explaining the european union’s eastern enlargement
DESCRIPTION
Explaining the European Union’s Eastern Enlargement. EC/EU Objectives. Promote domestic economic and political reforms in Eastern Europe Promote international stability and peaceful resolution of conflicts Goals remained constant, but means have varied. Widening vs. Deepening. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Explaining the European Union’s Eastern Enlargement
EC/EU Objectives
Promote domestic economic and political reforms in Eastern Europe
Promote international stability and peaceful resolution of conflicts
Goals remained constant, but means have varied
Widening vs. Deepening
France: deepening favored over widening Great Britain: deepening favored over
widening Germany: deepening and widening
France
Why deepening?– Contain Germany within a political union
Why not widening?– Enlargement would shift balance of power in favor of
Germany– Reduce France’s benefits from the CAP– Not as vulnerable to consequences of instability
Policies– Monetary union (and political union?)– Slow down enlargement
Great Britain
Why widening?– Widening would make deepening more difficult
Why not deepening?– Reluctance to give up sovereignty
Policies– Stay out of EMU– Support enlargement to the East
Germany
Why deepening?– Bind present and future governments to
(Western) Europe– Win French support for German unification
Why widening?– Promote stability in Eastern Europe
Policies– EMU and enlargement
What’s Being Explained
Decision to enlarge to the East– 1993 Copenhagen European Council accepts
enlargement contingent on political and economic reforms
Timing of the decision to enlarge Reconsideration of the enlargement strategy
at December 1999 Helsinki European Council
Enlargement Strategy
July 1997: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia judged to have met political and economic conditions
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria did not meet the economic conditions. Slovakia did not meet political conditions
Membership negotiations open with the five front-runners in March 1998
Three Explanations
Liberalism (liberal intergovernmentalism)– Economic interests
Sociological institutionalism– Identity and norms
Geopolitics– Promoting stability in Eastern Europe– Maintaining relative influence within the EU
Liberalism
Policymaking dominated by sectoral interests Logic
– Those who would benefit most from increased economic interdependence should favor it
Liberalism’s Predictions
Limited concessions Those bordering Eastern Europe should
favor enlargement
Empirical Support for Liberalism
Explains – opposition to enlargement– trade and cooperation agreements and Europe
Agreements
Does not explain– Shift in favor of membership in 1993– 1999 decision to open up negotiations with those
excluded in 1997
Sociological Institutionalism (SI)
Identity and norms explain– Enlargement– Conditionality
Logic– Becoming a member of an organization means
adopting the collective identity of the organization
EU: adopt liberal values and norms
Predictions of SI
Accession conditions reflect the EU’s liberal values and norms
Countries selected for accession talks should– Match EU members– Be different from those not invited to talks
Empirical Support for SI, I
Explains– Accession conditions does reflect the EU’s liberal
values and norms The new members do share the EU’s collective identity
– 1997 decision to open accession talks with the five frontrunners
Different from those not invited
Empirical Support for SI, II
Does not explain– Shift in policy in 1993– 1999 decision to open talks with the other five
associates
Geopolitics
Geopolitical considerations– Need to promote stability in Eastern Europe– Maintain influence and power in the EU
These considerations explain– Decision to enlarge as well as its timing– Conditions attached to membership– Reconsideration of enlargement strategy in 1999
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: High threat Favor deeper/costlier engagements with Eastern Europe
Hypothesis 2: States whose influence will increase will favor enlargement, those whose influence will decrease will oppose it
Hypothesis 3: Major geopolitical events that reveal new information shifts in preferences and policies
Before 1993
Threat low enough that concerns about influence within EC predominated
– France: favors deepening over widening (bind Germany)– Great Britain: favors widening over deepening (weaken
supranational aspects)– Germany: favors both (stability and self-binding)
Difference between France and Germany is consistent with hypothesis 1: threat higher for Germany
All three positions consistent with hypothesis 2
The Decision to Enlarge
New information– Rise of protectionist pressures in Eastern Europe– Conflicts on the Balkans, particularly Bosnia-
Herzegovina
Increases threat of instability, which changes the calculus, particularly France’s– Membership offered to promote and lock in
reforms and provide stability (hypotheses 1 & 3)
Kosovo and the Shift in Enlargement Strategy
Italy, Sweden, and Denmark argued in 1997 that strategy would create dangerous political divisions
Argument rejected: limited intake would reduce costs (EU reforms)
Kosovo crisis: threat reassessed Countries kept out would become disillusioned, reforms
might be reversed 1999 Helsinki European Council: accession negotiations
would begin with Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania (and Malta)
Evidence consistent with hypotheses 1 & 3
Summary of Findings
Support for hypotheses 1 and 3:– France supports enlargement as result of increased threat to
stability after break-up of Yugoslavia (also Eastern European protectionism)
– Shift in enlargement strategy after Kosovo: increased threat Support for hypothesis 2:
– French position on enlargement driven in large part by desire to maintain influence in EU, constrain Germany
– British position: enlargement will weaken supranational aspects
– German position: consistent with hypotheses 1 & 2