fo b2 commission meeting 9-23-03 fdr- table of contents and tab 1 entire contents- minutes of...

8/14/2019 FO B2 Commission Meeting 9-23-03 Fdr- Table of Contents and Tab 1 Entire Contents- Minutes of 9-10-03 Meeting

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1) Minutes of September 9-10, 2003Meeting

2) Second Interim Report

3) Biography and Joint Inquiry Testimonyof General Brent Scowcroft

4) September 19 Letter to Judge Gonzales

5) Proposed October 14 Hearing Agenda

6) Family Steering Committee Report Card


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Minutes of the September 9-10, 2003 MeetingThe Vice Chair called the Commission to order at 6:35 p.m. on September 9, 2003. ViceChair Hamilton, and Commissioners Ben-Veniste, Fielding, Gorton, Lehman, and Roemerwere present. Hamilton chaired until Chairman Kean arrived.Minutes. The minutes of the August 14,2003 meeting were approved.Press Guidelines. The Vice Chair indicated that recent public statements regarding the AirThreat Conference Call had created problems with the White House. He added that theCommission was able to work through those problems, but the incident raised the questionof how to deal with the media. The Vice Chair stated that although he was reluctant to givestrict guidelines, they way the Commission deals with the press has an important impact onits relationship with the White House. He offered a few suggestions:1) Do not disclose the Commission's internal deliberations.2) Do not discuss the details of White House documents.3) Do not disclose the character of intelligence information, especially with respect toforeign governments or detainees.4) Do not disclose the status of negotiations with the White House or conditions of access

unless the Commission decides to make such information public.5) When in doubt, call the Chair or Vice Chair to work it out.Commissioner Roemer stated that it was important fo r Commissioners to be able to speakto the press without censorship or approval, and that the Commissioners should usecommon sense when speaking to the media. The Vice Chair pointed out that the guidelinesonly ask that Commissioners consult the Chair or Vice Chair when they are in doubt, andtherefore, most of what Commissioner Roemer said would still be permissible.Commissioner Roemer said he would try to live by the guidelines, but added that the mediawas a source of the Commission's leverage.Commissioner Ben-Veniste underscored the importance of the Air Threat Conference Call.The call's significance, combined with the minor redactions, made the four-month delay inreceiving the transcript inexplicable. He stated that he had not leaked, but as a trial lawyerand former prosecutor with significant government experience, he will not be quiet if hebelieves the Commission is getting the run-around. The issue with the conference call wasnot one of disclosing national security information, as doing so would aid those who do notwish the Commission well.Commissioner Gorton noted that the while each Commissioner has the right to his or herown views, the Commission will ultimately derive its authority from preserving unanimityin the delivery of its major recommendations. If commissioners separate themselves now

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYCOMMISSION SENSITIVEfo r reasons that may seem wo rthy at the moment, the later ab ility of the Commission tosucceed might be threatened. He added that it doesn't help for a single member to makestatements and splinter o ff .Commissioner Lehman expressed his support for the press guidelines and his concern thatthe Commission is losing the public relations battle. He added that the public perceives theCommission to be focusing on access and not generating substantive outcomes. Herecommended that the Commission focus on media backgrounding and foregrounding onsubstantive issues, and refrain from obsessing about access, hi reference to CommissionerLehman's comments on substance, the Vice Chair stated that he and the Chair still neededto solicit ideas from the Comm ission o n the content of the September 23 interim repor t.Co ncurring with Commissioners Go rton and Ben-Veniste, Comm issioner Fieldingreiterated that leaks would destroy the Commission. He added that the media would seizeupon the perception of anarchy w ithin the Commission, whether it was true or not.The Vice Chair added that if the White Ho use sees discussion o f negotiations in the press,an adversarial treatment o f the Comm ission is mo re likely and the Com mission w ill get lessinformation. Fundamentally, he argued, in order to have successful negotiations with theWhite House they have to remain private. He observed that the guidelines will protect theintegrity of the Com mission dow n the ro ad. He distributed the guidelines, and asked thatCom missioners let the Chair o r Vice Chair know if there were any concerns or objections.Access. The Vice Chair announced that there was goo d news to repor t, and asked theGeneral Counsel to describe recent developments to the Commission.The General Counsel stated that the first interim report had a big impact on documentproduction, and that the letters to agency heads with the prospect of a second interim reportalso had a significant impact. He observed that, overall, the picture w as pretty goo d. Theadministration had produced roughly 2 million pages of do cuments. The agencies that werebehindFBI, Justice, and Defensehad impro ved substantially. He added that the FB I hadbeen very helpful, although there was one serious pr oblem that he would address later.The remaining gaps in do cument production, he no ted, were high-level po licy do cuments.They have received assurances from Dan Levin that the Commission would receive the vastmajority o f remaining documents within the next two weeks.Commissioner Roemer asked why the Commission had not sent an August 19 letter to theEOP/NSC, and further inquired about the production status of EOF Document Request N o.3. In regard to the first question, the General Counsel responded that the Co mm ission 'srelationship with the White House was on a separate track and that they had already hadwo rked o ut a production schedule, hi regard to the latter question, the General Counselreported that the White House had begun to pro duce EOF #3 documents in the beginning ofSeptember and that much mo re wo uld be ready by the third week o f September.

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYCOMMISSION SENSITIVEThe General Counsel then distributed and introduced a discussion of an August 15, 2003,letter from Judge Gonzales. The General Counsel noted that the letter had presented someissues. He reported that he and the Executive Director met with David Leitch that sameweek to raise the Com m ission's concerns regarding the letter. As a result of this discussion,they reached several understandings wh ich were reflected in a Memorandum for the Recordthat was m ade available to commissioners.Com m ission Ben-Veniste recom m ended that the Com m ission mem orialize theseunderstandings in a letter responding to the Judge's letter of August 15. The Vice Chairconcurred.The General Counsel reported that the Com m ission had m ade progress regarding notes andbelieved it was likely that the W hite House would allow the Commission to take notes onfinal PDDs and NSPDs. He added that the Executive Director had made a strong case forthe Com m ission's need to take notes on m ost of these docum ents, and that they wouldcontinue to press for the lifting of restrictions. The Executive Director observed that theWh ite House lawyers are marinated in executive privilege law and that their positionsfollow the vocabulary and approach of that body of law. The General Counsel stressed thatthe Com m ission has to dem onstrate a case of particularized need in order to get past theexecutive privilege presum ption. The Chair added that in a conversation w ith the WhiteHouse Counsel, the Judge indicated that when the Comm ission m akes a case, he is willingto help.Commissioners Roemer and Ben-Veniste expressed their concern that the Commission wasbeing pu t into a position in which it can't take notes, can't discuss the material to which ithas access, and can't put the material in the final report. They added that the current note-taking arrangem ents are a waste of their tim e. The E xecutive Director acknowledged thatthe restrictions could be annoying and stressed that the staff would try to resolve theseissues before Commissioners visited the NEO B to review docum ents. In addition, heobserved that they would soon reach the po int where the num ber of pages on w hich theCommission cannot take notes would be very sm all. The key, he added, is if theCom m ission gets the documents it needs and is able to use them in the report.PDBs. The Executive Director noted that the White House has assembled all materialsresponsive to the Com m ission's request, and that there are hundreds of such item s. Hereported that the White House first wants to provide a briefing to the Commission on thePDB items. The concern they articulate is not just legal. In a way, the PDBs also reveal"the best the intelligence com m unity can do," and both the W hite House and the CIA areparticularly sensitive about this. The Vice Chair noted that the briefing would coverquestions such as: What kind of warnings did the President receive and when? How wasthe al Qaeda threat depicted? How were the relationships between al Qaeda and otherstatesSaudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistandepicted?Com m issioner Roem er noted that the PDBs are also given to the DCI, and suggested thatthis would m ake the executive privilege argum ent m ore difficult to make. The Executive



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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYCOMMISSION SENSITIVEDirector stated the Commission was unlikely to win on such a legal argument, as the "statesecrets" privilege is nearly absolute. Commissioner Roetner then suggested that theCommission not request to see all| |PDBs, but perhaps! IThe Executive Directorconcurred that the Commission should not attempt to obtain hundreds of PDBs.

Commissioner Lehman observed that the SEIBs [Senior Executive Intelligence Briefings]contain nearly all of the information provided in the PDBs. He suggested that theCommission ask for the difference between then SEIBs and PDBs. He went on torecommend that the Commission reframe the PDB debate over what the President knew towha t inform ation the intelligence community did (or did not) provide him .The Vice Chair advised that the Commission move ahead and accept a briefing. He addedthat although they should not be satisfied with a briefing and that the next steps may beunclear, the Commission needed to take this first step.Interviews. The General Counsel then turned to the issue of interviews with NSC andhigh-level officials. He reported that the W hite House had suggested a set of guide lineswhich would prohibit the Commission from recreating "blow-by-blow" descriptions ofconversations and determining specific positions taken by officials. The Commissioncountered with a set of "need-to-know" principles. The Commission has also agreed tomeeting with the agency representative befo re these interview s to give them notice aboutthe topics the Commission would cover, so that the interviewees are prepared to beresponsive and so key legal issues can be addressed before the interview occurs.Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked if there was a point at which the Commission couldconclude whether or not if had enough information to do its job. Speaking on behalf ofComm issioner G orelick (who was unable to attend the meeting but provided writtencomments), the Chair asked if the Commission was at a point where they could judgewhe ther they can produce the final report on time? Th e Execu tive D irector stated that, asbest he knew , the answ er was yes. He had met with all of the team leaders that morn ing,and that, in general, they were on track.FBI Access. One problem of particular concern, thoug h, was Team 1 A's need for access tothe FBI's Automated Case File System (ACS). The Executive Director reported that Team1A had determined that the PENTTB OM file is incomplete, and that they will need directaccess to the FBI database in order to conduct searches in a complete and tim ely manner.Below the level of Mueller, he stated, no one at the FBI has agreed to this level of accessthus far. The Bureau is concerned that, wi th such an arrangem ent, they would not be able toredact confidential sources and Rule 6E material. In addition, after negative experienceswith the Joint Inquiry, some at the FB I had resolved to not let staff "roam around" ACS.The General Counsel explained that the FBI concedes that the Commission should seethese materials, but the current production mechanisms are too slow. He added that theissue was going to be brought to the Director's attention that week.



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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYCOMMISSION SENSITIVEThe Executive D irector reported that the agency minders have had no visible impact oncandor in interviews thus far.The meeting adjourned and continued at 9:10 a.m. on September 10 with Comm issionerCleland joining.Budget. The Deputy Director reported on the status of the Comm ission's budget. As ofAugust 31, the Com mission had used approximately a third of its funds, and he stated thathe was reasonably confident that the Comm ission would remain on track financially.The Chair asked if there were any funds reserved for implementation. The Deputy Directorresponded that $200,000 was reserved for such activities. Commissioner Roemer asked ifthere were funds reserved for consulting services from a public relations firm. The DeputyDirector replied that there were not, but that the Com mission could do so if it chooses. TheVice C hair noted that PR services can be rather expensive, and that the Com mission shouldtry to seek pro bono support. The Executive Director added that the C omm ission had beenapproached by a couple of firms offering pro bono services.Hearings.The Executive Director presented an outline for hearings in 2004. CommissionerRoemer asked if the Comm ission would have time to interview the witnesses prior to thepublic hearings. The Executive D irector responded that it was the staffs intention to do so.Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked when the topics of NO RA D/FA A and intelligencefailures would be addressed. The Execu tive Director responded that the topics would beaddressed at the April and February hearings, respectively. Commissioner Ben-Venistestated tha t the 2004 hearing plan divided the various witnesses in such a way that it wouldbe difficult to tell the story of what happened. The public, he added, expects theCommission to tell the story. The Executive Director replied that it might be challenging totell the story with a large num ber of witnesses in the style of a trial, but that staff statementsmight be a way to set the scene for each hearing. Commissioner Ben-Veniste agreed thatstaff statements could be useful, but reiterated that it was important to tell the story with thewitnesses as well.The Vice Chair observed that the purpose of the pub lic hearings was to get the facts theCom mission needs. On the role of Congressional oversight, he expressed his view that thebest way to get the information is to have private conversations w ith selected members. Hesuggested that they begin by meeting w ith Senators Roberts and Rock efeller andRepresentatives Goss and Harman. Governor Kean expressed his belief that Congressionaloversight w as not very interesting as a pu blic topic.Com missioner Lehman noted tha t Congressional oversight goes beyond intelligenceinthe cases of imm igration and aviation, the role of Congress is m ore im portant than that ofthe President. C omm issioner F ielding noted that the Comm ission could address the roleCongressional oversight at each of the 2004 hearings instead of scheduling a separatehearing on the subject.



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Commissioners Roemer and Lehman expressed their support for hearings on "hot topics"such as DNI, MI-5, and Congressional oversight. The Executive Director noted that theOctober hearing could be reshaped to focus more on the DNI issue, and that the Decemberhearing could focus more on MI-5. The Deputy Director described plans for the Novemberhearing at Drew U niversity on emergency preparedness.Comm issioner Roemer suggested that the Commission add a fourth hearing onCongressional oversight in October. The Chair expressed his reluctance over addinganother fall hearing, and recalled the staffs preference to refrain from fall hearingsaltogether. Comm issioner G orton stated that although he finds the hearings very useful andbelieves every suggested topic has merit, he was concerned that the Commission would nothave enough time to complete its work. The Vice Chair concurred with CommissionerGorton, and observed that it was not possible to write the definitive account on each topic.He suggested that the Commission should come up with one or two recommendations ineach area.Commissioner Roemer asked if there were any topics in which the families wereparticularly interested. The E xecutive Director stated that their interests were all over themap; the Commission needs to convince them that it is seriously addressing their concerns.Comm issioner R oemer recounted a call from Stephen Push during which he expressed hisconcerns that the Commission wasn't doing more.Comm issioners Lehman, Ben-Veniste, Cleland, and Roemer agreed that the Commissionneeds to remain in the public eye. Commissioner Cleland added that the Commission needsto bring the public along as the investigation progresses. Commissioner Ben-Veniste notedthat the family groups expect the Commission to develop the facts, and that theCommission needs to have a narrative with individuals telling the story.Comm issioner Roemer restated his proposal to hold a fourth hearing on Congressionaloversight in October. He suggested that he and Comm issioner Lehman w ould take the leadon it. The Vice Chair amended the proposal, suggesting that Com missioners Roemer andLehman talk to Congressional leaders before scheduling the hearing and come back to thenext meeting with a proposal. The Commission agreed to the amended proposal byconsensus.Comm issioner Ben-Veniste proposed to hold an additional day of hearings on December 9to explore the NOR AD/FAA story. The General Counsel suggested holding this hearing inJanuary to give the staff more time. The Commission agreed to hold an earlierNORAD/FAA hearing.Foreign Travel. The Executive Director presented a plan to the Commission for foreigntravel. He stated that he and the Deputy D irector would each lead a staff delegation tovarious countries in the Middle East, S outh Asia, and Europe central to the investigation.Keeping a low profile, they expect to meet with country teams and working level officials.



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The Vice Chair said that it was important for the staff to go and commended them fortaking it on. Commissioner Roemer asked if the Commissioners might have the opportunitytravel as well. The Vice Chair suggested that they make a judgment at a later date.Team Leader Presentations. Team Leaders begin presentations at 11 a.m., in reversenumerical order.Team 8 Leader John Farmer explained the merger of former Teams 8 and 9, and why it wasappropriate and instructive to look at immediate response issues at both the national and thelocal levels within the same team. He mentioned that Team 8 would begin interviewingAir Traffic Controllers shortly, and walk them through the events of the day. One of theimportant purposes of the interviews will be to understand their situational awareness. Thecontrollers tried to understand what was happening as events unfoldedand never quite gotthere. The Team will also explore the changing Rules of Engagement for the shoot-downof commercial aircraft, the EPA's work on air quality immediately after 9/11, and theresponse of the financial markets.One key question for NYC is also situational awareness, especially what was learned afterthe 1993 WTC bombing. Team 8 will also take a close look at the tenants of the WTCbuildings. The Commission needs to identify best practices, andwill want to look closelyat the work of the New York Safety Council.A theme running throughout the work of the Team is "bureaucracies struggling to adapt."The Team will begin interviewing first responders in October.The Chair asked Team Leader Farmer about obstacles. He responded that his chiefobstacles are time, logistics and the volume of people whom he needs to interview. Inresponse to questions about document access, Farmer said access was "good." There donot appear to be certain documents from Cheyenne Mountain, but DOD is checking again.Also, NORAD does not appear to have done after-action reports. NYC documents arecoming in; we do not know yet whether NYC is fully responsive, and the Port Authorityhas exceeded expectations.The Vice Chair asked when the Team will be in a position to write a narrative; Farmer saidthat his team is writing an open source narrative, and then will add to it when informationfrom documents becomes available.Farmer stated that it is premature to commit to a hearing in early December, but stated hisbelief that his team "has the people to get the job done," and is confident that the job willget done. The Team can leverage DOD's historical effort, the work of the NationalInstitute of Standards, and John Farmer's own law students.Team 7 Leader Sam Brinkley stated that his team has already drafted the first of 3 parts ofits own narrative, on the status of the civil aviation security system prior to 9/11. The first15 interviews are intended to support this narrative; the interviews will be concluded by



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FO R OFFICIAL USE ONLYCOMMISSION SENSITIVE9/30 and the target date for completion of internal review of the draft is October 3. Th enext 15 interviews are scheduled for the purpose of telling the 9/11 story. Th e Team hasconducted interviews an d visits to Portland an d Boston's Logan airports; Dulles isscheduled for 9/29 and New ark soon thereafter.

Team 7 met with the Transportation Security Administration's Red Team, and is workingwith TS A on a re-enactment, includ ing pre-screening through the CAPPS system in place atthat time. The team will w alk through the screening process using the same type ofweapons the hijackers purchased.On document requests, Brinkley noted that the team is in good shape. The air carriers havebeen responsive, and TS A very responsive. Add itional document requests have been sentout, including to the Air Transport Association. The Chair asked about obstacles: TeamLeader Brinkley said "time," but that the team right now is in good shape, though that couldchange.Team 6 Leader Barbara Grewe stated he r team's mission is to understand ho w intelligenceabout terrorism inside the United States is collected, analyzed, and disseminated, includingto state and local authorities. The central question is whether the FBI should have the jobor not, an d this question requires a factual answer, not an emotional answer. Team 6 islooking into this very question through a series of Field Office interviews at theWashington Field Office, New York City, Miami, Phoenix, and San Diego. Documentrequests pertain to five additional field offices. Eighty-five interviews have been conductedalready; 14 more are scheduled in NYC in the following week.Key observations so far: the FBI is very worried about losing its job. Current policy is tofollow every single anti-terrorism lead, despite the huge drain on manpower, because theFB I is worried that the one lead they don't follow will cause them to lose their job.M anagers have been candid in interviews: "we are not there yet" in terms of w here the FBIneeds to be. They have taken a thoughtful approach, and understand that the Commissionis important in terms of the FBI's future, and therefore are taking the Commissionseriously.The NY Field Office bears considerable resentment at how it has been treated in the waragainst terrorism. They believe their role in the war on terrorism is to indict people, andthey indicted bin Laden in June 1998, before the East Africa bombings and before theDCFs "declaration of war" on terrorism. They state they were doing prevention befo re9/11 and have devoted their lives and mission to counterterrorism.hi response to a question on minders, Team Leader Grewe notes they were notobstructionist, and did not get in the way of candor.Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked about the role of analysts. Team Leader Grewe notedthat Maureen Baginski's vision of analysis within the FBI is still a long way from being

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FO R OFFICIAL USE ONLYCOMM ISSION SEN SITIVEachieved. In Field Offices, it seems that they do not yet understand how to do all-sourceanalysis the way it is done at CIA. So far, FB I analysts are glorified paralegals, supportingcase work. Right now, agents are doing the real analytic work.hi response to aquestion about FBI cooperation with local law enforcement, Team LeaderGrewe says cooperation has been very good at the squad and local level, bu t there havebeen c omp laints about cooperation at the top level of organizations.She observed further that there has been excellent cooperation with her team from theJustice Department's Inspector General, and close cooperation with Team 1A on the Saudiissue. She did not have a firm update on FBI document production simply because herteam has been o n the road so long that it has not caught up with the document inflow.Team 5 Leader B etty Sw ope noted that the focus of her team's work is on intelligencewatchlist development, visas, and border inspections. The team has just received 4 majorboxes of documents from the State Department, and is now unable to keep up. The team isstill waiting on some CIA documents, and still lacks documents on senior-level policydecisions pre 9-11.The team is w orking on the question of how the 19 hijackers got their docum ents, and itspolicy themes have no t changed: watchlists; identity security; redesign of the US visa andscreening process (which began immediately post 9/11), student tracking, and efforts withCanada and M exico. The Vice Chair asked about docum ents. Team Leader Swope statedthat the question is how to get former INS leadership docum ents. DHS is looking for them,and has found few.Team 4 Leader John Roth noted that he has 3 main goals: first, al-Qaeda's funding of theplot. Are there gaps in the FBI's work, how do we address them, and what are the lessonsfor the future; second, the team is looking at 5 domestic charities alleged to be involved interrorist financing, and how the USG pursued these 5 organizations before and after 9/11;and third, where are we now in terms of efforts to disrupt terrorist financing operations, andwhere are we going? As a subsidiary of the third issue, the team will be looking into Saudicooperation: how has it changed over time? W hat was the level of cooperation pre 9-11, upthrough the Riyadh bombings on M ay 12, and cooperation now?On document production, Team Leader Roth states "we have turned the corner." Agencieshave been inefficient in production, no t because they are ill-willed, bu t because they justlack the capability to produce. Deadlines were set for early July, and documents did notcome through until late August. The Team has enough documents to do its job and has thepeople; the challenge will be to keep its focus. The Chair asked about the costs associatedwith compliance with the PATRIOT Act; Team Leader Roth said his team will look into it.Team 3 Leader Mike H urley stated that the team's goal is to produce the most authoritativeaccount of the key policy decisions, in detail and in clear prose. The team is creating adetailed timeline (now 35 pages), and is working on a chronological outline that will be the

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYCOMMISSION SENSITIVEspine of the narrative. The team is still getting feedback from the Front Office and its goalis to tell the story fairly and fully. The staff is looking at the following division of labor:(1) the Clinton adminstration; (2) the transition; (3) Bush administration pre- 9/11; theBush adminstration post 9/11 and the immediate aftermath; and analysis, conclusions andpolicy recommendations. Two eminent outside experts are handling the pre-1998 period.A recurring theme in the team's work is the belief in the Department of Defense thatcounter-terrorism is not fundamentally a military problem: this was true post-KhobarTowers, and post-Cole bombing. The Team has developed a good sense of Dick Clarke's2001 policy review, and of Bush options as outlined in NSA Rice's 9/15 briefing book.The Team has an ambitious schedule seeking to interview a number of very high-levelofficials. Also, there are some 80 to 100 potential interviews with individuals ofconsiderable interest to other teams as well. The Chair asked about obstacles; Team LeaderHurley replied that the team has a complex, big task, with a large volume of work and alimited time to do it. So far the team is managing it.Team 2 Leader Kevin Scheid mentioned a number of questions pending before his team.Was there an intelligence failure? Who performs the warning function in the IntelligenceCommunitymany have a piece of it but who is in charge? Do we have "Kentucky FriedAnalysis" in the Community, short-term analysis that falls short on its strategic component?How is the intelligence system working, not only as a community at home, but also as atransnational system? What exactly happened when the DCI declared war? The team isalso looking at resources and congressional oversight.The Vice Chair asked whether the Team was also looking at the question of dissemination;Team Leader Scheid answered yes. He noted that the team had received approximately70% of the documents it had requested, and had conducted about 20 interviews so far, withsenior former officials. The purpose of these interviews is to prepare fo r interviews withcurrent officials. He would like, similar to Team 6, to focus on some 5 or 6 case studies, inthis case country teams instead of field offices. He would like to investigate Ottawa,London, Berlin, Riyadh, Islamabad, and Kuala Lumpur, to get a snapshot of how weinteract with foreign liaison. He noted that his challenges are (1) the new Department ofHomeland Security assignment; (2) resources; and (3) coordinating with other teams.Team 1A Leader Dieter Snell described the primary mission of his team as telling thedefinitive story of the conspiracy. His team needs to figure out who was involved, withoutworrying about whether that involvement meets the legal test of "conspiracy." The team islooking at detainee debriefings, from CIA, FBI and a little bit from DOD; the Joint Inquirydid no t have the benefit of any of these debriefings. It is looking to get additionalinformation about the detainee interviews.Snell noted that the CIA has been in good in its timely response to document requests. Buthe has questions as to whether the disseminated intelligence meets his team's needs, andthey mayneed to get more information. He also reviewed the FBI issues that had been



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discussed earlier with the Commission, making the case for direct access to the FBI'sautomated case files.Team 1 Leader Doug MacEachin stated his mission as follows: Wewant to knoweverything we can about what we knewand knowabout what happened when. Theteam has received a mountain of documents from CIA and DOJ, and documents fromterrorist seizures and arrests. He then commented on his evaluation of some of theevidence, noting the importance of an earlier defector. He then summarized the emergingdepiction of Al Qa'ida as an organization.The chief problem Team 1 faces, MacEachin notes, is that its work made analysts who hadcommitted themselves to earlier positions feel defensive. Commissioner Ben-Venisteasked what our response has been; MacEachin notes that it is one of persistence, going backto people and pursuing questions. Over time, this has produced the needed information.Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked further about link-ups between narcotics trafficking andterrorist networks; MacEachin replied. Both he and Team 5 noted that this is a questionthat they, as well as State and CIA, are following closely.The Chair noted that Team Leader reports have been very valuable; he stated that theCommission should receive such updates monthly. The Chair adjourned the meeting at 1:15PM .

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