In Federalist No. 1, Hamilton listed six topics to be covered in the subsequent articles:

1. "The utility of the UNION to your political prosperity" – covered in No. 2 through No. 14

2. "The insufficiency of the present Confederation to preserve that Union"—covered in No.

15 through No. 22

3. "The necessity of a government at least equally energetic with the one proposed to the

attainment of this object"—covered in No. 23 through No. 36

4. "The conformity of the proposed constitution to the true principles of republican

government"—covered in No. 37 through No. 84

5. "Its analogy to your own state constitution"—covered in No. 85

6. "The additional security which its adoption will afford to the preservation of that species of

government, to liberty and to prosperity"—covered in No. 85.[26]

#1

Federalist No. 1 (Federalist Number 1) is an essay by Alexander Hamilton. It was published on

October 27, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius. This paper provides the outline for the rest and

argues for the inadequacy of the Articles of Confederation.

Contents

  [hide] 

1   Response to Anti-Federalists

2   Opposition to The Articles of Confederation

3   Political Discord

4   Rejecting the Current Government

5   Supporting the New Constitution

6   A series of concepts

7   References

8   External links

Response to Anti-Federalists[edit source | edit beta ]

Federalist No. 1 introduces a series of essays published in the Independent Journal, the New-

York Packetand the Daily Advertiser as a response to Anti-Federalist opposition to the

proposed US Constitution. After the Constitutional Convention of 1787 the new Constitution was

sent to the various states for ratification in September 1787. Anti-Federalists essays condemning

the document began to surface later that month, quickly followed by the Federalist efforts of

Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay.

Opposition to The Articles of Confederation[edit source | edit beta ]

The essay is highly critical of the government in place at the time, though, it does not take the

form of a diatribe. Eloquently written, yet manifestly biased, Federalist No. 1 heaps praise upon

the Constitution as an efficient system of government. Hamilton is quite aware of his own bias:

You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general scope of them, that [these

ideas] proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own

to you that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your

interest to adopt it.

Hamilton is keenly aware not only of his own bias, but also those of others. In fact, Federalist No.

1, as an introductory essay, can be interpreted mainly as an attempt to impress upon readers that

opinions will always contain bias when it comes to important matters such as this. Hamilton

writes:

Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests,

unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a

thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected.

The investigation of particular types of bias is quite sophisticated. Hamilton identifies not only

those with a venomous bias, but also the plethora of people who, while their intentions are good,

exhibit an unmistakable bias. In fact, he claims even those who believe themselves to be

impartial often have hidden biases:

It cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may

hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable —

the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears.

More importantly, the discussion of bias actually introduces a key theme of the Federalist as a

whole, the relation of motive and reason in politics. Hamilton, as Publius, argues that political

motives are irrelevant to the truth of arguments made in their behalf. Arguments stand or fall of

their own weight and can neither be enhanced nor diminished by knowledge of the motives that

gave rise to them. The irrelevance of motives to the truth of arguments is one of the main reasons

why the authors of these papers choose to use a pseudonym.

Political Discord[edit source | edit beta ]

Hamilton, predicting the initial Anti-Federalist response would continue, correctly foresaw the US

Constitution as a polarizing issue. In reference to those who would oppose the Constitution, he

claimed that "A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose." According to Hamilton:

An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the

offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty.

This prediction has proven false, with hardly any discussion about the Papers (and the

known Anti-Federalist Papers) continuing to this day. Hamilton maintained that he held a genuine

duty to the citizens, in setting them on their guards against a barrage of political spin:

I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from

whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare.

Rejecting the Current Government[edit source | edit beta ]

The essay's major thrust is to impress upon citizens that the system which was in place prior to

the Constitution was not worth keeping. Many would view this as a tall order; it can be hard to

convince someone to replace something, unless it is entirely broken. Hamilton never

underestimated the gravity of the decision people were faced with. He met it head on in his

introductory prose:[1]

It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country,

by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are

really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they

are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If there be

any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the

era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this

view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.

Supporting the New Constitution[edit source | edit beta ]

As a consequence of encouraging people to reject the old system, Hamilton supported the new

Constitution, at all costs. He went so far as to say the only viable alternatives were either a

ratification of the Constitution or a complete dissolution of the existing Union. This conclusion was

justified by referring to the Anti-Federalists, who claimed the 13 members of the Union had

already made for an unwieldy system and that governance had to take place by breaking down

federal government into smaller, regional chunks. Hamilton thought this view so pernicious and

outlandish that he encouraged its propagation, so all citizens could see how bizarre the Anti-

Federalist's views were (bizarre according to Hamilton, that is).

A series of concepts[edit source | edit beta ]

Hamilton outlines six key concepts discussed in the Federalist Papers:

1. The utility of the Union to prosperity

2. The insufficiency of the existing confederation to preserve the Union

3. The necessity of a government as powerful as that proposed, to meet this object

4. The conformity of the proposed Constitution with the true principles

of Republican government

5. The Constitution's analogy to various state Constitutions.

6. The additional security a Constitution will provide to the preservation of government in

those states, and to the preservation of liberty and property.

Federalist No. 2

Federalist No. 2 is an essay by John Jay, the second of the Federalist Papers. It was published on October 31, 1787

under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. No. 2 is the first of four

papers by Jay discussing the protection of the United States from dangerous foreign influence, especially military force. It

is titled, "Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence."

The question[edit source | edit beta ]

The American War of Independence had been a difficult conflict for the American forces, and despite the eventual victory

it was clear that the new country was not on a level, militarily, with European nations, especially Britain and France, which

were the two European powers exercising major influence along theNorth Atlantic coastline. There was significant

concern among Americans that one of the European powers would attempt to return the United States to colonial status

or otherwise limit American sovereignty. In Federalist No. 2, Jay strove to demonstrate that a strong Union of the

American states would provide the best opportunity for defense.

Jay's argument[edit source | edit beta ]

Jay begins by noting that his paper is in response to politicians who have lately rejected the previously "uncontradicted

opinion that the prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing firmly united."

He borrows ideas from the early English Enlightenment thinkers John Locke and Thomas Hobbes about the need to

mediate human affairs to secure peace and prosperity. Jay argues that in order to "vest it [the national government] with

requisite powers," the "people must cede to its some of their natural rights." Throughout this paper, the central idea is

Union and it is justified as being evident given the American people's cultural similarities in background, language and

religion.

Jay argues that the benefits of Union against foreign wars are immense.

To address the prevailing concern about the nature of the newly proposed Constitution, Publius begins by noting that the

Articles of Confederation, though established with the public good in mind, lacks the proper deliberation that was present

at the convention in Philadelphia. Furthermore he relates the current situation of the convention to that of the 1774

congress that drafted the Declaration of Independence, and how it too was attacked wrongfully by opponents who seek to

aggrandize themselves at the expense of the public good. He concludes with a warning, saying that if the Constitution

fails to be ratified, the nation's union would be jeopardized, and so too its greatness.

Federalist No. 3From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Federalist No. 3, titled The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence, is an

essay by John Jay, the third of the Federalist Papers. It was published on November 3, 1787 under

the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. This is the second of four essays

by Jay on the utility of the Union in protecting Americans against foreign aggression and meddling.

Jay had earlier acted as ambassador to Spain and Secretary for Foreign Affairs, leading to his focus on international

relations.

Summary of the argument[edit source | edit beta ]

As a whole, the earliest Federalist Papers argued for the utility of the Union, stating that a strong national government was

more desirable than a diverse group of weaker local governments without national leadership. In No. 3, Jay argues that a

strong national government could better preserve peace. He states that a "united America" would be less likely to provoke

other nations to attack. For instance, it would be better able to uphold the terms of an international treaty. Additionally, the

United States would be less likely to engage in "direct and unlawful violence": whereas states immediately bordering

foreign territories may act "under the impulse of sudden irritation," the national government will be safer, since its "wisdom

and prudence will not be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties immediately interested."

Jay also argues that, in the event of an international conflict, a foreign power would be more likely to come to terms with a

united America. He observes that, in 1685, Genoa was forced to send its national leadership to France to ask pardon

from Louis XIV; Jay questions whether France would have demanded such tribute from any "powerful nation." Thus a

"strong united nation" could better preserve the peace, since it would find it easier to settle causes of war.

Federalist No. 4From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Federalist No. 4 is an essay by John Jay, the fourth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on November 7, 1787

under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. It is the third of four

essays by Jay discussing the protection of the United States from dangerous foreign influence, especially military force. It

is titled, "The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence."

Summary of the argument[edit source | edit beta ]

Jay argues that a singular government speaking for all states would serve as a greater deterrent to military interference by

foreign nations than a system of government where each state is given complete control over its affairs.

John Jay believes that one Union would react better than many states with their own governments. For example, with one

body speaking for the nation there would be no arguments over troop placements or treaties. Furthermore a singular army

and navy appears a much less inviting target to invaders than the individual army of a one state by itself. Suppose if this

one state were to be attacked, who's to say whether the other states would respond? With a single government that

problem would be avoided.

Federalist No. 5

Federalist No. 5 is an essay by John Jay, the fifth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on November 10, 1787

under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. It is the last of four essays

by Jay discussing the protection of the United States from dangerous foreign influence, especially military force. It is titled,

"The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence."

Summary of the argument[edit source | edit beta ]

In this paper, Jay argues that the American people can learn a lot from the troubles Great Britain had when it was divided

up into individual states. When divided, envy and jealousy ran rampant. Try as you might to make each nation-state equal,

eventually one will begin to grow more powerful than the others (assumed by Jay to be the north), they in turn will grow

jealous and distrustful of each other. Alliances with different nations may be forged by different states, tearing America

apart at the seams. A single nation would be 'joined in affection and free from all apprehension of different interests' and

as such a much more formidable nation.

Federalist No. 6

Federalist No. 6 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the sixth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on November 14,

1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. Arguing for the

importance of the Union to the well-being of Americans, Hamilton addresses a theme continued in Federalist No. 7: the

danger of dissension among the states if they remain without a strong federal government. No. 6 is titled "Concerning

Dangers from Dissensions Between the States."

In Federalist No. 6, Hamilton enumerates different instances of hostility among nations, and suggests that should the

States remain separate, such hostilities will befall them as well. However, mutual commercial interest will bring the States

together and keep them in a peaceful accord. He concludes that nations that exist as neighbors will be natural enemies of

one another, unless brought together in a confederate republic with a constitution which will promote harmony through

commercial interests rather than competition.

Federalist No. 7

Federalist No. 7 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the seventh of the Federalist Papers. It was published on November

15, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. Arguing for the

importance of the Union to the well-being of Americans, Hamilton addresses a theme begun in Federalist No. 6: the

danger of dissension among the states if they remain without a strong federal government. No. 7 is titled "The Same

Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States."

Federalist No. 8

Federalist No. 8 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the eighth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on November

20, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. In it, Hamilton

argues for the utility of the Union to the well-being of Americans, specifically addressing the negative consequences if the

Union were to collapse and conflict arise between the states. It is titled, "Consequences of Hostilities Between the States."

Essay Synopsis[edit source | edit beta ]

If the states do not unify into a single nation there will be a perpetual cycle of conflict between neighboring states. Their

alliances or dis-unions create circumstances similar to European nations, where the cycle of aggression between

neighboring nations creates the need for domestic armies and fortifications. Additionally, if not unified populous states,

motivated by greed might plunder weaker states for their resources.

The motivation for a union is safety, being aware though that no matter how great the nation's commitment to liberty

freedoms are compromised in order to achieve protection. The physical damage of armed conflict compels nations to

implement a military deterrent and in doing so an overly militaristic culture diminishes the civil and political rights of the

people. "To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free."

The new Constitution does not prohibit standing armies and it's inferred that a perpetual army will exist. The frequency of

conflict and the need for defense will necessitate a ready armed force for defense. And by its nature a militaristic state

strengthens the executive arm (from which a monarchy could emerge). War increases executive authority at the expense

of the other branches of government.

Extreme defense would likely give rise to oppressive government practices.

Observing history; the livelihood of citizens cause the population to be ill suited for war. A varied workforce necessitates

the development of a profession of soldiers who would be distinct from the body of the citizens.

"The military state becomes elevated above the civil." Nations that don't have a full-time army are less likely to oppress

citizens. The leaders of nations prone to invasion must maintain defensive forces, however frequently this militarism

infringes upon the citizen's rights or weakens their sense of entitlement of those rights; the continental nations of Western

Europe were examples of this.

Also, a Union of states would act as a deterrent from aggression by nearby Foreign colonies.

Federalist No. 9

Federalist No. 9 (Federalist Number 9) is an essay by Alexander Hamilton and the ninth of theFederalist Papers. It was

published on November 21, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were

published. Federalist No. 9 is titled, "The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection." The same

subject is continued in the subsequent paper by James Madison, Federalist No. 10.

Publius' argument[edit source | edit beta ]

A major aspect of Federalist No. 9 is Hamilton's response to the common Anti-Federalist argument based on the theories

of Montesquieu, who wrote famously in his The Spirit of the Laws that "it is natural to a republic to have only a small

territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist." The Anti-Federalisttook his arguments to mean that the federal Union was

bound to fail. Hamilton responded that if Montesquieu were taken literally, then since he was thinking of dimensions far

smaller even than those of the states, the Americans would have to split themselves into "an infinity of little, jealous,

clashing tumultuous commonwealths." More seriously, Hamilton contends that the confederated federal system described

in the proposed Constitution would not suffer as Montesquieu predicted because of its confederated, rather than

centralized, design. He further argues that Montesquieu himself proposed a confederation of republics as the solution.

Federalist No. 10

Federalist No. 10 (Federalist Number 10) is an essay written by James Madison and the tenth of theFederalist Papers,

a series arguing for the ratification of the United States Constitution. It was published on November 22, 1787 under the

pseudonym, Publius, the name under which all of the Federalist Papers were published. Federalist No. 10 is among the

most highly regarded of all American political writings.[1]

No. 10 addresses the question of how to guard against "factions", or groups of citizens, with interests contrary to the rights

of others or the interests of the whole community. Madison argued that a strong, big republic would be a better guard

against those dangers than smaller republics—for instance, the individual states. Opponents of the Constitution offered

counterarguments to his position, which were substantially derived from the commentary of Montesquieu on this subject.

Federalist No. 10 continues a theme begun in Federalist No. 9; it is titled, "The Same Subject Continued: The Utility of the

Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection". The whole series is cited by scholars andjurists as an

authoritative interpretation and explication of the meaning of the Constitution. Jurists have frequently read No. 10 to mean

that the Founding Fathers did not intend the United States government to be partisan.

Background[edit source | edit beta ]

Prior to the Constitution, the thirteen states were bound together by the Articles of Confederation, which was essentially a

military alliance between sovereign nations used to fight the Revolutionary War. Congress had no power to tax, and as a

result was not paying the debts left over from the Revolution. Madison, George Washington, Benjamin Franklin and others

feared a break-up of the union and national bankruptcy.[2] Like Washington, Madison felt the revolution had not resolved

the social problems that had triggered it, and the excesses ascribed to the King were now coming from the state

legislatures. Shays' Rebellion, an armed uprising in Massachusetts in 1786, was therefore but an extreme example of

democratic excess in the aftermath of the War.[3]

A national convention was called for May 1787, to revise the Articles of Confederation. Madison believed that the problem

was not with the Articles but the state legislatures, and so the solution was not to fix the articles but to restrain the

excesses of the states. The principal questions before the convention became whether the states should remain

sovereign, whether sovereignty should be transferred to the national government, or whether a settlement should rest

somewhere in between.[4] By mid-June it was clear that the convention was drafting a new plan of government around

these issues—a constitution. Madison's nationalist position shifted the debate increasingly away from a position of pure

state sovereignty, and toward the compromise.[5] In debate on June 26, he said that government ought to "protect the

minority of the opulent against the majority" and that unchecked, democratic communities were subject to "the turbulency

and weakness of unruly passions".[6]

Publication[edit source | edit beta ]

September 17, 1787 marked the signing of the final document. By its own Article Seven, the constitution drafted by the

convention needed ratification by at least nine of the twelve states, through special conventions held in each state. Anti-

Federalist writers began to publish essays and letters arguing against ratification,[7] and Alexander

Hamilton recruited James Madison and John Jay to write a series of pro-ratification letters in response.[8]

Like most of the Anti-Federalist essays and the vast majority of the Federalist Papers, No. 10 first appeared in popular

newspapers. It was first printed in theDaily Advertiser under the name adopted by the Federalist writers, "Publius"; in this

it was remarkable among the essays of Publius, as almost all of them first appeared in one of two other papers:

the Independent Journal and the New-York Packet. Federalist No. 37, also by Madison, was the only other essay to

appear first in the Advertiser.[9]

Considering the importance later ascribed to the essay, it was reprinted only on a limited scale. On November 23, it

appeared in the Packet and the next day in theIndependent Journal. Outside New York City, it made four appearances in

early 1788: January 2 in the Pennsylvania Gazette, January 10 in the Hudson Valley Weekly, January 15 in the

Lansingburgh Northern Centinel, and January 17 in theAlbany Gazette. Though this number of reprintings was typical for

the Federalist, many other essays, both Federalist and Anti-Federalist, saw much wider distribution.[10]

On January 1, 1790, the publishing company J. & A. McLean announced that they would publish the first 36 of the essays

in a single volume. This volume, titled The Federalist, was released on March 2, 1788. George Hopkins' 1802 edition

revealed that Madison, Hamilton, and Jay were the authors of the series, with two later printings dividing the work by

author. In 1818, James Gideon published a third edition containing corrections by Madison, who by that time had

completed his two terms as President of the United States.[11]

Henry B. Dawson's edition of 1863 sought to collect the original newspaper articles, though he did not always find the first

instance. It was much reprinted, albeit without his introduction.[12] Paul Leicester Ford's 1898 edition included a table of

contents which summarized the essays, with the summaries again used to preface their respective essays. The first date

of publication and the newspaper name were recorded for each essay. Of modern editions, Jacob E. Cooke's 1961 edition

is seen as authoritative, and is most used today.[13]

The question of faction[edit source | edit beta ]

Federalist No. 10 continues the discussion of the question broached in Hamilton's Federalist No. 9. Hamilton there

addressed the destructive role of a faction in breaking apart the republic. The question Madison answers, then, is how to

eliminate the negative effects of faction. He defines a faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a minority or

majority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the

rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community".[14] He identifies the most serious

source of faction to be the diversity of opinion in political life which leads to dispute over fundamental issues such as what

regime or religion should be preferred.

However, he thinks that "the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution

of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society". [15] He

saw direct democracy as a danger to individual rights and advocated a representative democracy in order to protect what

he viewed as individual liberty from majority rule, or from the effects of such inequality within society. He says, "A pure

democracy can admit no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will be felt by a majority, and

there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party. Hence it is, that democracies have ever been

found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have, in general, been as short in their lives as

they have been violent in their deaths".[16]

Like the anti-Federalists who opposed him, Madison was substantially influenced by the work of Montesquieu, though

Madison and Montesquieu disagreed on the question addressed in this essay. He also relied heavily on the philosophers

of the Scottish Enlightenment, especially David Hume, whose influence is most clear in Madison's discussion of the types

of faction and in his argument for an extended republic.[17][18]

Madison's arguments[edit source | edit beta ]

Madison first assessed that there are two ways to limit the damage caused by faction: either remove the causes of faction

or control its effects. The first, destroying liberty, would work because "liberty is to faction what air is to fire", [19] but it is

impossible to perform because liberty is essential to political life. After all, Americans fought for it during the American

Revolution. The other option, creating a society homogeneous in opinions and interests, is impracticable. The diversity of

the people's ability is what makes them succeed more or less, and inequality of property is a right that the government

should protect. Madison particularly emphasizes that economic stratification prevents everyone from sharing the same

opinion. Madison concludes that the damage caused by faction can be limited only by controlling its effects.

He then argues that the only problem comes from majority factions because the principle of popular sovereignty should

prevent minority factions from gaining power. Madison offers two ways to check majority factions: prevent the "existence

of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time" or render a majority faction unable to act. [20] Madison

concludes that a small democracy cannot avoid the dangers of majority faction because small size means that

undesirable passions can very easily spread to a majority of the people, which can then enact its will through the

democratic government without difficulty.

Madison states, "The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man",[21] so the cure is to control their effects.

He makes an argument on how this is not possible in a pure democracy but possible in a republic. With pure democracy,

he means a system in which every citizen votes directly for laws, and, with republic, he intends a society in which citizens

vote for an elite of representatives who then vote for laws. He indicates that the voice of the people pronounced by a body

of representatives is more conformable to the interest of the community, since, again, common people’s decisions are

affected by their self-interest.

He then makes an argument in favor of a large republic against a small republic for the choice of "fit characters" [22] to

represent the public's voice. In a large republic, where the number of voters and candidates is greater, the probability to

elect competent representatives is broader. The voters have a wider option. In a small republic, it would also be easier for

the candidates to fool the voters but more difficult in a large one. The last argument Madison makes in favor of a large

republic is that as, in a small republic, there will be a lower variety of interests and parties, a majority will more frequently

be found. The number of participants of that majority will be lower, and, since they live in a more limited territory, it would

be easier for them to agree and work together for the accomplishment of their ideas. While in a large republic the variety

of interests will be greater so to make it harder to find a majority. Even if there is a majority, it would be harder for them to

work together because of the large number of people and the fact they are spread out in a wider territory.

A republic, Madison writes, is different from a democracy because its government is placed in the hands of delegates,

and, as a result of this, it can be extended over a larger area. The idea is that, in a large republic, there will be more "fit

characters" to choose from for each delegate. Also, the fact that each representative is chosen from a larger constituency

should make the "vicious arts",[23] a reference to rhetoric, of electioneering less effective. For instance, in a large republic,

a corrupt delegate would need to bribe many more people in order to win an election than in a small republic. Also, in a

republic, the delegates both filter and refine the many demands of the people so as to prevent the type of frivolous claims

that impede purely democratic governments.

Though Madison argued for a large and diverse republic, the writers of the Federalist Papers recognized the need for a

balance. They wanted a republic diverse enough to prevent faction but with enough commonality to maintain cohesion

among the states. In Federalist No. 2, John Jaycounted as a blessing that America possessed "one united people—a

people descended from the same ancestors, the same language, professing the same religion".[24] Madison himself

addresses a limitation of his conclusion that large constituencies will provide better representatives. He notes that if

constituencies are too large, the representatives will be "too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser

interests".[25]He says that this problem is partly solved by federalism. No matter how large the constituencies of federal

representatives, local matters will be looked after by state and local officials with naturally smaller constituencies.

Contemporaneous counterarguments[edit source | edit beta ]

The Anti-Federalists vigorously contested the notion that a republic of diverse interests could survive. The author Cato

(another pseudonym, most likely that of George Clinton)[26] summarized the Anti-Federalist position in the article Cato no.

3:

Whoever seriously considers the immense extent of territory comprehended within the limits of the United States, with the

variety of its climates, productions, and commerce, the difference of extent, and number of inhabitants in all; the

dissimilitude of interest, morals, and policies, in almost every one, will receive it as an intuitive truth, that a consolidated

republican form of government therein, can never form a perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility,

promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to you and your posterity, for to these objects it must be

directed: this unkindred legislature therefore, composed of interests opposite and dissimilar in their nature, will in its

exercise, emphatically be, like a house divided against itself.[27]

Generally, it was their position that republics about the size of the individual states could survive, but that a republic on the

size of the Union would fail. A particular point in support of this was that most of the states were focused on one industry

—to generalize, commerce and shipping in the northern states and plantation farming in the southern. The Anti-Federalist

belief that the wide disparity in the economic interests of the various states would lead to controversy was perhaps

realized in the American Civil War, which some scholars attribute to this disparity.[28] Madison himself, in a letter

to Thomas Jefferson, noted that differing economic interests had created dispute, even when the Constitution was being

written.[29] At the convention, he particularly identified the distinction between the northern and southern states as a "line of

discrimination" that formed "the real difference of interests".[30]

The discussion of the ideal size for the republic was not limited to the options of individual states or encompassing union.

In a letter to Richard Price, Benjamin Rush noted that "Some of our enlightened men who begin to despair of a more

complete union of the States in Congress have secretly proposed an Eastern, Middle, and Southern Confederacy, to be

united by an alliance offensive and defensive".[31]

In making their arguments, the Anti-Federalists appealed to both historical and theoretic evidence. On the theoretical side,

they leaned heavily on the work of Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu. The Anti-Federalists Brutus and Cato

both quoted Montesquieu on the issue of the ideal size of a republic, citing his statement in The Spirit of the Laws that:

It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist. In a large republic there are men of

large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too great to be placed in any single subject; he has

interest of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy, great and glorious, by oppressing his fellow citizens;

and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country. In a large republic, the public good is sacrificed to a

thousand views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is

easier perceived, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses are of less extent, and of course

are less protected.[32]

Greece and Rome were looked to as model republics throughout this debate,[33] and authors on both sides took Roman

pseudonyms. Brutus points out that the Greek and Roman states were small, whereas the U.S. is vast. He also points out

that the expansion of these republics resulted in a transition from free government to tyranny.[34]

Modern analysis and reaction[edit source | edit beta ]

In the first century of the American republic, No. 10 was not regarded as among the more important numbers of The

Federalist. For instance, inDemocracy in America Alexis de Tocqueville refers specifically to more than fifty of the essays,

but No. 10 is not among them.[35] Today, however, No. 10 is regarded as a seminal work of American democracy. In "The

People's Vote", a popular survey conducted by the National Archives and Records Administration, National History Day,

and U.S. News and World Report, No. 10 (along with Federalist No. 51, also by Madison) was chosen as the 20th most

influential document in United States history.[36] David Epstein, writing in 1984, described it as among the most highly

regarded of all American political writing.[37]

Douglass Adair attributes the increased interest in the tenth number to Charles A. Beard's book An Economic

Interpretation of the Constitution, published in 1913. Adair also contends that Beard's selective focus on the issue of class

struggle, and his political progressivism, has colored modern scholarship on the essay. According to Adair, Beard reads

No. 10 as evidence for his belief in "the Constitution as an instrument of class exploitation".[38] Adair's own view is that

Federalist No. 10 should be read as "eighteenth-century political theory directed to an eighteenth-century problem; and ...

one of the great creative achievements of that intellectual movement that later ages have christened 'Jeffersonian

democracy'".[39]

Garry Wills is a noted critic of Madison's argument in Federalist No. 10. In his book Explaining America, he adopts the

position of Robert Dahl in arguing that Madison's framework does not necessarily enhance the protections of minorities or

ensure the common good. Instead, Wills claims: "Minorities can make use of dispersed and staggered governmental

machinery to clog, delay, slow down, hamper, and obstruct the majority. But these weapons for delay are given to the

minority irrespective of its factious or nonfactious character; and they can be used against the majority irrespective of its

factious or nonfactious character. What Madison prevents is not faction, but action. What he protects is not the common

good but delay as such".[40]

Application[edit source | edit beta ]

Federalist No. 10 is the classic citation for the belief that the Founding Fathers and the constitutional framers did not

intend American politics to bepartisan. For instance, United States Supreme Court justice John Paul Stevens cites the

paper for the statement, "Parties ranked high on the list of evils that the Constitution was designed to check".

[41] Discussing a California provision that forbids candidates from running as independents within one year of holding a

partisan affiliation, Justice Byron White made apparent the Court's belief that Madison spoke for the framers of the

Constitution: "California apparently believes with the Founding Fathers that splintered parties and unrestrained

factionalism may do significant damage to the fabric of government. See The Federalist, No. 10 (Madison)".[42]

Madison's argument that restraining liberty to limit faction is an unacceptable solution which has been used by opponents

of campaign finance limits. Justice Clarence Thomas, for example, invoked Federalist No. 10 in a dissent against a ruling

supporting limits on campaign contributions, writing: "The Framers preferred a political system that harnessed such

faction for good, preserving liberty while also ensuring good government. Rather than adopting the repressive 'cure' for

faction that the majority today endorses, the Framers armed individual citizens with a remedy".

Federalist No. 11

Federalist No. 11 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the eleventh of the Federalist Papers.[1] It was published on

November 23, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published.[2] It is

titled, "The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy."[3]

Summary[edit source | edit beta ]

The essay begins with Publius admitting that the "adventurous spirit" of America has already made the European

countries uneasy about engaging in trade.[3] Publius explains that continued uneasiness will deprive the States of "active

commerce."[4] Publius then posits that a Union would counteract that problem by making prohibitory regulations that are

uniform throughout the states, thus requiring foreign countries to negotiate with the Union as a whole and bid against each

other for trading rights.[5]

Publius then moves to discuss the importance of establishing a federal navy.[6] This would increase the Union's ability to

gain access and control the trade opportunities of the West Indies, thus allowing the Union to set prices and control all

European trade in the Americas, putting the Union in a commanding position over foreign trade.[7] This "active commerce"

in controlling trade, as opposed to "passive commerce," reflects the American spirit.[8]

Publius further emphasizes not just the importance of controlling foreign trade, but also that a Union would allow "an

unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves."[9] The naval presence will allow the States to protect trade

among themselves and help promote mutual gains.[9] Without a Union between the States, trade would be less successful;

"would be fettered, interrupted, and narrowed by a multiplicity of causes."

Federalist No. 12From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Federalist No. 12 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the twelfth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on November

27, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. It is titled, "The

Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue."

In Federalist 12, Hamilton argues that the formation of the union will lead to greater wealth for the states. The

government, by establishing currency, would encourage industry and all Americans would enjoy the benefits. Hamilton

continues by arguing that there is no rivalry between commerce and agriculture - rather each benefits when the other

prospers. Taxes should be levied on commerce and the union will be much more efficient than the states at collecting

revenue. In fact, the article predicts that revenue will triple with the new federal government administering tax collection.

The states have been unable to establish an adequate way to collect taxes. Hamilton claims that direct taxation is not a

reality for the new government. Instead, taxes should be levied on imposts and excises, mainly on imports. Hamilton also

points out that if the federal government administers tax collection instead of leaving the task to states, it will reduce the

amount of resources needed to ensure that the tax is not being evaded. It will be much easier for the federal government

to protect one border - the Atlantic coast - than it would be for each state to protect its borders. A few ships stationed

outside of Americas ports would ensure the collection of duties. Hamilton concludes that funding the government is

essential and if Americans fail to do so then the Revolution itself will have been in vain.

Federalist No. 13

Federalist No. 13 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the thirteenth of the Federalist Papers.[1] It was published on

November 28, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published.[2] It is

titled, "Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government."[2]

Summary[edit source | edit beta ]

This essay focuses on the view that a Union would be more economically sound than separate States.[3]Publius explains

that rather than having many separate governments to support, a Union would have only one national government to

support.[4] He describes this as being both simpler and more economical.[5] The essay further explains that in order to

defend themselves, separate States would have to work together, but their support of one another would be disjointed.

[6] Only a fully united government would provide the best defense for all the States and be able to support military

establishments and necessary civil servants.[7]

Federalist No. 14

Federalist No. 14 is an essay by James Madison, the fourteenth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on November

30, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. It addresses a

major objection of the Anti-Federalists to the proposed United States Constitution: that the sheer size of the United States

would make it impossible to govern justly as a single country. Madison touched on this issue in Federalist No. 10 and

returns to it in this essay. No. 14 is titled "Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered."

Federalist No. 15

Federalist No. 15 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the fifteenth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on

December 1, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. No. 15

addresses the failures of the Articles of Confederation to satisfactorily govern the United States; it is the first of six essays

on this topic. It is titled, "The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union."

Federalist No. 15 warns citizens that the states are on the brink of national humiliation. There is impending anarchy

between the states and borrowing and lending policies are causing turmoil. Publius says that the states must make a firm

stand for their tranquility, dignity and reputation by creating a new government with a more energetic executive. Publius

points out that under the Articles of Confederation, the national government does not have the power or authority to issue

sanctions over individuals. The national government cannot enforce its laws because the states cannot be thrown in jail

and without an army, the national government cannot enforce taxes on states

"government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a law that it be attended with a sanction; or, in

other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience"

Publius argues that government must have force behind its laws. He reminds the reader that punishment for disobedience

is necessary because the "passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice without this constraint."

Punishment of individuals, not states, is necessary because "regard for reputation has a less active influence when the

infamy of a bad action is to be divided among a number than when it is to fall singly upon one."

Federalist No. 16From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Federalist No. 16 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the sixteenth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on

December 4, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. No. 16

addresses the failures of the Articles of Confederation to satisfactorily govern the United States; it is the second of six

essays on this topic. It is titled, "The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve

the Union."

Federalist No. 17From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Federalist No. 17 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the seventeenth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on

December 5, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. No. 17

addresses the failures of the Articles of Confederation to satisfactorily govern the United States; it is the third of six essays

on this topic. It is titled, "The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the

Union."

Summary[edit source | edit beta ]

Federalist No. 17 specifically regards the possible encroachment of the federal government on the powers of the state

governments. Hamilton argues that because states are given the most direct power over their citizens, namely the ability

to administer criminal and civil justice, they remain "the most attractive source of popular obedience and attachment."

According to Hamilton this power contributes more than any other circumstance to impressing upon the minds of the

people affection, esteem and reverence towards the government [of the state]." Furthermore Hamilton says human nature

makes it so they are more closely attached to things they are geographically near, hence a person is more attached to

their neighborhood than the community at large. Therefore "The people of each state would be apt to feel a stronger bias

towards their local governments than towards the government of the union." Because of the reasons listed, Hamilton

believes that state governments will have the popular strength to resist encroachment on their state's rights.

Federalist No. 18

Federalist No. 18 is an essay by James Madison, the eighteenth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on December

7, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. No. 18 addresses

the failures of the Articles of Confederation to satisfactorily govern the United States; it is the fourth of six essays on this

topic. It is titled, "The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union."

Federalist No. 19

Federalist No. 19 is an essay by James Madison, the nineteenth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on December

8, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. No. 19 addresses

the failures of the Articles of Confederation to satisfactorily govern the United States; it is the fifth of six essays on this

topic. It is titled, "The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union."

Federalist No. 20

Federalist No. 20 is an essay by James Madison, the twentieth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on December

11, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. No. 20

addresses the failures of the Articles of Confederation to satisfactorily govern the United States; it is the last of six essays

on this topic. It is titled, "The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the

Union."

Federalist No. 21

Federalist No. 21 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the twenty-first of the Federalist Papers. It was published on

December 12, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. It is

titled, "Other Defects of the Present Confederation."

In Federalist No. 21 Alexander Hamilton focuses on the three main imperfections of government under theArticles of

Confederation, and how the Constitution will rectify these problems. First, Hamilton observes that the current government

has no power to enforce laws and also lacks a mutual guarantee of state rights. Under the Articles, a faction could easily

take control of a state and the government would not be able to do anything about it. Then, Hamilton comments on the

inefficiency of the confederation's current method of collecting taxes by quotas, and denounces it as a method by which

the states may be broken apart. According to Hamilton, however, these problems are easily rectifiable, and the

Constitution will fix all of them if it is approved.

Federalist No. 22

Federalist No. 22 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the twenty-second of the Federalist Papers. It was published on

December 14, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. This

essay continues with a theme started in Federalist No. 21. It is titled, "The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the

Present Confederation."

The power to regulate commerce is one of the strongest reasons to switch from the Articles of Confederation to a stronger

"federal superintendence." The lack of a centralized federal government to regulate commerce has acted as a bar against

the "formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers" and has also led to dissatisfaction between the states. Several

states have attempted to create concert "prohibitions, restrictions, and exclusions, to influence the conduct of that

kingdom in this particular" area. However, "arising from the lack of a general authority, and from clashing and dissimilar

views in the states" has frustrated every experiment of the kind, and will continue to hinder the true growth that could be

realized under a federal system.

Aside from the regulation of commerce, the power to raise and keep an army, under the powers of the Articles of

Confederation, is merely a power of making requisitions upon the states for quotas of men. "This practice in the course of

the late war, was found replete with obstructions to a vigorous, and to an economical system of defense." Publius went on

to state that this led to a competition between the states, which turned into an auction for men. Having states bid on men

for defense, "is not merely unfriendly to economy and vigor, than it is to an equal distribution of the 'burden'.

Also, Publius states, that the right of equal suffrage among the states is another exceptionable part of the confederation.

"The sense of the majority should prevail. However this kind of logical legerdemain will never counteract the plain

suggestions of justice and common sense." He continues by stating, "for we can enumerate nine states, which contain

less than a majority of the people and it is constitutionally possible, that these nine may give the vote."

The overall gist of Federalist No. 22, is that the current structure under the confederation is weak and unable to support

the demands that are required of a global nation.