explaining different trajectories in immigrant political integration: moroccans and turks in...

This article was downloaded by: [University of Florida]On: 04 October 2014, At: 19:07Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK

West European PoliticsPublication details, including instructions for authorsand subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fwep20

Explaining Different Trajectoriesin Immigrant PoliticalIntegration: Moroccans and Turksin AmsterdamLaure Michon & Floris VermeulenPublished online: 22 Apr 2013.

To cite this article: Laure Michon & Floris Vermeulen (2013) Explaining DifferentTrajectories in Immigrant Political Integration: Moroccans and Turks in Amsterdam, WestEuropean Politics, 36:3, 597-614, DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2013.773727

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2013.773727

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all theinformation (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, orsuitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressedin this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not theviews of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content shouldnot be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions,claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilitieswhatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connectionwith, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fwep20

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/01402382.2013.773727

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2013.773727

forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Fl

orid

a] a

t 19:

07 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

014

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Explaining Different Trajectories inImmigrant Political Integration:Moroccans and Turks in Amsterdam

LAURE MICHON and FLORIS VERMEULEN

This article examines why the political integration and representation of ethnic minoritygroups may develop along different paths. Taking Amsterdam as a case study, itcompares two of the city’s most predominant immigrant groups: Turks, who have takena group-based incorporation strategy – visible in this group’s dense organisationalinfrastructure – and Moroccans, who have followed a more individualist assimilationstrategy. The distinct trajectories have produced a relatively high proportion of Turkish-origin elected officials, while individuals of Moroccan origin feature more prominentlyin executive office, exercising power over day-to-day decisions. The article proposes thatwhereas features of the electoral system determine which opportunities exist for immi-grants to participate in the political process, it is the structure of an immigrant groupthat affects the ability of members to seize such opportunities. Furthermore, it showshow political parties and party elites act as gatekeepers and facilitators of immigrants’political participation.

The underrepresentation of particular groups – be they women, economicallyless well-off residents, or minorities of immigrant origin – raises important nor-mative questions about democratic legitimacy for European governments. Forscholars of politics, it also provides an empirical case to better understand thefunctioning of systems of representation. The representation of immigrantminorities is particularly instructive in this regard. Immigrants, as newcomers,are outsiders to the political system. How immigrant minorities gain access tothe system, or fail to gain access, provides valuable insights into how our civicsystems function to represent new groups and constituencies.

To understand the representation and political incorporation of minorities ofimmigrant origin, one major school of European research focuses on politicalopportunity structures and cross-national differences in ‘national models’ of

Correspondence Address: [email protected]

West European Politics, 2013Vol. 36, No. 3, 597–614, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2013.773727

� 2013 Taylor & Francis

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Fl

orid

a] a

t 19:

07 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

014

incorporation (Garbaye 2005; Ireland 2000; Koopmans et al. 2005; Odmalm2005; Vermeulen and Berger 2008). Koopmans et al. (2005) explain differentlevels of immigrants’ political participation by referring to the degree to whichequal citizenship is accessible to them. In some countries, conceptions of citi-zenship favour ethnic bonds, while other countries attribute citizenship accord-ing to a civic territorial principle. Compared to the civic approach, the ethnicconception provides immigrants with fewer opportunities on average to partici-pate, to gain access, or to become incorporated in the political system (Brubak-er 1992; Ireland 2000; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). Another factor affectingthe political opportunity structure is a country’s electoral process. Quotasystems, party lists, and multi-member constituencies have been identified asimportant factors in explaining variation in a minority’s political representation(Norris 1997); these systems are posited to provide more opportunities forminorities to participate in, and gain access to, the system by having represen-tatives of their group get elected relatively easily (Banducci et al. 2004; Bird2005; Bird et al. 2011; Dahlstedt and Hertzberg 2007; Garbaye 2005).

The second major school of thought looks at the mobilising capacity ofdisadvantaged groups, notably their social capital and the existing civic infra-structures, rather than the host state’s structures (Fennema and Tillie 1999,2001; Jacobs and Tillie 2004; Jacobs et al. 2004; Morales and Giugni 2010;Tillie 2004; Vermeulen 2006). For instance, Fennema and Tillie (1999, 2001)found a significant difference in the political participation of the three largestimmigrant groups in Amsterdam. They explained this variation by referring tothe organisational density of the groups and their organisational network.Through a network of Turkish organisations, civic virtues are created. Thesevirtues are then transferred to the wider circle of Turkish civil society inAmsterdam, which, in turn, leads to a more active, trusting, politically inter-ested, and ultimately more incorporated group of immigrants (Fennema andTillie 1999, 2001). Research in other European cities has found that the politi-cal participation of individual immigrants seems to depend largely on theinvolvement of immigrants in ethnic and/or cross-ethnic organisations, thoughthis does not mean that groups with high organisational density are alwaysthose who participate most and/or are the most incorporated. The host statecontext seems to influence this mechanism. In some contexts, large, denseorganisational networks lead to high levels of political participation, whereasin others this is not the case (Eggert and Guigni 2010; Jacobs et al. 2004;Tillie 2004; Togeby 2004; Vermeulen and Berger 2008).

These results suggest that host state factors and group-related factors inter-act. To understand the way in which immigrant minorities gain access to hoststate political systems, or are precluded from access, we need to look at howthe opportunity structures of the host state interact with a group’s resources,skills levels, and civic structures. Many different outcomes are possible here.There is no simple formula. The combination of political systems providingample opportunities for outsiders to participate and groups who possess manyresources does not necessarily lead to incorporated groups. Nor do systems

598 L. Michon and F. Vermeulen

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Fl

orid

a] a

t 19:

07 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

014

with few opportunities combined with groups who have scarce resourcesnecessarily precipitate marginalisation. In reality, the process is more compli-cated because context influences groups, groups influence context, and bothcomponents change over time. For instance, minorities facing a hostile hostenvironment may develop a clearer sense of group interest. This can produce astronger group consciousness and more group-based resources available forcollective political mobilisation (Lee 2008; Schrover and Vermeulen 2005;Vermeulen and Berger 2008). Conversely, Bloemraad (2007) hypothesises thatthe political mobilisation of immigrant minorities has the potential to stir ananti-immigrant or anti-ethnic backlash among the majority. As such, the major-ity group’s sense of being threatened, and their ensuing reaction, could furtherdecrease opportunities for minorities’ participation.

Using Amsterdam as a case study, we argue that what is critical is theintersection of host state electoral system opportunities and group structures.Furthermore, we argue that we have to study this mechanism in a long-termperspective. We also highlight the important distinction that political represen-tation can occur through election to legislative office as well as by appointmentto executive office – a process that places non-elected people in powerfuldecision-making positions. Reflecting on the experiences of the Turkish- andMoroccan-origin populations in Amsterdam, we argue that while group socialcapital and collective mobilisation can lead to political presence in electedbodies through an open electoral system, it is not the only – or potentiallymost effective – route to political power. Rather, we identify a second, individ-ualist strategy that leads to individual political influence through appointedoffice. Within this individualist track, the appointed official might providestatistical representation of a minority group, but, lacking democratic account-ability, he or she will not necessarily provide substantive representation of thegroup’s concerns.

For either the elected or appointed track, political parties play a decisiverole in the process, acting as gatekeepers of the political system. Their percep-tion of group social capital and ethnic mobilisation affects the ways in whichthey recruit minority candidates, which eventually determines a group’s levelof political representation. Our argument – that it is the interaction betweenelectoral systems and group resources, and that political parties are the keyactors in this process – has a number of important implications for futuretheorising and research, which we discuss in this article’s conclusion.

For several reasons, we believe that Amsterdam and immigrants of Turkishand Moroccan origin together provide a relevant case study for understandingdifferent patterns of political incorporation. The Netherlands – Amsterdam, inparticular – constitutes a favourable, open context for minority participation.The Dutch concept of citizenship, the Netherlands’ electoral system, and thefact that the country gives foreigners the right to vote at the local level havehelped bring about one of the Western world’s highest levels of minorityrepresentation at the national level as well as – and especially – at the locallevel. That said, it seems that the multicultural backlash that the Netherlands is

Moroccans and Turks in Amsterdam 599

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Fl

orid

a] a

t 19:

07 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

014

experiencing (Prins and Saharso 2010) has significantly diminished opportuni-ties for minorities to participate. This makes Amsterdam particularly interest-ing, as it allows us to study interactional effects over a relatively long periodof time in an evolving context, one that originally encouraged representationthough now arguably does so much less.

Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in Amsterdam share institutionalopportunities, average socio-economic status, and a predominant religion. Botharrived as guest workers in the late 1960s to take up low-skilled jobs in thecity’s heavy industry. Moroccan immigrants now represent about 9 per cent ofAmsterdam’s population, and Turkish immigrants about 5 per cent. Bothgroups are predominantly Muslim, and 72 per cent of the Turks and 88 percent of the Moroccans self-identify as religious (O+S 2011b). This makes themminorities in a city that is highly secular (59 per cent of the Amsterdampopulation self-identify as secular; O+S 2011b) and in a country where Islamis increasingly cast in a negative light. Furthermore, both experience socio-eco-nomic challenges: in 2011, 16 per cent of the Turks and 19 per cent of theMoroccans were unemployed, while the average unemployment rate inAmsterdam was 8 per cent (Entzinger and Scheffer 2012; O+S 2011a).

Despite similarities, Moroccans feature more prominently in public debates,being often portrayed as Amsterdam’s most problematic minority (Bovenkerk2009; Vermeulen and Bovenkerk 2012). Headlines have stigmatisedMoroccans, giving rise to labels such as ‘criminal’, ‘problem youth’, and ‘reli-gious extremist’. Recent surveys reflect the suggestive influence of theseportrayals: 34 per cent of Amsterdam’s population has a negative perception ofMoroccans, whereas only 8 per cent feel this way about Turkish immigrants(O+S 2010). Another difference between the groups is that the Turkish immi-grants can be characterised as a minority group with many group-basedresources (strong ethnic networks, many civic organisations, and a strong senseof ethnic belonging, as discussed later in this article), whereas the Moroccanimmigrants can be characterised as a minority group with fewer group-basedresources. This juxtaposition allows us to study the interaction effects ofcontext and group-related factors for two different groups with comparablestarting positions in a similar, albeit evolving, institutional context.

To explain the interaction effects, we first look into the characteristics ofAmsterdam’s electoral system, processes of recruitment, and ethnic social capi-tal among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in Amsterdam. Following that,we investigate different trajectories of political representation of both groups.We conclude with an explanation of how the different explanatory factorsinteract to produce different outcomes.

The Amsterdam Electoral System and Political Context

In several respects, Amsterdam provides a favourable electoral context for the polit-ical mobilisation and representation of immigrants. The system of proportionality


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Fl

orid

a] a

t 19:

07 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

014

favours representation in terms of gender and social background (Bird 2005; Farrell2001: 165–66; Michon 2011). Elections in the Netherlands occur through a partylist system, with pure proportionality, very low thresholds, and the ability to castpreferential votes.1 In these respects, it shares features with other cities that havebeen identified as particularly open to minority political incorporation, such as Oslo(Bergh and Bjørklund 2002), Copenhagen (Togeby 1999, 2008), and Birmingham(Garbaye 2005). At all levels of government, numerous parties can be elected, andcoalitions are subsequently forged to form executives.

In 1985, the Netherlands began allowing non-nationals to participate inlocal elections after five years of legal residence in the country. It is unneces-sary to even register: the municipal administration automatically mails voterregistration cards to all inhabitants entitled to vote. The enfranchisement offoreigners can have a direct effect via participation in elections, as well as anindirect effect – parties place immigrants on electoral lists to appeal to the for-eign electorate. We assume an indirect effect because most immigrant represen-tatives in Amsterdam hold Dutch citizenship (Michon 2011: 90). Furthermore,the ability to cast a preferential vote means that minority candidates who areplaced at seemingly hopeless positions on electoral lists might still win if asignificant group of co-ethnic voters mobilises for their election.2 The avail-ability of a large and dense ethnic network will stimulate participation rates ofimmigrant groups and, eventually, help increase the number of representatives.

Since 1953, left-wing parties have always held more seats than the right inAmsterdam’s municipal council, and the social democrats remain dominant(Berveling 1994: 25; Michon and Vermeulen 2009). In all elections over thelast 20 years, the PvdA (the Labour Party) has come out first, followed by thesocial-liberal D66, the right-wing VVD, and the green GroenLinks. Governingcoalitions have changed regularly over the past years, though the PvdA hasalways played a pivotal role, deciding with which other parties it would governthe city (Berveling 1994: 25; Vermeulen et al. 2011). Social democrats havealso dominated a majority of district councils. Their dominance in Amsterdamhas had major implications for immigrant mobilisation. Immigrants seekingpolitical power or influence must be willing to interact with the PvdA and,especially, to engage in the party’s recruitment process.3

A political party’s nomination or selection of fewer candidates from acertain group also signals something about the party. For example, includingfewer candidates of Muslim background can be taken as a sign of little interestin diversity or of a more secular orientation. As Katz (2001: 278) argues, a‘party’s candidates define the public face of the party in elections. Collectively,they manifest the demographic, geographic, and ideological dimensions of theparty. The nomination of more women or more minority group members ormore members of some religious sect signals something about the party as awhole’. Given the message that candidates send, it is crucial for politicalparties to control recruitment processes. This includes providing access to – orshutting out – newcomers, who may change not only the party’s public face,but ultimately its ideological orientation.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Fl

orid

a] a

t 19:

07 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

014

The literature on political recruitment has two main fields of interest: theprofiles of recruited politicians and their actual recruitment (Michon andVermeulen 2009). While the latter focuses on organisational processes andinstitutional constraints, the former is more concerned with issues of back-ground, socialisation, and ‘political cultures’ (Eldersveld et al. 1995). Studiesconcerned with the individual characteristics of political elites all point tohomogeneity among political recruits. Often, elected politicians are highlyeducated males who rarely come from modest social backgrounds (Andrewset al. 2008; Michon 2011; Putnam 1976). Minority politicians, noticeablywomen and people of immigrant origin, often do not conform to the homoge-neity of elites, which makes it more difficult for them to get selected.According to Norris (1997), the rules and procedures of political recruitmentare both facilitated and constrained by the legal, electoral, and party systems.The recruitment process itself has an effect on the ‘supply’ of prospectivecandidates, as the demands of so-called gatekeepers (voters, party members,financial supporters, and political leaders) are taken into consideration. Partyelites function as gatekeepers and minority groups often have little influenceon them. Parties may provide access to particular groups at a certain point ifand when party elites perceive a mutual interest. However, this access can justas easily be closed off should the perception of mutual interest change or whengroups or representatives of a constituency do not act according to the party’sperceived interest (Goldstone 2003).

In Amsterdam, the recruitment procedure is more or less the same for allmajor parties: a selection committee auditions candidates, receives supportstatements from individuals or party groups, and then drafts a candidate list.Party members consequently set the final candidate order, as they vote on eachposition on the electoral list (Michon 2011: 60). Leijenaar and Niemöller(1997) note that party control over the recruitment process in the Netherlandshas grown since the 1960s. Selection procedures in almost all Dutch partieshave become more rigid and controlled by the elites. In the Netherlands, politi-cal parties are legally free to organise candidate selection as they choose, andthe procedures therefore differ among parties. In general, left-wing parties seemto have more democratic, open procedures, whereby lists are based on votesby party members. However, Leijenaar and Niemöller (1997) find that theLabour Party (PvdA) presents an exception to this rule. They characterise thisparty’s selection procedures as being less democratic than those of otherleft-wing parties, identifying less support for minority candidates and a weakereffect of civic society on the selection process.

Other studies on the Netherlands have shown how selection committees –although predominantly composed of white, middle-aged men – haveprioritised the inclusion of more immigrants on party lists (Berger et al. 2001:58–60; Leijenaar et al. 1999). However, a 2009 study on candidate selectionwithin the local Amsterdam branches of six parties showed that none had strictrules concerning the inclusion of immigrants (or, for that matter, women).4

Parties officially stated that they wanted to include minorities, but did not


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Fl

orid

a] a

t 19:

07 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

014

actively attempt to correct the composition of their lists to ensure descriptiverepresentation. The result of this passive approach was immediate: the numberof councillors of foreign origin in the Amsterdam-wide city council decreasedfrom nine in 2006 to six in 2010.

Parties have reduced efforts to include immigrants on their electoral listsdue to a growing, generalised suspicion of immigrants and group-based politicsin the Netherlands (Sleegers 2007; Tillie 2008). After 2001, the electoralsuccess of parties with explicit anti-immigrant and/or anti-Islamic programmesled to major changes in Dutch policies. These included restricted conditionsfor entry to the Netherlands, reduced subsidies for ethnic and religious organi-sations, a rejection of the Dutch principle of emancipation in one’s owncommunity when it came to Islam, and a critical mainstream discourse – if notdownright disrespect – towards the integration of Muslims in Dutch society(Joppke 2007; Prins and Saharso 2010).

Thus, while Amsterdam has a favourable electoral context for minorityparticipation, due to changing public and political debates on immigration andIslam, political parties show a decreasing support for group-based politics. Thishas led to falling numbers of immigrant-origin candidates on party lists in elec-tions. As we argue in the remainder of this article, the evolving context hasdiffering effects for minority representation for groups with high levels ofgroup-based resources (Turkish immigrants) compared to groups with fewergroup-based resources (Moroccan immigrants). For levels of representationover which parties have high control (i.e. executive political positions), candi-dates with presumably strong links to an ethnic constituency face more andmore elite-imposed obstacles. By contrast, candidates of a certain ethnic back-ground with presumably weak links to the ethnic constituency find it easier togain access to executive positions. In contrast, for elected representational posi-tions, the influence of the favourable electoral Amsterdam context is still sostrong that it privileges groups with a high degree of group-based resources.

Ethnic Social Capital among Turkish and Moroccan Immigrants inAmsterdam

Turkish and Moroccan immigrants differ significantly in terms of their ethnic socialcapital, continuing a trend already identified in the 1990s (Fennema and Tillie1999). Table 1 provides recent figures for organisational densities of Moroccans,Turks, and native Dutch in Amsterdam, indicating the number of organisationspresent for every 1,000 persons within a certain ethnic group.5 Turkish immigrantsclearly have a higher organisational density than Moroccan immigrants.6

Table 1 also shows percentages of active organisation members and, morespecifically, ethnic organisations. We find a significantly higher number ofTurkish than Moroccan immigrants participating in ethnic immigrant organisa-tions. Other analyses of Amsterdam’s different city districts in 2002 and 2007concur with these findings (Vermeulen et al. 2010). In almost all districts,Turkish immigrants display above-average organisational densities, which are


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Fl

orid

a] a

t 19:

07 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

014

significantly higher – up to four times – than those of Moroccan immigrants.The gap between the two groups does not shrink between 2002 and 2007. Inall districts, Moroccan immigrants display organisational densities below theorganisational density of the general population.

The relationship between immigrant organisations and local politicians ofimmigrant origin also provides insight into the strength of the immigrant com-munity and the extent to which resources are used politically. We posit thatboard members of ethnic organisations acquire civic and political experienceand, especially when active membership is high, they are perceived to be ableto mobilise many affiliated immigrant voters during elections. As a result,immigrants with group-based, politically exploitable resources becomeattractive candidates for inclusion on party lists.

Table 2 presents the number of Turkish and Moroccan politicians whoserved on the board of an immigrant organisation before being elected asmunicipal or city district councillor. Among Turkish municipal councillors, alarge majority was active in a local Turkish organisation (69 per cent). AmongMoroccans, this was significantly lower (40 per cent). The number of Turkishcity district councillors with civic experience in one of Amsterdam’s Turkishorganisations was less significant than at the municipal level, but still a greaterproportion of Turkish city district councillors (46 per cent) served on the boardof a local immigrant organisation than their Moroccan counterparts. In total,we see a significant difference between Turkish and Moroccan political repre-sentatives, with 61 per cent of Turkish representatives and 41 per cent ofMoroccan representatives having served as a board member of an immigrantorganisation prior to election.

Once elected, councillors of Turkish origin often refrain from expressingethnic group interests, despite their experience in Turkish organisations(Michon and Vermeulen 2009: 270). Interviews with councillors of Turkishorigin7 reveal their insistence that they represent the interests of the generalpopulation. They also minimise contact with Turkish organisations. Most coun-cillors do this under party influence: parties pressure their elected officials toserve as an ‘everyman councillor’ who can represent all voters (Michon andVermeulen 2009: 270). Indeed, many Dutch parties and party elites in the cur-rent political climate do not deem group-based resources a legitimate political

TABLE 1ORGANISATIONAL DENSITY OF MOROCCANS, TURKS, AND NATIVE DUTCH INAMSTERDAM, 2002–07, AND MEMBERS OF ETHNIC ORGANISATIONS IN 2008

Moroccan TurkishNativeDutch

Density of organisations in 2002 (number per 1,000 people) 8.7 15.9 24.2Density of organisations in 2007 (number per 1,000 people) 7.0 12.3 26.9% of immigrant population that is member of ethnic

organisation in 200825 44 –

Sources: Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce; Dekker (2008).


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Fl

orid

a] a

t 19:

07 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

014

means. Nevertheless, parties are also happy to have current or former civicleaders of immigrant organisations on their lists, seeking to benefit from whatthey perceive as the individuals’ ability to bring a large number of co-ethnicvotes to the party during elections. This apparent contradiction is partly a mat-ter of timing: close contacts with ethnic communities are fine during electoralcampaigns, but undesirable when it comes to the daily political practice(Michon 2011: 79, 108). Parties’ ambivalence towards the role of ethnicity inpolitics presents immigrant politicians with a paradox. On the one hand, ethniccommunity ties provide an electoral resource (i.e. an asset) in an ethnicallydiverse city like Amsterdam. On the other hand, they represent a risk withinthe frame of Dutch contemporary debates on integration, which, as we will seebelow, plays out differently at various levels of representation.

Divergent Patterns of Political Incorporation of Moroccan and TurkishImmigrants in Amsterdam

Here we analyse three indicators of the political participation and representa-tion of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in Amsterdam: voting, elected repre-sentatives, and appointed executive positions.

1. Voting

Amsterdam’s electoral turnout figures for immigrants – defined as individualswho are foreign-born or have at least one foreign-born parent – are availablefor certain groups and for five consecutive local elections (1994–2010). The

TABLE 2TURKISH AND MOROCCAN COUNCILLORS IN AMSTERDAM AND THEIR

IMMIGRANT ORGANISATION BOARD MEMBERSHIP, 1992–2006

Number ofcouncillors

Number ofcouncillors who havebeen board members

of an immigrantorganisation

As% of number ofcouncillors of thatimmigrant group

Turkish Moroccan Turkish Moroccan Turkish Moroccan

City council 13 5 9 2 69 40City district council 48 36 22 15 46 42Total 51 41 31 17 61 41

Note: We relied on a database containing 189 formal Turkish organisations established in the period1965–2002 and 286 formal Moroccan organisations from 1965 to 2007. The databases alsoincluded all active members (1,695 Turks and 3,057 Moroccans) who were board members of oneor more of the organisations during these periods. Following Fennema and Tillie (1999, 2001), weculled information on immigrant organisations from the archives of the Amsterdam Chamber ofCommerce. These data provide the year an immigrant organisation was founded and dissolved, theorganisation’s name, its mission statement, as well as its board members’ and founders’ names anddates and places of birth.Source: Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce and calculated by the authors.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Fl

orid

a] a

t 19:

07 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

014

figures in Table 3 compare voting turnout for those of Turkish and Moroccanorigin with overall turnout; with two exceptions, overall turnout is higher.

Both exceptions involve Turks, who have always participated inAmsterdam elections more than Moroccans. In 1994 and 2006, their turnoutrate was, respectively, higher than and equivalent to overall turnout.Moroccans’ turnout rate was substantially lower than overall turnout.8

2. Elected Representatives

In the Netherlands, immigrants have been present in national and localassemblies for 20 years – and in significant numbers (Michon et al. 2007).In Amsterdam, immigrants found their way into the local political elite bythe early 1990s. As Table 4 shows, numbers have risen gradually. The high-est share of immigrants elected to the city council was attained in 2006,when 20 per cent of local councillors were counted as being either bornabroad or the children of immigrants. In 2010, however, the steady increasewas broken and, for the first time since 1990, the number of people ofimmigrant origins elected to the council decreased markedly.9

Compared with their share in Amsterdam’s general population, Turkishimmigrants have been almost proportionally represented in the city councilsince 1994, although this changed in the recent election. In contrast, Moroccan

TABLE 3TURNOUT OF MIGRANT VOTERS IN AMSTERDAM OVER TIME (1994–2010) , IN %

Voter’s country of origin 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010

Turkey 67 39 30 51 46Morocco 49 23 22 37 39Overall turnout 57 46 48 51 51

Sources: Tillie (2000); Michon and Tillie (2003); Van Heelsum and Tillie (2006); van der Heijdenand van Heelsum (2010).

TABLE 4AMSTERDAM IMMIGRANT CITY COUNCILLORS, 1990–2010

Election 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010Origin of councillors

Turkey 1 3 3 4 3 2Morocco 1 2 1 2 3Other non-Western 3 2 4 3 4 1Total 4 6 9 8 9 6As % of whole council (N = 45) 9 13 20 18 20 13

Note: This table reflects individuals elected on Election Day and those who stepped in after deputymayors were chosen (a few weeks after the election), but not those who stepped in during the termof office.Source: Calculated by the authors.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Fl

orid

a] a

t 19:

07 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

014

immigrants have always been statistically underrepresented. For the ensuingdiscussion, it is important to note that the overwhelming majority of Turkishand Moroccan councillors is affiliated with left-wing parties, notably thesocial-democratic PvdA.10

Amsterdam also has a number of districts that elect councils. Until theMarch 2010 elections, Amsterdam had 14 district councils comprising a totalof 322 elected councillors. In 2002, 15 were of Turkish background and 14were of Moroccan background (respectively, 4.7 and 4.3 per cent of all districtcouncillors). In 2006, their numbers rose to 22 and 20 (6.8 and 6.2 per cent),respectively.11 These figures demonstrate how, similar to their experience inthe city council, Turkish immigrants have not suffered unequal representationin district councils over the past years, compared to their 5 per cent share ofthe city’s population. Statistical representation of Moroccan immigrants lagsbehind their share in the population (9 per cent), though it is still significant.12

3. Executive Positions

We also measured the number of politicians of Turkish and Moroccan back-ground holding executive positions. We refer here to the positions of city-leveldeputy mayor, district mayor, or district deputy mayor. In 2002, a strict separa-tion was introduced in Dutch municipalities between the council (the legisla-tive body that controls the executive) and the mayor and deputy mayors (theexecutive). Since then, deputy mayors and district deputy mayors are appointedby the coalition parties and approved by the council. This means that, amongother things, political parties have greater control as gatekeepers when it comesto executive positions than the legislative body.

Table 5 provides information about executive positions held by people ofTurkish and Moroccan origin in Amsterdam since 2002. Here a different pic-ture emerges from the earlier indicators measuring access to the system. It isstriking that among those holding executive positions, we find significantlymore individuals of Moroccan than Turkish descent. Amsterdam has twice hada city-level deputy mayor of Moroccan origin, though never one of Turkish

TABLE 5NUMBER OF POSITION HOLDERS OF TURKISH AND MOROCCAN ORIGIN IN

AMSTERDAM, 2002–10

Of Moroccan origin Of Turkish origin

Deputymayor

Citydistrictmayor

City districtdeputy mayor

Deputymayor

Citydistrictmayor

City districtdeputy mayor

2002 1 0 1 0 0 12006 1 2 3 0 0 12010 0 2 1 0 0 1

Note: Some of these positions are occupied by the same individual during different periods of gov-ernment. We have therefore counted positions rather than persons here.Source: Calculations by the authors.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Fl

orid

a] a

t 19:

07 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

014

origin. The same holds true at the district mayor level. Since the 2010 elec-tions, two of seven city district mayors (29 per cent) have been of Moroccandescent, whereas no one of Turkish descent has ever been appointed. Politi-cians of Turkish origin have been district deputy mayors, but to a lesser extentthan Moroccans.

Summarising the evidence for different forms of incorporation of Turksand Moroccans in Amsterdam, we conclude that political participation andelectoral representation has been more extensive among the former group.Turks display higher turnout rates over time and, with the exception of the2010 election, they enjoy higher rates of local representation at city and citydistrict levels. The data presented here, however, also indicate that the positionof Turkish representatives has gradually weakened: their presence hasdecreased at the city council level and they fail to get appointed to executivepositions. Moroccan immigrants, by contrast, show low rates of participationand representation, though they do better than Turks in executive positions.

Explaining the Different Patterns: Perceptions of Political Parties inAmsterdam

We lack direct observational evidence on how political parties’ perceptions ofvarious groups influence the recruitment and appointment processes for differ-ent political positions in Amsterdam. But based on public comments andresearch interviews with party officials, we conclude that in contemporaryDutch politics, having ties to particular immigrant organisations can be a liabil-ity in the selection process (personal communication from interviews withparty officials).13 This has everything to do with the current backlash againstmulticulturalism in the Netherlands, which for the Amsterdam case has had anespecially strong effect on Turks’ political position. Group-based mobilisationis no longer openly valued in the Dutch political arena, thus affecting the posi-tion of Turks, who more than other groups in Amsterdam mobilise along eth-nic lines. Political parties perceive the community as dense and cohesive andare aware that Turkish politicians maintain strong ties to Turkish organisations.Parties fear that giving politicians of Turkish descent an influential positionwill automatically bring in ethnic group-based interests. The recent hostility ofparties towards immigrant group-based mobilisation therefore has a negativeeffect on political weight: Turkish politicians’ access to politically influentialpositions becomes obstructed. The electoral system, in contrast, is less influ-enced by the backlash against multiculturalism: given that the electoral systemincludes party lists and preferential voting, group-based resources can still helpgarner votes and seats on council, thus keeping the door relatively open toTurkish immigrants’ political participation and representation in Amsterdam.

For Moroccan immigrants, the integration debate’s increasingly harsh tonehas two types of consequences. First, the debate is fixated on an assumptionthat Moroccans display higher rates of violence and delinquency than any othergroup, thus making them more visible in the public eye. Second, the backlash


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Fl

orid

a] a

t 19:

07 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

014

against multiculturalism has had especially negative consequences forMoroccan organisations in Amsterdam, as Moroccan immigrants lack autono-mous group-based resources to maintain many immigrant organisations aspublic funding has diminished. Nevertheless, we have seen that politicians ofMoroccan origin do particularly well in executive positions. We therefore positthat individual politicians of Moroccan descent are given opportunities bypolitical parties and party elites to enter the precincts of power for bothsymbolic and political reasons. As shown by studies in the United States(Aptekar 2009), groups perceived as most problematic draw political parties’attention. Politicians may seek to establish contacts with politicians fromwithin the immigrant group to help change the situation. In the present Dutchcontext, politicians of Moroccan descent are expected not to engage openly inethnic politics, yet simultaneously to find solutions for the problems Moroccanimmigrants are perceived to cause. They thus find themselves in a contradic-tory bind, as do Turkish politicians, albeit with differential outcomes as far asaccess to positions of power is concerned.

Conclusion: Towards an Interaction Model for Explaining PoliticalIntegration

In sum, we agree with those who underscore the importance of the electoralsystem for opening doors to minority representation (Bird 2005; Garbaye2005; Togeby 1999, 2008) and with scholars who focus on group resources,such as civic associations and social capital (Jacobs and Tillie 2004; Jacobset al. 2004; Morales and Giugni 2010; Tillie 2004; Vermeulen 2006). Weadvance beyond these two approaches, however, in showing that the interactionbetween political opportunity structures and community resources can be con-tingent on the overarching discourse on immigrant minorities and the recruit-ment strategies of political parties. One-dimensional approaches are insufficientfor understanding the differences between the political incorporation of Turksand Moroccans in Amsterdam. Our model is based on three elements thatexplain the success or failure of immigrants’ political mobilisation and politicalincorporation. First, features of the electoral and political systems determine if(and to what extent) immigrants can vote and get elected. Second, the structureof immigrant groups influences the extent to which immigrants are able toseize the opportunities offered. The extent to which immigrants get elected andbecome represented depends on this (as displayed by Turkish immigrants inAmsterdam). Third, parties and party elites facilitate the political participationof immigrants, as they choose whether or not to exploit the resources of agiven immigrant community.

Groups that have more tools to develop a robust civil society in the hoststate will engage in active participation more than groups without those tools.Consequently, a community’s high level of civic organisation and its degree ofcohesiveness explain why – especially in a relatively open political system –they gain greater access to the political arena and displayed higher levels of


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Fl

orid

a] a

t 19:

07 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

014

political participation and presence than groups without these group-basedresources. We hypothesise that a similar mechanism can be found elsewhere inEuropean countries and cities. For instance, observers in the United Kingdomhave noted a higher degree of cohesiveness among Pakistani than Bangladeshiimmigrants (Anwar 2001), while in Germany differences exist between Turkishand Italian immigrants (Berger 2010).

The high level of group-based resources is, however, only part of the story.At work here is not only the opportunity structure, but also the important rolethat parties play in selecting candidates to run for election as well as appoint-ing non-elected executive officials. Party rules regarding recruitment and selec-tion, the contacts that parties do or do not have with organisations, and theirpolitical strategies all influence immigrants’ access to politics, including whichgroups and individuals among them are favoured in the process. This dynamichighlights another critical factor: changes in the political climate and the publicdebate and their interaction with political recruitment processes as well as com-munity structures will define the future public image of political parties andtheir ideological dimension. A positive attitude towards immigration will prob-ably lead political parties to increase the number of candidates of immigrantorigin and lead them to either welcome or ignore any links with their ethnicconstituency. A wariness of immigration and ethnic mobilisation as well assubstantial, negative media attention on minorities will probably prompt partiesto include politicians from ‘problem’ groups, although they are likely to beindividuals who are generally known as being less group-centric. Partiesthereby respect the (unwritten) rule that political representatives should reflectthe population’s diversity in elected councils. Yet, at the same time, they takecare not to fan the flames of a backlash against multiculturalism by stayingaway from individuals who are ‘too’ ethnic. The appointment of individuals ofimmigrant origin to executive positions by conservative French and Britishgovernments and of politicians of Surinamese background in Amsterdam(Vermeulen et al. 2011) illustrate this mechanism at work. The ethnicbackground of the candidate does play an important role in the recruitmentprocess, but only when combined with the absence of a strong link to anethnic constituency. Politicians of immigrant origin who have stronger ties totheir ethnic community and whose constituency is less visible or perceived asless problematic than other groups are, especially in more hostile contexts,often excluded from the political arena, including the executive.

All in all, our analysis of the position of Turks and Moroccans in Amster-dam shows that a convincing model of immigrant political integration requiresexplanations that can account for distinct pathways of incorporation. Thismodel can also be applied to the political inclusion of social groups moregenerally. It devotes due attention to contextual opportunities and barriers(including the electoral system and the functioning of parties), communityfeatures, and the public debate on groups’ position in society. As such, themodel holds out significant promise beyond the Dutch case because it seeks toexplain variation across contexts, between groups, and across time. More


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Fl

orid

a] a

t 19:

07 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

014

research in other contexts with other groups, including non-immigrant minori-ties, should provide additional empirical evidence and further tests of such amulti-dimensional model. Future studies should focus more on the ways inwhich parties fulfil their role as gatekeepers that control access for minoritygroups to the political systems. We hope that this will encourage further dis-cussion of the representation of minority groups beyond electoral outcomes.As highlighted in this article, what happens before and after elections withinthe realm of political parties may affect the political position of minorities evenmore than the actual election results.

Acknowledgements

We thank Irene Bloemraad, Michael Jones-Correa, Karen Schönwälder, Philipvan Praag, Tjitske Akkerman and the anonymous reviewers of West EuropeanPolitics for their comments on an earlier version of this article.

Notes

1. Party lists compete in elections. The order of candidates is decided upon by each party,though voters can select a listed candidate who will independently earn a seat upon gettingenough votes. Direct election through preferential votes requires at least one-quarter of thequota (i.e. the number of votes needed for a party to win a seat).

2. This dynamic seems similar to what has been identified in some Scandinavian cities (Berghand Bjørklund 2002; Togeby 1999, 2008) as well as in Brussels (Jacobs et al. 2004).

3. The link between left-of-centre parties and minorities is a general phenomenon across Europe(see Messina 2007; Schönwälder 2013; Sobolewska 2013).

4. This insight is based on BA theses in political science by C. Biervliet, S. ter Borg, I. deBruin, T. van der Heijden, A. Molijn, and C. van der Velden, all written in 2009 at the Uni-versity of Amsterdam.

5. Every formal not-for-profit founded by Turkish or Moroccan immigrants is included in ourdata, regardless of the organisation’s mission statement or the membership’s ethnic composi-tion. The role of active organisers is strongly emphasised in our understanding of what anorganisation is. Organisations of second-generation Turkish and Moroccan immigrants areclassified in this table as Dutch because their board members were born in the Netherlands.However, second-generation organisations in Amsterdam amount to less than 1 per cent forboth 2002 and 2007 (Vermeulen et al. 2010).

6. Table 5 also shows that the number of immigrant organisations is significantly lower thanamong the majority Dutch inhabitants. To a large extent, this difference between natives andimmigrants can be explained by the groups’ differing characteristics. On average, immigrantsin Amsterdam have less income and lower levels of education and are much younger thannatives. Such factors are known to have a negative effect on organisational activities.

7. These councillors were elected in the early 1990s and were interviewed both in 1990 and in2006.

8. These turnout figures are based on exit polls; for a discussion of these data, see Michon et al.(2007).

9. The 45-seat council is limited in size, which means that small fluctuations in councillor num-bers translate into important statistical changes. Nevertheless, based on our knowledge of thelocal political arena, we believe that a decrease of immigrants on the council (from nine tosix) is significant – even more so given their prior constant increases.

10. This is the case in other Dutch cities as well (Dekker and Fattah 2006: 8).


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Fl

orid

a] a

t 19:

07 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

014

11. For elections prior to 2002, no comprehensive data is available. Outcomes of the 2010 elec-tions are difficult to compare with those of 2002 and 2006 because of the merger of districtsand the subsequent decrease in the overall number of councillors (from 322 to 203). In 2010,20 per cent of all district councillors were of foreign origin, with Turks comprising 6 per centand Moroccans comprising 3 per cent.

12. The presence of councillors of Turkish and Moroccan origin differs greatly across districtcouncils, though is generally concentrated in districts with the highest share of Turks andMoroccans in the overall population.

13. These interviews were conducted by C. van der Velden for her BA thesis.

References

Andrews, Caroline, John Biles, Myer Siemiatycki, and Erin Tolley, eds. (2008). Electing a DiverseCanada: The Representation of Newcomers and Minorities in Canadian Cities. Vancouver: Uni-versity of British Columbia Press.

Anwar, Muhammad (2001). ‘The Participation of Ethnic Minorities in British Politics’, Journal ofEthnic and Migration Studies, 27:3, 533–49.

Aptekar, Sofya (2009). ‘Organizational Life and Political Incorporation of Two Asian ImmigrantGroups: A Case Study’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 32:9, 1511–33.

Banducci, Susan A., Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey A. Karp (2004). ‘Minority RepresentationEmpowerment, and Participation’, Journal of Politics, 66:2, 534–56.

Berger, Maria (2010). ‘Politiek burgerschap van migranten in Berlijn: De weerbarstige relatie tus-sen sociaal kapitaal en integratie van Turken, Italianen, Russische Joden en Aussiedler’. Unpub-lished PhD dissertation, University of Amsterdam.

Berger, Maria, Anja van Heelsum, Meindert Fennema, Jean Tillie, and Rick Wolff (2001). Politiekeparticipatie van etnische minderheden in vier steden. Amsterdam: IMES.

Bergh, Johannes, and Tor Bjørklund (2002). ‘The Political Representation of Immigrants in Osloand Copenhagen: A Study of Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior’, Comparative SocialResearch, 22:1, 101–22.

Berveling, Jaco (1994). Het stempel op de besluitvorming: Macht, invloed en besluitvorming optwee Amsterdamse beleidsterreinen. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.

Bird, Karen (2005). ‘The Political Representation of Visible Minorities in Electoral Democracies: AComparison of France, Denmark, and Canada’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 11:4, 425–65.

Bird, Karen, Thomas Saalfeld, and Andreas M. Wüst, eds. (2011). The Political Representation ofImmigrants and Minorities: Voters, Parties and Parliaments in Liberal Democracies. Londonand New York: Routledge.

Bloemraad, Irene (2007). ‘Unity in Diversity? Bridging Models of Multiculturalism and ImmigrantIntegration’, Du Bois Review, 4:2, 317–36.

Bovenkerk, Frank (2009). Etniciteit, criminaliteit en het strafrecht. The Hague: Boom JuridischeUitgevers.

Brubaker, Rogers (1992). Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press.

Dahlstedt, Magnus, and Fredrik Hertzberg (2007). ‘Democracy the Swedish Way? The Exclusionof Immigrants in Swedish Politics’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 30:2, 175–203.

Dekker, Paul (2008). ‘Civil Society’, in Andries van den Broek and Saskia Keuzenkamp (eds.),Het dagelijks leven van allochtone stedelingen. The Hague: SCP, 78–100.

Dekker, Lisette, and Brahim Fattah (2006). ‘Meer diversiteit in de gemeenteraden’, IPP Nieuws-brief Zomer, 2006, 7–10.

Eggert, Nina, and Marco Giugni (2010). ‘Does Associational Involvement Spur Political Integra-tion? Political Interest and Participation of Three Immigrant Groups in Zurich’, Swiss PoliticalScience Review, 16:1, 175–210.

Eldersveld, Samuel J., Lars Strömberg, and Wim Derksen (1995). Local Elites in Western Democ-racies: A Comparative Analysis of Urban Political Leaders in the U.S., Sweden and the Nether-lands. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Fl

orid

a] a

t 19:

07 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

014

Entzinger, Han, and Paul Scheffer (2012). De Staat van Integratie in Rotterdam en Amsterdam.Amsterdam: Onderzoek + Statistiek, Gemeente Amsterdam.

Farrell, David (2001). Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction. Basingstoke: Palgrave.Fennema, Meindert, and Jean Tillie (1999). ‘Political Participation and Political Trust in Amster-dam: Civic Communities and Ethnic Networks’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 25:4,703–26.

Fennema, Meindert, and Jean Tillie (2001). ‘Civic Community Political Participation and PoliticalTrust of Ethnic Groups’, Connections, 23:2, 44–59.

Garbaye, Romain (2005). Getting into Local Power: The Politics of Ethnic Minorities in Britishand French Cities. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Goldstone, Jack A., ed. (2003). States, Parties, and Social Movements: Protest and the Dynamicsof Institutional Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Heijden, Teri van der, and Anja van Heelsum (2010). Opkomst en stemgedrag tijdens gemeentera-adsverkiezingen van 3 maart 2010. Amsterdam: IMES.

Heelsum, Anja van, and Jean Tillie (2006). Opkomst en partijvoorkeur van migranten bij de gem-eenteraadsverkiezingen van 7 maart 2006. Amsterdam: IMES.

Ireland, Patrick (2000). ‘Reaping What They Sow: Institutions and Immigrant Political Participationin Western Europe’, in Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (eds.), Challenging Immigration andEthnic Relations Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 233–82.

Jacobs, Dirk, and Jean Tillie (2004). ‘Introduction: Social Capital and Political Integration ofMigrants’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30:3, 419–27.

Jacobs, Dirk, Karen Phalet, and Marc Swyngedouw (2004). ‘Associational Membership and Politi-cal Involvement among Ethnic Minority Groups in Brussels’, Journal of Ethnic and MigrationStudies, 30:3, 543–59.

Joppke, Christian (2007). ‘Transformation of Immigrant Integration Civic Integration and Antidis-crimination in the Netherlands, France, and Germany’, World Politics, 59:2, 243–73.

Katz, Richard S. (2001). ‘The Problem of Candidate Selection and Models of Party Democracy’,Party Politics, 7:3, 277–96.

Koopmans, Ruud, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni, and Florence Passy (2005). Contested Citizenship:Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Lee, Taeku (2008). ‘Race Immigration and the Identity-to-Politics Link’, Annual Review of PoliticalScience, 11, 457–78.

Leijenaar, Monique, and Kees Niemöller (1997). ‘The Netherlands’, in Pippa Norris (ed.), Passages to Power:Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 114–36.

Leijenaar, Monique, Kees Niemöller, and Astrid van der Kooij (1999). Kandidaten gezocht: Politi-eke partijen en het streven naar grotere diversiteit onder gemeenteraden. Amsterdam: Instituutvoor Publiek en Politiek.

Messina, Anthony A. (2007). The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration to Western Europe.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Michon, Laure (2011). ‘Ethnic Minorities in Local Politics: Comparing Amsterdam and Paris’.Unpublished PhD dissertation. University of Amsterdam.

Michon, Laure, and Jean Tillie (2003). Amsterdamse polyfonie: Opkomst en stemgedrag vanallochtone Amsterdammers bij de gemeenteraads- en deelraadsverkiezingen van 6 maart 2002.Amsterdam: IMES.

Michon, Laure, and Floris Vermeulen (2009). ‘Organizing for Access? The Political Mobilizationof Turks in Amsterdam’, Turkish Studies, 10:2, 255–75.

Michon, Laure, Jean Tillie, and Anja van Heelsum (2007). ‘Political Participation of Migrants in theNetherlands since 1986’, paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Helsinki, 7–12 May 2007.

Morales, Laura, and Marco G. Giugni, eds. (2010). Social Capital, Political Participation andMigration in Europe: Making Multicultural Democracy Work? Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Norris, Pippa (1997). ‘Introduction: Theories of Recruitment’, in Pippa Norris (ed.), Passages toPower: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1–14.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Fl

orid

a] a

t 19:

07 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

014

O+S (2010). De Amsterdamse burgermonitor 2010. Amsterdam: O+S.O+S (2011a). Amsterdam in cijfers 2011. Amsterdam: O+S.O+S (2011b). De staat van de stad Amsterdam VI: Ontwikkelingen in participatie en leefsituatie.Amsterdam: O+S.

Odmalm, Pontus (2005). Migration Policies and Political Participation: Inclusion or Intrusion inWestern Europe? Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Prins, Baukje, and Sawitri Saharso (2010). ‘From Toleration to Repression: The Dutch Backlashagainst Multiculturalism’, in Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf (eds.), The Multicultural-ism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices. London: Routledge, 72–91.

Putnam, Robert D. (1976). The Comparative Study of Political Elites. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall.

Schönwälder, Karen (2013). ‘Immigrant Representation in Germany’s Regional States: The Puzzleof Uneven Dynamics’, West European Politics, 36:3, 634–51.

Schrover, Marlou, and Floris Vermeulen (2005). ‘Immigrant Organisations’, Journal of Ethnic andMigration Studies, 31:5, 823–32.

Sleegers, Fleur (2007). In Debat over Nederland: Veranderingen in het discours over de multicultu-rele samenleving en nationale identiteit. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Sobolewska, Maria (2013). ‘Party Strategies and the Descriptive Representation of Ethnic Minori-ties: The 2010 British General Election’, West European Politics, 36:3, 615–33.

Tillie, Jean (2000). De etnische stem, opkomst en stemgedrag van migranten tijdens gemeentera-adsverkiezingen, 1986–1998. Utrecht: Forum.

Tillie, Jean (2004). ‘Social Capital of Organisations and their Members: Explaining the Political Inte-gration of Immigrants in Amsterdam’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30:3, 529–41.

Tillie, Jean (2008). Gedeeld land: Het multiculturele ongemak van Nederland. Amsterdam:Meulenhoff.

Togeby, Lise (1999). ‘Migrants at the Polls: An Analysis of Immigrant and Refugee Participationin Danish Local Elections’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 25:4, 665–84.

Togeby, Lise (2004). ‘It Depends… How Organisational Participation Affects Political Participationand Social Trust among Second-Generation Immigrants in Denmark’, Journal of Ethnic andMigration Studies, 30:3, 509–28.

Togeby, Lise (2008). ‘The Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities: Denmark as a DeviantCase’, Party Politics, 14:3, 325–43.

Van Heelsum, Anja, and Jean Tillie (2006). Opkomst en partijvoorkeur van migranten bij de gem-eenteraadsverkiezingen van 7 Maart 2006. Amsterdam: IMES.

Vermeulen, Floris (2006). The Immigrant Organising Process: Turkish Organisations in Amsterdamand Berlin, and Surinamese Organisations in Amsterdam, 1960–2000. IMISCOE DissertationsSeries. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Vermeulen, Floris, and Maria Berger (2008). ‘Civic Networks and Political Behavior: Turks inAmsterdam and Berlin’, in S. Karthick Ramakrishnan and Irene Bloemraad (eds.), Civic Hopesand Political Realities: Immigrants, Community Organizations and Political Engagement. NewYork: Russell Sage Foundation Press, 160–92.

Vermeulen, Floris, and Frank Bovenkerk (2012). Engaging with Violent Islamic Extremism. LocalPolicies in Western European cities. The Hague: Eleven International Publishing.

Vermeulen, Floris, Martijn Brünger, and Robert van de Walle (2010). Vitaal, dynamisch maar tochkwetsbaar? Een onderzoek naar de ontwikkelingen van het maatschappelijk middenveld inAmsterdam. Amsterdam: Instituut voor Migratie en Etnische Studies.

Vermeulen, Floris, Jean Tillie, and Laure Michon (2011). ‘How Are Immigrants Entering thePrecincts of Power in Amsterdam?’, unpublished paper presented at the Amsterdam and NewYork: The Impact of Immigration in Two Global Cities conference, Amsterdam.

Wright, Matthew, and Irene Bloemraad (2012). ‘Is There a Trade-off between Multiculturalism andSocio-Political Integration? Policy Regimes and Immigrant Incorporation in ComparativePerspective’, Perspectives on Politics, 10:1, 77–95.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Fl

orid

a] a

t 19:

07 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

014

explaining different trajectories in immigrant political integration: moroccans and turks in...

Documents