCouncillor of the area in which the market waslocated, the Market Master who is the overalladministrator of the market and employed bythe Council, a Council police officer, a Cashierand three democratically elected representativesfrom the marketeers.The responsibilities of theMACs were to collect market levies in the

market, provide security, enforce the Council by-laws, maintain appropriate levels of hygiene andcleanliness and allocate market stalls.TheCommittee was also expected to undertake orrecommend improvements in the physicalinfrastructure of the markets to the Councilsuch as improvement of sanitation, electrificationand resurfacing of the markets.

In order to improve management of the markets,the government announced plans for a newsystem of market boards in September 2004.6

Whereas MACs did not have manyresponsibilities, the new market boards are fullyresponsible for the management of the marketsalthough the Councils do retain ownership ofthe markets and direct overall policies towardsthe markets. Market boards will also have thepower to appoint management and staff for themarkets.The major change is therefore thetransfer of decision-making powers from theCouncil to the market boards.

According to the presentation of the new modelin September 2004 by the Ministry of LocalGovernment and Housing, the main objectives ofthe new model are “to increase efficiency, attainviability and sustainability of the markets – thusdo away with council subsidies – and to ensure apleasant environment in which business willflourish which is as of now unattainable”. “Theneed to operate markets on commercial lines” isrequired according to the Ministry in order “tomaintain and sustain high standards of themarkets which is necessary to attract customersand ultimately ensure viability and sustainability”.8

Concerns have been raised by the ZambiaNational Marketeers Association (ZANAMA)that the new system of market boards will notempower marketeers.Although they will have aseat in the market boards, other stakeholderswill be part of the market boards as well.ZANAMA has been advocating for total controlof the marketeers in the markets as they do nothave confidence in bureaucrats being involved inrunning the markets. In addition, concerns havebeen raised about increases in levies as a resultof the reduction of Council subsidies.The new

L O C A L G OV E R N M E N T P O L I C Y TOWA R D S T H E I N F O R M A L E C O N O M Y6 4

market management has not been fullyimplemented and it therefore remains to be seenwhether it will lead to improvement of themanagement of markets in Zambia. Perhaps it isworth noting that marketeers have been activelyinvolved in the policy formulation as ZANAMAwas part of the Market Task Force appointed bythe President.

Apart from changes in market management inZambia, the government also plans to improvethe physical infrastructure of the markets. Inorder to finance the rehabilitation of 11 urbanmarkets in Zambia, it secured a 16.5 million eurogrant from the European Union.A pilot projecttargeted three markets in Lusaka: Chilenje, Libalaand Nyumba Yanga, and was completed in 2002.In October 2005, the Urban MarketDevelopment Programme unit, which is housedat the Department of Infrastructure and SupportServices within the Ministry of LocalGovernment and Housing, was reviewing andevaluating various tenders and the second phaseof the Urban Markets Development Programmewhich involved the construction of 11 modernmarkets in Zambia was expected to becompleted in 2007/8.

Marketeers have raised concerns about the lackof consultation with them about these newdevelopments.Although the EU stipulated thatmarketeers should be actively involved in theprocess, for example through the establishmentof Market Development Committees in the 11markets, marketeers often felt consultationswere left till the last moment and they were notinvolved in the early stages of the project.Furthermore, based on other examples such asthe construction of Kamwala Market in Lusaka,marketeers have been concerned that not allvendors currently present in the 11 markets, willbe able to move into the newly constructedmodern markets. In addition, they are worriedthat market levies will go up and only more well-to-do marketeers will be able to afford a place inthe new markets.

Market vendors frequently cited the example ofLusaka City Market which is a 'modern market'

that was opened in 1997.The design of themarket is based upon an Israeli public market,and it is run by a private management companysubcontracted by the City Council. Streetvendors who managed to get a stall within theCity Market quickly vacated because of the highfees charged by the management company. ByApril 1999, the market had become a 'whiteelephant' and the occupancy rate was only 10percent, i.e. 400 traders occupying the marketwhereas it had a capacity of 4,000 traders.9 Inorder to encourage vendors to occupy stands inLusaka City Market, the Lusaka City Councillaunched a massive crackdown on street vendorsin 1999. Subsequently, vendors did take up stallsinside Lusaka City Market and the market hasnow become overcrowded.

ConclusionThe example of the Durban MetropolitanCouncil in South Africa has often been cited as amore progressive example of how localauthorities can involve informal economyworkers in their policies.10 In 2001, the Councilintroduced an overall policy framework towardsinformal economy workers and incorporatedstreet traders into city planning processes. Itrecognised the need for representativeorganisations in the informal economy andinitiated a capacity building programme to assistorganisations in becoming stronger. In addition, itbegan issuing street trading permits to traders in

Lusaka City Market


Durban.The example of Durban hassubsequently been celebrated by the ILO andother organisations as 'international bestpractice' as it sought to actively involve informaleconomy workers in policy formulationprocesses. However, this came to change in May2005 when fifty armed police officers weredeployed in Durban to remove street traderswithout permits.11 Whereas a 1998 surveyestimated 19,000 street vendors to be operatingin the whole Durban Metropolitan Area, only872 permits were issued between 2001 and2005.The crackdown on street vendorsthreatened the livelihoods of 18,000 streetvendors and this therefore brought into questionthe so-called success story of Durban.

This chapter has provided a brief overview ofthe way in which local government interacts withinformal economy workers in Ghana, Malawi,Mozambique and Zambia. It has become clearthat there has often been a confrontational

relationship between local government andmarket vendors and street traders.Whereas theDurban example seemed promising at the start,it now seems the Council has reverted back toits previous practices. In many cases, theemphasis in local policy making has been oncontaining and regulating instead of enabling andpromoting.The challenge for local governmentsis to involve workers more into formulation ofnew plans with regard to street trading andmanagement and maintenance of markets.Current legislation is mainly through acts andbyelaws that date back from the colonial era andrequire urgent revision. If informal economyworkers are not involved in the process ofrevision of legislation and improvement ofinfrastructure, there could be high costs for localgovernments such as became evident in Blantyre,Malawi where a newly constructed flea markethas remained empty because street vendorswere not consulted sufficiently and weretherefore unhappy with the design of the market.

6 6 L O C A L G OV E R N M E N T P O L I C Y TOWA R D S T H E I N F O R M A L E C O N O M Y

It has become clear in this report that structuraladjustment policies in the late 1980s and early1990s have significantly contributed towards arapid growth of the informal economy in manyAfrican countries. Increasing foreign competitiondue to trade liberalisation forced localcompanies to cut down their costs and to eitherclose their business or to retrench some of theirlabour force. Privatisation of state enterprises aswell as reforms of the public sector resulted inmore retrenchments.The removal of statesubsidies on basic commodities and inputsreduced people’s real wages and often forcedthose in formal employment to supplement theirincome with informal economic activities.

While the informal economy is estimated tocontribute between 38 and 49 percent towardsthe GNP of the four countries included in thisstudy, workers in the informal economy are onlygradually acknowledged as stakeholders in policyformulation processes.Although the informaleconomy provides employment to between 70and 90 percent of people in Africa, this has notmeant that their views and needs have beenrepresented or consulted.Women especially relyon the informal economy in order to survive orsupplement their incomes.

Several organisations have been established inthe past decades that sought to represent theviews of street traders, market vendors andother informal economy workers. Most of theseorganisations had a predominantly localorientation in the sense that they wereestablished in order to address immediateproblems in their environments such asharassment by local authorities, high marketlevies, poor maintenance of markets and lack ofvending space.Their role has mainly been tonegotiate with local government with the aim ofimproving the working conditions of theirmembers.They were often established to

provide a social welfare role, e.g. to support eachother financially as members in the case offunerals and illnesses.

Recently, several new initiatives have been takenby trade union federations and internationalorganisations such as StreetNet International tobring some of these organisations togetherunder umbrella bodies like the StreetNet GhanaAlliance and the Alliance for Zambia InformalEconomy Associations. By providing a platform toall workers in the informal economy, theseorganisations aim to bring their problems to anational level.Whereas other organisations havetended to interact mainly with local government,these organisations aim to defend their intereststowards central government and could thereforepotentially be more effective forces of change.

This is an encouraging development, especiallyafter it has become clear in this research projectthat most national governments have notdeveloped overall policy frameworks to addressthe needs of informal economy workers.Aninvestigation of the macro-economic policyframeworks of the four countries in this study, asexpressed in their Poverty Reduction StrategyPapers, has demonstrated that policies have notsufficiently focused on the informal economy.Where the informal economy was mentioned,policies have tended to focus on eliminating thebias towards large enterprises in favour of micro,small and medium enterprises (MSMEs).Governments are promising to improve theirsupport to smaller enterprises through theprovision of vocational and technical training anddelivery of credit.

Although this should be encouraged, it remainsdoubtful to what extent these policies will reallytarget the most disadvantaged self-employedpeople in the informal economy.An evaluation ofsimilar type of strategies in South Africa has

Conclusion and recommendations


shown that support still tends to be biasedtowards the small and medium enterprisesinstead of micro enterprises, individual streettraders and market vendors. It is thereforecrucial that informal economy workers have avoice at the national level and are recognised bygovernments in order for them to ensure thatfuture policies will be beneficial to them.

Recommendations to stakeholders

This report recommends:

• trade union federations to includerepresentatives from informal economyorganisations in their official delegation to theInternational Labour Organisation (ILO)Annual Conference in Geneva;

• trade union federations to promotesupportive relations between trade unionsand informal economy organisations;

• trade union federations and centralgovernments to include informal economyorganisations into tripartite negotiationplatforms;

• central and local governments to establishlegal institutions that will compel governmentto a dialogue with informal economyorganisations;

• central governments to engage informaleconomy organisations into policyformulation processes such as the PovertyReduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)consultation;

• the International Labour Organisation -Bureau for Workers' Activities (ILO-ACTRAV) to invite representatives frominformal economy organisations wheneverorganising activities on the informal economy;

• informal economy organisations to considerinvesting in research capacity building inorder to enable organisations to analysepolicy changes and to provide an analyticalresponse to these changes.

Recommendations for further research

This report recommends that further researchbe focused on:

• analysis of the relation between gender andeffective participation of members in informaleconomy organisations;

• assessment of the applicability of theGhanaian social protection model in theinformal economy to other countries;

• analysis of the impact of Southern AfricanDevelopment Community (SADC) andCommon Market of Eastern and SouthernAfrica (COMESA) trade rules on the informaleconomy;

• analysis of the different status in terms ofgovernment recognition of trade unionsversus informal economy organisations;

• analysis of effectiveness of informal economyorganisation in influencing local and centralgovernment policies.

6 8 C O N C L U S I O N A N D R E C O M M E N DAT I O N S

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1.Theoretical aspects of the debate on theinformal economy

1 Castells, M., Portes,A. and L. Benton (eds.)(1989). The informal economy: Studies inadvanced and less developed countries.Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.

2 De Soto, H. (1989). The other path:The invisiblerevolution in the Third World. New York: Harper& Row.

3 In a well-known article, Keith Hart also usedthe term in an article to refer to economicactivities in Ghana. See: Hart, K. J. (1973).Informal income opportunities and urbanemployment in Ghana. In: Journal of ModernAfrican Studies 11(1): 61-89.

4 Bangasser, P.E. (2000). The ILO and the informalsector: an institutional history. Geneva: ILO, pp.17-24.

5 Ibid, p. 46-47.6 ILO (2002). Decent work and the informal

economy. Report VI. International LabourConference, 90th Session. Geneva: ILO, p. 2.

7 Ibid.8 Ibid, p. 3-4.9 See WIEGO website:

http://www.wiego.org/about (last accessed: 21November 2005).

10 Chen, M., R. Jhabvala and F. Lund (2002).Supporting workers in the informal economy:Apolicy framework.Working Paper on theInformal Economy, Employment Sector2002/2. Geneva: ILO, p. 5.

11 ILO (2002). Women and men in informalemployment: a statistical picture. Geneva: ILO,available from:http://www.wiego.org/papers/2005/unifem/19_ILO_Stats_booklet.pdf (last accessed: 14March 2006). Chen, M., J.Vanek, F. Lund et al.(2005). Progress of the world's women 2005:Women, work and poverty. New York: UnitedNations Development Fund for Women (inparticular Chapter 3: Employment, gender and

poverty).Available from:http://www.unifem.org/attachments/products/PoWW2005_eng.pdf (last accessed: 14 March2005).

12 See also: Hussmanns, Ralf (2003). 7th Meetingof the Expert Group on Informal Sector Statistics(Delhi Group). Statistical definition of informalemployment: Guidelines endorsed by theSeventeenth International Conference of LabourStatisticians (2003). Geneva: ILO, p. 5.Availablefrom:http://www.ilo.org/public/English/bureau/stat/download/papers/def.pdf (last accessed: 14March 2006).

13 Chen, M.A., R. Jhabvala and F. Lund (2002).Supporting workers in the informal economy:Apolicy framework.Working Paper on theInformal Economy, Employment Sector2002/2. Geneva: ILO, p. 5.

14 See WIEGO website:http://www.wiego.org/main/ilocstats.shtml(last accessed: 21 November 2005).

2. Growth of the informal economy

1 For GDP per capita, average life expectancyand illiteracy rate, see:http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/socind/default.htm. For Gross DomesticProduct, see: http://web.worldbank.org Fortotal population, see:http://web.worldbank.org (WorldDevelopment Indicators, 2003 and 2004). ForHIV/AIDS prevalence rate, see:http://www.unaids.org.

2 Please refer to:http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gh.html (GDP per capita: data from 2004)

3 Please refer to:http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=ZMB&CCODE=ZMB&CNAME=Zambia&PTYPE=CP

Notes


4 Please refer to:http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTZAMBIA/Resources/ZambiaataGlance.xls

5 Barwa, S. D. (1995). Structural adjustmentprogrammes and the urban informal sector inGhana. Geneva: ILO, p. 3.

6 Gockel,A. and D.Vormawor (2004). FES Tradeunion country reports.The case of Ghana.Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p. 8

7 Barwa, S. D. (1995). Structural adjustmentprogrammes and the urban informal sector inGhana. Geneva: ILO, p. 3.

8 Gockel,A. and D.Vormawor (2004). FES Tradeunion country reports.The case of Ghana.Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p. 8.

9 Munthali,Thomas (2004). The impact ofStructural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) onmanufacturing growth in Malawi. UnpublishedMA Thesis. Leeds: Leeds University BusinessSchool, p. 16.

10 Harrigan, J. (2001). From dictatorship todemocracy: Economic policy in Malawi: 1964-2000,Aldershot:Ashgate Publishing Ltd, p.117.

11 Munthali,Thomas (2004). The impact ofStructural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) onmanufacturing growth in Malawi. UnpublishedMA Thesis. Leeds: Leeds University BusinessSchool, p. 17.

12 Pryor, F. C. (1990). The political economy ofpoverty, equity and growth: Malawi andMadagascar. OUP. Oxford, NY, p. 44.Campbell, R. (2000). Malawi.African Review,23rd edition, 171-176.

13 Harrigan, J. (2001). From dictatorship todemocracy: Economic policy in Malawi: 1964-2000, Aldershot:Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

14 Ibid, p. 309.15 Government of Malawi (2001). Malawi

National Gemini Micro and Small Enterprise(MSE) Baseline Survey 2000. Zomba: NationalStatistical Office (NSO), p. 37.Available on theNSO website: http://www.nso.malawi.net/(last accessed: 14 November 2005).

16 Jimu, I. M. (2003). Appropriation and mediationof urban spaces: Dynamics and politics of streettrading in Malawi. Unpublished MA Thesis,University of Botswana.

17 The Nation, 3 June 2002,Vendors please

Muluzi.18 Cramer, C. (2001). Privatisation and

adjustment in Mozambique: a “hospital pass”?Journal of Southern African Studies 27(1), p. 93.

19 Ibid, p. 101.20 Xaba, J., P. Horn, et al. (2002). The informal

sector in sub-Saharan Africa. Geneva: ILO, p. 15.21 Simutanyi, N. (1996).The politics of structural

adjustment in Zambia. In: Third World Quarterly17(4): 825-39.

22 McCulloch, N., Baulch, B. and Cherel-Robson,M. (2000). Globalisation, poverty and inequality inZambia during the 1990s. Brighton: Institute ofDevelopment Studies, University of Sussex.

23 Lungu, J. and Mulenga, C. (2005). Corporatesocial responsibility practices in the extractiveindustry in Zambia,A Report for the CatholicCommission for Justice, Development andPeace, the Development EducationCommunity Project, and the ZambiaCongress of Trade Unions, p. 7, available fromhttp://www.niza.nl/docs/200505301137193579.pdf (last accessed: 20 March 2006).

24 Data from Mineworkers Union of Zambia,2005. Quoted in: Lungu, J. and Mulenga, C.(2005). Corporate social responsibility practices inthe extractive industry in Zambia,A Report forthe Catholic Commission for Justice,Development and Peace, the DevelopmentEducation Community Project, and theZambia Congress of Trade Unions, p. 77,available fromhttp://www.niza.nl/docs/200505301137193579.pdf (last accessed: 20 March 2006).

25 ZPA chief Executive, 2002.26 See status report on Zambia Privatisation

Agency (ZPA) website,http://www.zpa.org.zm/summary2. htm (lastaccessed: 14 November 2005).

27 Central Statistical Office, Government ofZambia, September 2004. Quoted in: Lungu, J.and Mulenga, C. (2005). Corporate socialresponsibility practices in the extractive industryin Zambia,A Report for the CatholicCommission for Justice, Development andPeace, the Development EducationCommunity Project, and the ZambiaCongress of Trade Unions, p. 15-16, availablefrom

7 4 N OT E S

http://www.niza.nl/docs/200505301137193579.pdf (last accessed: 20 March 2006).

28 MTEF 2004-6, ZPA website, 2003.

3.The size of the informal economy

1 ILO Bureau of Statistics on the basis ofofficial national data,http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/papers/comp.htm, (last accessed 8 February2005)

2 See document on the ILO website withnational definition of Ghana,http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/download/compmeth.pdf, (last accessed 14November 2005).

3 Schneider, F. (2002). Size and measurement ofthe informal economy in 110 countries aroundthe world. Paper presented at a Workshop ofAustralian National Tax Centre,ANU,Canberra,Australia, July 17, 2002, p. 6.Available from website Rapid Response Unit(RRU),World Bank:http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/PapersLinks/informal_economy.pdf (last accessed: 20March 2006).

4 See:Adu-Amankwah, K. (1997). Contract labourin the agriculture sector in Ghana:A studyconducted for the ILO. Geneva: ILO.

5 Government of Malawi (1995). PolicyFramework for Poverty Alleviation Programme.Lilongwe: PAP Coordinating Unit Ministry ofEconomic Planning and Development, p. 2.

6 Government of Malawi (2001). MalawiNational Gemini Micro and Small Enterprise(MSE) Baseline Survey 2000. Zomba: NationalStatistical Office (NSO), p. ix.Available on theNSO website: http://www.nso.malawi.net (lastaccessed: 14 November 2005).


8 Chilowa, 1991 quoted in: Baden, S. and C.Green (1994). Women and development inMalawi. Report prepared for the Commissionof European Communities Directorate-General for Development. Brighton: Instituteof Development Studies, University of Sussex.

9 Government of Malawi (2000). The state ofMalawi’s poor:Their economic characteristics.Poverty Monitoring Systems (PMS) BriefingNo. 6. Zomba: National Statistical Office(NSO).

10 Chirwa, J. (2000). A reconnaissance study ofsocial, economic and environmental impact ofstreet vending in Malawi: a case study of Mzuzucity. Unpublished BA Geography dissertation,University of Malawi.

11 Xaba, J., P. Horn, et al. (2002). The informalsector in sub-Saharan Africa. Geneva: ILO, p. 6-7.


13 Ardeni, P.G. (2001). Women and poverty inMozambique: Is there a gender bias in livingstandards and employment conditions.WorkingPaper. Feminisation of Poverty Study(Mozambique). Harare: ILO/SAMAT.

14 de Vletter, F. (1996). Study on the informalsector in Mozambique (Maputo and Sofala).Maputo: Poverty Alleviation Unit, Ministry ofPlanning and Finance, Government ofMozambique.

15 de Vletter, F. (2001). Unpublished study on 100Maputo female market vendors, carried out forILO/SAMAT Feminisation of Poverty Study(Mozambique).

16 National Institute of Statistics, Government ofMozambique, 14 September 2005, The informaleconomy.The sector’s contribution to nationalaccounts,http://www.ine.gov.mz/Ingles/noticias/ieComomy, (last accessed: 14 November 2005).


17 McCulloch, N., Baulch, B., Cherel-Robson, M.(2000). Globalisation, poverty and inequality inZambia during the 1990s. Brighton: Institute ofDevelopment Studies, University of Sussex.


19 ILO Bureau of Statistics on the basis ofofficial national data,http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/papers/comp.htm, (last accessed 8 February2005)

20 Living Conditions Monitoring Branch, CentralStatistical Office, Government of Zambia,2004, Living Conditions Monitoring Survey Report2002-2003, Lusaka: Zambia, p. 11. Summaryavailable on website:http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/general/lcmsIIsum.asp (last accessed: 20 November 2005).

21 Ibid.22 Ibid.23 Ibid.24 For Ghana, see: Government of Ghana

(1997). Core Welfare Indicator Survey.Accra:Ghana Statistical Office. Government ofGhana (2000). Ghana Living Standards Survey -Report of the Fourth Round (GLSS 4) 2000.Accra: Ghana Statistical Service. For Malawi,see: Government of Malawi (2001). MalawiNational Gemini Micro and Small Enterprise(MSE) Baseline Survey 2000. Zomba: NationalStatistical Office (NSO). For Zambia, see:Government of Zambia (1993). HouseholdBudget Survey. Lusaka: Central StatisticalOffice. Government of Zambia (2004). LivingConditions Monitoring Survey Report 2002-2003.Lusaka: Living Conditions Monitoring Branch,Central Statistical Office.

4. Characteristics of informal economyorganisations

1 For example, the ILO Bureau for Workers’Activities (ACTRAV) held an “InternationalSymposium on Trade Unions and the InformalSector” in Geneva from 18-22 October 1999.The meeting brought together trade unionrepresentatives from developing andindustrialised countries to discuss ways toorganise and represent the interests ofworkers in the informal economy moreeffectively. See for reports on this meeting:ILO (1999). Trade unions and the informalsector: towards a comprehensive strategy. Reportprepared for the International Symposium onTrade Unions and the Informal Sector,Geneva, 18-22 October 1999. Otherpublications include: Birchall, J. (2001).Organising workers in the informal sector. Astrategy for trade union cooperative action. CoopWorking Paper 01-1. Geneva: ILO-CooperativeBranch.Two issues of the journal LabourEducation were also devoted to the sametopic:Trade unions in the informal sector:finding their bearing, Labour Education (1999);Unprotected labour: what role for unions inthe informal economy?, Labour Education(2002).

2 See in particular Chapter Five ‘Strengtheningrepresentation and voice in the informaleconomy’ in: ILO (2002). Decent work and theinformal economy. Report VI. InternationalLabour Conference, 90th Session, Geneva.Geneva: ILO.

3 See for example: Bhatt, E.R. (2006). We arepoor but so many: the story of self-employedwomen in India. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress; Datta, R. (2000). On their own:Development strategies of the Self-EmployedWomen's Association (SEWA) in India. In:Development 43(4), 51-55; Datta, R. (2003).From development to empowerment:TheSelf-Employed Women's Association in India.In: International Journal of Politics, Culture &Society, 16(3), 351-68; Kalima, R. (1992). Wherewomen are leaders: the SEWA movement inIndia. London: Zed Books; Sreenivasan, J.(2000). Ela Bhatt: uniting women in India. New

7 6 N OT E S

York: Feminist Press at the City University ofNew York;Vaux,T. and F. Lund (2003).Workingwomen and security: Self Employed Women'sAssociation's response to crisis. In: Journal ofHuman Development, 4(2), 263-85.

4 See: Report of an international conference onorganising in the informal economy:“combiningour efforts” held in Ahmedabad, India, from 3 – 6December 2003, available from:http://www.wiego.org/papers/2005/AhmedabadConfReport.pdf (last accessed: 23 March2006).

5 See StreetNet's website for moreinformation:http://www.streetnet.org.za/english/default.htm

6 Devenish,A. and C. Skinner (2004). Collectiveaction in the informal economy: the case of theSelf Employed Women's Union. Report part ofresearch project "Globalisation, marginalisationand new social movements in post-apartheidSouth Africa". Durban: Centre for Civil Societyand the School of Development Studies,University of KwaZulu-Natal, see:http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?5,56(last accessed: 22 March 2006).

7 See: http://www.global-labour.org/pat_horn.htm (last accessed: 22March 2006).

8 See for reports on the South African casestudies: Motala, S. (2002). Organising theinformal economy.A case study of street tradingin South Africa. Geneva: ILO. Goldman,T.(2002). Organising the informal economy.Acase study of the building industry in SouthAfrica. Geneva: ILO. Bennett, M. (2003).Organising the informal economy. A case study ofthe clothing industry in South Africa. Geneva:ILO. Barrett, J. (2003). Organising the informaleconomy.A case study of the minibus taxiindustry in South Africa. Geneva: ILO. Goldman,T. (2003). Organisations in South Africa's informaleconomy:An overview of sectoral case studies.Geneva: ILO.

9 Lund, F. and C. Skinner (1999). Promoting theinterests of women in the informal economy: ananalysis of street trader organisations in SouthAfrica. Durban: School of DevelopmentStudies, University of Natal.

10 Thulare, P. (2004). Trading democracy.

Johannesburg informal traders and citizenship.Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies.

11 Our questionnaire has been inspired by thequestionnaire used in the following study:Lund, F. and C. Skinner (1999). Promoting theinterests of women in the informal economy: ananalysis of street trader organisations in SouthAfrica. Durban: School of DevelopmentStudies, University of Natal.

12 During the time of fieldwork in Ghana(estimated as the exchange rate on 20December 2004), the exchange rate for £1was 17,310 Ghana cedis (GHC). Obtainedfrom the Economist website:http://www.economist.com/markets/currency/fullconverter.cfm (last accessed: 16 March2006). During the time of fieldwork in Malawi(estimated as the exchange rate on 4 January2005), the exchange rate for £1 was 201Malawi Kwacha (MKW). Obtained from theEconomist website:http://www.economist.com/markets/currency/fullconverter.cfm (last accessed: 16 March2006). During the time of fieldwork inMozambique (estimated as the exchange rateon 20 December 2004), the exchange ratefor £1 was 43,441 Mozambique Metical(MZM). Obtained from the Economistwebsite:http://www.economist.com/markets/currency/fullconverter.cfm (last accessed: 16 March2006). During the time of fieldwork inZambia (estimated as the exchange rate on15 October 2005), the exchange rate for £1was 6,017 Zambia Kwacha (ZKW). Obtainedfrom the Economist website:http://www.economist.com/markets/currency/fullconverter.cfm (last accessed: 16 March2006).

5. Organisational and advocacy strategiesof informal economy organisations

1 These associations are the following: MakolaMarket Vendors Union, Ghana Young ChristianWorkers, Street Food Vendors Association,Farmers and Traders Association of Ho, Craftand Art Makers Association, Small ScaleFarmers,Vendors and Traders Association


(Sunyani), Kumasi Race Course Traders andVendors Association,Takoradi/Sekondi MarketVendors Association, New Amanful TradersAssociation,Adjoah Traders Association,Apremdo Market Traders Association,Ankyernyin/Yebikrom Traders Association,Apowa Traders Association,Takoradi TradersAssociation, Railways & Ports TradersAssociation, Ghacem Traders Association,Lagos Town Traders Association,AdiembraTraders Association, St. Mary’s TradersAssociation.These are the following unions:Industrial and Commercial Workers Union(ICU), Ghana Private Road Transport Union(GPRTU),Timber and Woodworkers Union(TWU), General Agricultural Workers Union(GAWU), Local Government Workers Union(LGWU), Public Services Workers Union(PSWU), Construction and Building MaterialsWorkers’ Union (CBMWU) and the GeneralTransport Petroleum and Chemical Workers’Union (GTPCWU).

3 Malawi has two union federations: MalawiCongress of Trade Unions (MCTU) which has17 affiliates and the Congress of Malawi TradeUnions (COMATU) which has 3 affiliates.Thelatter broke away from the MCTU in 1999 toform its own federation.

4 Weekend Nation, 18-19 May, 2002, carried astory titled ‘Unemployed to have union’ inwhich MCTU pressed government to registerMUFIS to represent vendors, job seekers,pensioners and widows. Ministry of LabourActing Registrar of Trade Unions BensonChirwa turned down the application but wasquoted as saying ‘We didn’t necessarily rejectthe union but there were some things wewanted them to clarify in their application’.

5 Jimu, I. M. (2003). Appropriation and mediationof urban spaces: Dynamics and politics of streettrading in Malawi. Unpublished MA Thesis.Gaborone: University of Botswana, p. 107.

6 Ibid.7 Ibid, p. 46.8 Ibid.9 In the southern Mozambican area of Maputo,

cross-border trade is known as mukhero, asmadjolidjos in Zobwe (Tete); djambaboda(derived from ‘border jumper’ in English) in

Machipanda (Manica) and as nadyanji in(Mutarara/Nsanje, border with Malawi).

10 See report on 28 May 2005 by Mozambique'sNews Agency (AIM):http://www.bernama.com/cgi-bin/snni2/list_item.cgi?peserta/mozambique/mo2805_3.txt (last accessed: 23 March 2006).

11 For a report of this seminar, please refer to:http://www.wiego.org/papers/ilo/africa_rep.pdf(last accessed: 23 March 2006).

12 As of September 2005,AZIEA's members are:Zambia Fisheries and Marketeers Union,Visual Arts Council of Zambia, ZambiaNational Marketeers Association, Cross-Border Traders Association,TinsmithAssociation of Zambia (based in Lusaka),Chibolya Carpentry, Shoe and Fence WireMaking and Blacksmith Association (based inKitwe), Mansa Carpenters Association (basedin Mansa),Tuntemba Association of Zambia(based in Kalulushi),Twapya Women PoultryFarmers Association (Ndola).

6. Central government policy towards theinformal economy

1 Chen, M.A., R. Jhabvala and F. Lund (2002).Supporting workers in the informal economy:Apolicy framework.Working Paper on theInformal Economy, Employment Sector2002/2. Geneva: ILO, p. 14.

2 Ibid.3 For more information on the IMF 'Poverty

Reduction and Growth Facility', refer to IMFwebsite,http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prgf.htm (last accessed: 17 November 2005). For acritical view on the World Bank and IMF, seethe Bretton Woods Project,http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/index.shtml (last accessed: 17 November 2005).

4 The dates of submission were the following:Mozambique (30 April 2001), Zambia (31March 2002), Malawi (23 April 2002) andGhana (19 February 2003). See World Bankwebsite:http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPRS/0,,contentMDK:20200608~menuPK:421515~pagePK:14

7 8 N OT E S

8956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:384201,00.html(last accessed: 17 November 2005).

5 Trade unions and Poverty ReductionStrategies, Labour Education, 2004(1/2) 134-135,http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/actrav/publ/134/134.pdf (last accessed: 24November 2005).

6 ILO (2005). Decent work and Poverty ReductionStrategies. A reference manual for ILO staff andits constituents. Geneva: ILO,http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/integration/departme/national/prsp/download/prsrefmanual.pdf (last accessed: 24 November2005).

7 See the website of:“IMF/World Bank: 50years is enough”,http://www.50years.org/cms/ejn/story/159(last accessed: 22 November 2005).

8 This policy strategy falls within Ghana’soverall PRSP paper. See: Government ofGhana (2003). Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy2003-2005.An agenda for growth andprosperity.Volume 1:Analysis and policystatement.Accra: Government of Ghana.Available from:http://povlibrary.worldbank.org/files/Ghana_PRSP.pdf (last accessed). For more info on thePRSP process in Ghana, see: Baah,A. (2004). Indoubt but on board – Ghana’s unions and thePRSP. In: 45-50. In: Labour Education 1/2, No.134-135: 45-50 (special issue on “Tradeunions and poverty reduction strategies”).

9 See website Government of Ghana:http://www.ghana.gov.gh/governing/ministries/economy/private.php (last accessed: 20November 2005).

10 The NBSSI was set up in 1972 by thegovernment of Ghana in order to encouragesmall-scale enterprises in manufacturing,agriculture and agro-processing. Empretec(see: http://www.empretec.net) is a capacitybuilding programme of the United NationsConference on Trade and Development(UNCTAD) that seeks to support small andmedium enterprises. Both institutions havebeen involved in the provision of microcreditin Ghana.

11 Government of Malawi (2002). Final draft.

Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper:Lilongwe: Government of Malawi.Available from:http://povlibrary.worldbank.org/files/Malawi_PRSP.pdf (last accessed: 20 March 2006). Formore info on the PRSP process in Malawi, seeJenkins, R. and M.Tsoka (2003). Malawi. In:Development Policy Review 21(2): 197-215.

12 Government of Malawi (1995). PolicyFramework for Poverty Alleviation Programme.Lilongwe: PAP Coordinating Unit Ministry ofEconomic Planning and Development.

13 Ibid, p. 37.14 Government of Malawi (2002). Final draft.

Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper:Lilongwe: Government of Malawi, p. xi.Availablefrom:http://povlibrary.worldbank.org/files/Malawi_PRSP.pdf (last accessed: 20 March 2006).

15 Ibid.16 IRIN News, 22 April 2005, MALAWI: Loan

scheme to assist rural poor,http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=46774 (last accessed: 20 November 2005).

17 Government of Mozambique (2001). ActionPlan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (2001-5) (PARPA) (Strategy Document for the Reductionof Poverty and the Promotion of EconomicGrowth). Maputo: Ministry of Planning andFinance.Available from:http://povlibrary.worldbank.org/files/Mozambique_PRSP.pdf (last accessed: 20 March 2006).For more info on the PRSP process inMozambique, see Falck, H., K. Landfald and P.Rebelo (2003). Mozambique. In: DevelopmentPolicy Review 21(2): 235-52.

18 Government of Zambia (2002). ZambiaPoverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2002-2004.Lusaka: Ministry of Finance and NationalPlanning.Available from:http://povlibrary.worldbank.org/files/11240_Zambia_PRSP.pdf (last accessed: 20 March2006).

19 Rogerson, Christian M. (2004).The impact ofthe South African government’s SMMEprogrammes: a ten-year review (1994-2003).In: Development Southern Africa, 21(5): 765-84.


7. Local government policy towards theinformal economy

1 Only a portion of Mozambique presently haslocal government.There are 33 municipalitiescovering Mozambique’s 23 cities (cidades) andten of the 116 towns (vilas) in the districts.From: The local government system inMozambique, Country Profile Mozambique,p. 157,http://www.clgf.org.uk/2005updates/Mozambique.pdf (last accessed: 24 November 2005).

2 See: The local government system in Ghana,Country Profile Ghana, p. 92,http://www.clgf.org.uk/2005updates/Ghana.pdf(last accessed: 24 November 2005).

3 See: The local government system in Zambia,Country Profile Zambia, p. 279,http://www.clgf.org.uk/2005updates/Zambia.pdf (last accessed: 24 November 2005).

4 Government of Zambia (2004). The newmarket management model. Lusaka: UrbanMarkets Development Programme, Ministryof Local Government and Housing, p. 7.

5 Government of Zambia (2003). Report of theMarkets Task Force to be presented to theHonourable Minister of Local Government andHousing. Lusaka: Market Task Force, Ministryof Local Government and Housing.

6 Government of Zambia (2004). The newmarket management model. Lusaka: UrbanMarkets Development Programme, Ministryof Local Government and Housing.

7 Ibid, p. 7.8 Ibid, p. 15.9 Hansen, K.Tranberg (2004) Who rules the

streets? The politics of vending space inLusaka. In: K.Tranberg Hansen and M.Vaa(eds.), Reconsidering informality: perspectivesfrom urban Africa (pp. 62-80). Uppsala: NordicAfrica Institute, p. 66.

10 See for example the work done at the Schoolof Development Studies, University of Natalon local government policy in Durban, SouthAfrica. Skinner, C. (1999). Local government intransition. A gendered analysis of trends in urbanpolicy and practice regarding street trading in fiveSouth African cities. Durban: School ofDevelopment Studies, University of Natal.Skinner, C. and I.Valodia (2003). Localgovernment support for women in theinformal economy in Durban, South Africa. In:International Journal of Politics, Culture andSociety 16(3): 431-44.

11 See: Horn, P. (2006). From best practice toPariah: the case of Durban, South Africa, availablefrom:http://www.streetnet.org.za/english/Durban06.htm (last accessed: 22 March 2006).

8 0 N OT E S

Name of Date of Location of Areas of Main activitiesorganisation establishment organisation operation

1 Local Market Banana 2000 East Legon, East Legon, •Organising contributionsSellers Association Accra Accra to help members.

2 Ghana Association 1995 Accra Main Nima,Adabraka, •Organising workshopsof Barbering and Abeka Lapaz, and seminars.Salon Owners Teshie/Nungua,

Nowlow and Adenta Madina

3 Ghana Electrical 1980s, Opera Square, Mainly Accra •Protecting the interestsDealers Association reorganised Accra Central and Kumasi and welfare of members.

in 1993/944 Ghana Electrical 1972 Accra Technical New Town •Sharing ideas on how to

Services Technical Training Centre, solve complex problems.Association (Radio Accraand TV RepairersAssociation)

5 Ghana Hairdressers 1972 Kokomlemle, 21 districts •Organising workshops toand Beauticians Accra in Accra promote work andAssociation enhance the image

of Association;•Providing education on the latest products.

6 Ghana Tailors and 1997 Electricity – Greater Accra •Supporting each other, especiallyDressmakers Adjacent Guest Branch,Accra on how to pay Accra Association Inn Teshie Metropolitan Assembly taxes.

7 Tetteh Quarshie 2003 Tetteh Quarshie Tetteh Quarshie •Making decisions regarding the Roundabout Roundabout Roundabout welfare of members.WoodworkersAssociation (carvers,carpenters andceramics sellers)

8 Odorkor Water 2000 Odorkor Water supply to •Organising the end of year get-Tankers’ Owners Kasoa, together;Association cantonments and •Providing support in case of

all areas in Accra illness and hospital bills.9 Odorkor Water 2004 Odorkor branch All areas in Accra •Looking out for the welfare and

Tankers’ Drivers interests of members in cases of Welfare Association bereavement.

10 Kantamanto Used 1984 Kantamanto Retailers around •Fostering peace, unity, happiness Clothing Sellers Accra and mutual assistance.Association

11 Nsokodua 1990 Timber Market Accra,Togo, •Working to ensure that Cooperative Society Nsawam, everybody has access to

Koforidua facilities.12 Abossey Okai Spare 1979 Kaneshie and Kaneshie and •Looking out for the interest and

Parts Dealers Abossey Okai Abossey Okai welfare of members.Association

13 Yam Sellers 1964 Kaneshie Market Kaneshie Market •Assisting members in cases of Association bereavement.

Appendix 1: Basic characteristics oforganisations


Table 1.1: Ghana


14 Cassava Sellers 1979 Kaneshie Market Kaneshie Market •Providing a system of checks andAssociation balances;

•Aiding each other in cases of bereavement.

15 Spices Sellers 1972 Kaneshie Market Kaneshie Market •Helping with funerals, marriages Association and end of year parties.

16 Plantain Sellers 1964 Kaneshie Market Kaneshie Market •Providing support during births Association and deaths.

17 Onion Sellers 1999 Kaneshie Market Kaneshie Market •Providing support during Association bereavements.

18 Tomato Sellers 1983 Kaneshie Market Kaneshie Market •Organising susu1 collections to Association help themselves as a credit

scheme.19 Charcoal Sellers 1974 Kaneshie Market Kaneshie Market •Supporting each other in susu

Association collections.20 Kaneshie Butchers 1994 Kaneshie Market Kaneshie Market •Providing support during

Cooperative bereavement.Association

21 New Amanful Traders 2003 New Amanful New Amanful • Supporting each other through Association Fishing Community Fishing Community social protection.

22 Adjoah Traders 2003 Adjoah Fishing Adjoah Fishing •Defending members’ interests Association Community Community and welfare.

23 Apremdo Market 2003 Apremdo Apremdo •Looking out for the welfare and Traders Association interests of members and help

each other.24 Ankyernyin/Yebikrom 2003 Ankyernyin/ Ankyernyin/ •Helping each other when the

Traders Association Yebikrom Yebikrom need arises.Community Community

25 Apowa Traders 2003 Apowa Community, Apowa •Helping to protect each other’s Association Takoradi Community interests.

26 Takoradi Traders 2003 Takoradi Takoradi •Coming together to work for Association Community Community members’ interest.

27 Railways and Ports 2003 Railways, ports Railways, ports •Helping others.Traders Association and harbours and harbours

community community28 Ghacem Traders 2003 Ghacem Ghacem •Supporting each other.

Association Community, Community,Takoradi neighbourhood

29 Lagos Town Traders 2003 Lagos Town, Lagos Town, •Supporting each other.Association Takoradi neighbourhood

30 Adiembra Traders 2003 Adiembra Adiembra, •Helping each other meet their Association Community, neighbourhood needs.

Takoradi31 St. Mary’s Traders 2003 St. Mary’s St. Mary’s •Looking out for members’

Association Community neighbourhood welfare and supporting each other

32 StreetNet Ghana 2003 Accra,Takoradi Accra,Takoradi •Protecting the rights of street Alliance,Accra and Kumasi and Kumasi vendors;

(all cities) •Developing the capacity of members in managing work.

33 StreetNet Ghana 2003 Shama Ahanta East Takoradi (city) •Capacity building and creating Alliance,Takoradi Metropolis,Takoradi awareness among traders.

8 2 A P P E N D I X 1 : B A S I C C H A R AC T E R I S T I C S O F O R G A N I S AT I O N S

Note 1 Susu refers to informal savings groups.



1 Malawi Union of Formed in Blantyre Blantyre City •Organising and recruitment;Informal Sector 2001. Central Business •Sensitisation;(MUFIS), Blantyre Registered with District (CBD) •Training in leadership and Branch government in business skills; •Protection of members

June 2004. from harassment byauthorities.

2 Wenela Vendors Blantyre City Blantyre,Wenela •Overseeing the welfare of theBus depot vendors that includes resolving

conflicts;•Representing vendors’ interests at meetings with city authorities.

3 MUFIS, Namilango 2004 Blantyre City, Township named •Recruitment;Branch South Lunzu Machinjiri •Training

4 MUFIS, Lunzu Branch 2004 Blantyre Rural Blantyre Rural at •Organising recruitment Lunzu Trading campaigns;

•Training members in business venturing.

5 Vegetable Vendors Blantyre City at Limbe Produce •Overseeing the welfare of Committee Limbe Central Central Market vegetable vendors;

market •Settling disputes among the vendors;

•Organising condolence of bereaved members;

• Liasing with police on theft cases in the market.

6 Newspaper and Blantyre City, Limbe Produce •Settling disputes;Magazine Vendors Limbe Central Central Market •Organising condolence of

Market bereaved members.7 Fish Vendors Since the Blantyre City, Limbe produce •Settling disputes;

market was Limbe Central Central Market •Condolence;established. Market (dried fish section) •Mobilising members for political

party functions.8 Blantyre Market Since the Blantyre City, Blantyre CBD, •Settling disputes among the

Vendors market was Blantyre Market Blantyre Market vendors;established. •Providing social welfare and

support of the sick or bereaved.9 Limbe Street Vendors 1994-5 Blantyre City Limbe CBD •Allocating vending space;

Association •Settling disputes among the vendors;

•Representing the street vendors at meetings organized by City Assembly;

•Liasing with the City Assembly to ensure proper waste disposal;

•Working with police to curb theft cases.

10 Blantyre Street 1994-5 Blantyre City Blantyre CBD •Allocating vending space;Vendors Association •Settle disputes among the

vendors;•Representing street vendors atmeetings organized by CityAssembly;

•Liasing with the City Assemblyto ensure proper waste disposal;

•Working with police to curbtheft cases.

Table 1.2: Malawi


11 Kaunjika (second- Mzuzu City Mzuzu City Centre •Resolving conflicts among the hand clothes) Centre Market, Kaunjika vendors;Vendors Section •Mobilising money from members

for supporting sick and bereavedmembers;

•Negotiating with the marketmaster and City Assembly;

•Liasing with the chairman for thewhole Mzuzu main market.

12 Hardware Market 2001 Mzuzu City Mzuzu City •Providing social support during Vendors Centre, Hardware times of bereavement;

market •Maintaining a bank account;•Negotiating with City Assemblyon various issues includingsecurity and cleanliness;

•Settling disputes among thevendors.

13 Jombo Vegetable 2004 Mzuzu City Mzuzu City, Old •Liasing with City Assembly on Vendors Town, new market various problems at the new

site market;•Allocating space to vendors;•Settling disputes among thevendors.

14 Chibavi Community Since the Mzuzu City •Settling disputes in the market;Market Vendors market was Chibavi market •Overseeing the security of goods

established. in the market;•Mobilising members for socialsupport when one is sick andbereaved;

•Representing the vendors’ needsto City Assembly.

15 Katawa Market Since the Mzuzu City, Katawa •Representing vendors at City Vendors market was Katawa Market Neighbourhood Assembly meetings;

established. (township) •Settling disputes;•Providing social support duringsickness and in case ofbereavement.

16 Freedom Square 1998 Mzuzu City, Mzuzu City, •Representing members at (Mataifa) Market Old Town Mataifa market meetings with City Assembly and

Malawi Revenue Authority(MRA);

•Collaborating with City Assemblyin allocating space to newvendors;

•Assisting other organisations inmobilizing funds for charity inthe market;

•Assisting bereaved memberswith burial arrangements.




1 Association of Established Maputo City Maputo City, •Defending informal sector Informal Sector between Matola, workers’ rights;Operators and 1998-1999 Marracuene, •Organising the informal sector.Workers (ASSOTSI) Xai-xai, Inhambane

and Beira.2 Association of Maputo, Maputo City and •Regulating prices;

Barbers of Maputo Chamanculo suburbs. •Organising the sector’s workers.City’s Suburbs

3 Mukhero - 1999 Maputo City Borders with •Protecting informal importers;Association of nearby countries. •Organising and improving the Informal Sector activities of informal sector’s Traders and importers;Importers •Working to eradicate the

violation of the borders and taxevasion.

4 Association of 1999 Maputo City Borders with •Protecting informal importers;Micro-Importers of nearby countries •Organising and improving the Mozambique and markets. activities of informal sector’s

importers;•Working to eradicate theviolation of the borders and taxevasion.

Table 1.3: Mozambique


1 Association of Audio, 2001 Lusaka Province, Lusaka City •Training members to be Video and CD Central Province, Market professional in their businesses;Dealers in Zambia Northwestern Market in Kitwe •Educating members to deal in

Province, genuine products, e.g. audio Copperbelt tapes, video tapes, CDs, DVDs Province, Luapula and electronics;Province and •Training members on how to Northern protect intellectual property Province rights, e.g. music, arts and crafts.

2 Chibolya Carpentry 1999 Wusakile Old Wusakile •Carpentry;Shoe Making, Market (previously Zambia •Saw milling;Blacksmith and Consolidated •Welding;Wirefence Making Copper •Wire fence making.Association Mines township)

3 Zambia Fisheries Established Based throughout Mainly in Luapula •Promoting and protecting the and Marketeers 1963, Zambia, offices are Province and interests of membersUnion registered 1965 located in Kitwe Northern •Recruiting and organising

Province membership•Organising markets for thefishermen;

•Negotiating and resolving theirgrievances with relevantauthorities.

4 Zambia Association 1994 Mansa town Mansa town centre, •Helping disabled people;of Employment and centre, Samfya, Samfya town •Teaching them how to work Development for the Mwense town centre, Mwense and also how to becomeDisabled (ZAEDD) centre town centre productive citizens in the future.

Table 1.4: Zambia



5 Zambia National 1999 Mansa, Mwense, New market, •Advocating /lobbying for the Marketeers Samfya and Chilyapa, Senama, promotion and protection of the Association Kawambwa Maiteneke, marketeers' interests;(ZANAMA), Mansa Muchinka, •Resolving and providing Branch Mwamfuli, arbitration services when dealing

Chinsanka, Lubwe, with disputes among members;Mwense, Chembe, •Organising and managing funeral Kasasa and health sub committees;

•Providing credit facilities tomembers.

6 Visual Arts 1995 Lusaka Mansa, Lubunda, •Working with visual arts.Association Mansa Showground Lusaka showground

7 Mansa Carpenters 2002 Mansa central Mansa •Promoting good working and Joiners cooperation among the Association carpenters.

8 Traditional Healers 1972 Lusaka, Mansa, Mansa main •Helping people in need;and Practitioners Chipata market, Lusaka at •Bringing people together as a Association of hospital community.Zambia (THPAZ)

9 Mansa Street Vendors 1998 Mansa Mansa •Providing a collective voice for Association the poor, especially street

vendors.


Appendix 2: Relations with central andlocal government and otherorganisations

Name of Relationship Relationship Interference Relationship organisation with central with local with operations with other

government government organisations

1 Local Market Banana Sellers No relations Cordial No Trade unionAssociation

2 Ghana Association of Barbering and Cordial Confrontational No Trade union, local Salon Owners and international

NGOs.3 Ghana Electrical Dealers Association Engagement/ Cordial No Trade union

negotiation4 Ghana Electrical Services Technical Engagement/ Cordial No Trade union

Association (Radio and TV Repairers negotiationAssociation)

5 Ghana Hairdressers and Beauticians Engagement/ Engagement No Trade unionAssociation negotiation and negotiation

6 Ghana Tailors and Dressmakers Engagement/ Cordial No Trade unionAssociation negotiation

7 Tetteh Quarshie Roundabout No relations Cordial No Trade unionWoodworkers Association (carvers, carpenters and ceramics sellers)

8 Odorkor Water Tankers’ Owners Cordial Cordial No NoneAssociation

9 Odorkor Water Tankers Drivers No relations No relations No NoneWelfare Association

10 Kantamanto Used Clothing Sellers Cordial Cordial No NoneAssociation

11 Nsokodua Cooperative Society No relations Cordial No None12 Abossey Okai Spare Parts Dealers No relations Cordial No Trade union

Association13 Yam Sellers Association No relations Cordial No None14 Cassava Sellers Association No relations Cordial No None15 Spices Sellers Association No relations Engagement/ No None

negotiation16 Plantain Sellers Association No relations Engagement/ No None

negotiation17 Onion Sellers Association No relations Cordial No None18 Tomato Sellers Association No relations Engagement/ No None

negotiation19 Charcoal Sellers Association No relations Engagement/ No None

negotiation20 Kaneshie Butchers Cooperative No relations Engagement/ No None

Association negotiation21 New Amanful Traders Association No relations Cordial No Trade union22 Adjoah Traders Association No relations Cordial No Trade union23 Apremdo Market Traders Association No relations Cordial No Trade union24 Ankyernyin/Yebikrom Traders No relations Cordial No Trade union

Association25 Apowa Traders Association No relations Cordial No Trade union26 Takoradi Traders Association No relations Cordial No Trade union27 Railways and Ports Traders No relations Cordial No Trade union

Association

Table 2.1: Ghana

8 8 A P P E N D I X 2 : R E L AT I O N S W I T H C E N T R A L A N D L O C A L G OV E R N M E N T



28 Ghacem Traders Association No relations Cordial No Trade union29 Lagos Town Traders Association No relations Cordial No Trade union30 Adiembra Traders Association No relations Cordial No Trade union31 St. Mary’s Traders Association No relations Cordial No Trade union32 StreetNet Ghana Alliance,Accra Engagement/ Engagement No StreetNet

Branch negotiation with and negotiation International,government Workers agencies Education

Association ofZambia and tradeunion.

33 StreetNet Ghana Alliance,Takoradi Engagement/ Cordial No Trade union and Branch negotiation StreetNet

International.

Name of Relationship Interference Relationship organisation with local with operations with other

government organisations

1 Malawi Union of Informal Sector (MUFIS), Cordial No Trade unionBlantyre Branch

2 Wenela Vendors No relations Yes Trade union and MUFIS

3 MUFIS, Namilongo Branch Cordial Yes Trade union4 MUFIS, Lunzu Branch Cordial Yes Trade union5 Vegetable Vendors Committee Cordial No None6 Newspaper and Magazine Vendors Cordial No None7 Fish vendors Cordial No None8 Blantyre Market Vendors Cordial No None9 Limbe Street Vendors association Engagement/negotiation/ Yes None

sometimes confrontational 10 Blantyre Street Vendors Association Engagement/negotiation/ Yes None

sometimes confrontational11 Kaunjika (second-hand clothes) vendors Engagement/negotiation No12 Hardware Market Vendors Engagement/negotiation No13 Jombo Vegetable vendors Confrontational Yes None14 Chibavi Community Market Vendors Engagement/negotiation No None15 Katawa Market Vendors Engagement/negotiation No None16 Freedom Square (Mataifa) Market Engagement/negotiation Yes

Table 2.2: Malawi




1 Association of Informal Sector Cordial Engagement/ No Trade unionOperators and Workers (ASSOTSI) negotiation

2 Association of Barbers of Maputo Engagement/City’s Suburbs negotiation

3 Mukhero - Association of Informal Cordial Engagement/ Sector Traders and Importers negotiation

4 Association of Micro-Importers Cordial Engagement/ of Mozambique negotiation




1 Association of Audio,Video and CD Confrontational Cordial YesDealers in Zambia

2 Chibolya Carpentry Shoe Making, Confrontational No relations No Blacksmith and Wirefence Making Association

3 Zambia Fisheries and Marketeers Engagement/ Engagement/ No Trade unionUnion negotiation negotiation

4 Zambia Association of Employment No relations No relations No NGOsand Development for the Disabled (ZAEDD)

5 Zambia National Marketeers Engagement/ Engagement/ Yes Trade union, local Association (ZANAMA) negotiation negotiation and international

Cordial Cordial NGOs.Confrontational Confrontational

6 Visual Arts Association Mansa Engagement/ No relations No NGOsnegotiation

7 Mansa Carpenters and Joiners Engagement/ Engagement/ No NGOsAssociation negotiation negotiation

8 Traditional Healers and Practitioners Engagement/ Engagement/ No NGOs, trade Association of Zambia (THPAZ) negotiation negotiation unions, social

movements.9 Mansa Street Vendors Association No relations No relations Yes

Table 2.4: Zambia


Appendix 3: Membership details oforganisations

Name of organisation Method of becoming Membership fees1 Size ofa member membership

1 Local Market Banana Sellers Association No specific procedure. GHC 2,000 per month to 8Ghana Trade Union Congress.

2 Ghana Association of Barbering Sign form and pay Registration fee GHC 200and Salon Owners membership fee. 200,000. Monthly dues

GHC 5,000.3 Ghana Electrical Dealers Association Sign form and pay Registration fee GHC 200

membership fee. 100,000. Monthly dues GHC 50,000.

4 Ghana Electrical Services Technical Buy membership card. Annual dues GHC 50,000.Association (Radio and TV Repairers Association)

5 Ghana Hairdressers and Beauticians Buy membership card. Registration fees GHC 1,500Association 50,000 -100,000. Monthly

dues GHC 5,000.6 Ghana Tailors and Dressmakers Sign form and pay Registration fee GHC 120 – 150

Association membership fees. 60,000. Monthly dues GHC 10,000.

7 Tetteh Quarshie Roundabout Buy membership card. Registration GHC 70,000. 25 – 50Woodworkers Association (carvers, Monthly dues GHC 5,000.carpenters and ceramics sellers)

8 Odorkor Water Tankers’ Owners Sign form and pay Initial fee GHC 30Association membership fee. 200,000 – 300,000.

Monthly dues GHC 10,000.9 Odorkor Water Tankers Drivers Welfare Sign form and pay Registration fee GHC 50

Association membership fee. 20,000. Monthly dues GHC 10,000.

10 Kantamanto Used Clothing Sellers Buy membership card. Annual dues GHC 50,000. 1,640Association

11 Nsokodua Cooperative Society No specific procedure. Annual dues GHC 50,000. 15012 Abossey Okai Spare Parts Dealers Sign form and pay Registration GHC 20,000. 5,000

Association membership fee. Monthly dues GHC 10,000.13 Yam Sellers Association Buy membership card. Registration GHC 120

50,000 - 100,000.Monthly dues GHC 2,000.

14 Cassava Sellers Association Buy membership card. Registration GHC 50,000. 40Commission GHC 1,000 a day.

15 Spices Sellers Association Buy membership card. Registration GHC 10050,000 - 100,000.Monthly dues GHC 2,000.

16 Plantain Sellers Association Buy membership card. Initial fee GHC 20,000. 100Monthly dues GHC 2,000.

17 Onion Sellers Association Buy membership card. Monthly dues GHC 2,000. 8018 Tomato Sellers Association No specific procedure. Monthly dues GHC 1,000 195

but contributions when need arises.

Table 3.1: Ghana

Note 1 During the time of fieldwork in Ghana (estimated as the exchange rate on 20 December 2004), the exchangerate for £1 was 17,310 Ghana cedis (GHC). Obtained from the Economist website:http://www.economist.com/markets/currency/fullconverter.cfm (last accessed: 16 March 2006).

9 2 A P P E N D I X 3 : M E M B E R S H I P D E TA I L S O F O R G A N I S AT I O N S


19 Charcoal Sellers Association No specific procedure. Susu contribution amongst 25themselves.

20 Kaneshie Butchers Cooperative No specific procedure. No monthly dues but 50Association members contribute when

needs arise.21 New Amanful Traders Association Buy membership card. Affiliation fees based on 36

numerical strength.Membership dues of GHC 100,000 but not paying.

22 Adjoah Traders Association Buy membership card. Affiliation fees based on 30numerical strength.Membership dues of GHC 100,000 but not paying.

23 Apremdo Market Traders Association Buy membership card. Affiliation fees based on 345numerical strength.Membership dues of GHC 100,000 but not paying.

24 Ankyernyin/Yebikrom Traders Association Buy membership card. Affiliation fees based on 33numerical strength.Membership dues of GHC 100,000 but not paying.

25 Apowa Traders Association Buy membership card. Affiliation fees based on 120numerical strength.Membership dues of GHC 100,000 but not paying.

26 Takoradi Traders Association Buy membership card. Affiliation fees based on 67numerical strength.Membership dues of GHC 100,000 but not paying.

27 Railways and Ports Traders Association Buy membership card. Affiliation fees based on 81numerical strength.Membership dues of GHC 100,000 but not paying.

28 Ghacem Traders Association Buy membership card. Affiliation fees based on 31numerical strength.Membership dues of GHC 100,000 but not paying.

29 Lagos Town Traders Association Buy membership card. Affiliation fees based on 68numerical strength.Membership dues of GHC 100,000 but not paying.

30 Adiembra Traders Association Buy membership card. Affiliation fees based on 38numerical strength.Membership dues of GHC 100,000 but not paying.

31 St. Mary’s Traders Association Buy membership card. Affiliation fees based on 51numerical strength.Membership dues of GHC 100,000 but not paying.

32 StreetNet Ghana Alliance,Accra Sign form and pay Affiliation fee GHC 11 organs membership fee. 300,000. Membership fee with 400,000

GHC 50,000. individualmembers.

33 StreetNet Ghana Alliance,Takoradi Sign form and pay Affiliation fee GHC 11 groupsmembership fee. 300,000. with 900

individualmembers.



1 Malawi Union of Informal Sector (MUFIS), Sign a form. No fee 2,500Blantyre Branch

2. Wenela Vendors No specific procedure. 1,0003 MUFIS, Namilongo Branch Sign form. MKW 120 2504 MUFIS, Lunzu Branch Sign form. MKW 120 1055 Vegetable Vendors Committee No specific procedure. 7006 Newspaper and Magazine Vendors No specific procedure. 307 Fish vendors No specific procedure. 1008 Blantyre Market Vendors No specific procedure. 1,0009 Limbe Street Vendors association Register name with the chairman. 3,00010 Blantyre Street Vendors Association Register name with the chairman. 2,50011 Kaunjika (second-hand clothes) vendors No specific procedure. 40012 Hardware Market Vendors Automatic/pay a fee. Membership fee: 600

MKW 50 per month,security fee:MKW 100 per month.

13 Jombo Vegetable Vendors No specific procedure. 20014 Chibavi Community Market Vendors No specific procedure.15 Katawa Market Vendors No specific procedure.16 Freedom Square (Mataifa) Market Register name with the 700

chairperson.

Table 3.2: Malawi


1 Association of Informal Sector Operators Filling in the token. 5,000 MZM per month. 36,000and Workers (ASSOTSI)

2 Mukhero - Association of Informal Sector 476Traders and Importers


Note 3 During the time of fieldwork in Mozambique (estimated as the exchange rate on 20 December 2004), theexchange rate for £1 was 43,441 Mozambique Metical (MZM). Obtained from the Economist website:http://www.economist.com/markets/currency/fullconverter.cfm (last accessed: 16 March 2006).

Note 2 During the time of fieldwork in Malawi (estimated as the exchange rate on 4 January 2005), the exchangerate for £1 was 201 Malawi Kwacha (MKW). Obtained from the Economist website:http://www.economist.com/markets/currency/fullconverter.cfm (last accessed: 16 March 2006).

9 4 A P P E N D I X 3 : M E M B E R S H I P D E TA I L S O F O R G A N I S AT I O N S


1 Association of Audio,Video and CD Sign form and pay Varies from ZKW 25,000 300 Dealers in Zambia membership fee. to ZKW 150,000

depending on your income from your business.

2 Chibolya Carpentry Shoe Making, Sign form and pay You renew by paying 30Blacksmith and Wirefence Making membership fee. ZKW 10,000 annually.Association

3 Zambia Fisheries and Marketeers Union Sign form and pay ZKW 5,000. 450 membership fee.

4 Zambia Association of Employment and Buy membership card. ZKW 10,000 per year. 68 Development for the Disabled (ZAEDD)

5 Zambia National Marketeers Association Sign form and pay ZKW 12,000 per year with 3,050(ZANAMA) membership fee. a ZKW 2,500 initial joining

fee.6 Visual Arts Association Mansa Sign form and pay ZKW 20,000 per year. 36

membership fees.7 Mansa Carpenters and Joiners Association Sign form and pay ZKW 25,000 per year. 17

membership fee.8 Traditional Healers and Practitioners Buy membership card. ZKW 5,000 per year. 300

Association of Zambia (THPAZ)9 Mansa Street Vendors Association Sign form and pay ZKW 5,000 per year. 50

membership fee.

Table 3.4: Zambia

Note 4 During the time of fieldwork in Zambia (estimated as the exchange rate on 15 October 2005), the exchangerate for £1 was 6,017 Zambia Kwacha (ZKW). Obtained from the Economist website:http://www.economist.com/markets/currency/fullconverter.cfm (last accessed: 16 March 2006).


Appendix 4: Democratic practice,funding and staffing of organisations

Name of organisation Method of Method of Gender Sources of Numberchoosing decision composition income for of paidleadership making of leadership organisation staff

1 Local Market Banana Sellers By appointment Participatory Total number: 3 Membership fees NoneAssociation Men: 0

Women: 32 Ghana Association of Barbering Elections By voting Membership fees None

and Salon Owners3 Ghana Electrical Dealers Elections General meeting Total number: 12 Membership fees None

Association but executive Men: 9 committee decides Women: 3and then discusses with members.

4 Ghana Electrical Services Elections Executive decides Total number: 12 Membership fees NoneTechnical Association (Radio and then submits it Men: 12and TV Repairers Association) to membership for Women: 0

discussion.5 Ghana Hairdressers and Elections Executive council Women only. Membership fees None

Beauticians Association in zones, then regional meetings.

6 Ghana Tailors and Dressmakers Elections Executive decides Total number: 12 Membership fees NoneAssociation: and relays to Men: 4

members. Women: 87 Tetteh Quarshie Roundabout Elections Executive decides Total number: 10 Membership fees None

Woodworkers Association and relays to (carvers, carpenters and members.ceramics sellers)

8 Odorkor Water Tankers’ Appointment Executive members Total number: 3 Membership fees 8 Owner Association then relay to

members.9 Odorkor water Tankers Elections Executive members Total number 8 Membership fee No

Drivers Welfare Association then have a general Men: 8 and daily tollmeeting to relay Women: 0and discussion.

10 Kantamanto Used Clothing Elections Executive decision Total number: 5 Members fees 8 Sellers Association conducted by and passed to Men: 3

Electoral members at the Women: 2Committee. general meeting.

11 Nsokodua Cooperative Society Appointment Executive decides Total number: 3 Charge for Noneand relays to Men: 2 offloadingmembers. Woman: 1

12 Abossey Okai Spare Parts Election Executive then Membership fees 1Dealers Association group level for

decision to be taken.13 Yam Sellers Association Appointment Executive Total number: 5 Membership fees None

Committee decides Men: 0and relays to Women: 5members for agreement.

Table 4.1: Ghana

9 6 A P P E N D I X 4 : D E M O C R AT I C P R AC T I C E , F U N D I N G A N D S TA F F I N G O F O R G A N I S AT I O N S


14 Cassava Sellers Association Appointment Participatory Total number: 4 Membership fees NoneMen: 0 Women: 4

15 Spices Sellers Association Appointment Participatory Total number: 1 Membership fees NoneMen: 0Women: 1

16 Plantain Sellers Association Appointment Participatory Total number: 5 Membership NoneMen: 0Women: 5

17 Onion Sellers Association Appointment Participatory Total number: 3 Membership fees NoneMen: 0Women 3

18 Tomato Sellers Association Appointment Participatory Total number: 4 Membership fees NoneMen: 0 and other Women: 4 contributions.

19 Charcoal Sellers Association Appointment Participation Total number: 2 Membership fees NoneMen: 0Women: 2

20 Kaneshie Butchers Appointment Participatory but Total number: 10 Membership fees NoneCooperative Association most decisions Men: 10

come from the Women: 0national association.

21 New Amanful Traders Elections Participatory Total number: 9 Membership fees NoneAssociation Men: 3

Women: 622 Adjoah Traders Association Elections Participatory Total number: 9 Membership fees None

Men: 2Women: 7

23 Apremdo Market Traders Elections Participatory Total number: 9 Membership fees NoneAssociation Men: 2

Women: 724 Ankyernyin/Yebikrom Traders

Association Elections Participatory Total number: 9 Membership fees NoneMen: 2Women: 7

25 Apowa Traders Association Elections Participatory Total number: 9 Membership fees NoneMen: 3Women: 6

26 Takoradi Traders Association Elections Participatory Total number: 9 Membership fees NoneMen: 3Women: 6

27 Railways and Ports Traders Elections Participatory Total number: 9 Membership fees NoneAssociation Men: 3

Women: 628 Ghacem Traders Association Elections Participatory Total number: 9 Membership fees None

Men: 3Women: 6

29 Lagos Town Traders Association Elections Participatory Total number: 9 Membership fees NoneMen: 0 Women: 9

30 Adiembra Traders Association Elections Participatory Total number: 9 Membership fees NoneMen: 0Women: 9

31 St. Mary’s Traders Association Elections Participatory Total number: 9 Membership fees NoneMen: 0Women: 9



32 StreetNet Ghana Alliance, Elections at General meeting/ Leadership Membership fees NoneAccra general meeting/ conference is the dominated by

conference for highest decision men;4 years. making body and 2 women only.

meets every 4 years.Management Committee 4 times a year. Decisions made by consensus.

33 StreetNet Ghana Alliance, Elections Participatory Total number: 9 Membership fees NoneTakoradi Men: 2

Women: 7


1 Malawi Union of Informal Democratic Through discussion Total number: 12 External donor NoneSector (MUFIS), Blantyre process Men: 7 grant and inBranch through and consultation. Women: 5 future

elections. membershipfees

2 Wenela Vendors Elections for Committee discuss/ Total: 12 No regularchairperson, debate then consult Men: 8 income.secretary and the total Women: 4 Memberstreasurer and membership contribute totheir vice. supportAppointment of bereavedrepresentatives members.from each category of vendors.

3 MUFIS, Namilongo Branch Elections Consultation Total number: 10 Membership fees NoneMen: 4Women: 6

4 MUFIS, Lunzu Branch Democratic Holding Total number: 10 Membership fees Noneelections consultation Men: 7

meetings with total Women: 3membership.

5 Vegetable Vendors Committee By elections Discussion to Total number: 42 No income Noneevery 2 years. reach consensus. Men: 14

Women: 14Youth: 14

6 Newspaper and Magazine Appointment by Through discussion Total number: 2 No income NoneVendors former with the total Men: 2

chairperson. membership. Women: 07 Fish vendors Elections Discuss with Total number: 2 No income None

chairpersons in Men: 2other section. Women: 0

8 Blantyre Market Vendors Through vote. The committee Total number: 10 No income Nonediscusses to reach Men: 6consensus. Women: 4

Table 4.2: Malawi

9 8 A P P E N D I X 4 : D E M O C R AT I C P R AC T I C E , F U N D I N G A N D S TA F F I N G O F O R G A N I S AT I O N S


9 Limbe Street Vendors Organise The committee Total number: 14 No income Noneassociation elections every meets every Men: 14

2 years.Vacant Tuesday to discuss Separate women’spositions are outstanding issues committee: 7filled as and and reach when they exist. consensus.

10 Blantyre Street Vendors Organise The committee Total number: 10 No income NoneAssociation elections every meets whenever Men: 10

two years. there is burning Women: 0Vacant issue. Memberspositions are discuss openly.filled as and Sometimes voting is when they used to decide on exist. sensitive issues.

11 Kaunjika (second-hand clothes) Elections every Discussion to reach Total number: 12 No income Nonevendors two years. consensus. Men: 10

Women: 212 Hardware Market Vendors Elections every Committee meets Total number: 12 Membership fees None

2 years. to analyse issues Men: 11and reach Women: 1consensus.

13 Jombo Vegetable Vendors Elections Discussion to reach Total number: 3 No income Noneconsensus. Men: 2

Women: 114 Chibavi Community Market Elections The committee Total number: 10 No income None

Vendors whenever the meets to discuss Men: 5 members feel and then members Women: 5necessary or are informed.when the Action is only taken committee is when members arenot performing agreeable to the as expected. committee’s decision.

15 Katawa Market Vendors Elections every Discuss and reach Total number: 10 No income Noneyear. consensus. Men: 6

Women: 416 Freedom Square (Mataifa) Elections every Discuss and reach Total number: 15 No income None

Market 2-3 years. consensus. Men: 9Women: 6


1 Association of Informal Sector Democratic Consensus and Contributions 6Operators and Workers process and simple majority from members.(ASSOTSI) universal vote. Donations from

suffrage. the FRELIMO Party.

2 Mukhero - Association of Democratic Consensus and Informal Sector Traders and process and simple majority Importers universal vote.

suffrage.




1 Association of Audio,Video Elections Collectively 75% composed Membership fees 2 and CD Dealers in Zambia of men. and contributions

2 Chibolya Carpentry Shoe Elections every There is a Making, Blacksmith and three years at constitution which Men hold all the Membership fees NoneWirefence Making Association the General is subject to change leadership

meeting. during general positions.meeting.

3 Zambia Fisheries and Elections and The national Total number: 10 Membership fees NoneMarketeers Union appointments. executive committee Men: 10

makes decisions Women: 0about important issues facing the organisation through the policy making body.

4 Zambia Association of Elections By holding meetings Total number: 11 External donor 12 Employment and Development with the executive Men: 6 grantfor the Disabled (ZAEDD) and general Women: 5

membership.5 Zambia National Marketeers Elections Decisions are Total number: 16 Membership fees 22

Association (ZANAMA) passed in meetings Men: 10 Finesby majority votes. Women: 6

6 Visual Arts Association Mansa Elections Meeting with the Total number: 10 External donor 6executive. Men: 8 grant

Women: 27 Mansa Carpenters and Joiners Elections General meeting Total number: 10 Membership fees

Association are called. Men: 10Women: 0

8 Traditional Healers and Through By the executive Men: two-third Membership fees 50Practitioners Association of elections committee. Women: one-third and grantsZambia (THPAZ)

9 Mansa Street Vendors Elections The executive calls Total number 10 Membership fee NoneAssociation for meetings with Men: 6

the general Women: 4members.

Table 4.4: Zambia

Cover photo: Market vendors in Maputo, Mozambique.

Back page photos:Products for sale in a market in Maputo, Mozambique (left, right).Market vendor in a market in Maputo, Mozambique (centre).

Forces for ChangeInformal economy organisations in Africa

War on Want fights poverty indeveloping countries in partnershipand solidarity with people affected byglobalisation.We campaign forworkers' rights and against the rootcauses of global poverty, inequalityand injustice.

War on WantDevelopment House56-64 Leonard StreetLondon EC2A 4LTT: +44 (0)20 7549 0555 F: +44 (0)20 7549 0556E: [email protected]: www.waronwant.org

Company limited by guarantee registration number 629916Charity number 208724

The Workers Education Association ofZambia was formed in 1997 by theZambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)to provide education not only to formalworkers but also to the educationally,economically and socially disadvantaged.

The Alliance for Zambia InformalEconomy Associations was formed in2001 by 12 informal economy workersassociations to promote and protect theinterests of informal economy workers.

Workers Education Association of Zambia andAlliance for Zambia Informal EconomyAssociationsSolidarity House, P.O. Box 20652Oxford Road, Kitwe, ZambiaT/F: +260 (0)2 222607E: [email protected]

Overall Project Coordinator and SupervisorGuillermo Rogel, Director of International Programmes,War on Want

Research Project Coordinator and EditorWendy Willems, Research Officer,War on Want

Country ResearchersGhana: Vitus Azeem, with assistance from Gladys Ohene-Darko and Ama Blankson-AnamanMalawi: Ignasio Malizani JimuMozambique: Raul Chambote, with assistance from Boaventura Veja and Ilidio NhantumboSouth Africa: Sarah MosoetsaZambia: Chomba Mulenga, Mutale Makasa, Malama Chongo and Julius Mulenga

Published in May 2006

All photos taken by War on Want

ISBN 0-905990-00-5 ISBN 978-0-905990-00-2

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