fisc reform affirmative - northwestern 2015 6ws (1)

7/25/2019 FISC Reform Affirmative - Northwestern 2015 6WS (1)

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Contention 1 Separation of PowersSeparation of powers on!i t now-- "a # of "ear a$t%orit& %asa""owe' ()ama %$*e o+errea % in war po"i &,re+ita"i in*Con*ressiona" %e #s in'epen'ent of t%e .par"or *ame/ is #e&

- e $ti+e o+errea % e pan'in* now in t%e area of warpowers

- Not $st a)o$t t%is presi'ent t%is is a)o$t pre e'ent- Re-esta)"is%in* %e #s an' )a"an es in *enera" so"+es

!e i)i"it& iss$es- Con*ress 'oesn3t want to ta#e minima" steps

Ni %o"s 14 (John, writes about politics for The Nation magazine as its Washingtoncorrespondent, Rand Paul Points to ome Real !"ecuti#e $#erreach% &ndeclaredWars', No#ember ) *+), http% www thenation com article real-e"ecuti#e-o#erreach-waging-war-without-congressional-declaration .

In mo+in* to for e Con*ress to forma""& 'e i'e w%et%er to 'e "are war ont%e Is"ami State mi"itants that the &nited tates is alread/ 0ghting, t%e senator from 1entuc2/is %i*%"i*%tin* t%e fai"$re of Republican on*ressiona" "ea'ers (or, for the most part,their 3emocratic counterparts. to ta#e serio$s"& what should alwa/s be t%e most on ernin*e amp"e of e e $ti+e o+errea % This is t%e e e $ti+e a tion t%at tro$)"e't%e fo$n'ers a)o+e a"" ot%ers warma#in* )& presi'ents in t%e a)sen e ofa 'e "aration of war )& t%e Con*ress 4onser#ati#es are mad at ($bama. about immigration5nd the/6re mad about him using e"ecuti#e authorit/ on $bamacare,' sa/s Paul 7ut this is another e"amplewhere he doesn6t ha#e much respect for 4ongress, and some conser#ati#es don6t 8uite get that ' Paul shouldac2nowledge that warma#in* wit%o$t t%e a$t%ori ation of Con*ress is not.anot%er e amp"e/ of e e $ti+e a$t%orit& being e"tended into troubling territor/ It is , b/far, t%e most si*ni7 ant e amp"e Paul should also ac2nowledge that the disrespect shown b/presidents for 4ongress with regard to declarations of war did not begin with $bama 9t e"tends bac2 decades andhas been e#idenced b/ Republican and 3emocratic presidents Pa$"3s proposa" to ha#e 4ongress declarethat a state of war e"ists between the organization identif/ing itself as the 9slamic tate and the go#ernment andthe people of the &nited tates / is !awe' on man& "e+e"s :or instance, despite the senator6sprotestations to the contrar/, it opens too much space for the assignment of ground troops to a 0ght in a regionwhere most 5mericans are e"ceptionall/ disinclined to engage in another full-scale war 8et w%at Pa$" is'oin* is important , in that %e is %a""en*in* t%e . par"or *ame / w%ere in"ea'ers of Con*ress ons$"t/ wit% presi'ents an' t%en a""ow t%em towa*e war wit% an&t%in* a#in to the on*ressiona" o+ersi*%t re8uired b/ the4onstitution This parlor game' has been going on for a long time The &nited tates has not formall/ declared warsince World War 99 5nd man& of the same Rep$)"i ans w%o are now s reamin* a)o$t t%epresi'ent iss$in* an e e $ti+e or'er wit% re*ar' to immi*ration ;as RepublicanPresidents !isenhower, Ni"on, :ord, Reagan and 7ush did before him; %a+e en*a*e' in t%e war-an'-pea e par"or *ame 9$ite wi""in*"& In'ee' , inter#entionist Rep$)"i ans s$ %as 5rizona enator John : Cain an' outh 4arolina enator


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e+en t%e most minima" steps to %e # an' )a"an e presi'entia" warma#in*since the da/s when =eorge W 7ush began o#erreaching When President $bama began ramping up the current0ght with 9slamic tate militants in eptember, a 4NN poll found that, while 5mericans were alarmed' andconcerned' about reports of con>ict in 9ra8 and /ria, the/ were also s2eptical about getting too deepl/ engagedin that con>ict peci0call/ the poll found that% + 5mericans want limits placed on the & militar/ response to the9slamic tate in 9ra8 and the oor ofthe Douse of Representati#es before 4ongress lea#es for the upcoming district wor2 period ' Douse 5rmed er#ices4ommittee member John =aramendi, 3-4alifornia, has for months been speci0c in arguing that the &4onstitution and War Powers Resolution are clear% 4ongress is obligated to weigh in on e"tended & militar/actions No matter how noble the cause, no matter how ?ust the engagement, 4ongress6 #oice and #ote are re8uiredwithin a @*-F* da/ window ' The si"t/-to-ninet/-da/ window that =aramendi spo2e of in that eptember statementhas passed :or months, pea2er 7oehner and other congressional leaders ha#e ignored what the 4aliforniacongressman correctl/ describes as our 4onstitutionall/-re8uired dut/ ' Now, it appears that 4ongress ma/ 0nall/send a signal regarding its sentiments 7ut, as The New Cor2 Times notes% ome (Republican. conser#ati#es ma/bal2 at setting up a narrow set of parameters for the president enator James A 9nhofe of $2lahoma, the seniorRepublican on the 5rmed er#ices 4ommittee, has introduced a resolution that would gi#e the president allnecessar/ and appropriate force' to defend the countr/ against the 9slamic tate but would re8uire him to reportbac2 to 4ongress on the eEort e#er/ F* da/s The debate will probabl/ continue into the ne"t 4ongressRepublicans will then control both chambers, which is li2el/ to ma2e it more diGcult to pass a resolution that setsma?or limits 4ongress has ceded to successi#e presidents immense authorit/ to act on domestic and foreign-polic/concerns This has created a confusing circumstance that fa#ors the e"ecuti#e The White Douse has broadauthorit/ to act when emergencies arise, and when crises go unaddressed b/ obstructionist or d/sfunctionalcongresses In man/ areas of 'omesti po"i & , the o$rts an' Con*ress ha#e %e"pe' to'e7ne for presi'ents a *oo' 'ea" of !e i)i"it& 8et w%en it omes tomatters of war an' pea e , t%ere %as )een "itt"e in t%e war of responsi)"e'e7ntion Instea' , t%e power of presi'ents %as e pan'e' to a point w%ere


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Con*ress now ten's to )e a spe tator ; rat%er t%an separate-)$t-e9$a")ran % of *o+ernment

Stat$tor& a tion is ine+ita)"e= )$t on"& tar*ete' reform #e& to*et t%e ri*%t )a"an e

- Stat$tor& $rtai"ment ine+ita)"e-


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interesting !-mails sent b/ a Duman Rights Watch law/er to a researcher in Nigeriawould be scanned, e#en if neither is suspected of in#ol#ement in wrongdoing 9f the/mention something about the political situation there of interest to the N 5, the/ could be retained 5 te"tmessage from an 5merican ?ournalist to a colleague in Tur2e/ as2ing a 8uestionabout the 9slamic tate in 9ra8 and the


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the mandator/ disclosure of documents in the possession of the !"ecuti#e 7ranch '+M* Dowe#er, the e"ecuti#ebranch has argued that the 4ommander-in-4hief 4lause of 5rticle 99 bestows upon the President independent powerto control access to national securit/ information +M+ 5s such, according to this line of reasoning, Con*ress3s*enera""& )roa' a)i"it& to re9$ire 'is "os$re of a*en & 'o $ments ma& )eonstraine' w%en it imp"i ates nationa" se $rit& +M The e"ecuti#e branch has t/picall/

e"ercised discretion to determine what particular information should be classi0edO and the upreme 4ourt has

obser#ed in dicta that the President is 4ommander in 4hief, and his authorit/ to classif/ and control access toinformation bearing on national securit/ >ows primaril/ from this 4onstitutional in#estment of power in thePresident and e"ists 8uite apart from an/ e"plicit congressional grant '+MM 9n addition, o$rts %a+erafte' ommon "aw pri+i"e*es t%at prote t t%e e e $ti+e )ran % fromre+ea"in* ertain mi"itar& se rets 1>4 Nonetheless, S$preme Co$rt

$rispr$'en e 'oes not esta)"is% a)so"$te power )& an& )ran % o+er"assi7e' information 1>5 an' re o*ni es room for Con*ress to impose"assi7 ation pro e'$res 1>6 :oreo+er= Con*ress = p$rs$ant to its

o+ersi*%t f$n tion= re9$ires onsistent 'is "os$re of sensiti+e nationa"se $rit& information to t%e re"e+ant inte""i*en e an' 'efense ommitteesan' %as re*$"ate' ontro" o+er a ess to nationa" se $rit& information +MB

Pursuant to these statutes, courts ha#e re8uired the e"ecuti#e branch to disclose information to the public and the ?udiciar/+ML 4onse8uentl/, proposa"s t%at a""ow t%e e e $ti+e )ran % to 7rst re'a t"assi7e' information from FISA opinions )efore p$)"i re"ease appear to)e on 7rm onstit$tiona" *ro$n' w%i"e a proposa" t%at man'ate' a"" pastFISA opinions )e re"ease' in t%eir entiret&, wit%o$t an& re'a tions )& t%ee e $ti+e )ran %, mi*%t raise a separation of powers iss$e

It3s t%e #e& iss$e for separation of powers an' spi""s o+erA< FISC Fai"sBIne e ti+e No a$t%orit& now= p"an *i+es ita$t%orit& 8o$3+e rea' $ni9$eness ar*s for $s

@RA > (Dar#ard


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tripartite go#ernment and to safeguard litigants right to ha#e claims decided before ?udges who are free from potential domination

b/ other branches of go#ernment Q@)


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of t%e &nited Nations pea e#eepin* mission , on"& to )e wit%'rawn in 5pril afterso"'iers opene' 7re on i+i"ians imilarl/, in **I relations between 4had and udan hardenedo#er 3Xb/6s support for udanese rebel groups and pro"/ militias in 3arfur 7/ the time 4had and udan settledtheir diEerences, the rebel groups were diGcult to control, defecting from their patrons to pursue local grie#ances4had6s eastern region and udan6s west ha#e become deepl/ di#ided and ungo#ernable C%a'3s s$pportfor re)e" *ro$ps in S$'an an' t%e Centra" Afri a Rep$)"i %as sp$n o$t ofontro" an' 'e+astate' "o a" omm$nities 5nd its ent%$siasti mi"itar&inter+ention in Ni*eria is )ein* +iewe' wit% s$spi ion Some Ni*erians ha#ee+en s$**este' that DJ)& %as pro+i'e' s$pport for Eo#o aram The claimillustrates 4had6s tainted histor/ of regional e"cursions

Afri a is a *"o)a" %otspot for on!i t an' terror 'raws ininternationa" powers

- Afri a is a *"o)a" %otspot for on!i t 'raws ininternationa" powers

- Con!i t o $rs )e a$se of re*iona" insta)i"it& K a$se' )&C%a'L

$intana an' F"oran e 15 (5na Uuintana, Polic/ 5nal/st in the 5llison4enter, 4harlotte :lorance, contributor to The 3ail/ ignal he pre#iousl/ wor2ed at

The Deritage :oundation as a research associate, Regions of !nduring 9nterest%


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into a on!i t that is de0ned primaril/ in re"i*io$s terms %i*%"i*%ts t%e e tent tow%i % re"i*io$s e tremism an' et%ni on!i ts are mi in* to reate an e+en more 'an*ero$s t%reat to re*iona" sta)i"it&


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operations t%reaten t%e "ose inte""i*en e-s%arin* re"ations%ip that 5mericanand =erman spies ha#e de#eloped in recent /ears ince the ept ++ attac2s, the 7N3 has aggressi#el/ pursuedterror suspects in =erman/ and pla/ed a role in the crippling tu"net c/berattac2 on 9ran6s nuclear programThere6s onl/ so much that sp/ing on the =ermans is going to get /ou,' said a former 4 9 5 oGcial once posted in!urope 9t6s not li2e the =ermans are planning to establish relations with 9ran '


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roles and missions for the alliance &nfortunatel/, the document is so general that itpro#ides little guidance as new challenges emerge, lea#ing member states stilldebating the institution6s responsibilities and priorities With the support o f N5T$6s Public 3iplomac/3i#ision, the &1 :oreign H 4ommonwealth $Gce, and the 4anadian 3epartment of National 3efence, the & Pro?ect at 4hatham Douse held threeroundtables to discuss the wa/ forward for N5T$ The discussions culminated in this paper, which aims to inform debate leading up to the eptembersummit in Wales The paper brie>/ la/s out the principal e"ternal challenges that N5T$ members face, what tas2s are re8uired of the institution, itscurrent resources and capabilities, the gaps between strateg/ and capabilities, and what actions N5T$ needs to ta2e to 0ll these gaps tarting from thethreats that the N5T$ member states prioritize, and remaining in the con0nes of the trategic 4oncept, the paper is intended to oEer a path forward forN5T$ 9t pro#ides guidance on how the alliance can mo#e ahead in the coming /ears to address current and emerging challenges $#er the past few

months, e#ents ha#e challenged the assumptions that man/ N5T$ members ha#e maderegarding the stabilit/ of the international en#ironment and, accordingl/, their ownnational securit/ The grand strategic pro?ect to ma2e !urope \whole and free _ and at peace with itself6, once conside red complete, is now#er/ much in 8uestion largel/ as a result of Russian aggression ) To !urope6s southeast, the /rian con>ict has metastasized to dangerous le#els and hasspilled o#er into 9ra8, with profoundl/ worr/ing counter-terrorism implications for Tur2e/ (a 2e/ N5T$ member. and !urope I While it is absolutel/ #ital

that N5T$ members respond to the pressing nature of the abo#e concerns, the/ must also 2eep in mind thelonger-term strategic and future trends that will aEect them The organization needs to be able to reactto the former while ma2ing progress on others, including o#erthe-horizon, critical issues such as grappling with natural resource constraints (particularl/ in

energ/. and c/ber attac2s 1e/ national securit/ priorities are largel/ a function of geopoliticalrealities While there are some challenges on the importance of which the #ast ma?orit/ of N5T$ member states can agree, others are more a factorof speci0c interests or geograph/ Thus the urgenc/ of the Russian threat diminishes the furtherfrom Russia6s borders a member is located imilarl/, the e"igenc/ of crises in North 5frica is more palpable forAediterranean members contending with refugee in>ows stemming from instabilit/ in the region 9n order to understand whether, and how, countriesdiEer in their #iews of the emerging threat en#ironment, 4hatham Douse as2ed national securit/ e"perts how their respecti#e countries prioritized theirsecurit/ re8uirements Table +, deri#ed from a combination of their responses as well as rele#ant go#ernment polic/ statements, re>ects the similaritiesand diEerences of opinion on critical national securit/ priorities across the alliance @ 9t is important to note that Table + re>ects issues that both nationalsecurit/ e"perts and national strateg/ documents deemed criticall/ core interests of their countries 5s such, it necessaril/ e"cludes other issues that areimportant, but not considered trul/ crucial b/ those sur#e/ed 9t is illustrati#e rather than de0niti#e 9n some cases the respondents did not prioritizeissues such as \#iolations of national territorial integrit/6, probabl/ not because the/ are unimportant but because the/ are, in the minds of thosecommenting, so unli2el/ to occur as to be irrele#ant 3iscussed below are the principal challenges that most member states studied here could agree arecritical to their national interests While this paper largel/ follows the organization of Table +, some categories ha#e been merged gi#en the signi0canto#erlap, such as attac2s on allies, #iolations of territorial integrit/, and RussiaO and crises emanating from failed and failing states, and Aiddle !ast and

North 5frica


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wor2ing to destabilize 2e/ areas in North 5frica , and which led to :rance6s inter#ention in Aali The &nitedtates and the &nited 1ingdom are more focused on 9 9 < in 9ra8 and /ria as wellas radical groups based in 5fghanistan and Pa2istan 4/ber attac2s 9n **B, following the relocation of aRussian war monument, !stonia e"perienced a massi#e \denial of ser#ice6 attac2 that crippledman/ of its go#ernmental websites for se#eral da/s, an act that was particularl/

damaging, as a relati#el/ high number of !stonia6s go#ernmental functions are conducted online While Russia denied in#ol#ement,

it didsuggest that Russian \patriot6 hac2ers be/ond the state6s control might bear someresponsibilit/ for the attac2s ++ ict O the escalation of ph/sicalhostilities between Russia and &2raine has been mirrored b/ a commensurateincrease in online attac2s +M The/ ha#e also been used b/ other actors be/ond the region including, allegedl/, the 4hinese and North1orean go#ernments, and 9srael and the & against 9ran6s nuclear programme +) =i#en the increasing propensit/ for go#ernment s/stems, processes and

information to be put online, this challenge is of growing concern to man/ WA3 and missile proliferation :or decades, a central interestof N5T$ member states was to pre#ent and deter the use of w eapons of m assd estruction This is still on the minds of most of them Dowe#er, while historicall/ the fear was focused onRussia6s potential use of nuclear weapons against N5T$ members, toda/ it is on9ran (although gi#en the recent concerns about Russian aggression discussed abo#e, man/ countries are increasingl/worried about Russia6s recent mo#es to modernize its nuclear arsenal . +I The8uestion of 9ran6s nuclear capabilities whether the/ are trul/ ci#ilian or militar/ in nature has been muchdebated since shortl/ after the o#erthrow of the shah6s regime in +FBF Regardless of thenuclear programme6s ultimate intent, 9ran has also wor2ed to impro#e its long-range ballistic missilecapabilities, and se#eral of its hahab missile con0gurations are capable of reaching!uropean soil +@ While there is little e#idence to suggest that 9ran would target !urope with a nuclear capabilit/ (if ac8uired., it appears thatits desire for such a capabilit/ stems from the belief that it will both enhance itssecurit/ (against regime change b/ the &nited tates or 9srael, for e"ample. and support its aspiration to regionalleadership 9t is clear that a nuclear 9ran would ha#e a signi0cantl/ destabilizing

eEect on its region 9t is not in the West6s interests to ha#e an/ one power dominatethe Aiddle !ast 5nd t%e "i#e"i%oo' of f$rt%er pro"iferation wo$"' in reasesi*ni7 ant"& were Iran a)"e to *ain n$ "ear weapons apa)i"ities 4ritical challengeswith less consensus 9nsecurit/ of natural resources, particularl/ energ/ 9nstabilit/ in the Aiddle !ast, combined with Russian aggression in itsneighbourhood, ha#e prompted man/ N5T$ member states to 8uestion the reliabilit/ of their energ/ supplies This is particularl/ true with respect to!urope6s reliance on Russian natural gas (which accounted for M) per cent of its imports in *+ ., as Aoscow has been willing to use its le#erageaggressi#el/ in the energ/ sector to ad#ance its own strategic ob?ecti#es Notabl/, Russia shut oE gas supplies to &2raine in Januar/ **F, and June *+) a tactic it has used with some regularit/, including against &2raine in **@ +B While Russia cited commercial disputes in **F, se#eral obser#ers at thetime argued that the shutoE was a pro"/ for much more fundamental issues between the two countries, in particular &2raine6s attempts to forge strongerrelations with the West +L :urthermore, according to its *M* !nerg/ trateg/, Russia is wor2ing acti#el/ to di#ersif/ awa/ from its reliance upon the!uropean gas mar2et for its e"ports 9n particular, it is e"ploring options for building its infrastructure to support increased e"ports to 4hina and the4entral 5sian states +F 9f successful, this would translate into signi0cantl/ less Russian dependence on !urope 5lthough !urope is wor2ing to furtherdi#ersif/ its energ/ supplies, if it fails to do so ade8uatel/, it could in fact become more dependent upon Russia * $rganized crime =i#en thecomparati#e porousness of !urope6s borders, and the relati#e ease of illicit transit across the Aediterranean ea, it is hardl/ surprising that organizedcrime is of paramount concern to a number of N5T$6s members =angs and other organized crime actors can not onl/ corrupt legitimate state institutionsbut also construct illicit trans-shipment networ2s for smuggling an/thing from drugs to weapons to people :urther, as gangs become more powerful, the/can challenge state authorit/, especiall/ as addressing their acti#ities often blurs the lines between militar/ and police responses The & e"perience with4entral 5merica, and particularl/ Ae"ico, is a notable e"ample of how serious organized crime can raise fundamental 8uestions about the abilit/ of a state

to pro#ide securit/ and stabilit/ to its population, and ha#e profound conse8uences for its relations with its neighbours M What :unctions 5re Needed to5ddress These 3i#erse 4hallenges Aeeting the securit/ needs laid out abo#e will re8uire N5T$ to focus on 0#e ma?or functions that, ta2en together,pro#ide the capabilities to address them These are% ` deterrence and reassurance, ` crisis management, ` public diplomac/, ` resilience, and `

earl/ warning and intelligence :or e"ample, deterrence and reassurance (among allies. is re8uired to counterthe challenges posed b/ Russia, WA3 use, terrorism or c/ber attac2s 4hallenges stemming frominstabilit/ in the Aiddle !ast are handled, principall/, through crisis management 5t the same time, N5T$ members shouldendea#our to pre#ent crises or attac2s ta2ing place, or to prepare for themade8uatel/, through earl/ warning and intelligence-gathering, and r$ ia""&=inte""i*en e-s%arin* The alliance must also mitigate the conse8uences of being unable to do so b/ building resilience amongmembers but also with their neighbours and partners 5nd 0nall/, N5T$ and its member states will re8uire much more sophisticated public diplomac/


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capabilities if the/ are to e"plain to their citizens the alliance6s enduring rele#ance as well as countering the narrati#es of ad#ersaries 3eterrence and

reassurance 3efending the territorial integrit/ of all members remains one of N5T$6sforemost tas2s 9t will re8uire the alliance to deter aggression as well as reassuremembers Dowe#er, deterrence was ne#er, and will ne#er be, eas/ to e"ecute, re8uiringN5T$ to demonstrate apa)i"it& an' re'i)i"it& + 4omplicating this challenge is the fact that deterrenceneeds to wor2 against man/ t/pes of actors, and the strategies for doing so can diEer and re8uire a #ariet/ of assets 3eterrence andreassurance are necessar/ tas2s against states such as Russia as well as non-stateactors including terrorist groups such as 9 9 < and 5l-Uaeda =i#en the decline in militar/ spendingamong N5T$ members o#er recent /ears, man/ ha#e 8uestioned whether the alliance has thecapabilit/ to deter its ad#ersaries This is particularl/ true in the case of Russia where, as ecretar/ =eneral 5nders :oghRasmussen noted recentl/ at 4hatham Douse, \since **L, Russia has increased its defence spending b/ around I* per cent while, on a#erage, N5T$

allies ha#e decreased theirs b/ about * per cent 6 While N5T$ members together still spend +* timesmore on their armed forces than Russia does on its militar/, the picture issi*ni7 ant"& "ess im)a"an e' if one ta#es o$t t%e ?S ontri)$tion M Perhapsof more concern, howe#er, are worries o#er the alliance6s will to $se its assetsand , gi#en the size of the coalition at L members and the consensus decision-ma2ing structure, t%e spee' wit% w%i % it isa)"e to 'o so :ollowing Russia6s actions o#er &2raine, man/ countries in !urope ha#e found ma2ing decisions to act against it tough to ma2e

politicall/, gi#en their dependence on it for energ/ supplies Thus N5T$ must ha#e the capabilit/ to target anad#ersar/6s critical points of #ulnerabilit/ as well as to demonstrate its politicalresol#e to ta2e action Aan/ ha#e suggested that in the past two decades, following the end of the 4oldWar, N5T$ has forgotten how to deter S$ % "essons nee' to )e re"earne' torestore re'i)i"it& Dowe#er, while there are some 2e/ lessons from the 4old War e"perience that ma/ be applicable for deterrencetoda/, N5T$ and its member states must be careful not to o#er-rel/ upon that \pla/boo26 5s the situation in &2raine shows, ad#ersaries,including in this case Russia, ha#e also learned lessons from histor/, and are 0ndingwa/s to wor2 in the gre/ areas for which speci0c actions b/ N5T$ ha#e not beende0ned and where di#isions can potentiall/ be created among the allies N5T$needs to prepare for contingencies politicall/ and militaril/ that are \blurr/ 6 (ornonlinear, h/brid warfare., to respon' to as&mmetri ta ti s 9t must understand the 2inds of militar/ capabilities, orcombinations of capabilities, that will most eEecti#el/ deter aggression and de#elop \full-spectrum deterrence6 9t is li2el/ that a wide #ariet/ of tools,

militar/ (from pecial $perations :orces to nuclear, and air and sea policing. and non-militar/, will be necessar/ N5T$ will also need to coordinate itsactions with non-militar/ organizations such as the !&, the $rganization for ecurit/ and 4o-operation in !urope ($ 4!. and the World 7an2, that are

better positioned to le#erage economic and other instruments to bring greater pressure to bear on an ad#ersar/ 9n addition to militar/resources, a robust public relations strateg/ will be necessar/ to underscore thealliance6s political credibilit/, consensus and the international legitimac/ of an/actions ta2en 9t will also ha#e to respond to the public narrati#e of an ad#ersar/ (something that Russia has used #er/ eEecti#el/ o#er the pastdecade, if not longer. and ma2e transparent not ?ust to elites but also to the public the intentions and ob?ecti#es of the N5T$ response and limit an/ senseof pro#ocation 5s noted, it is not ?ust states that need deterring o too do terrorist groups or other non-state actors that might use weapons such asc/ber attac2s against N5T$ members 9n man/ respects these actors are harder to deter 9t is often more diGcult to pro#e that the/ are the instigator of

an/ attac2, and targeting them is more challenging as the/ often lac2 a clearl/ de0ned territor/ Therefore, 'eterrin* t%em is"i#e"& to re9$ire fewer "ar*e-s a"e mi"itar& apa)i"ities )$t far moretar*ete' reso$r es = in "$'in* = as wi"" )e e"a)orate' )e"ow= inte""i*en ean' resi"ien e owe+er= )ein* a)"e to i'entif& an' t%en a t a*ainst t%ese

*ro$ps is a ne essar& part of t%e 'eterren e portfo"io 4risis management 4risis managementwill also remain a fundamental tas2 for N5T$ ince the end of the 4old War, it has become in#ol#ed in orled a number of such operations 5ll of these missions from 7osnia andDerzego#ina to 1oso#o and


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longer-term ground force presence 5s noted abo#e, toda/6s crisis-management challenges are focused principall/ around the Aiddle !ast and North5frica Cet the e"perience in 5fghanistan, as well as other operations, indicates that success on the ground re8uires a comprehensi#e eEort in#ol#ing thepro#ision of militar/ securit/ as well as commensurate impro#ements in local go#ernance and, in some instances, economic conditions These latter tas2sare well be/ond N5T$6s militar/ remit Therefore, the organization must not onl/ be capable of performing e"peditionar/ militar/ operationsO it must alsobe able to wor2 closel/ and eEecti#el/ with other partners on the ground, including host go#ernments, other international organizations such as the &nitedNations, the !& or the 5frican &nion, nongo#ernmental organizations and non-N5T$ partners, in order to manage crises eEecti#el/ and pre#ent their

recurrence !nsuring the longer-term success of future N5T$ crisis-managementoperations will still re8uire a number of capabilities that are rapidl/ deplo/able,

sustainable and able to operate eEecti#el/ in the gre/ areas that characterize thatspace between war and peace which is most often found in crisis-managementscenarios These include inte""i*en e -gathering capabilities focused onunderstanding the interpersonal and inter-tribal d/namics of local populations aswell as personnel capable of helping militar/ forces plan, liaise and coordinate withnon-N5T$ actors on areas outside its core competence 5s with deterrence, crisismanagement also re8uires 8uic2 decision-ma2ing in order to respond to swiftl/changing en#ironments This is true in the political and militar/ arenas N5T$ must 0nd wa/s to impro#e on its decision-ma2ingstructures and processes, to allow it to respond more eEecti#el/ to such e#ents While much progress has been made (as ecretar/ =eneral Rasmussennoted recentl/, it too2 si" months for N5T$ to agree to respond to the e#ents in 7osnia, but onl/ si" da/s to respond to those in an2s, member

states must also be able to handle potentiall/ signi0cant migration and refugee >ows In man&= if not most= asesNA


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Russia or pre#ented the fait accompli in 4rimea and protected the eastern part of&2raine from what might now de#elop into a ci#il war !8uall/, impro#ing the understanding of e#ents ta2ingplace in the Aiddle !ast and North 5frica (and wor2ing with other countries in the region and further a0eld to do this. in order to pre#ent con>icts frombrea2ing out or to mitigate them will be increasingl/ important 5nother lesson learned from the recent e#ents in &2raine is that while the threat therewas not on the screens of N5T$ or of man/ Western !uropean countries, those members that are geographicall/ c loser to Russia were #er/ aware of it and

of scenarios that might unfold It is t%$s ne essar& not $st to %a+e inte""i*en e= )$t a"soto )e a)"e to s%are it amon* a"" mem)ers 9t seems clear from recent e#ents that a betterbalance is needed 5t the same time, e#en if the intelligence is shared, the memberstates and N5T$ must be willing to act on it haring intelligence ine#itabl/ causes some securit/ concerns, howe#er,bearing in mind, for e"ample, that a senior !stonian defence oGcial was disco#ered to be a Russian mole (four Russian moles ha#e been found in !stonia6s

go#ernment in recent /ears. @ :inall/, as seen in the operation in


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also been purportedl/ breaching the terms of the 9ntermediate-Range Nuclear:orces Treat/, which prohibits Russia (and the &nited tates. from possessing thesort of missiles that could be used against targets in !urope 9f 7arac2 $bamaentered the White Douse hoping to reduce atomic weapons stoc2piles and ma2e the world asafer place, it loo2s li2e he will lea#e it with a Russia boasting a more "et%a" arsena" of

nuclear weapons than at an/ time since the 4old War 7ut Putin would ne#er actuall/ use nuclear

weapons, would he The scientist and longtime Putin critic 5ndrei Piont2o#s2/, a former e"ecuti#e director of the trategic tudies

4enter in Aoscow and a political commentator for the 774 World er#ice, belie#es he might 9n 5ugust, Piont2o#s2/published a troubling account of what he belie#es Putin might do to win the currentstandoE with the West ; and, in one blow, destro/ N5T$ as an organization and0nish oE what6s left of 5merica6s credibilit/ as the world6s guardian of peace 9n #iew of the Russianleader6s recent remar2s and pro#ocati#e actions, the scenario Piont2o#s2/ la/s out becomes terrif/ingl/ rele#ant Worse, if the

trigger e#ents described come to pass, it becomes logical, ma/be e#en ine#itable Piont2o#s2/ e"plains thepositions of the two camps presenting Putin with ad#ice about how to resol#e the &2raine crisis

The 0rst, the QPeace Part/ ,Q as he calls it, composed of those occup/ing posts in in>uential thin2 tan2s, including, inthis case, erge/ 1aragano#, the head of Aoscow6s Digher chool of !conomics, urges Putin to declare #ictor/ in&2raine now and thereb/ end the con>ict Da#ing ta2en note of the lengths to which Aoscow will go to

pre#ent &2raine from slipping out of its orbit, N5T$ will almost certainl/ ne#er in#ite the formero#iet republic to ?oin its ran2s , the Peace Part/ argues 5nd Russia has alread/ won tacitacceptance from the international communit/ of its ac8uisition of 4rimea Piont2o#s2/dismisses out of hand the possibilit/ of Putin pursuing this solution 9f Putin chose to go this route, he wouldloo2 defeated , and looming before him would be the fate of o#iet Premier Ni2ita 1hrushche#, who was deposed and forcedinto retirement following his failed, and nearl/ catastrophic, +F@ attempt to secure communism in 4uba b/ stationing nuclear

missiles there The other camp putting pressure on Putin, the QWar Part/, Q howe#er, gi#es the presidenttwo options The 0rst, writes Piont2o#s2/, is a Qromantic and inspiring scenario% World War 9 between the $rthodo" RussianWorld, now risen from its 2nees, against the rotting and decadent 5nglo- a"on World Q (World War 999, in his #iew, has alread/

happened% the 4old War . This World War 9 would be a con#entional war with N5T$ ; and it wouldnot go well =i#en N5T$6s superior armed forces and Russia6s comparati#e economic, scienti0c, and technological wea2nesses, acon#entional campaign would, Piont2o#s2/ concludes, end with Russia6s defeat That lea#es Putin onl/ one option% a nuclear attac2Not a massi#e launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles at the &nited tates or Western !urope, which would bring about a suicidal

atomic holocaust, but a small, tactical stri2e or two against a N5T$ member that few in the West would be willing to die to protectPiont2o#s2/ surmises that, in such a con>ict, the nuclear-armed countr/ with the Qsuperior political willQ to alter the geopoliticalQstatus 8uoQ and ; most importantl/ ; with the Qgreater indiEerence to #alues concerning human li#esQ would pre#ail 5n/ guesses

which countr/ that would be 7ut what would trigger a Russian attac2 5ccording to Piont2o#s2/6s scenario , itcould be something as simple as a plebiscite % the !stonian cit/ of Nar#a,o#erwhelmingl/ ethnicall/ Russian and ad?acent to Russia, deciding to hold areferendum on ?oining the Aotherland To help them Qfreel/ e"press their willQ at thepolls, Russia could send in a brigade of Qlittle green men armed to the teeth,Q much li2eit did in 4rimea in Aarch !stonia would thereupon in#o2e 5rticle I of the N5T$ charter ; Q anarmed attac2 against one or more SN5T$ members _ shall be considered an attac2against them all Q ; and demand that the alliance defend it pea2ing in the !stonian capital of Tallinn on the e#e of N5T$6ssummit in Wales, this is ?ust what $bama promised QThe defense of Tallinn and Riga and ilnius is ?ust as important as the defense

of 7erlin and Paris and / against the &nited tates No Rather, he would


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legitimating their power and policies 9n part this in#ocation of #alues ma/ be strategic Oacceptance b/ or o#ert support from others ma2es e"ercise of power b/ the unipole cheaperand more eEecti#e mart leaders 2now how to sell' their policies Wrapping policies inshared #alues or interests smoothes the path to polic/ success b/ reassuring s2eptics ++ Rhetoric about sharedinterests in prosperit/ and economic growth accompanies eEorts to push free trade deals on unwilling partners and publics Rhetoric about shared lo#e of human rights and democrac/ accompaniespushes for po"iti a" reforms in other states 9n their e"amination of debates leading up to the**M 9ra8 war in this issue of World Politics, Jac2 n/der, Robert hapiro, and Caeli 7loch-!l2on pro#ide an e"ampleof unipolar attempts to create legitimac/ through strategic use of rhetoric The/ show how e#ocati#e and e#asi#erhetoric' allowed proponents of the war to impl/ lin2s between the F ++ attac2s, weapons of mass destruction, andaddam Dussein6s regime Potentiall/ unpopular or contro#ersial policies were rationalized b/ situating them in alarger strategic #ision built on more widel/ held #alues, as when the authors of the ** National ecurit/trateg/ memorandum wo#e together the global war on terror, the promotion of 5merican democratic #aluesabroad, and the struggle against authoritarian regimes to create a ?usti0cation for pre#enti#e war + 9ndeed, as Ronald 1rebs and Patric2 Jac2son argue, rhetorical sales pitches' of this 2ind can be highl/ coerci#e !"aminingthe same case (the selling of the 9ra8 war., 1rebs and Jennifer ect domestic#alues !#en authoritarian (and certainl/ totalitarian. regimes articulate shared goals and function onl/ becauseof the web of social ties that 2nit people together 4ertainl/ all recent and contemporar/ strong states that couldbe candidates for unipoles;the & , 4hina, Russia, =erman/, and 7ritain;do +) Thus unipole states, li2e allstates, 0nd na2ed self-aggrandizement or e#en the prescriptions of Aachia#ellian #irt diGcult to pursue +I &nipoles and the people who lead them pursue a #ariet/ of goals deri#ed from man/ diEerent #alues !#ennational interest' as most people and states concei#e of it in#ol#es some broader#ision of social good be/ond mere self-aggrandizement 5mericans li2e to see democrac/ spread around the world in part for instrumental reasons;the/ belie#e a world of democracies is a safer, moreprosperous world for 5mericans;and also for normati#e ones;the/ belie#e in the #irtues of democrac/ for alluential domestic constituencies must also be brought on board 4hannels for such persuasion are man/ and#aried, as is e#ident from past & diplomatic eEorts to sell its policies under bipolarit/ The shift from laissez-faire to what John Ruggie terms the embedded liberal compromise' as the basis for the & -led economic orderafter WW99 re8uired e"tensi#e diplomatic eEort to persuade other states and New Cor26s 0nancial elite to go along

The tools of in>uence used to accomplish this were sometimes material but also intellectual and ideological 9twas the shared social purposes' of these economic arrangements that ga#e themlegitimac/ among both state and societal actors cross-nationall/ +@ 5 unipole6s policiesare thus circumscribed on two fronts The policies must re>ect #alues held at home, ma2ingthem legitimate 'omesti a""& 5t the same time, in order to induce ac8uiescence orsupport from abroad, the/ must appeal to the leaders and publics of other states4onstructing policies across these two spheres;domestic and international;ma/ be more or less diGcult,depending on circumstances, but the range of choices satisf/ing both constituencies isunli2el/ to be large Widespread disaEection on either front is li2el/ to createsigni0cant legitimac/ costs to leaders , either as electoral or stabilit/ threats domesticall/ or asdecreased cooperation and increased resistance internationall/ 4reating legitimac/ for its policies is thus essentialfor the unipole but it is also diGcult, dangerous, and prone to unforeseen conse8uences 3omesticall/, the needto cement winning coalitions in place has polarized & politics, creating incenti#es to e"ploit wedge issues and ideological narrati#es 5s n/der, hapiro, and 7loch-!l2on describe, neoconser#ati#es, particularl/ after F ++,used these tools to great eEect to generate support for the 7ush administration6s policies uch ideologicall/-dri#en persuasion eEorts entail ris2s, howe#er 4onstructing coherent ideological narrati#es often in#ol#es


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sidelining incon#enient facts, what n/der and his coauthors call fact bulldozing ' This is more than ?usthighlighting some facts at the e"pense of others 9t ma/ (or ma/ not. begin with that aim, but it can also in#ol#echanging the facts people belie#e to be true, as when large numbers of people came to belie#e that weapons ofmass destruction were indeed found in 9ra8 Thus, to the degree that these persuasion eEorts are successful, iftheir ideolog/ does not allow them to entertain contrar/ facts, polic/ma2ers and publics ma/ ma2e decisionsbased on bad information This 2ind of self-delusion would seem unli2el/ to result in smart polic/ To the e"tentthat ideological narrati#es become entrenched, these delusions ma/ e"tend to future generations of polic/ma2ersand ma2e them #ictims of blowbac2 !#en if successors come to terms with the facts, the/ ma/ be entrapped b/the powerful legitimating rhetoric constructed b/ their predecessors +B


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1AC P"an


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Contention > So"+en &

P"an3s pro ess of reform is #e& it re)a"an es separation ofpowers an' e e ti+e"& onstrains s$r+ei""an e: Nea" 2B16 (=regor/ AcNeal Ph3, professor of law at Pepperdine &ni#ersit/chool of


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interpretation/ of FISA o$"' )e mo'i7e' to )e ome a tri**er forappe""ate re+iew )& re9$irin* t%at a"" opinions of t%e Forei*n Inte""i*en eS$r+ei""an e Co$rt t%at in+o"+e si*ni7 ant onstr$ tion or interpretation of an& stat$te or $'i ia" pre e'ent are s$) e t to 'e no+o re+iew )& t%eForei*n Inte""i*en e S$r+ei""an e Co$rt of Re+iew A$tomati re+iew of

"ower o$rt opinions is not $n%ear' of in t%e nationa" se $rit& ases :ore"ample, in courts martial proceedings, trials that result in a con#iction are automaticall/ re#iewed b/ thecon#ening authorit/, and the con#ening authorit/ has discretion to mitigate the 0ndings and sentence @@:urthermore, if the sentence imposed b/ the con#ening authorit/ includes death, dishonorable or bad; conductdischarge, or con0nement for one /ear or more,' the case is automaticall/ re#iewed b/ an intermediate court @B

Those courts re#iew cases for legal error, factual suGcienc/ and sentence appropriateness A 'e no+ostan'ar' of re+iew is appropriate for s$r+ei""an e a ti+ities as it a""ows.m$"ti $'*e pane"s t%at permit re!e ti+e 'ia"o*$e and collecti#e ?udgment' with regardto legal issues @L 5s the upreme 4ourt has e"plained, .TiUn'epen'ent appe""ate re+iew of"e*a" iss$es )est ser+es t%e '$a" *oa"s of 'o trina" o%eren e an'e onom& of $'i ia" a'ministration=/ an' w%i"e t%e S$preme Co$rt was notspea#in* of s$r+ei""an e= its a'monitions re*ar'in* appe""ate re+iew areper%aps stron*er in t%e onte t of nationa" se $rit& @F Dowe#er, national securit/sur#eillance oftentimes re8uires rapid action on the part of the courtsO thus while this essa/ argues that :9 4opinions should be presumpti#el/ re#iewed, the order or opinion issued b/ the :9 4 should be immediatel/eEecti#e, and 0nalized pending re#iew b/ the :9 4R A FISC $'*e s%o$"' %a+e t%e a)i"it& tosta& %is or'er or opinion= s$) e t to FISCR re+iew= )$t a)sent s$ % anor'er )& t%e $'*e= t%e opinion or or'er on t%e s$)stanti+e s$r+ei""an ematter s%o$"' )e e e ti+e imme'iate"&


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8o$r 'isa's are non$ni9$e s$r+ei""an e )i""s are )ein* passe'an' 'e)ate' in Con*ress

- Disa' non-$ni9$e S$r+ei""an e )i""s %a+e a"rea'& )een'e)ate' an' passe' in Con*ress

- No "in# P"an pop$"ar wit% t%e p$)"i- Eipartisan s$pport for t%e p"an- Inte""i*en e apa)i"ities an )e )a"an e' wit% pri+a &

on erns- :oment$m for $rtai"ment reforms now

J!NN9:!R S< IN A? R an' J$N5TD5N W IS:AN , @ * 15 , reporters KNCT, & ur#eillance in Place ince F ++ 9s harpl/


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senator from his state esh out in#estigations in other wa/s,and could still pro#e to be crucial in the future enator Ai2e


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clear after passage that curtailing the phone sweeps might be onl/ the beginning The two are collaborating onlegislation to undo a pro#ision in the !lectronic 4ommunications Pri#ac/ 5ct of +FL@ that allows the go#ernment toread the contents of email o#er si" months old Douse members and senators from both parties are alread/ e/einga section of the :oreign 9ntelligence ur#eillance 5ct that the/ sa/ has also been abused b/ the go#ernment 7ut

opponents of t%e "aw sai' t%e& ima*ine' f$rt%er 7*%ts *oin* forwar' fort%eir positions= too Senator S$san Co""ins = Rep$)"i an of :aine= sai' s%e

an' ot%ers wo$"' ontin$e to see# reforms an' o+ersi*%t .It3s not t%een'=/ she said


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2AC ?ni9$eness ;eneri


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@e*is"ation


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@e*is"ation Ine+ita)"e

@iti*ation o+er s$r+ei""an e is %i*% now in a"" "e+e"s of t%efe'era" o$rts ,%$*e "ist of ases are pen'in* a eptan e"a'e # 15 ; tephen 9 ladec2, Professor of


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apa)i"ities of t%ese s$r+ei""an e a*en ies to collect, store, and see2 out information or identif/those in#ol#ed with the terrorist groups or those who had a substantial part in planning or e"ecuting the attac2s LI owe+er=t%e impa t of t%ese new"& *rante' powers %as pre ipitate' an e treme)a #"as% from on erne' iti ens w%o fee" t%at t%eir "i)erties %a' )een9$i #"& i*nore' or a)an'one'


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@aws$its Now

;o+ernmenta" "aws$its es a"atin* now '$e to in rease'transparen &;oitein an' Pate" 15 ; !lizabeth =oitein, co-directs the 7rennan 4enter for

Justice6s


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A< FISC Co$rts

FISC is per ei+e' as a r$))er stamp---t%at means reforms wi""ine+ita)"& ro"" )a # s$r+ei""an e )e a$se of p$)"i o$tra*e4onor C"ar#e , L * 14 , J 3 4andidate K Cale


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important as we head to *+B and the debate o#er reauthorization of the :9 55mendments 5ct 9t now seems plain the & 5 :reedom 5ct will pass% the enate #oted to mo#e forward onthe bill b/ a #ote of BB +B, opposed onl/ b/ the strange bedfellows coalition of Rand Paul and +@ of the enate6smost hardcore N 5 cheerleaders Ac4onnell has proposed an arra/ of amendments wea2ening or diluting it, thoughperhaps less because he thin2 the/6ll pass than because doing so 0lls the tree' for amendments and pre#ents fol2sli2e Ron W/den or Rand Paul from oEering amendments that would strengthen the bill 5mong these are a dataretention notice' mandate (which would compel phone companies to notif/ the go#ernment in ad#ance if the/ planto retain call records for less than +L months, a wa/ of encouraging without strictl/ re8uiring retention. and anamendment stripping awa/ the crucial transparenc/ pro#ision that re8uirespublication of signi0cant :9 5 4ourt opinions, which is necessar/ to ensure that newsafeguards can6t be secretl/ reinterpreted' into irrele#ance the same wa/ the courtsecretl/ transformed +) and +I into bul2 collection authorities While unfortunatel/there are probabl/ 8uite a few senators in the /es' column on & 5 :reedom who would also fa#or these changes,the/6re li2el/ to meet strong opposition from both technolog/ companies and ci#il liberties groups, and it seems atthe #er/ least doubtful the/6d ma2e it through the Douse :or those who purport to thin2 it6s essential to e"tend thee"piring powers 8uic2l/, that should be a powerful argument for ?ust mo#ing with the language the Douse hasalread/ appro#ed, so it can go speedil/ to the President6s des2 The real signi0cance of the sunset is s/mbolic andpolitical ' 5s 9 noted abo#e, all of the pro-pri#ac/ enators but Rand Paul are on board with the & 5 :reedom 5ct,but it ma/ be worth elaborating a bit on wh/ 9 thin2 their concerns are largel/ misguided 5s 9 argued in m/ icepiece

, we should distinguish between fundamentall/ strategic arguments for lettingPatriot pro#isions sunset, of the sort we6#e heard from the 5merican 4i#il


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A< Free'om A t So"+es

Free'om a t fai"s it *i+es t%e *o+ernment t%e "e*a" )asis toe pan' s$r+ei""an eAmnest& Internationa" 6B5 N=$ concerned with human rights, @ I +I, TW$

C!5R 5:T!R N$W3!N PR$T!4T9N= D&A5N R9=DT 9N 5N 5=! $: A5&R !9


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order to end it We are ta2ing the appropriate steps to obtain a court order reauthorizing the program 9f such an order i s granted, we6ll ma2e an appropriateannouncement at that time as we ha#e with respect to past renewal applications,' said Aarc Raimondi, the Justice 3epartment6s national securit/ spo2esman S enate Aa?orit/


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further reforms including boosting transparenc/ of sur#eillance practices, opposinggo#ernment eEorts to wea2en encr/ption and strengthening its mutual legalassistance treaties with other nations Q$#er the last few /ears, the &go#ernment s failure to meaningfull/ reform its sur#eillance practices has ta2en aserious economic toll on the & tech sector and the total cost continues to grow

each da/,Q 4astro said 4astro said the & 5 :reedom 5ct, which curbs bul2 datacollection among its reforms, is Qgood legislation and a step in the right directionWe ha#e ignored the economic impact of & sur#eillance Q


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(+errea % Now,GB11Con*ress %as a)'i ate' its ro"e in forei*n po"i &,intri a ies ofs$r+ei""an e an' spe ia" ops warfare %as on"& ma'e t%at worsehttp% nationalinterest org article congressional-abdication-L+ML

7ut in t%e aftermat% of the ana"&ti a""& simp"er %a""en*es of t%e Co"' War ,present-'a& rises %a+e )e ome more omp"i ate' to e p"ain wit% an/e pertise , e#en as the electoral process has become more obsessed with thenecessities of fund-raising and as the political messages themsel#es ha#e beenreduced to blunt one-line phrases 5s former Douse pea2er Thomas P Tip' $6Neillfamousl/ put it decades ago, most politics are local, and most politicians learnabout the essentials of foreign polic/ onl/ after the/ ha#e been elected, if at all

This dichotom/ e"plains the nearl/ total absence of an/ real foreign-polic/ debate inour electoral process, whether at the congressional or presidential le#el Nowhere isthis truth more self-e#ident than in the national discussions that ha#e emerged inthe aftermath of the F ++ terrorist attac2s Despite more t%an ten &ears ofon*oin* om)at operations , an' despite the fre9$ent on*ressiona" trips toplaces such as 9ra8 and 5fghanistan (usuall/ on highl/ structured #isits lasting onl/a few hours, or at the most a da/ or two., Con*ress %as )e ome largel/irre"e+ant to t%e s%apin*= e e $tion and future of our forei*n po"i & 3etailedPowerPoint brie0ngs ma/ be gi#en b/ colonels and generals in the battle zones '5d#ersarial confrontations might mar2 certain congressional hearings Reportsmight be demanded Passionate speeches might be made on the >oor of the Douseand the enate 7ut on the iss$es of w%o s%o$"' 'e i'e w%en an' w%ere to$se for e an' for %ow "on g, and what our countr/6s long-term relations shouldconsist of in the aftermath, Con*ress is mostl/ to"erate' an' fre9$ent"&i*nore' The few e eptions ome w%en ertain mem)ers are a'amant intheir determination to stop something from happening, but e+en t%en t%e& 'o nottr$"& parti ipate in the s%apin* of po"i & The fai"$re of Con*ress to meet its%istori a" o)"i*ations w%i"e t%e presi'ent $ni"atera""& en*a*e' in om)atoperations in @i)&a promises e+en 'eeper onse9$en es for future crises 9nman/ international situations t%e f$t$re promises a 'i erent #in' of warfare=ma'e possi)"e (and politicall/ more comple". )& the use of spe ia"operationsforces, ia operati+es= 'rones an' pre ision m$nitions , thus remo+in* t%ea+era*e Ameri an from the conse8uences and e#en the direct 2n ow"e'*e ofmi"itar& a tions that a president might underta2e at his or her sole discretion 7utto w%at e tent s%o$"' t%is cleaner' wa& of war a"so remo+e Con*ress asan ar)iter of when and where our nation should become in#ol#ed in o#erseashostilities The inherent right of self-defense allows the president, as commander inchief, to order stri2es an/where in the world against legitimate terrorist targets ifthe countr/ in which the/ operate either cannot or will not ta2e appropriate actionitself 7ut this is a diEerent concept than unilaterall/ commencing hostilities insituations that do not directl/ threaten our countr/ When we e"amine theconditions under which the president ordered our militar/ into action in


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?ni9$eness


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R$ssia pose

Re ent inte""i*en e s an'a"s %a+e wre #e' re"ations on!i tis ine+ita)"e in t%e stat$s 9$oFarmer 6B14 (7en, 3efence 4orrespondent, Russia could e"pose 7ritish agentsto its allies after nowden 0les crac2ed ,' June +) th , *+I,http% www telegraph co u2 news worldnews europe russia ++@B) *+ Russia-could-e"pose-7ritish-agents-to-its-allies-after- nowden-0les-crac2ed html. ghs-5

R$ssia ma& e pose Eritis% inte""i*en e a*ents to its a""ies around the world after 1remlin spies ha#e reportedl/ crac2ed the top-secret cache of 0les stolen b/ the fugiti#e & whistle blower !dwardSnow'en , a former securit/ minister has said


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Inte" Ine e ti+e Now

Inte" S%arin* is ine e ti+e nowDa"ton 14 (Aatthew, Reporter, The Wall treet Journal, N5T$ War =ame Tests9ntelligence- haring,' Aa/ M*, *+), http% www ws? com articles nato-war-game-tests-intelligence-sharing-+)*+)II *@. ghs- 5

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P$)"i For in* Disr$ption

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that it would prompt other countries to re8uest similar deals 9n earl/ *+*, the director of national intelligence,3ennis 4 7lair, e"plored a nonsp/ing pact with :rench intelligence oGcials, partl/ because Ar 7lair belie#ed such adeal would ease the burden on the : 7 9 , which has the tas2 of hunting :rench spies in the &nited tates The:rench are reputed to be particularl/ aggressi#e in pursuing 5merican industrial secrets 9n contrast, current andformer 5merican oGcials said that =erman operati#es are far less acti#e in the &nited tates, ma2ing the bene0tsof a nonsp/ing deal with 7erlin less ob#ious


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director of =4DU, said R$ssia an' C%ina *ainin* a ess to Snow'en3s materia" wasa \%$*e strate*i set)a #\ t%at was \%armin*\ to Eritain= Ameri a an't%eir Nato a""ies While 3owning treet said there was no e#idence of an/one being harmed' b/ theintelligence, a senior Dome $Gce oGcial accused nowden of ha#ing blood on his hands' 5 7ritish intelligencesource added% QWe 2now R$ssia an' C%ina %a+e a ess to Snow'en s materia" an'

wi"" )e *oin* t%ro$*% it for &ears to ome= sear %in* for "$es to i'entif&potentia" tar*ets Q nowden has done incalculable damage 9n some cases the a*en ies %a+e)een for e' to inter+ene an' "ift t%eir a*ents from operations to pre+entt%em from )ein* i'enti7e' an' #i""e' Q nowden has pre#iousl/ said his 0les were encr/ptedand could not be uncoded b/ an/ intelligence agencies


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Terrorist 5ttac2s &pon the &nited tates recommended a far-reaching intelligencereform, which resulted in the 9ntelligence Reform and Terrorism 5ct (9RT5. of **), who saw thecreation of the 3irector of National 9ntelligence (3N9. and of a National 4ounter-Terrorism 4enter (N4T4, ()** emplo/ees. locat ed ne"t to the 495compound $ther laws were amended, li2e the :oreign 9ntelligence ur#eillance 5ct of +FBL M* The ecret er#ice and 4oast =uard 9ntelligence weremo#ed to the new 3epartment of Domeland ecurit/, a mo#e that was not reall/ understood The National 9ntelligence 5genc/ (N95. is the successor ofthe National 9ntelligence 4ouncil (N94.M+ and was shifted from the 495 to the 3N9% 9t is a rather small instrument of the 3irector of National 9ntelligence(3N9., and will 0nalize estimates which in fact are basicall/ 495 estimates M President 7ush also installed with P33 BI a National 4ounterintelligence!"ecuti#e (N49^. MM 9n **I and in **L, more changes came along with additional re#isions of ! $ + MMM, which altered again some of the re#isionsmade in **) M) Dowe#er, changes in the organization alone were not being the onl/ answer to impro#e conditions MI F ++' was not onl/ an intelligencefailure, but also one of established airport and airline securit/ policies and procedures Dowe#er, organizational changes li2e the ones of **M **) couldnot o#ercome all inade8uacies,M@ therefore, new approaches were needed, and especiall/ the 4ollins


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de#eloping new mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as submarine-launched ballistic missiles ` Three new countries (9ndia, Pa2istan, and North 1orea. ha#e ?oined the list ofac2nowledged nuclear weapons states , and one ( outh 5frica. has been remo#ed ` :inall/, in recent/ears a series of aspirants (9ra8,


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e#en against other nuclear powers The empirical e#idence regarding this issue is sparse and sub?ect to #ar/inginterpretations North 1orea has beha#ed aggressi#el/ toward the outh on se#eral occasions since conducting its 0rst nuclear tests, but it did so often inthe past as well :or the most part, as 1ang 4hoi6s essa/ suggests, the North 1orean regime seems to regard its small arsenal as the ultimate insurance

polic/ rather than a useful new tool with which to ful0ll its grandiose self-proclaimed ambitions Pa2istan6s leaders appear tobelie#e that nuclear weapons reduce the ris2 of large-scale con#entional retaliationand thus pro#ide a bac2stop for their continued support of terrorist groups operating

against 9ndia 7ut 9slamabad has not thrown caution to the winds, and, as 7asrur suggests, both Pa2istan and 9ndia ma/ at times be tempted tomanipulate the ris2 of escalation to get the &nited tates to e"ert pressure on their behalf !#en when its own forces were smaller and less secure,4hinese strategists appear to ha#e belie#ed that the/ were suGcient to discouragethe &nited tates from e#er using nuclear weapons against their countr/ 7ei?ing6smodernization programs ma/ be intended simpl/ to bolster that con0dence in theface of growing & precision-stri2e capabilities Now that 4hina is de#eloping similar con#entional capabilities ofits own, howe#er, it has options for the use of force that it pre#iousl/ lac2ed and that it ma/ be more li2el/ to e"ercise if it belie#es it can deter the &nitedtates from nuclear escalation This is a possibilit/ about which & and Japanese strategists ha#e begun to worr/ and to which the/ will li2el/ de#ote

more attention in the /ears ahead 9s the world approaching critical mass,' a point at which thenumber and size of nuclear arsenals and the dangers associated with them willgrow with e"plosi#e speed The e#idence presented here suggests that the answeris mi"ed While superpower stoc2piles ha#e dwindled, the roster of nuclear weaponsstates has grown, and further horizontal proliferation is a distinct possibilit/ in both5sia and the Aiddle !ast 5t least for the moment, the plans and programs of the nuclearpowers remain loosel/ coupled, but this too could change 8uic2l/, resulting in atrul/ m$"tisi'e' arms ompetition t%at is more omp"e an' potentia""&more 'i $"t to ontro" t%an t%e Co"' War arms ra e The ac8uisition of nuclearweapons (in the case of 9ndia, Pa2istan, and North 1orea. and the de#elopment of more secure arsenals (in the caseof 4hina. ha#e not resulted in radicall/ increased rec2lessness 7ut there are indications that states e8uipped withsuch capabilities ma/ assess that the/ pro#ide a bac2stop for greater asserti#eness uch beliefs could raise theris2 of con#entional con>ict and bring the world much closer to critical mass than it appears to be at present


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A< :AD:$t$a""& Ass$re' Destr$ tion fai"s nations are *i+enin enti+es to t%reaten n$ "ear war in e %an*e for *eopo"iti a"a'+anta*es t%is in reases t%e ris# of n$ "ear war

Zroeni* 2012 Aatthew 1roenig, proliferation e"pert, I @ + , The Distor/ ofProliferation $ptimism% 3oes 9t Da#e 5 :uture ', http% www npolic/org article phpaidZ++L HrtidZ

Proliferation through Rose-4olored =lasses The proliferation optimist position has a distinguishedpedigree, and pro#ides a useful rationale for actors interested in de#elopingstrategic deterrence with limited means, but it pro#ides a wea2er intellectualframewor2 for comprehensi#el/ understanding the li2el/ eEects of nuclearproliferation on international politics cott agan and other contemporar/proliferation pessimists ha#e pro#ided s/stematic and thoroughgoing criti8ues ofthe proliferation optimism position M agan shows that t%e sprea' of n$ "ear

weapons leads to greater le#els of internationa" insta)i"it& because% statesmight conduct pre+enti+e stri#es on t%e n$ "ear fa i"ities of proliferant states,proliferant states might not ta2e the necessar/ steps to build a se $re= se on'-stri#e apa)i"it& , and organizational pathologies within nuclear states could leadto accidental or inad#ertent nuclear launch MM 5s :ran2 =a#in writes in his re#iew of theoptimism pessimism debate, The real problem, howe#er, is that agan pla/s small ball in his debate with Waltz, conceding the bigissues Wh/ not challenge Waltz on his core arguments about deterrence and stabilit/ 'M) Rather than repeat the substantial eEortsof pre#ious pessimists, therefore, 9 will ta2e up =a#in6s challenge and focus on three big issues 9n particular, this section maintains

that proliferation optimists% present an o#ersimpli0ed #ersion of nuclear deterrencetheor/, follow a line of argumentation that contains an internal logical contradiction,and do not address the concerns of & foreign polic/ma2ers :irst and foremost, proliferationoptimists present an o#ersimpli0ed #iew of nuclear deterrence theor/ $ptimistsargue that since the ad#ent of Autuall/ 5ssured 3estruction (A53., an/ nuclear warwould mean national suicide and, therefore, no rational leader would e#er choose to start one :urthermore, the/argue that the re8uirements for rationalit/ are not high Rather, leaders must #alue their own sur#i#al and thesur#i#al of their nation and understand that intentionall/ launching a nuclear war would threaten those #alues Aan/ anal/stsand polic/ma2ers attempt to challenge the optimists on their own turf and 8uestionwhether the leaders of potential proliferant states are full/ rational MI Cet, these debateo#erloo2 the fact that, apart from the optimists, leading nuclear deterrence theorists belie#e that nuclear proliferationcontributes to a real ris2 of nuclear war e#en in a situation of Autuall/ 5ssured3estruction (A53. among rational states M@ Aoreo#er, realizing that nuclear war is possible does not dependon peculiar beliefs about the possibilit/ of escaping A53 MB Rather, as we will discuss below, these theorists understand that

some ris# of n$ "ear war is ne essar& in or'er for 'eterren e to f$n tion Tobe sure, in the +F)*s, iner, 7rodie, and others argued that A53 rendered war among ma?or powers obsolete, but nucleardeterrence theor/ soon ad#anced be/ond that simple understanding ML 5fter all, great power political competition does not end with

nuclear weapons 5nd nuclear-armed states still see2 to threaten nuclear-armedad#ersaries tates cannot credibl/ threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war, butthe/ still want to coerce their ad#ersaries This leads to a credibilit/ problem% how can statescredibl/ threaten a nuclear-armed opponent ince the +F@*s, academic nuclear deterrence theor/ hasbeen de#oted almost e"clusi#el/ to answering this 8uestion MF 5nd their answers do not gi#e us reasons to be optimistic Thomaschelling was the 0rst to de#ise a rational means b/ which states can threaten nuclear-armed opponents )* De argued that

leaders cannot credibl/ threaten to intentionall/ launch a suicidal nuclear war, but the/ can ma2e a threat thatlea#es something to chance ')+ The/ can engage in a process, t%e n$ "ear risis ,


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which in reases t%e ris# of n$ "ear war in an attempt to force a less resol#edad#ersar/ to bac2 down 5s states escalate a nuclear crisis there is an in reasin*pro)a)i"it& t%at t%e on!i t wi"" spira" o$t of ontro" and result in aninad#ertent or accidental nuclear e"change 5s long as the bene0t of winning the crisis is greater than theincremental increase in the ris2 of nuclear war, howe#er, threats to escalate nuclear crises are inherentl/

credible 9n these games of nuclear brin2manship,

the state that is willing to run the greatest ris2 of nuclear war before bac2ing down will win the crisis, as long as it does not end incatastrophe 9t is for this reason that Thomas chelling called great power politics in the nuclear era a competition in ris2ta2ing ') This does not mean that states eagerl/ bid up the ris2 of nuclear war Rather, the/ face gut-wrenching decisions at each

stage of the crisis The/ can 8uit the crisis to a#oid nuclear war, but onl/ b/ ceding animportant geopolitical issue to an opponent $r the/ can the escalate the crisis in an attempt to pre#ail, butonl/ at the ris2 of suEering a possible nuclear e"change ince +F)I there were ha#e been twent/ high sta2es nuclear crises inwhich rational' states li2e the &nited tates run a frighteningl/-real ris2 of nuclear war )M 7/ as2ing whether states can be

deterred, therefore, proliferation optimists are as2ing the wrong 8uestion The right 8uestion to as2 is% what ris2 ofnuclear war is a speci0c state willing to run against a particular opponent in a gi#encrisis $ptimists are li2el/ correct when the/ assert that a nuclear-armed 9ran will not intentionall/commit national suicide b/ launching a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attac2 on the&nited tates or 9srael This does not mean that 9ran will ne#er use nuclearweapons, howe#er 9ndeed, it is almost inconcei#able to thin2 that a nuclear-armed 9ranwould not, at some point, 0nd itself in a crisis with another nuclear-armed power 9t isalso inconcei#able that in those circumstances, 9ran would not be willing to run some ris2 of nuclear war in order to achie#e its

ob?ecti#es 9f a nuclear-armed 9ran and the &nited tates or 9srael were to ha#e ageopolitical con>ict in the future , o#er the internal politics of /ria, an 9sraeli con>ict with 9ran6s client Dezbollah,the & presence in the Persian =ulf, shipping through the trait of Dormuz, or some other issue, do we belie#e that9ran would immediatel/ capitulate $r is it possible that Iran wo$"' p$s% )a #= possi)"&)ran'is%in* n$ "ear weapons in an attempt to oer e its a'+ersaries 9f thelatter, t%ere is a ris# t%at pro"iferation to Iran o$"' res$"t in n$ "ear war andproliferation optimists are wrong to dismiss it out of hand 5n optimist might counter that nuclear weapons will ne#er be used, e#enin a crisis situation, because states ha#e such a strong incenti#e, namel/ national sur#i#al, to ensure that nuclear weapons are not

used 7ut this ob?ection ignores the fact that leaders operate under competing pressures


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trategic and 9nternational tudies (4 9 . The main portions of the report were authored b/ acareer & go#ernment strategist and senior 4 9 anal/st, 4lar2 Aurdoc2, a man who pre#iousl/ wor2ed in high-le#elstrateg/ ?obs at the 4entral 9ntelligence 5genc/ (495., the 3epartment of 3efense (3$3., the & 5ir :orce and theNational War 4ollege The report included contributions from a large team of researchers and e"perts, includingpanels from the 4N5 and the National 9nstitution for Public Polic/ (N9PP. The thrust of the 4 9anal/sis is that the & must ma2e its nuclear arsenal easier to use in a war with

Russia, 4hina or some other power The militar/ must adopt a & nuclear strateg/designed for twent/-0rst centur/ realities ,' based on new generations of tactical warheads anddeli#er/ s/stems Aore ad#anced tactical nuclear weapons will enable Washington tothreaten and launch small nuclear wars , without being self-deterred' b/ concerns that its actionswould lead to a nuclear holocaust, the 4 9 report argues The &nited tates needs to de#elop anddeplo/ more emplo/able nuclear weapons,' the 4 9 wrote, including low collateraldamage, en%an e' ra'iation= eart% penetration= e"e troma*neti p$"se , andothers as technolog/ ad#ances ' uch ad#ances, the report argues, are the onl/ wa/ to counter theerosion of 5merican technological superiorit/ b/ the growth of the 4hinese and Russian nuclear arsenals, togetherwith the addition of as man/ as nine new go#ernments to the nuclear club ' &nder the Aeasured Response'theor/ ad#ocated b/ the 4 9 and Aurdoc2, these t/pes of highl/ mobile nuclear stri2e forces could engage incontrolled nuclear operations,' 0ring low /ield, accurate, special eEects' nu2es against enem/ targets without

leading to a full-scale nuclear war 7/ forward deplo/ing a robust set of discriminate nuclearresponse options,' the & could launch tactical nuclear stri2es at all rungs of thenuclear escalation ladder,' Aurdoc2 wrote uch small-scale' nuclear con>ictswould ine#itabl/ claim tens, if not %$n're's of mi""ions of "i+es , e#en assumingthe/ did not escalate into a global nuclear war


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and or 4hina :or e"ample, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attac2, the &president might be e"pected to place the countr/6s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert 9n such atense en#ironment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of realit/, it is ?ust possible that Aoscow and or 4hina mightmista2enl/ read this as a sign of & intentions to use force (and possibl/ nuclear force. against them 9n that situation, thetemptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that an/ preemption would probabl/ still meet with a

de#astating response 5s part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier. Was%in*tonmi*%t 'e i'e to or'er a si*ni7 ant on+entiona" Kor n$ "earL reta"iator& or

'isarmin* atta # a*ainst t%e "ea'ers%ip of t%e terrorist *ro$p an'Borstates seen to s$pport t%at *ro$p 3epending on the identit/ and especiall/ the location of these targets,Russia and or 4hina might interpret such action as being far too close for theircomfort, and potentiall/ as an infringement on their spheres of in>uence and e#enon their so#ereignt/ $ne far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a ?udgment in Washingtonthat some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as 4hechn/a, perhaps in connection with

what 5llison claims is the 4hechen insurgents6 _ long-standing interest in all things nuclear ') 5merican pressure onthat part of the world would almost certainl/ raise alarms in Aoscow that mightre8uire a degree of ad#anced consultation from Washington that the latter founditself unable or unwilling to pro#ide There is also the 8uestion of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of thatspecial club 9t could reasonabl/ be e"pected that following a nuclear terrorist attac2 on the &nited tates, bothRussia and4hina would e"tend immediate s/mpath/ and support to Washington and would wor2 alongside the &nited tates in the ecurit/

4ouncil 7ut there is ?ust a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and or4hina is less automatic in some cases than in others :or e"ample, what would happen if the &nitedtates wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territor/ 9f, for some reason, Washington found theresponses of Russia and 4hina deepl/ underwhelming, (neither for us or against us'. might it also suspect that the/ secretl/ were

in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps e#er so slightl/. the chances of a ma?or e"change 9f the terroristgroup had some connections to groups in Russia and 4hina, or e"isted in areas ofthe world o#er which Russia and 4hina held swa/, and if Washington felt thatAoscow or 7ei?ing were placing a curiousl/ modest le#el of pressure on them, whatconclusions might it then draw about their culpabilit/


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2AC So"+en &


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Spi""o+er

FISA reform reates more e e ti+e re+iew o+er s$r+ei""an ewit%in t%e "ower o$rts an' pro+i'es o%eren e wit%in t%e

$'i ia" s&stem: Nea" 15 ; =regor/ AcNeal, J 3 , Ph 3 , 5ssociate Professor of


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So"+en & :e %anism


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Re+ita"i es Competition


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:e'ina So"+es


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C%ina A'' (nS9$o s$r+ei""an e po"i & a""ows C%ina to $stif& prote tionistmeas$res w%i % intensi7es on *oin* ?S-C%ina tensionsCastro an' : $inn 15 (3aniel, #ice President of the 9nformation Technolog/and 9nno#ation :oundation and 3irector of the 4enter for 3ata 9nno#ation, 5lan,7e/ond the & 5 :reedom 5ct% Dow & ur#eillance till ub#erts &4ompetiti#eness', June *+I, http% www itif org *+I-be/ond-usa-freedom-act pdf.

Protectionist policies in 4hina ha#e further strained the & tech industr/ 9n Januar/*+I, the 4hinese go#ernment adopted new regulations that forced companies thatsold e8uipment to 4hinese ban2s to turn o#er secret source code, submit toaggressi#e audits, and build encr/ption 2e/s into their products ML While ostensibl/an attempt to strengthen c/bersecurit/ in critical 4hinese industries, man/ westerntech companies saw these policies as a shot across the bow tr/ing to force them outof 4hina6s mar2ets 5fter all, the 4hinese go#ernment had alread/ launched a de-9$!' mo#ement;9$! stands for 97A, $racle and !A4; to con#ince its state-ownedban2s to stop bu/ing from these & tech giants MF To be sure, the 4hinesego#ernment recentl/ halted this polic/ under & pressure )* Dowe#er, the haltedpolic/ can be seen as a part of a "ar*er "as% between 4hina and the &nited tateso#er trade and c/bersecurit/ 9ndeed, these proposed barriers were in part a 8uidpro 8uo from 4hina, after the &nited tates barred Duawei, a ma?or 4hinesecomputer ma2er, from selling its products in the &nited tates due to the fear thatthis e8uipment had bac2 doors' for the 4hinese go#ernment )+ ince the nowdenre#elations essentiall/ ga#e them co#er, 4hinese lawma2ers ha#e openl/ called forthe use of domestic tech products o#er foreign goods both to boost the 4hineseeconom/ and in response to & sur#eillance tactics This s/stem of retaliation hasnot onl/ led to a degradation of business interests for & tech companies in 4hina,but also disrupted the dialogue between the & go#ernment and 4hina onc/bersecurit/ issues )


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customers could certainl/ decide to switch their data pro#iders for greater pri#ac/protection impl/ put, the rep$tationa" %arm %a' a 'ire t impa t onAmeri an ompanies3 ompetiti+eness ;some estimate that it has cost &tech 0rms +L* billion thus far + 3efenders of the programs ma/ argue that thenowden allegations are o#erblown or that foreign companies are ?ust using the

re#elations for their own protectionist purposes 7ut it doesn6t matter if theallegations are actuall/ true because the global public belie#es them to be true, andthe/ are therefore real in their conse8uences 9n man/ wa/s, the nowdenre#elations ha#e created a sense of betra/al among 5merican companies omehad been pro#iding information to the N 5 through e"isting legislati#e means either under ection +I of the & 5 Patriot 5ct,+M or under ection B* of the :9 55mendments 5ct (:55. +) 9t was unsettling to read stories that, outside of thisstatutoril/ compelled cooperation, the go#ernment had been getting access to hugeamounts of their data in other unauthorized wa/s 5s one tech emplo/ee said, thebac2 door ma2es a moc2er/ of the front door '


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C"o$' Comp$tin*

E$t e pansion isn3t possi)"e )e a$se Ameri an )$sinesses "oo# "i#e .pawns/ of t%e ?SF;,spe i7 a""& $n'ermines "o$'omp$tin* an' mer*ers an' a 9$isitionsSensen)renner 1> (Jim, chair of the Douse Judiciar/ ubcommittee on 4rime,

Terrorism, Domeland ecurit/ and 9n#estigations, The N 5 o#erreach poses aserious threat to our econom/', No#ember * *+M,http% www theguardian com commentisfree *+M no# * ?im-sensenbrenner-nsa-o#erreach-hurts-business.

The o#erreach b/ the National ecurit/ 5genc/ (N 5. does more than infringe on5merican ci#il liberties 9t poses a serious threat to our economic #italit/ Reportsfrom the business communit/ are clear% indiscriminate collection of data b/ the N 5damages 5merican companies growth, credibilit/, competiti#e ad#antage and

bottom line & companies see2ing to e"pand to lucrati#e mar2ets in !urope and5sia will 0nd regulator/ en#ironments much less recepti#e to mergers andac8uisitions because of N 5 programs =erman regulator/ oGcials ha#e made itclear, for instance, that 5THT, a massi#e 5merican telecommunications compan/that pro#ided customer telephone numbers to the N 5 as ordered b/ the :oreign9ntelligence ur#eillance 4ourt (2nown as the :isa court., would undergo intensescrutin/ to ensure it complies with =erman pri#ac/ laws before it can ac8uire a=erman telecommunications compan/ This mandate would certainl/ impede eEortsto e"pand its presence in the region $f course, & tech companies do not e"ist in a#acuum, free from competition 4ompanies li2e =oogle, which e"hibit cleardominance in the &nited tates, compete intensel/ with foreign competitors around

the world 5merican businesses will lose considerable mar2et share if foreigncompetitors and regulators paint them as pawns of t%e ?S inte""i*en eomm$nit& 4isco /stems warned that its re#enues could fall b/ as much as +*because of the le#el of uncertaint/ or concerns engendered b/ N 5 operations4isco saw its new orders fall b/ + in the de#eloping world, I in 7razil and M*in Russia This is in contrast to the L growth 4isco saw in the pre#ious 8uarter Thecloud computing industr/ will also suEer ince man/ in'$stries re"& %ea+i"& ont%is te %no"o*& , an/ disruption would ripple across all segments of the nationaleconom/ 5ccording to the 9nformation Technolog/ and 9nno#ation :oundation, the& cloud computing industr/ could lose between and MIbn (pdf. o#er the ne"tthree /ears because of the N 5 s o#erreach 5nd smaller cloud ser#ice pro#iders

that partner with & companies ha#e alread/ cancelled contracts


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FISA Ine ien ies In rease


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Information (+er"oa' Now

Information o+er"oa' is o $rrin* wit%in ?S s$r+ei""an e now ma#es o$nterterror "ess e e ti+e:$e""er an' Stewart 14 John Aueller, 3epartment of Political cience $hiotate &ni#ersit/, Aar2 tewart, enior :ellow, 4ato 9nstitute, ecret without Reasonand 4ostl/ without 5ccomplishment% Uuestioning the National ecurit/ 5genc/6sAetadata Program', p +*-+

Important in t%is %a+e )een in reases in inte""i*en e an' po"i in* as t%e9$estin* enterprise= entra" to w%i % is t%e NSA= ontin$es to )ee pan'e'= sear %in* for t%e nee'"e )& a''in* more an' more %a& 9n the process,information %as )een fo"'e' into a .


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:i''"e ast :o'e"in* A'' (nict among political parties, which constitutional courts are called uponto resol#e The process of appointing ?udges is central to establishing or reforming a constitutional court The ?udicial appointments

process determines who will interpret the constitution This report in#estigates how constitutional courtappointment procedures can be designed to promote both ?udicial independenceand ?udicial accountabilit/ to a democraticall/ elected go#ernment The fact thatconstitutional courts cannot a#oid ad?udicating disputes with partisan dimensions logicall/ suggests that political actors should pla/a role in selecting constitutional court ?udges 9n#ol#ing a wide range of political actors in the appointments process fosters a broadsense of political in#estment in the court, so that all actors ha#e an incenti#e to continue supporting the court e#en when the/ areon the losing side of its decisions 5nother reason to in#ol#e a broad #ariet/ of political actors in the appointment process is thatalthough ?udges stri#e to interpret the law fairl/ and i ssue impartial decisions, the/ are onl/ human, and a ?udge6s political ideolog/will naturall/ pla/ some role in how he or she #iews the law The appointments process should be designed to stri2e an appropriatebalance between the constitutional court6s independence (insulating the court from political interference. and its need to beresponsi#e to the democratic societ/ in which it operates This report refers to this balance as relati#e ?udicial independence 9n the

A!N5 region, t%e e e $ti+e %as %istori a""& 'ominate' onstit$tiona" o$rtappointments (ften= t%e e e $ti+e ontro""e' )ot% appointments to t%eo$rt an' %an*es to t%e o$rt3s omposition= a''in* $'*es to a o$rt or

remo+in* t%em at wi""= w%i % *a+e it tremen'o$s in!$en e o+er t%eo$rt3s $'*ements Fai"in* to in+o"+e ot%er po"iti a" a tors inonstit$tiona" o$rt appointments 'ama*e' t%e o$rt3s "e*itima & in t%ee&es of po"iti a" parties an' t%e *enera" p$)"i , and constitutional court decisions oftenprotected the interests of the e"ecuti#e or the small group of elites that formed the court !#en in the midst of the 5rab pring,man/ of the newl/ formed constitutional courts in the region continu

fisc reform affirmative - northwestern 2015 6ws (1)

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