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Financial System Architecture Adap%ng to Systemic Concerns
Darrell Duffie Stanford University
Pacific Ins<tute for the Mathema<cal Sciences, Summer School
Economics and Mathema<cs of Systemic Risk and Financial Networks Vancouver, July, 2014
Capital and Liquidity Provision
ULTIMATE USER OF CAPITAL (ISSUER-‐BORROWER)
BANK
INVESTMENT COMPANIES (CLO-‐SPV, ETF, Mutual Fund, Hedge Fund, REIT, BDC, PE, VC)
UI
UI
UI UI
UI UI
ULTIMATE INVESTORS
UI
payment and
seXlement
underwri<ng
market making
hedging
credit provision with maturity transforma<on
Volcker boundary of U.S. banking system
other trading
Policy changes affec<ng market structure
• Bank capital and liquidity rules (Basel, stress tests) • Bank ac<vity limits (Volcker) • Deriva<ves market compe<<on and transparency • Collateral, central clearing, counterparty limits
• Monetary policy (ZLB, LSAP, RRP)
Frac<on of U.S. Private Credit Provided by Banks
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0% 1952
1955
1958
1961
1964
1967
1970
1973
1976
1979
1982
1985
1988
1991
1994
1997
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
Data Source: Federal Reserve, BIS, adjusted for breakpoints
D1 D2
D3
asset manager
U5
U6 U3 U4
U2 U1
asset manager
U1
U3
U2
U5
U6
U4
U5 U3
U6 U2
U4
U1
E D E
OTC (dealer as principal)
direct exchange
agency intermedia7on
Secondary Market Architecture
D1 D2
D3
U5
U3
U4
asset manager
U1
U2
OTC mul7lateral trading facili7es (swap execu7on facility, bond trading pla>orm)
Hybrid OTC Market Approaches
TF
TF TF
CCP
A B
C
100
90 80
A B
C
CCP
10 20
10
Central Clearing
A B
C
100
90 80
A B
C
100 100
10
CCP1
CCP2
90 80
CCP Default Management Waterfall
Failed member margin and default fund contribu<on.
Surviving members default fund contribu<ons.
More CCP capital.
Replenishment contribu<ons to default fund.
Payment to surviving members to accept failed swaps
CCP capital.
Selected Sources • The Clearing House, “Central Counterpar<es: Recommenda<ons to
Promote Financial Stability and Resilience,” December 2012. • CDS Default Management Working Group, “Principles and Best Prac<ces
for Managing a Defaul<ng Clearing Member’s Remaining Porjolio and Shorjall in Available Funds,” January, 2011.
• CommiXee on Payment and SeXlement Systems, Board of the
Interna<onal Organiza<on of Securi<es Commissions, “Recovery and Resolu<on of Financial Market Infrastructures,”Consulta<ve Report, July 2012.
• Duffie, Darrell and David A. Skeel (2012)A Dialogue on the Costs and Benefits of Automa<c Stays for Deriva<ves and Repurchase Agreements.”
• EllioX, David “Central Counterparty Loss-‐Alloca<on Rules,” Bank of England, Financial Stability Paper Number 20, April 2013.
Selected Sources, con<nued
• “Applica<on of the Key AXributes of Effec<ve Resolu<on Regimes to Non-‐Bank Financial Ins<tu<ons,” Consulta<ve Document, Financial Stability Board, August 2013.
• CommiXee on Payment and SeXlement Systems, Board of the
Interna<onal Organiza<on of Securi<es Commissions, “Recovery of Financial Market Infrastructures,” Consulta<ve Report, August, 2013.
• ISDA, David “CCP Loss Alloca<on at the End of the Waterfall,” August, 2013.
• Consulta<on on a possible recovery and resolu<on framework for financial
ins<tu<ons other than banks, EU Consulta<on Document, October 2012. • DIRECTIVE 2014/59/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL of 15 May 2014, establishing a framework for the recovery and resolu<on of credit ins<tu<ons and investment firms, Official Journal of the European Union, June 12, 2014.
BUYER (Cash investor e.g. MMF)
TRI-‐PARTY REPO
FACILITY
SELLER
(Dealer)
Cash
Securi7es
Tri-‐Party Repo
Cash
Securi7es
Tri-‐party Repo Clearing
S2 S1
S3
B1
B2
B3
TPR agent
Confirm Select Transfer Transfer trade collateral cash securi<es
SELLER e.g.
Tri-‐party repo environment
Trade
BUYER
Transfers
Cash Investor Accounts
Securi<es
Cash
Securi<es
Cash
Dealer Accounts
Tri-‐party environment
A systemic flaw
S2 S1
S3
B1
B2
B3
big complex bank
TPR facility
CPSS-‐IOSCO FMI Principle 9 “An FMI should conduct its money se4lements in central-‐bank money where prac<cal and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimize and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.” “One way an FMI could minimize these risks is to limit its ac<vi<es and opera<ons to clearing and seXlement and closely related processes.” (CHIPS)
$0
$20
$40
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
$160
$180
$200
$0
$20
$40
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
$160
$180
$200
7/17/08 7/31/08 8/14/08 8/28/08 9/11/08 9/25/08
Thou
sand
s
Thou
sand
s
Billions Billions Lehman Bankruptcy
US Treasuries and Strips
Source: Copeland, Martin, Walker (2011) FRBNY
Agency Debentures
Agency MBS
Non Fed-Eligible
Cash
Other Fed-Eligible
Lehman’s tri-‐party repo book
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
10/28 10/21 10/14 10/7 9/30 9/23 9/16 9/9 9/2 8/26 8/19 8/12 8/5 7/29 7/22 7/15 7/8
$ billion
s
Source: Duffie (2012)
Ins<tu<onal investment in prime money market mutual funds
September 2008 Run on Money Market Funds
HEDGE
FUND A
HEDGE
FUND B
DEALER BANK
(PRIME BROKER)
CASH AND
SECURITIES
INVESTOR
CASH SECURITIES
Prime-‐Brokerage
Morgan Stanley collateral received that can be pledged
($ billions)
Nov 05
798
877
Aug 08
Nov 08
294 283
Mar 09
953
May 08
Nov 07
948
Nov 06
942
Data Source: Singh (2009)
Morgan Stanley’s Liquidity Loss Sept. 12-‐22, 2008
$176.8 billion
$91.5 billion
$85.3 billion
Prime brokerage liquidity loss
� New York $44.8 billion
� London $17.6 billion
Conduit finance roll off ($8.8 billion)
Other ($3.4 billion)
Repo haircut widening ($4.0 billion)
Debt maturing/buyback ($5.4 billion)
Deriva7ves collateral loss ($7.3 billion)
Duffie (2011) Data source: Morgan Stanley-‐FRBNY FCIC disclosure
Prime Broker $56.4b
HEDGE
FUND
PRIME BROKER ONE
ASSETS
INVESTOR
CASH SECURITIES
Mul<ple prime brokers
PRIME BROKER
TWO
ASSETS
INVESTOR
CASH SECURITIES
HEDGE
FUND
DEALER BANK
(PRIME BROKER)
Cash and Securi7es
Prime-‐Brokerage Custodian
Who handles the bonds?
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Bond Fund+ETF Dealer Bonds Financed
Data sources. ICI: AUM, bond mutual funds + ETFs. FRBNY: primary dealer daily financing (securi<es out) of UST + agencies + MBS + corporate bonds (first quarter).
Assets (b
illion USD
)
How are REIT assets growing?
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Agency assets Repo liabili<es
Amou
nt (b
illion USD
)
Data source: Flow of Funds L127
Dealers and Hedge Funds
$-‐
$50.00
$100.00
$150.00
$200.00
$250.00
$300.00
$350.00
Fixed Income Hedge Fund AUM Dealer Corp Bond Inventory
Data sources. Dealer inventories: FRBNY (March). Fixed income hedge funds AUM (Barclay)
Asset level (b
illions)
Average daily bond market turnover
0
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
0.008
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Municipal bonds Corporate bonds
Daily volum
e/ou
tstand
ing (percent)
Data source: SIFMA
Average Daily Trading Volum
e ($ billions)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
US10YR MBS CORP
Data Source: Campbell, Li, Im (2014) BrokerTec: US10YR. TRACE: MBS 30yr FNMA TBA 3%, 3.5%, 4%. CORP 100 most traded IG.
Trading volume
UST10yr: Volume and Vola<lity
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
5/16/11
7/16/11
9/16/11
11/16/11
1/16/12
3/16/12
5/16/12
7/16/12
9/16/12
11/16/12
1/16/13
3/16/13
5/16/13
7/16/13
9/16/13
11/16/13
10YR-‐VIX VOLUME/4
Data sources: CME: UST10yr-‐VIX. BrokerTec: UST10yr daily volume ($ billions).
Daily Average Volume: Interest Rate Deriva<ves
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
US-‐OTC US-‐EXCH UK-‐OTC
Daily average volum
e ( $
billions)
Data sources. BIS: OTC Triennial (April), U.S. exchanges Table 23A (March).
Amount x of safer asset
Amou
nt y of risk
ier a
sset Risk-‐weighted assets are limited by
available capital c.
Amount of safe assets
Amou
nt of risk
y assets The leverage rule could be distor<onary, by
penalizing safe assets rela<ve to risky assets.