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GUANGDONG HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS

MODEL UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

2017

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

FIRST COMMITTEE

6th -7th October 2017

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General Assembly: The Disarmament and International Security Committee

(DISEC)The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) was the

first committee established by the United Nations General Assembly, tasked with the

UN’s founding purpose: preventing another world war. DISEC has, over the 71 years

of the existence of the General Assembly, discussed topics concerning the prevention

of the proliferation of arms, the resolution of regional conflicts, the settlement of

border disputes, and much more.

Because of the sensitive nature of DISEC’s purview, it is often considered both the

most influential and the most contentious committee of the General Assembly.

DISEC is as relevant today as it ever has been. Multiple states are on the verge of

becoming new nuclear powers, and the international norms and statutes preventing the

usage of weapons of mass destruction are being stressed, tested, and questioned.

Topic A: The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in South Asia

Introduction

Throughout the course of the history the issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction

(WMDs)s including Nuclear and Chemical Weapons in South Asia has been a very

significant one. India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, which was the first test of

its sort in South Asia. The strong arms race between India and Pakistan led to Pakistan

developing its nuclear weapons and thus conducting its first nuclear test in 1998.

Initially India also possessed a certain amount of Chemical Weapons but in 1992, after

signing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), India started a dismantling

program for its chemical weapons stockpile.

India has also ratified the Biological Weapons Convention and pledges to abide by its

obligations. In 1974, Pakistan also ratified the Biological Weapons Convention.

Therefore the issue of Biological Weapons remains of a lesser significance.

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However, India and Pakistan have not signed the NPT, which enhances the issue of

nuclear proliferation even more in the region. All other states within the geographical

boundaries of South Asia have signed the NPT.

Both India and Pakistan have frequently been through severe tensions since 1947

including three wars. Furthermore the issue of Kashmir and the disputed territories

between both the countries increase the problem even more. At various instances in

the history both of the countries have been at the verge of a nuclear war.

Both of the countries possess Second Strike capabilities and maintain huge stockpiles

of different types of nuclear weapons. India has declared a ‘no first-use policy’

whereas Pakistan maintains a ‘no first-attack policy’ which is even more problematic

in this case.

Pakistan refuses to adopt a "no-first-use" doctrine, indicating that it would launch

nuclear weapons even if the other side did not use such weapons first.

Indian officials also say that the main threat to national security comes from China,

not only from Pakistan. Thus, the Pakistani ballistic missile called Ghauri (1998) was

never introduced by India as a significant nuclear power of its neighbour, even though

it was adequate to reach New Delhi for example. It is clear that diminishing the

importance of the nuclear power of Pakistan, India wants to position itself as the rival

power of China. Also, Pakistan and China maintain close diplomatic ties for a long

time.1 Indeed, during the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict, China expressed its

support for a referendum in Kashmir, like Pakistan and contrary to what India wanted.

Hence, India continues to be concerned about the emergence of a Chinese threat,

considering the strong military and diplomatic bonds between China and Pakistan.

Adding the issue, the non-state actors within the region also pose a security threat.

The presence of terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, Taliban and Harkat-Ul-

Mujahideen within the region pose a risk to the security of the nuclear weapons.

History of the Problem

The history of WMDs in South Asia dates back to 1967, when India started its nuclear

program. It was the very first time any state in South Asia had access to a WMD

program which is why India did not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

in 1968. In 1974, India tested its first nuclear device, which was code-named as

“Smiling Buddha”. India called it a “Peaceful nuclear explosion” stating that it was

testing its nuclear program for the purpose of deterrence. India's pursuit of nuclear

weapons was first spurred by a 1962 border clash with China and by Beijing's 1964

nuclear test.

1 http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/06/17/commentary/world-commentary/china-india-battle-

nuclear-playing-field/#.WCIa_TdF0qY

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Pakistan's nuclear weapons development was in response to the loss of East Pakistan

in 1971's Bangladesh Liberation War. In 1972, under Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali

Bhutto, Pakistan started its nuclear program. Munir Ahmed Khan, Ex-President of the

Nuclear Reactor division at IAEA Vienna was appointed as the Chief of Pakistan’s

nuclear program, with the initial goal of completing the bomb by the end of 1976.

In the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Pakistan suffered a very heavy defeat from India,

losing an area of 56,000 sq. miles (Formerly known as East Pakistan. Now knowns as

Bangladesh) This defeat and such huge loss of territory led to Pakistan eventually

starting its nuclear program enabling it to compete in a nuclear arms race with its rival

India.

Throughout the course of the decade, various Pakistani scientists from all over the

world, particularly from International Research Centre for Physics in Italy joined the

program. The program was highly secretive throughout the time.

In 1998, India conducted its second nuclear test. Around 2 weeks later, Pakistan

successfully conducted its first nuclear test. The map above shows the Nuclear Test

sites throughout South Asia. Pakistan conducted its nuclear test in Ras Koh hills near

its border with Iran. Whereas India conducted its first nuclear test in Pokhran near its

border with Pakistan.

In 1999, Kargil War occurred between both the countries. It was feared that a nuclear-

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war may breakaway, as Pakistan had recently conducted its first nuclear test.

Furthermore, Pakistan doesn’t maintain a “no-first-use” policy, which increased the

threat of a nuclear war even more. During the period, Pakistan Foreign Secretary,

Shamshad Ahmad made a statement saying that Pakistan could use any weapon in its

arsenal during the war. The situation worsened when CIA received reports that

Pakistan was moving its warheads closer to the border with India. At that time, the US

President Bill Clinton tried persuading Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif against

any such actions.

The disputed territory of Kashmir has now and then been the cause of hostility

between Pakistan and India. It has also been the reason behind the wars of 1947, 1965

and the Kargil War of 1999. India has maintained control over the Jammu and

Kashmir area, whereas Pakistan maintains control over the Azad Kashmir region.

Thousands of people have died in the Kashmir Conflict, but no solution was ever

reached. The UNSC called for a referendum to be held in Kashmir, but until the date,

it has not been held.

The Line of Control (LOC) separates the Pakistani administered Kashmir from the

Indian administered Kashmir. Although no official statistics are available regarding

the matter, but it is rumoured that both Pakistan and India maintain 120-130 nuclear

warheads each.

Within the region, several non-state organizations are very active, including the

terrorist organization, Lashkar-e-Taiba, which operates several training camps for

militants all over Kashmir. With the existence of such organizations in such a hostile

region, the threat of security risks increases even more. The security of the Nuclear

Programs of India and Pakistan are also at risk.While Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan claimed

that Pakistan’s nuclear program is the most secure in the world, there is always a

threat of these non-state actors gaining access to these weapons.

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Statement of the Problem

Proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the most important issue and is at the very

heart of the international political agenda. At the present time and despite prevention

and control arrangements, two regions require debating: the Middle East and Asia.

The United Nations Security Council and IAEA concerns are numerous: Iranian

nuclear weapons development, North Korean nuclear tests and its consequences in the

Sea of Japan, the growing power of China, and other tensions such as the ones just

mentioned between Pakistan and India. In Asia, theories of deterrence and

proliferation effect political realities: we can call it the “security dilemma”.2 Indeed,

once a country develops its nuclear arsenal, its neighbour increases its own nuclear

capacity as well: China’s nuclear arsenal is real and is seen by India as a threat, so

India acquired nuclear weapons.3 As a consequence, Pakistan developed its nuclear

capabilities4. Also, DPRK declared possessing nuclear weapons in 2005.

Even if the nuclear build-up by Pakistan and India is a classic nuclear dissuasion, the

international community feels concerned about this region’s stability. However, some

believe that proliferation in Asia is due to the will of these countries to strike a better

balance of power.5 Therefore, the Chinese, Indian and Pakistani increasing nuclear

arsenal can be seen as stabilizing factor in a region where 40 per cent of the global

population live. India and Pakistan have created a group of experts that meets

regularly for the harmonization of New Delhi and Islamabad positions. Even if this

situation is not ideal especially because they have not signed the NPT, it ensures a

certain strategic stabilization.

Areas of tension are multiple: Pakistan and India had a common history (until the

partition in 1947), the border is close to Pakistani vital centers, and there are recurring

boundary disputes (Kashmir for example).6

The P5 members of the Security Council have attempted to ensure that Article 1 of

the NPT will be respected, and especially within these Asian countries. The first

article of the Non-Proliferation Treaty states that “each nuclear-weapon State Party to

the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or

other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices

directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-

2 http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/solving-the-northeast-asia-security-dilemma/ 3 https://asialyst.com/fr/2016/08/02/inde-le-programme-nucleaire-cible-contre-la-chine-pas-contre-le-

pakistan/ 4 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/indias-mighty-nuclear-weapons-program-aimed-

china-pakistan-11956 5 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

co/hotcontent/index.html?section=world/asia/eastasia/northkorea 6 http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/dossiers/inde-pakistan/cachemire.shtml

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nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other

nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.”7

However, India and Pakistan did not sign the treaty, so these countries are under no

legal obligation.

After the 1998 nuclear tests by India, both India and Pakistan rejected the idea of

signing the NPT. Thus, these countries went against the UNSC resolution taken the

same year about international security, demanding in Article 3 of the resolution to

India and Pakistan to “refrain from further nuclear tests and in this context calls upon

all States not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear

explosion in accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty”.8

The international community feels concerned not only about the fact that India and

Pakistan possess an important nuclear arsenal, but also the security measures of these

materials are not sufficient enough, nor satisfactory. Indeed, even if the NTI index

2016 (Nuclear Threat Initiative index) shows that improvements have been noticed

especially by India, the country still lacks an independent regulatory agency.9 Even if

the IAEA Additional Protocol has been set up in India, many efforts needs to be done.

Also, the unstable Pakistani political environment is a major regional concern, even if

efforts have been undertaken, particularly to prevent the theft of nuclear materials.

Moreover, Pakistan has not implemented the Additional Protocol of IAEA.

The situation is still more worrying because of the tensions between Pakistan and

India. The NTI index attests that South Asia is the most likely region for “the first

Post-Second world war use of nuclear weapons”, especially because of the border

conflicts in Kashmir. As History has shown, these two countries have already gone to

war with each other four times (1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999).

Current Situation

While five countries with nuclear weapons are trying to reduce or maintain their

nuclear arsenal, three others continue to increase theirs. Indeed in one of its reports,

the International Peace Research Institute Stockholm (SIPRI) explained that China

has now 250 nuclear warheads whereas they had 240 in 2012, Pakistan 100 to 120

against 90 to 110 and India increased the number of its warheads by 20%.10

Institutes such as SIPRI judge the peace in South Asia as fragile, and this arms race is

7 http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/text%20of%20the%20treaty.pdf 8 https://documents-dds

ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/158/60/PDF/N9815860.pdf?OpenElement 9 http://www.ntiindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/NTI_2016-Index_FINAL.pdf 10 http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2013/06/03/chine-inde-et-pakistan-continuent-d-accroitre-

leur-arsenal-nucleaire_3422592_3210.html

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worrying the international community, mainly because of the growing tensions that

persist between India and Pakistan, the two Koreas, or even China and Japan.11 The

signatories of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) like Russia and the

United States of America have reduced their arsenals. France, the United Kingdom

and Israel remain at the same level. However, these are estimations. These statements

are more or less reliable depending on the country. For example, China is now such a

total opacity and Russia are showing less and less transparency.

Also, the reduction of the stockpile of nuclear weapons arms does not mean reducing

the nuclear threat. Shanon Kile, the coordinator of the nuclear research at SIPRI,

explained that "The long-term modernization programs in ongoing in these states

suggest that nuclear weapons are still a sign of the international status, and show that

nuclear weapons are power".12

Pakistan increases its military capabilities depending on what India does, India

increases its military capabilities depending on what China does, China increases its

military capabilities depending on what the United States does, and the US according

to its allies (including South Korea). That is what Greg Thielmann and David Logan

(two researchers at the University of Princetown) call « arms race vortex », a

dangerous chain reaction.

Bloc Positions

Both, Pakistan and India, face continuous pressure from the International community

regarding the issue of Nuclear Proliferation, as both of them are non-signatories to the

NPT. Furthermore, it was believed that Pakistan secretly assisted North Korea for

developing its own nuclear program.

China has always been a supportive ally for Pakistan’s Nuclear and Military

Programs. It can also be explained by China’s rivalry with India and the territorial

disputes between both of the countries. Beijing’s nuclear test was also one of the

reasons why India developed a nuclear program in the first place. Recently, China has

also started investing in the nuclear energy production program in Pakistan.

Russia has also been supportive of India’s nuclear program. There has always been a

historical military and nuclear cooperation between India and Russia. In 2009, another

nuclear deal was signed between both of the countries to set up two more nuclear

power plants in India for which Russia provided technical and financial assistance.

Recently in 2016, Russia also conducted a joint

Military exercise with Pakistan, making it the first time any such cooperation had

occurred between Pakistan and Russia.

11 https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2016/global-nuclear-weapons-

downsizing-modernizing 12 http://www.obsarm.org/spip.php?article276

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However, The US has always been a promoter of non-proliferation. The issue always

been a very controversial topic between both of the countries. In fact, in 1999 after

Pakistan’s first nuclear test, the relations between Pakistan and US were heavily

strained.

In 2005, US and India signed a Civil Nuclear Cooperation deal to separate India’s

military and civil nuclear programs and to place its civil nuclear program under IAEA

safeguards, whereas in return the US agreed to cooperate for the further development

of the civil nuclear program.

In 2008, France also signed a civil nuclear cooperation deal with India for the

development of nuclear energy in India. France provided technical and financial

assistance, according to the deal. In 2009, France signed a deal with Pakistan known

as the France-Pakistan Atomic Energy Framework under which France promised to

provide more security to Pakistan’s nuclear energy program. Pakistan and France also

agreed upon mutual collaboration for nuclear safety and security. Critics have

compared this deal to India-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation deal. France has also been

one of Pakistan’s biggest military contractor despite its good relations with India.

Questions A Resolution Must consider

• What role can DISEC play in addressing the issue of Nuclear Proliferation in South

Asia?

• How can Pakistan and India ensure the safety and integrity of their individual

nuclear programs from the hands of non-state actors and organizations within the

regions?

• What role should the international community play in addressing the Kashmir

Conflict?

• How can China play an important role in ensuring stability in the South Asian

region?

• What new mechanisms and agreements need to be formulated to promote nuclear

disarmament in South Asia?

Sources

Asialyst, “Le programme nucléaire cible contre la Chine pas contre le Pakistan”,

August 2016, Asialyst

H. PANT Harsh, “China and India battle on nuclear playing field”, June 2017, The

Japan Times

JIMIN Chen, “Solving the Northeast Asia security dilemma”, May 2013, The

Diplomat

Le Monde, “La Chine, l’Inde et le Pakistan continuent d’accroître leur arsenal

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nucléaire”, June 2013, Le Monde

SIPRI, “Global nuclear weapons downsizing modernizing”, June 2016, SIPRI

The Washington Post, “North Korea declares itself as a nuclear power”, February

2005, The Washington Post

NTI 2016 Index, Building a framework for Assurance, Accountability and Action,

January 2016, Nuclear Security Index

Non Proliferation Treaty, July 1968

Topic B: Combating the Threat of Islamic State Sleeper Cells

Introduction

Over the past three years, the world has faced an immense security threat from the

Islamic State (IS). Numerous countries in the West and the Middle East have been

significantly affected by this threat.

One of the reasons why the threat is so grave is because of the unique way ISIS

operates. The organization commands a sizable amount of sleeper cells all over the

world. These sleeper cells are used to carry out attacks far beyond the reach of IS’s

conventionally-held territory. Reports suggest that in Continental Europe alone, IS

operates more than 20 individual sleeper cells comprising of more than 120 members

each.13

During the last years, these sleeper cells have been used to carry out attacks in Paris,

Brussels and other places in the world. The nature of these sleeper cells makes it very

hard for security organizations to cater to this threat. Most of these cells are only

activated a few days prior to the attacks. These sleeper cells only execute the

instructions of the masterminds of the attacks. Sleeper cells have extended to South

Asia and Southeast Asia as well. IS has claimed responsibility for various attacks in

Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh. In order to respond to this threat, continuing

multilateral security cooperation and intelligence is needed.

During the past years, security organizations throughout the world have focused on

defeating IS at its core, which includes destroying its strongholds in Syria and Iraq,

however the issue of sleeper cells is now of increasing importance.

In Europe, the ongoing refugee crisis has eased the spread of IS sleeper cells

throughout the continent. It has been reported that numerous IS trained fighters

disguised as refugees had been sent to Germany, France, and other European member-

13 http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/16/europe/europe-terrorism-threat/

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states.14 With such a large influx of refugees to the Continent, it has become

increasingly difficult to screen individuals for potential links with ISIS and other

terrorist organizations. Various IS sleeper cell members crossed through Turkey into

the Balkans and then further into mainland Europe. Furthermore, the potential visa-

free travel deal between Turkey and Brussels may render controlling the Schengen

Zone’s borders a nearly insurmountable task.

History of the Problem

The so-called Islamic State (IS) was established by ex-members of al-Qaeda in Iraq

(AQI) in 2013 upon the declaration of a new caliphate by self-declared caliph Abu

Bakr al-Baghdadi. The group’s ideology draws on theological writings of Salafist-

Islamist writers across the Muslim world --mainly Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and from

within the al-Qaeda network-- however it also represents a new stage in the evolution

of jihadist discourse. While al-Qaeda had never attempted territorial control, IS

explicitly sought to establish a Sunni Salafist caliphate which was territorially

contiguous, “remaining and expanding” to incorporate new ‘Emirates’ across the

Greater Middle East. IS thus differs from other religious extremist organizations in

that it has overt territorial ambitions, and thus more closely resembles a quasi-state.

This assertion is supported by the IS leadership’s actions within their captured

territory: establishing a pseudo-governmental bureaucracy in Raqqa in Syria, minting

a currency, levying taxes, etc.

Attacks perpetrated by IS sympathizers have thus far impacted almost every continent

on Earth. In the United States, two attacks by individuals pledging allegiance to IS

have occurred. The first was a shooting at an office complex in San Bernardino,

California in December 2015, which killed 14 individuals and wounded a number of

others. The attack was carried out by a radicalized husband and wife, who had

pledged allegiance to IS on social media before the shooting. The husband was an

American-born citizen and his wife was a lawful permanent resident of Pakistani

origin. The second attack occurred in June 2016 in Orlando, Florida, when a

radicalized American citizen, Omar Mateen, attacked a gay nightclub of which he had

frequently been a patron. Prior to the attack, Mateen declared himself a “fighter of the

Islamic State” on social media.

Europe has seen the three most striking examples of successful IS attacks outside of

conflict zones. Two attacks occurred in Paris, the first on the offices of satirical

newspaper Charlie Hebdo and the second on a series of cafes and concert halls in

Paris’s young and diverse 11th district. In both cases, the French GIGN (armed

police) killed the individuals involved, all of whom were French citizens, both

natural-born and naturalized. In Belgium in March 2016, bombers attacked the

capital’s international airport, killing dozens and themselves in the process. The

country has made serious changes to its internal security architecture since, as both

14 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-security-idUSKCN0VE0XL

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the attackers in Brussels and Paris used the western Bruxelloise suburb of Molenbeek

as a staging area for their cells. Since the attacks, residents of Molenbeek have

become some of Europe’s strongest voices against both harsh anti-immigrant

sentiment and religious radicalisation. In Germany, multiple isolated ‘lone-wolf’

attacks have occurred over the past year, some of which were perpetrated by German

citizens and some by refugees and migrants. Though some attacks have been linked to

sleeper cells, most were isolated incidents more closely associated with mental illness.

In Africa, IS-associated groups in Mali and Nigeria have been the deadliest islamist

groups outside the Syrian conflict. Though these militants cannot be accurately

described as “sleeper cells”, their existence nonetheless exemplifies the spread of

Salafist ideology across the globe.

In the Middle East, attacks committed by radicalised Syrian refugees and Kurdish

militants associated with multiple groups, including IS, have hit various locations in

Turkey. The most notable incident took place in Ankara in October 2015, where two

IS militants detonated explosive belts in the middle of a crowd of demonstrators,

killing well over 100 Turkish citizens. In a separate incident, an IS fighter detonated a

bomb in Istanbul near the Blue Mosque, deliberately targeting foreign nationals and

killing 13 German tourists.

In Asia, a pair of IS militants attacked a bakery in the Bangladeshi capital of Dhaka,

in an attack inspired by the attacks on a Jewish supermarket in Paris which occurred

in tandem with the Charlie Hebdo killings of 2015. When Bangladeshi security forces

retook the building, 20 hostages and 8 bystanders had been killed. In Quetta, Pakistan

in August and October 2016, IS militants attacked a hospital full of lawyers and a

police academy, respectively. The attacks together killed over 100 Pakistanis and

wounded 100 more. In the tribal areas of Pakistan’s northern provinces, the threat

posed by IS cells is often exacerbated by the ongoing conflict between central

authorities in Islamabad and the Pakistani Taliban.

Statement of the Problem

IS sleeper cells are a unique evolution of the threat posed by religious extremism for

two reasons: its unique organizational structure and its recruiting methods.

Unlike al-Qaeda, IS operates with an incredibly decentralized network structure. Al-

Qaeda commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan had tight control over their cells around

the world. Conversely, IS-central in Raqqa has only varying degrees of spotty contact

with its cells in other parts of the world. The organization operates more like a

franchise enterprise than a typical militant organization, thus complicating the tasks of

internal security agencies more accustomed to combatting opponents such as the IRA,

Tamil Tigers, leftist militants, or the PLO. In many cases, fighters are not part of any

formal network and may not even be in contact with IS itself. In such cases, ‘lone

wolf’ fighters plan and execute simple attacks, only linking themselves to IS and its

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ideology on social media or in suicide notes as part of their justifications or

manifestos. Often these individuals have little-to-no training, are typically poorly

educated on Islam and takfiri ideology, and more than likely have non-theological

motivations. Such was the case in the 2016 Orlando attack, where the gunman was

most likely motivated by a combination of social isolation, marital troubles, and

mental illness, and was never an extraordinarily or demonstrably religious individual

according to his associates interviewed by authorities. In fact, IS fighters, both in and

outside the Syrian theatre, have shown remarkably low levels of familiarity with the

Islamic religion in general when compared with the leadership of other organisations

such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda, many of whom were educated in theological

discourse to degree-level.

The result of these two loosely-constructed frameworks --ideology and control-- mean

that almost any violent act committed around the globe is open to ties to the Islamic

State, a link drawn either before the attack by its perpetrators or ex post facto by IS

media outlets. Many attacks by members of militant groups not officially affiliated

with the Islamic State, such as the Pakistani Taliban, have been appropriated after the

fact by opportunistic IS propagandists. The effect of this strategy is a sense of

relentless panic and despair instilled in target publics, a sort of apocalyptic feeling that

IS’s enemies are under siege while in reality most attacks have very little to do with

central authorities within the Caliphate’s territory. IS is able to capitalise on domestic

criminal activity in otherwise secure nations for its own branding and narrative

purposes. IS leadership’s repeated open calls for Muslims living in the West to attack

any and all civilian targets thus comes as no surprise, as it gives terrifying

significance to any act of violence of any magnitude committed by any Muslim

citizen of any Western country, adding to the IS narrative of civilisational conflict

between Islam and the West.

Islamic State’s decentralized system of sleeper cells creates an organization which is

hard to track and defeat, and which is extremely adept at taking advantage of

unrelated attacks for propaganda purposes. Even the world’s most experienced

security agencies --DGSÉ, FSB, CIA, MI5, BND- have struggled to keep up with the

dizzying rate at which IS can contact potential sympathizers through social media, far

from its online operators in Iraq and Syria. In fact, IS itself has internal security

organizations both involved in recruitment abroad and in control of its foreign-born

fighters. Most of the members of these intelligence-related organs are former

members of the mukhabarat, Saddam Hussein’s internal security service, and thus

were trained by Warsaw Pact agencies such as the KGB and the Stasi. When

confronting the threat of IS sleeper cells, the international community must adopt an

approach which draws upon methods from the fields of counterinsurgency,

counterterrorism, and counterintelligence.

Current Situation

Reports from IS defectors interviewed by European and American media and

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academics over the past year reveal the new evolution of IS strategy, one which is

aware of the group’s likely conventional military defeat by Iraqi and Kurdish security

forces (ISF, KRG). Immediately before the ‘13 November’ attacks in Paris in 2015, IS

leadership began turning away European recruits, telling them to leave Syria and

instead return to Europe and await instructions to attack European civilians. A number

of recruits, thinking they had come to Iraq and Syria to fight in the Syrian Civil War,

were disturbed by this, and began to speak with media such as the New York Times,

Der Spiegel, and Le Monde, as well as by academic institutions such as King’s

College London’s International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR). These

ex-recruits described a network of IS fighters, deliberately interspersed amongst

refugees transiting over land through Turkey and the Balkans, told to return to Europe

and begin organizing attacks. Raqqa likely does not have direct control over the

details of attacks carried out by these cells, instead opting to spread their assets as thin

as possible, hoping that at least a few of the IS cells will succeed, slip past security

agencies, and be able to carry out attacks.

Outside of Europe, IS still relies on its franchise network for global influence. IS

franchises are faring differently from region-to-region. While the Libyan franchise in

Sirte is still the group’s wing largest outside of Syria, its Nigerian and Afghan

affiliates are still in fighting form as well. This state of affairs will, however, not last,

given recent Nigerian military victories, American drone strikes in Afghanistan, and

the slow formation of alliances amongst Libyan tribes against their IS-affiliated

counterpart.

Bloc Positions

Combined Joint Task Force/Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR):

Beyond geographic blocs, it is worth noting the allegiance of certain states to the

coalition currently fighting IS forces in Iraq and Syria, as these states are more

directly invested in the conflict. By engaging the Islamic State militarily, these states

are also more likely to be targeted for attacks by IS fighters. The OIR member-states

kinetically engaged with IS are as follows: Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada,

Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Kurdistan

Regional Government, Latvia, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,

Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UAE, United Kingdom,

United States.

Europe: European states are particularly vulnerable to infiltration by sleeper cells for

a number of political, geographic, and socioeconomic reasons. Equally, the large

Muslim minorities present in many European states are particularly vulnerable to

radicalization, especially in states where these minorities are socioeconomically

marginalized. European states currently face a dual security threat both from the

violence of IS sleeper cells and nationalist hate crimes in response to high numbers of

migrants. These problems are further complicated by Continental European states’

open borders. The EU has thus focused on common border security agencies --led by

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Italy-- and intelligence sharing mechanisms --led by France and Belgium--.

Middle Eastern States: By proximity, these states are the most vulnerable to IS

sleeper cell formation, and main states such as Libya and Afghanistan have seen

organizations which started as small cells metastasize into fully-fledged ‘emirates’.

These states pursued highly varied approaches to the crisis, depending largely on

domestic factors such as the level of authoritarianism in government, the religious

sect of the state, the state’s religious plurality, the number of refugees accepted, and

the sympathies of the given state’s population for Salafist ideology. Middle Eastern

states, even those within the Arab League, do not form a contiguous bloc on such

issues relating to the Syrian Civil War. Notable divisions exist particularly in the

power struggle between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

Russia and Central Asian States: Moscow and the Central Asian republics which rely

on her for military assistance are highly concerned by infiltration from sleeper cells

given their large Muslim populations and histories of inter-religious violence in the

region. These states have taken hardline stances on internal security in an attempt to

combat ‘homegrown terrorism’ since the First Chechen War of the 1990s.

East Asia: Only China has become truly concerned by the prospect of domestic

terrorism resulting from allegiances to global jihadist movements, and with good

reason, given Beijing’s complicated relationship with its western provinces. China has

relied upon a combination of a security crackdown in western provinces and an

informational campaign to create a Han Chinese ethnic identity which transcends the

country’s diverse religious composition.

South Asia: All three major South Asian states --India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, are

gravely threatened by IS sleeper cells. All three states have strong nationalist,

separatist, and irredentist political factions, which when combined with allegiances to

a terrorist organization such as IS could prove threatening. Bangladesh was the victim

of an IS-aligned terrorist attack in 2016 in its capital which specifically targeted

foreign nationals.

Questions A Resolution Must consider

• What role can the General Assembly play in international coordination on

counterterrorism?

• How will the international community address the diffusion of ISIS affected by the

impending defeat of the group’s bases of operations in Syria and Iraq? Will the nature

of the group change moving forward?

• How do the solutions to combating radicalization differ from region-to-region?

• How should states treat citizens who travelled to fight for the Islamic State?

Sources

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