FEDERATION WITHOUT FEDERALISMRELATIONS BETWEEN MOSCOWAND THE REGIONS

Jadwiga Rogoża

49

FEDERATION WITHOUT FEDERALISM RELATIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND THE REGIONS

Jadwiga Rogoża

NUMBER 49WARSAWApRIL 2014

© Copyright by Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnichim. Marka Karpia / Centre for Eastern Studies

CONTENT EDITORSAdam Eberhardt, Marek Menkiszak

EDITORHalina Kowalczyk

CO-OpERATIONAnna Łabuszewska, Katarzyna Kazimierska

TRANSLATIONJadwiga Rogoża

CO-OpERATIONJim Todd

GRApHIC DESIGN pARA-BUCH

pHOTOGRApH ON COVERShutterstock

DTpGroupMedia

MApSWojciech Mańkowski

pUBLISHEROśrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia Centre for Eastern Studiesul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, polandphone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40osw.waw.pl

ISBN 978-83-62936-43-4

Contents

Key points /5

introduCtion /8

I. post-soViet neGotiAted FederALisM /10

II. tHe LAndsCApe AFter CentrALisAtion /13

III. A MuLti-speed russiA /18

IV. FerMent in tHe reGions /29

V. MonoCentrisM striKes BACK /34

VI. prospeCts: deCentrALisAtion AHeAd (But WHAt Kind oF deCentrALisAtion?) /41

MAps /44

5

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

Key points

• The territorial extensiveness of the Russian Federation brings about animmensediversity in termsofgeographic,economicandethnic featuresof individual regions.Thisdiversity is reflectedbyseriousdisparities intheregions’levelsofdevelopment,aswellastheirnationalidentity,civicawareness,socialandpoliticalactivity.Weareinfactdealingwitha‘mul-ti-speed Russia’: along with the economically developed, post-industrialregions inhabitedbyactivecommunities, therearepoverty-stricken, in-ertialregions,dependentonsupportandsubsidiesfromthecentre.Largecities,withtheirhigher livingstandards,concentrationofsocialcapital,a growing need for pluralism in politics and elections characterised bycompetition constitute specific ‘islandsof activity’ onRussia’smap.Thisprovesonceagainthatthesocialchangesthataretakingplace inRussiaalongwithgenerationalchange,economicdevelopmentandtechnologicalprogress,areinfactinsularinnature.

• ThecurrentmodelofrelationsbetweenMoscowandtheregionshasbeenshapedbythepolicyofcentralisationpursuedbytheKremlinsince2000.Thepriorityofthispolicyhasbeentorestorethepresident’sdominanceinthesystemofgovernment,byregainingcontroloverregionalelites (andotherpolitical andbusinessactors)andbyredirectingfinancialflows tothecentralbudget,tobearbitrarilyredistributedbytheKremlin.Asare-sultofthispolicy,theautonomyoftheRussianregionshasbeenreducedfundamentally,andtheircapacitytoconductpoliciesbasedontheirspeci-ficityisextremelylimited.Thecentralgovernment’scontrol(political,eco-nomicandadministrative)overtheregionsiscurrentlysothoroughthatitcontradictstheformallyexistingfederalformofgovernmentinRussia.

• The policy of centralisation creates a number of negative consequencesforthedevelopmentoftheregions.Firstly,therestrictionoftheregions’politicalandeconomicautonomyhasaffectedtheperformanceofthere-gionalelites.Theirprioritieshaveshiftedfromfocusingontheregiontoseeking favours from the Kremlin, whose will determines the politicaloutlooksoftheregionalheadsandtheconditionofregionalbudgets.Thismodelpromotestheroleoftheregionasapassivesupplicant,forwhomitiseasiertoseeksupportfromthecentralgovernment,offeringloyaltyinex-change,thantoimplementcomplexsystemicreformsthatwouldcontrib-utetolong-termdevelopment.Oneofthemeasurableeffectsofthispolicyis the constantly decreasingnumber of thedonor regions. Secondly, the

6

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

centralisationpolicymakesitdifficultfortheregionstousetheirnaturaladvantagestotheirbenefit;theyareunabletoinfluencetheimplementa-tionof large investments into their territory (suchas theexploitationofrawmaterials) or the establishment of special economic zones. Regionswithadistinctivespecificityandsignificantresourcesperceivethecurrentmodelasquasi-colonial,onewhichlimitstheiropportunitiesforgrowth,andarethereforeinterestedinreconstructingthatmodel.

• Ontheotherhand,themainstayofthecurrent‘asymmetric’modeloffed-eralismarethepoorandinertialregions,whichneverthelesshaveanu-mericalsuperiorityovertherichones.Theseregionsarenotinterestedinexpandingtheirautonomy,asitwouldinvolvetheneedtofindnewsourcesofincomeindependently,forwhichtheyarenotprepared;theylackbothnatural competitive advantages and the habits of activity and entrepre-neurship.Theseregionsseetheironlyopportunitytoimprovetheirfinan-cialconditioninthecentralgovernment’saidandassistance,andarepre-paredtoprovideMoscowwithunconditionalpoliticalsupportinreturn.

• Thenewphaseofthecentralisationpolicy,whichbeganwithVladimirPu-tin’sreturntotheKremlinin2012,furtherrestrictstheregions’roomformanoeuvre,mainlyby imposing additionalfinancial burdens on the re-gionalbudgets.Currently, two-thirdsoftheregionalbudgetarerunningdeficits,andtheregionalgovernmentshavedifficultiesstrikingabalancebetween increasing pressure fromMoscow and the financial and socialproblemsoftheirregions,whichtriggersocial frustration.However, theregionalelites’limitedinfluencedoesnotallowthemtolobbyforfavoura-blesystemicsolutions.Inaddition,thepoor‘politicalquality’oftheregion-alelitesisyetanotherlegacyofthepolicyofcentralisation;regionalpoliti-cians lackthecapacityforstrategicplanning, foractinginthecollectiveinterest,andforcoordinatingtheirinitiativesinter-regionally,especiallywhenthoseinitiativesruncountertothepolicyofthecentre.Instead,par-ticularisticattitudesprevailintheregions;theirelitesuseinformalchan-nelstolobbytheinterestsoftheirownregions,whichareoftennarroweddowntotheinterestsofthelocalrulingclans.

• Theexistingmodelofrelationsbetweenthecentreandtheregions,whichentailstheoverwhelmingdominanceofMoscow,hasnotbeenshapedbyin-stitutionalmechanismsandofficialarrangementsbetweendifferentlevelsofgovernmentandsociety.Instead,ithasbeenaresultofanumberofpro-visionalfactors,withtheleadingrolebeingtakenbyeconomicconditions

7

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

andpersonal issues,suchas thecomposition,mentalityandprioritiesofVladimirPutin’steam.Institutionalweaknessandasusceptibilitytopo-liticalandeconomicfluctuationspreventthismodelfrombeingaconstantandfinalone,andmaketheserelationscyclicalinnature.CurrentlyRussiais facingachangeintwokeyfactors,economic(prospectsofstagnation)andpolitical(thedeterioratinglegitimacyoftherulingelite).Intheper-spectiveofthenextfewyears,theescalationofthesetrendsmayleadtotheerosionoftherulingsystemintheKremlinandenhancetheactiveregions’effortstoalterthemodelofrelationswiththecentre.However,thedegreeofinstitutionalweaknessandtherulinggroups’lackofdemocratichabitsmayturntheprocessofnegotiatingnewprinciplesofrelationsintoyetan-otherbehind-the-scenesarrangementsbetween the federalandregionalelites,withthelatterguidednotsomuchbytheinterestsoftheirregions,asbytheinterestsoftheirclans.Asaresult,thealternativetothecurrentcentralisedmodelmaybenotsomuchamaturefederalmodel,asanothervariationofadeformedfederalism,reminiscentofthe1990s,whosebenefi-ciarieswereselectedregional‘barons’.

8

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

introduction

The regional differentiation of theRussian Federation and the relations be-tweenthecapitalandtheregionsareoftentreatedasanelementofbroaderpolitical and economic studies. However, they deserve separate analysis.Firstly,thecountry’sgreatgeographic,economic,ethnicandsocialdiversityaffectsthedirectionandpaceofdevelopmentoftheentireRussianFederation,aswell as its socio-economic stability. Secondly, the aforementioned factorsdeterminethepracticalimplementationofmanystrategiesmappedoutintheKremlin.Thirdly,ananalysisofRussianfederalismisoneofthekeyelementsinthestudyoftheentiresystemofgovernment; itonceagaindemonstratesRussia’s institutionalweaknessand the system’s ‘ductility’,while indicatingthatthecurrentformoffederalism,withitsfar-reachingcentralisation,isnotpermanentandfinaleither.Itthereforeseemsimportanttotakenoticeofthevoiceoftheregions,whichisoftendepreciatedduetothepresent-daydomina-tionofMoscow,asitmightbehelpfulinreflectingontheshapeoftheRussiansystemifitshouldevolvetowardsamoredecentralisedmodel.

Itshouldbespecifiedthatthispaperfocusesmainlyonthewealthierregionsorthosewithadistinctivespecificity,whichtranslatesintocertainexpecta-tionsofthecentralgovernmentandthecapacitytoseektheirimplementation.Thestudydeliberatelydoesnotengageinadetailedanalysisofpoorerregions,eventhoughinthescaleoftheRussianFederationtheypredominateintermsofpopulationandarea.Themainreasonisthattheweaknessoftheireconomiesmakes themhyper-dependenton thecentre: theyactaspassivesupplicantsvis-à-visMoscow,whodonotcarryoutorevenformulatetheirownpolicies,andonlyseekgreater fundingwithin theexistingsystem.SuchregionsareandwillremainpassivewitnessesofagamebetweentheKremlinandthoseregionswithdistinctivespecificityandgreaterambitions.Nordoesthisstudydealwiththecaseof theNorthCaucasus,whose internalspecificsandrela-tionswithMoscowexceedthestandardframeworkofRussia’sregionalpolicy,andhavebeendescribedinseparatestudies1.

ThetextopenswithachapterdescribingtheevolutionofRussianfederalisminthe1990s,followingthecollapseoftheUSSR,whentheweakenedcentralau-thorityplayedsecondfiddletostrong,ambitiousregions.Thesecondchapter

1 W.Górecki,No change in theRussianCaucasus.ThewinterOlympics amida localwar,OSWStudies,27Jan.2014,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2014-01-27/no-change-russian-caucasus-winter-olympics-amid-a-local-war

9

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

showstheevolutionofthismodelunderthepolicyofcentralisation,initiatedbyVladimirPutinin2000.ThethirdchapterpresentsthediversityoftheRus-sian regions by describing selected regions with distinctive characteristics(related to geography, resources, ethnic composition) and specific interests.Thefourthchapteranalysesthestanceoftheactiveregionstowardscentrali-sation, theirexpectationsand (limited)possibilities to fulfil them.ThefifthchapterpresentsthereactivationofthepolicyofcentralisationuponVladimirPutin’sreturntotheKremlinin2012.ThestudyisconcludedwithachapteroutliningtheprospectsofrelationsbetweenMoscowandtheregions in thecomingyears,includingtheevolutionofthecurrentcentralisedmodel.

10

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

i. post-soViet neGotiAted FederALisM

FollowingthecollapseoftheSovietUnion,aspecifictypeoffederalismformedinRussiathatlastedforalmostadecadeandwascharacterisedbytheweak-nessofcentralauthorityandtheassertivenessofkeypoliticalandeconomicactors–bigbusiness(oligarchs),politicalpartiesandregionalelites.Thefed-eral elite was struggling with the hardships of transition and serious eco-nomicdifficulties,andwasadditionallyweakenedbythepersonalproblemsofPresidentBorisYeltsin–everysooften,theKremlinwasforcedto‘exchange’concessionstotheaforementionedplayersfortheirpoliticaloreconomicsup-port.TheregionalelitestookfulladvantageofYeltsin’sfamousappeal:‘Takeasmuchindependenceasyoucanswallow’.ThebalanceofpowerintheRussianFederationclearlyshiftedinfavouroftheregions,especiallythemoreaffluentones(theso-called‘donor’regions,i.e.netcontributorstotheRussianbudget)whohad theirdistinctivespecificityand identity,anddemonstratedaspira-tionstoextendtheirautonomytoderivemoreprofits.Thiswasthetimeofthegreatestpoliticalandeconomicpluralisminpost-SovietRussia,albeitsaddledwithseriousdeficienciesthathinderedtheemergenceofamaturefederalism.

TheshapeofthefederalmodelofthattimewasheavilyaffectedbytheSovietlegacy;thegenerationofregionalpoliticiansinpowerhadbeenraisedintheSovietUnion,andwascharacterisedbyanauthoritarian political culture.Their pursuit of greater autonomywas not (as in developed countrieswithafederalsystem)synonymouswithdecentralisationandadivisionofpowerswhichwouldhavehelped topreventmalpracticesat all levels. It is sympto-maticthatthebiggestenclavesofauthoritarianisminthe1990sdevelopedinthoseregionsthatenjoyedthegreatestdegreeofautonomy,suchasTatarstanandBashkortostan2.

Another deficiency was institutional weakness. The Kremlin’s relationswiththeregions(andwithotheractors)wereheavilypersonalisedandoftenresembledbehind-the-scenesbargainingfromwhichthepublicwasexclud-ed.Thecourseofthisbargainingwasdependentontheeconomicpotentialofagivenregion,onthepositionofindividualgovernorsandtheirconnectionsintherelevantstructuresofthecentralgovernment.Asaresult,someregional‘barons’extortedsuccessiveeconomicprivileges fromMoscowandtheirre-gionswerebedizenedwithsymbolicattributesof ‘independence’:references

2 A.Zakharov,Spyashchiyinstitut:federalismvRossiiisovremennommirye,Moscow2012,pp.7-8.

11

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

to‘sovereignty’inregionalconstitutions(Yakutia,Tatarstan,Bashkortostan,Tuva),insetsinnationallanguagesinsertedinpassports(Tatarstan,Bashkor-tostan,Dagestan),traderepresentationsabroad,orthereconstructionofhis-toricheritagewithsomeanti-Russianovertones(e.g.therestorationoftheKul-SharifmosqueinTatarstan,whichhadbeenburnedbyIvantheTerribleafterthe capture of Kazan). Themost self-confident regions – Tatarstan and theChechen-Ingushrepublic–evenrefusedtosigntheFederalTreatyin1992con-cerning the division of powers between the centre and the regions3,whichthey saw as confirmation of the regions’ vulnerability vis-à-vis the centre.Throughout theentiredecade, thecentralgovernmentconcluded individualcontractswiththeregionsthatspecifiedthedivisionofpowersinthespheresofeconomy,budget,propertyrights,financial,monetaryandcustomspolicy.By1998,42suchagreementshadbeenconcluded(outof89thenexistingre-gions).Asymptomofthiswasthefactthatthepowersofindividualregionsvariedgreatly anddependedon theirpolitical importanceand the lobbyingpotentialoftheregion’selites4.Auniqueagreement,eveninthatcontext,wastheonewhichthePresidentofTatarstanMintimerShaimievsignedwithMos-cow;therepublicwasgrantedthestatusofasovereignstateassociatedwithRussiaandasubjectof international law5.Thepoliticalcrowningofthisre-gional ‘Fronde’wasthefoundationoftheFatherland-AllRussiapartyin1999,whosebackboneweretheelitesofthedonorregions.Oneoftheparty’slead-ers,YevgenyPrimakov,wasevenaseriouscontendertoVladimirPutininthepresidentialelectionin2000.

Todescribethepositionofregionalelitesinthe1990s,somescholarsusetheterm‘paradeofsovereignties’,referringtothesuccessivedeclarationsofsov-ereigntyoftheSovietrepublicstowardstheendoftheSovietUnion,whichini-tiateditscollapse.The1990swereengravedinthepublicmemory–especiallyafter2000–asatimewhentheterritorialintegrityoftheRussianFederationwasatrisk,andthatriskwasaggravatedbythechaosoftransformation,eco-nomichardships and the ambitionsof ‘regionalbarons’. Scholarsdefine the

3 TheFederationTreaty(31March1992)wasanagreementthatregulatedtherelationswith-intheRussianFederationanddividedthepowersbetweenthefederalauthoritiesandtheregionscontainedinthreegroups:1.republics;2.territories,regionsandcitieswithafed-eralstatus(MoscowandSt.Petersburg);3.autonomousregionsandautonomousareas.

4 L.Polishchuk,‘TheRussianModelofNegotiatedFederalism’,inKlimanov,V.,andZubarev-ich,N.,eds.,TheRegionalDimensionofPoliticsandEconomics(Moscow,St.Petersburg:StudiaPolitica,2000).

5 L. Ambinder, ‘Mintimer Shaimiev: Lider v borbye regionalnykh elit’,Kommersant daily,30March1996.

12

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

Russianvariantof federalism in the 1990sasnegotiated federalism, stressingthatitcontradictsthefundamentalprincipleofafederalstateasafixedandcleardivisionofpowersandspheresofactivitybetweentheauthoritiesofthefederalandregionallevels,eachofwhomoperatesautonomouslywithintheirownsphereofcompetence6.

6 L.Polishchuk, op. cit.

13

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

ii. tHe LAndscApe AFter centrALisAtion

Theturningpointforthecentre-regionsrelationswastheelectionofVladimirPutinaspresidentin2000.ThismarkedtherebuildingoftheKremlin’sposi-tion,whichwassupportedbysoaringoilpricesandsolidpublicacceptanceforthenewpresident’sactions,includingthe‘restorationoftheterritorialintegri-tyofthecountry’(whichinthepublicperceptionwaschallengedbytheeman-cipationoftheregionalelites)andforabroadlydefined‘order’(consistinginthesubordinationofthekeypoliticalandeconomicplayers).Inthefollowingyears,thecentralisationofpowerinitiatedbyPutinhascompletelychangedthebalanceofpowerbetweentheKremlinandotherpoliticalandeconomicplayers,includingtheregionalelites,andMoscowhasregainedtheroleofthecentrethatconcentratespowerandresources.TherestorationoftheKremlin’sdominancewasdubbedthe‘strengtheningoftheverticalofexecutivepower’(Russian:vertikal vlasti)andthistermhasdominatedthepoliticaldiscourseinRussiasince2000.

Theyear2000marked theweakeningof thepositionof regional leaders,asaresultoflegalamendmentsthathavechangedthelegalframeworkoftheiractivity,informalactions,inspiredbytheKremlin,andbyMoscowacquiringcontrolovertheregions’strategicassets7.

The process of harmonising regional laws with federal legislation waslaunched, includingtheremovalofreferencesto ‘sovereignty’ fromregionalconstitutions and laws, aswell as other provisions that contradicted feder-alnorms.Underapresidentialdecreeof 13May2000,anadditional levelofadministrationwas introducedwhichwasnot reflected in theConstitution:alongwith thedivisionof theRussianFederation into ‘federal subjects’ (re-gions),itwasdividedintosevenfederaldistricts.Theseareheadedbypleni-potentiaryenvoys,officialrepresentativesofthepresidentwhosefunctionisto ensure the realisationofhis constitutionalpowers in thedistrict, and toactasadvisoryandcontrolbodieswithregardtoregionalgovernments.Theyareresponsibleformonitoringthesituationintheregionsandprovidingin-formationtotheKremlin;overseeingtheharmonisationofregionallawswith

7 In 2009,Moscow took control of Bashkortostan’smain asset, the Bashneft oil company(viatheMoscow-basedAFKSistemacompanywhichboughtacontrollingstake).ThishasstrengthenedMoscow’sinfluenceintheregionandmadeitpossibletoforcetheresigna-tionofBashkortostan’slong-timepresidentMurtazaRakhimovoneyearlater.InthecaseofYakutia,controlovertheworld’slargestdiamondminingcompanyAlrosawasacquiredthroughregularmanagementexchanges(thestateholdsamajoritystakeinthecompany).

14

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

thefederallegislationandselectedaspectsofregionalfiscalpolicy;andpar-ticipatinginconsultationsconcerningregionalelections.Despitetheirlimitedformalpowers,intheinitialphaseofthecentralisationpolicythepresidentialenvoysplayedasignificantrole in limitingtheautonomyof theregionsandsubordinatingthemtothecentralgovernment.

Thecentrehasalsostrengthened its control over the regional institutions of force; the right toappointheadsof their regional structureshasbecometheexclusiveprerogativeofthepresidentoftheRussianFederation.In2002,theregional leaders lost their senatorial status;theyhadtoleavetheFed-erationCouncil, theupperhouseofparliament, thus losinginfluenceonthelegislativeprocessat thefederal level. Instead, theybecamemembersof theState Council, which is an advisory body without significant powers. EventhoughrepresentativesoftheregionsstillsitintheFederationCouncil(eachregiondelegatesonerepresentativefromthelegislativeandexecutivebranch),theirrankisnowmuchlower.Moreover,successive legalamendmentshavereducedtheregions’leverageontheappointmentanddismissalofsenators8.Finally,thedecisiveblowinthepoliticalpositionandlegitimacyoftheregion-aleliteswasthepresident’sinitiativein2005toreplace general elections to governorships with a system of direct appointmentanddismissalbythepresident9.DuringthepresidenciesofPutinandespeciallyMedvedev,adeepreshuffleofregionaleliteswascarriedout(underMedvedev,aquarterofthegubernatorialcorpswasreplaced).Asaresultofthisprocess,theregionswereheaded–withveryfewexceptions–bypoliticiansdevoidofinfluenceandcha-risma,renderedimpotentandawareoftheirdependenceonthecentre.

Thebudget and tax reformprovedtobeakeytooltolimittheautonomyoftheregions.Underthechangesintroducedin2000-2001,theshareofthecentralbudgetrevenuessignificantlyincreasedattheexpenseofregionalbudgets:the

8 Accordingtorecentamendments,thegovernorandregionalparliament losetherighttorecallasenatorfromtheirregion;thismaynowonlybedonebythechamber.Atthesametime,residencyrequirementswere introducedforsenators (thecandidate isrequiredtohavelivedintheregionforatleastfiveyears),aspreviouslytherehadbeenmanyinstancesofpersonslinkedtotherulingelitebuthavingnolinkswiththeregionbeingnominatedsenators.Thesewereoftenbusinessmen-billionaires,whothusgainedimmunity,suchasSergeiPugachev(representativeoftheexecutivepoweroftheTuvaregionin2001-11),Bo-risShpigel(Penzaoblast,2003-13),DmitryAnanyev(Yamalo-Nenetsautonomousdistrict,2006-13),VitalyMalkin(Buryatia,2004-2013),andLudmilaNarusova,wifeofAnatolySob-chak,Putin’sformermentor(representativeoftheTuvaregionparliament,2002-12).

9 Formally,regionalparliamentsnominatedtheheadsoftheregions,votingamongcandi-datesproposedbythepresidentofRussia.Thisprocedurewasinforceuntil2012.

15

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

shareofthecentreintheconsolidatedbudgetincreasedfrom44%in1999to66.2%in2007.In2005,anewmechanismwasintroducedforthesharingoftaxrevenues.Thetaxeswiththehighestchargeability(VAT,excise,PIT,CIT,Min-eralExtractionTax)wereredirectedtothecentralbudget.Regionalbudgetshavelostasignificantpartoftheirincome;thedivisionofrevenuesbetweentheregionsandthecentralbudgethavechangedfrom50/50beforethereform,toslightlyabovethe30%oftaxesleftintheregion(35%in2013)10.Inreturn,regionswereentitledtotransfersfromthefederalbudget,althoughthisdidnotoffsetthelossescausedbythereform.

Thelimitationoftheregionalleaders’economicroomformanoeuvreandtheprocedureof theirappointmentby theKremlinreduced the independence and effectiveness of the regional authorities.TheirprioritieshaveshiftedfromconcentrationontheregionandtheinterestsofregionalactorstowardsseekingtheKremlin’sfavour,whosewilldeterminedthepositionoftheheadof theregion.Thismodel isnotconducive to increasingtheefficiencyofre-gionaleconomies, improvingthe investmentclimateorattracting investors.Instead,theregionalelitesareconcentratedonlobbyinginthefederaloffices,usuallyintheinterestofcompanieslinkedtoregionalclansorpartlytothefederalelite11.Themotivationforthislobbyingactivityisfurtherenhancedbytheopacityandarbitrarinessofthesystemfordistributingtransfersfromthecentralbudget12.Themostglaringexampleof thistrendisTatarstan,oneofthemosteffectiveregionallobbyists.TheTatarstangovernmentisfocusedonobtainingfundsforlarge-scale‘one-offprojects’,suchasthemillenniumcel-ebrationsforKazancityin2005(forwhichthecentralgovernmentallocatedabout$360million,andover$1billionofprivateinvestments),theUniversiadein2013(over$1billionfromthestatebudget)andtheconstructionofahigh-speedrailwayconnectingMoscowandKazan,whosetotalcostwasestimatedatabout$30billion(althoughthisprojecthasbeenhaltedrecently).

This model promotes an attitude of the regions as passive supplicants,whereinit iseasiertoseekdonationsfromthecentrethantocreatefavour-ableconditions in theregions themselves todevelopand invest innewpro-jects (especiallybearing inmind that a largeportionof taxes frompossible

10 RBC daily.11 L.Polishchuk,op. cit.12 Aslittleasaquarterofthetransfersisallocatedonthebasisoftransparentcriteria;the

restisdividedarbitrarily.FordetailsseeN.Zubarevich,‘Niodinregionneimeyetstimulovzarabatyvat’,Izvestia,19September2013.

16

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

newinvestmentswouldbedirectedtothecentralbudget13).Thepolicyofcen-tralisation–thefiscalreform,andtherestrictionstotheautonomyofthere-gionalauthorities–seemstobethemainreasonforthesteadydeclineinthenumberofRussiandonorregions–from33-35inthelate1990s14to19in2007,andasfewas10in2013,withresource-richregionspredominating15.

Moreover,thismodeldoesnotoffertheregionsanyopportunitiestomake full use of their natural potential and toprofit from their competitiveadvan-tages.In2004theregionalgovernmentslosttheirleverageontheinvestmentpolicy concerning the extraction of natural resources on their territories:theextractionlicensesarenowissuedbythefederalMinistryofNaturalRe-sources.Nordotheregionshaveanyimpactonthepoliciesofcorporationsthatcarryoutminingworkon their territories:mostof the largecompaniesareregisteredinMoscow,wheretheypaytaxesandnegotiatethetermsoftheiractivities. It isalsoup to the federalauthorities togrant taxreliefs to thosecompanies,whichlowersthetaxrevenuesoftheregionalbudgetsandreducestheregions’income.

Instead, the Kremlin often offers the regions projects that do not quite match their needs and specificity.Anexampleof this is theKaliningradOblast, a Russian exclavewithin the EuropeanUnion. A Special EconomicZone in force in that region from 1996 to 2006was conducive to small andmedium-sizedinvestors,includingfromabroad.Whenitexpired,thefederalparliamentpassed anew lawon a Special EconomicZone,which this timepromotes large investors (with investments exceeding $5million).Thenewzonehasattractedonlyafewdozeninvestors,whilethemajorityofforeigncompanies havewithdrawn fromKaliningrad: the overall number of com-panieswithforeigncapitalhasdecreasedfourfold16.Moscow’sother‘flagshipproject’plans in theregion, suchas thecreationofagamblingzoneon theBalticcoastoratouristcentre,havenotbeenimplementedatall.Moreover,Moscowhasalsolimitedthepotentialbenefitsfortheregionsassociatedwith

13 Y.Zabavina,‘Poteryakormilcev’,Novye Izvestia,29April2013.14 SeeNataliaZubarevich,http://www.aif.ru/money/2922915 Thelistofdonorregionscurrentlyincludes:Moscowcity,MoscowOblast,St.Petersburg

city,Leningradoblast,RepublicofTatarstan,SakhalinandTyumenoblasts,Nenets,Yama-lo-NenetsandKhanty-Mansiautonomousokrugs(Zabavina,op. cit.).

16 J. Rogoża,A.Wierzbowska, I.Wiśniewska, ‘A captive island:Kaliningrad betweenMos-cow and the EU’,OSW Studies, 25 July 2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2012-07-25/a-captive-island-kaliningrad-between-moscow-and-eu

17

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

theorganisationofthe2018WorldCup:PrimeMinisterMedvedevtransferredthesupervisionoftheinfrastructureconstructiontothefederalMinistryofSport,andthegovernmentannouncedthatthemaincontractorstobuildthesiteswouldnotbeselectedinatender,butwouldbeappointedbyadministra-tivedecision,whichislikelytopromotelargecompaniesassociatedwiththerulingeliteinMoscow17.

17 ThecompanieslinkedtotheKremlinandcontrolledbytheoligarchsGennadyTimchenkoand Arkady Rotenberg have already expressed their interest in constructing the infra-structureforthe2018WorldCup.AllsevenstadiumstobebuiltforthechampionshipwillbedesignedbytheSportsEngineeringcompany,asubsidiaryoftheMinistryofSports.SeeH.Aminov,Y.Gerashchenko,‘Stomillyardovvodnivorota’,Kommersant,25October2013.

18

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

iii. A MuLti-speed russiA

Theterritorialextensivenessof theRussianFederationresults inanunusu-aldiversityof individualregions, in termsof theireconomicconditionsandpotentials(theirresources,their levelsofeconomicdevelopment),aswellastheirethniccomposition,nationalidentity,socialandpoliticalactivity,civicawarenessandtheirexpectationsofthegovernment.Thebest-knowntypol-ogybasedontheeconomicandsocialcriteriahasbeencreatedbytheesteemedexpertontheregions,NataliaZubarevich,whomadeaclassificationinto‘fourRussias’18.The current study focuses on several selected regionsof theRus-sianFederationandonesupra-regionalarea.Theyhavebeensingledoutduetotheirspecificeconomic,ethnicorgeographicalcharacteristics.Thisspecificityisastartingpointfortheanalysisoftheseregions’identityandtheirambitionsintheirrelationswithMoscow,aswellasthecivicandpoliticalattitudesoftheirinhabitants.Acounterpointtotheactiveregionsisprovidedbyageneralcharacterisation of the remaining federal subjects – themore passive ones,thatlackaclearidentity,characteristicsandresources,butwhichneverthe-lesshaveanumericalsuperiorityamongtheRussianFederationregions.

Oneareathatstandsoutdueto itseconomic potential (mainlyrawmate-rialresources)isSiberia19,whichisthenaturalresourcebaseofRussia–itholds the largestnatural gas reserves and the third-largest oil reserves intheworld,hugeforestareasanddrinking-waterreservoirs20.Therelation-shipbetweentheRussiancapitalandthisregioncanbedescribedasquasi--colonial21, both in regard to the scale of extraction and export of natural

18 Zubarevichdistinguishes:Russia-1–large,post-industrialcities,inhabitedbyabout21%ofthepopulation,withalargeshareofmiddleclass;Russia-2–medium-sizedcitiesdominat-edbyheavyindustry(includingtheso-calledmono-cities),inhabitedby25%ofthepopula-tion;Russia-3–smalltownsandvillages,inhabitedby38%ofthepopulation,wholiveinanalmostautarchicway,andfinallyRussia-4(6%ofthepopulation)–economicallybackwardregions,withasocio-politicalculturedifferent fromtheRussianmainstream– thiscat-egoryincludestheNorthCaucasusandTuva.FordetailsseeN.Zubarevich,‘ChetyreRossii’,Vedomostidaily,30December2011.

19 Forthepurposesofthecurrentstudy,thebordersofSiberiaaremarkedbytheSiberianFederalDistrict.TheFederalDistrictoccupies30%oftheentireterritoryoftheRussianFed-erationandconsistsof12regions:itswesternbordersaremarkedbytheOmskandTomskoblasts,andtheeasternonesbyBuryatia,theZabaykalskykraiandtheIrkutskoblast.ThewealthiestregionsoftheFederalDistrictaretheKrasnoyarskkraiandtheKemerovooblast(Kuzbass).Formoreinformationseewww.sibfo.ru.

20 FordetailsseeV.Zubov,V.Inozemtsev,Sibirskiyvyzov,Moscow2013,p.8.21 This termhasbeenusedbyRussia’smostprominentexpertson regionalpolicy,Natalia

ZubarevichandVladislavInozemtsev.

19

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

resources,aswellasthenatureoftheinvestmentsMoscowhasmadethere.Thescaleoftheseinvestmentsislimited:inthefirsthalfof2013,theshareof theSiberianFederalDistrict in thecentralbudgetsubsidieswasamere11%22.Whatismore,themaininfrastructureprojectsthatarefundedbythecentre,suchastheconstructionoftheESPOpipeline,theplannedmoderni-sationoftheTranssibandBAMrailway,aremainlyintendedtoimprovetheprocessofexploitationandexportationofrawmaterials,andtoamuchless-erextenttoenhancethesocio-economicdevelopmentof theregionanditssocial facilities.Also, theSiberian transport system isdesigned to amuchgreaterextent to facilitate theaccess to thecapital than to link individualregions23.Asmentionedinthepreviouschapter,thepowersoftheregionaladministrationsinthemanagementoftheresourcesontheirownterritoriesareextremelylimited:theyhavelostcontrolovertheissueofextractionli-censesinfavourofthefederalgovernment,andmostcorporationswhocarryoutminingworkinSiberiaareregisteredandpaytaxesinMoscow.AnotherblowtotheSiberianregions’budgetscomesfromthetaxreliefs(fromtaxesthatgotoregionalbudgets,suchasincometaxandpropertytax)grantedbyMoscowtothecorporationswhoarelinkedtotherulingelite.Forexample,theRosneftcompany,whichproducesoilontheKrasnoyarskKraiterritoryandhasnotedarapidincreaseofproductioninrecentyears,hasgainedsig-nificanttaxreliefs,andconsequentlythebudgetoftheregionhasreceivedonlyasmallpartofthetaxesdue24.

DissatisfactionwithbeingreducedtoRussia’s‘rawmaterialbase’hasregular-lybeenexpressedbytheSiberianelites–notonlyinexpertcircles,butalsobypoliticalleaders.OneofthemostactivelobbyistsfordecentralisationandtransferringsomemetropolitanpowerstotheregionallevelisAlexandrUss,aninfluentialSiberianpoliticianandspeakeroftheKrasnoyarskKraiParlia-ment.DuringnumerousconferencesandforumsdevotedtoSiberia’sautono-my,Usshasemphasisedthattheregionshouldassertivelymakeupa‘Siberianagenda’whichcanbetranslatedintodecisionsatthefederallevel.UssstressesthatSiberiaearnsenough forRussia,andso thegreaterpartof these fundsshouldremainintheregionandbedirectednotonlytocurrentsocialneeds,butalso to investments in theregion’sdevelopment.Pointing to theregion’s

22 N. Zubarevich, ‘Ekonomicheskiy separatism ili zdorovaya zhazhda zhizni?’, Vedomosti,20November2013.

23 SeeZubov,V.Inozemtsev,op. cit.,M.Trudolubov,‘KakRossiyazakhvatilasamasebya’,Ve-domosti,25October2013.

24 N.Zubarevich,Ekonomicheskiyseparatism,op. cit.

20

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

desire toprofit from itsvicinity to the rapidlydevelopingareasofAsia andthePacific,UsshasrepeatedPetertheGreat’scallto ‘cutawindow’notonlythroughtoEuropebutalsotoAsia25.

In termsof socialdistinctiveness, a specific identityofSiberianscanbede-fined,notlinkedtotheirethnicity,butdevelopedasaresultoflivinginase-vereclimateandasparselypopulatedarea.Siberiansarecharacterisedbymu-tualsolidarity,atoughcharacterandphysicalvigour,aswellasbyaspecificSiberianpronunciation,andevenlocaldialects26.TheregionaboundsinsocialinitiativeshighlightingSiberianidentityandadvocatingfortheextensionoftheregion’sautonomy:in2010,priortotheall-Russiacensus,a ‘TrueSiberi-ans’socialmovementemergedintheregion,whichcalledfortheindicationofaSiberiannationalityinthecensus;whiletheslogan‘StopfeedingMoscow!’regularlyappearsatralliesandintherhetoricoflocalorganisationssuchasSiberia’sRegionalAlternative27.TheSiberianidentityalsotranslatesintopo-liticalattitudes;politicianswhowinthegreatestsupportarethosewhohavestrongtieswiththeregion,eventhoughtheyoftenactunderthebannerofna-tionwideparties(regionalpartiesarebannedinRussia).ThelastelectionstotheKrasnoyarskKraiparliamentinSeptember2013werewonbythePatriotsofRussia,apartythatismarginalonanationwidescale,butwhichisrepre-sentedintheregionbyAnatolyBykov,apopularregionalbusinessmanwithacriminalpast.

Theregionwiththemostexpressiveethnic specificity(apartfromtheNorthCaucasus republics), fromwhich it derives its identity and cultural distinc-tiveness,istatarstan,locatedintheVolgaregion.Tatarsprevailintheethnicstructureof therepublic (theymakeup53.2%of thepopulation,whileRus-sians are 39.7%)28. Ethnic issues are an important aspect of the policy pur-suedby theregion’sgovernment. Inrecentyears theso-called ‘Tatarisation’oftherepublic’sadministrationhasbeennoted,asinitiatedbythePresidentofTatarstanRustamMinnikhanov,whoreplacedtherepublic’slong-standingleaderMintimer Shaimiev in 2010. ‘Tatarisation’ is defined as the increaseinTatar-speakingpoliticiansandofficialsintherepublic’sadministrationattheexpenseofRussian-speakers.Thebasisofthisprocess,however,isnotso

25 UssA., ‘WehavetomakeSiberiaaterritoryofexceptionaleconomicandsocialcomfort,TheSiberian Times,11October2013.

26 Fordetailsseehttp://region.krasu.ru/node/8427 Seehttp://altapress.ru/story/65280andhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xv5Bbep1sg428 http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/perepis_itogi1612.htm

21

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

muchethnicissuesasclanandbusinessties,andtheprocessitselfisaresultofanaturalrotationfollowingthechangeoftheregion’sleader;Minnikhanovandhisentouragehavepromotedtheirtrustedassociates,whomostlyderivefromTatar-speakingvillagesandtowns.Minnikhanovhimselflikestodem-onstratehisethnicandreligiousaffiliation;hepubliclyspeaksTatar,andin2013heperformedahajj(apilgrimage)toMecca.

the influence of islamisstrongintherepublic,andisconsideredasoneofthemaindistinctionsofTatars’national identity.A largepartof theTatarsareMuslim (Sunni), but their exactnumber isdifficult to calculate, as cen-suses inRussiadonot containaquestionon citizens’ religiousbeliefs.Cur-rentlyapproximately1200mosquesoperateinTatarstan(incomparisonto300Orthodoxchurches)29.Tatar-languageliterature(includingreligiouswritings)andhalalproductscanbeboughtinmanyplaces.Anon-stateRussianIslamicUniversityoperatesintherepublic,educatingmuftisandIslamictheologians.TheVolgaregion(andTatarstanandBashkortostaninparticular)isalsoasiteofactivitybyradicalfactionsofIslamists,suchastheSalafists(includingsomeeducatedintheUnitedArabEmirates),forwhomnationalidentityisasecond-aryissue,andwhoinsteadpromotethespreadofIslamandtheconstructionof a global caliphate, and takemilitary actions aimed at representatives ofmoderateIslam.AradicalIslamicpartyHizb ut-Tahrir(bannedbytheRussianauthorities)operates inTatarstan,while thenumberofactivesupportersofradicalIslamisestimatedatabout300030.ThearmedIslamicundergroundun-dertakessporadicactsofterror,includingagainststrategiceconomicsitesandOrthodoxchurches31.

Asmentionedabove,Tatarstanenjoyedextensiveautonomyinthe1990s.Eveninthetimesofcentralisation,itspositionvis-à-vis thecentreismuchstrongerthan thatofmostRussian regions.TheTatar leadership’s relationswith theKremlinmayrecallthepolicyoftheChechenleaderRamzanKadyrov,where-innumerousverbaldeclarationsofloyaltytoMoscowandprovidinggoodelec-tionresultsforthe‘partyofpower’coexistwithbroadinternalautonomyandefficientlobbyingforexpensiveinvestmentsintherepublic,whichprimarily

29 Seehttp://www.tatworld.ru/anons.shtml30 SeeRaisSuleymanov,Regnum,9January2013,http://www.regnum.ru/news/1611036.html31 InNovember2013,apetrochemicalplantinNizhnekamskwasmachine-gunned;anIslam-

icmilitantwhoreferredtohimselfasan‘AmirofTatarstan’tookresponsibilityfortheat-tackinaspeechontheInternet.Also,nineOrthodoxchurcheswereburnedintherepublicduringthesecondhalfof2013.

22

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

benefitstheeliteoftheregion(seesection2).AnotherindicatorofTatarstan’sspecialpositionmaybethefactthatwhenpushingforthedismissalofMintim-erShaimiev(wholeftin2010after20yearsofrulingtherepublic),theKrem-linleftthedecisiononthesuccessortotheoutgoingpresident,whileinmanyotherregionsMoscowimposedpoliticianslackinganyconnectiontothelocalclans,andsometimeseventhosewhohadnothingtodowiththeregion.Ta-tarstan’snewpresident,RustamMinnikhanov,isapoliticianfromTatarstan,anethnicTatar,andcloselylinkedtoShaimievbypersonalandbusinessties.

AsinthecaseofChechnya,theTatars’distinctiveethnicandreligiousidentityleadsthemtoactindefence of their national autonomy(TatarstandefendstheteachingofTatarlanguageinitsschools,despiteprotestsbytheRussian-speakingpopulation32)andtheirinterpretation of history.Tatarshavesuc-ceeded in blocking interpretations of history they considered unfavourablewhennationalhistorytextbookswerebeingpreparedforsecondaryschools.ThedrafttextbookpreparedbytheRussianHistoricalSociety,attheinitiativeofVladimirPutin,hasfacedoppositionnotonlyfromprominentTatarscien-tists(startingwithRafaelKhakimov,theheadoftheAcademyofSciencesofTatarstan)butalso frompoliticians, suchasFaridMukhametshin, theheadoftheTatarStateCouncil,andeventheformerpresidentMintimerShaimiev(whoisnowanadvisortothecurrentleader).Asaresult,atermusedinthefirstdraft(‘theTatar-Mongolyoke’)hasbeenreplacedbyamoreneutralfor-mula,‘asystemofdependenceofRussianlandsfromtheHordekhans’;whileaTatarpoetMusaCälilwasincludedinthelistofprominentpeoplewhohaveinfluencedthehistoryofRussia33.Ontheotherhand,Tatarhistorytextbooksemphasisesomethingwhichnationaltextbooksoverlook–thefactthatin1992ShaimievrefusedtosigntheFederalTreatyputforwardbyMoscow,whichispresentedasamilestoneinthedevelopmentofTatarnationalsovereigntyandtheirfutureindependence34.Tatarnationalistgroupsalsoorganiseanannual‘TatarNationMemoryandMourningDay’,tocommemoratetheseizingofKa-zancitybythetroopsofIvantheTerriblein1552.

32 TheTatarstanStateCouncilpassedanegativeopinionoftheproposedamendmentstothelaw‘OnthelanguagesoftheRussianFederationpeoples’,whichwasaimedtogivetheRus-sianlanguagethestatusof‘mothertongue’inallRussianregions;TatarsconsideredthatthiscouldleadtoareductioninthenumberofhoursofteachingTatarintheirschools.SeeK.Antonov,‘Kaknerodnoy’,Kommersant,26September2013.

33 V.Khamrayev,‘Kulikovskuyubitvuvyvelinarossiyskiyrynok’,Kommersant,25September2013.34 OlegKashin,http://os.colta.ru/mediathek/details/21660

23

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

SomeRussianregions’distinctivelocation–suchastheKaliningradoblastandthePrimorskyKraiontheSeaof Japan–significantlyaffectstheidentityoftheirinhabitantsandtheirelites’visionfortheregion’sdevelopment.

the Kaliningrad oblast is a russian exclave surrounded by eu countries;thislocationaffectstheidentityandmentalityofitsinhabitants.Apreviouslydominantsenseofuprootedness(theentirepopulationoftheregionwereim-migrants)andisolation(theoblastwasclosedtoforeignersduetoitsstrategicimportance)havenowbeenreplacedbyasenseofbelonging both to europe and russia.Thischangewascausedbybothaprocessofongoinggenerationalreplacement(one-thirdofthecurrentpopulationwasbornintheregion,andalargepartoftheremainderhasbeenlivingthereforadozenyearsormore),aswellas theKaliningraders’mobility– they travelabroadmuchmore fre-quentlythantheaverageRussian35.TheirmobilitywasadditionallyboostedbytheintroductionofalocalbordertrafficregimewithPolandin201236,andintheirperceptiontheexistingSchengenborderwithPolandhaseffectivelybe-cometransparent;tripsacrossthePolishborderprovinceshavebecomecom-monplace,whiletraveltootherRussianFederationregionsismoretime-con-sumingandexpensive,asevidencedbyacharacteristicsayinginKaliningrad:‘I’mgoingtoRussia’.Theresidents’opennesstoEuropetranslatesintogreaterentrepreneurshipandcivicactivity(suchasahigherproportionofNGOsthantheRussianaverage)andadifferentpoliticalculture–theelectionresultsforVladimirPutinandthe‘partyofpower’UnitedRussiaintheKaliningradre-gionhavebeenamongthelowestintheentirecountryforyears37.Kaliningradwasalsooneofthefirstregionstolaunchmassiveanti-governmentprotestsinJanuary2010,whichresonatedalloverthecountry.

TheawarenessoftheirgeographicaldistinctionalsoaffectstheagendaofKa-liningrad’spoliticalandeconomicelites,eventhoughtheyferventlydenythattheregionhasanyseparatistinclinations38.Theregionalauthoritieshavebeenseekingtravel facilitationsforyears,whichwaspartiallyfulfilledbythein-troductionofthelocalbordertrafficregimewithPoland.TheGovernorNikolai

35 In2011,Kaliningradresidentsreceivedatotalof215,000visasissuedbytheconsulatesoftheSchengenstates,whilein2012thisfigurewas260,000(outof955,000inhabitants).DataprovidedbyPoland’sConsulateinKaliningrad.

36 Currently over 130,000people have local border traffic travel cards (which entitle theirholderstotraveltoPoland’sborderregionswithoutavisa),andtheirnumberissteadilygrowing.

37 Acaptiveisland…,op. cit.38 InterviewwithGovernorNikolaiTsukanovfortheRegnumagency,13November2013.

24

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

TsukanovhasrepeatedlyappealedforKaliningradtobemadeapilotregionfor visa-free travel between Russia and the European Union. Kaliningrad’sgovernmentandbusinessarealsointerestedinexpandingeconomiccoopera-tionwiththeEU,attractingforeigninvestmentsandparticipatingintheEUaidprograms(NorthernDimension,CBCandother).Theyhavesoughttocre-atepreferentialinvestmentconditionsintheregion,includingintheSpecialEconomicZone,whichwould consider support for small andmedium-sizedenterprises (see section 2).A barrier to the region’s attractiveness to inves-torsistheextensive areas of restricted access:foreignersarenotadmittedtoa5-kilometerborderzoneandotherareascoveringatotalofathirdoftheoblast’sterritory39.Atthesametime,thelocalelitesareawarethattheyowemajor infrastructural investments toMoscow, suchas themodernisationoftherailwaytoMoscow,theconstructionofamodernpassengerportinPioner-skoye,thedevelopmentoftheKhrabrovoairportortheconstructionofroads(includingMamonowo-Grzechotki-Sovetsk)andbridges,fundedfromfederalprograms40.On theotherhand,despite theendorsementof the federalpro-grammefortheKaliningradoblastby2015,withplannedinvestmentsamount-ingto$600million,nofundshavereachedtheregionsofar.

the primorsky Krai with the capital in Vladivostok isaffectedbothbyitsperipheralpositionvis-à-visthecapital,andbyitsseasidelocationandproxim-itytodevelopedorrapidlydevelopingeconomiesofAsiaandthePacific.There-gionitselfsuffersfromitspost-Sovietlegacy–intheSovietUnion,Vladivostokwasaclosedmilitaryportanditsindustrywasfocusedontheneedsofthearmy(itsshipyardsproducedshipsfortheNavy).ThecollapseoftheUSSRbroughtthecollapseoftheentirelocalindustry,andunemploymentsoared.Currentlybusinessactivity intheregionischaracterisedbyahighdegreeofcriminali-sation,which can best be seen in one of themost important branches of itseconomy,thefishing industry41.Sincethe1990sthissectorhaswitnessedthecoalescenceofthelocalauthoritiesandcriminalstructures,asevidencedintheterm‘fishmafia’,identifiedwiththeformergovernorSergeiDarkinwhocreatedaspecificcriminalisednetworkthatsurvivedevenafterhisdismissalin201242.

39 Acaptiveisland…,op. cit.40 N.Tsukanov,op. cit.41 As ascertained by the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service, 50% of income from fishing goes

tothegreyzone,andthepriceoffishhasbeeninflatedseveral times.Y.Skrynnik, ‘FASglubokonyrnula’,Vedomosti,20April2011.

42 N. Istomin, ‘Primorskayarybnayamafiyaostayotsyanaplavu’,The Moscow Post, 18Octo-ber2013.

25

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

TheregionaleconomyisstronglyaffectedbytheproximityofAsiancountries:thePrimorskyKraiisanimporterofmanycategoriesofgoodsfromAsia,suchaselectronics,cars,clothingandfood.Thistradeisconducivetothedevelop-mentofsmallandmediumbusinesses(especiallyinareassuchastheimport,sale and service of cars, and the clothing trade) andhorizontal businessnet-works.Theresidentsof theregionhaverepeatedlydemonstrated theirdeter-mination and ability to self-organise in defence of their interests wheneverMoscowtriedtostrikeatthem.Forexample,in2005thefederalgovernmentan-nouncedtheintroductionofabanonimportsofcarswiththesteeringwheelontheright-handside(carsimportedfromJapanmakeupapproximately90%ofallpassengervehiclesusedintheRussianFarEast).Massprotestsbrokeoutintheregion,andmanyprotesterstiedorangeribbonstotheircars,inareferencetothe‘OrangeRevolution’thatwastakingplaceinUkraineatthetime.Theseweresomeofthefirst mass grassroots protests in russiasince2000;asaresult,thegovernmentinMoscowgaveupontheplannedactivities.In2008,thefed-eralgovernmentannouncedasharpincreaseindutiesonimportedcars,whichstartedanotherwaveofprotests inVladivostok,organisedbyrepresentativesof the automobile business, social organisations (including the regional civicorganisationTIGR),withpoliticalpartiesjoininglater(theCommunists).Dur-ingtheseprotests,harshanti-governmentrhetoricandcriticismofthenPrimeMinisterVladimirPutinappeared,whichwasanoveltybyRussianstandards43.

JustasinKaliningrad,discontenthasbeenmanifestedinthePrimorskyKraiat theprojects that theKremlin launched in the region, suchas theway inwhichtheAPECsummitwasorganisedinVladivostokin2012,whichcostthefederalbudgetover$20billion.Thelocationofthesummitonthealmostun-inhabitedRusskiyislandwascriticisedasanideathatdidnotmatchtheneedsofVladivostokcity:ahugeuniversitycampuswaserectedontheisland,whichwasconnectedwiththemainlandbyagiantbridge,andabighighwayrunningtotheairport(whilenonewroadwasconstructedinthecityitself).Contro-versywasalsosparkedbythe lowqualityof the infrastructureconstructedandtheinflatedcosts,whichwaslaterconfirmedbyareportbytheAccountingChamberthataccusedthesummit’sorganisersofembezzlement.Asaresult,the ‘shot’offederalinvestmenthasnotresultedinanymodernisationoftheinfrastructurethattheregionneededmost,andhasnotincreaseditsinvest-mentattractiveness.ThefrustrationofthePrimorskyKrai’sresidentsatMos-cow’sinitiativesisalsomanifestedintheirvotingduringelections;theKraiis

43 Theslogansthatwereraisedduringtheprotestsincluded‘Putlerkaput’,http://www.news-vl.ru/vlad/2009/01/31/miting

26

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

amongtheregionswiththelowest election results for Vladimir putin and the ‘party of power’, united russia44.

Finally,aspecialplaceonthemapofRussiaisreservedforMoscow,whichisacentreofdisproportionately high concentration of capital and human resources,butalsoaspotwithaspecificsocialandpoliticalculture,clearlydifferentfromtherestofRussia.Moscow,especiallywithinthelimitsoftheso-called Garden Ring (Sadovoye Koltso, a circular ring road setting out theboundariesofthecentre)isadistinctiveislandontheeconomicmapofRussia.MostlargeRussiancorporationsareregisteredandmaintaintheirheadquar-tersthere,andpaytaxestothemetropolitanbudget,eventhoughtheiractiv-ityisoftencarriedoutthousandsofkilometresaway.MoscowtopstheForbeslistofdollarbillionaireslivinginacity45andisintheforefrontoftheworld’smostexpensivecities(in2013itwassecond,accordingtoForbes).MoscowalsooutnumbersallotherRussianregionswhenitcomestolivingstandards–theaverageincomeofametropolitanresidentexceedsthatinmostoftheremain-ingregionsbyseveraltimes46.

Theexcessiveconcentrationofcapitalhastranslatedintotherapiddevelop-mentofMoscow’seconomy,andconstantlyattractsthemostactiveresidentsofotherregions.Apartfromhigherlivingstandards,thecapitalischaracterisedbyahighpercentageofeducatedpeopleandawell-developed social fabric.WhenitcomestoMoscow,wecansaythatRussia’straditionalsocialattitudesofpassivity,atomisation,lackofsocialtrustandinabilitytotakegrass-rootsinitiativeshaveeffectivelybeenovercomehere.RecentyearshavealsoshownthattheresidentsofMoscowareinthevanguardindemonstratingexpecta-tions for systemic changes; forpluralismin theeconomyandpolitics;andfor a democratic alternative to the current government. These new habitshavestartedtoaffectthepoliticalsphere.Sofar,themosttangibleresultsofMoscow’s social andpolitical ‘awakening’havebeenmassive streetprotestsattheturnof2011and2012,andtheMoscowmayoralelectionsinSeptember2013,whentheoppositioncandidateAlexeiNavalnygainedasurprisinglyhigh

44 Intherecentparliamentaryelectionsof2011inthePrimorskyKrai,UnitedRussiawon33%ofthevote(withtheaveragenationwideresultbeing49.5%),andinthecityofVladivostokitevenlosttothecommunists.Details:J.Rogoża,‘ParliamentaryelectionsinRussia:poli-ticsisback’,7December2011,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2011-12-07/parliamentary-elections-russia-politics-back

45 AccordingtoForbes,78billionaireslivedinMoscowin2011,andaccordingtotheChineserankingoftheGlobalRichListin2013therewere76oftheminMoscow.

46 RIANovostiratingfortheyear2013,http://vid1.rian.ru/ig/ratings/life_2013.pdf,pp.12-15.

27

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

result(over27%ofthevotes)47.ThecharacteristicsofNavalny’ssocialbase(theyoungergenerationofMoscowresidents)andhisnovelelectioncampaignmaybeoneofthemanymanifestationsofthedevelopmentofanewsocialandpo-liticalculture,basedonahorizontal,bottom-upapproachanddecentralisationofpower.Navalny’selectionprogrammealsoincludedappealstodecentraliseMoscow’smanagementandstrengthenlocalcouncils.

The abovementioned regions are in the vanguard of those Russian regionsthat are interested in systemic changes, including theextensionof their au-tonomyandtheabilitytobenefitfromtheirspecificassets.Shouldthepoliticalcircumstancesbecomemorefavourable, theyare likelytoseeksuchchangesmoreactively.However,itshouldbenotedthatinthescaleoftheentireRussianFederation,theregionsthatpredominatenumericallyaretheoneswhichareindigent, resourceless, and devoid of a clear specificityandidentity.Exam-plesofsuchregions intheEuropeanpartofRussiaareKalmykia,Mordovia,Mari-El,theOryol,KostromaandBryanskoblasts,andintheAsianpartTuva,Buryatia,theZabaykalskykraiandtheAmuroblast48.Asarule,theseregionsareeconomicallyunderdevelopedandtendtoseetheironlychanceofimprov-ing theirfinancial condition inaid fromthecentralgovernment.TheirdeepfinancialdependenceuponthecentredeterminestheirsupplicantpositioninrelationswithMoscow,whocanonlyseektheincreaseofsupportintheformofgrantsandsubsidies,inreturnforguaranteesofloyaltytotheKremlin.

Thesocietiesinsuchregionsareusuallytryingtodealwithacutesocio-eco-nomicproblems, donot engage in grassroots social activity, and show little(ifany)interestinpolitics.Thelackofinstitutionsforciviccontrolandofin-dependentmediameansthatpoliticalprocesses,includingelectionsatalllev-els,arefarfromcompetitiveandtransparent.Theresultsofelectionswithinsuchregionsareinfactbasedonbehind-the-scenesagreements(inthecaseofelectingtheheadoftheregion,thesearrangementsincludetheopinionoftheKremlin),whileduringfederalelectionstheregions’authoritiesdotheirbesttoprovidegoodelectionresultsforcandidatesandpartiesassociatedwiththeKremlin.Incontrasttothepreviouslydescribed‘active’regions,theindi-gentand inertialonesareuninterested in expanding their autonomy, asitwouldinvolvethenecessityofindependentlysearchingfornewsourcesof

47 J. Rogoża, ‘Regional elections in Russia:Moscow versus the regions’, 11 September 2013,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-09-11/regional-elections-russia-moscow-versus-regions

48 Seefootnote46.

28

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

income,forwhichtheyarenotprepared;theylackbothnaturalcompetitiveadvantages(suchasrawmaterialsorattractivelocation)aswellashabitsofac-tivityandentrepreneurship.Therefore,theseregionsarethebackboneofthecurrent‘asymmetric’modelofrelationsbetweenMoscowandtheregions,butalsoofthewidersystemofgovernmentcharacterisedbycentralisation,lackoftransparencyandthetop-downdirectionofimportantprocesses.

This enormous diversity, as evidenced by the description of thementionedgroupsofregions,leadsustotalkabouta‘multi-speedRussia’.Ontheonehand,theRussianFederationhas ‘islandsofactivity’– largecitieswithhigherliv-ingstandardsanddistinctivespecificity,ahigherconcentrationofsocialcapi-tal,andagrowingneedforpluralisminpoliticsandelectionscharacterisedbycompetition,wherethe‘partyofpower’andtheKremlincandidatestradi-tionallygainlowerresults.Ontheothersideofthescalearethenumericallydominant,inertandindigentregions,financiallyandpoliticallydependentonthecentre,whicharenotinterestedinchangingtheexistingmodel.Thus,thesocial changesobserved inRussiaalongwiththegenerationalchange,eco-nomicandtechnologicdevelopment,aredistinctivelyinsular in nature.Fur-therconfirmationofthispointwasprovidedbytheabovementionedregionalelectionsof8September2013,whichwereheldinmostRussianregions,andonce again showedhow much the individual regional societies differ in terms of their political activity, civic awareness and expectations of the authorities.

29

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

iV. FerMent in tHe reGions

Insomeregions,dissatisfactionatthelimitstotheirautonomyhasexistedinalatentformsincethebeginningofthepolicyofcentralisation.Untilrecently,however,inthetimesofeconomicprosperity,therelationsbetweenthecentreandtheregionswerebasedonthe‘exchangeofservices’andwerebeneficialforbothsides:thecentreexpectedtheregionstoprovidegoodelectionresultsandguaranteesocialstability(noprotestsorriots)ontheirterritory,andinreturnMoscowdistributedabundantincomegeneratedbyenergyresources,andleftregionalelitessignificantroomformanoeuvreconcerninglocalmat-ters.However,theseconditionshavebeguntochangeinrecentyears.Moscow’spoliticalcontrolovertheregionaleliteshasbeenintensified,regionalbudgetshavebeenseriouslyburdenedwithsocialobligations(seesection2),andsomeregionshavelostcontrolovertheirstrategicassetstoMoscow(Bashkortostan,Yakutia),whichhasweakenedtheirbargainingposition.

Asaresult,someregionshavestartedtopubliclyexpressdissatisfactionwiththeKremlin’spolicies.Thisdiscontentcametolightattheturnof2011and2012,whentheannouncementthatPutinandMedvedevwereswappingplaceswasmetwithmasssocialprotestsinMoscow.Formostofthepolitical,economicandsocialplayers,Putin’sreturnequalledtheabandonmentofagradualevo-lutionofthesystemofgovernment,andareturntoapolicyofcentralisationand‘directcontrol’,aswellasastrengtheningoftheinstitutionsofforce’spo-sition in the system.Theseprospects sparkedunrestnot only amongactivesocialgroupsandbusinesscircles,butalsoamong the stateadministration,includingapartofregionalelites.

Dissatisfactionwiththepolicyofthecentrewaspubliclyexpressedbyleadersofcertainregions;thosewithastrongereconomicpositionordistinctivespec-ificity(suchasthepresidentsofTatarstanandBashkortostan,andpoliticiansfrom the Krasnoyarsk krai) and governors with a democratic background(suchasNikitaBielykh,theleaderoftheKirovoblast).Sometimestheregions’dissentwasnotdirectlyexpressedbythelocalelites,butbyaffiliatedpoliticalgroups,mediaor loyal experts.Themain subjectsofdiscontentbecame thescopeoftheregionalauthorities’competences,thescaleoffinancialburdensputontheregions,aswellastheKremlin’sdemandto‘boost’UnitedRussia’selectoralresultswhenrealpublicsupportforthepartywasinsharpdecline.Thecurrentdivision of powersbetweenthecentreandtheregionswasopen-ly criticised by the former president of Tatarstan,Mintimer Shaimiev (andacurrentadvisortothenewpresidentofTatarstan;seesection3).Shaimiev

30

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

appealedfortheroleoftheregionsintherelevantdecision-makingprocessestobestrengthened,andaccusedtheKremlinoffailingtorespecttheprincipleofseparationofpowers.Similardemandsappearedinspeechesbypoliticiansfromresource-richSiberianregions, includingAlexandrUss,thespeakeroftheKrasnoyarskKraiparliament.ThepresidentsofTatarstanandBashkor-tostan,RustamMinnikhanovandRustemKhamitov,criticisedtheKremlin’s2013initiativeconcerningthewithdrawalofdirectelectionsforregionallead-ers (restoredbyMedvedev in 2012).The regionshave also expresseddissat-isfactionwiththegrowingdependenceonthecentralbudgetandadditionalfinancialburdensputontheregionsbyMoscow.TheKremlin’scontroversialinitiatives(concerninginternationalissuesandmoralaspects)havealsobeensubjecttodisapproval,especiallythelawprohibitingUScitizensfromadopt-ingRussianorphans;thiswascriticisedbyKaliningradgovernorNikolaiTsu-kanovandtheKirovoblast’sheadNikitaBielykh,amongothers.

Theriseofdiscontentintheregionshasalsotranslatedintothedecreasing efficiency of the Kremlin’s ‘electoral machine’,whichisbasedonregionaladministrations and so far has ensured good results for Kremlin-affiliatedpartiesandcandidates.IntheparliamentaryelectionsinDecember2011,the‘partyofpower’UnitedRussiagained49.3%ofthevote–almost15percentagepointslessthaninthepreviouselections,andinafewlargecitiesthepartyevenlosttothecommunists49.Meanwhile,themediareportedthatbeforetheelection,thePresidentialAdministrationtaskedtheregionswithaninformalcommandtoensure65%ofthevotesfortheparty.Theparty’smuchlowerelec-toralresultsmaybethusseenasreluctancebytheregionalelitestotakeexces-siverisksinthefaceoftheparty’sdeterioratingimageanddroppingpopular-ity,thefermentwithintheadministration,andtheactivitiesofindependentelectionobservers,whowereengagedintheelectiononamassscaleandre-cordednumerousviolations.

Another signof the regional elites’ discontentwith thepolitical system im-posedbytheKremlinmaybethesymptomsoferosionofthe‘powervertical’(bestseenintheexampleofUnitedRussia)andthesignsofpolitical pluralismattheregionallevel.Thefirstsignalsofthisprocesswereseveralsplitswithintheparty’sregionalstructures,especiallyregardingthecaseofYevgenyUr-lashov,wholeftUnitedRussiaaccusingthepartyoffraud,andin2012wonthe

49 InSt.Petersburg,UnitedRussiagained32.5%ofthevotes,inthePrimorskyKrai33%,andintheKaliningradoblast37%.ThepartywasevendefeatedbytheCommunistsinKalinin-grad,IrkutskandVladivostok.Seesection3ofthistext.

31

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

mayoralelectionsinYaroslavlcity.Insomeregions,alternativeforcestotherulingcampstartedoperatingmoreactively. In theelectionofgovernor forRyazanoblast,theincumbentheadoftheregionfacedseriousopposition;dur-ingthecampaignhisopponentIgorMorozov,amemberofthePatriotsofRus-siaparty,becameafocusoftheregion’scounter-elite.Aprecedent-settingsitu-ationoccurredbeforetheelectionofthegovernorforBryanskoblast,wheretheincumbentNikolaiDenin,amemberofUnitedRussia,ranagainstVadimPotomsky, a popular businessman associated with the Communists. AfterPotomskyfiledacomplaintduringthecampaign,theregionalcourtexcludedtheincumbentgovernorfromtheelection,whichwasanon-standardoccur-renceinRussianrealities(DeninwaseventuallyrestoredbyRussia’sSupremeCourtandwontheelection,whichcanberegardedastheresultofMoscow’sintervention). In 2013, this trend continued; several candidates from ‘out-side the system’ achieved spectacular successes:thepopularsocialactivistYevgenyRoizmanbecamethemayorofEkaterinburg, thedemocraticpoliti-cianGalinaShirshina,affiliatedwiththeYablokoparty,becamethemayorofPetrozavodsk,andoppositionleaderAlexeiNavalnywonasurprisinglyhighpercentageofvotesinthemayoralelectioninMoscow.Existingpoliticalandpartyarrangementsintheregionshavegraduallybeguntochange;personal exchanges between the parties have intensified,somemembersofthere-gionalnomenklaturahavechangedparties,andtheentireprocesshasbeenac-celeratedby the liberalisationofparty legislation, introduced inApril 2012,whichsignificantlyfacilitatedtheregistrationofpoliticalparties.OneofthegreatestbeneficiariesofthisprocessistheCivicPlatformparty,establishedbythebillionaireMikhailProkhorov50.

However,despitethesymptomsoferosionoftheKremlin ‘vertical’,anddis-contentwithintheregionaleliteswiththeirlimitedautonomy,onecanhardlyspeakoftheregionsadoptingaconsolidatedpositiononthesystemicimprove-mentoftheirsituation,andnothinglikearegional‘Fronde’exists.Thisisduetoseveralfactors:

• the regional elites’ limited instruments of influence on the centre.WhiletheKremlinhasextensiveinstrumentsofpressureontheregions,

50 Civil Initiatives Committee report, 14August 2013, http://komitetgi.ru/analytics/788/ #.Uiid5Zyyx1k.Among thebest knownpoliticianswhohave joined theCivic PlatformareYevgenyUrlashov,nowtheformermayorofYaroslavl(whohadpreviouslybeenamemberofUnitedRussia);YevgenyRoizman,themayorofYekaterinburg,andSolomonGinzburgandKonstantinDoroshok,well-knownoppositionMPsfromtheKaliningradoblast.

32

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

bothlegalandinformal,theregions’instrumentsofleveragearemostlyin-formalandrelatetoissuesofalimited scope.AlongwiththeirdeparturefromtheFederationCouncil,theregionalleadershavelosttheirinfluenceontheRussianlegislationatthefederallevel.Theircurrentpotentialin-cludeslobbyinginthePresidentialAdministration,and(throughselectedDumadeputies)theFederationCouncilsenators(whorepresenttheregionsatleastformally)andregionalbusinessstructures(forexample,alargeTa-tarbusinesslobbyoperatesinMoscow).Someregionsarealsolookingforwaystostrengthentheirlobbyingpotential;theTatarstangovernmenthassignedanagreementwithleadingnewsagenciestohavepositivereportsabouttherepublicpublished.Moreover,threats(realorexaggerated)com-ingfromsomeregionsareregardedasoneofthetoolstheycanusetoputinformalpressureonMoscowandserveasargumentsineffortstoobtainsome concessions or increased funding.One example of this is the 2010protests inKaliningrad (oneof thefirstmassiveprotests inRussia after2000),whichwereallegedlysupported(implicitlyandindirectly)bypartoftheregionaladministration.Thiswasaimedtostrengthenthefeelingoftheregion’sdiscontentwiththepoliciesoftheKremlin-appointedgover-norGeorgyBoos.Asaresult,thisMoscow-basedgovernorwasreplacedbyapoliticianfromtheregion.TheethnicrepublicsalsoseemtobeexertingpressureonMoscow;TatarstanandBashkortostanhaveapparentlybeen‘blackmailing’MoscowwiththeactivityofradicalIslamicgroupsontheirterritories,aswellaswithgrowingnationalistsentiments,andeventheriseofregional‘separatism’51.

• thinking in terms of private interests–theinterestsoftheirownre-gion,andmostoftentheinterestsofregionalrulingclans.Itismainlyin-dependentexpertswhoformulatethesupra-regionalobjectivesandstrate-gies,whilethepoliticalelitesintheregionsthinkintermsofthediverginginterestsofindividualregionswhohavetocompetewitheachotherforthesamepooloffundsfromthecentralbudget,andthisrivalryisazero-sumgame.Butevenwithinoneregion,theauthoritiesdonotsomuchseekfa-vourablesystemicsolutions,astheypursuelucrativeprojectsthatwouldbe ‘managed’bystructuresassociatedwith theregionaladministrations(seesection2,thecaseofTatarstan).

51 Intheopinionofpro-Kremlinexperts,this‘blackmail’oftheethnicrepublicsismanifestedintheactivityofillegalIslamicorganisations,includingnumerousattacksonrepresenta-tivesofmoderateIslam,orparadesthroughthestreetsofKazanofcolumnsofcarswithflagsoftheradicalIslamicpartyHizbut-Tahrir.MoreinR.Suleymanov,op. cit.

33

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

• the inability to consolidate at the level of regional elites.Russialacksapublicplatformfordebatesontheregionalpolicy.Themainbarrierforregionalconsolidation,orevenforlaunchingapublicdebateontherela-tionshipbetweenthecentreandtheregions,istheattitudeoftheKremlin,whichopposesanydecentralisationofpowerandbandiesaboutconceptssuchas the ‘threatofseparatism’andthe ‘menaceofRussia’sdisintegra-tion’.Anotherfactorunconducivetoanyconsolidationandelaborationofcommondemandsistheattitudeofthegovernorsthemselves.Theabsolutemajorityofthecurrentheadsofregionsarenotpoliticiansinthefullsenseoftheterm;theyaretheKremlin’sappointees,withnohabitsofpublicpol-icyandnoabilitytothinkintermsofthepublicinterestandthecommongood.ThisproblemisadditionallyexacerbatedbyawidersocialprobleminRussia,namelysocialatomisation,alackofmutualtrustandthehabitsofcoordinatingcollectiveinitiatives.

34

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

V. MonocentrisM striKes BAcK

VladimirPutin’sreturntotheKremlininMay2012wasaturningpointthatseparatedthemoreliberal(inform)ruleofPresidentMedvedevfromanotherstage of the centralisation policywhich Putin re-launched. This policywaspartlyaresponsetounrestwithintheelitesandsociety,includingsome‘slack-ness’intheregions,themeasurableeffectofwhichwasUnitedRussia’sweakerelectoralresultsin2011.Putin’spolicyhasresultedinthereorganisationoftheKremlin’sregionalpolicy,bothintermsofitscontent,aswellasitspersonalandstructuralcomposition.

The attempt to strengthen control over the regions and over the entire do-mesticpolicyhasentailedpersonnel changes and the reorganisationofthePresidential Administration. Vladislav Surkov, the previous regional policystrategist,hasbeenmarginalised;hisstrategyconcerningtheregionsandtheentiredomesticpolicywasconsideredineffective,asithadfailedtopreventtheemergenceofopendiscontentagainsttheKremlininthesociety,regionalandbusinesselites.Surkov’srolewastakenoverbythedeputyheadofthePresi-dentialAdministration,VyacheslavVolodin,whohasareputationasa loyalexecutorofPutin’sordersandanadvocateof ‘directcontrol’methods.Volo-dinhasreorganisedthePresidentialDomesticPolicyDirectorateandreplacedSurkov’speoplewithhisownprotégés.TheDirectoratewasexpanded:thetwodivisionspreviouslydealingwithregionalpolicyhavebeenmultipliedtosix.Oneofthem,responsiblefortheoverallstrategyofregionalpolicy,washead-edbyAlexeiAnisimov,adeputyheadofVladimirPutin’selectionstaffinthelastpresidentialelection52.Thesestructuralchangeshavealsostrengthenedthesubordinationofregionaladministrations;attheleveloffederaldistrictsandtheregions,domesticpolicydepartmentswereestablished(orexpanded),modelledonthestructureofthePresidentialAdministration(inmanyregionstheywereheadedbydeputygovernors).TheworkofUnitedRussia’sregionalbrancheswassupportedbymorerecognisablepoliticianssentfromMoscowheadquarters53.

Theroleofpresidentialplenipotentiaryrepresentativesinthefederaldistrictshasbeenmarginalised, andmanyof themhavebeenreplaced54. In2012 the

52 For details see Administratsiya Prezidenta zavershila reformu upravleniya vnutrenneypolitiki,http://www.lenta.ru,15March2012.

53 M.Tirmaste,‘Vregionyspustilivnutrennuyupolitiku’,Kommersant,4June2012.54 Themost interestingnominationwas theappointmentof IgorKholmanskikhasapresi-

35

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

Kremlinalsoinitiatedanongoingreplacementofthoseregionalleaderswhowere considered ineffective (suchas thegovernorsof theStavropol andZa-baykalskykrais and theOmsk,Magadan,Vladimir and Ivanovooblasts), orthosewhowereconsideredSurkov’sprotégés (suchasMikhailYurevich, thegovernorofChelyabinskoblast).Thedepartureofgovernorsappointeddur-ingMedvedev’spresidency,suchasNikolaiTsukanov(Kaliningrad),NikolaiIgnatiev(Chuvashia)andIgorOrlov(Archangelskoblast),isalsoexpected.Inaddition,theKremlinhastighteneditscontroloverregionalsecurityagencies:inNovember2013Putininitiatedtheprocessofsubordinatingregionalpros-ecutorsdirectlytothepresident(beforetheyhadbeenappointedbythePros-ecutorGeneralofRussia)55.

TheKremlinispursuingadualstrategyconcerningtheregionalelites.Ontheonehand,thisinvolvesdemonstrationsofconcessionstotheregions,i.e.therestoration of formal democratic procedures,andontheotherhand,itin-troducesrigorousmethodsofcontroloverthosenewprocedures,whichdis-tortstheirimpactalmostcompletely.Asaresult,theconcessions introduced by Moscow appear to be just an empty gesture.Thedecentralisationandthetransferofsomecompetences to theregional level,asannouncedby formerPresidentMedvedev and prepared by two governmentworking groups (ledbydeputyPMsKozakandKhloponin)haveultimatelybroughtnoresults.Therestorationofgeneralelectionstothepostsofregionalleader(undertheactof1June2012)hasbeensubjecttosomanyblockingmechanisms56thatMoscowisstillabletomaintainthecontrolovertheelectionprocessasearlyasthestage

dentialplenipotentiaryrepresentativesintheUralFederalDistrict.Kholmanskikh,atankfactoryengineerfromNizhnyTagil,isbestknownforhisstatementduringthemassanti-PutindemonstrationsinMoscowin2011;infrontoftelevisioncamerasheofferedtocometoMoscowwithhisco-workersand‘teachtheprotestersalesson’.Also,tworepresentativesassociatedwithMedvedevandSurkovhavebeenreplaced:NikolaiVinnichenko(North-WesternFederalDistrict)wasreplacedbytheFSBofficerVladimirBulavin,andOlegGovo-run(whomanagedtheCentralFederalDistrictforayear)wasreplacedwiththeSt.Peters-burg-basedAlexandrBeglov.

55 InOctober2013,PutinsubmittedadraftconstitutionallawtotheDumathatextendsthepresident’spowers;theprojectentailsthepresident’srighttoappointanddismissnotonlytheProsecutorGeneral (as isthecaseatthemoment),butalsohisdeputiesandregionalprosecutors.

56 ThemainmechanismoftheKremlin’scontrolovertheelectionofregionalleadersistheso-called‘municipalfilter’,i.e.therequirementforthecandidatestocollectsignaturesfrom5to10%ofcouncillorsin75%ofalllocalmunicipalitiesintheirarea.Theexecutivebranch’scontroloverthecouncillorsmakesitvirtuallyimpossiblefortheoppositioncandidatestomeetthisrequirement,asevidencedbythefactthateveninMoscowAlexeiNavalnywasunabletocollecttherequirednumberofsignatures,andhadtoaccepttheassistanceofhismainrival,theincumbentmayorSergeiSobyanin.

36

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

ofthecandidates’registration.Inaddition,theKremlinfreelyusesitsrighttodismissgovernors,whichmakesitpossibletoholdearlyelectionsandappointthecandidateitsupportsasactingheadoftheregionuntiltheelections.Thisfossilisestheprinciplesfromthetimeswhengovernorswerede factoappoint-edbytheKremlin:regional elites seek the support of the Kremlintoafargreaterdegreethanthesupportofregionalgroupsandsocieties.Atthesametime,italmostcompletelywrecksanyrealpoliticalcompetitionattheregionallevel57.Asaresult,in most cases the ‘new’ practice of electing regional gov-ernors is no different from the ‘old’ practice of their appointment by the president.Moreover,theeffectofthischangehasbeenfurtherweakenedbytheamendmentadoptedinApril2013,attheinitiativeofPresidentPutin,thatofferstheregionsthepossibilitytoabandontheprocedureofelectingthegov-ernorandrestoretheprocedureofhisappointmentbyaregionalparliamentuponthenominationoftheKremlin(sofar,thisprocedurehasbeenrestoredinDagestanandIngushetia).

Severalotheramendments to the regional electoral legislation,sometimespresentedasasignofdemocratisation,weremerelyattemptsbytheKremlintoadapttochangingsocialandpoliticalconditions.TheincreaseinNovember2013oftheshareofdeputieselectedinsingle-memberconstituenciesfrom50to75%wasmainlyduetothedecline insupportforthepro-KremlinUnitedRussiaparty.Theamendmenttothepartylegislation,whichcameintoforceinApril2012andsignificantlysimplifiedtheregistrationofnewparties,was,surprisingly,alsobeneficialforthegovernment,asithasresultedinanenor-mous increase in thenumberofparties,most ofwhicharemarginal. Someofthem,duetoasimilarityofnames, ‘stole’votesfromoppositionpartiesintheelections(suchasthenewlyformedCommunistsofRussiaandtheCPSU,whichtookawayseveralpercentofthevotesfromthe‘official’CommunistPar-tyoftheRussianFederationinseveralregions).Moreover,theparticipationoftheseparties(inRussiatheyarecalled‘spoilers’)inelectionshascontributedtothedispersionofvotesandtheinabilityofmostofthepartiestocrosstheelectionthreshold.Duringtheprocessofdistributingseats,these‘lost’voteswouldbetakenoverbytheelections’favourite–inthiscase,UnitedRussia58.

57 AnexceptiontothisrulewastheelectionsformayorofYekaterinburg,wonbyYevgenyRoizman,anindependentlocalcandidateopposedtotheSverdlovskoblastgovernorYevg-enyKuyvashev.However,thepowersofthemayorinthiscityareverymodestandlimitedtorepresentativefunctions(economicissuesaremanagedbyahiredcitymanager);moreo-ver,itcanbeassumedthatMoscowmostlikelyconsciouslydecidednottoblockRoizmaninorderto‘discipline’thegovernorKuyvashev.

58 Intheregionalelectionson8September2013,approximately30-40%ofthevoteswerecast

37

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

Anothermanipulationmadeintheinterestofthegovernmentwastoscheduleregionalelections for thesecondSundayofSeptember–on theonehand, itmade itmoredifficult for theopponents toprepare their electioncampaign(whichtookplaceduringtheholidays),andontheotheritdecreasedtheturn-out,whichinRussiaistraditionallyconsideredtobeconducivetotheauthori-ties’manipulationsoftheelectoralresults.

Anotherformaltool tocontrol theregions is theexpanded mechanism for verifyingtheregionalelites’work.UnderVladimirPutin’sdecreeofJanuary2013,theprocedureofthegovernors’dismissalwasextended;therighttode-mand thisdismissalwasgranted to federal governmentministers,whoareoften critical of the regions (for example, theMinister of Finance regularlycriticisestheregionsforthelackoffiscaldiscipline);thefinaldecisiontodis-misstheheadoftheregionremainsthepresident’sprerogative.Thelistofcri-teriameasuringtheeffectivenessofregionalleaders,whichwaspreparedbythePresidentialAdministration,includestheimplementationofpresidentialdecreesandtheregion’sethnicandreligiousstability59. InOctober2013, theDumapassedalawmakingtheregionalandlocalauthoritiesresponsibleforthepreventionofethnicconflictsintheirregions60.ThisexposestheregionstofurthercriticismfromMoscowinasituationofrisingethnictensioninRus-sia,eventhoughthesourceofthisproblemistoagreatextentthepolicyofthecentre (including theunregulatedprinciplesofmigration, andanextensivegreyzoneofillegalmigrantlabour).

Intheeconomicsphere,Moscow’sstrategytowardstheregionsisbasedonin-creasing their socio-economic obligations,amovewhichhasshaken the stability of their budget systemsandreinforced the model of ‘direct con-trol’ from the centre.PresidentPutin’sdecreesof7May2012burdenedtheregionalbudgetswiththeneedtoraisesalariesinthebudgetsector,whichin-creasedtheirspendingby5%.Thisrequirementhasnotbeencompensatedbyequivalenttransfersfromthecentralbudget.Theregions’incomehasalsode-creasedduetotheeconomicslowdown,whichhasledtothereductionoftaxescollected,includingincometax(theshareoftaxesintheregions’incomefellfrom28%to22%overtheperiod2008-2013).Asaresult,thedeficitofregional

forpartiesthatdidnotcrossthethreshold,whichcontributedtotheimprovementintheperformanceoftheelections’favourite,UnitedRussia:afterthefinaldistributionofseatsthepartygainedanaverageof77%.J.Rogoża,‘RegionalelectionsinRussia’,op. cit.

59 http://www.minregion.ru/upload/documents/051113/051113_794.pdf60 http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1720890.html

38

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

budgetsmore than doubled in 2013, reaching $22 billion; two-thirds of re-gional budgets currently have a deficit61.Thistrendwillcontinuein2014;thecostof salary increases forpublic sectoremployees for regionalbudgetswillriseby7%,andinsomeregionsbyupto10%.Theregions’incomehasad-ditionallybeenreducedbythecentralauthorities’taxpolicy;thecentregrantsnumerous taxreliefs to largecorporationswhichoperate inEasternSiberiaandtheFarEast,mainlyconcerningtaxesthatgotoregionalbudgets(incometax,landandrealestatetax).Incidentally,norebatesaregrantedforthetaxesthataredirectedtothefederalbudget(suchastheMineralExtractionTax).

Duetotheshrinkageofrevenues,theregionshaveassignedamajorshareofthemforcurrentliabilities,whileagreat deal of investments, including in infrastructure, have been cut.Thisproblemnowconcernsnotonlytheleastdevelopedregions,butalsotheindustrialisedones,suchastheChelyabinsk,SverdlovskandIrkutskoblasts.Thedeteriorationofthefinancialsituationintheregionshas forced theregionalgovernments tomakeunpopularcuts insocialspending;closingschoolsandhospitalsinsmallertowns,andreducingthescopeoffreebenefits62.Moscowinturnisusingthisforpropagandapur-poses;thecentreblamestheregionalauthoritiesfortheliquidationofsocialinfrastructureandanincreaseinmunicipaltariffs.Despitethereductionoftheirinvestmentplans,theregionsbecomefurtherindebtedastheyhavetocovertheexpenditureresultingfromthepresidentialdecreesof7May2012,which requires incurring further loans. In 2013, 28 regions issuedbonds tomendtheirfinancialsituation,althoughthesedonotalwaysenjoysufficientdemand,sincetheyhavetocompetewiththefederalbondsandthoseissuedbystate-ownedcompanies.

Thecentralauthorities’decisionshavedisturbedthestabilityofregionalbudg-etsystems,whichstrengthensthemechanismofdirectcontrolfromMoscow.The central authorities are seeking tomaintain their control over regionalspending,andassignfinancialaidintheformofsubsidiesforspecificpurpos-es,suchastheimplementationoffederaltargetprograms,specialisedmedi-cal assistance, equipment for sports centres, the implementation of energy

61 Inthefirsthalfof2013,theincometaxraisedfellby20%,andtransfersfromthefederalbudgetfellby15%.TheaveragedebtofregionalandlocalgovernmentsinSeptember2013exceeded25%oftheirincome.SeeN.Zubarevich,‘ChetyreRossii:Chtodalshe’,Vedomosti,24September2013.

62 This reduction affects selected specialisations: for example, schools fire child psycholo-gists,speechtherapists,musicteachers,etc.N.Zubarevich,‘ChetyreRossiinaodnoyter-ritorii’,Novaya Gazeta,18November2013.

39

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

efficiencyprogrammes,theorganisationofsportingevents,economicforums,etc.Atthesametime,thedecisionsonhowthesefundsareallocatedbythecentre are far from transparent,which reinforces thearbitrary nature of Moscow’s support for the regional budgets.

Alongwithitslegislativetools,theKremlinhasawiderangeofinstrumentsfor putting informal pressure on regional governors or citymayors, suchas involving the institutions of force orwieldingcorruption allegations.Thecampaignofharassmentagainstofficialsand(alsoregional)politicians,intended to discipline them and conducted under anti-corruption banners,was reinforced followingPutin’s return to theKremlin.Themostoutstand-ingexampleinthiscontextisthecaseofYaroslavlcity;asalreadymentioned,themayorelectionsinthecityin2012werewonbyanoppositionpolitician,YevgenyUrlashov,whohadleftUnitedRussiaandrunacampaigncriticalofthepartyandtheKremlin,andafterhisvictorycompletelyreplacedthecitymanagingteam.Inresponse,Moscowfirstappliedeconomicsanctionstothecity(Gazpromcutoffgassuppliestothecity’sheatingplantsandtheresidentsweredeprivedofhotwater),andinJuly2013Urlashovwasarrestedovercor-ruptionallegationsandstillremainsincustody.Sofar,theharshestsentenceforacrimeofcorruptionagainstaregionalpoliticianwasasentenceofnineandhalfyearsinapenalcolonyfortheformergovernorofTulaoblast,Vyache-slavDudka.Thecampaigncontinues,andoneofitsmostrecentvictimsistheformermayorofAstrakhan,MikhailStolyarov,whowasarrestedinNovem-ber2013.

ThereactivationofthepolicyofcentralisationfollowingVladimirPutin’sre-turntotheKremlinhasfurtherstrengthenedthesystemoftheregionalelites’dependenceonthecentre.ItimpliestheKremlin’sstrictpoliticalcontrolovertheelectionandactivityofregionalelites,andfurther limitstheirroomformanoeuvreinthefinancialsphere.Thisintensifiesbilateral pressure on re-gional elites whohaveincreasingdifficultiesbalancingbetweenthedemandsof thecentreand thegrowingdissatisfactionof regionalbusinessesandso-cieties(whosesocialsituationisdeteriorating).Whileintheshortterm,this‘grip’weakenstheassertivenessofregionalelitesandforcesthemtobeloyalto theKremlin, in the long run thepolicyofhyper-centralisation increasestheriskofrisingdiscontent,whichmayquicklyfindaventifthecentralgov-ernmentweakens.Moreover, thismodelof relations isnotconducive to theefficiencyinternaldevelopmentoftheregionaleconomies,asevidencedbythesteadilydecreasingnumberofdonorregionsandthegrowingindebtednessofregionalbudgets.AnalysisoftheRussianrulingelite’sprioritiessuggeststhat

40

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

thisinefficiencyisthecostthattheKremliniswillingtopayforensuringtheregionalelites’loyaltyandobedience.However,thissystemcanonlycontinuewhenthefinancialsituationofthecentralbudgetissoundandtheinflowoffundsisconstant,whichwouldmakeiteasiertomasktheinefficiencyofthismanagementmodel.

41

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

Vi. prospects: decentrALisAtion AHeAd (But WHAt Kind oF decentrALisAtion?)

DuetoRussia’slegalandinstitutionalweaknesses,therelationsbetweenthecentreandtheregionsareonlygovernedbytheconstitutionandformallawstoacertainextent,andareheavily influenced by political, economic and social conditions,aswellasthepersonalcircumstancesoftherulingteam,whichmakesthemcyclical by nature.Thislatterpointisillustratedbythetransitionfromapersonalised‘negotiatedfederalism’fromthe1990swiththefocusonthe influential regions, to thehyper-centralisation launched in thenextdecade,whenthescalestippedtowardthecentre.Thischangeinthecen-tre/regionsrelationswasmainlybroughtaboutbypersonalandpoliticalfac-torsrelatedtothechangeinRussia’sleadershipandtheeconomicboom,whilethelegalissuesweretreatedinstrumentally;theydidnotsomuchleadtothechangesastheysanctionedthempost factum.Therefore,itisworthstressingthatthecurrentformofrelationsbetweenMoscowandtheregionsisnotim-mutable,permanentandfinaleither;andthekey factor that could initiate change is the situation in the ruling camp of the federal elite.

Currently,Russiaseemstobepreparing toface the next cycle,astherearesignsofchangesinconditionsrelevantforthestabilityofthecentralgovern-ment.Ontheonehand,theeconomic situationisbecomingmorecomplicat-ed;Russiaisenteringaperiodofstagnation,whichintermsofsocialandeco-nomicconsequencesmaybemoreseverethanthecrisisof2008-200963.ThishasbroughttheKremlinupagainsttheprospectsofdecliningrevenues,andwill impose spendingcutsatboth federal and regional levels64.Otherprob-lemsincludethedeterioratingeffectivenessofmanagementandrampantcor-ruption,whichmakes the russian economy extremely capital-intensive;eventhecurrenthighpricesofrawmaterialsareno longersufficient toen-sureRussiaanadequateGDPgrowth65.Theseeconomicproblemsmayresult

63 N.Zubarevich,‘ChetyreRossiinaodnoyterritorii’, op. cit.64 Thedraftbudgetfor2014entailscutsinsocialspending,aswellasexpenditureoneduca-

tion,health,cultureandotherspheres,forthefirsttimeinyears.FordetailsseeE.Fischer,‘Projektbudżetufederalnegonarok2014–cięciazamiastreform’,2October2013]http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2013-10-02/projekt-budzetu-federalnego-na-rok-2014-ciecia-zamiast-reform

65 In 2013, the average annual price of a barrel of Urals oil amounted to US$105, and GDPgrowthreachedonly 1.3% (ithadoriginallybeenestimated at 3.7%); in2012GDPgrowthtotalled3.5%.DatafromRosstatandtheMinistryofEconomicDevelopment,quotedbyV.In-ozemtsev,‘Nebudetnidefolta,nirezkoydevalvatsii.Nozhytpridyotsyatugo’,Komsomols-kaya Pravda,3December2013.

42

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

innumeroussystemic,politicalandsocialconsequences:theexacerbationofdisputeswithintherulingeliteoverdwindlingresources,crisesindifferentspheresexposingtheinefficiencyofthemanagementmodel,risingsocialdis-contentandacceleratingdeclineinsupportfortherulingcamp.

Theweakening of the ruling elite’s legitimacy is anotherkey factor thatwill tend todevelop in thecomingyears,despite successivedemonstrationsofpowerbyVladimirPutin.Apartfromeconomic issues,manydurableandlong-termfactorscontributetothisweakness(albeitincreasinggraduallyasyet):theemergenceofnewgroupsinRussiansocietywhoseinterestsandvi-sionofthestatesystemicallycontradicttheinterestsofthecurrentleadership;agrowingfeelingthattheKremlin’svisionofacentralised,statistcountryislessandlesscongruenttoRussia’sneeds;fatigueattheunchangingcomposi-tionoftheelite;thedivergenceofinterestsbetweenthenarrowrulingcampandagrowingnumberofgroupsinbusinessandstateadministration.Expec-tationsforpoliticalchangeinRussiaweresignalledbytheprotestsattheturnof2011and2012,bypoliticalfermentintheKremlin’sbase,andbytheerosionofsupportforthe‘partyofpower’,UnitedRussia.AfterPutin’sreturntothepresidency inMay2012, thisunresthasbeen largelysilenced, the loyaltyofmanygroupsforced,andthemobilisationoftheoppositionweakened.How-ever,therestorationofthestatus quo anteseemstemporaryandfragile,andthecostofmaintainingitisgrowing:theKremlin’spolicyofblockinganychangeinvolvestheconstantuseofforceandresources,andinadditionitcreatesnewgroupsofmalcontents,includingwithinthestateadministration,whichinthelongrunisariskfactorforthecohesionoftherulingteamandthestabilityofthesystemofgovernment.

The prospects of the central governmentweakening are likely to intensifytheeffortsoftheregions–especiallythemoreaffluentones,withadistinc-tive characterandgreaterambitions– tomodify thecurrentmodelof rela-tions,whichtheyconsiderunjustandunfavourabletotheirdevelopment.Theturningpointmaycomewhentheweaknessorineffectivenessofthecentralgovernmentvis-à-vis theregions isexposed, forexample,whenMoscowhasaproblemprovidingsupportforloyalregionalactors,orusingeffectivesanc-tionsincaseofinsubordination.However,thehighdegreeofde-institutional-isationincentre/regionsrelationsmakesitdifficulttopredictwhattheexactcourseofthisprocessanditsultimateformcouldbe.Itmaytaketheformofachaotic process of disintegrationofthecurrent(largelyinformal)princi-plesandpractices.Personalfactorswillalsoplayanimportantroleinshapinganewmodel,bothinMoscowandtheregions.

43

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

Itcanbeforecastthatthelikelihoodofafurtherdeclineinthelegitimacyoftherulingelitewillincreasethepossibilityofchangesintherelationshipbe-tweenthecentreandtheregionswithinthenextdecade.thischange, how-ever, would not be equal to the creation of foundations for a fully-fledged federal model,theonethatwouldentailthestrengtheningofinstitutions,in-cludingthedevelopmentofself-governance,andtheroleofsocietyasasubjectinpolitics.Instead,thischangemaysignalthetransition,inamodifiedform,to amodel reminiscentof the 1990s:decentralisedyetheavilypersonalised,andarbitraryinnature,servingtheshort-terminterestsoftheregionalrul-ingclans.Thiswouldreplicateaflawedfederalsystemofgovernmentontheregionallevel,andcouldleadtotheformationofnewregionalsatrapies.Theprobabilityofthisscenarioisincreasedbyanumberofconditions:theregion-alrulinggroupslackdemocratichabits(theformalrestorationofgeneralelec-tionstogovernorshipschangednothinginthisrespect)andstrategicthink-ing (thehyper-centralisationpolicyhasonlydeepened the incapacitationofregional elitesby the centre).Atpresent, inmost regionsonemayquestiontheveryexistenceofregional‘elites’inthefullsenseoftheword66.Moreover,mostregionslackrealseparationofpowers,developedsocietiesandinstitu-tions likeastablepartyscene, independent judiciary,or freemedia.Evenifthecentralauthorityweakensandnewprinciplesofrelationswiththeregionsarenegotiated,thesenegotiationsmayprovetobeanotherbehind-the-scenesbargainbetweenafederalrulingcampfocusedonsavingitsownskinandtheregionalpoliticians,guidedbytheinterestsnotsomuchoftheirregionsasoftheirownclans.Asaresult,apossiblesystemicevolutionmayleadfromthedisintegrationof thecurrent,centralisedandhierarchicalmodel toanotherformofdeformedfederalism,withRussiastuckwithinaviciouscircleofcen-tralisationandregional‘paradesofsovereignties’.

JAdWiGA roGożA

66 Zakharov,op. cit.,p.106.

44

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

Obwód Kaliningradzki

Północno-Zachodni OF

Nadwołżański OF Uralski OF

Syberyjski OF

Dalekowschodni OF

Południowy OF

Północnokaukaski OF

St. Petersburg

Moskwa

Centralny OF

©

140

20 8060

1

14

30

31

19

35

2333 32

21

22

24

253427

20

15 2829

16

11

17

18 36

373

12

26

13

4

5

8 7

10

9

6

2

38

56

69

59

40

6870

41

42

53

54

55

43

44

4551

52

46

5777

78

79

67

71

72

73

74

75

76

64

58

49

61

62

63

50

80

81

82

83

47

48

3960

65

66

140

Cities of federal importanceMoscow – 1St. Petersburg – 2

AUTONOMOUS OKRUGSKhanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug – 3Chukotka Autonomous Okrug – 4Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug – 5Nenets Autonomous Okrug – 6

AUTONOMOUS OBLASTSJewish Autonomous Oblast – 7

KRAISAltai Krai – 8Khabarovsk Krai – 9

Kamchatka Krai – 10Krasnodar Krai – 11Krasnoyarsk Krai – 12Primorsky Krai – 13Perm Krai – 14Stavropol Krai – 15Zabaykalsky Krai – 16

REPUBLICSRepublic of Adygea – 17Republic of Altai – 18Republic of Bashkortostan – 19Republic of Buryatia – 20Republic of Khakassia – 21Chechen Republic – 22Chuvash Republic – 23

Republic of Dagestan – 24Republic of Ingushetia – 25Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) – 26Kabardino-Balkar Republic – 27Republic of Kalmykia – 28Karachay-Cherkess Republic – 29Republic of Karelia – 30Komi Republic – 31Republic of Mari El – 32Republic of Mordovia – 33Republic of North Ossetia – 34Republic of Tatarstan – 35Republic of Tuva – 36Udmurt Republic – 37

OBLASTSAmur Oblast – 38Arkhangelsk Oblast – 39Astrakhan Oblast – 40Belgorod Oblast – 41Bryansk Oblast – 42Chelyabinsk Oblast – 43Irkutsk Oblast – 44Ivanovo Oblast – 45Yaroslavl Oblast – 46Kaliningrad Oblast – 47Kaluga Oblast – 48Kemerovo Oblast – 49Kirov Oblast – 50Kostroma Oblast – 51Kurgan Oblast – 52

Kursk Oblast – 53Leningrad Oblast – 54Lipetsk Oblast – 55Magadan Oblast – 56Moscow Oblast – 57Murmansk Oblast – 58Nizhny Novgorod Oblast – 59Novgorod Oblast – 60Novosibirsk Oblast – 61Omsk Oblast – 62Orenburg Oblast – 63Orel Oblast – 64Penza Oblast – 65Pskov Oblast – 66Ryazan Oblast – 67Rostov Oblast – 68

Sakhalin Oblast – 69Samara Oblast – 70Saratov Oblast – 71Smolensk Oblast – 72Sverdlovsk Oblast – 73Tambov Oblast – 74Tyumen Oblast – 75Tomsk Oblast – 76Tula Oblast – 77Tver Oblast – 78Ulyanovsk Oblast – 79Vladimir Oblast – 80Volgograd Oblast – 81Vologda Oblast – 82Voronezh Oblast – 83

Map 1.RussianFederation–administrativedivision

45

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

Obwód Kaliningradzki

Północno-Zachodni OF

Nadwołżański OF Uralski OF

Syberyjski OF

Dalekowschodni OF

Południowy OF

Północnokaukaski OF

St. Petersburg

Moskwa

Centralny OF

©

140

20 8060

1

14

30

31

19

35

2333 32

21

22

24

253427

20

15 2829

16

11

17

18 36

373

12

26

13

4

5

8 7

10

9

6

2

38

56

69

59

40

6870

41

42

53

54

55

43

44

4551

52

46

5777

78

79

67

71

72

73

74

75

76

64

58

49

61

62

63

50

80

81

82

83

47

48

3960

65

66

140

Cities of federal importanceMoscow – 1St. Petersburg – 2

AUTONOMOUS OKRUGSKhanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug – 3Chukotka Autonomous Okrug – 4Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug – 5Nenets Autonomous Okrug – 6

AUTONOMOUS OBLASTSJewish Autonomous Oblast – 7

KRAISAltai Krai – 8Khabarovsk Krai – 9

Kamchatka Krai – 10Krasnodar Krai – 11Krasnoyarsk Krai – 12Primorsky Krai – 13Perm Krai – 14Stavropol Krai – 15Zabaykalsky Krai – 16

REPUBLICSRepublic of Adygea – 17Republic of Altai – 18Republic of Bashkortostan – 19Republic of Buryatia – 20Republic of Khakassia – 21Chechen Republic – 22Chuvash Republic – 23

Republic of Dagestan – 24Republic of Ingushetia – 25Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) – 26Kabardino-Balkar Republic – 27Republic of Kalmykia – 28Karachay-Cherkess Republic – 29Republic of Karelia – 30Komi Republic – 31Republic of Mari El – 32Republic of Mordovia – 33Republic of North Ossetia – 34Republic of Tatarstan – 35Republic of Tuva – 36Udmurt Republic – 37

OBLASTSAmur Oblast – 38Arkhangelsk Oblast – 39Astrakhan Oblast – 40Belgorod Oblast – 41Bryansk Oblast – 42Chelyabinsk Oblast – 43Irkutsk Oblast – 44Ivanovo Oblast – 45Yaroslavl Oblast – 46Kaliningrad Oblast – 47Kaluga Oblast – 48Kemerovo Oblast – 49Kirov Oblast – 50Kostroma Oblast – 51Kurgan Oblast – 52

Kursk Oblast – 53Leningrad Oblast – 54Lipetsk Oblast – 55Magadan Oblast – 56Moscow Oblast – 57Murmansk Oblast – 58Nizhny Novgorod Oblast – 59Novgorod Oblast – 60Novosibirsk Oblast – 61Omsk Oblast – 62Orenburg Oblast – 63Orel Oblast – 64Penza Oblast – 65Pskov Oblast – 66Ryazan Oblast – 67Rostov Oblast – 68

Sakhalin Oblast – 69Samara Oblast – 70Saratov Oblast – 71Smolensk Oblast – 72Sverdlovsk Oblast – 73Tambov Oblast – 74Tyumen Oblast – 75Tomsk Oblast – 76Tula Oblast – 77Tver Oblast – 78Ulyanovsk Oblast – 79Vladimir Oblast – 80Volgograd Oblast – 81Vologda Oblast – 82Voronezh Oblast – 83

46

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4©

140

40

2080

60

Nor

thw

este

rn F

eder

al D

istr

ict

Volg

a Fe

dera

l Dis

tric

tU

ral F

eder

al D

istr

ict

Sibe

rian

Fed

eral

Dis

tric

t

Far

East

ern

Fede

ral D

istr

ict

Sout

hern

Fed

eral

Dis

tric

t

Nor

th C

auca

sian

Fede

ral D

istr

ict

Cen

tral

Fed

eral

Dis

tric

t

Nov

osib

irsk

Niz

hny

Nov

goro

d

Rost

ov-o

n-D

on

Pyat

igor

sk

Yeka

terin

burg

Khab

arov

sk

Mos

cow

Sain

t Pet

ersb

urg

Map

2.FederaldistrictsofR

ussia

47

OSW

STU

DIE

S 4

/201

4

12

34

5

6 8

7

910

1 2 3 4 5

6 7 8 9 10

Mos

cow

city

Mos

cow

Obl

ast

St. P

eter

sbur

g ci

tyLe

ning

rad

Obl

ast

Repu

blic

of T

atar

stan

Nen

ets

Aut

onom

ous

Okr

ugYa

mal

-Nen

ets

Aut

onom

ous

Okr

ugK

hant

y-M

ansi

Aut

onom

ous

Okr

ugTy

umen

Obl

ast

Sakh

alin

Obl

ast

©

140

40

2080

60M

ap 3

.Russian

Federation–thedonorregions