eva picardi philosophy: april, 3, 2009
TRANSCRIPT
A Successful Dig
Remarks on Eva Picardi’s work on Frege
Carlo Penco (Università degli studi di Genova)
[1] Translations and Exegesis
[2] Frege’s Pragmatics
[3] a Successful Dig
[1] Translations and Exegesis
Dummett’s Frege
“calling it [the Italian edition of Dummett’s Frege] ‘reduced and enlarged’ is misleading…the reduction alludes to the omission of eight chapters (half of the original), let alone the mutilation of chapters VI and IX, without counting that the last chapter, deprived of the discussion in the previous two, looks like hanging in the void (…)
Chapter VIII changes unexpetedly its title, a manoeuvre
disputable also from a Fregean point of view.
Dummett’s letter
New College 2nd March 1984
“Dear Carlo,
I was really delighted to receive copies of the Italian translation of my book (…). It looks splendid, and I think that the selection that you made works extremely well…”
who was right?
I didn’t dare:
1st to translate the entire book2nd to ask the publisher to publish the entire book3rd to believe in the Italian philosophical community
Eva did dare (something even worse)
to translate and publish the entire book Dummett: the Logical Basis of Metaphysics
She did well
Translations (and editorial works)
L. Wittgenstein, Lectures on the Foundation of mathematics (tr. 1982)
G. Frege, Posthumous Writings (tr. 1987)
M. Dummett, Origins of Analytic Philosophy (tr. 1990)
D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (ed. 1992)
H. Putnam, Realism with a Human Face, (1995)
M. Dummett, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (tr. 1996)
D. Davidson, Truth and Interpretation, (ed. 1998)
M. Dummett, The Nature and Future of Philosophy (tr. 2001)
G. Frege, Philosophical papers [collection 1891-1897] (tr. 2001)
H. Putnam, The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, the World (ed.. 2005)
M Dummett, Thought and Reality (ed. 2008)
G. Frege, Logical Works (tr. forthcoming)
a tradition of translations
First Italian Translation of Frege:
L. Geymonat (Einaudi 1948)
First English Translation of Frege:
Black and Geach (Blackwell 1952)
Sinn und Bedeutung
Peter Geach and Max Black: “Sense and Reference”
Eva Picardi:for the famous paper… may be it is allright, but…
discussing hours
“senso e significato” (“sense and meaning”)
Although it appears strange to give reasons for a literal translation..
“Bedeutung”
1) if we wanted a “theoretical” translation, the best term should have been “semantic value”, but it is too distant from the lexicon used by Frege, and it cannot keep the link with the verb “bedeuten”, (which is used interchangeably with bezeichnen)
2) it might be useful to translate “Bedeutung” with “reference” in the framework of the contemporary debate, but this choice does not properly work the whole of Frege’s work (especially when the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung has not yet been given)
3) The surrounding philosophical environment of discussion would be cut off translating “Bedeutung” with “reference”, making it difficult - for example - to understand many passages made by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus.
and then
4) The term “Bedeutung” cannot be assimilated to the notion of “denotation” as used in Russell
5) A translation has to render also the feeling (tone) of a term; and it is apparent that “Bedeutung”, as used by Frege, gives an awkard sensation which should be preserved.
6) The literal translation preserves too many good aspects to be abandoned in a translation of his work - although it may be useful in contemporary discussion or in teaching to use the term which is currently used in the debate (be it “reference” or “denotation”).
[2] Frege’s Pragmatics
on the background of:
Assertibility and Truth. A Study of Fregean Themes (1981)
Linguaggio e analisi filosofica (1992)
La chimica dei concetti (1994)
Le teorie del significato (1999)
a series of papers…
“Compositionality” (2001)
“Individualismo semantico e significato letterale” (2006)
“Colouring, Multiple Propositions and Assertoric Content” (2006)
“On Sense, Tone, and accompanying Thoughts” (2007)
“The Context Principle in Frege and Wittgenstein (2009)
Hyper-simplifying Eva’s ideas
J. M. W. Turner,
The Fighting Temeraire tugged to her last Berth to be Broken up, 1838
Commemorating the Battle of Trafalgar 1805:
Twenty-seven British ships led by Admiral Lord Nelson defeated thirty-three French and Spanish ships
the Finghting Temeraire was fighting near Nelson’s ship:
a symbol of the great superiority of the British ships
(and of the end of that period in front of modern times)
but…
the ship had been part of the French Navy, and captured in 1759
Willmore’s Steel Engraving: The Old Téméraire
Let us assume - for the sake of simplicity - that
The fighting Temeraire and The Old Téméraire
are two different names of the same ship
Frege’s treatment
(1) The Fighting Temeraire = (2) the Old Téméraire
S believes that the Fighting Temeraire is British ship
S does not believe that the Old Téméraire is a British ship
S may have consisent beliefs: (1) and (2) have different senses:
Sense of (1): the British ship symbol of the superiority of Britain
Sense of (2): the French ship that was captured by the British Army
Tone/Colouring of (1): proudness, honour, end of the heroic period
Tone/Colouring of (2): “sic transit gloria mundi” (thinking of Napoleon)
A suggested solution
A proposed simplification (Neale 2001):
In order to state the idea the proper names have no sense butcontribute via their reference to the truth condition of a sentence
Coreferring proper names differ only in “tone” or “colouringCognitive differences are explained in a Gricean way
(1) the Fighting Temeraire was a British ship(2) the Old Tèméraire was a British ship
express the same singular proposition, but have different implicatures
Eva Picardi’s reaction
(1) parallelism between Freges conception of tone and Grice implicatures: YES, BUT
(2) abolishing the Fregean idea of the sense of a proper name: NO
Parallelism: Grice on “but”
S, in uttering:
“She is poor but honest”
says: she is poor and honestConventionally implies: typically poor people are not honest
There is a gap between (a) what the speaker literally says(b) what the words literally mean
What do we gain in separating (a) the saying and (b) the conventionally meant?Which is the rationale for this distinction?
Parallelism: Frege on “but”
The sense (thought) expressed by a sentence
(what is relevant for the truth of a sentence)
The sense (thought) suggested by a sentence
“but” differs from “and”
“we use it to intimate that what follows contrasts with what was to be expected from what preceded it. Such conversational suggestions (Solche Winke in der Rede) make no difference to the thought” (SuB)
“but” indicates an accompanying thought,
which is suggested, not expressed by the sentence.
Nebengedanke (accompanying thought)
Tone or Colouring features (differences in lexicon or syntax) suggest accompanying thoughts which can be separated by
the truth conditional thought expressed by a sentence Tone and coloring features perform three roles
(a) Give the point of the purpose of the utterance
(b) Suggest an accompanying thought
(c) Suggest psychological associations governed by psychological laws
expecially (c) is reminded of Grice’s conversational implicature
Explaining Grice’s concern
“Frege’s theory provides an excellent background against which Grice’s concerns acquire a point” (“Compositionality”, p. 65)
The difference:In Grice meaning is explained in terms of communicative intentionsIn Frege meaning is defined in terms of truth and compositionality
The prototypical model of understanding in Grice’s program is an unstructured utterance (a gesture, a drawing) calling for a reactionThr prototypical model of understanding in Frege’s program is given by compositionality: the parts of a sentence are meaningful also because they may occur in other sentences [Evans generality constraint]
but….
does it really works?
Can we have a generalied Fregean treatment of implicature?
Frege 1897 “Logic”
Extending “but” to pejorative terms
(1) A dog barked all the night(2) A cur barked all the night
Difference in tone; not affecting truth conditions (Frege 1987) A sentence is suggested by the use of the lexicon, but not expressed
(1) Blacks are better boxers than whites(2) Niggers are better boxers than whites
Are the consequences of using “nigger” part ot the thought suggested? part of the thought expressed? (Williamson: implicature) (Brandom: inferential potential)
Sense of a sentence is its inferential potential (Bg 3)
Muhammed Ali
Justification ofrefusal to enlist during the Vietnam War
'I ain't going to fight in Vietnam, no Vietnamese ever called me a nigger’
[3] a Successful Dig
Dummett again
New College 2nd march 1984
“Have you seen the recently published book by Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker on Frege? To my mind is quite deplorable, and is liable to give rise to widespread confusion (…) I decided to put on four lectures… discussing their very hostile interpretation of Frege”
Michael Dummett, 'An Unsuccessful Dig',
Philosophical Quarterly, 34.2 (1984), pp. 194-226
What was the problem?
Baker and Hacker have done a nice exegetic work on Wittgenstein, but…
Their work on Frege is partly depending on Wittgensteinian assumptions against the project of traditional semantics
Eva Picardi
President of theItalian Society for Analytic Philosophy2000-2002
“Wittgenstein today”Bologna 2001
(picture by Valerio Mieli)
A Wittgensteinian Eva
Wittgenstein against Frege?
Eva Picardi: a rare case where Frege and Wittgenstein scholarship are put together in an unified manner
“Il principio del contesto in Frege e in Wittgenstein” (2002)
“Concepts and primitive Language Games” (2008)
“Wittgenstein and Frege on Proper Names” (forthcoming)
A central Point
According to Wittgensteinthe same sentence can make very different assertions
NOT ONLY as in standard pragmatics: because of different contexts of utterance
BUT ALSObecause of different grammar
(different types of language games)
example
“X is lighter than Y”
(1) In the L-Game of reporting greater lightness or darkness of bodies
(2) In the L-Game of stating the relationshp between the lightness of certain colours
Remarks on Colors §131: In (1) the report is temporal; not in (2)
What Baker and Hacker reject
Should relativity to language games apply to proper names?
Baker and Hacker are very happy with language games
but very dissatisfied with Wittgenstein’s treatment of proper names
in the Philosophical Investigation
- Wittgenstein seems too similar to a Fregean approach
- This would make it difficult to make W. a forerunner of social theories of reference (as Wettstein would like him to be)
Substantial departure from Frege: according to Wittgenstein
there is no uniform account of the semantic role of proper names
Deep agreement when the focus is changed
From
the problem of determination of the referent:How do we get the reference of a proper name?
To
the problem of communication of the thought expressed:How do we succeed in proper communication using proper names?
Detailed analysis of “Der Gedanke” and of Frege’s Nachlass
Frege’s context principle in W
“We may say: nothing has so far been done when a thing has been named. It has not even got a name except in the language-game [of naming]. This was what Frege meant too, when he said that a word has meaning only in the context of an utterance.” (Wittgenstein)
many kinds of language games: naming, calling for help, describing, …
1) using proper names of ordinary people2) using names of famous persons (Moses)3) using names of fictional objects
Context sensitivity strikes back
For communication to succeed
Not enough that speaker and hearer refer to the same individual,
but also they must be aware to do so
Sense as background information
Pieces of information that may fluctuate allow us to understand whether people are talking to the same person or not - or are realizing they are doing so
“Gustav Lauben” = dr. Lauben
the dear old man the famous doctor
I meet everyday who discovered
at the market a rare disease
Rediscovering old stuff
(1) “Gustav Lauben has been wounded”(2) “Dr. Lauben has been wounded”
Although they refer to the same semantic (truth conditional) content may fail to communicate the same information
In fact they express different procedures (information flow) to get the same individual
hence
they express different assertoric contents, different thoughts
understanding a sentence
We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be repaced by another which says the same;
But also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other.
In the one case the thought in the sentence is something common to different sentences;
in the other, it is something that is expressed only by the words in these positions.
The End