evolution and state science standards

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Culture Wars in State Education Policy: ALook at the Relative Treatment of

Evolutionary Theory in StateScience Standardsn

M. Troy Gibson, University of Southern Mississippi

Objectives. Students of public policy have recognized that not all policies are completelyor mostly shaped by socioeconomic factors. Some policies, known as morality policies,derive from the deeply held values and beliefs of effective participants in the policy-

making process. To better understand this distinct policy category and where it exists,policy analysts must test for the impact of both socioeconomic forces and explanatoryfactors developed in morality politics theory (particularly religious contexts). This studyattempts to explain differences in state science education standards with regard to stip-ulated instruction in evolutionary theory as morality policy. Methods. A cross-sectionalstudy of the American states employing ordinary least squares and logistic regressionanalysis assesses the impact of popular evangelical adherence over the presence ofevolution-friendly state science standards, ceteris paribus. Results. Socioeconomicfactors inadequately explain the variation in state science standards. Furthermore,these standards are morality policies with clearly defined religious implications andare better explained by state religious divisions than by other cultural forces such asstate ideological context. Conclusion. This study demonstrates that some policieshave clear implications for religious beliefs and may represent a subcategory ofmorality policy. These kinds of policies are better explained by religious contextsthan other political and cultural determinants of morality policies.

The current revival of interest in creationism has focused largely on the publicschools. Parents, pastors, and others have become painfully aware that, in thename of science, their young people are being thoroughly indoctrinated in

the deadly philosophy of evolutionary humanism. Biblical creationism iseither ridiculed or (which is even worse) ignored as not worth mentioning.

Drs. Henry and John Morris (1996:161)

At the state and local government level, Peterson (1981) and Hwang andGray (1991) place all public policy into one of three categories: develop-mental, allocational, and redistributional. Each of these policy categories is

nDirect correspondence to Troy Gibson, Department of Political Science, University of

Southern Mississippi, Long Beach, MS 39560 [email protected]. The author agrees toshare all data and coding information with those wishing to replicate this study. The authorthanks Scott Ainsworth, Mark Smith, Trey Hood, Frank Mixon, Kenneth Cumming, and

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thought to be a function of the presence and salience of socioeconomicfactors (e.g., political parties and income levels). Others have argued thatstate political outcomes are a function of distinct political subcultures (seeElazar, 1984) and/or the political and ideological context of the state (see

Erikson, Wright, and McIver, 1993). Yet, an additional policy category,morality policy, better describes policies that are inadequately explained bythese frameworks. Minkenberg and Inglehart (1990) have shown that ma-terialist values and economic issues have been greatly replaced by moralvalues and cultural issues (e.g., abortion, homosexual rights, and drug use)over the last few decades. Policies associated with these cultural or moralissues can be exclusively grouped as a separate category of public policybecause they depend on and represent the deeply held moral values ofcitizens closest to the controlling level of government and depend less on

socioeconomic characteristics for their existence (Mooney, 1999).Several studies have indicated the presence of policies that appear to be

reflecting state moral values and not socioeconomic characteristics (seeErikson, Wright, and McIver, 1993; Haider-Markel and Meier, 1996;Mooney and Lee, 1995; Wald, Button, and Rienzo, 2001; Meier andMcFarlane, 1993; Norrander and Wilcox, 1999; Smith, 1999). Indeed,Gusfield (1963) argues that states have long adopted policies that are drivenby the moral and religious values of their citizens. Morality policy, as do theother categories of public policy, has a distinct set of explanatory variables.

Unique noneconomic social forces, frequently religious, with deeply heldmoral beliefs are key players in determining morality policy (see Meier and

Johnson, 1990; Morgan and Meier, 1980).Debate surrounding nonmorality policy is quite different than that of

morality policy (Carmines and Stimson, 1980; Meier, 1994). Mooney(2001:79) identifies certain characteristics of morality policies that differwith characteristics of nonmorality policies. Morality policies concern con-flicts of first principles and are to be distinguished from nonmoralitypolicies. For most citizens, morality policies are technically simpler and

more salient and meaningful. They also encourage more citizen participa-tion than other policy types.

Still, Wald, Button, and Rienzo conclude, scholars have not done muchto establish that morality politics warrants its reputation as an independentdomain in the policy process (2001:222). This study is designed to test forthe impact of both morality and nonmorality policy predictors by attempt-ing to explain the relative treatment of states science education standardswith respect to instruction in evolutionary theory in terms of the religiousenvironment of states. Specifically, do states with larger numbers of evan-

gelicals adopt science standards that are more hostile to instruction in ev-olutionary theory? Indeed, while many studies of morality policies

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will demonstrate that some policies have such theologically salient implica-tions that religious context becomes a particularly decisive determinant ofsome morality policies. That is, some morality policies are better explainedby noneconomic forces featuring the orthodox-progressive religious division

(culture war), while others are perhaps explained by other cultural deter-minants, such as ideological composition (Erikson, Wright, and McIver,1993). Indeed, more researchers are showing that American political dis-course now features religious traditionalists and nontraditionalists (and sec-ularists) divided not by materialist concerns, but religious ones (Layman andCarmines, 1997). Specifically, Hunter (1991) argues that most aspects of

American political debate can be characterized as a culture war betweenthe religiously orthodox (i.e., theologically conservative) and progress-ives (i.e., theologically liberal or secular). Wuthnow (1988, 1989) and

Green et al. (1996) observe that similar patterns are apparent among re-ligious communities where orthodox believers are uniting across faith tra-ditions to oppose progressives in many areas of society. The culture wartheory has been tested with mixed results at the individual level in severalpublications (see Layman and Carmines, 1997; Layman, 1997, 1999; Guthet al., 1995; Davis and Robinson, 1996). According to the theory, politicalvalues, vote choice, party identification, and other political behaviors shouldreflect an orthodox-progressive divide.

In this article, the culture war theory will be further tested at the political-

outcome level. If the culture war theory is true, then we should not only seeorthodox-progressive political divisions at the individual level, but we shouldsee the effects of that division at the policy level. After all, if what Hunterand others posit is true, then the effectsof a culture war, with fierce fightingbetween monolithic orthodox and progressive camps, and the pressure theybring to bear on lawmakers, should be visible at the policy-output level(Hunter, 1991:286). Further, the effect should be most apparent involvingmorality policies that feature questions of explicitly religious concerns (see

Jelen, 1998:120), especially in education policy (Hunter, 1991:ch. 8).

I will start by presenting evangelicals, a theologically conservative de-nominational family within Protestant Christianity, as a viable political forcewell suited, motivated, and equipped for morality politics debate. I will thenintroduce the adoption of state science standards regarding instruction inevolutionary theory as a unique candidate for morality policy. Data andvariables will then be explained and subjected to empirical testing, andconcluding comments will be offered.

Evangelical Adherence as a Determinant of Morality Policy

Culture Wars in State Education Policy 1131


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sharing basic beliefs regarding ecclesiology, ritual, and theology, and oftenembodying ethnic, quasi-ethnic, or racial distinctions as well (Kellstedt andGreen, 1993:57). In general, the term evangelical refers to the theolog-ically and doctrinally conservative sects of Christian Protestantism, which

essentially stem from a firm belief in biblical inerrancy or scriptural au-thority (Wilcox, 1992). In terms of the culture war thesis, evangelicals arethe primary foot soldiers of the orthodox camp. Mainline refers to mod-erate theological views with respect to the Bible. The Bible is generally seenby mainline sects as a source of great Truth, even if they do not consider itinerrant or authoritative. Mainline sects are also more likely to consider

Jesus Christ to be a prophet of social justice instead of a personal savior(Wald, 1997). In their work, Kellstedt and Green (1993:Table 3.1) dem-onstrate the importance of denomination when it comes to political be-

havior. Mainline members tend to be less Republican and conservative thanevangelicals across a variety of political issues and ideological measures.Further, as Wald, Owen, and Hill (1990) show, evangelical churches as acommunity are particularly constructed and positioned to pose a politicallycohesive force in policy debates. Their analysis shows that evangelicalchurches, compared with mainline churches, are stronger in the sense thatthey are more unified around theological beliefs, social practices, demo-graphics, and moral conservative beliefs. Table 1 provides a brief catego-rization scheme for the dominant religious groupings in America.

These theoretical foundations have been carefully constructed, but fewstudies have actually tested the impact of a particular religious adherence onpolitical outcomes. However, the few studies that have lend support to thenotions that theological conservatism matters and evangelical communitiesactively seek government validation via policy of the values they hold. Forexample, significant evangelical adherence effects were found by Wald,Button, and Rienzo (1996) studying local gay rights ordinances, by OCon-ner and Berlman (1995) and Mier and McFarlene (1993) examining stateabortion policies, by Wald, Button, and Rienzo (2001) studying school-

based sexual health service provision, and by Songer and Tabrizi (1999)regarding judicial decision making.

Teaching Evolutionary Theory in Public Schools as a Morality Policy

Instruction in evolutionary theory, I argue, makes a strong candidate asmorality policy and represents a type of morality policy that is particularlyaffected by the sort of religious convictions thought to be important in the

culture war literature. Many in the Christian community have seen con-ditions in public education as the source of moral decline in America.



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TABLE1

Major

DenominationsCategorizedIntoDenominationalFamilies

vangelical

W

hiteMainline

BlackProtestant

Catholic

Jewish

Ang

lican

Bap

tis

t

Roman

Ca

tho

lic

Churc

h

Conserva

tive

nBaptist

EpiscopalChurch

NationalBaptistConventionUS

A

nBap

tist

General

Congrega

tiona

l

NationalBaptistConventionAm

.

Re

form

UnitedChurchofChrist

Lu

theran

ProgressiveNationalBaptist

n/MissionaryAlliance

EvangelicalLutheranChurch

ofNaz

arene

Met

ho

dist

thodis

t

AfricanMethodistEpiscopal

nArmy

Me

tho

dist

nChu

rch

UnitedMethodistChurch

AfricanMethodistEpiscopalZio

n

n

Non

denom

ina

tiona

lMa

inline

Pen

tecos

tal

SynodWisconsin

om

inationa

l

elical

Pen

tecos

tal

Chu

rchofGodinChrist

Pres

byter

ian

Presbyter

ianChurchUSA

Chu

rchofGodinChrist

(International)

Reforme

d

iesof

God

Reformed

ChurchinAmerica

ofGodCleveland,TN

Continued



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TABLE1C

ontinued

vangelical

W

hiteMainline

BlackProtestant

Catholic

Jewish

Res

tora

tion

ist

erian

ChristianChurch

erianC

hurchinAmerica

oxPresbyterianChurch

ed n

Refo

rmedChurch

tion

ist

esofC

hrist

DayAdventists

iteCh

urch

calFreeChurch

calCovenantChurch

hBrethren

slistis

notexhaustive,butisadescriptionofthedominantreligiousgroupingsinAmericatakenfrom

KellstedtandGreen(1993:Ap

pendix).



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Yet, the dissemination of evolutionary theory has received less attentionfrom religion and politics and morality politics scholars than, for example,school prayer. But education policy concerning instruction in evolutionarytheory clearly falls within morality policy. The debate involves religious

groups and popular religious sentiment, not obviously associated with soci-oeconomic class but with deeply held moral values. Indeed, Haider-Markeland Meier (1996:333) argue that if at least one advocacy coalition . . . por-tray[s] the issue as one of morality or sin and uses[s] moral arguments in itspolicy advocacy the policy is a moral one. Evangelicals clearly represent thissort of advocacy coalition. The 1980s saw a tremendous level of advocacy onthe part of the conservative Christians in this area. Evolutionary theory isconsidered by many, if not most, conservative Christians to be antithetical tobiblical authority and inerrancy. However, conservative Christians have not

only cited the Bible in their effort to gather support, but they have alsoemployed sociological arguments to engender widespread hostility towardevolution in the classroom. Evolutionary theory has been blamed by con-servative Christians for a number of socially unpopular ideas and behaviorsranging from Nazism to murder to racism (Morris and Morris, 1996; Berg-man, 1999a). That is, opponents of evolutionary theory often consider it to beprimarily responsible for many or most of the very behaviors studied in themorality politics literature (e.g., abortion, homosexual behavior, pornography,etc.). Indeed, some empirical research has attempted to tie belief in evolution

with Christian immoral views (see Overman, 1998).The issue also appears to be well understood and salient among citizens.

Popular opinion has mostly been on the side of the Christian Right in thisregard. Bergman (1999b) reports on the results of 50 survey studies re-garding the teaching of evolution and creationism in public schools. Hefinds popular support for teaching creationism and evolution in publicschools but not exclusively one or the other. A 1999 Gallup survey findssimilar results (68 percent favor teaching creation along with evolution inpublic school) (Gallup Survey Poll, 2001).

There has been considerable debate over this issue at the state level. Somestates have tried to require teachers to teach creationism if they choose toteach evolution. Much of these efforts are directly traceable to activism onthe part of conservative Christian organizations (see Numbers, 1992; To-umey, 1994). Pro-creationist research was presented claiming that a two-model approach to teaching origins was educationally beneficial to sciencestudents (Bliss, 1978), and creationist textbooks were written by scientistsfor use in public schools (e.g., Davis and Kenyon, 1993). However, thecourts did not allow states to implement the balanced-treatment curric-

ulum, which required the teaching of creationism whenever evolution ispresented. In two landmark cases, Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578



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creationism in the classroom, however, have not stopped their advocacy.Creationist advocates argue that the language in Edwards does not indicatethat teaching creationism (or contrary evidence) is unconstitutional, onlythat states must not require teachers to do so. However, at least a few lower

court decisions have restricted even the voluntary teaching of creationism(see Webster v. New Lenox School District, 917 F.2d 1004, 1990, 7th Circuitand Peloza v. Capistrano School District, 37 F.3d 517, 1994, 9th Circuit).Furthermore, overcoming the evolutionary grip on scientific education hasproven to be a difficult and costly task even when the courts are not par-ticularly hostile. Gieryn, Bevins, and Zehr (1985) argue that the publicscientific community has become professionalized such that advocates of thecreationist paradigm are not likely to penetrate what amounts to an aca-demic monopoly over scientific scholarship (e.g., censoring creationist per-

spectives) and over scientific educational materials (e.g., public schooltextbooks). Bergman (1984, 1996) extensively documents the disadvantagesthat creationist scientists face in the academic and scientific world.

As a result, recent creationist efforts have mobilized in opposition to thescientific emphasis on evolution in public school curriculums rather than theabsence of a creationist curriculum. Instead of trying to push creationismonto the curriculum, many creationists are trying to keep Darwin out of theclassroom or ensure that if evolution is taught, it is presented as merely anunproven theory (San Francisco Chronicle, 1999). Across America, there are

significant attempts to reduce the importance of evolution in public schoolscience curriculums. The National Center for Science Education (hhttp://www.natcenscied.org/default.aspi) reports on most of the anti-evolution orpro-creation legal and legislative activities taking place state by state (Na-tional Center for Science Education, see References). Alabama, Kansas,Georgia, Florida, Montana, Ohio, West Virginia, and Michigan are justsome of the states currently considering changes in the relative inclusion ofevolutionary theory in state science curriculums. Further, the creationistmovement has encountered an ally in the effort to end exclusively natu-

ralistic interpretations in scientific curriculums. The intelligent-designmovement has grown considerably over the last several years and has re-ceived more mainstream and scientific acceptance than the creation sciencemovement. This is most likely because it is far less religious in presentationthan the scientific creation models of the traditional creationists (see De-mbski, 1998). Together, there appears to be a renewed effort on the part ofcreationist organizations aiming to attack naturalism and secularism in thepublic schools rather than to advocate for the inclusion of creationist cur-riculums. Along with the direct lobbying activities of creationist and reli-

gious interest groups, evangelical churches serve as important political forcesboth as recruiting grounds for creationists groups and facilitators of public



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Data, Hypotheses, and Methodology

The purpose of this article is to test the hypotheses concerning the impactthat evangelical church adherence has on state science curriculums (i.e.,

morality policy). Do greater levels of membership within the evangelicalProtestant denominational family lead to greater levels of intolerance towardinstruction in evolutionary theory? I expect that relatively high levels ofevangelical membership will produce greater levels of resistance to the in-clusion of evolutionary theory in public schools as lawmakers respond toeffective evangelical electoral and political pressure.

A recent report released by the Thomas B. Fordham Foundation, a re-spected education research institute, provides a state-by-state evaluation ofthe relative inclusion of evolutionary theory in state science standards

(Lerner, 2000). The report numerically and alphabetically (i.e., A, B, C, D,and F) grades individual states according to how well they present ev-olution in state science standards for public schools. High scores indicatebetter efforts at inclusion and presentation than low scores. Table 3 presentsthese numerical grades for the various states where evaluations were con-ducted. The median score is 64 (100 is the highest score possible). I intendto use these scores (standardized with z-scores) as an approximation of therelative treatment of evolution by the states. Furthermore, I will assume thatif lower scores indicate a states poor treatment of evolution, then lower

scores also indicate a states favorable treatment of creation (although cre-ationist curriculums may not be formally used in the science standards).1

I hypothesize that large evangelical populations significantly impact statemorality policy. In this case, I expect state evangelical adherence to benegatively related to Lerners state standards scores. Denominational mem-bership statistics on church groupings are reported at the state level everydecade by the Glenmary Research Center (Bradley et al., 1990). Classifyingdenominations is both a difficult and necessary task. My classificationscheme for the evangelical denominational family improves on previous ones

1Some have argued that Lerner only measures the relative treatment of evolution and notthe quality of state science standards (see Wells and Richards, 2000; Sarfati, 2000). Theirobjections, then, do not preclude the use of Lerners index as an indicator of tolerance forevolution. I assume that creationists would give low scores to the states that Lerner scoreshighly. Generally, an A is said to be given to states that introduce at least some of thebasic processes of biological evolution . . . and make evolution the centerpiece of the lifesciences. F grades are reserved for states that fail so thoroughly as to render theirstandards totally useless. To be sure that the inverse of Lerners scoring system wouldsufficiently approximate creationist approval of state science standards, I personally phoned

the leading creationist organization in the United States, the Institute for Creation Research(ICR) in California. ICR has an accredited graduate school in a variety of science disciplinesand is at the forefront of the creationist movement in the scientific, political, and educational

i i I k i h h d f h d h l D K h C i I k d



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because it has been carefully cross-referenced according to the most accept-able definitions of evangelical faith. Defining evangelicalism has been thesubject of considerable debate. However, as a guiding principle here, evan-gelicalism is most closely associated with a belief in biblical inerrancy or

scriptural authority and a candidate for my evangelical category is evaluatedin terms of its potential for political cooperation and proximity to otherevangelical churches. Some researchers have used more encompassing def-initions by relaxing standards tied to belief in biblical inerrancy (OConnerand Berlman, 1995), but these measures fail to capture the truly uniquecharacteristics of denominations that are highly committed to biblical in-errancy and scriptural authority. What one believes about the Bible has beenshown to be politically important (Kellstedt and Smidt, 1993). Further,some researchers include denominations of Christianity that may be the-

ologically conservative but are inappropriate for a study of the politicaleffects of evangelical adherence. For example, denominations that are tra-ditionally African American may have much in common with evangelicalbelief systems, but can hardly be expected to cooperate politically withpolitically conservative (largely and traditionally white) denominationalfamilies (e.g., Southern Baptists). Some measures have included denomi-nations that are theologically conservative in some sense, but are apolitical(e.g., Amish) or unorthodox (e.g., Mormons). Again, if one evaluates evan-gelical churches as political forces or interests, then a useful evangelical

standard will pay attention not only to the denominations belief system(e.g., biblical inerrancy) but also its potential for political alliances withother theologically conservative Christian churches.

My classification scheme considers both. First, I cross-referenced severalpreviously used and published classifications. In particular, I comparedclassifications from The Polis Center(a sociological research institute that hascoded the Glenmary data into its own denominational taxonomy) andpublished articles by Greenberg (2000), Peterson (1992), Green, Guth, andHill (1993), and Kellstedt and Green (1993; reprinted in Table 1 as a

general guide). When conflict between published classifications arose, I ex-amined, compared, and selected denominations according to my two cri-teria, using the most exhaustive denominational reference source available,The Handbook of Denominations in the United States (Mead, 1995). Alto-gether, my evangelical denominational family includes 67 denominations.Few denominations were in conflict. Each states evangelical percentage ispresented in Table 2. Ultimately, I intend for this measure of evangelicaladherence to capture the orthodox-progressive divide for each state.2

2I need to make two additional points concerning the Glenmary data. First, according tothe advocates of the culture war theory, the term orthodox also includes theologically

i J d C h li U f l h d i i l dh d



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An ordinary least squares regression equation is employed to test thehypothesis that evangelical church participation (Evangelical) will negativelyaffect a states treatment of evolution in state science standards. Yet, in orderto distinguish science standards adoption as a morality policy, the model

must include variables associated with other policy determinant theories, aswell as other relevant control variables. Altogether, the model presented hererepresents a mix of state contextual factors associated with socioeconomic,political, policy-specific, and cultural predictors of state education policy.

To control for the effects of differences in state socioeconomic conditions,I include three socioeconomic variables: a measurement of state educationalattainment (College Educated5% graduating from college in 1999), thepercentage of the state that is urbanized in 1994 (Urban), and the relativewealth of the state as measured by real Per Capita Income in 1996. Com-

bined, these measures are included for two purposes. First, they are includedto control for the effects of socioeconomic differences between states. Con-ventional wisdom in the state policy literature asserts that state policyadoption, continuation, and diffusion decisions are functions of socioeco-nomic variations between American states (Walker, 1969; Peterson, 1981).Second, some have argued that resistance to instruction and belief in ev-olutionary theory is connected to a backward-looking worldview or ap-proach to education, which may be expected of poorer, less educated, andrural peoples.3

Perhaps a states science standards have more to do with the ideologicalpreferences of policymakers than with the pressures of the evangelical com-munity. To control for this possibility, I used Berry and Ringquists (1998)helpful index of State Government Ideology, which is a composite score ofvarious factors including partisan seat share in state legislatures, averageideology scores of the states congressional delegation, and the governorsideology score (i.e., ADA). Lower scores reflect more conservative states. Ialso included Erikson, Wright, and McIvers (1993) measure ofState CitizenIdeology to capture the ideological disposition of each state. Lower scores

reflect more liberal states.4 This variable may also prove interesting sinceculture war theorists posit a relationship recently between the Republican

regression analysis using the 2000 Glenmary data produces nearly identical results. This isnot surprising since state religious adherence levels are relatively constant over time (Jacobsand Carmichael, 2001). Indeed, the 2000 evangelical data is correlated with the 1990 evan-gelical data used here at 0.98.

3The values for income are adjusted for the relative cost of living between states using anindex presented at the American Federation of Teachers website. Because the theoretical

justification for including measures of socioeconomic differences is admittedly weak andambiguous (Gray, Hanson, and Jacob, 1999:22), I ran the analysis with and without thesevariables. Results indicate that the controls do not add much in the way of explanatory power( dj d R2 d l d d) N d h l d dd h h



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TABLE 2

Evangelical Adherence in the United States, 1990

State %

Alabama 42Alaska 12Arizona 11Arkansas 40California 8Colorado 11Connecticut 6Delaware 5Florida 15Georgia 31Hawaii 5

Idaho 10Illinois 11Indiana 17Iowa 11Kansas 17Kentucky 36Louisiana 22Maine 5Maryland 7Massachusetts 3Michigan 10Minnesota 11

Mississippi 41Missouri 28Montana 10Nebraska 15Nevada 6New Hampshire 4New Jersey 3New Mexico 18New York 4North Carolina 28North Dakota 10Ohio 10

Oklahoma 43Oregon 12Pennsylvania 5Rhode Island 4South Carolina 32South Dakota 14

Tennessee 40Texas 27Utah 2

Vermont 4Virginia 18Washington 9

West Virginia 18Wisconsin 13Wyoming 14



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TABLE 3

National Report Card: Measuring States Treatment ofEvolution in State Science Standards

State Score Letter Grade

Alabama 9 FAlaska 48 DArizona 82 BArkansas 55 DCalifornia 100 A Colorado 86 BConnecticut 100 A Delaware 91 A Florida 16 FGeorgia 7 F

Hawaii 91 A Idaho 82 BIllinois 45 DIndiana 100 A Kansas 18 FKentucky 55 DLouisiana 64 CMaine 30 FMaryland 77 CMassachusetts 82 BMichigan 84 BMinnesota 86 B

Mississippi 5 FMissouri 82 BMontana 82 BNebraska 66 CNevada 70 CNew Hampshire 23 FNew Jersey 100 A New Mexico 73 CNew York 68 CNorth Carolina 100 A North Dakota 9 FOhio 28 F

Oklahoma 25 FOregon 82 BPennsylvania 91 A Rhode Island 100 A South Carolina 95 A South Dakota 82 B

Tennessee 2 FTexas 64 CUtah 82 B

Vermont 86 BVirginia 50 DWashington 86 B

West Virginia 3 FWisconsin 55 DWyoming 36 F



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party and evangelical Christianity (Layman, 1999; Peterson, 1992; Wald,Owen, and Hill, 1989; Kellstedt and Smidt, 1993). More importantly, it takesideological disposition of the state into account and allows the model to isolatethe effects of religious context over a morality policy. Any discussion of morality

politics or culture war politics is incomplete without addressing the importantrole of Christian Right interest groups. Unfortunately, data is only impreciselyavailable for such a concept at the state level. Christian Right Influence employs

Wilcoxs (2000) ordinal measure of the groups influence for each state (i.e., 1,2, and 3 indicates a minor, substantial, and dominant influence). Some scholarshave noted that the level of Party Competition is often a key determinant ofpolicy outcomes (see Dye, 1984). Austin Ranney (1976) created a formula tomeasure the level of state party competition. His index is included here usingGray, Hanson, and Jacobs (1999:95) calculations taken from 19951998 and

ranging from 0.5001.000 (the latter reflects perfect competition). Finally, theprobability that a state will adopt an evolution-friendly standard may also be afunction of the states policy commitment to ensuring Teacher Quality (i.e.,adopting policies that prepare teachers in the subject area to be taught andcontinuous teacher training therein). An indicator for these assessments (0100scale) was configured by experts at Education Week magazine.5

Results: Determinants of State Science Standards

Table 4 provides means and regression results for the specified model.Clearly, evangelical adherence matters in terms of state education policyregarding science curriculums as morality policy theory predicts. The co-efficient for Evangelical is highly significant in the hypothesized directionbeyond the 0.01 level and is substantially larger than any other coefficient. Itnegatively impacts a states adoption of evolution-friendly standards in sci-ence curriculum requirements and suggests that science education regardingevolutionary theory clearly fits the profile of a morality policy. Moreover,results suggest that evangelical adherence is the strongest predictor in the

model with a standardized coefficient of 0.62. Teacher Quality was signif-icant in the expected direction and was the second most powerful predictorin the model at 0.34.6 All the other variables, including political and

5The Teacher Quality data are presented and explained at hwww.edweek.org/sreports/qc01/tables/quality-t1.htmi.

6The process by which evangelicals are politically effective is not directly explored here, butreligion and politics and civic engagement scholars have argued that church membership,especially among evangelicals, leads to increased individual political activism (active influ-ence; e.g., Christian Right) and individual political socialization (latent influence; electoral

connection) in ways particularly similar to and more pronounced than other venues for civicengagement (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Peterson, 1992; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995;Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Wald, Owen, and Hill, 1989; Greenberg, 2000). Therei h id h li l h b i i l li i ll i (



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ideological measures, fail to achieve statistical significance. Overall, themodel explains 23 percent of the variance in state science standards.

To paint a clearer picture, consider the results in Table 5. Here, all states

are divided into two categories. States scoring a letter grade of A or Bon the Lerner report are coded one and states scoring less than a B arecoded zero. In all, 46 percent of the states scored above an 80 and 54 percentscored below. Using the same predictors, Evangelical is significant at the0.01 level (one-tailed) in the hypothesized direction (Teacher Quality fallsout of significance). Standardized coefficients from the logit analysis arealmost identical to those in the OLS analysis. I estimated the expectedprobability of making the Honor Roll (i.e., an A or B) of Lernersreport when all other variables are held at their mean. The expected prob-

ability of making the Honor Roll goes from 85 percent with a 2 percentevangelical state population (min), to 64 percent with evangelicals making

TABLE 4

Multivariate Analysis of the Impact of Evangelical Adherence on State ScienceStandards Regarding the Teaching of Evolutionary Theory

Independent Variables Mean b se

Evangelical 0.16 5.03n 1.86(2.70)

Urban 0.67 0.008 0.01(0.795)

College educated 24.75 0.027 0.04(0.741)

Per capita income 21,376.82 0.0001 0.0001(1.56)

State gov. ideology 39.34 0.003 0.01(0.43)

Party competition 0.864 0.56 1.96(0.29)

State citizen ideology 44.80 0.01 0.03(0.53)

Teacher qualifications 69.90 0.05 0.03(1.88)

Christian Right influence 1 (mode) 0.11 0.21(0.53)

Constant 1.62 2.42

N 46Adjusted-R2 0.23

NOTES: T-values are in parentheses. ndenotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. Hawaiiand Arkansas were not included in the State citizen ideology measure; Iowa did not participatein the science standards study conducted by Lerner (2000); Nebraska was excluded from theRanney Index of Party Competition.



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only 2 percent with 43 percent evangelicals (max). Apparently, the relative

treatment of evolutionary theory in state science curriculums is highly sen-sitive to the number of evangelicals in a state (from min to max, the re-duction in expected probability is 83 percent), but not much else.

Overall, these results offer little support for the conventional theory thatall state policies are essentially products of socioeconomic factors. Of thethree socioeconomic factors tested here, only income had an effect (a coun-terintuitive effect, perhaps). Nor are these policies simply a function of theideological or partisan composition of state governments or the ideologicalinclinations of state citizens. That is, these science standards are explained as

a distinct morality policy determined by state religious context and notfactors that have usually been associated with prevailing theories of policyadoption.7 Further, these results support the culture war thesis. Although theculture war thesis predicts the importance of the orthodox-progressive dividein most areas of American politics, its importance involving issues of the-

TABLE 5

Logistic Regression Analysis of the Impact of Evangelical Adherence on StateScience Standards Regarding the Teaching of Evolutionary Theory

Independent Variables Logit Coefficients se

Evangelical 15.445n 6.45Urban 0.008 0.02College educated 0.09 0.09Per capita income 0.0003 0.0002State gov. ideology 0.001 0.02Party competition 1.54 5.47State citizen ideology 0.05 0.08

Teacher qualifications 0.12 0.07Christian Right influence 0.71 0.54Constant 4.292 4.917N 46Model X2 14.11Pseudo-R2 0.35 (Nagelkerke)2 log-likelihood 49.576

nDenotes significance at the 0.02 level.

7Though some may suggest otherwise, I do not include a dummy variable for south. First,Przeworski and Teune (1970) persuasively argue that scholars should not include peculiar

location variables, but should instead include the variables that make those locations peculiar.I think I am doing that with my evangelical measure (e.g., the south is often referred to as theBible Belt). Second, Smidt (1987) found that the south is becoming increasingly irrelevant

h li l l ld li l I h d li l



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ological concern should be especially evident. The analysis here demon-strates that it is.

Concluding Comments

Since educational policy regarding the inclusion and presentation of ev-olutionary theory in the classroom has largely been the focus of evangelicalcriticism, cultural frustration, and political activism, I predicted that stateswith larger levels of evangelical church membership would express less fa-vorable treatment, in terms of state science standards, toward Darwinstheory of evolution, ceteris paribus. Empirical testing here shows that evan-gelical adherence is a strong predictor of a states science standards with

respect to the relative treatment of evolutionary theory.This study demonstrates not only that morality policy is a useful categoryfor understanding state policy variation, but that morality policies them-selves vary. Perhaps some morality policies are primarily explained by ide-ological contexts (Erikson, Wright, and McIver, 1993), but others have suchclearly identified theological implications that religious contexts capturingorthodoxy becomes highly predictive. The results here indicate that thecontent of state science standards are clearly in the morality politics domainbut, even more, these standards are mostly determined by religious factors,

even when controlling for political, ideological, socioeconomic, and policy-specific factors. Further research needs to be conducted to discover whereand when morality policies are explained by religious factors rather thanpolitical and ideological factors.

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