ethnicity, elections and democracy in trinidad and tobago: analysing the 1995 and 1996 elections

Ethnicity, Elections and Democracy inTrinidad and Tobago:

Analysing the 1995 and 1996 Elections

RALPH R. PREMDAS and BISHNU RAGOONATH

The paper examines elections in Trinidad and Tobago, showing howthey are organised around communal appeals in an environmentwhere inter-ethnic suspicion is widespread and communal identity isinterwoven and institutionalised in organised party politics. The 1995general elections witnessed the defeat of the predominantly African-based ruling PNM by the predominantly Indian-based UNC, the firsttime an Indian acceded to the prime ministership. Local electionsalmost a year later reaffirmed the victory of the UNC over the PNM.The Indian ascendance to power seemed to constitute not just achange of government, but an event that threated the fragile stabilityof the multi-ethnic order.

On 6 November 1995 in the multi-ethnic Caribbean state of Trinidad andTobago, when voters went to the polls in the national parliamentaryelections, the seventh such election since independence in 1962, thepredominantly African-based ruling People's National Movement (PNM)was dramatically ousted from power and replaced by the predominantlyIndian-based United National Congress (UNC) in coalition with the smallerparty, the National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR), making it the firsttime that an Indian acceded to the prime ministership. Eight months later,when local elections were held, both the defeated PNM and the victoriousUNC argued that these elections would not only serve as an informalplebiscite on the popularity of the new government, but that the resultswould indicate whether the UNC victory was a fluke. The results reaffirmedthe victory of the UNC over the PNM in an uncanny statistic showingalmost identical percentages obtained at the national and local levels for the

Ralph R. Premdas and Bishnu Ragoonath, Department of Behavioural Sciences, University of theWest Indies, St Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago.

Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol.36, No.3 (November 1998), pp.30-53PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

ETHNICITY, ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 31

two parties. It suggested a fundamental shift in power between the two mainethnic communities in Trinidad, one replacing the other in a newcommunalised hegemonic order.

For some, especially the African-descended Creole populationconstituting about 38.91 per cent of the population, the change of regimewas greeted with grave apprehension, since the Indian section constitutedabout 39.60 per cent of the population, already in control of much of theeconomy, was now seemingly poised to assert political pre-eminence also.In an essentially ethnically bifurcated polity, political power was wielded inthe past (uninterruptedly from 1956 to 1986) by the Creole African section.Even in the period 1986 to 1991, when NAR, then a party composed ofIndian and African supporters, won power, the Prime Minister was anAfrican, thereby re-asserting African continuity in the leadership of thecountry.1

TABLE 1

POPULATION AND ETHNIC GROUPS IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Group

AfricanIndianChineseSyrian/LebaneseWhiteMixedOthersTotal

Number

444,804452,709

4,322936

7,302207,280

25,7731,143,126

%

38.9139.60

0.380.080.64

18.132.35

100.00

Source: 1990 Census (Trinidad and Tobago Statistical Office).

In a society where inter-ethnic suspicion is widespread and communalidentity is interwoven and institutionalised in organised party politics, thestruggle for control of the government carries with it extraordinarilysignificant symbolic and substantive implications. Since independence, thestate has been characterised by an ethnic division of labour in a system ofspheres of influence whereby Africans controlled the polity and Indians andothers, including the descendants of whites, dominated the area ofagriculture, commerce and business.2 In Trinidad, however, no consensusfor the sharing of spheres of sectoral economic and political control existed.Dominance of the polity by the African section and the economy by theIndian-European community eventuated from historical circumstances. Thepolitical system built on the competitive parliamentary system was an openarena for the ongoing contestation of power. Indian ascendance to power

32 COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS

then seemed to constitute not just a change of government decision makersfollowing yet another election, but a fundamental shift in the communaliseddistribution of spheres of control, threatening the fragile stability of themulti-ethnic order. It is this aspect of the Trinidad elections which evokescomparisons with such societies as Fiji, Guyana, and Malaysia which aresimilarly ethnically bifurcated.3 In a society where inter-ethnic distrust,especially between Africans and Indians, runs deep, and in which inter-communal rivalry between the two main ethnic communities is played outevery day in discourse over public policy, a radical shift in power asrepresented by the 1995 general elections and 1996 local elections raises theproblem of ethnic conflict regulation in relation to the problem of resourceallocation and power sharing. In this article, these issues will be looked atgenerally; the focus is, however, on describing and analysing the 1995 and1996 elections in some detail, showing how the shift in the system of ethnicrule eventuated.

There are many excellent reasons why democratic elections in multi-ethnic states constitute a suitable site for the examination of ethnic strife andconflict regulation. Generally, elections may be conceived as the criticalarbiter in adjudicating the rival claims by different groups for power andprivilege. In Trinidad's multi-ethnic setting, however, the function of theelection device had been thrown into question on several counts.4 Theelectoral device was imported into Trinidad from Britain, an environmentradically different in social structure from Trinidad. The adaptation of theelectoral device to the multi-ethnic society in Trinidad has left importantquestions unresolved about the roles of representation, identity, integration,citizen commitment and government accountability traditionally assigned tothe electoral system. In particular, representation tends to becomecommunalised so that the party in power symbolises not the public will atlarge but sectional solidarity and ethnically particularised interests. Citizencommitment is passionately expressed but communally cleaved so that onlyone section at a time identifies with the governing regime. The out-section isalienated. Elections in polyethnic societies then can elicit fearsome primordialresponses and deeply divisive fears in culturally fractured states. In acommunally divided society lacking shared beliefs and identities, all politicalstructures, however neutrally designed, tend to be tainted and imbued withsuspect ethnic motifs and interests. Communal identities are at stake, for indefeat the vanquished may witness the marginalisation of its way of life.5

Consequently, the electoral device becomes larger than its original purposedesigned for selecting decision makers. In Trinidad, elections have become anarena of contesting identities enmeshed in a threat of ethnic domination.

We shall begin by giving a broad overview of Trinidad's economy andpolity followed by a recapitulation of the political system under which the


elections of 1995 occurred. The main body of the paper deals with the twoelections themselves.

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: BACKGROUNDTO THE ELECTIONS

Trinidad and Tobago, formerly a British colony, is a twin island state withTrinidad by far the larger of the two in both population (Trinidad with about1.3 million and Tobago with about 50,000 persons) and land mass. Tobagowas not appended to Trinidad until 1898. In 1962, Trinidad and Tobagoacceded to independence as a single political unit. How Trinidad evolvedhas been quite different from Tobago, with Trinidad acquiring a multi-ethnic social structure. For the most part, Tobago remained a predominantlyAfrican, uni-ethnic island. In what follows, the description relates toTrinidad.

Trinidad and Tobago was first colonised by Spain on 31 July 1498, untilit fell under British control in 1797 and remained so until the mid-twentiethcentury. A workforce of culturally different immigrants from the Old Worldwas recruited to labour on plantations, which provided the nucleus for a newsociety. When the indigenous Amerindian population of Arawaks andCaribs was practically exterminated, the new source of labour came fromthe iniquitous African transatlantic slave trade. Slavery was abolished in1833 and in turn this led to the recruitment of indentured labourers fromEurope, India and China. In the end, Asian Indians (Indians hereafter)proved most adaptable to the rigours of plantation life. By 1917, when theIndian indenture scheme was terminated, some 144,000 Indians wereimported into Trinidad, most opting to remain as permanent residents of thecolony. The emancipated Africans developed a contempt for the Indianswho had willingly submitted themselves to the degrading regimen of theplantation. Indians in turn regarded the Africans as 'outcastes' who hadreadily accepted and acculturated to the ways of the oppressor. Herein, then,would the first seeds of Indian-African antipathy be born.

The pluralised ethnic structure which came into being in Trinidad wasreinforced by multiple coinciding cleavages expressed in patterns ofoccupation, residence, and cultural orientation among each of the segmentsin the immigrant population. By the turn of the twentieth century, acommunally oriented multi-ethnic society was fashioned; with somemodifications, most of its essential features have persisted into the present.While European influence has remained pre-eminent (Europeans derivedmainly from English and French origins are collectively called FrenchCreoles today and they are nearly all locally born and bred), inter-communal rivalry between Africans (locally called 'Creoles' or 'Africans')


and Asian Indians (called 'Indians') would emerge as the dominant featurein inter-ethnic relations in the state.

Petroleum was discovered at the turn of the twentieth century and slowlyemerged as the dominant primary producing export product, eclipsingsugar, coffee and cocoa. In a peculiar twist of events that can only happenin a plural society, ethnic identity and the economy became enmeshed:sugar production has come to be associated with the Indians, oil withAfricans, and big multi-national business corporations with FrenchCreoles.6 In the twentieth century, the Trinidad economy attained new levelsof complexity, registered especially in the development of a large publicsector employing about 60,000 public servants, roughly 70 per cent ofwhom were Africans and mixed races. Indians did not remain with sugareven though most sugar workers and planters are still Indians. Most Indianshave gravitated into small businesses, trades, teaching and the professions.Apart from residence and occupation, cultural behaviour and traditions,including religious practices, have also accentuated differences and divisionamong the ethnic communities in Trinidad. With regard to the Afro-Trinidadian community, because the African slaves were denied theopportunity to practise their aspects of ancestral culture, they were forced toacculturate to Western ways, with most adopting Christianity. A uniquecultural form emerged that combined old forms with responses to the newenvironment. The result of this is that the majority of Afro-Trinidadianstoday engage in an autonomous cultural form which in many ways, andespecially among the middle and upper classes, may be regarded as anapproximation of Western cultural behaviour and traditions, including thepractice of Christianity. The Indo-Trinidadian community has been able toretain more of its cultural traditions as well as religious beliefs, but, like theAfrican community, it has created a new syncretic cultural combination ofold and new. Consequently, a substantial section of the Indo-Trinidadiancommunity presently engages in an unique variant of Indian culturaltraditions with regard to food, music, dance and even dress. With regard toreligion, about 60 per cent of Indo-Trinidadians are Hindu, while just overten per cent are Muslim.7 The notion of religion and culture is critical toTrinidad's politics, especially since it was only in 1995 that a non-Christiangovernment took office.

Politics in Trinidad, like the economy, developed in terms of the underlyingethnic delineations in the state. When mass representation and a party systembecame a part of democratic politics after centuries of colonial rule, thefragmented social structure shaped political orientation and partisanpreference. Ethnically based parties emerged and exacerbated communaltensions. In the 1950s, two major parties, the People's National Movement(PNM) and the Democratic Labor Party, which would later become the United


Labor Front and in the contemporary political scene became the UnitedNational Congress, were organised mainly around the Creole and Indiancommunities respectively. The Creole-based PNM party headed by Dr EricWilliams led the colony to independence in 1962 and governed the statethrough several elections until December 1986. During the long period ofPNM rule, the Indian community bitterly complained about ethnicdiscrimination, as attested to by the exclusion of Hindus from cabinetappointments and the overwhelming stacking of the civil service with Creoles.8

When oil prices were high in the 1970s, Trinidad enjoyed unprecedentedprosperity and the PNM became entrenched. In the 1980s, however, with theplummeting of oil prices, a steep recession led to the eviction of the PNM frompower in the 1986 general elections. The victorious party was called theNational Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR). It was composed of anunprecedented alignment of disgruntled Indians and Creoles. It representedthat elusive multi-ethnic formation which had so far failed to appear inTrinidad's modern mass politics. NAR called itself a 'rainbow party' bound by'ONE-LOVE'.9 Its ethnic unity was short-lived, however. About one year laterthe NAR was fatally split between an Indian group led by Basdeo Panday andthe Creole group led by Prime Minister A.N.R. Robinson. The countryreturned to ethnic partisan politics. In the December 1991 elections, NAR wascomprehensively defeated as the African-based PNM regained power and theIndian-based UNC returned to its familiar role as opposition party.

Despite the cultural differences which have come to separate Indiansfrom Africans, a substantial proportion of the electorate tends to beapathetic. For instance, in the 1986 elections, which saw the NARdramatically ousting the PNM from office with a 33-3 victory, a mere 65per cent of the electorate had voted. A similar proportion of the electorateagain participated in the 1991 elections which returned the PNM into power.It was against this backdrop of voter participation that the three politicalparties contested the 1995 parliamentary elections. While only about two-thirds of the electorate tends to participate in national parliamentaryelections, an even smaller proportion turns out at the local governmentelections. In the seven local government elections since independence andprior to the 1996 elections, the average turnout was 27 per cent, with thehighest turnout being 39.9 per cent in 1987. After the upset in the 1995general elections, the local government poll, coming less than a year later,would present a somewhat different picture.

THE 1995 GENERAL ELECTIONS

In the 1995 elections, the main actors competing for office consisted ofthree parties: the PNM, the UNC and the NAR, along with four other parties


without any significant following. Two main parties, the UNC and PNM,erected around a core of Indian and African constituents respectively, haddominated Trinidad's politics since 1961 and would do so again in 1995.The NAR was reduced to its Tobago rump, with small margins of supportin Trinidad. In 1995, in an electorate of 837,453 eligible voters, sevenparties put forward 114 candidates (with no independent candidate since1956) for the 36 seats in the National Assembly. Of the 36 candidates thatthe PNM put up, 15 were Indians, one white, and the others Africans andmixed races. Only one of the PNM's Indian candidates, in the Arouca Southconstituency, could be regarded as a sure win, while three in St Joseph, SanJuan-Barataria and San Fernando West were given a fair chance of winning.Of the 34 candidates that the UNC put up, 18 were Indians, one white andthe others were Africans and mixed races. None of the African and mixedrace UNC candidates was placed in a safe UNC stronghold. The electoralsystem was based on a parliamentary single seat simple plurality procedureunder which the candidate with the largest number of votes wins. Theelectoral system is administered by a neutral and independent Elections andBoundaries Commission and the elections are free and fair.

In October 1995, when Prime Minister Patrick Manning called forgeneral elections about a year before it was constitutionally necessary, thesurprise date, partly intended to catch the opposition parties unprepared,paradoxically provided the occasion for a fateful informal collaborationbetween the UNC and NAR, eventually leading to the toppling of the PNMfrom power. Robinson and Panday, erstwhile bitter political enemies, cametogether in an ad hoc strategy to combine their efforts against the PNM. TheUNC did not put up any candidates in the two Tobago constituencies andNAR did not have candidates in a number of constituencies in Trinidad.This arrangement in effect allowed the UNC and NAR to combine theirforces in a number of critical constituencies.

The campaign for office in the multi-ethnic environment of the country,where the support of the two major parties was anchored in their respectiveethnic communities, displayed a split character. The parties in Trinidadgenerally do not make open public appeals for communal support. Overtlyand publicly, they project an image of inter-ethnic tolerance and a multi-ethnic following. They have woven a delicate strategy that reconcilestolerance with intolerance, bigotry with enlightenment and love with hate.In contradiction to their carefully crafted 'clean' public image, they makeracist and communalist appeals at the grassroots level. Hence, the campaigncontains two levels of activity, one an issue-oriented debate and the other asubterranean appeal to communal instincts. This is an important ritual, forit permits an accepted public hypocrisy peddled by each of the two mainparties which are officially committed to equality and justice free from


sectional prejudices and interests. The macro-level is the clean face that isopen and public for all to see and this is taken with grave seriousness,despite what takes place at the micro-grassroots level and known toeveryone. We shall look at both of these faces briefly and generally.

The sudden calling of the elections by the PNM was quite rational andstrategically calculated. The PNM highlighted at the macro-level theaccomplishments of its government, especially in the economy. To bring allits optimistic economic statistics into a coherent social and political wholefor popular consumption, the ruling party projected what it referred to as 'aPNM vision' to create 'a world class society'. It claimed to have achieved4.6 per cent growth in GDP in 1994; reduced unemployment from 20 percent to 16.5 per cent; increased foreign reserves from practically zero in1991 to US$700m in 1994; decreased government subsidies by reducing thenumber of government corporations from 87 in 1992 to 49 in 1995;liberalised the economy and external trade, while controlling inflation andstabilising prices; and successfully floated the Trinidad currency. Inaddition, it advanced evidence to show that it had significantly improvedand expanded the infrastructure of roads, educational facilities, and powerand water supply. It was a staggering catalogue of claims, which warrantedthe PNM invitation to the population to seek 'world class' status in strivingfor 'a level of excellence that allows us as a nation to compete with the bestin the world'. The PNM vision aimed at making Trinidad 'an outwardoriented, multi-lingual, knowledge driven harmonious society over the next10 to 15 years'. To court the business community in this election-inspiredvision to regain popular support, the PNM announced that it would bringdown corporate income taxes.10 The economic strategy was aimed at makingTrinidad an attractive haven, fostering private investment in a highlycompetitive world. This was a critical indirect attack on the oppositionleader, Basdeo Panday, who was a trade union activist with unabashedclaims to being a socialist.

The PNM list of claimed accomplishments was impressive, and, in itsscope and preparedness, seemed to have flattened the opposition, which wastaken by surprise. However, Trinidad is not a sleepy place where issues ariseand die just before and after elections. Rather, it is a small closely knitsociety in constant agitation, almost permanently peppered by politicaldebate and disputation. It did not require, therefore, an extraordinaryawakening of the opposition and the population to rise to the call ofelectoral struggle. About a week after the call for elections, the oppositionUNC party was up and in stride, posting to the public at the macro-level itsown counter-vision of the state of the economy and society. It not onlycontradicted the vaunted economic claims of the PNM but refused to acceptthem as the agenda for popular debate. This it had to do a mere 24 days


before polling. Against the unemployment figure of 16.4 per cent wasportrayed vivid life scenes of suffering among those who did not have jobs,suggesting that the figures were incorrect and concealed the real widespreadhardship among a significant segment of the population. The reduction inthe number of state-owned corporations in the government's policy ofprivatisation and divestment was not portrayed by the opposition as costsaving to the tax payer, but as insensitive to the interests of workers andadding to poverty and unemployment in the country. All of this wasprojected by the opposition as actions taken to further what oppositionleader, Panday, called 'the capitalist parasitic oligarchy' at the expense ofthe common people. All the shiny and meticulous economic statistics oneconomic growth were challenged and re-cast so as to paint the PNM as anuncaring party in government serving the interests of a small elite. Thecentre-piece of the UNC counter-attack was to be the area of crime. Todeflect the economic claims of the PNM, the UNC effectively utilisedrepeated real life stories of crime gone rampant in the country." Crisis in theareas of crime and the judiciary were close to the daily experiences of mostTrinidadians, who felt that it was these items that were of foremostimportance to them.12 In a campaign that relied heavily on the country'sthree television stations and numerous newspapers, one large UNCadvertisement resonated rhetorically: 'ARE YOU SAFER NOW THAN 4YEARS AGO?'.13

For someone unfamiliar with Trinidad's politics, the issues that weredebated with such seriousness and seeming sincerity at the macro-level of thecampaign would suggest that ethnicity and communal identity had little to dowith shaping voter preference and the election outcome. This was, however,only one level of political discourse in which issues are debated free fromcommunal appeals and interests. It is in the second level of discourse that theethnic issue is salient. At the grassroots, the parties' activists appeal tocommunal instincts and often they employ certain familiar terms andmetaphors that are loaded with ethnic meaning on certain public issues whichconceal the ethnic factor under what appears as an innocent debate. We shalloffer a brief portrait of the micro-grassroots campaign.

The campaign strategy and tactics designed by the parties at thegrassroots were the critical means by which they sought to capture amajority of seats in parliament and, hence, power. In the Trinidad andTobago context, the grassroots campaign followed a commonly shared setof modalities and procedures among the competing parties. Each partyorganised its 'grassroots' party unit or group located around each pollingdivision. Each constituency had a number of polling divisions and theparties put in place a constituency executive group which in turn was sub-divided into polling division units equipped with its own staff canvassers. It


was the task of each constituency party group to map comprehensively itspolling divisions so that a portrait of the ethnic, economic and religiouscharacteristics of voters could be ascertained. These data serve as the rawmaterials for identifying three categories of voters: (i) 'core' or loyalsupporters; (ii) marginals in need of conversion; and (iii) 'die-hard'opposition party supporters.

As a matter of priority, each party attended to its core supporters whichwere its ethnic compatriots and thereafter focused its efforts on the'marginals' or floating voters. Voters and constituency areas which wereperceived as constituting opposition faithfuls and strongholds tended to beavoided at the grassroots in practice. As a result of this tactic of selectivecanvassing, and because in a number of cases party canvassers were openlyafraid to enter an area perceived as belonging to the communal domain of anopponent, most constituencies throughout the country had not been criss-crossed comprehensively by all the parties. In an election where ethnicpreference became salient and where the ethnic demographics of eachconstituency were known, the consequence of this practice was that all butabout five of the 36 constituencies were preordained to vote for one or theother major parties, with the result of inevitable reinforcement of old votingpatterns.

In the 1995 elections, the presence of NAR as a multi-ethnic partywithout a 'natural' traditional ethnic constituency such as was associatedwith the PNM and UNC meant that the old selective practices of ethnicallydirected campaign behaviour were partially challenged. This becamemeaningful, however, in only about five constituencies in Trinidad. In theclose race that was expected there, it was quite probable that the small NARvote of about five to eight per cent of the respective critical constituenciescould determine the outcome. In the Trinidad constituencies, typical NARvoters tend to be middle class, and while these came from both the Africanand Indian communities, more frequently they derived from mixed racepersons. In a population with about 18 per cent mixed races, NAR was ableto draw a segment of this vote. The UNC and NAR tactical votingarrangement ensured that there was extensive NAR support for UNCcandidates in a number of constituencies.

The method of access to each voter and household was throughindividual house to house canvassing and small group, household andneighbourhood gatherings called 'cottage' meetings. Parties such as thePNM have fashioned the 'cottage' meeting into an effective tradition with asemi-permanent cadre of grassroots party activists and homes alwaysavailable for activation and mobilisation, especially in loyal core areas. It isat this level of intimate inter-personal communication that each of the twomajor parties made their communal pitch, invoking ethnic stereotypes,


symbols, metaphors and prejudices so as to consolidate their support. Inpractically every case, the two major parties realised that the campaigncanvasser, who was often a well known community leader such as a teacher,a church minister, a businessman, or a popular sport or musical personality,was of the same ethnic group as the local community he was active among.In every constituency, a roster was maintained of community leaders andtheir ethnic identity, many of these persons serving as officials in local clubsand socio-cultural voluntary organisations. Co-ethnic community leaderswere the party's influentials from whom the party's polling andconstituency committees were composed and often the source from whichcandidates were selected. Usually, a party's candidate for a constituencywas someone with a long list of service in community organisations.Community leaders, constituting a critical tier of citizenry, operated in anetwork exerting continuing influence on behalf of the party at thegrassroots. If a party sought to penetrate another's stronghold of support,often this was made practically impossible because of the thicket of ethnicloyalty at the level of community leaders. The canvassers and communityleaders were usually the carriers of the party's paraphernalia of buttons, T-shirts, posters and messages. They made the party literally visible in theconstituency, constantly parading and placing on display all the physicalsymbols of the party's campaign presence. The combination of partyactivists, party paraphernalia, music, cottage meetings and public presence,especially within areas that were already captured, as well as smalltownships, markets and shopping malls, all added up to a formidable wholeand in some ethnically mixed constituencies they engaged in fiercecompetitive display of party allegiances. Not infrequently, persons fromother communal groups are recruited and paraded as proof of the party'snon-ethnic following. No one is fooled or converted, however.

At a macro-level, the campaign literally changes its complexion fromethnic identity to issue-oriented arguments and appeals. In support of thegrassroots political organisations were party advertisements and eventswhich served to link all the constituency and sub-constituency groups intoan integrated dynamic national unit. Among the activities of the macro-party campaign were mass meetings, which were often attended by partyactivists from other constituencies and on whose platforms speakers andcandidates from other constituencies appeared and especially a contingentof cross-communal speakers as part of the public facade of cross-ethnicpartisan support. The mass meetings tended to occur at various levels,ranging from individual constituency meetings to regional and nationalgatherings. These mass gatherings were all characterised by a level oftheatre that maximised the party's image as a popular, multi-ethnic, vibrantand optimistic organisation. The staging was marked by party music


arranged for the occasion; the speakers were well orchestrated so as toinclude local leaders and national figures, small parochial issues andnational debates, and in all cases a major effort was made to have aflamboyant display of the party's few cross-communal candidates andprominent citizens. The design of this show was often a work of art, high-tech entertainment intended to lure everyone to come for a social as well asa political treat.

Music was an integral and indispensable part of the campaign at macro-level mass meetings. In a multi-ethnic country, at open mass meetings, theaccompanying tunes come from the respective cultural communities, takingthe form of tassa drumming and 'chutney' tunes from the East Indiansection to 'pan (steelband) beating' and 'calypso, soca and kaiso' songsfrom the African Creole section. Another important aspect of the campaignat the level of mass meetings was 'picong' and 'bacchanal'. These localpopular media, derived from a tradition of story telling, involve acombination of humour, hate, slander, sex and politics, and giveconsiderable licence to interpret facts and rumours in a most outrageousmanner. Speakers engage the crowd in 'street theatre' as they slur thereputation of their adversaries by innuendoes and 'picong' that evokeemotional rapture, uncontrolled laughter, horror and tears. Often, the'picong' would thinly disguise unflattering ethnic jokes which serve tomaintain the boundaries separating each of the major communities. In orderto prevent the excesses of 'picong' from degenerating into open characterassassinations and even racial conflagration, futile promises wereundertaken by the parties to impose ethical standards.

While under the rules of the Electoral Commission an individualcandidate could not spend more than TT$5,000 for campaigning, no limitswere placed on the expenditure of the parties. At the macro-level, then, theparties expended large undisclosed sums to promote their main leaders, andto project their key issues and their main appeals. The relative financialcapabilities of the parties were often displayed at this level. How each of themajor parties combined these broad modalities in the repertoire of campaigntechniques in large part distinguished them as unique organisations.

During the 1995 elections, a particular issue with ethnic implicationswas debated at the macro-level, but in terms that did not openly implicateeach of the major parties as communally bound. The issue pertained to theproposal for a government of cross-communal unity. In the light of the closecorrelation between ethnic identity and partisan choice, with Indians votingen bloc for the UNC and Africans for the PNM, the idea of a government ofnational unity at once reminded the electorate of the fractured state of thecommunity and appealed to a higher ideal that transcends divisiveness. It iscommon in Trinidad elections for the same politician who makes a call for


national unity to be fully aware of the communal grassroots appeal whichhis/her party is using to gain votes at the same time. In the 1995 elections,the PNM, since it was in the past able to win a majority of seats without theneed for a coalition partner, decided in the campaign not to endorse the callfor a government of national unity (GNU) and dismissed the idea withoutdiscussion in its manifesto. The GNU idea softened the crude edges ofcommunal appeals for support and conferred on its advocates an aura ofenlightened legitimacy in the quest for power. In this regard, the PNM lostmuch ground by dismissing the GNU idea while the main opposition partiesnever lost sight of it in advocating a reconciliation among ethniccommunities in Trinidad. The PNM leader openly denounced the GNUidea, calling it illegal, and at one point declaring that it was 'a recipe forchaos'. The UNC and NAR, on the other hand, were engaged in an opencourtship and appealed to the population to join in this act of 'one love'. TheUNC knew that beyond the rhetoric of love and harmony it could not winthe elections alone and that it would need the NAR, and the NAR similarlyknew that it was going to be consigned to a Tobago rump without some sortof arrangement with a larger party. The UNC and NAR, which had engagedin a joint relationship that brought them to power in 1986, remembered thatthings did not work then and the arrangement miscarried, with Pandayexpelled and left in the cold. On this occasion, however, while the UNCleader declared that 'it was time to love again', this time it would be 'in aUNC bed under the rising sun [the symbol of the UNC]'.

The UNC's constant harping on the theme of fashioning a governmentof national unity in a coalition regime successfully attracted to its fold anumber of prominent persons, especially from the NAR camp. HencePanday was able to wrap himself in the attire of a healing statesman inadvocating ethnic and class reconciliation, while Manning rejected the veryidea of a coalition. When the UNC unity proposal was successfullyattracting more and more non-UNC support from a diverse group ofprominent persons, the PNM chose to label these persons disparagingly as'grasshoppers', while one pollster sympathetic to the PNM lost his balanceand daubed it 'whoring'.14 Among the persons from the NAR leadershipwho crossed over to the UNC cause in support of a national unitygovernment were Winston Dookeran, Clive Pantin, George Laquis, JenniferJohnson, Raul Rafael, Suruj Rambachan, Robert Sabga, Tim Gopeesinghand others who banded together as 'A Committee of NationalReconciliation'.15 Added to this group were several other persons, includingwriters as well as cultural and spiritual groups, among them thepredominantly African group, the Spiritual Baptists16 and the Orishas, aswell as Errol Macleod, President of NATUC, the apex organisation oflabour unions in Trinidad. The larger point is that over a period of about

ETHNICITY, ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 4 3

three weeks into the campaign, on almost a daily basis, one prominentperson after another either joined or spoke up on behalf of the UNC positionfor a government of national unity to heal the fractured wounds of the multi-ethnic state. It all unleashed a moral momentum, especially at the elite level,in favour of a UNC-led coalition government and correspondingly made itdifficult for the PNM to win the small but critical sliver of floating voters inthe critical constituencies.

The elections resulted in a tie between the PNM and UNC, with 17 seatseach. The NAR captured the remaining two seats in Tobago and thereforeheld the balance of power. In the past, from 1961 to 1986 and from 1991 to1995, the PNM won with convincing majorities; similarly, in 1986, whenthe NAR won with the support of the UNC, it obtained 33 out of the 36seats. A tie was unprecedented and ushered in for the first time the politicsof post-election coalition formation. The popular votes received by the mainparties showed that no one received a majority of the votes cast. The tinyparties that contested the elections all lost so badly that they lost theirdeposits. Voter turnout was 63.17 per cent compared with 63.39 per cent in1991. Of the voters who cast their ballots, the PNM received 48.35 per cent,an increase of 3.04 per cent from 1991; the UNC got 45.31 per cent anincrease 16.01 per cent from 1991; and the NAR 4.71 per cent, a decreaseof 19.72 per cent from 1991. While these results underscored the polarisedethnic partisan preferences of the population, just as significantly theyundeniably demonstrated that the losses of the NAR party wereoverwhelmingly gained by the UNC. This was reflected in the increase ofthe UNC parliamentary seats from 14 to 17. The gains by the UNC weregreatest in five key constituencies where Indian /African ratios were closeand in which the NAR vote played a critical support role.

To an overwhelming degree, ethnic identity determined voter choice in1995. For nearly all the 34 constituencies except five, the presence ofoverwhelming concentrations of either Indians or Africans pre-ordained theoutcome. Fifteen seats were strongly PNM and 14 UNC, with clear ethnicmajorities. Together these accounted for 29 seats in Trinidad and, given thatthe two Tobago seats were controlled by the NAR leader, Robinson, this leftfive seats to be fought for. It would be these five constituencies that woulddecide the outcome of the election.

Given that the NAR had been rendered virtually impotent in 1995 in theTrinidad constituencies, resulting in a two-way race between the UNC andthe PNM, how the 1991 NAR support was split between these two partieswas absolutely crucial to the outcome of the elections. Some indication ofthis was already signalled in the 1994 by-election for the Pointe-a-Pierreconstituency which became vacant after the sitting PNM Member ofParliament died. The Pointe-a-Pierre seat has historically been a marginal


seat, with the PNM winning it four out of nine times since 1956, andchanges in voter sentiment have often served as an indication of the way thegeneral elections would go. Certainly, this was the case of the 1994 by-election results in relation to what was likely to transpire in 1995. By 1994,the NAR, having suffered devastating defeat in the 1991 general elections,was reduced to a mere shadow of its 1986 self. In gaining victory in the by-election, the UNC picked up about 70 per cent of the NAR support,suggesting that it could replicate this in the five critical constituencies of StJoseph, Tunapuna, San Juan-Barataria, Ortoire-Mayaro and San FernandoWest, all places with almost equal distribution of Indians and Africans. Inthe end, the PNM would take two of these, Tunapuna by a margin of 244votes and San Fernando West by 1,288 votes. The UNC would take theremaining three, two by small margins (St Joseph by 614 votes and Ortoire-Mayaro by 900) and one by a more substantial lead (San Juan Barataria by1,183).

Several hypotheses have been advanced to explain the astoundingresults of the 1995 elections, among them the persistence of ethnic votingpatterns, personality and leadership factors, campaign strategy, grassrootsmobilisation capabilities, the impact of structural adjustment policies andUNC-NAR collaboration. In a sense all these factors were at play withdifferent saliences individually and in combination to spell disaster anddefeat for the PNM. A few of these factors in particular could be creditedfor the shift in favour of the UNC, of which the differential votermobilisation capabilities of the parties in the context of persisting ethnicpreference was probably most significant. The mobilisation explanation istherefore about a party being able in the first place to get out its communalsupporters and then to persuade undecideds and others to vote for it. Therehas been some suggestion that differential party mobilisation by itself needsto be understood in the context of demographic changes in favour of theIndian population. However, as yet there is no evidence available to validatethis view, even though it is known from the last census that the Indianpopulation has overtaken the African overall in the country. Themobilisation factor also includes the assumption that many erstwhile PNMsupporters, either disenchanted with the PNM record of achievement orcomplacent about a foregone PNM victory, decided to stay at home.Contained in the mobilisation hypothesis, then, is a complex subset ofassociated assumptions. What is undisputed is that the vast majority ofIndians and Africans voted for their respective ethnic parties, with a smallgroup of non-committed voters who were more than likely NAR supportersgiving their ballot to the UNC, thereby overturning the anticipated victoryof the PNM.


THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS OF 1996

Eight months after the astounding upset that occurred in the 1995 generalelections, local government polls were called. Ordinarily, local electionsdraw less public attention and participation than general elections, but withthe equal split in the parliamentary seats in the Trinidad constituenciesbetween the PNM and UNC, the local elections assumed unusual salience.The opposition PNM called its manifesto 'Enough is Enough', and consideredthe June 1996 polls a referendum on the UNC-NAR coalition government.17

The UNC, which fought the election in an accommodation with its coalitionpartner in central government, accepted the PNM's challenge that the electionshould be viewed as a referendum on the government's eight-month reign.Thus, in winding down his campaign, Prime Minister Panday asked hissupporters for their vote as a sign saying 'Yes, you're going right'.18 What wastrue about this renewed contest between the PNM and UNC at the localgovernment level was the fact that they operated by activating the sameunderlying campaign appeals at the grassroots but engaged more openly at thepublic level in ethnic and communalist charges and counter-charges. The thirdparty in the race, the NAR, focused its attention on the issue of national unity,and thus campaigned on the basis that it was the only organisation whichcould bridge the gap between the two ethnic groups. At the same time, theNAR's campaign took on a more partisan perspective, whereby party leaderssuggested that the party's success in the local government elections wouldserve to empower the NAR within the coalition government." The campaign,therefore, at least from the perspective of what was to be presented on theplatforms of the three political parties, focused on a combination of nationaland local government issues with greater salience to the former.

With reference to the manifestos, all three parties sought to lay aframework based on a local government orientation. They all adopted asimilar philosophical approach to local government, speaking of the need tofoster community participation in local government. Thus, for instance, theUNC manifesto entitled 'Empowering the People' outlined the need for a'partnership with the people' to be developed with local governmentauthorities. The NAR, in its manifesto entitled 'Empower your Community:Building from the Ground Up', complained about the emasculation of localgovernment, and also called for greater participatory democracy and thusposited the urgent need to resuscitate local government. The PNM echoedthese sentiments and proposed to build communities through grassrootsparticipation.

The manifestos of all the parties explored the future and functioning oflocal governments, calling for further decentralisation in terms of devolvingadditional powers and functions to local government, and specifically


focusing on management and staffing considerations proposing to ensureadequate staff and resources to enable the local government councils todeliver the services for which they were responsible. The only major localgovernment issue which was discussed on the campaign was the move bythe government to proclaim the Municipal Corporations Act a week beforepolling day. The UNC boasted that it had succeeded in proclaiming the Actin its entirety following only eight months in office, while the PNM hadfailed to do so during the previous four years. The PNM countered bysuggesting that, even though the UNC did proclaim the Act, themechanisms to enforce the sections now proclaimed were not in place andthus any such proclamations would be rendered useless. But apart from thissubject, no other local government issue received any substantive treatmenton the campaign trail beyond what was stated in the manifestos.

On the hustings, national issues predominated since the elections wereviewed as a referendum. The UNC and NAR concentrated on defending thepolicies adopted within the preceding seven months. The UNC, claimingthat 'we've only just begun', identified various policies related to reducingprices of food and other consumer goods, the fight against crime, as well asa review of energy sector policies which were to result in increased earningsfrom that sector. In full-page newspaper advertisements, the UNC remindedthe population of the previous Manning administration's record, suggestingthe PNM's mismanagement of the economy, resulting in widespreadpoverty. Fingers were also pointed at the PNM in the disposal of stateenterprises in a manner not beneficial to the state. In turn, the PNMcampaign, with regard to the national issues, focused on the failure of thegovernment to bring about a substantial reduction in the high crime rate andin the cost of living, arguing that the UNC had failed on both these counts.

Apart from the open discourse on crime and economic well-being, asecond level of campaign activity addressed the very sensitive matter ofcommunal interests and fears. While in the 1995 general elections much ofthis contestation was confined to the quiet appeals of local grassrootsactivists, in the 1996 local government elections, ethnic and communalistcharges were more openly ventilated. The PNM platform speakersquestioned the government's policy on national unity, alleging that thegovernment was promoting disunity, and this was manifested invictimisation and unfair dismissals of PNM sympathisers, as well as theforgiving of a loan to Guyana.20 In defeat, it appeared that the PNM leaderwas fearful of losing some of his disenchanted communal supporters and sodecided to engage openly in sectional chauvinist appeals to secure his base.At the launch of the campaign, PNM leader, Patrick Manning, spoke ofdiscrimination, making specific reference to employment of Afro-Trinidadians, complaining about 'discrimination and division'. He argued


that under his administration four administrative regions along theeast-west corridor, which coincidentally were predominantly populated byAfro-Trinidadians, had comparatively higher levels of poverty than CountyCaroni, a predominantly Indo-Trinidadian region. Accordingly, in 1995, hisadministration created over 200 unemployment relief projects (URP) in theeast-west corridor, while 16 such projects were implemented in CountyCaroni. Manning complained that in 1996 the UNC-NAR government haddecreased the number of projects in the east-west corridor to 129, while itincreased County Caroni's tally to 36.21 This was presented as an indicatorof government's 'discriminatory practice' against PNM strongholds.Following his initial salvo, Manning persisted with the concerns ofdiscrimination, specifically in making reference to the firing of chiefexecutive officers of various state enterprises. Manning said openly on apublic platform of the UNC-NAR government: 'under the disguise ofnational unity they are imposing on this population some of the most racistacts ever perpetrated by any government of Trinidad and Tobago.'22

While the PNM attacked the governing coalition for racialdiscrimination, both coalition partners argued that their parties were ratherseeking to promote national unity. The NAR party chairman told a publicmeeting that the 'future of national unity in this country lies with the NARin conjunction with the UNC and that the PNM was unable to bridge thegap between the various ethnic groups of the society.23 The UNC adopted asomewhat similar position, chastising the PNM for focusing on communalaffiliation, and for appealing 'to only one race'. UNC leader, Panday, thuslikened the PNM to the Democratic Labour Party (DLP), the Indo-Trinidadian party of the 1960s which had failed to win an election becauseit appealed only to Indo-Trinidadians. He emphasised that 'no party canbecome the Government unless it can appeal to both Indians and Africans'.24

On the specific charges that the PNM leader levelled against the UNC,Panday defended his government's policies, arguing that the claims ofracism were last-ditch efforts to maintain the support of the Afro-Trinidadian community. Further, he claimed that the issues raised on thePNM platform against the UNC had implicit ethnic overtones. Certainwords and categories were clearly associated with one or other of the ethniccommunities in Trinidad, so that a reference to that name served as an ethnicsurrogate. Hence, the PNM's attacks on Caroni, which is the metaphor forthe UNC Indian support base, as well as the PNM's campaign against thedismissals of certain CEOs in the public service, were interpreted as racistin intent. The same line of argument was used in reference to the PNM'scharges regarding the debt forgiveness to Guyana, which was under thecontrol of Cheddi Jagan, the former Indo-Guyanese president. With regardto the debt forgiveness to Guyana, which arose out of a Paris Club formula,


the Panday administration had argued that it was well accepted by themajority that it was impossible to recover all the Guyanese debt. Hisgovernment was therefore moving to recover some of the debt, but he addedthat the mere forgiveness was not evidence of an ethnically based decisionin which the Trinidad 'Indian government' was freeing a Guyanese 'Indiangovernment' of its debts. Panday claimed that his government was firm inits quest for national unity and would not divide the country on ethnic andracial grounds.25

Polling day approached with great anticipation by all parties. The PNMhoped that the election result would show it was regaining ground lost in1995. Some had argued that the PNM had lost ground in the 1995 electionsnot because of a drop in popularity but because of poor party mobilisationof the faithful on election day.26 For the PNM, therefore, the 1996 electionpresented the opportunity to regain ground by regrouping and consolidatingthe Afro-Trinidadian vote for the PNM. The UNC, on the other hand, sawthe poll as a mirror to reflect public opinion of its short tenure in office, andthus hoped for a vote of confidence cutting across ethnic lines. Clearly, theUNC argued, an increase in its popular vote in the elections could only bepossible with support from both Afro and Indo-Trinidadians.

In the local government elections, the contest was for the control of 14municipal corporations comprised of 124 electoral districts. Of the 260candidates who contested the election, ten were identified as independentcandidates,27 while the other 250 contested the poll on a party card, with 124candidates standing for the PNM and another 126 representing theUNC-NAR accommodation.28 Notwithstanding the entry of the NAR in theelections, it was clear that its participation was to be limited, since it did notpossess a strong electoral base in Trinidad, unlike the PNM and UNC,whose support was grounded in ethnic blocs. In the seat-splittingarrangement between the UNC and NAR for several Trinidadconstituencies, the NAR chances of success were remote because the seatsit agreed to contest were strongholds of the PNM. Moreover, even in thoseinstances where the PNM was not formidable, the NAR faced the challengeof 'independent' candidates, who sought to divide the anti-PNM votesufficiently for the PNM to retain the seats. A case in point was the Calvarydistrict in the Arima Borough, where the PNM candidate, Melan Garcia,secured only 484 votes while the 'independent', Martin Hollingsworth,received 417, with 252 votes going to Peter Asse, the NAR candidate.Effectively, the NAR was later to complain that the UNC surreptitiouslyundermined their candidates' chances of victory by giving 'critical' supportto the 'independents', who were really the UNC's candidates for theelection. The upshot was that the NAR, as well as all the independentcandidates, failed to win any of the 124 available seats.


TABLE 2

SHARING THE MUNICIPALITIES BETWEEN THE PNM AND THE UNC

Municipality

Port of SpainSan FernandoArimaPoint FortinChaguanasDiego MartinSanJuan/LaventilleTunapuna/PiarcoSangre GrandeRioClaro/MayaroCouva/TabaquitePrinces TownPenal/DebeSiparia

TOTAL

%ofVotes

For PNM

70.9256.4255.2070.7326.9166.03

62.5846.8642.8733.9326.6133.1816.7643.67

43.67

%ofVotes

For UNC

8.4439.1919.5220.8073.0911.41

25.4244.2256.8463.7972.2866.8283.2449.92

49.92

PNMSeatsWon

120506060009

1007020100010004

63

UNCSeatsWon

000401000800

0205050511080804

61

PartyWinningControl

PNMPNMPNMPNMUNCPNM

PNMPNMUNCUNCUNCUNCUNCUNC

The seats in the 1996 local government election were shared by thePNM and the UNC without any success for the NAR or the independents.The PNM won 63 of the 124 seats, with the UNC taking the other 61.However, a closer analysis of the results, especially in terms of comparativeanalysis between the 1992 and 1996 local government polls, shows that thePNM lost much ground. Although the PNM won the majority of seats in1996, that majority was significantly reduced from what the party hadobtained in 1992. Put differently, with the PNM having won 63 of the 124seats in 1996, its proportion of seats in the local government arena wasreduced from 62 per cent in 1992 to 51 per cent in 1996. This 11 per centdecline in the PNM's proportion was transferred to the UNC, which saw itsproportion of seats rise from 38 per cent to 49 per cent over two elections.A similar outcome occurred in relation to the votes cast. In the 24 June 1996local government poll, the UNC obtained 177,848 votes as compared withthe PNM's tally of 155,585. The UNC obtained 23,000 more votes than thePNM in 1996. Since 1956, when the PNM entered party politics in Trinidad,this was the first time that the PNM, as a party, received fewer votes thanany other party in a local government poll. Furthermore, and from thecomparative perspective of the 1992 and 1996 local government polls,despite an increase in the electorate of over 24,000, the PNM's 1996 tally ofvotes increased marginally (767) over what the party had received in the


1992 local government poll. A near opposite picture emerges for the UNC,which saw an increase of over 65,000 votes from what that party polled in1992.

As a result of its performance at the polls in 1996, the UNC was able toadvance its challenge to the PNM's past hegemony of local government.From the perspective of control of the municipal corporations, the resultsgave the PNM a majority of seats in seven of the 14 councils, with the UNChaving a majority in another six. One council, the Siparia RegionalCorporation, which had eight electoral districts, was split into four seatseach for the PNM and the UNC. This tie was later broken by the 'drawingof lots' and resulted in the UNC gaining control of the council.Consequently, control of the 14 corporations was equally shared by theUNC and the PNM.

The equal sharing in 1996 of the 14 municipal corporations between thePNM and the UNC served to underscore the electoral tie which resulted inthe 1995 parliamentary elections. Just as importantly, the electoral mapwhich demonstrates political party distribution of parliamentary seats is,with minor adjustments, nearly replicated by the map showing similar partycontrol of the various local government councils. Put differently, the resultsof the 1996 local government poll clearly demonstrate the similarity ofethno-partisan structure in the political configuration and division ofTrinidad between the UNC and the PNM. Moreover, when such a party-based configuration is contrasted with the ethnic demography, it becomesclearly visible that the politics and voting behaviour of citizens in Trinidadare closely linked with ethnic identity. The result of the 1996 localgovernment poll served to underscore that communal voting dividesTrinidad today at both the local and national level and questions the valueof local elections in recasting and moderating ethnic competition at thenational level because of the nature of the practical local issues andproblems which require daily inter-sectional co-operation for theirresolution.

CONCLUSION

A UNC-NAR coalition acceded to national power on 9 November 1995with Basdeo Panday as prime minister and A.N.R. Robinson as 'MinisterExtraordinaire', an ambiguous title. Robinson was later to become Presidentof the Republic. The Panday-led coalition government, which brought forthe first time an Indian and a trade unionist to power, potentially representedstriking if not radical departures from the past. In particular, the ascensionof an Indian to the prime ministership carried the greatest anxiety especiallyfor the African community long accustomed to the idea of a Creole chief


executive as a sort of rightful inheritance. The fact of an Indian primeminister is fraught with symbolism of power and domination, an intangiblefactor of potentially explosive implications in a society that is deeplydivided almost in equal Indian-African ratio. The fact that the localgovernment elections confirmed a fundamental shift in power underscoredthe prospect that in the near future Trinidad and Tobago's ruling group islikely to be dominated by persons of Indian descent. This is bound to be thesource of ongoing chronic political instability to the society and state. Inassuming control of the government, the UNC is caught in the crossfire ofboth Indian and African demands, with one volley emanating from theAfrican-dominated public service technocracy insisting that its traditionalprivileges and prerogatives be maintained and the other volley coming fromIndians demanding equality and entry not only to public service jobs but tothe distribution of projects and other benefits. How these two claims arereconciled in the crossfire that is essentially a zero-sum game in which onecommunity can only benefit at the expense of the other would determine thestability and legitimacy of the Panday-led regime and their very hold onpower.29

On a broader canvas that engages issues of theory as well as policy, thestudy investigates the suitability of political institutions, such as electoralsystems and competitive political parties, imported from relativelyintegrated states into deeply divided countries serving to adjudicate rivalclaims by ethno-political communities in conflict. Nearly all Third Worldstates are multi-ethnic and most have embarked on a course to establishopen democratic systems. Critical issues demanding immediate resolutionabound, including the allocation of material values, such as jobs andprojects, symbolic needs, such as recognition and respect, and politicaldemands, such as power sharing. To a substantial extent, it is the politicalinstitutions which are adopted that will go a long way towards equitablydistributing these interests or frustrating them. The Trinidad case points tothe limitations of adopting a particular type of electoral and party system indeeply divided states. Competitive elections in which the parties areconstituted almost entirely on communal blocs tend to exacerbate sectionalsentiments. In Trinidad and Tobago, these elections attempt to conceal atone level the crude appeals to ethnic identity, but local grassrootsmobilisation keeps alive the fears and prejudices through which the rivalcommunities regard each other. The division in Trinidad and Tobago isparticularly acute since it points to major groups - Indians and Africans -who are in almost equal demographic numbers and who have dividedpolitical seats almost equally at both national and local elections. Thisbipolar ethnic division, as is found in places like Fiji, Guyana and NorthernIreland, throws up a special quality to the intensity of the communal conflict


that elections tend to engender. That fact demands swift and decisiveattention to designing modes of ethnic conflict resolution before thesituation degenerates into open warfare. Specifically, it clearly suggestspolitical mechanisms and institutions be established for some sort ofconsociation in power sharing, decentralisation of territorial autonomy,proportionality in the distribution of the resources of the state, and electoralsystems which encourage appeals to cross-communal interests.30

NOTES

1. See Ralph R. Premdas, 'Race, Politics and Succession in Trinidad and Guyana', in A. Payneand P. Sutton (eds.), Modern Caribbean Politics (Baltimore, 1993), 98-124.

2. For the division of spheres of influence as a mechanism of ethnic conflict regulation, see R.S.Milne, 'The Pacific Way - Consociational Politics in Fiji', Pacific Affairs (Summer 1975);also, Ralph Premdas, 'Balance and Ethnic Conflict in Fiji', in John McGarry and B. O'Leary(eds.), The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (London, 1993), 251-74.

3. See R.S. Milne, Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States: Guyana, Fiji and Malaysia (Vancouver,1982); also, Ray K. Vasil, Politics in Bi-Racial Societies (New Delhi, 1984).

4. For a discussion of the role of elections in multi-ethnic states, see R.S. Milne, 'Elections inDeveloping Countries', Parliamentary Affairs, XVIII, 1 (1964-65); Ralph Premdas,'Elections and Campaigns in a Racially Bifurcated State', Journal of Inter-American Studiesand World Affairs (August 1972), 5-35; Ralph Premdas, Ethnicity and Development: TheCase of Guyana (London, 1995), 57-78; Stephanie Lawson, The Failure of DemocraticPolitics in Fiji (London, 1991), 191-4.

5. See Milne, Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States, 7-10; also, Ralph Premdas, Ethnic Politicsand Development in Fiji (London, 1995), 152-3

6. See Paul Sutton, 'Trinidad and Tobago: Oil, Capitalism and the "Presidential Power" of EricWilliams', in A. Payne and P. Sutton (eds.), Dependency and Challenge: The PoliticalEconomy of the Commonwealth Caribbean (Manchester, 1984), 43-6.

7. See Trinidad and Tobago, Central Statistical Office, Annual Statistical Digest.8. See Bishnu Ragoonath, 'Race and Ethnic Relations and the Competition for Political Power

in Trinidad', Journal of Ethno-Development, 3, 3 (1994), 53-65.9. See Ralph Premdas, 'Ethnic Conflict in Trinidad and Tobago: Domination and

Reconciliation' in K. Yelvington (ed.), Trinidad Ethnicity (Tennessee, 1993), 136-60.10. S. Chouti, 'Taxes To Come Down', Sunday Express, 22 Oct. 1995, 3.11. 'Panday Holds Unusual Press Conference', Toronto Express, 31 Oct. 1995, 6.12. 'Court System Still Inadequate, CJ', Guardian, 11 Oct. 195, 10.13. Guardian, 29 Oct. 1995, 13.14. 'TT Poll Puts Ruling Party Ahead', Toronto Express, 3 Oct. 1995, 6.15. W. Gibbins, 'The Dookeran Factor', Sunday Express, 12 Nov. 1995, 4.16. S. Shepherd, 'Senator Appeals for Baptist Unity', Sunday Express, 7 Dec. 1995, 50.17. See '"Enough is Enough" Manning: June 24 polls referendum on Govt', Sunday Guardian,

2 June 1996, 1.18. See 'Panday asks voters for the sign', Sunday Express, 23 June 1996, 3.19. See Peter Richards, 'ANR: Win will help NAR to Reorganize', Trinidad Guardian, 10 June

1996, 1.20. The issue of debt forgiveness to Guyana was viewed in a racial context, whereupon it was an

'Indo-Trinidadian' government helping an 'Indo-Guyanese government'. See Suzanne Mills,'PNM "jury" delivers guilty verdict on coalition Govt', Newsday (Trinidad), 16 June 1996,2.

21. Sandra Chouthi, 'Manning sees Govt Carom bias', Sunday Express (Trinidad), 2 June 1996,1.


22. Stephen Boodram, 'Manning: Racist acts under national unity', Trinidad Guardian, 10 June1996, 1.

23. See 'NAR: Victory will make us equal', Trinidad Guardian, 19 June 1996, 5.24. Debra Wanser, 'The PNM is now like the DLP', Sunday Guardian (Trinidad), 23 June 1996,

17.25. Yvonne Webb, 'Panday: We will not divide country on racial grounds', Trinidad Guardian,

6 June 1996, 3.26. See Selwyn Ryan, 'Round of Applause for Calypso', Sunday Express, 25 Feb. 1996, 9.27. It may be noted here that the ten independent candidates were originally screened and some

were even selected as candidates for the UNC, prior to the announcement of theaccommodation with the NAR. On the announcement that certain seats were allocated for theNAR to contest, the disgruntled aspiring UNC nominees proceeded to have themselvesnominated as independent candidates.

28. In the week preceding nomination day, an accommodation was reached between the UNCand the NAR, whereby it was decided that the UNC was to contest 90 seats with the other34 being contested by NAR candidates. However, at nomination day, two persons who werescreened and proposed by their respective parties before the accommodation was finalised,proceeded to file nomination papers on behalf of their respective parties. Effectively, withthese two additional candidates, the 250 persons represented contested the election on a partycard.

29. See Ralph Premdas, 'Ethnic Conflict and Patterns of Ethnic Conflict Regulation in Trinidadand Tobago', in Crawford Young (ed.), The Accommodation of Cultural Diversity(forthcoming, 1999).

30. For some works which are useful in this regard, see John McGarry and B. O'Leary (eds.),The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (London, 1993); Arend Lijphart, Democracy inPlural Societies (New Haven, CT, 1977); Joseph Montville (ed.), Conflict and Peacemakingin Multiethnic Societies (Lexington, MA, 1990); Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Ethnic Conflicts andthe Nation-State (London, 1996); Crawford Young (ed.), The Accommodation of CulturalDiversity (London, 1999); and Ralph Premdas, 'The Politics of Interethnic Accommodation:The Lewis Model', in Ralph Premdas and Eric St Cyl (eds.), Sir Arthur Lewis: An Economicand Political Portrait (Trinidad, 1991), 51-70.

ethnicity, elections and democracy in trinidad and tobago: analysing the 1995 and 1996 elections

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