final eco project

7/21/2019 Final Eco Project

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MALAD KANDIVLI EDUCATION SOCIETY’S

NAGINDAS KHANDWALA COLLEGE OF COMMERCE, ARTS AND

MANAGEMENT STUDIES AND SHANTABEN NAGINDAS KHANDWALA COLLEGE

OF SCIENCE

RE-ACCREDITED BY NAAC WITH ‘A’ GRADE &

ISO 9001:2008 CERTIFIED

A PROJECT

ON

“__________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

________________________________________”

In the subject Economics of Global Trade & Finance

SUBMITTED TO

UNIVERSITY OF MUMBAI,

FOR SEMESTER –I OF

MASTER OF COMMERCE

BY

Niyati Gala

103 - Management

UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF

Dr G. K. Kalkoti

YEAR - 2015 – 16



e-mail : [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. : 28072262 / 28085424Website : www.khandwalacollege.ac.in 28013433 / 28086427

Tele fax: 28650461

MALAD KANDIVLI EDUCATION SOCIETY’S

NAGINDAS KHANDWALA COLLEGE OF COMMERCE, ARTS ANDMANAGEMENT STUDIES AND SHANTABEN NAGINDAS KHANDWALA

COLLEGE OF SCIENCERE-ACCREDITED BY NAAC WITH ‘A’ GRADE &

ISO 9001:2008 CERTIFIED

Bhavishya Bharat Campus, S.V. Road, Malad (West), Mumbai – 400 064.

DECLARATION BY THE STUDENT

I, _____________________________________________________student of M Com Part-IRoll Number __________hereby declare that the project for the Paper Economics of GlobalTrade & Finance titled,

“ _________________________________________________________________________ ”submitted by me for Semester –I during the academic year 2015-16, is based on actual workcarried out by me under the guidance and supervision of Dr. G.K. Kalkoti.

I further state that this work is original and not submitted anywhere else for any examination.

Signature of Student

EVALUATION CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the undersigned have assessed and evaluated the project on“ _________________________________________________________________________ ”submitted by ___________________________________________Student of M Com Part-I.

This project is original to the best of our knowledge and has been accepted for Internal Assessment.

Internal Examiner External Examiner Principal

Dr G K Kalkoti Dr N Rajalakshmy Dr (Mrs) Ancy Jose

mailto:[email protected]


http://www.khandwalacollege.ac.in/

http://www.khandwalacollege.ac.in/





NAGINDAS KHANDWALA COLLEGE

Internal Assessment: Project 40 Marks

Name of the Student Class Divisio

n

Roll

Number

.

First name :

Father’s Name:

Surname :

M COM

PART I

Subject: Economics of Global Trade & Finance

Topic for the Project: Recent Trends in Global Trade

Marks

Awarded

Signatur

e

DOCUMENTATION

Internal Examiner

(Out of 10 Marks)



External Examiner

(Out of 10 Marks)

Presentation

(Out of 10 Marks)

Viva and Interaction

(Out of 10 Marks)

TOTAL MARKS (Out of

40)



PREFACE/ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

“Acknowledgement is an art, one can write glib stanzas without meaning a

word, and on the other hand one can make a simple expression of

gratitude”

I take the opportunity to express my gratitude to all of them who in some or

other way helped me to accomplish this challenging project in Company

Name, Location. No amount of written expression is sufficient to show my

deepest sense of gratitude to them.

I am extremely thankful and pay my gratitude to our college and my faculty

guide Dr. G. Kalkoti , Nagindas Khanwala College for their valuable

guidance and support on completion of this project in its presently.

I also acknowledge with a deep sense of reverence, my gratitude towards

my parents and member of my family, who has always supported me

morally as well as At last but not least gratitude goes to all of my friends

who helped me in my project directly or indirectly .



INDEX

SL.N0. PARTICULARS PAGE NO.

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

1.1 The global context

1.2 Recent developments in WTO negotiations

1.3 Bilateral free trade agreements with developing

countries

1.4 Climate change and trade

CHAPTER 2 – REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.1 Comparison of different sectors in global world

CHAPTER 3 – UNDERSTANDING OF CONCEPT

3.1 The Swiss context

3.2 Switzerland’s contribution in agriculture: implications

for developing countries

3.5 The liberalization of environmental goods and services

CHAPTER 4 – SUMMARY OF THE STUDY

4.1 Summary of topic

4.2 Conclusion

Bibliography

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Recent Trends in Global Trade



1. Introduction

We set out to review recent trends in world trade flows and international arrangements governing

economic integration and their potential implications for developing countries. In chapter 2, aftera short review of the impact of the 2008 economic downturn on the trade performances of

emerging economies and least developed countries, we assess the extent to which governments’

responses to the crisis have resulted in a protectionist backlash.

Chapter 3 focuses on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and recent progress in the DohaRound of trade negotiations, with a particular emphasis on the two main drivers of the talks,

namely market access in industrial goods and the reduction of agriculture subsidies and tariffs.

Given the prominence of the agriculture sector in low-income developing countries, the chapter

provides an in-depth analysis of the draft provisions designed to address their food security,livelihood and rural development concerns. It then proceeds to assess the value of envisaged cuts

in agriculture subsidies and tariff barriers in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development (OECD) countries and their likely impact on agricultural exports from developing

countries. In doing so, it focuses on the case of Switzerland as an example of a country which, inspite of gradual efforts to remove tariff protection and trade distortion, still maintains

proportionately one of the highest levels of agriculture support in the world.

Chapter 4 deals with bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs). It discusses intellectual

property rights provisions going beyond the minimum level of protection provided in the WTOand their possible consequences for public policies in areas such as access to medicine and

biodiversity management. The analysis concentrates on the case of FTAs between members of

the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and selected developing countries, not least

because some of them contain innovative anti-biopiracy provisions, which could create relevant

precedents in international negotiations on the relationship between intellectual property and biodiversity.

Chapter 5 aims to contribute to post-Copenhagen negotiations by providing information on the

most salient and pressing policy linkages between trade and climate change.

The concluding chapter offers suggestions on how the multilateral trading system might address

new policy challenges such as the proliferation of regional and bilateral agreements and possibletrade measures implemented as a response to climate change.

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The Swiss context

Switzerland has not been immune to the crisis. The Swiss Federal Department of Financedescribed the country’s trade performance in the first quarter of 2009 as the “worst resul t in

ages”. Exports declined by 13.3% in real terms, imports by 4.3% though 10.6% in nominal terms

(FDF 2009). Swiss imports from most developing country regions were not spared. Imports fromAfrica fell by 73.1% compared to the first quarter of 2008, although most of this was accounted

for by oil. Imports from Brazil fell by 14.8% and those from Latin America as a whole fell by

8.7%. Indian exports to Switzerland fell by nearly 9% and Korea’s decreased by over 30%.Exports from Asia as a whole were up, but much of the increase was due to some CHF 1.8

billion worth of gold ornaments, principally from Vietnam, to be melted down and recast.

As for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), they have never been a significant source of

imports for Switzerland. In the first quarter of 2009 imports from LDCs represented only 0.15%

of Switzerland’s total imports, in keeping with their share in recent years. That said, LDC

exports to Switzerland actually increased by 13.3% over the same period the year before, withBangladeshi textiles accounting for over half of the CHF 66.7 million worth of merchandise

imported. LDCs’ generally poor export performance is not due to tariff barriers since

Switzerland offers duty-free and quota-free access to all LDC exports. However, LDCs have not been able to take advantage of these considerable tariff advantages to boost agricultural exports,

principally due to their difficulty overcoming sanitary and phytosanitary requirements and other

non-tariff barriers, according to research by Christian Häberli, a former Swiss trade official(Häberli 2008). This has prompted observers to question the real value of current preferential

market access schemes provided by Switzerland.

The economic crisis has been accompanied by widespread fears of protectionism. Governments

facing heat over heavy job losses, the thinking goes, would come under tremendous pressure toerect barriers to trade. The Great Depression of the 1930s was marked by a spiral of trade protection and competitive devaluation, both of which served primarily to make people poorer

still. Heads of State from the Group of 20 (G-20) leading industrialised and developing nations

spoke to these concerns at their summit in Washington in November 2008, pledging to “refrain

from raising new barrier s to investment or to trade in goods and services” for 12 months (G-202008). But only a few months later the World Bank found that some 17 members of the G-20

had implemented measures that “restrict trade at the expense of other countries” (World Bank

2009c). Thus far, however, it seems that trade-restricting measures have been relatively modest

in scope. A March 2009 report by the WTO Director-General’s office found “no indication of animminent descent into high intensity protectionism involving widespread resort to trade

restriction and retaliation” (WTO 2009a, 1).

Switzerland did not figure in the report’s list of countries that took measures to either restrict or

facilitate trade. Its aid to the troubled bank UBS was mentioned, alongside a description offinancial sector bailouts undertaken by other governments. The Economist magazine, however,

suggested that Switzerland was guilty of financial protectionism. The country’s new leverage

restrictions for UBS and Crédit Suisse exclude domestic lending from calculations of capital,thus privileging it over foreign lending. This is part of a more general worldwide trend for banks






to lend more at home than abroad, in response to market and political pressures ( The

Economist 2009).

Despite the lack of cause for serious alarm, WTO investigations into countries’ trade policies

since autumn 2008 did find evidence of increased tariffs, new non-tariff measures and use of

trade remedies such as anti-dumping duties on imported goods. It warned of the risk of “anincremental build-up of restrictions that could slowly strangle international trade” and undermine

worldwide attempts to boost demand and restore growth (WTO 2009a, 1). Past downturns in the

1970s and 1980s were marked by such measures, and supposedly temporary subsidies and protective measures to protect jobs and businesses in fact took years to unwind, during which

they underwrote uncompetitive industries and sectoral overcapacity.



2. Literature review

If governments have not been scrambling to raise new barriers to trade, they have not exactly

been rushing to agree to new liberalization either. The Doha Round of trade talks at the WTOcontinues to languish, despite assorted governmental promises, including by the G-20, to bring

them to conclusion. This is understandable. Since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September2008 governments, particularly which of the US, have had more pressing preoccupations: saving

the financial system from a catastrophic breakdown and stimulating domestic economies mired

in a deep recession.

Within this grim context, however, the political circumstances for negotiated trade liberalisation

have become somewhat more propitious. For one, the crisis has shattered impressions that global

trade was flourishing without a Doha agreement, and thus there was no point making unpopularchoices to secure a trade deal. Meanwhile, as President of the US, Barack Obama has stepped

back from the trade-sceptic rhetoric he employed on the campaign trail, quietly dropping pledgesto renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and pushing Congress tomake the fiscal stimulus package’s “Buy American” clauses WTO-compliant. Ron Kirk, the new

US trade representative, has moved to re-engage with other countries on the Doha Round and

stressed that the Obama administration will be committed to open trade.

The new distribution of power in Washington should also simplify US trade politics. Relations

between the Congressional Democratic leadership and the current President are far better thanunder George W. Bush, increasing the chances that trade deals will secure law-makers’ approval.

Nevertheless, the Obama administration would need to win support for trade legislation from

some Republican members of Congress since several representatives from Obama’s own party

would be unlikely to support any trade agreement.

India, whose clash with the US over protections for developing country farmers helped doom aJuly 2008 mini-ministerial summit on the Doha Round, has also come out of the April-May

elections better positioned to pursue economic reforms. The Congress-led ruling coalition

substantially expanded its share of seats in the country’s parliament, meaning it will no longer bereliant on the fickle support of communist parties. Nevertheless, the government is also aware

that its gradual approach to reform and canny welfare spending over the past five years won it

votes. Dramatic shifts in policy may not be on the agenda. Finally, although the European

Commission will continue under Jose Manuel Barroso’s leadership, Brazil, one of the few vocalsupporters of the Doha Round, faces a political shake-up in its presidential elections in 2010.



Recent developments in WTO negotiations

For the third summer in a row, a push for breakthrough WTO accords on agriculture and

manufacturing trade at a mini-ministerial meeting in July 2008 ended in failure. However, themost surprising thing about the summit was not that it broke down but rather how close ministerscame to reaching an agreement. By WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy’s reckoning, they made

it “80-85% of the way” to “modalities” deals with formulae and figures for future subsidy and

tariff ceilings during the nine days of gruelling discussions, the longest such meeting in theWTO’s history (ICTSD 2008a). Of the some 20 issues in the talks related to agriculture and non -

agricultural market access (NAMA), Lamy indicated that positions had converged on 18.

Differences on the ease with which developing countries should be allowed to raise tariffs

beyond current legal limits to protect farmers from import surges under a “special safeguardmechanism” proved “irreconcilable”, Lamy conceded. The 20th issue, cotton, was never

discussed, to the irritation of African countries especially, some of which have seen already-

meagre earnings severely hit by the effects of US cotton subsidies in particular (ICTSD 2008b).

Since then negotiations among trade diplomats have moved slowly, while the unlikelihood of an

agreement forced Pascal Lamy to abandon plans to bring ministers back to Geneva in December2008 for yet another try at a deal on “modalities”, i.e. the formulae and figures for reductions and

exceptions that will determine countries’ future tariff and subsidy levels. While some members

envisaged the possibility of an “early harvest” (if it can be called early after over seven years ofnegotiations), under which agreements would be reached and implemented on individual issues

potentially including trade facilitation, duty-free and quota-free access for LDC exports, cotton

subsidy and tariff cuts, and banana trade, nothing concrete has emerged yet from this process.

The negotiations on industrial goods

In the NAMA negotiations the principal division is over so-called sectoral liberalizationinitiatives, i.e. proposals to eliminate or deeply cut tariffs across entire industrial sectors ranging

from bicycles, motor vehicles and auto parts to chemical products, electronics, forestry products,sports equipment and toys. To compensate for what they see as weak levels of overall tariff

reduction for developing countries, industrialized nations like the US, Canada and Japan want to

be sure that major markets like China, Brazil and India will participate in some sectoral

liberalization initiatives.

But the negotiating mandate explicitly states that participation in such initiatives is “non-mandatory”, a point on which the targeted developing countries have been adamant. The

governments of the fast-growing markets are willing to commit to no more than a discussion of

how a sectoral approach might work in terms of product coverage, exceptions and future tarifflevels for developed and developing countries. Proponents of sectoral initiatives are eager to

secure the participation of larger developing countries, especially China, for two reasons. First,

countries that together account for a high proportion of total world trade would need to sign on

for the extra tariff cuts to kick in. Second, even if a sectoral initiative managed to get off the









ground without China, Chinese exporters would benefit from low tariffs elsewhere without being

comparably exposed to international competition.

The draft negotiating text, released in December 2008 by the chair of the negotiating committee,

recognizes the conflicting objectives. But US manufacturers were unimpressed with the

committee’s proposal to simply have countries commit to negotiate the terms of how a particularinitiative would operate, with participation remaining optional. The sharpness of the

disagreement obscures how much differences have narrowed on what were previously thought to

be the central aspects of the negotiations: the “coefficients” linked to the formula that willdetermine the future tariff levels of most major economies and the figures governing the extent

of “flexibilities” for developing nations to shield some products from full duty cuts.

1 When fed through the so-called Swiss reduction formula, all of a country’s tariffs are slashed

to.

2 Developing countries opting for a coefficient of 20 would be allowed to subject 14% of tariff

line

As per the terms of a compromise suggested by Pascal Lamy during the July mini-ministerial

meeting, the text provides for the industrialized country coefficient to be eight.

For the 30-odd developing countries that would have to apply the tariff reduction formula there

is a three-option “sliding scale”, i.e. the higher the coefficient they choose, the less freedom theyhave to shelter products from tariff reduction.

In the negotiations Switzerland has pushed for relatively deep tariff cuts and is a co-sponsor of

sectoral initiatives on chemical sector products, forest products, gems and jewellery, health care products, industrial machinery and sports equipment. Switzerland’s tariffs on manufactured

goods are generally quite low and thus do not stand to be heavily affected. However, a WTOsecretariat review of Swiss trade policy found that most favored nation (MFN) tariffs on textilesand clothing products remain relatively high, averaging 12.8% on cordage and 9.1% on made-up

textile goods. Used clothing faced an applied tariff of 45% (WTO 2008a). These would be cut to

below 8% by a Doha Round deal along the terms outlined above, i.e. a 9.1% tariff would be cutto 4.25% by a coefficient of eight.

The agriculture negotiations

\

According to the text that was released by the chair of the WTO agriculture negotiations on 6December 2008 (WTO 2008b), the US would cut its agriculture trade-distorting subsidies by

70%, to roughly USD 14.4 billion, while the European Union (EU) would make cuts of 80%, to

around EUR 22 billion. However, along with other WTO members, both would be allowed tomaintain and even increase billions of dollars of “green box” subsidies if such payments cause

not more than minimal trade distortions. In the area of cotton subsidies reduction, a long-






standing issue of importance for West African countries, delegates remains in the dark about

possible US concessions. In the absence of counter-proposals, the text still reflects the cuts put

forward by the “cotton 4” African producers (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali). Some tradesources have suggested, however, that recent Democratic victories in the US congressional and

presidential elections may leave the US more room to man oeuvre on this issue.

As shown in table 1, in terms of tariff cuts developed countries’ highest tariffs would be reduced

by up to 70%, although the numerous opt-out clauses envisaged in the text such as for “sensitive

products” might result in only limited cuts and quota expansion for products of key importanceto developing country exporters such as beef, dairy and sugar. Developing countries would make

cuts of up to 46.7% on tariffs higher than 130%.

Table 1: Tariff cut formula

Source: WTO (2008b).

3 Up to 5% of tariff lines may be exempted from cuts, but the overall average cut shall, in any

case

Additional flexibilities were also granted to small and vulnerable economies and Net Food-

Importing

However, they would be allowed to select a limited number of tariff lines as special products(SPs) on the basis of food security, livelihood security and rural development criteria and apply

gentler tariff cuts on those products. This concept, introduced by a coalition of developing

countries called the Group of 33 (G-33), comes from the recognition that opening markets to

competition from cheap and often highly subsidized foreign agriculture imports may affect thelivelihood of small and resource-poor farmers, particularly in countries where agriculture still

accounts for a large share of gross domestic product (GDP) and employment. The chairperson of

the agriculture negotiations, Ambassador Crawford Falconer, proposed draft modalities,

according to which developing countries will be entitled to self-designate 12% of theiragricultural tariff lines as SPs, guided by an illustrative list of indicators of food security,

livelihood security and rural development. For recently acceded members, including China and

Vietnam, the maximum entitlement is 13%.

These numbers reflect a compromise between the G-33 position, which asked that 20% ofagricultural tariff lines be subject to the SP exemption, and the US position, which proposed to

limit SPs to five tariff lines.

https://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/143/img-1-small580.png



From a development perspective, the SP concept raises two important questions: (i) how to

define products that play an important role from a sustainable livelihood perspective? (ii) what

would be an appropriate number of tariff lines? A series of studies undertaken by theInternational Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) in nearly 20 countries has

provided some empirical evidence on both questions. These studies used a set of food security,

livelihood security and rural development indicators similar to those provided in Falconer’s text.They also took into account a series of trade variables including existing levels of tariff protection and import vulnerability (ICTSD and FAO 2007).

Overall the studies identified more than 40 different product categories susceptible to being

categorized as SPs. While several of them were specific to one or two countries, figure 1 shows

19 were common to at least 25% of the studies.

Given the confidential nature of the studies, countries are represented by letters. The countries

Chicken was the most commonly identified product and was recommended as a potential SP by

94% of the studies, followed by rice, dairy products, bovine meat, sugar, maize, pork, potatoes,

vegetable oils and wheat. Not surprisingly, these are often products that receive the highest

amounts of subsidies in OECD countries. With respect to the number of agricultural tariff linesrepresented by SPs, the findings of the studies vary considerably, from 3% to 20%, reflecting

large disparities among developing countries related to the size of the economy or the level of

agricultural diversification. Figure 2 shows SP as a percentage of tariff lines for countries wheredata were available at the Harmonized System (HS) six digit level.5 Overall out of the 12

countries studied, four exceed the 12% limit envisaged in Falconer’s text.

Figure 1: Special Products Most Frequently Identified in ICTSD Studies

Source: ICTSD and FAO (2007).

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Figure 2: Special Product Tariff Lines as a Percentage of Total Agriculture Tariff Lines

Source: ICTSD and FAO 2007.














3. Understanding of concept

Switzerland’s contribution in agriculture: implications for developing countries

Since the introduction of the new Agriculture Act in 1999 legislative changes and funding forSwiss agriculture have been granted by parliament for four-year periods. For the 2008-11 period

Swiss agricultural policy (AP) 2011 aims to continue the shift from price support to de-coupled

payment, with a further reduction of 50% in market price support. The savings thus made will beused for direct payments, or non-trade-distorting subsidies in WTO parlance. All remaining

export subsidies for agricultural commodities are to be eliminated by 2010. Between 2008 and

2011 total expenditure on agriculture will amount to CHF 13,499 million (OFDA 2006). This is

more than the total amount of official development assistance (ODA) disbursed by Switzerland between 2003 and 2008.

As shown in figure 3, in spite of Switzerland’s gradual efforts to remove protection and tradedistortion, the country’s level of agriculture support remains proportionately one of the highest in

the world. The Producer Support Estimate, as calculated by OECD, suggests that support to

producers still amounted on average to around 50% of farm income in Switzerland (OECD2007). This figure represents the cost to taxpayers (who pay for the AP budget) and to consumers

(who pay more for their food). As illustrated in figure 3, while the share of producers’ income

coming from such support has declined, from 73% in 1990 to roughly 50% in 2007, this remains2.1 times higher than the average level of support in OECD countries. In this respect several

developing countries have argued that the high amount of support provided in Switzerland has

contributed to the overproduction of cheap, subsidized exports in the North, depressing world

markets and ultimately undermining developing countries’ productive capacities and investment

in agriculture.

Figure 3: Producer support estimated by country (in %)










Source: OECD (2007).

* EU-12 for 1990-94, including ex-GDR; EU-15 for 1995-2003; EU-25 for 2004-06; then EU-

27.

** Austria, Finland and Sweden are included in the OECD total for all years and in the EU from

1995. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic are included in the OECDtotal for all years and in the EU from 2004. The OECD total does not include the six non-OECD

EU member States.

The elimination of export subsidies

See Switzerland’s notifications to the WTO in document series G/AG/N/CHE/.

One of the main deliverables of the Doha Round may possibly be the total elimination of export

subsidies as the most trade-distorting kind of agriculture payments. Figure 4 shows the evolutionof Switzerland’s export subsidies by product as notified in the WTO since 1997 and reflects

significant cuts in the dairy sector where subsidies went down from nearly CHF 300 million in

1997 to less than CHF 13 million in 2007.6 As far as food aid is concerned, it is provided solelyin response to humanitarian needs and on full-grant terms. Overall it appears the total elimination

of export subsidies will not require any major effort from Switzerland, not least because AP 2011

already envisaged the elimination of such subsidies by 2010.











Figure 4: Swiss export subsidies (in CHF millions)

Reduction in domestic support

7 See Switzerland’s notifications to the WTO in document series G/AG/N/CHE/.

With roughly CHF 6 billion a year of support notified to the WTO,7 Switzerland provides

significant levels of domestic support and, in spite of conforming to Uruguay Roundrequirements, this amount has remained fairly constant over the last ten years, as shown in figure

5. Support to farmers includes green and amber box subsidies. Green box subsidies refer to non-or minimally trade-distorting subsidies. They are mainly provided through direct payments that

are de-coupled from production. They amount to roughly CHF 3.6 billion a year. Amber box

payments are linked to production and are expressed as aggregate measurement of support(AMS) in WTO parlance. In the case of Switzerland they essentially refer to market price

support. Overall nearly 40% of total support remains linked to production, which is slightly

lower than EU support but considerably higher than support in the US or Japan.

Figure 5: Swiss total AMS amber box and green box subsidies (in CHF millions)











Source: WTO Notifications.


The top five products receiving amber box support include bovine and swine meat, milk and

dairy products, poultry and wheat. As highlighted above, these products often play a critical role

in terms of livelihoods and food security in developing countries. As shown in figure 6, while the

removal of milk price control and the gradual elimination of the milk quota system havecontributed to improving the economic efficiency of the sector, support to bovine meat increased

substantially between 1998 and 2006.

9 OTDS is defined as the sum of AMS + de minimis (i.e. 10% of the average value of agriculture

product.

The latest text issued by the chair of the WTO agricultural negotiations indicates a 55% cut in

overall trade-distorting support (OTDS) and a 52% cut in AMS. These cuts will be implemented

from the Uruguay Round base level as opposed to current applied levels. Switzerland has notnotified the WTO of any blue box subsidies or de minimis measure. Thus, the total of its trade-

distorting support adheres to the form of amber box subsidies.




Figure 6: Swiss top five subsidized products (in CHF millions)

Current levels of AMS stand at around CHF 2.3 billion, far below the maximum of CHF 4.2

billion allowed under current WTO rules. This means a 52% cut in AMS will only imply limited

effective reduction in applied levels of amber box measures, as illustrated in figure 7. When oneconsiders OTDS, the limit envisaged under the current text is still higher than applied levels and

would in theory allow Switzerland to increase its OTDS compared to current levels. For these

reasons, proposed disciplines under current agriculture drafts will not result in significant cuts intrade-distorting domestic support in Switzerland and therefore are unlikely to effectively benefit

developing country exporters. If one takes into account the reduction in price support already

envisaged in AP 2011, Switzerland could even accept much deeper cuts in domestic supportwithout having to operate an effective reduction in its applied levels.

Finally, a reduction in the more trade-distorting types of supports will likely be accompanied byincreases in direct payments, or green box subsidies in WTO parlance. While such payments are

much preferable from a developing country perspective in the sense that they do not encourage

overproduction, most experts tend to agree that such payments still generate distortions, for

example by discouraging farmers from getting out of the business of production.

Figure 7: Swiss trade-distorting support (in CHF millions): implications of the Doha

Round




Source: Author’s calculation based on WTO Notifications.

Market access

10 Under WTO commitments, Switzerland has in fact 28 tariff quota commitments. But three

tariff quota

Agriculture has traditionally remained the most tariff-protected sector in Switzerland. Tariffs are

particularly high in the dairy sub-sector and on products such as poultry, beef, pork, onions,sugar, potatoes and grape juice, reaching over 1,000% on certain meat products. To further

complicate matters, 77.3% of bound agricultural tariffs are “specific tariffs” expressed in non advalorem terms (WTO, ITC, and UNCTAD 2008). This means they are not defined as a percentage of import prices but, for example, as a specific amount per ton. This makes

comparison with other tariff rates impossible unless specific tariffs are converted into ad

valorem equivalent (AVE). Finally, Switzerland applies tariff quotas on 26 product categories,including beef, pork, dairy products, eggs, vegetables, fruits and some cereals, covering a total of

287 tariff lines (WTO 2008a).

Under Falconer’s new text on draft modalities, developed countries will have to reduce their

tariffs by up to 70%, as described in table 1, with a minimum average cut of 54%. However,

WTO members will have the right to designate 4%, and in some cases such as Switzerland, even

6% of their tariff lines as sensitive products. These products will be eligible for gentler tariffreductions in exchange for quota expansion of up to 4.5% of domestic consumption. If, after

application of the tariff reduction formula, a member still has some tariffs in excess of 100%

outside its sensitive products, these would have to be reduced according to this cap, except forIceland, Japan, Norway and Switzerland, which might be allowed to maintain tariffs above 100%

for 1% of tariff lines in exchange for further quota expansion in sensitive products. This means

Switzerland will be able to apply less than full tariff reduction to up to 7% of its tariff lines (6%sensitive products plus 1% special entitlement for tariffs higher than 100%). If it decides to apply







these flexibilities to its highest tariff lines, it would be allowed to shield all tariffs higher than

275% from the full reduction formula.

43In practice most developing countries benefit from preferential market access conditions

through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), allowing them to pay lower tariffs than

those consolidated at the WTO. As mentioned above, LDCs even benefit from a duty-free/quota-free scheme similar to that of the EU, which allows them to export agricultural goods into

Switzerland at zero tariffs. This preferential margin is likely to be eroded by multilateral

liberalization efforts. At the same time non-LDCs might benefit from lower MFN rates, particularly on goods where tariff peaks prevent them from accessing the highly protected Swiss

market.

The last column in table 2 shows only the developing countries where exports of the product

analysis

Assessing the impact of possible tariff cuts on developing country exports is clearly beyond the

scope of the present paper. Table 2 provides, however, examples of tariff peaks applied to

products of actual and potential export interest to developing countries. For each product itshows existing bound tariff rates at the WTO expressed in AVE and the average preferential

rates paid by developed and developing countries on those products. The last two columns

respectively show the top developing country exporters to Switzerland, as well as countries thatmay not be currently exporting to Switzerland but have a high concentration of the analyzed

products in their agricultural exports and therefore have an interest in finding new market access

opportunities. This is the case for Botswana and Uruguay, for example, where exports in

boneless bovine cuts (HS codes 20130 and 20230) represent between 20% and 30% of theiragricultural exports (Ibañez, Rebizo, and Tejeda 2008).

While competitive agricultural exporters such as Argentina, Brazil, Thailand and even South

Africa appear as current and potential exporters in many of the products , it is interesting to notethat less advanced developing countries like Namibia, Swaziland, Bolivia, Peru and Guatemala

also have an interest in exporting more to Switzerland.

From a development policy perspective, therefore, the numerous caveats, exceptions andflexibilities envisaged in the Falconer text for developed countries might have the potential to

significantly dilute opportunities for new market access to developing country exporters resulting

from a Doha deal. Combined with the limited gains that these countries can expect fromreduction in domestic support, this explains why many developing members have been reluctant

to reduce their own agricultural tariffs, let alone accept ambitious cuts in industrial tariffs as

envisaged in the NAMA negotiations.



Bilateral free trade agreements with developing countries

Despite the financial crisis, Switzerland has continued to move forward in its pursuit of bilateral

FTAs, many of them with developing countries. In the absence of progress at the multilaterallevel, FTAs are often seen as a faster and more flexible way to secure preferential market access

in the South.

Together with Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein, its partners in EFTA, Switzerland is currently

negotiating trade agreements with Algeria, the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait,

Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) and India. Similar talks with Thailandstarted but are currently on hold. Agreements have already entered into force with Chile, Egypt,

Korea, Israel, Tunisia, Morocco and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). EFTA has

also explored negotiations with Albania, Indonesia and Malaysia. Negotiations with Peru have

been concluded, but the text is currently undergoing legal review before it can be formallysigned, paving the way for ratification. A similar agreement with Colombia was signed in late

2008. Despite calls from more than 30 Swiss non-governmental organizations to withhold

ratification, citing human rights violations in Colombia (Alliance Sud, Declaration de Berne, andGroupe de Travail Suisse-Colombie 2009), the Swiss parliament approved it in May 2009,

followed by the senate in September.

Alliance Sud, an umbrella group of Swiss development advocacy organizations, has been highly

critical of EFTA FTAs with developing countries, arguing that they are of dubious economic

value and could harm people in developing countries by raising drug costs and flooding theirmarkets with low-cost imports with which local businesses would be unable to compete. It has

also complained that the FTAs go well beyond WTO demands on issues such as tariff

liberalization and protection for intellectual property and foreign investment and could weakendeveloping country solidarity in WTO negotiations (Alliance Sud and Declaration de Berne

2008).

In general EFTA’s trade agreements cover a wide range of subjects, not all of which come under

the purview of existing WTO rules. Since most EFTA countries have heavily protected farm

sectors, agriculture usually receives special treatment, with each EFTA member negotiating farmtrade concessions separately. On industrial goods, the agreements largely phase out tariffs, albeit

with a longer adjustment period for developing countries. They also cover trade in services

(going beyond commitments locked in for all trading partners at the WTO), public procurement(either modeled on or going beyond the WTO’s plurilateral agreement on government

procurement), protections for foreign investors (often including the right of establishment) and

competition rules.






Intellectual property provisions in EFTA agreements12

This section is based on research and analysis by David Vivas-Eugui, ICTSD.

Intellectual property provisions in EFTA FTAs have evolved from a model that basically follows

the content and structure of NAFTA and the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of

Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to a model that contains very detailed provisions providingfor higher intellectual property protection standards than the minimum requirement of the TRIPS

Agreement, e.g. EFTA agreements with Chile, Egypt, Morocco, Korea and Colombia. These are

often referred to as FTAs containing TRIPS-plus obligations. More recently issues that fall

outside the scope of TRIPS, such as genetic resources and the promotion of research, technologyand innovation, are starting to arise, for example in the EFTA-Colombia agreement.

Baseline provisions

EFTA agreements establish a baseline through a series of general provisions and the subscription

and incorporation of several multilateral intellectual property agreements. They reaffirmobligations under the Paris, Bern and Rome Conventions and require parties to adhere to several

World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties, including the Nice and Budapest

agreements and that with the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants.Subscription to the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the Patent Law Treaty has also become an

obligation in recent models. Finally, the WIPO Internet treaties of 1996 have also been

incorporated in recent FTAs, e.g. with Chile and Egypt. With the exception of the first three

agreements, these treaties are not directly covered by the TRIPS Agreement and therefore imply

internal modification of patent, trademark, copyright legislation and administrative procedures.

TRIPS-plus obligations

In the case of the agreement with Canada no intellectual property provisions were included,

which

Specific obligations are usually found in a special annex, with the exception of the FTAs with

Canada and SACU. The annexes tend to cover a wide variety of intellectual property provisions

which, by nature, go beyond the minimum standards provided in the TRIPS Agreement (TRIPS- plus). This is particularly the case in areas such as patents, undisclosed information, copyrights,designs, geographical indications and enforcement.

With respect to undisclosed test data, the FTAs follow the basic TRIPS obligations but, instead

of reaffirming the protection against unfair competition, a period of exclusivity of five years for

pharmaceutical products and ten years for agrochemicals from the day of marketing approval isrequired. Test data protection has been heavily criticized as one of the TRIPS-plus provisions













that most affects access to medicines because such measures generate delays in the entry of

generic, and thereby cheaper, products. In order to balance these features, EFTA FTAs

incorporate a reference to the right of the parties to take measures to protect public health in lightof relevant WTO Declarations, Decisions and Amendments. This allows some level of coherence

with recent developments in the WTO on the TRIPS and public health front.

In the case of geographical indications the scope of protection has recently been expanded to

include both goods and services, whereas the TRIPS Agreement only covers goods. This reflects

the interest of the Swiss government in expanding the use of geographical indications to certainservices as a brand of quality. In the case of the Swiss financial services, for example, this

extension is applied both as a means of protection against unfair competition and as an

enforcement measure.

Finally, enforcement provisions have been emphasized in recent FTAs. They include stronger

corrective measures, inspection rights and border measures. This strengthening of enforcement

measures follows previous trends in US and EU FTAs, thus limiting application to counterfeitingand piracy.

New issues

The recent FTA between EFTA and Colombia contains several relevant new issues that were notcovered in any previous EFTA FTA. The most relevant is probably the section dealing with

“measures related to biodiversity”. This section constitutes without doubt a landmark towards

generating coherence and balance between intellectual property agreements and the Convention

on Biological Diversity (CBD). It recognizes the importance of existing obligations under theCBD, basic principles such as sovereign rights over genetic resources, as well as access and

benefit-sharing rights as reflected in national and international law. It also recognises thecontributions of indigenous peoples and their knowledge to economic and social development.More specifically, the parties to the agreement shall require, according to their national law, that

patent applications contain a declaration of the origin or source of genetic resources to which the

inventor has had access. Mentions of civil and administrative enforcement measures are also

incorporated.

A more detailed analysis can be found in Vivas 2009.

Overall this shows that it is possible to generate synergies between intellectual property

provisions and CBD objectives and principles without affecting the rights of patent holders. For

the first time it includes precise measures backed by enforcement provisions in an FTA. Beyondthe unclear economic value of such provisions, the precedent they create could be used as a

reference in other bilateral and multilateral negotiations addressing biodiversity and intellectual

property issues.






Climate change and trade

The global effort to address climate change requires a fundamental transformation of our

economies and the ways in which we use energy. Internalizing the cost of carbon will have deep-seated effects on what we produce, how we produce it and on what we trade. In the aftermath of

the Conference of the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC) in Copenhagen in December 2009 trade and trade-related issues have emerged as akey element of the trade-offs required by climate change considerations. This chapter provides

information on the most salient and pressing policy linkages between trade and climate change.

Switzerland does not address climate change with a unique policy, but rather with a combination

of economic instruments, regulation, public investments and voluntary approaches in sectors

such as agriculture, energy and transportation. Under the Kyoto Protocol, Switzerland has

committed to reduce its “greenhouse gas” (GHG) emissions by 8% by the end of 2012 from 1990emission levels. The main spearheads of its strategy are the Federal Law on the reduction of CO2

emissions and the Federal Energy Law.

Agriculture, trade and climate change

Agriculture is a major source of GHGs, currently contributing to 10-12% of globalanthropogenic GHG emissions (excluding deforestation). While the Swiss AP 2011 does not aim

to address climate change as such, it indirectly contributes to this objective through the shift it

promotes from intensive agriculture to integrated or organic farming and limited chemical

treatment of plants. It also gives priority to exports manufactured using sustainable methods andin particular organic certification and good agricultural practices.

The food miles debate

Action to address climate change in industrialized countries is leading to a range of standards

and certification schemes. These schemes seek to measure and account for the carbon content ofgoods that are produced and traded internationally. Many of the emerging standards and

certification schemes are private sector and consumer-driven initiatives, making it challenging

for public policy to fully address their trade and development implications. In 2008 Switzerland

initiated its first carbon labelling scheme for products sold in the retail chain Migros.

The role of voluntary carbon labelling schemes is likely to grow in the future, providing

consumers with the option of decreasing their personal carbon footprint. A major concern in thisarea, however, has been the focus on air transport, which only accounts for a negligible share of

GHG emissions when compared with those generated by agricultural products, often providing

misleading information to consumers. In this respect the debate on food miles needs to beexpanded not just to include road and sea transport but also to look at the total carbon emissions

of products throughout the supply chain, using life-cycle analysis, and to evaluate how to reduce

emissions at each stage of the chain to achieve low carbon ratings.

From a sustainable development perspective, carbon schemes would also need to balance the

need for accurate and useful data with equity concerns and the need to be simple, transparent,












and involve sufficiently low transaction costs to include small producers. While labelling

schemes provide opportunities to access niche markets, many producers are concerned that such

standards may become a vehicle for green protectionism. In Switzerland, for example, the BioSuisse label excludes organic air-freighted products. This provision directly affects fruit and

vegetable producers in East Africa that would otherwise qualify as organic producers.

The liberalization of environmental goods and services

Trade is an important channel for the diffusion of climate mitigation technologies and goods.Lowering trade barriers might, in theory, make them more affordable to consumers and bring

down climate mitigation costs overall. Lowering tariffs on climate mitigation goods can also

contribute to UNFCCC technology transfer mandates by facilitating access to these goods. TheWTO’s Doha Ministerial Declaration calls for a reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on

“environmental goods and services”. However, there is no universally accepted definition of

these. Complexities also exist with regard to their classification for customs purposes, making

selective liberalization of climate-friendly goods challenging.

Many developing countries want to safeguard sensitive industries and domestic capacity, whichmay discourage them from pursuing full liberalization in climate mitigation goods. Overall the

liberalization of those goods would likely bring benefits mainly to developed countries and a few

middle-income developing countries, such as China, Singapore, Hong Kong, Mexico and India, but may not lead to significant environmental benefits in the LDCs that lack purchasing power.

As part of the Friends of Environmental Goods group at the WTO, Switzerland supports the

establishment of a list of environmental goods for which tariffs would be removed. Jointly with

Canada, the EU, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Chinese Taipei and the US, it hassubmitted a list of 153 environmental goods with categories such as renewable energy products,

solid waste management and heat and energy management products. A recent ICTSD study hasshown, however, that by and large the proposed products do not really match developingcountries’ environmental concerns. Furthermore, it appears that tariff reduction might only play a

marginal role in enhancing trade in the list of 153 goods, with other factors such as

environmental regulations, feed-in tariffs and the general level of industrialization playing a

much greater role as drivers of trade in this area (Jha 2008).

Intellectual property rights and transfer of technology

The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol require parties to promote and cooperate in thedevelopment and diffusion of technology, including transfer of technologies that control, reduce

or prevent GHG emissions. As recognized in the Bali “road map”, enhanced action on

technology development and transfer will be necessary to enable the full, effective and sustainedimplementation of the UNFCCC beyond 2012.

Intellectual property rules, particularly those established in the WTO context, have been at the

heart of the UNFCCC debate on transfer of technology. Some developing countries are









concerned that strict intellectual property rules might prevent the effective transfer of climate-

friendly technologies. Initial research found that the impact of patents on access to solar, wind

and biofuel technologies in developing countries would not be significant, largely because thelevel of concentration in those industries is still limited, in contrast with the pharmaceutical

industry where patents play a much greater role (Barton 2007). More research is needed,

however, to fully understand the role of intellectual property rights, particularly on licensing practices which are likely to play a more important role than patents in the diffusion of climate-friendly technologies.

Carbon leakage and border tax adjustments

Countries set to take on mandatory climate mitigation obligations worry that doing so may affectthe international competitiveness of their energy-intensive and carbon-intensive industries.

Concerns centre on the economic and social implications of the real or perceived costs ofrelocating industries to countries without such obligations. In addition, such relocation may lead

to higher overall carbon emissions from the same volume of production of goods in countrieswith less efficient processes.

In response to such concerns, politicians have been considering legislation instituting carbon-

related “competitiveness provisions” in the form of mandatory carbon offsetting allowances onimports or border tax adjustments. Draft legislation in the US contains provisions for carbon

barriers targeting emerging economies among non-Annex I countries that are currently not

obliged to make emissions reductions. In Europe border measures were left out of draft climate

and energy legislation (at least at the time of writing in October); however, they are very much part of the debate. The European parliament has been calling for border measures against climate

“free riders”. French President Nicolas Sarkozy has expressed support for the idea of tariffs on

imports from countries that do not place a cap on carbon emissions. Carbon-related bordermeasures are controversial; their legality under the WTO has also been questioned. Recent

studies have pointed to the potential ineffectiveness of unilateral trade measures to encourage

action on climate change (Houser, Bradley, and Childs 2008).






4. SUMMERY OF THE STUDY

World trade in 2009 was dominated by the worst financial and economic crisis in decades.Global output shrank. So did the volume of international trade. Despite bearing no responsibility

for the crisis, the poorer developing countries have fared the worst. China, Brazil and India sawexports drop by between a fifth and a third in the second half of 2008, but countries not

belonging to the top 20 developing country exporters were hit even harder. Trade and GDP

growth have started to pick up again, but some economists fear a “double-dip” recession. If

unemployment continues to grow, it may become harder for governments to resist protectionist pressures. In terms of the WTO negotiations, the crisis cuts both ways. Governments are

preoccupied with more immediate concerns. But the crisis has shattered the sense that

protectionism was unthinkable, making a trade deal seem more valuable. The G-20 major

economies have called for concluding the Doha Round in 2010, but it remains to be seen whether

this pledge will amount to anything.The number of bilateral trade deals continues to grow, with Switzerland an enthusiastic

participant. Some of these deals have been criticized for “WTO- plus” obligations, particularlyregarding intellectual property. Meanwhile, there are real grounds for arguing that the Doha

Round agenda does not reflect many current problems, especially climate change. With the US

and the EU threatening to impose tariffs on exports from emerging economies with no hardemissions caps, it is clear that governments need to find some way of discussing the new

challenges confronting the global economy.



Conclusion

Today most developing country governments could dramatically raise manufacturing tariffs, and

induct

It is difficult to argue that the tariff and subsidy concessions arising out of a Doha Round deal

would help the world economy recover from the crisis. The currently proposed cuts to maximum

allowable subsidy and tariff levels have, to a great extent, already been superseded by reality;

domestic reforms mean that “applied” rates are already near or below the future c aps underdiscussion. Of course a WTO trade deal would provide an example of multilateral economic

cooperation at a time when such cooperation is badly needed for a future global climate

agreement. Locking in autonomous liberalization reforms would also be a useful bulwark against

backsliding, but it does not excite businesses or developing countries looking for new exportopportunities.

More generally the Doha agenda reflects concerns from the world of the late 1990s, not from the

world of today in which regional and bilateral FTAs continue to mushroom, in which high, not

low, food prices are the worry and in which key trade policy concerns involve overcoming thecurrent economic recession and addressing competitiveness concerns related to attempts to curb

GHG emissions. If the system is not able to address today’s trade concerns, it runs the risk of

becoming irrelevant. Worse still, if these issues cannot find a home at the multilateral level, they

will be addressed through bilateral or unilateral measures, as illustrated by the debatesurrounding border tax adjustment in the US.

In these circumstances there might be a case for rethinking the negotiating agenda of the WTO.The system can probably not afford to wait for the next round of trade negotiations to start

discussing possible ways to respond to pressing trade concerns emerging from the climatechange debate, the food crisis or the proliferation of FTAs. For most WTO members, however,reopening the negotiating mandate set in Doha is a “non -starter” as this would most probably kill

the Doha Round of negotiations.

A possible third way would consist in establishing a parallel track, at the WTO, where emerging

issues could be addressed, both at the political and technical level, outside of the Doha Round

and initially in a non-negotiating setting. The recent establishment of a WTO task force andmonitoring system to deal with the trade dimension of financial crisis provides an interesting

precedent in this respect, as a creative way through which new issues can be addressed outside of

the ongoing negotiating mandate. In the same line the holding of a largely overdue formal

ministerial conference to reflect on the future of the multilateral trading system and discuss acommon vision for the WTO beyond ongoing negotiations could provide a useful venue to

address the new challenges confronting the global economy.






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NOTES

1 When fed through the so-called Swiss reduction formula, all of a country’s tariffs are slashedto below the value of its “coefficient”, with lower tariffs cut less sharply across the board.

2 Developing countries opting for a coefficient of 20 would be allowed to subject 14% of tariff

lines to cuts that are half as high as those required by the formula, covering 16% ofmanufacturing imports by value. Alternatively, they would be allowed to exempt 6.5% of tariff

lines from cuts altogether, accounting for 7.5% of import value. A coefficient of 22 would

involve “half -formula cuts” for 10% of tariff lines and import value, or full exemptions for 5% of

both. Finally, developing countries choosing not to use the flexibilities would use a coefficient of

25.

3 Up to 5% of tariff lines may be exempted from cuts, but the overall average cut shall, in anycase, be 11%.

4 Additional flexibilities were also granted to small and vulnerable economies and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries. See paragraph 130 of Falconer’s draft modalities.

http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_home.asp?language=1&_=1



https://poldev.revues.org/143#article-143


https://poldev.revues.org/143#bodyftn1
















5 Given the confidential nature of the studies, countries are represented by letters. The countries

covered are Barbados, China, Ecuador, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru,

Philippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam.




9 OTDS is defined as the sum of AMS + de minimis (i.e. 10% of the average value of

agriculture production in the 1995-2000 period) + blue box subsidies (or 5% of the average valueof agricultural production in the 1995-2000 period for countries such as Switzerland which have

not used blue box subsidies).

10 Under WTO commitments, Switzerland has in fact 28 tariff quota commitments. But three

tariff quotas on wines were merged in 2001, bringing the number down to 26.

11 The last column in table 2 shows only the developing countries where exports of the productanalysed represent at least 5% of agricultural exports. When there is no country that fulfils this

requirement the three developing countries with the highest concentration are identified.

12 This section is based on research and analysis by David Vivas-Eugui, ICTSD.

13 In the case of the agreement with Canada no intellectual property provisions were included,which somehow reflects the fact that such provisions in FTAs primarily target developing

countries. The SACU agreement only contains general provisions on intellectual property, due tostrong resistance from both southern African governments and civil society.

14 A more detailed analysis can be found in Vivas 2009.

15 Today most developing country governments could dramatically raise manufacturing tariffs,and industrialised countries could likewise raise trade-distorting farm subsidies, without running

afoul of current WTO rules.

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS







































Title Table 1: Tariff cut formula

Credits Source: WTO (2008b).

URL https://reader009.{domain}/reader009/html5/0318/5aad50727b877/5aad508874d

File image/png, 14k

Title Figure 1: Special Products Most Frequently Identified in ICTSD Studies

Credits Source: ICTSD and FAO (2007).

URL https://reader009.{domain}/reader009/html5/0318/5aad50727b877/5aad50892b6

File image/png, 48k

Title Figure 2: Special Product Tariff Lines as a Percentage of Total

Agriculture Tariff Lines

Credits Source: ICTSD and FAO 2007.

URL https://reader009.{domain}/reader009/html5/0318/5aad50727b877/5aad5089a3f

File image/png, 38k

Title Figure 3: Producer support estimated by country (in %)

Credits Source: OECD (2007).

URL https://reader009.{domain}/reader009/html5/0318/5aad50727b877/5aad508a433

File image/png, 76k

https://poldev.revues.org/docannexe/image/143/img-1.png














Title Figure 4: Swiss export subsidies (in CHF millions)

URL https://reader009.{domain}/reader009/html5/0318/5aad50727b877/5aad508bda4

File image/png, 30k

Title Figure 5: Swiss total AMS amber box and green box subsidies (in CHF

millions)

Credits Source: WTO Notifications.

URL https://reader009.{domain}/reader009/html5/0318/5aad50727b877/5aad508c5d8

File image/png, 26k

Title Figure 6: Swiss top five subsidised products (in CHF millions)

URL https://reader009.{domain}/reader009/html5/0318/5aad50727b877/5aad508cd7f

File image/png, 37k

Title Figure 7: Swiss trade-distorting support (in CHF millions): implications

of the Doha Round

Credits Source: Author’s calculation based on WTO Notifications.

URL https://reader009.{domain}/reader009/html5/0318/5aad50727b877/5aad508d5f0

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Title Table 2: Tariff peaks on selected products of current and potential















interest to developing countries

Credits Source: Ibañez, Rebizo and Tejeda (2008). Authors’ calculation of AVE is based on the MAcMap-HS6 Database conversion using the methodology

developed in Bouët et al. (2004).

URL https://reader009.{domain}/reader009/html5/0318/5aad50727b877/5aad508f018

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URL https://reader009.{domain}/reader009/html5/0318/5aad50727b877/5aad508f8fa

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REFERENCES

Electronic reference

Christophe BELLMANN, Trineesh BISWAS and Marie CHAMAY, « Recent Trends in WorldTrade and International Negotiations », International Development Policy | Revue internationale

de politique de développement [Online], 1 | 2010, Online since 11 March 2010, connection on

07 October 2015. URL : http://poldev.revues.org/143 ; DOI : 10.4000/poldev.143

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Christophe BELLMANN Programmes Director at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development

(ICTSD).

By this author

The Bali Agreement: Implications for Development and the WTO [Original article in full]

Published in International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique dedéveloppement , 5.2 | 2014

Le système commercial multilatéral face aux défis des politiques publiques globales[Original

article in full]









https://poldev.revues.org/128

















Published in International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique dedéveloppement , 3 | 2012

Promouvoir le développement durable dans le commerce mondial et les négociationsmultilatérales [Original article in full]

Published in International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique dedéveloppement , 2 | 2011

Trineesh BISWAS Adviser to the Chief Executive at the ICTSD.

Marie CHAMAY

Manager of the ICTSD Global Platform on Trade and Climate Change
















final eco project

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