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Essential Histories

The Punic Wars264-146 BC

First published in Great Britain in 2002 by Osprey Publishing.

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Pimlico of Random House who have kindlypermitted me to draw on my book The Punic Wars: Rome.Carthage and the Struggle for the Mediterranean (1999) whichgives a fuller account of the three wars. I am also grateful to my

old friend Major General David Alexander-Sinclair for his carefulreading of the Osprey manuscript and helpful comments.

i owe my wife Anna and my two daughters. Emma and Sarah, aspecial word of thanks for their patience, tolerance and goodhumour over the years and to whom I now dedicate this book.

02 03 04 05 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

Introduction 7

Chronology 9

Background to war

Two great Mediterranean powers 11

Warring sides

Carthaginian and Roman forces on land and sea 20

Outbreak

Collapse of the Third Treaty of Friendship 30

The fighting

The three Punic Wars 36

Portrait of a soldier

Hannibal Barcid and Scipio Africanus 76

The world around war

The political, social and economic impact 80

Portrait of a civilian

Carthaginian trade; a Roman senator 84

Conclusion and consequences

Expansionism and the disposition for war 88

Glossary of names 91

Further reading 93

Index 94

Introduction

There are those who would have us believethat man is a peace-loving animal, asking forno more than to be allowed to live inharmony with his fellow beings, rearing hisfamily and pursuing his interests incontented prosperity. Such aspirations aresavagely disrupted by the excesses of power-hungry despots and their brutal soldiery. Thepious then regard history as little more thana tragic record of how peace is shattered by afew evil men; while military history isdismissed as a corrupting influence,glorifying war and promoting xenophobia.Yet wars have never been intermittentoccurrences disrupting the natural, orderlycondition of man, but rather an activitypursued with relentless consistency,sometimes with relish, and under manydifferent guises.

As Professor Sir Michael Howard said inhis David Davies Memorial Institute lectureentitled Weapons and Peace (January 1983):

The anises of war are as diverse as those ofhuman conflict itself, but one factor common toalmost all wars has been on the one side, orboth, a cultural predisposition for war, whetherthis has been confined to ruling elites, orwidespread throughout society. This is a factorwhich has been so often overlooked by liberal-minded historians, the existence of cultures,almost universal in the past, far from extinct inour day, in which the settling of contentiousissues by armed conflict is regarded as natural,inevitable and right.

However unpalatable, the realitiessurrounding war should be recognised.Rather than taking refuge in wishfulthinking, to avoid wars we shouldinvestigate their causes, consider how theymight be prevented and prepare to defendourselves, in itself a powerful deterrent. The

study of military history then provides someperspective and enables us to learn from thelessons of the past.

The Greek historian Polybius wrote:'There are only two sources from which anybenefit can be derived, our own misfortunesand those which have happened to othermen.' Bearing these words in mind, we canturn to the three human misfortunes knownas the Punic Wars which, in spite of theirremoteness, possess a remarkablecontemporary relevance. Two largelyincompatible civilisations confronted oneanother in a rivalry that quickly became ato-the-death fight for supremacy. The lessonsof that struggle clearly demonstrate the needfor positive and consistent national policy,and the importance of co-ordinated land andnaval operations; equally they highlight theconsequences of failing to adapt militaryforce structures and thinking to matchcircumstances, the impact of new technology(as exemplified by the corvus) and therelevance of certain battlefield principleswhich are common to any war.

The three Punic Wars, which lasted formore than 100 years in all, though with longperiods of peace in-between, and extendedthroughout the Mediterranean were todecide the future of the Western world.The contest was between two races: thelndo-Germanic, which incorporated theGreeks and Romans, and the Semitic,which included the Jews and Arabs. The oneside had a genius of order and legislation,the other the spirit of commercial adventureand a love of gold, blood and pleasure.

There are basically two different ways ofpresenting the wars that determined thecourse of European, if not world history: anacross-the-board chronological account, or asequential examination of the differentcampaigns, each in its entirety. The

Essential Histories • The Punic Wars

conventional method has been the former, support this approach the chronology at thebut 1 have chosen the latter because I end of this introduction presents theconsider any difficulty in interrelating milestones of the wars and details of theevents occurring at the same time in events which led to Sicily becoming thedifferent theatres to be far outweighed by principal battlefield of the First Punic War.the ability to follow through the Finally, there is a glossary of names of thedevelopment of each separate campaign. To principal characters.

Chronology

814 BC The founding of Carthage byPhoenician settlers from Tyre.

800 BC After some unknown natural 279 BCcatastrophe which decimated thepopulation, Phoenician migrantsreturn to Sicily, followed by Greeks.

750 BC The traditional date for thefounding of Rome.

509 BC Treaty of friendship signed between 275 BCRome and Carthage definingtrading rights. 264 BC

415 BC Athenian expedition (during thePeloponnesian War) attempts to 256 BCwrest Syracuse from the Spartans andcut their grain supplies from Sicilybut is totally annihilated, leavingDoric Syracuse as the dominant andmost prestigious city in Sicily. 241 BC

480 BC Gelon of Syracuse defeats theCarthaginians at Himera andeffectively removes their influence 240 BCfrom the island for 70 years.

405 BC A resurgence of Carthaginian 241 BCinfluence in Sicily leads to a second 236 BCwar with the Greek settlements,ending with the Carthaginians inpossession of most of the western 237 BCpart of the island.

380 BC A second treaty is signed betweenRome and Carthage confirming 229 BCtheir respective trading rights.

310 BC In a third war between theCarthaginians and Greeks,Agathocles of Syracuse extends his 229 BCdomain in Sicily and lands in North 221 BCAfrica, marches on Carthage butbeing too weak to take the city,returns to Sicily.

290 BC Following the death of Agathocles,the Carthaginians attempt to reassert 220 BCtheir domination but in 278 BCPyrrhus, King of Epirus, crosses overto Sicily and secures most of the

island until forced to leave throughlack of support.A third treaty is drawn up betweenRome and Carthage. It confirms theearlier treaties and adds thesignificant clause that they wouldgo to one another's assistanceif attacked.The Carthaginians regain mostof Sicily.The Romans intervene in Sicily andthe First Punic War begins.Carthaginian naval supremacyis broken at the battle of Ecnomus,enabling the Romans to land inNorth Africa where they areheavily defeated.A new Carthaginian fleet isdestroyed, which leads to the endof the First Punic War.Disgruntled returning Carthaginianmercenaries revolt.The Gauls invade Italy.The Romans respond to a requestfrom Carthaginian mercenaries andseize Sardinia.Hamilcar Barca begins the conquestof Spain and establishes a Barcidempire.Hamilcar is drowned whenattempting to escape across a river.He is succeeded by his son-in-lawHasdrubal.The Romans invade Illyria.Hasdrubal is assassinated andfollowing the army's unanimouschoice, Hannibal is confirmed byCarthage as the new commanderin Spain.Saguntum is placed under Romanprotection but taken by Hannibal,the last of many incidents leadinginevitably to war.

10 Essential Histories • The Punic Wars

218 BC Hannibal marches from Spain,crosses the Alps and invades Italyto begin the Second Punic War.

217 BC Hannibal defeats the Romans atLake Trasimene.

216 BC Hannibal wins an annihilatingvictory at Cannae and the Romansgo on the defensive, avoiding anymajor encounter.

215 BC The war expands to Spain, Sardinia,Sicily and lllyria.

211 BC After threatening Rome, Hannibalis in retreat and progressivelyconfined to southern Italy.

207 BC Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal leavesSpain and crosses the Alps but isdefeated and killed at the battleof Metaurus.

206 BC Scipio secures Spain.205 BC Scipio lands in North Africa.

203 BC Hannibal is recalled to defendCarthage.

202 BC Scipio defeats Hannibal at Zama.201 BC The Carthaginians accept the Roman

Senate's peace terms confining themto their African territories,surrendering their fleet and payinga large indemnity of silver.

200 BC Polybius, who wrote the history ofthe Punic Wars, is born in Arcadia, acountry in the centre of Peleponnesus,now a part of modern Greece.

155 BC Cato starts urging the Senate torenew hostilities against a rejuvenatedCarthage which, he claims, posesa mortal threat to Rome.

149 BC The Carthaginians refuse a Romanultimatum to surrender their cityand the Third Punic War begins.

146 BC Carthage is captured and obliterated.

Background to war

Two great Mediterraneanpowers

With hindsight it is hard not to concludethat war between Carthage and Rome had adegree of inevitability, but at the time thereseemed no reason why this should be so.Rome had established its hegemony over thewhole of the Italian peninsula only relativelyrecently and the Senate showed noinclination for further expansion, whileCarthage had no territorial designs beyondthe retention of her colonies and tradingposts scattered around the Mediterranean

Gravestone from a children's cemetery. The Carthaginianspractised the sacrifice of children. (Edimedia, Paris)

seaboard. In a later chapter I will examinehow the conflict arose, but first let us take acloser look at the two protagonists, Carthageand Rome.

The classical sources only give usrestricted information. The wars themselvesare well covered but otherwise we onlyhave sporadic data, such as what theGreek philosopher Aristotle, writing in the4th century BC, has to say about theCarthaginian constitution, or the writings ofPolybius on the Carthaginian MercenaryRevolt. Moreover, as Carthage was totallydestroyed after the Third Punic War, in146 BC, no records have survived. All wehave are the results of archaeologicalexcavations in cemeteries which, thoughproviding much information about the minorarts (for example, terracotta figurines, carvedivory and jewellery, together with inscribedstelae bearing figures), tell us nothing aboutthe human dramas that unfolded, or the dayto day activities and concerns of the civilianpopulation. It is much the same with theRomans of this period: records deal almostexclusively with the actual fighting, withoutany mention of, for example, how the womenbore such stupendous losses amongst theirmenfolk or, indeed, how they themselvesaided the war effort.

Carthage

FoundingIt was Phoenician settlers from Tyre, justnorth of today's border between Israel andLebanon, who founded Carthage not farnorth of modern Tunis, in about 814 BC.According to one source, those who settled inTyre were given the name Phoenician,meaning 'dark skinned' by the Greeks. Othersmaintain the name derived from the purple


dye, phonix, which was obtained frommolluscs of the Murex genus and usedextensively in the dyeing of linen or woollengoods. For their part, the Romans called themPoeni, which led to the name Punic. Butwhatever their etymological origins, thePhoenicians were a Semitic race and aseafaring people who, according to Herodotus,the Greek fifth-century BC historian known asthe 'Father of History', sailed down the Gulf,round Africa and returned to theMediterranean through the Straits of Gibraltarto establish a number of trading posts.Amongst these, near the head of a sandstonepeninsula that provided shelter for bothwarships and merchant vessels, was Carthage.Though by far the largest city, there weremany others in North Africa, Spain, with itsrich gold, silver and copper mines, Sardinia,Cyprus, Malta and - most importantly - Sicily,where Carthaginian expansion was eventuallychecked by Greek settlements in the east ofthe island.

PeopleWhat is known about the Carthaginiancharacter comes from Roman sources and somay not be altogether impartial. Polybiusrefers to the more virtuous Roman attitudetowards money matters, whereby wealthobtained by unlawful transactions waswidely disapproved of and bribery waspunished by death. The Carthaginians, onthe other hand, obtained office by openbribery and nothing which resulted in profitwas thought disgraceful. Cicero, the first-century AD Roman consul, orator and writer,identified the Carthaginians' mostdistinguishing characteristics as being craft,skill, industry and cunning, all of which inmoderation can reasonably be associatedwith people who made their living throughtrade. Others allege, however, that theCarthaginians combined these characteristicsto an inordinate degree. 'Punic honour' anda 'Carthaginian mind' were derogatory termsin Roman times. In spite of theseunflattering labels, it seems reasonable toconclude that the Carthaginians were, likeall mortals, neither wholly good nor wholly

An example of a murex shell, from which purple dye canbe obtained. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

bad. They were traders who lived by profit ina time when their political institutions werein decline and their religious practices acause for disgust, but their personal andcollective conduct might have appearedcorrupt to the Romans, who were at anearlier, more austere and virtuous stage oftheir evolutionary development.

ReligionReferences to the Phoenician religion andthat of Carthage in particular arefragmentary and at times contradictory.What we do know is that the Carthaginianreligion was polytheistic, characterised bythe worship of a number of deities whocontrolled the totality of man's needs andthe needs of society. In this respect it is not

Background to war 13

dissimilar to several other civilisations, witha pantheon of superhuman beings who hadto be propitiated and placated in accordancewith established rites. What was different,however, was the way in which the politicalindependence of the city states enabled themto develop a diversity of religiousinterpretations. Each city organised its ownform of worship, creating individualtraditions, assigning prominence to a rangeof elected deities of their own choosing andattracting their own somewhat surprisingcustoms. For example, Astarte, thePhoenician female warrior deity, was alsoconnected with Aphrodite, or Venus, and herworship involved temple prostitution, asexual ritual that slaves and other womenfulfilled on payment, catering particularly forforeign visitors.

During the fifth century BC Carthagebegan to adopt an increasingly independenttheology and liturgy. When relations withTyre were broken off, the worship ofMelquarth, Lord of the City, was replaced bythat of Baal Hammon, and Astarte wasrenamed Tanit. These changes gave a sinisterturn to Carthaginian religion since BaalHannon had to be placated by humansacrifice. It was not, however, only theCarthaginians who followed such a practice,as is borne out by the biblical prophetJeremiah, who relates how the children ofJudah did evil in that they built topeths 'toburn their sons and daughters in the fire', acustom which was continued among theCanaanites and later by the Israelites.

There is considerable controversy as to theextent of human sacrifice. Some scholarsmaintain that it was fairly common, whileothers, especially archaeologists, now considerit to have been reserved for times of extremedanger, and suggest that the cremated remainsof children found near all the Carthaginiansettlements were usually of those who haddied from sickness or other natural causes andhad been 'offered' to the gods. Against thismoderating interpretation must be set thebarbarous description given by DiodorusSiculus, a first-century BC Greek historian:'There was a brazen statue putting forth the

palms of its hands bending in such a mannertowards the earth, so that the boy to besacrificed who was laid upon them would rolloff and fall into a deep fiery furnace.'

Though prisoners were also sacrificed, itseems unlikely that Carthaginian religiouspractices would have determined theirconduct on the battlefield. Hannibal andothers sacrificed animals to the gods beforeundertaking some hazardous enterprise, butthat seems to have been about all.

ConstitutionAlthough the other Phoenician cities eachhad their government, they were dependenton Carthage for defence as they had nomilitary forces of their own. There was thenno solid political unity or cohesion betweenthem. It was the rather loose constitution asit affected the city states that certainlycontributed to Carthage's downfall. As forthe subject territories in Africa and Sardinia,they were made to pay tribute, and theirdiscontent was reflected in the part theysubsequently played in revolts. Carthage hadmerely created a feudal empire with no senseof corporate loyalty, whereas Rome, as wewill see, had forged a confederation of stateswhich, for the most part, held together evenwhen gravely threatened

Despite this lack of cohesion, Cicero hadthis to say: 'Carthage could not havemaintained her pre-eminent position for sixhundred years had she not been governedwith wisdom and statesmanship.' A raretribute from a Roman at a time when thebitter legacies of the long struggle of thePunic Wars must still have been very muchto the forefront of his compatriots' minds.

Though we know little about thecircumstances in Carthage itself thatproduced such estimable results, they can toa large extent be attributed to the politicalstability provided by the aristocracy. Thepatriciate of Carthage was never ashereditary as that of early Rome, and theinterminable constitutional struggles whichracked the Roman political and social scenewere relatively unknown in Carthage.Elevation to the aristocracy was by wealth,

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which ensured a steady flow of new,enterprising families who invigorated publiclife. This was offset, however, by widespreadcorruption: not only could the highestoffices be purchased, but a return on thisinvestment was demanded. As in any state,corrupt political leadership permeates alllevels of society.

Rome

FoundingThe development of Rome into a dominatingpower throughout the Italian peninsulahappened over three broad periods. The firstlasted from the traditional date of the city'sfounding in about 750 BC until its absorptionby the Etruscans about 100 years later; thesecond period of Etruscan colonisation lastedsome 250 years until around 400 BC; then,after its brief occupation by the Gauls in386 BC, Rome's own expansion graduallybegan, so forming the third and final period ofits growth. This was completed in 270 BC withthe surrender of Rhegium (Reggio).

Though the earlier periods are of historicinterest and relevant to our widerunderstanding of the Roman political,religious, cultural and economic customs andattitudes, we are only concerned with thefinal period of expansion and the subsequentdevelopment of Rome into a confederation.

As Rome had extended her hegemony, shehad come into conflict with Greek citiesscattered around the peninsula's southerncoastlines. One of these cities, Tarentum(Taranto), had appealed to Pyrrhus, King ofEpirus (Map 8) for help. Crossing theAdriatic in 280 BC Pyrrhus defeated theRomans in a hard-fought contest, promptinghim to exclaim: 'Another such victory andwe are undone', giving rise to the immortalexpression, a 'Pyrrhic victory'.

Responding to an appeal from the Greekcity of Syracuse, still Pyrrhus crossed over toSicily in 278 BC and was soon in possessionof most of the island, driving theCarthaginians into its western extremity. Hishigh-handedness, however, eventually lost

him the support of the Greek cities he hadcome to assist and he was forced towithdraw. As he set sail he looked back andprophetically observed: 'What a field we areleaving to the Carthaginians and theRomans to exercise their arms.' Hisimportance for us in trying to understandthe relationship between Carthage and Romeis that he seemingly brought them closertogether while they faced him as a commonenemy. That said, however, Pyrrhus'adventurous excursion could have extendedRoman ambitions beyond the confines of theItalian peninsula, and though there isnothing to suggest that this led directly tothe Romans seeking further territorial gains,it must have encouraged the patriarchalClaudii family, who favoured a southerlyexpansion, to oppose the powerful Fabii,whose interests lay to the north, where some300 of the family had been killed defendingthe frontiers.

Antique sculpture of Pyrrhus. (Museo della Civilta.Rome/Edimedia, Paris)


PeopleThe Romans who participated in theconquest of the Greek cities witnessedunimagined wealth and luxury, but theywere nevertheless still predominantly arural society. Their intellectual horizonshad not been widened by close contactwith others who possessed morequestioning minds and more sophisticatedstandards, and the loosening of their strict,simplistic code of behaviour had hardlybegun. The Roman paterfamilias ruled hisfamily as an autocrat, instilling obedience,loyalty and integrity with a severityapproaching the institutionalised trainingof the Spartan youth.

The result of this upbringing, upheldand fortified by the rigorous demands ofpublic opinion, was that the Romansdisplayed high standards and set themselvesan ideal of virtue based on willpower,self-restraint, a seriousness devoid offrivolity, perseverance and a bindingsense of duty to the family, social group ormilitary unit, all established in the hierarchyof state authority. The importance of theindividual was subordinated to his corporateresponsibilities, and a willingness to sacrificehis own interests or even his life for the goodof his group was accepted as the normalstandard of personal conduct.

This gave rise to a pragmatic, dour andpersistent breed of men, supported byobedient and respectful wives who occupiedthemselves with the running of theirhouseholds and the rearing of children. Fewwould have held doubts about the rectitudeof the state's policies and most were deeplyconservative, probably not very imaginative,and profoundly superstitious. They werecertainly parochial in outlook but boundtogether by a powerful moral code ofreciprocal loyalty. They were hard-working,brave through training, and hardenedmentally and physically by the vicissitudesof nature and a life of laborious toil. Theymade hardy, courageous and disciplinedsoldiers, whose strength was tempered onlyby superstition and the usual measure ofhuman failings.

ReligionAs the Romans extended their conquests, sothey absorbed the religion and culture of theraces they had subjected, and in the process,modified their own earlier animistic worship.It was the influence of the Greek cities insouthern Italy and later in Sicily which madethe greatest impact. By the 3rd century BC theGreek gods and goddesses had beenassimilated by the Romans. Greek names wereRomanised: Demeter became Ceres; Poseidonand Ares became Neptune and Mars; Zeus andHera became Jupiter and Juno; and Aphroditeand Hestia became Venus and Vesta, thoughthis renaming did not change their ficklenatures and wanton ways.

There was no established church as weknow it, with a hierarchy, creed and moralcode. Nor was there a single all-powerfulgod, but rather a multiplicity of deitiesinterfering with and squabbling over theirdifferent interests and mortal proteges. Tothe majority of Romans the mythology thatwe regard as little more than a collection offables was, in varying degrees, a portrayal ofimmortals to whom established rights weredue and who had to be propitiated. Thefulfilment of these obligations would ensurethe safe return of mariners by Neptune orvictory in battle by Mars, while Ceres wouldprovide an abundant harvest and Jupiter,rain. Neglect, on the other hand, would leadto abandonment, if not the purposefulinfliction of disaster. Nevertheless, there werea few hardy souls like the consul PubliusClaudius Pulcher who, before the battle ofDrepana off Sicily, lost patience when thesacred chickens would not eat and soprovide a favourable omen. He flung thebirds overboard with the short-temperedadvice: 'If you won't eat, then try drinkinginstead.' Whether his subsequent disastrousdefeat can be ascribed to his irreverence is amatter for conjecture, though the godscannot have been too enraged since hemanaged to escape with his life.

As there was no church, responsibility forofficial religious ceremonies was a function ofthe state, the chief officials being the Collegeof Pontiffs, headed by the Pontifex Maximus


Ceres, the Roman goddess of agriculture andcorn (Greek Demeter), mother of Persephone.(Ann Ronan Picture Library)

(Chief Priest), who were the judges andarbiters of divine and human affairs and theinterpreters of portents, augurs and omens.Their role was of great significance since thegods could only make their wishes knownthrough coded messages. Divination, however,was not confined to these officials; so long ashe could afford to do so, no citizen enteredinto an undertaking of any importancewithout offering a sacrifice and reading forhimself the signs in the victim's entrails.

Beliefs varied considerably, and religionand its role in determining the course ofmen's lives was as varied as it is now. Evenso, after allowing for this individuality, therecan be little doubt that religion influencedmilitary decisions. Major ventures werefrequently not undertaken through lack offavourable portents, causing delay andhesitancy. Among soldiers too, individualinterpretations inevitably had some bearingon the way they faced an impending battle.A favourable omen could raise morale but anunfavourable one could cause anxiety.

ConstitutionAfter the kings had been displaced by consuls,and following a period of strife between thePlebeians (the common people) and thePatricians (the hereditary aristocracy), a morestable and durable constitution evolved.According to Polybius this consisted of threeelements: consuls, senators and the people.Each element possessed sovereign powerswhich were regulated with such scrupulousregard for equality and equilibrium that noone could say for certain whether theconstitution was democratic, despotic oraristocratic: the consuls could be regarded asdespots, the senators as aristocratic and thepeople as democratic.

The consuls had complete control of theadministration, raising levies on Rome's allies,appointing the military tribunes and spendingpublic money as they chose. They alsocommanded the legions when the army took tothe field. They were, however, only elected for ayear, and had to account for their stewardshipon leaving office. Moreover, being a pair, theywere subject to one another's vetoes. TheSenate, which numbered about 300, came to belargely hereditary and aristocratic. It had theright to exercise authority in many public areaswithout consulting the people, so was also tosome extent despotic. The hereditary nature ofthe Senate inevitably led to the perpetuation offactional party interests, represented by threefamily clans who exerted a powerful, and attimes contradictory, influence on Rome's policy.The Fabii saw Roman and their own interestsbeing best served by a northern expansion,coupled with a policy of moderation andco-operation with Carthage. The Claudiibelieved that the future of Rome lay to thesouth and increasingly came to regard Carthageas a rival to be eliminated. Finally, the Aemiliifavoured overseas expansion rather moreindiscriminately, but later inclined towardsthe western Mediterranean. The power thatremained with the people seems small, but infact related to a number of important functions.Apart from various assemblies, they also hadsole authority for deciding honours, ratifying orrefusing peace treaties, passing sentences ofdeath and imposing major fines. The powers to


Neptune, god of the oceans. From an ancient bust.(Ann Ronan Picture Library)

honour and punish were placed in the handsof the people; in Polybius' view it is these twothings and these alone that hold humansociety together.

As Rome extended her hegemony, statesdefeated in battle were allied to Rome bytreaty and incorporated into the RomanConfederacy. Those with the strongest tieswere the Latin cities, amongst which Romehad originally been counted when the Latinshad settled around the lower reaches of theRiver Tiber and named the region Latium.Except for foreign policy, allied states werepermitted a considerable measure of localgovernment, were free to retain their political

parties and they paid no tribute.Though Roman garrisons were established

at strategic points, after the 4th century BCthe land belonging to the allied states wasseldom encroached upon. They were, however,expected to provide troops organised onRoman lines and grouped alongside a Romanlegion to form a consular army. The allies didnot have to pay for their soldiers' food andweapons, and when called upon to providetroops in excess of their treaty obligations,they received special payments from Rome. Inthis way Rome was able to field a substantiallygreater number of men than her limitedmanpower would have allowed.

The goddess Venus, portrayed on a Roman mosaic fromLow Ham, Somerset. (Edimedia, Paris)

Warring sides

Carthaginian and Roman forceson land and sea

The Carthaginian army

Carthage was primarily a trading nationseeking to extend its commercialconnections, its sphere of influence and itsempire. A maritime nation supported bymilitary force, Carthage was able to maintainher role and trading monopolies for threecenturies, mainly through a superior navywhich was not averse to sinking rival tradevessels. Such incidents were not regarded asacts of war, especially since many such losseswere probably attributed to natural disasters,given the absence of any survivors to testify-to the contrary.

The Carthaginian army consisted mainlyof mercenaries recruited from the varioussubject territories who, except in Spain,seldom served in their own countries, andremained isolated from one another throughdifferences of language and religion. Theywere then largely dependent upon theCarthaginian fleet for supplies, anddiscipline was enforced via a strict codewhich included capital punishment. Eachterritory provided special military skills:Numidia supplied a nimble, courageous andindefatigable cavalry armed with spears andjavelins. These lightly clad horsemen, whorode without saddle or bridle, had superbfighting skills, both in the hills or on theplains, manoeuvring like flocks of starlingsthat wheel and change direction as thoughby instinct. Threatening and enticing,surprising with sudden and unexpectedmoves, there was no cavalry on thebattlefield to match them.

From the Balearic Islands came theformidable slingers, organised into corps of2,000 men who were armed with two typesof slings, one for long-range engagementsagainst a densely packed enemy and theother for close-quarter, individual targets

up to some 600 feet. Their delivery of stonesor lead, which could penetrate a helmet orlight protective armour, matched the rate offire and accuracy of contemporary archers.They were savage fighters who were oftenpaid in women rather than gold or silver.

Though infantry soldiers were recruitedfrom Spanish hill tribes, they were inperpetual conflict with one another, anational disharmony which had simplifiedthe Carthaginian conquest of Spain. Theywere experts at guerrilla warfare but oftemperamental disposition and doubtfulloyalty, not best suited to set-piece battles.Their basic weapon was a short sword suitablefor cutting and thrusting. Also recruited fromSpain were lightly armed cavalry whose horsescould carry a second rider, ready to dismountand fight as an infantryman.

The largest mercenary contingent,however, were the Libyans of Tunisia.Hardened by the harsh conditions of theirown country, they were versatile fighters whoserved both as light infantry skirmishers andin the heavily concentrated infantry of theline. There were Gauls too but relatively fewuntil Hannibal's invasion of Italy encouragedthem to join in substantial numbers to fighttheir traditional enemies, the Romans. Theyfought without armour and showed greatdash in the attack, but they were unreliable,especially when hard-pressed.

Then there were the elephants. Initiallythe Carthaginians only used the Africanelephant found in the forests aroundCarthage, at the foot of the Atlas mountainsand along the coast of Morocco, but later itseems probable that Hannibal obtained someof the larger Indian elephants from Egypt.Until tactics had been developed to counterthem on the battlefield, elephants struckterror into men and horses alike and theirsmall numbers were disproportionately

Warring sides 21

A Numidian cavalryman as shown in an eighteenth-century representation. (AKG, Berlin)

effective. When frightened, however, theysometimes wreaked devastation in their ownranks by turning and fleeing.

There were also native Carthaginians inthe army, but their number was never verygreat and they were mainly confined to afew hundred heavy infantry called the SacredBand. From this force the long-termprofessional leadership was selected, thusensuring that the generals who commandedthe mercenary army came from amongsttheir own citizens, though the Numidiancavalry did produce their own commanders.Carthage's reliance on a mercenary army wasprobably caused by the shortage ofmanpower: there may have been just too fewmen to do any more than crew theirextensive fleet of warships and numeroustrading vessels without endangering theircommercial activities.

Historians differ in their views as to theeffectiveness of the Carthaginian army. Someclaim that the mercenaries were not unitedby any common or reciprocal interest andhad no long-term concern for the well-beingof those they served, who were, in turn,largely indifferent to the mercenaries anyway.Serving only for money, plunder and rape,they could not be relied upon to faceextremes of danger with zeal, or disaster withresolution. Others point out that thoughthere were incidents of desertion and

cowardice, as well as bloody mutiny, suchincidents were not exclusive to mercenaries.On balance, except for the long time it tookto recruit, train and deploy a large mercenaryarmy in an emergency, the defects andinadequacies of the system look exaggerated.The old British Indian Army, with its Sikhs,Gurkhas, Rajputs and Bengalis - to name buta few - incorporating both Hindus andMoslems, was a mercenary army cementedtogether by its British officers. Whatever thecomposition of Hannibal's army and howeverfew Carthaginian officers he may have had inrelation to his men, these were not factors ofgreat significance; what counted was themagnetism of his leadership.

The Carthaginian navy

The navy played a vital part in theCarthaginian war machine and, unlike thearmy, it was manned entirely by-Carthaginians. There were three basic typesof ships: large cargo vessels which were easilyconverted to troop transports; warships; andsmall, general-purpose vessels. The cargovessels, or transports, had rounded hulls toprovide capacious holds and were about fourtimes as long as their width. The warships,needing speed rather than capacity, werelong and narrow in order to accommodatethe greatest possible number of oarsmen.Unlike the earlier Phoenician and Greektriremes which had three levels of oars, eachwith a single rower, from the 4th century theCarthaginian trireme, and then thequinquereme - the classic warship of thePunic Wars - had four and five rowersrespectively, sitting on the same bench andplying the same oar. Thus the sides of theships were lower than the Greek triremes,which enhanced stability.

Both the trireme and the quinqueremewere about 40 metres long and 6 metres wide,with a draught of no more than 2 metres.With 30 oars on each side, they had crews ofaround 240 and 300 respectively, togetherwith some 30 to 40 sailors who handled thesails and worked on deck. The ships had two


Representing the battle of Lake Trasimene in 217 BC, this painting shows the use of

war elephants. Atributed to Leonard Thiry. (Edimedia, Paris)

Warring sides 23


The Carthaginian quinquereme was the work horse ofthe Punic Wars. No images are extant, but the pictureshows a diagram of the Roman quinquereme, based onthe relief from the Isola Tiberina monument. (JF Coates)

sets of sails: the central main mast providedpropulsion and the smaller mast, mountedon the prow, allowed the ship to bemanoeuvred in cross winds. Only sails wereused on the approach to a battle area, butonce the enemy was sighted, the masts werelowered and the rowers took over. The basictactical unit consisted of 12 ships, whichcould be grouped together to form a fleet ofvarying size - 120 ships, or 10 tactical units,was the normal number.

The general-purpose vessels were smaller,swift and easily manoeuvrable, and weremainly employed on reconnaissance andcommunication tasks. Two such vessels havebeen found off the western coast of Sicily andshow how the Phoenicians constructed theirships. The wooden components wereprefabricated and assembled later. Thisdiscovery helps explain how the Romans wereable to dismantle and copy a Carthaginian shiponce they had captured one. Battles usuallytook place near the shore, where the shipscould be handled in relatively calm water.

There were two basic battle tactics. In bothinstances the fleet was initially deployed inline ahead, but the subsequent actiondepended on the enemy's dispositions. If therewas sufficient space, the Carthaginian shipswould move alongside the enemy and bysuddenly turning, ram them amidships. If therewas not enough room for this manoeuvre thenthe Carthaginian vessels would breakthrough gaps in the enemy line and turnabout sharply to take them in the rear. TheCarthaginians, then, had a potent navywhich assured them of sea supremacy at theoutbreak of hostilities. With the versatile useof cargo ships as troop transports, theypossessed a strategic mobility that offered aunique advantage over any opponent, solong as they had commanders capable ofexploiting this superiority.

The Roman army

Under normal conditions all males betweenthe ages of 18 and 46 who satisfied theproperty criteria were eligible for militaryservice and were recruited into the cavalry orthe infantry. The infantry, who were by farthe most important arm and formed the

Warring sides 25

main element of the principal fightingformation - the legion - were expected toserve for 20 years. Selection for the cavalrywas even more heavily dependent uponwealth, but carried a commitment of just twoyears. Military service was regarded as a markof honour without which public recognitionand advancement were virtually impossible,especially since it was only after 10 years'duty that a man could hold public office.

A legion consisted of some 4,000 infantry,except in times of special danger when thenumber was increased to 5,000. These wereorganised into 10 cohorts, and 300 cavalrywho were formed into 10 squadrons. Thelegion had been developed from the Greekphalanx into a more flexible formation,better able to manoeuvre over brokenground and face the highly mobile Gauls.Each cohort was organised into threemaniples comprising soldiers of differentages. Forming the first rank were the hastati,120 young men in 12 well spaced files, each10 men deep; behind the hastati, at adistance equivalent to the frontage of themaniple, came the princeps of 120 slightlyolder men, again organised into 12 files

10 men deep, so disposed that they faced thegaps between the files of the hastati to forma chequerboard pattern. In this way a solidfront could quickly be established by eitherthe hastati withdrawing or the principesadvancing. When adopting this morecompact order, a legionary standing to armsoccupied three feet and, unlike the Greekphalanx, three further feet separated himfrom the men on either side, thus enablinghim to use his sword freely and change theposition of his shield. The third maniple of60 older men, usually veterans, were calledthe triari. They were also deployed to coverthe gap of those in front of them, but werein six files, each 10 men deep. In addition,each cohort had a squadron of cavalry and120 light infantry for use as skirmishers,flank protection or to form a rearguard.

The hastati in the leading maniple wereeach equipped with a short cutting andthrusting sword, together with two javelinsto be thrown on approaching the enemy.The shields they carried were some four feetlong and two and a half feet wide, bound

Trireme. (Roger-Viollet)


A Balearic slinger (Osprey Publishing)

with iron at the upper edge to withstand asword blow and at the bottom to enablethem to be rested on the ground withoutdamage. The legionaries wore body armourand helmets, but though the principes andtriari were similarly protected, they carried aspear instead of two javelins. The lightinfantry were armed with a spear forthrusting or throwing, a sword, and a roundshield three feet in diameter. The cavalry,who were not considered much more thanan adjunct to the infantry, were poorlyarmed and wore no body armour.

Command was exercised at four differentlevels: centurions, tribunes, legates andconsuls. The centurions were long-serviceprofessional officers equating to companycommanders. Two of them were selected bymerit to command each maniple, the one onthe right being the senior. The cohorts werecommanded by tribunes who had either beenpromoted from amongst the centurions, inwhich case they would have been battle-hardened professionals, or were magistrates

who had been posted to the army to serve fora few years before returning to civilian life. Alegion, which in modern terms could becompared with a division, was commandedby a legate, another temporary civilianappointment, but one of senatorial rank. Anarmy was formed by combining two legionsand was commanded by a consul appointedby the Senate. One of the legions wasinvariably Roman, but as mentioned above,the other was generally recruited from one ofthe allied cities.

The slow progress that had been madetowards improving tactical flexibility wasdiscarded at the battle of Cannae withdisastrous consequences. The Romans revertedto massing as a phalanx, in the belief that theywould then burst through the thinly drawnCarthaginian centre. Though there weredeserters - 900 in Carthage when the city fell -who preferred to fight to the death rather thanbe taken alive and crucified, we do not knowwhether they were Roman or mainly fromamongst the allies. The legionaries, bothRoman and allied, were motivated through acombination of harsh discipline and publicesteem. The certain and severe punishmentthey faced for cowardice was more feared thanthe prospect of death on the battlefield.Bravery and victory, on the other hand,brought rewards: a triumph for the consul,spoil and esteem for those who had shared inhis achievements. The Romans do not appearto have been any braver than their opponents;if they showed greater perseverance over alonger period, it was because of their trainingand their social conditioning.

The Roman navy

The history of the Roman navy is strangeindeed. Following the third treaty betweenRome and Carthage, drawn up in 279 BC atthe time of Pyrrhus' campaign in Italy,Carthaginian naval supremacy had beenrecognised: they would aid the Romans bysea should the need arise. The Romanconquest of southern Italy had beenachieved with just an army and no attempt

Warring sides 27

had been made to reduce the coastal citiesusing a combined land and sea assault, oreven a blockade. Eventually, however, theRomans recognised their maritime deficiencyand with their usual thoroughness set aboutputting things right. A Carthaginianquinquereme which had run aground duringa naval brush was dismantled and used as amodel for the construction of a wholeRoman fleet.

The recorded facts relate how 100quinqueremes and 20 triremes were orderedto be ready in two months. While theworkmen were busy building and fitting outthe ships, the recruiting and training of thesailors proceeded apace. Skeleton shipframes were constructed along the shoreand the rowers drilled under the commandof their officers. It was a stupendousundertaking involving some 35,000 men,suggesting a considerable amount ofpre-planning, with the crews beingrecruited, the timber felled and shaped, theskeleton frames constructed and the shipsthemselves all completed before the twomonths training, including a period at sea,actually began. Even so, it is small wonderthat in the first encounters with theCarthaginians the Romans proved to behopelessly inadequate.

To compensate for their lack of nauticalexpertise, however, the Romans introduced atechnical innovation that exploited theirlegionaries' aptitude for close-quarterfighting. A 12-foot pillar of wood with apulley on the top was fitted to the prow ofevery vessel. To this pillar a boarding bridgewas attached which could be hoisted up andswung around in the required direction. Atthe end of the bridge there was a largepointed spike called a COITUS which, whenreleased, drove itself into the deck of theopposing vessel, locking the two shipstogether. Then the legionaries could stormaboard and slaughter the near-defencelesscrews. As an example of a technicalinnovation which led to a precipitousreversal of battlefield superiority that hadendured for centuries, the corvus outclassedall subsequent developments such as

gunpowder, the tank, radar, submarines, airpower and electronic warfare.

A Roman sword (gladius). (Edimedia, Paris)


Bronze relief of Roman legionaries (Edimedia, Paris)

Warring sides 29

Outbreak

Collapse of the Third Treatyof Friendship

The causes of war are seldom explicit orsimple, nor do they lend themselves tobroad generalisations, such as commercialrivalry, social unrest, or religious fanaticism.To isolate one single factor, howeverprominent, risks over-simplification;equally, to follow too many threads canresult in confusion. Furthermore, to relyon subsequent statements by those directlyinvolved is notoriously dangerous:memories of complex events becomeclouded and perhaps even adjusted,if only subconsciously, with hindsight.

When considering what occurredover 2,000 years ago, it must be recognisedthat much of the available evidence isfragmentary and, even at the time, theopinions expressed are largely hearsay.Even so, although there may never be anyway of determining exactly why Carthageand Rome went to war, there are twoclearly identifiable factors which makesuch a war more probable. First, theRomans saw an opportunity to advantagethemselves; secondly they saw that theCarthaginians were unprepared militarily,and succumbed to this temptation. Nothinghas changed in human nature during thelast 20 centuries. Whether as individuals orcollectively, most of the human racedisplays an unfortunate proclivity foropportunism, unless deterred by the threatof sufficiently painful consequences.Bearing in mind the limitations of thisexamination, let us then take a look atwhat occurred.

While the Romans had remorselesslyextended their conquests down the lengthof the Italian peninsula, the Carthaginianshad maintained their policy ofnon-intervention. Whether this wasprimarily because they were alreadyoccupied in Sicily and had no wish to

enter a new and potentially hazardousundertaking or whether they felt theiroverall interests were best secured by notantagonising this emerging power, is notknown. But the result remains the same: theCarthaginians did not provoke the Romansany more than the land-bound Romansdirectly challenged Carthaginian interests.Both powers then appeared to be respectingthe Third Treaty of Friendship, drawn up in279 BC, which amongst other things hadcommitted them to go to one another'sassistance if attacked. We have seen how,only a year or two after the treaty, Romeand Carthage were drawn closer togetherwhen Pyrrhus first crossed the Adriatic tohelp the Greek cities opposing Romandomination, then sailed the straits ofMessina to assist the Greek cities inSicily against the Carthaginians. Yet some10 years later Carthage and Rome wereat war: what went wrong?

A modern strategist might point out thatthe possession of Sicily would have broughtuntold advantages: strategically placedbetween Italy and Africa, it provided animportant springboard for militaryoperations in either direction, whiledominating east-west trade routes acrossthe Mediterranean at its narrowest point.For the Romans it also offered a forwardoperating base from which seacommunications between Carthage,Sardinia and Spain could be interdicted.Yet clearly such an analysis played no partin Roman thinking, since Rome lacked afleet for its implementation. That theCarthaginians could have pursued suchreasoning is more plausible, but they hadshown no wish to renew their earlierendeavours to conquer Sicily so their goalseems to have been limited to achievinga monopoly of trade throughout the island.

Outbreak 31

Bronze coin of the Mamertini. (The British Museum)

There are two other considerations whichsupport this contention. Spain was by farthe most important source of wealth for theCarthaginians, and their attention musthave been drawn westwards rather thantowards an area in which they had had somuch difficulty in establishing a presence.Secondly, whenever the Carthaginians hadmounted an expedition to Sicily, it had

been in response to the loss of their tradingpossessions, not in direct search of furtherconquests. As there was no suchexpeditionary force in Sicily during theperiod we are considering, it can beconcluded that the Carthaginian state ofreadiness was far too low to undertake amajor campaign. We must, then, look forless dynamic reasons for war.


The straits of Messina. (Roger-Viollet)

Outbreak 33

\

34 Essential Histories * The Punic Wars

First hostilities

The actual catalyst for conflict was a requestby some unscrupulous adventurers calledthe Mamertines, from Campania on thewestern seaboard of the Italian peninsula.The Mamertines had fought in Sicily asmercenaries for Agathocles of Syracuseagainst the Carthaginians. After Agathocles'death in 289 BC the inhabitants ofMessana welcomed the Mamertines intotheir city and the Mamertines promptlyset about massacring the leading citizens,appropriating their wives and property, andcreating a vassal empire around the citywhich extended over the north-east cornerof the island. This brought them intoconflict with Hiero of Syracuse, who wasbuilding an empire to succeed that ofAgathocles. Adopting a high moral tone,Hiero condemned the Mamertines for thetreacherous manner by which they hadobtained Messana 15 years earlier and,marching north with his army, he broughtthem to battle on the Longanus river, wherehe defeated them decisively.

Before Hiero could reap the full rewardsof this victory, however, the Carthaginiansmoved swiftly to assist the Mamertines byplacing a garrison in Messana. This promptaction did not arise from any concern forthe Mamertines but rather from adetermination that the Syracusans, againstwhom the Carthaginians had waged war forso many years, should not obtain possessionof the harbour of Messana and so be in aposition to dominate the narrow straitsbetween Sicily and Italy.

Although they had been saved from Hiero,who quickly realised that he was no match forthe Carthaginians and withdrew to Syracuse,the Mamertines had no wish to be subjectedto a regime that put the orderly conduct oftrade before their own self-interested piracy.Furthermore, since the Carthaginians had notdisplayed great consistency of purpose orundisputed skill in their military campaigns,the wheel of fortune might take a lessfavourable turn and leave the city once againexposed to the ambitions of Hiero. An

alliance with the Romans looked a betterbet: they were after all fellow countrymenwith a shared heritage; furthermore, theRomans allowed a considerable degree ofindependence to the cities and tribes theyhad assimilated into their Confederation.Envoys were despatched to Rome, seekingan alliance and Roman protection.

This request put the Romans on thehorns of a dilemma. Agreeing to it wouldclearly risk war with Carthage; not doingso would mean letting an opportunity tosecure a foothold in Sicily slip away. Themove was strongly advocated by those likethe Claudii who believed that the future ofRome lay in the south.

The Senate was probably divided, onaccount of its changing social composition.The old families who had once dominatedthe Senate by aristocratic right were seeingtheir position eroded by the promotion of anew class of men who had either wondistinction on the battlefield or recognitionin the democratic assembly of the people.Another war would threaten the Senatewith a renewed influx of candidates borneon a wave of public fervour. Additionally,the popular assembly had acquiredincreasing influence and power becauseof its ultimate right to declare war andapprove terms of peace, while the Senatewas still left responsible for the directionof the war and the consequences of failure.The people had thus acquired powerwithout responsibility; the Senate wasattempting to combine in a single assemblytwo diverse factions, one based on theinherited privilege of aristocratic birth andthe other on plebeian approval.

Apart from these conflicting interests, inwhich the views of the Claudii prevailed,there were obvious attractions in respondingpositively to the Mamertines' appeal. Aslong as the Carthaginians held Messana theywere in a position to dominate the Straitswith their all-powerful fleet and, moremenacingly, they might be tempted toextend their conquests on to the mainlandof Italy. Thus the occupation of Messana bya Roman garrison would not only provide a

Outbreak 35

foothold for further expansion, but alsoensure that the key cities either side of theStraits were in Roman hands. No doubtthere were some who also saw anopportunity to secure the whole of Sicily asa Roman province, but the inherent dangersof such a position probably deterred all butthe most ardent.

There must have been much debateabout the recently reaffirmed treaty withCarthage which declared friendship and areadiness for military co-operation; anyunprovoked breach of this treaty would beseen as an act of flagrant aggression. Theargument that the despatch of Roman troopswould only be in response to an appeal forprotection against Syracuse and not directedagainst Carthage was sheer sophistry: aCarthaginian garrison was already installedand would have to be evicted. For Rome tobe perceived as an aggressor would not onlybe a contradiction of the virtuous standardsso purposefully inculcated into her people,but would also endanger her dealings withthe other states which were, at least inpublic relations terms, based on equallynoble ideals.

There was a further moral problem facingthose in the Senate who pressed for theoccupation of Messana. A few years earlierthe Roman garrison in Rhegium had seizedcontrol of the city and established atyrannical government similar to the onewhich the Mamertines, probably in imitation,now practised. When Rhegium waseventually recaptured the mutinous survivorswere assembled in the Forum in Rome,flogged and then beheaded. What then wasthe moral justification in responding to acall for assistance from criminals in Messanawho had been fortunate in preserving theirskins, if not their possessions, underCarthaginian protection? The answer wasself-evidently none.

At the time of the Mamertine request, therewas nothing to suggest that the Romans hadanything to fear from the Carthaginians in theforeseeable future. In Messana itself there wasonly a small garrison, and the hesitancy of itscommander, Hanno, in resisting the Romans

when they did eventually land, which resultedin his crucifixion, hardly suggests that he orhis troops were preparing for a Carthaginianinvasion of Italy. Even the Carthaginian fleetwas absent from the harbour of Messana andhad done nothing to contravene the ThirdTreaty of Friendship, let alone attempt todominate the Straits. Surprisingly, however,although lacking both provocation and a fleetto transport and sustain their army, the Senatecould not persuade its contesting factions todetermine a rational policy, and insteaddelegated the responsibility for reaching adecision to the popular assembly.

Though constitutionally correct, this was ahigh-risk enterprise relying as it did on apopular vote that was probably even moreheavily influenced by powerful voices withvested interests than would have been theSenate itself. This does not mean that Romeand Carthage would not have eventuallyfought for supremacy in the Mediterranean -given Rome's imperialistic ambitions andCarthaginian preoccupation with theircommercial empire this was almost inevitable- but in 264 BC there was no obvious reasonfor these two powers to become embroiled ina major war. The fact that they did so, andover such a minor and unworthy cause, wasunequivocally the fault of the Romans.

When commenting on the Punic Wars,reference to the three levels of war -strategic, operational and tactical - helpsexplain the course of the fighting. This isnot to suggest that either Carthage or Romepossessed such a military vocabulary orindeed recognised the conceptual differencesbetween these three levels.

Strategic level: the definition of strategicobjectives to be achieved in fulfilment ofgovernment policy.

Operational level: the planning andexecution of military operations to achievestated strategic objectives.

Tactical level: the planning and conductof battles in pursuit of the operational aim.

To put it simply, having decided whatyou want to do, you plan how this is to beachieved and co-ordinate the actual battlesto be fought in its fulfilment.

The fighting

The three Punic Wars

The First Punic War264-241 BC

For the sake of clarity, the First Punic Warwill be considered in four phases, though thefighting in Sicily did not end in 261 BC andthen begin again three years later. Somethingof a stalemate had been reached, so theRomans shifted the war's centre of gravity toNorth Africa, leaving Sicily very much abackwater. Similarly, the war at sea did notend in 256 BC, but thereafter it formed suchan integrated part of the land campaign thatthey are best considered together. The fourphases are:

The opening round in Sicily 264-261 BCThe maritime dimension 260-256 BCThe African campaign 256-255 BCThe return to Sicily 254-241 BC

The opening round in Sicily264-261 BCAfter the decision had been taken to aid theMamertines, the problem facing AppiusClaudius, the commander of the expedition,was that his two legions were some 400 milesnorth of their port of embarkation atRhegium and the necessary shipping, all ofwhich belonged to the allies, had to beassembled. Appreciating that any delay wouldcost him the element of surprise, Claudiusdespatched a smaller force, which managed tocross the Straits undetected and quickly securethe town of Messana, allowing theCarthaginian garrison to leave unmolested.However, Hanno, the unfortunateCarthaginian commander, was subsequentlycrucified for his lack of resolution.

Appius Claudius was later able to make anight crossing with his main force withoutbeing intercepted, though he must havebeen detected as it was then that theCarthaginian quinquereme, which served as

the model for the construction of a Romanfleet, charged so furiously that it ranaground. Once ashore, Claudius foundhimself confronted by the Carthaginiansunder Hanno and the Syracusans underHiero. These two former opponents failed toco-ordinate, let alone concentrate, theirrespective forces, so were defeated separately,though not decisively. Both were able towithdraw, Hanno into some neighbouringCarthaginian cities and Hiero into Syracuse,which became the Romans' next objective.

With two new consuls and reinforced bya further two legions, the Romans'determination and overwhelming forcequickly persuaded 67 Syracusan and Puniccities to reach an accommodation withRome; shortly afterwards Hiero too enteredinto an alliance.

Meanwhile the Carthaginians had beenraising a mercenary army, mainly from Spain,and when their training had been completedthey were transported to the fortified city ofAgrigentum on Sicily's south coast. Here theCarthaginians were besieged but managed toslip out through the Roman lines during thenight, leaving the hapless population to bebutchered. Until the capture of Agrigentum,the Romans had drawn a distinction betweenthe garrisons of foreign cities and the civilianpopulation, but with the ferocious reprisalsthat had now been taken, an example was setwhich possibly was intended to serve as awarning to others contemplating siding withCarthage. The effects of this new policy arenot clear; some inland cities went over to theRomans, but those on the coast which couldbe sustained by the Carthaginian fleet stoodfirm.

Whatever the members of the Claudii hadhoped for, with their ambitions for southernexpansion, there was no long-term Romanstrategic objective for becoming involved in

The fighting 37

Eighteenth-century copperplate engraving of a Roman warship, showing the corvus, thebeam with which the Romans attacked other ships. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)


Sicily; more an uncertain drift towards totalconquest. On the other hand, for the firstthree years of the war the field commanderswere quite clear as to their operationalobjectives: the occupation of Messana, thesubjugation of Syracuse and the reduction ofAgrigentum. These precise aims had enabledthem to achieve a concentration of force andto take and hold the offensive.

In 261 BC, however, the situation wasreversed. There was now an unequivocalstrategic objective to clear the Carthaginiansfrom Sicily but no operational plan as to howthis was to be achieved. Roman strength lay inthe set-piece battle, the decisive clash ofopposing armies that settled the issue one wayor another, but Hamilcar, the Carthaginiancommander who had replaced Hanno, wasnot to be drawn. Instead he used the flexibilitywithin his fleet to dominate the seaboard andits cities. The fighting then became diffuse and

reactive as city after city flared into revolt ordeclared for Carthage. The problem facing theRomans was that even if they were to seek aconclusive action by first concentratingagainst the main Carthaginian base atLilybaeum on the west coast, they would beunable to reduce it by siege unless they wereable to prevent reinforcements and provisionscoming in by sea. Meanwhile, they wouldincur the risk of being cut off from their ownsupplies, as had nearly occurred atAgrigentum. An entirely land-based strategycould not break this stalemate and the needfor a Roman fleet was self-evident.

The maritime dimension 260-256 BCWe have seen how the Romans hastilyconstructed a fleet, and to compensate fortheir inferior seamanship raised corvi on theprows of their ships to enable the legionariesto swarm aboard opponents' vessels. It was

The fighting 39

in 260 BC at Mylae (Milazzo), on the northcoast near Messana, that this developmentwas first used, when 130 Carthaginian shipsclosed with a superior Roman fleet of145 vessels and lost nearly half their totalstrength in the encounter. The victory atMylae presented the Romans with twostrategic options: either they couldcontinue the Sicilian campaign, or theycould go on to the defensive in Sicily andassault the African mainland with a view todestroying Carthage. They decided on theformer, maintaining a consistent strategicobjective but one which required a changeof operational tactics.

Though the Romans had energeticallysought to enlarge their fleet, like their army, itwas still not sufficiently powerful to deal withwidely spread objectives. Yet in 258 BC, this isexactly what they attempted to do: instead ofconcentrating their resources and mounting

Relief showing a Roman trireme with legionaries onboard. (Sopraintendenza Archeologica per le Provinciedi Napoli e Caserta)

combined land and sea operations against thecoastal cities in Sicily, so cutting their supplylines to Carthage, or alternatively, ending thepolitically embarrassing raids against theItalian seaboard by subjugating Sardinia andCorsica, the Romans attempted to conductboth campaigns at once. The result was that,although the Romans won another navalvictory and had some successes in Corsica,they were too weak to exploit theirachievements and in Sicily they suffered asevere reverse when Hamilcar Barca suddenlytook the offensive. The prevailing stalemateled to growing disenchantment and then toan alternative strategy: to carry the war toNorth Africa. In so doing they set the scene forone of the largest naval battles in history.


In the summer of 256 BC a Roman fleetof 330 ships, of which 250 were probablyquinqueremes, set sail southward fromMessana, along the eastern coast of Sicily toPhintias, a substantial port on the southerncoast lying under Mt Ecnomus, where twolegions were waiting to embark. Meanwhilethe Carthaginian fleet, which was about thesame warship strength, sailed from Lilybaeum,and following the shoreline, encountered theRomans as they set sail for Africa.

The Roman commander, Marcus AtiliusRegulus, had divided his fighting ships intofour squadrons. Two made up the sides of atriangle, the third, with the transports intow, formed the base, while the fourthsquadron deployed in a single, extended lineto the rear to cover the flanks of the thirdsquadron and the transports. TheCarthaginians also divided their fleet intofour squadrons. Three were placed in linefrom the shore so that the one on theextreme seaward right did not directly facethe Roman wedge but remained free toadvance and attack their left flank. Thefourth was deployed forward of the others,parallel to the shore, so that it was already inposition to attack the Roman right flankwithout having to change direction.

The Roman wedge drove forward towardsthe Punic fleet. As they approached the twosquadrons directly facing them, theCarthaginians turned and feigned flight.The Romans then hastened in pursuit butin doing so, became separated from thethird squadron towing the transports. At asignal from Hamilcar, the Carthaginiancommander, the two squadrons pretendingto flee turned on their pursuers; thesquadron that had been deployed beyondthe Roman wedge fell upon its rear, and thesquadron posted parallel to the shoreadvanced to attack the Roman squadronthat was towing the transports. Threeseparate battles raged and the haplesstransports were cast off and left to driftunattended. For a while both navies heldtheir own, but eventually, despite theirbrilliant initial tactics, the Carthaginiansquadrons engaging the apex of the Roman

wedge were forced to flee in earnest, leavingthe Romans free to turn back and assist theirother hard-pressed squadrons. Now heavilyoutnumbered, the Carthaginians' tworemaining squadrons were broken andforced to withdraw as best they could.

Once again the com had proved theirusefulness, and although nearly as manyRoman ships were sunk as Carthaginian,24 and 30 respectively, 64 Carthaginian shipswere captured. The Romans were now free tocross over to Africa, but some delay occurredwhile essential repairs were completed,not only to their own vessels but to theCarthaginian ships, which were now pressedinto service. When all was ready the Romansput to sea a second time, while theCarthaginians abandoned any attempt tohold forward in the seas around Sicily butfell back to the Gulf of Carthage. Instead ofmaking the direct approach anticipated by theCarthaginians and sailing into the gulf on thewestern side of Cape Bon, the Romans madean indirect approach and disembarked on theeastern seaboard, thus accepting the greaternatural obstacles on land that would have tobe overcome in the march on Carthage ratherthan risking another sea battle.

The African campaign 256-255 BCThe Carthaginians did not have enoughtroops in Africa to do more than defendCarthage, so they withdrew into the cityleaving the Romans to establish themselvesashore without hindrance some 40 milesalong the coast to the east. Though the delayfollowing the battle of Ecnomus may havecaused considerable disruption, asmessengers had to be sent back to Romeseeking further instructions, it appears thatthe Romans' operational planning had againbeen defective. They had probably assessedthat Carthage, like the fortified coastal citiesof Sicily, could only be taken if blockadedfrom both land and sea. Winter, however,was now approaching and it would havebeen too late to undertake such anenterprise. There was also a logisticalproblem with the fleet: if it were to remainin North Africa the Romans faced the task of

The fighting 41

feeding some 75,000 rowers, who greatlyoutnumbered the soldiers. It is hardlysurprising then that when orders arrived fromRome, only 40 warships were to remain, with15,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. The others,including all the transports, were to return toRome. Loading on board the 20,000 slavesthat had been rounded up, together withbooty, one consul went on his way leavingthe other, Marcus Atilius Regulus, theco-victor of Ecnomus, with two legionsand sufficient ships to keep opencommunications with Rome.

After recalling 5,000 infantry and500 cavalry from Sicily, the Carthaginiansfelt strong enough to try to prevent theRomans ranging unopposed through thecountryside, plundering at will. Theirforay, however, was swiftly defeated andthis encouraged the Romans to advancetheir forward base to Tunis, a few milessouth-west of Carthage.

Fame and a triumph now lay withinRegulus' grasp; all that was required of himwas the reduction of Carthage, apparentlytottering on the brink of starvation. This wasnot, however, to prove so easy. Responding toa Carthaginian appeal to the Greeks,Xanthipus, a Spartan general who hadreceived the rigorous training associated withhis countrymen, had arrived at the head of asubstantial number of Greek mercenaries andquickly appreciated that it was Carthaginiangeneralship that was at fault, not themercenary soldiers. Having put things right,in the spring of 255 BC Xanthipus marchedout of the city with some 12,000 infantry,4,000 cavalry and an unspecified number ofelephants. In the ensuing battle the Romanswere routed by the elephants, which smashedinto the legionaries. Despite heavy losses theyfought on manfully until assailed by theNumidian cavalry from the rear. Only 2,000 ofthe Romans escaped and some 500 prisonerswere taken, including Regulus himself.

When news of the defeat reached Rome,plans had to be radically recast. Abandoningall hope of laying siege to Carthage, anexpedition would be mounted instead torescue any survivors. The strategic aim of the

war would then revert to the securing ofSicily. In the early summer, 350 Roman shipssailed to the tip of Cape Bon. There theyencountered and heavily defeated theCarthaginian fleet, which thereafter made noeffort to intervene. The Romans were thenfree to re-embark their surviving legionariesunmolested in a thoroughly successfuloperation. However, they foolishly provokedthe weather gods by a display of hubris.Scorning the pressing advice of the pilots tosteer to the west of Sicily to avoid the suddensummer storms which frequently arose offthe southern coast, the Romans met withdisaster. Off Camarina, towards thesouth-eastern extremity of the island, thefleet was struck by a savage storm and all but80 ships were lost, together with their crewsand the soldiers they were transporting.Altogether some 100,000 men may have beendrowned. A stupendous effort would now berequired to replace their losses. Remarkably,the Romans achieved this in seven or eightmonths. The Carthaginians also had toreplace substantial losses, as well as contendwith widespread uprisings throughout theirAfrican possessions. Punic primacy andoverlordship had been challenged. It wouldhave to be re-established before Carthagecould confidently resume the struggle.

The return to Sicily 254-241 BCIn the spring of 254 BC the new consuls leftItaly with two fresh armies and 220 newships, bound for Messana. There they joinedup with the ships and survivors from thedisastrous storm off Camarina. Oncepreparations had been completed, the300-strong fleet sailed round Cape Peloriasalong the north coast, while the legionsmarched to Drepana, embarked and thensailed to Panormous (Palermo), one of thelargest and richest Carthaginian coastalcities, with a good harbour. The Romanslanded under the outer walls that encircledthe town, breached these defences and setabout butchering its inhabitants, a sightwhich must have encouraged thosesheltering behind the old city's innerdefences to surrender and face slavery.


The fall of Panormous induced a numberof other cities to throw in their lot withRome, leaving the Carthaginians mainlyconfined to the west of the island. But in253 BC the Romans lost sight of theirstrategic objective. The two new consulstravelled through Sicily and crossed over toNorth Africa, not to threaten Carthage butto raid the Libyan coastline some 200 milesto the south. The Romans probably wishedto sustain the unrest among the Libyans,but this division of their resources provedineffectual. Having been fortunate not tolose their fleet off the Libyan coast whenit was ignominiously stranded on an ebbtide, the Romans were caught in a stormon the passage back and lost 150 of their200 ships.

For the next two years Roman resolutionseemed to falter. The land campaign wasconducted in a desultory manner and the lostships were only partially replaced. TheCarthaginians on the other hand had quelled

The fighting 43

the dissident Libyans and sent reinforcementsto Sicily under Hasdrubal, the son of Hanno,who had served with Xanthipus. For twoyears he dominated the countryside aroundLilybaeum, but he was eventually defeated ina messy battle near Panormous from whichhe managed to escape. He was later recalledto Carthage and, like his father, summarilyexecuted; being a Carthaginian general wasno sinecure.

Though the Romans finally received navalreinforcements and troops for the investmentof Lilybaeum, they were unable to preventthe garrison being supplied from the sea,while on land they faced a Herculean task.Although they had four legions available, thecity lay on a promontory and was secured bya massive wall and a deep ditch that requiredthe erection of siege fortifications. Not longafter these had been completed a violentwind blew down some of the Roman towersprotecting their works, and this encouragedthe Carthaginians to sally forth and set themablaze. Following this reverse, the Romansgave up trying to take the city by storm andsettled down to starve the garrison into

submission. Eight years later, when the FirstPunic War ended, Lilybaeum remainedunconquered.

The Romans' next move was to try todestroy the Carthaginian fleet sheltering atDrepana, just north of Lilybaeum. PubliusClaudius Pulcher, who had earlier flung thesacred chickens overboard, set sail with120 ships, none of which were now equippedwith the corvus, since it adversely affectedtheir handling, especially in bad weather.However, surprise was lost and the Romansfound themselves trapped between the shoreand the Carthaginian fleet. Unable tomanoeuvre and less experienced than theCarthaginian sailors, the Roman fleet wasvirtually destroyed, though Pulcher managedto escape with about 30 ships. He wasfortunate not to be a Carthaginian as, althoughresponsible for the loss of some 20,000 lives,on his return to Rome he suffered no morethan public disgrace and a heavy fine.

While these dramatic events had beenunfolding, at the other end of the island

Cape Bon. (Bury Peerless)


a massive Roman fleet consisting of120 warships and 800 transports, had sailedfrom Messana and, after rounding CapePachynus (Cape Passero), found itself facingthe Carthaginian fleet. Before any seriousfighting could begin, the Carthaginians,recognising the signs of a pending storm,broke off the engagement and took shelterin the lee of the cape, where they wereable to ride out the rough weather. TheRoman fleet never had a chance to escape,so was driven on to the rocky shore andalmost annihilated.

Roman fortunes were at a low ebb but theCarthaginians were not faring much better.Success at sea had been nullified byimpotence on land and most importantly,following the ousting of the war party by thegreat landowners, attention was divertedfrom Sicily to interests nearer home. On thepositive side, Hamilcar Barca, Hannibal'sfather, a skilful and energetic commander,had been despatched to Sicily, but he hadnot the resources to do more than conducta guerrilla war while the Carthaginian fleetwas withdrawn. This was as a result of politicalrivalries. After four years of inconclusivefighting, the Roman Senate decided to make asupreme effort to end the costly andunrewarding conflict. In 243 BC a new fleetwas constructed, which set sail the followingyear to seal off Lilybaeum from the sea.

Only late in the day did the Carthaginiansrecognise the danger and return to Sicilianwaters to confront the Romans in the navalbattle that was to decide the war. It was notan engagement marked by audaciousmanoeuvre: the two fleets lined up andclashed head on to slog it out until, afterlosing more than 50 ships, the Carthaginiansconceded defeat and retired to Carthage.

Deserted and with no hope of furthersupport, Hamilcar Barca was left to negotiatethe best peace terms he could with Catulus,the Roman commander. In the event bothcommanders showed themselves to bereasonable in their demands, and a treaty wasconcluded whereby the Carthaginians wouldretain their arms but withdraw from Sicilyand pay a substantial war indemnity. After

24 years of fluctuating fortunes, with a heavycost in lives and resources, the war had ended,but it was not to bring peace to either side.

Strife between wars241-218 BC

Almost as soon as the treaty betweenLutatius Catulus and Hamilcar Barca hadbeen signed, both Carthage and Rome foundthemselves engaged in bitter fighting againstother opponents. For Carthage it was firstagainst her mutinous mercenaries and thenthe conquering of Spain. For the Romans itwas a renewal of the age-old conflict withthe Gauls and then an extension of theirpower across the Adriatic into lllyria. Thoughthese conflicts were not sequential, forclarity's sake they will be related as thoughthis were; when they interacted with thePunic Wars, as they sometimes did, this willbe brought out.

The mercenary revolt 241-237 BCThe cause of the revolt by the mercenarieson returning to Carthage from Sicily wastwofold: arrears of pay and the unfulfilledpromises of special rewards in recompensefor all they had faced during the long yearsof arduous campaigning. Carthaginianprevarication led to an open revolt, headedby two rabble-rousers who had nothing tolose: Spendius, a fugitive Roman slave whofeared the prospect of being handed over tothe Romans to face certain death by torture,and Matho, an African who, as the chiefinstigator of the trouble, could expecta similar fate if taken alive.

Joined by a number of African cities thathad been subjected to exorbitant taxes andhad had land confiscated as the cost of thewar had emptied the Carthaginian treasury,the vicious war spread and lasted for threeyears. Eventually the mercenary army wastrapped against an unidentified range ofmountains and was destroyed. The cost inlives and material resources had beenenormous, out of all proportion to thearrears of salary due the Sicilian veterans.

The fighting 45

The Gallic invasion 226-220 BCSpearheaded by the Fabii, who regarded theAlps as forming Rome's natural northernboundary, the Romans had progressivelyannexed territory from the Gauls inhabitingtheir fertile plains surrounding the river Po.With no firm boundaries and tribal rivalries,there had been intermittent warringamongst the Gauls themselves as well aswith the encroaching Romans. In 226 BCthese flickering conflicts came to a headwhen the Gauls united against the Romansand assembled an army of some 50,000 footsoldiers and 20,000 cavalry and chariots.It was at this crucial moment that news ofthe Carthaginian conquests in Spain reachedthe Romans and, as Polybius relates inmeasured terms: 'They were seized with nosmall consternation.' The Romans' dread ofthe Gauls had not diminished since theyhad devastated Rome in 390 BC, barely170 years earlier. Now, faced with anotherinvasion that threatened them more directlythan anything that was happening in Spain,they settled for a treaty with theCarthaginians designed to limit theirterritorial expansion.

The Gauls opened the campaign bystriking towards Rome through Etruria, onthe west coast, plundering and wasting thecountryside as they went. After inflictingheavy casualties on a Roman army closingwith them, they decided to return homerather than risk losing the vast quantities ofbooty they had acquired. Still pressed by theRomans, the Gauls took the easiest routealong the coast, with their left flank protectedby the sea, only to find their way blocked bya full consular army from Sardinia, whichhad disembarked ahead of them. Trappedbetween the two Roman armies and fightingback to back, 40,000 Gauls were killed and10,000 taken prisoner. The way was now leftopen for the Romans to advance thefollowing year, cross the Po and carry the warinto the Gauls' homeland. After anotherRoman victory, the Gauls sued for peace buttheir terms were rejected and the fightingresumed. During the next two years, 221 and220 BC, Cisalpine Gaul was finally conquered.

The Illyrian expeditions 229-219 BCThe initial Roman involvement with Illyriabegan as a result of the pirates who, regardingthe Adriatic as their undisputed huntingground, sallied forth from amongst the manyislands and deep indentations to plunder andmurder at will. There was nothing new inthis. Back in the fifth century BC theAthenian phrase 'to sail the Adriatic' was justanother way of saying 'to undertake ahazardous journey'. The Romans had at firsttolerated their losses, but the incidents hadbecome so numerous that two envoys weredespatched to demand an explanation fromthe autocratic Queen Teuta. According toPolybius, Teuta reacted 'like a true womanwith much passion and resentment' and thenhad the envoys murdered, thus igniting waron another front.

The fighting that followed was with thelimited aim of establishing Roman controlover the eastern shore of the Straits ofOtranto. There was never any question ofthe Romans wanting to subjugate the wholeof Illyria; they merely sought to end Illyriansupremacy in the Adriatic by decisivelydefeating them in battle. The Romans wereassisted by the Illyrian commanderDemetrius, who, fearing for his own safetyafter arousing his queen's wrath, hadtransferred his allegiance, so enabling theRomans to be welcomed as deliverers insome of the coastal cities. This was 229 BC.To secure their position, the Romans nextinduced a number of inland cities and tribesto sign treaties of friendship before turningnorthwards to clear the coastline.

In the spring of the following year theIllyrians sued for peace and accepted theresulting restrictions on the movement oftheir warships, besides paying a substantialtribute. Eight years later, in 220 BC, seeingthe Romans' preoccupation with theCarthaginians in Spain, Demetrius floutedtheir authority by attacking a neighbouringtribe whose independence had beenguaranteed by the Romans. The Romanresponse was vigorous and devastating. Thenext year an army descended on the coast ofIllyria and swiftly annihilated all opposition,


though Demetrius himself escaped toMacedonia, where he assiduously fuelled thelatent enmity to Rome. Later this led toPhilip of Macedonia entering into analliance with Hannibal during the SecondPunic War.

The conquest of SpainThis is running ahead of events, and we .must now step back to 237 BC to see whathad been happening in Spain. Having oustedthe peace party when the Mercenary War

ended, Hamilcar Barca was determined torestore Carthage to her former eminence andavenge the humiliation suffered in Sicily.Appreciating, however, that oligarchicinterests could once again prevail and blighthis intentions, he decided to establish hisown power base and make himselfindependent of Carthaginian vacillation.

Hamilcar Barca swears an oath of eternal hatred toRome. Eighteenth-century painting by Claudio FrancescoBeaumont. (Edimedia. Paris)

The fighting 47


He would conquer Spain and exploit herriches to pay off the war debt and raise amercenary army whose allegiance was tied tohim personally, ultimately enabling him tochallenge Rome.

As Carthage no longer had an effectivenavy, Hamilcar had no alternative but tomarch along the African coast to the Straitsof Gibraltar, with a few supply ships keepingpace with him. In 237 BC he ferried his armyacross the straits and having done so,proclaimed that he ruled by divine power.This soon transformed simple clan and tribalsuperstitions into a mystical theologycentred on the Barcic family, and a dynasticreligion was born that tied the loyalty of thearmy to him and his relations, whiledebarring ambitious aspirants from Carthage.

Having established his authority, Hamilcarbegan his campaign of conquest by securingsouthern Spain, with its high-quality silvermines, before advancing along the easterncoast. He had hardly achieved theseobjectives when in 229 BC, whilenegotiating with a tribal king, he was caughtoff his guard. In attempting to escape acrossa swollen river, he was swept from his horseand drowned. He was succeeded by hisson-in-law Hasdrubal, who, having ruthlesslyavenged Hamilcar's death, extendedCarthaginian domination northwards beforefounding New Carthage, modern-dayCartagena, on the east coast. This gave himpossession of a magnificent harbour andfurther rich silver mines in the surroundinghills. News of these developments reachedRome but, as we have seen, preoccupationwith the Gallic invasion meant that theRomans could do little more than draw up atreaty confirming Carthaginian possessionsto the south of the Ebro.

In 220 BC Hasdrubal was assassinated inhis palace by a Celt whose chieftain hadbeen crucified for plotting against theemperor king. When called upon to elect asuccessor, the army unanimously voted forthe 25-year-old Hannibal, who promptlybegan to extend Carthaginian territory intothe north-western highlands of Spain. Whennews of these developments reached Rome,

further envoys were despatched who, thoughconvinced that Hannibal was intent uponwar, never imagined that this would befought anywhere but in Spain. Once againRoman attention was focused elsewhere, thistime on Illyria, which enabled Hannibal toconsolidate his hold on Spain with thecapture of the important town of Saguntumafter an eight-month siege. Lying some250 miles north of New Carthage, Saguntummay not have been a formal ally of Rome -the treaty had not as yet been ratified - butas it lay well within the Romans' sphere ofinfluence, its capture and sacking was anirrevocable step towards war.

The Second Punic War218-201 BC

From the Ebro to the Alps 218 BCLeaving his brother Hasdrubal Barca in chargeof affairs in Spain, in the spring of 218 BCHannibal set out from New Carthage on acampaign that was to last for 17 years. Theplan to march overland had almost certainlybeen developed by his father, who, havingbeen precipitously abandoned in Sicily as aresult of political irresolution and anincompetent fleet, was determined thathenceforth he would be master of his owndestiny.

After crossing the Ebro, Hannibal wasstoutly opposed by tribes who were friendlywith Rome and, by the time he had crossedthe Pyrenees, his army numbered50,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, withlosses of 40,000 and 3,000 respectively sincesetting out from New Carthage. Not all ofthese were battle casualties, since a substantialnumber of Spanish mercenaries had beensent back home (which probably means theydeserted). From the Pyrenees to the Rhone,some 160 miles, progress was rapid, since allHannibal required of the tribes heencountered was freedom of passage and thepurchase of provisions. It seems that theywere only too willing to help and speed himon his way. On reaching the Rhone,however, Hannibal found the far bank held

The fighting 49

Chateau Queyras, a medieval fortress on the rockreferred to by Polybius. (Spectrum Colour Library)

by hostile Gauls, so he delayed his owncrossing until a strong detachment hadreached the other side further upstream andtaken the Gauls in the rear. Using a mass ofassorted rafts and canoes, Hannibal's leadingtroops were able to cross virtually unopposed.After ferrying the rest of the army over,Hannibal headed for the Alps and afterreaching the foothills some 10 days later,his long column started threading its wayalong a narrow pass towards the towering,snow-capped mountains.

After only a few days, the Carthaginiansencountered the hostile Allobroge tribe,which had occupied the high grounddominating the pass ahead. Hannibal sentforward a reconnaissance party of Gauls, whoreported that the Allobroges abandoned the

heights at night, so he ordered them to beseized under cover of darkness and at dawnthe advance was resumed. The Allobroges,however, soon found alternative positionsand attacked the densely packed column inseveral places, causing the cavalry horses andpack animals to panic and plunge to theirdeath in the gorge below or turn back tobring chaos to those behind. The situationwas only saved by the Carthaginian troopsholding the heights attacking the Allobrogesfrom the rear and eventually putting themto flight. For the next five days the armycontinued its advance unmolested, thenencountered another ambush laid by Gauls.Though caught in a deep ravine, after someheavy fighting the Carthaginians forced theGauls to withdraw and resort to harryingtactics, moving along the mountain ridge tohurl down rocks and stones. However fraughtthis situation, it was not as desperate as the


previous encounter when the Carthaginianshad faced a sheer drop on one side.

On the ninth day Hannibal arrived at themain watershed where he rested his men fortwo days and allowed the stragglers to catchup before starting his descent. Following asteep winding track, made more treacherousby the heavy snow that was now falling,stumbling and sliding, nearly as many menand animals were lost over the precipices ashad been killed in the fighting. Theirfaltering progress was halted by a landslidewhich blocked the track and had to be'cleared. Three days later, 15 days since hehad set off to cross the Alps, Hannibal at lastreached the fertile expanse of the plains;only 12,000 Africans, 8,000 Spaniards and6,000 cavalry had survived, about a quarterof the number that had marched out ofNew Carthage some six months earlier.

The route Hannibal took in crossing theAlps has been convincingly identified byGavin de Beer in his book Hannibal as beingthe Col de la Traversette. At some 9,000 feet,it is one of the highest passes, accessiblethrough the valley of Queyras with itsmedieval fortress perched on the top ofa huge sugar loaf-shaped rock.

The epic years 218-216 BCA study of Hannibal's strategy, operationalconcept and tactical thinking makes it easierto understand the course of his campaign.Although some of the Cisalpine Gauls nowjoined him, as we have seen, the hard coreof his army numbered only 26,000. As forthe Romans, we know that at the time of theGallic invasion, which had flared up onlytwo years previously, the Romans were ableto mobilise some 700,000 men. Clearly theycould do so again. Though many of thesewould have been no more than elderlyreservists or garrison troops of little militaryconsequence, the Romans still enjoyed a vastnumerical superiority, so what wasHannibal's strategic objective? From a treatydrawn up later between Hannibal and PhilipV of Macedonia we know that this was notto conquer and subjugate the whole of Italy- an impossible task anyway - but was

limited to breaking up the RomanConfederation and reducing it once more toa number of states. These could then be heldin check by those whose independence hadjust been restored to them.

The cohesive power of Rome lay in itsarmy, so Hannibal's operational aim wasclearly to inflict such defeats on the armythat the subjugated states would beencouraged to rise in revolt. To achieve this,Hannibal would have to avoid being drawninto positional warfare that would permitthe Romans to concentrate overwhelminglyagainst him. This consideration alonedebarred Hannibal from tying down hisarmy to some prolonged endeavour such as acity's siege. The fact that he had no siegetrain was the result and not, as has beensuggested, the cause of this restriction. Hadhe wished to obtain the machines necessaryfor a siege, he could have arranged for theirconstruction. As it was, he adoptedmanoeuvre-based tactics to bring theRomans to battle on ground and at a time ofhis own choosing. Hannibal undoubtedlyrespected the prowess of the Roman soldierin close combat, but the orderly progressionof rigidly linear deployment upon which theRomans relied could be broken using surpriseand flexibility - two vital elements ofHannibal's tactical thinking behind whichalways lay the aim of encirclement.

We will consider Hannibal's campaign inthree phases. The first, which is the subject ofthis section, while only lasting for two years,from 218 to 216 BC, was the most dramatic,when Hannibal's strategic aim of breaking upthe Roman Confederation came nearer tofulfilment that at any other time. The secondphase, which lasted for four years from216 to 212 BC, saw Hannibal initiallyholding the strategic initiative but failingto achieve the encirclement of Italy. The thirdphase, which lasted 10 years from 212 to202 BC, saw the consequences of the tidehaving turned decisively in Rome's favour.

Back in October 218 BC Hannibal restedhis army after crossing the Alps, then seizedTaurasia (Turin) and defeated PubliusCornelius Scipio and his fellow consul on the

Th

e figh

ting

51


Tribia, a tributary of the Po. These two deftand determined successes won over mostof the Cisalpine Gauls, who until then hadbeen divided in their support for theCarthaginians. The following spring Hannibalmarched south through Etruria, burning anddevastating the countryside, keeping Cortonaand the hills surrounding it to his left andmaking as though to pass Lake Trasimene tohis right. Gaius Flaminius, who had failedto intercept Hannibal because of Mis and theSenate's conviction that Hannibal's objectivewas Rome, now set off in pursuit, withoutwaiting for his fellow consul to join him.Here we have an example of religiousobservances affecting military operations.Intolerant of any delay, Flaminius hadscorned the usual preliminary sacrifices andvows on assuming command. Instead he hadtaken over in the field, leaving his fellowconsul, Geminus Gnaeus Servilius, to busyhimself with the traditional formalities.

When Hannibal reached Lake Trasimene,after following the northern shoreline, he setan ambush along a strip of land between thedefile of Borghetto and Tuoro. Here, facingthe lake, a semicircle of hills forms a naturalamphitheatre. The shore area would havebeen considerably smaller than it is todaysince the water level was lowered by theconstruction of a canal between the lake andthe river Nector in the fifteenth century.Hannibal positioned his Spanish and Libyaninfantry conspicuously on the ridge to thewest of Tuoro, while the Balearic slingers andhis light infantry concealed themselves onthe high ground facing the lake. Similarly,the cavalry and Gauls were hidden in foldsin the ground running down to theBorghetto defile. In this way the entirearea encircled by the hills was dominatedby the Carthaginians.

Flaminius reached Lake Trasimene, nearBorghetto, late in the evening, and at dawnthe legions started to move forward throughthe defile across the valley floor. SeeingHannibal's troops drawn up in battle to theirfront, the Romans deployed into line untilthe bulk of the two legions had passedthrough the Borghetto defile. Suddenly

assaulted by the light infantry and Balearicslingers on their left flank and the Numidiancavalry to their rear, blocked in front andhemmed in by the lake to their right, mostof the Romans died where they stood. Otherswere either weighed down by their armourand drowned, or were despatched by theNumidians, who rode out into the lake afterthem. Though some 6,000 managed to fighttheir way out of the trap, at least 15,000 areestimated to have died, amongst them theimpious Flaminius. However, the Romans'woes were not yet over. Servilius, who wasbelatedly hurrying down the Via Flaminia,was intercepted by a mixed forcecommanded by Maharbal, the Numidiancavalry commander, and routed. Half themen of the two legions were killed and theremainder taken prisoner.

When the magnitude of the defeatreached Rome, the city was thrown into astate of near despair, with the crowdsthronging the public places as the wildestrumours spread. Thoroughly alarmed, theSenate appointed an aristocrat, FabiusMaximus, as dictator with full imperium,which meant that, unlike the consuls, he didnot have to consult the Senate about hisplans. At the head of four legions Fabiusmarched down the Via Appia and closed upto Hannibal, but he had no intention ofaccepting battle in circumstances ofHannibal's choosing. Instead he wouldhover, threatening and harrying Hannibalbut keeping to the high ground to nullifythe superiority of the Numidian cavalry inparticular. He earned himself the titleCunctator, or 'The Delayer'. This was adifficult course to pursue, not least because itleft Hannibal free to burn and plunder atwill while the Romans looked on, apparentlytoo timid to intervene. Such a policy couldnot endure. The allies could not be expectedto remain loyal under such circumstancesand internal political pressures for resoluteaction were too strong. At the end of Fabius'year as dictator he was replaced, in 216 BC,

Saguntum, captured by Hannibal. The gate theatre is alater Roman addition. (Roger-Viollet)

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by two consuls, Marcus Terentius Varro andLucius Aemilius Paulus.

The Senate decided that Hannibal mustbe brought to battle, so four new legionswere mobilised and ordered to join the fouralready shadowing Hannibal in Apulia;concentrated together they would thencrush him, in accordance with traditionalmilitary thinking. So it was that the fatalday arrived and it was Varro who exercisedcommand at Cannae when, at first light, hemoved the Roman army across the riverAufidus on to the east bank. He positionedthe cavalry on the right wing, resting on theriver, with the legions next to them and thecavalry of the allies on the left wing. Infront of the whole army were the lightinfantry. The deployment was conventionalenough, but Varro shortened the frontagesof the legions and reduced the distancesbetween the maniples within them. Therewas a reversion to the theory of sheer mass,so flexibility was renounced and the rigidity

The fighting 55

View of Lake Trasimene, looking down from where the

Gauls and light horse were. The cavalry were behind the

hill on the right of the picture, beyond which lies the defile

of Berghetto, on the lake's shore. (Author's collection)

of the phalanx was reinstated. The Romanarmy numbered some 80,000 infantry andmore than 6,000 cavalry.

While the Romans were completing theirdeployment, Hannibal brought his army intoline. His light infantry and Balearic slingersformed a screen behind which his main forcematched the Roman deployment. On his leftflank were the Spanish and Gallic cavalry,resting on the river, next to them his heavyinfantry. The Gauls were thrown forward inan arc, facing and extending beyond theRoman front, with the Numidian cavalry onhis right flank. Being thinly spread, Hannibal's40,000 infantry retained the tactical flexibilityto manoeuvre and slowly give ground beforethe massed Roman legions; the arc would bereversed to curve rearwards and as theRomans pressed forward, they would beenveloped. The risk was that the centre of thearc would be torn apart, in which case thebattle would be lost, but Hannibal's cavalrywere superior both in number - some 10,000- and quality, so could be relied upon todefeat their Roman opponents and thencomplete the encirclement. That is exactlywhat happened. As the Romans pressedforward, the Carthaginian infantry overlapped

their front and assaulted them on the flanks.Compressed together and unable to protectthemselves, the casualties mounted andthe forward momentum began to falter.Meanwhile the Roman cavalry had beenrouted and the returning Numidians fell uponthe Roman rear. Completely surrounded andstill further compressed, the Romans wereslaughtered where they stood. According toPolybius, only some 3,500 Romans managedto escape, while 10,000 were taken prisonerand 70,000 left dead on the battlefield.Amongst those who escaped was theperpetrator of the disaster, Varro; theunfortunate Paulus was counted amongstthe dead.

After such an overwhelming victory thequestion arises as to why Hannibal did notthen march on Rome. Instead he continuedto try to bring about the dissolution of theRoman Confederation. Many explanationsare possible, but even with hindsight itwould be unwise to pass judgment on acomplex decision about which we only havethe most rudimentary knowledge. Beforefollowing Hannibal any further, mentionshould be made of the fact that though theRomans had suffered grievously at home, thetwo Scipio brothers, Gnaeus and Publius, hadlanded in Spain and conducted a well-executed land and sea campaign. However,lacking the resources, they had been unableachieve anything decisive.


The war expands 215-206 BCWhen news of Hannibal's victory at Cannaereached Carthage, a wave of enthusiasm forthe war swept through the city, ambitionsrose and Hannibal's plans for broadening thecanvas of the war were accepted. In essenceHannibal proposed a strategic encirclementof Italy, the execution of which would be theresponsibility of the Carthaginian Senate,and an inner encirclement of Rome itselfthrough the detachment of her allies, forwhich he would continue to be responsible.Whether this plan was conceived with ameasured intellectual approach or, as seemsmore probable, opportunistically andpragmatically, is not known, but howeverarrived at, it was both grandiose andimaginative in its design. We already knowHannibal's operational concept for isolatingRome from her allies, but we need to lookbriefly at his wider strategic concept for theencirclement of the Italian peninsula.

With the succession of the 17-year-oldPhilip V to the Macedonian throne, theinfluence of Demetrius, who had taken refugein the Macedonian court after losing hisIllyrian possessions, weighed heavily inpersuading Philip to side with theCarthaginians and evict the Romans from theAdriatic seaboard. Much the same situationarose to the south in Sicily, where Rome's allyHiero of Syracuse had been succeeded by his15-year-old grandson Hieronymus, who, underpressure from Hiero's two sons-in-law, agreedto enter into an alliance with Hannibal. To thewest, in Sardinia, where a Carthaginiantrading presence had long been amicablytolerated, a revolution was festering followingthe Romans' ruthless subjugation of the wholeisland after the First Punic War. WithCarthaginian reinforcements assured for Spain,and the Romans' loss of an entire consulararmy against the Gauls to the north in 216BC, given a fair share of good fortune and anadequate degree of competence in itsexecution, in the aftermath of Cannae theprospects for Carthaginian strategicencirclement looked favourable. The innerring round Rome only required Hannibal tocontinue with his seemingly effortless

succession of victories. What went wrong andwhy this double envelopment failed will nowbe examined theatre by theatre.

The campaign in Spain 215-206 BCAfter receiving over 4,000 cavalry andinfantry reinforcements and being relievedin southern Spain by a new army recentlyarrived from Carthage, Hasdrubal marchednorth to settle accounts with the Scipios.These two armies were of almost equalstrength and when they met, in obviousimitation of his brother's tactics at Cannae,Hasdrubal thinned out the Spanish infantry,holding the centre, and concentrated theLibyans and cavalry on the wings. Hasdrubalwas no Hannibal, however, and the Romansbroke through his centre, destroyed his armyand regained the line of the Ebro. After twoyears of inconclusive fighting the Scipiosdecided to divide their army between them;this dispersion of force resulted in thembeing handsomely defeated and countedamongst the dead. The opportunity forHasdrubal to recover the whole of Spaincame and went through internal dissension.Time was allowed for Roman reinforcementsto arrive in 210 BC, including a newcommander-in-chief, the 25-year-old militarygenius who was later to be known as ScipioAfricanus, the son and nephew of the twoScipios who had been killed two years earlier.After rallying his disheartened troops, thefollowing year Scipio struck at New Carthagerather than attacking the two Carthaginianarmies lying near Gibraltar and Madrid,whose commanders were still not able toreconcile their differences and co-operate.

It took Scipio seven days to reach NewCarthage, and he began his assault on thecity almost immediately, from both landand sea. As the day matured and thecasualties mounted with no prospect ofsuccess, Scipio sounded the retreat beforemaking his next move, which would proveto be decisive. Learning from somefishermen that at ebb tide it was possible to

Nineteenth-century painting by Evariste Vital Luminais.showing a fight between Romans and Gauls. (Edimedia, Paris)

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ford one of the lagoons and approach thecity from the rear, Scipio sought surprise bydeception. Renewing his assault on thesection of the wall he had attacked theprevious day, Scipio drew the defenders towhat they regarded as the critical pointwhile he led a 500-strong contingent acrossthe lagoon and scaled the weakly defendednorthern wall. The city was soon secured,most of its citizens massacred and animmense amount of booty taken.

Following the fall of New Carthage, Scipioturned his attention to the field armies andin 208 BC Hasdrubal, after suffering a defeaton the headwaters of the Guadalquivir,inexplicably decided to join Hannibal inItaly. As we will see later, it was a fatefulmove, both for him personally and forthose he commanded. Though substantialreinforcements had arrived from Carthage,in 206 BC the Carthaginians were finallydefeated at Ilipa, some 10 miles north ofmodern Seville, to end the war in Spain. There

were two main causes for the Carthaginiandefeat: first, their long enduring politicaldissension, reflecting the rivalry between theBarcids in Spain and those in power inCarthage; secondly, the superior generalship ofScipio. So much for Spain; we must now lookand see what was happening elsewhere.

Sardinia 215 BCIn 215 BC, the year after Cannae, a smallCarthaginian expedition sailed for Sardiniabut ran into a violent storm and was blownoff course to the Balearic Islands, where theships had to be hauled ashore for repair. Allthis caused considerable delay, and by thetime the Carthaginians reached Sardinia, theRomans had been alerted and had reinforcedthe island with a second legion, quicklysuppressing a premature revolt. When theCarthaginians landed, little effective supportwas available and, lacking adequate strengthby themselves, they were soon defeated.Their commander was taken prisoner and the


View of the river Rhone by Alexander Dunouy,. (Edimedia, Paris)

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survivors were left with little alternative butto flee to their ships. Fate had not favouredthe Carthaginians, but whether they wouldhave prevailed otherwise is far from certain.

Sicily 215-210 BCHieronymus of Syracuse, who had inheritedthe throne and decided to side with theCarthaginians, was assassinated by members

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of the pro-Roman party and for a time itlooked as though Carthaginian intentionshad been thwarted. However, the pro-Romanfaction behaved with such wanton crueltythat they in turn were overthrown. Thiscaused the Romans to reinforce Sicily, as inSardinia, with a second legion. Syracuse nowbecame the Romans' primary objective butwith its formidable fortifications, which hadbeen further strengthened by the ingeniouswar machines of Archimedes that could hurlboulders and grapple ships, it was no easyundertaking. Indeed, the first land and seaassault was a costly failure. Meanwhilethe Carthaginians had sent formidablereinforcements. The situation looked criticalfor the Romans, until two further legionswere sent, thus enabling them both to laysiege to Syracuse and to confront the newlyarrived Carthaginians.

In 212 BC the Romans achieved adecisive victory. The Syracusans'enthusiastic indulgence during a religiousfestival had left them with unsteady legsand less than clear heads, and they wereeasily surprised. The Romans scaled theouter defences under cover of darkness toopen one of the city's gates, and swarmingin, the Romans soon established themselvesin an unassailable position ringing theinner defences. Deserted by their fleet andso deprived of any relief, the garrisonsurrendered. Having secured the city itwas given over to plunder by the Romans,who destroyed three centuries of civilisationand massacred the population, includingArchimedes, one of the antique world'sgreatest mathematicians and physicists.With the fall of Syracuse the campaignseemed to be coming to an end, butthe arrival of further Carthaginianreinforcements prolonged the strugglefor another three years.

Unlike the First Punic War, theCarthaginians had made strenuous effortsand sent two reinforcing armies, togethernumbering nearly 40,000 men, besides

A third-century Roman mosaic showing the death of

Archimedes. (Roger-Viollet)

constructing a powerful fleet and a largenumber of supply ships. Why then did theyfail? It was quite simply a matter of poorgeneralship on both land and sea, but beforerushing to crucify any surviving general, aswas the Carthaginian wont, let us wait untilthe concluding analysis of this complex waris completed.

Illyria 215-205 BCUnlike the other campaigns we haveconsidered, there was no directCarthaginian involvement in Illyria, so itwas left to Philip of Macedon to try to drivethe Romans from their foothold on theAdriatic coast. This task added a newdimension to Macedonian interests, whichhitherto had been almost entirelyconcerned with the land-locked country'seastern and southern borders. WithMacedonian manpower gravely depleted bythe adventures of Alexander the Great,Philip was in no position to fight a war onmore than one front. In order that he couldturn against the Romans, a peace treaty hadto be concluded with Aetolia, a powerfulGreek state with which he was at war; butbefore Philip was ready to begin hiscampaign, he found himself under attack.The envoys he had despatched, informingHannibal of his intentions, had beenintercepted by the Romans, who nowdecided to reinforce their coastal garrisonwith an additional legion and take theinitiative themselves.

Surprised by the sudden Roman move,Philip was caught off-balance and forced towithdraw, but in 213 BC he was able to goon to the offensive himself and securedseveral Roman allied coastal cities. Soonafterwards, however, he found himselfmarching and counter-marching, either toexpel aggressors inspired by the Romans,including Aetolia, or to respond to appealsfor help from his allies. This scrappy andexhausting campaign eventually came toan inconclusive end in 205 BC. ThoughPhilip had won nearly all his tacticalbattles, he had apparently not appreciatedthe precariousness of his position at the


The Col d'Izoard, leading to the valley of Queyras, fromwhich Hannibal was attacked. (Spectrum Colour Library)

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An eighteenth-century engraving showing Archimedes'counter-weighted beams which snapped and capsizedRoman warships in 212 BC. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)


operational level: instead of fighting onjust one front as he had intended, hefound himself almost simultaneouslyengaged on four. The grand strategic designhad failed, partly through bad luck, asperhaps in Sardinia, partly throughmiscalculation, as with Philip of Macedon,but mainly through inadequateCarthaginian leadership, as in Spain andSicily. Now we must turn to see howHannibal had been faring with his innerencirclement of Rome.

The waning years 216-211 BCAfter Cannae Hannibal was faced with adilemma from which he could find noescape. Following the secession of a numberof Rome's former allies, he found himselfhaving to protect them and, in so doing,losing the initiative he had previouslyenjoyed. If he were to win over moredefectors, he would have to operateoffensively, yet if he were to retain thosecities he had already gained, he would haveto act defensively. With an army that wasnot strong enough to undertake bothcommitments simultaneously, the clarity ofHannibal's operational aim was lost.

In contrast to Hannibal's restrictedcapability, the Romans had the means tohold the fortified cities, which then formed adefensive framework around which the fieldarmies could operate. In this manner,wherever Hannibal decided to campaignoffensively, the Romans would go on to thedefensive, but when he was not present, theywould take the offensive against former allieswho had deserted them. In this wayHannibal was forced into a restless pursuit ofever-shifting and elusive objectives.

Undaunted by his difficulties, however,Hannibal still managed to conduct a robustcampaign and one which denied anyprospect of early victory for the war-wearyRoman population; as we have seen, muchof their strength was already being divertedto reinforce Spain, Sicily, Sardinia and Illyria.Yet despite this drain, by lowering the age ofrecruitment to 16 and enrolling slaves, theRomans were able to maintain 20 legions

under arms in the various theatres of war,16 of which were in Italy itself.

The most important city to defect afterCannae had been Capua, the capital ofCampania, second only to Rome itself in sizeand prosperity. Retaining Capua was ofprime importance to Hannibal if he were tohave any hope of encouraging other cities toseek their independence from Rome. In211 BC Capua was being threatened by theRomans, who had constructed two linesof siege works round the city. Concertedattempts by Hannibal to break in, and by thegarrison to break out, were repulsed, leavingHannibal no alternative but to seek anindirect means of relieving Capua. He wouldmarch on Rome. Without any hope of beingable to storm its formidable fortifications, hismove was a bluff, intended to create suchalarm that the armies investing Capuawould be summoned back to defend thethreatened city.

Hannibal in retreat 211-205 BCHannibal's sudden arrival before the walls ofRome caused consternation in the city, withthe wildest rumours gaining currency. Oneeven claimed that he would never havedared to threaten the city so brazenly had henot already destroyed the armies at Capua.Having made this demonstration, Hannibalbegan his return march but, though heinflicted heavy casualties on the Romanspursuing him, he realised that he wasincapable of relieving Capua. His gamble hadfailed, and though he still remained theundisputed master of the open battlefield,from now on Hannibal found himself inretreat. From the Romans' point of viewevents had not yet tilted decisively in theirfavour. Certainly in Italy the situation hadimproved, and in Sicily Syracuse had beencaptured, but in Spain the two Scipios haddied with their legions after crossing theEbro, and in Illyria Philip of Macedon wasstill on the offensive. Everything still hungin the balance.

In Capua all hope of relief had died; 27 ofthe senators wined and dined in generousexcess before taking their own lives by

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poison. The next day the inhabitants openedone of the gates to the Romans, whorounded up the remaining senators,scourging and then beheading them, whilethe aristocrats died more slowly in variousprisons and the rest of the population wassold into slavery.

Until 208 BC the fortunes of thecampaign had ebbed and flowed, withneither Hannibal nor the Romans gainingthe ascendancy, but in that year theimportant city of Tarentum (Taranto), on theheel of Italy, was captured by the Romanswhile Hasdrubal, who had marched fromSpain, was wintering in Gaul with his20,000-strong army. In the spring of 207 BChe crossed the Alps, following the same routeas his brother had done, evidently withoutserious incident, and marched to the eastcoast, where he turned due south towardsthe Metaurus river, which flows throughUmbria. Not knowing Hannibal'swhereabouts, Hasdrubal had sent sixhorsemen to try to locate him, ratherunwisely bearing a letter giving hisintentions. After having ridden nearly theentire length of Italy, the horsemen werepicked up by the Romans near Tarentumand the plan was revealed. Acting rapidly,the Romans closed in on the Metaurus,surrounded Hasdrubal and trapped him inthe winding steep-sided river course. Seeingthat all was lost, Hasdrubal rode into thethick of the fray, where he was killedtogether with some 10,000 of his men. A fewdays later Hasdrubal's severed head wasthrown into one of Hannibal's outposts andtwo African prisoners were released torecount the disaster. The Romans did notpress their advantage and the following yearsaw little activity, but in 205 BC Scipiostepped on to the scene and everythingchanged.

The Romans carry the war to Africa205-201 BCHitherto it had been the Carthaginians whohad held the strategic initiative with theirattempted encirclement, but now it was theturn of the Romans, who would do no more

than contain Hannibal in Italy while takingthe offensive in Africa. Throughout 205 BCthe preparations in Sicily for the invasioncontinued, and the next year the expeditionsailed from Lilybaeum. Once ashore theRomans set about ravaging the fertileBagradas valley, and after defeating aCarthaginian army, set siege to theimportant city of Utica on the coast. Themilitary reverses brought about arealignment of political power in Carthage,where the big landowners and wealthymerchants who had always wished to avoidwar with Rome in favour of their Africanterritorial and commercial interests, oustedthe Barcid faction and after 16 years in thewilderness came to power. Thirty members ofthe Council of Elders, superior even to theSenate, came to prostrate themselves beforeScipio and after cravenly blaming everythingon Hannibal, sought his pardon. Scipio actedwith commendable moderation when he laiddown his peace terms: all prisoners of warand deserters were to be handed over, allclaims to Spain and Mediterranean islandswere to be renounced, a substantialindemnity was to be paid, and only20 warships could be retained, the remainderwere to be surrendered. Probably realisingthat the terms could have been muchharsher, the Carthaginians accepted themand envoys were sent to Rome to seekratification.

Meanwhile, in the same year, Hannibalhad been recalled and with his arrival thosewishing to prolong the fighting displayeda new truculence, first seizing a number ofRoman ships that had been scattered ina storm, then intercepting and destroyingothers carrying envoys returning fromCarthage. Though a delegation had arrivedfrom the Senate informing Scipio that hisproposed peace-terms had been accepted,the acts of treachery made Scipiodetermined to settle the long-drawn-outstruggle between the Roman andCarthaginian peoples. Hannibal was to bebrought to battle and his army destroyedbefore Scipio directed his attention toCarthage itself.


The two armies confronted one anotherat Zama, some 100 miles south-west ofCarthage. Though the Romans had asuperiority in cavalry, overall numbers wereprobably about equal, some 40,000 apiece.Though it would be difficult to overestimatethe importance of Zama, with theCarthaginians fighting for their lives andhomeland and the Romans for thesupremacy of their empire, as the twocommanders appear to have matched oneanother tactically, the battle was little morethan a grisly slogging match in which theRomans prevailed. The details then neednot concern us, but what is of interestabout Zama is how it demonstrated theinterplay between the operational andstrategic levels of war. By ravaging theBagradas valley, Scipio had drawn Hannibalaway from his own secure base into ahostile interior where he had to fight onground and conditions not of his ownchoosing. This would have been a difficultoperational situation to have created inItaly but, by taking the strategic decision totransfer the war to Africa, it was achievedalmost effortlessly.

Hannibal had escaped from Zama andwas able to exert a moderating influence onthose who argued against accepting theRomans' inevitably harsher terms. Thenumber of warships allowed was halved, theindemnity increased, and Punic militaryrights were drastically curtailed, leavingCarthage as little more than a client state ofRome. The war that had brought devastationto the whole of the Mediterranean duringthe previous 17 years had come to an end,leaving Rome as an imperial power ofunmatched military might.

The following section deals with someof the major events which occurred duringthe next 50 years that led up to the ThirdPunic War, so all that needs to be said hereis that when Scipio Africanus returned toRome, he was indisputably the mostpowerful figure in the city. As politicalin-fighting tore reasonable compromiseapart and the passage of time diminishedScipio's moderating influence, in 184 BC

he finally withdrew from public life indisgust.

The Third Punic War149-146 BC

Carthage had been built on a naturallystrong defensive position and thenextensively fortified. There were only tworestricted land approaches, either along the3,000-yard wide isthmus to the north,protected by three lines of massive defenceworks towering one above the other, oralong the narrow spit of sand to the south,which terminated at the foot of the citywalls. The two isthmuses were separated bythe unfordable Lake of Tunis and washed bythe sea on their outer shores. The single22-mile city wall enclosed the great harbour,the entrance of which lay just to the east ofthe southern sandbar, as well as the citadelconstructed on the prominent Byrsa mound,not far from the harbour.

The Romans divided their forces betweenthe two isthmuses, and when ready,attempted to carry these two directlyapproachable defence works by storm. Notsurprisingly, they met with a bloody repulsein the north. Undeterred, they flungthemselves forward for a second attempt thatwas equally unsuccessful. On the sandbar tothe south they fared somewhat better. Byusing massive battering-rams propelled byseveral hundred soldiers and sailors, a breachwas made in the city wall, but the assaulttroops failed to exploit the opportunity, soallowing the Carthaginians to throw up freshbarriers during the night and man thesurrounding rooftops.

It was a brief respite. Though the Romanswere met with a hail of missiles and weredriven back, when they resumed the attackthe following day an unseemly withdrawalwas prevented from turning into a routonly by the timely intervention of ScipioAemelianus, the adopted grandson of ScipioAfricanus, who was serving as a tribune withthe Fourth Legion. Roman impetuosity wasthen sharply curbed, and they settled down

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A reconstruction of the circular inner harbour for warships atCarthage (above), and the harbour as it is today. (AKG. Berlin)


The River Aufides (Ofante), with an ancientcolonnade erected later, inscribed with a quotationfrom Livy:'No other nation could have suffered suchtremendous disasters and not been destroyed'.(Sopraintendenza Archeologica delle Puglie,Taranto)

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Stele, one of the remains of Carthage. (Roger-Viollet)

to the more prosaic business of blockadingthe city. The Carthaginians, however, did notrest on the defensive and made a determinedsortie along the northern isthmus. Catchingthe Romans by surprise, they forced them toabandon their forward position in favour ofone further back.

The following year, in 148 BC, althoughthe Romans secured a number of smallinland cities and others along the coast, theobvious lack of leadership, which had wastedthe first two years of the war, led to demandsfor the appointment of a more vigorouscommander. As a result, with theenthusiastic support of the Roman peopleand the army, Scipio Aemelianus was

promoted to consul and given command inAfrica. He at once set to work constructing ahuge mole, which was to extend from thesandbar across the harbour mouth andbottle up the Carthaginian fleet, as wellas sealing off any further supplies. At firstthe Carthaginians did not believe thatthe Romans could succeed, but aswork progressed relentlessly, they tookcounter-measures and cut a new entrancefrom the inner harbour, giving access to thesea from the east. Fifty triremes then sailedout in a triumphal display of contempt; butit was an unwise gesture, as they lost theelement of surprise and so the opportunityto destroy the Roman fleet, which was lyingunmanned at anchor while the sailors toiledon the mole.

Nothing daunted, Scipio positioned hisbattering rams and other siege engines at theend of the now completed mole and made apartial breach, but during the night aCarthaginian raiding party swam out to themole and set fire to the closely packed siegeequipment. The Carthaginians then workedfeverishly to repair the damage and raiseadditional towers along the wall. However, itwas only a matter of time before the Romanshad secured a foothold between the outer seawall and that of the harbour, which enabledthem to block the newly constructedharbour entrance. Cut off from both landand sea, Carthage's fate was sealed. Whilethe preparations for the final assault wereunder way, Scipo took the opportunity tomount a mopping-up operation into theinterior and extinguish the last flickeringembers of Carthaginian resistance beyondtheir capital's crumbling defences.

The final assault was mounted from theharbour area where the Romans hadestablished themselves the previous autumn.After some desperate fighting they managedto breach the city wall and then penetrateinto the sprawling dockyard buildings,which the Carthaginians set alight once theirstrength began to fail. A new defensive linewas adopted, centred primarily on the citadel

Ruins of the Acropolis of Carthage. (Roger-Viollet)

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commanding the ridge of high groundextending west and east from the Byrsa.Every remaining house had been turned intoa stronghold and was contested with thecourage born of despair, and the Romans hadto clear the whole area, house by house andstreet by street. For six days the battle raged;on the seventh, the Carthaginians offered tosurrender, begging for their lives in return.After Scipio had accepted their request, some50,000 terrified men, women and children,nearing the limits of exhaustion andstarvation, filed out, later to be sold intoslavery, but 900 Roman deserters, who couldexpect only crucifixion if taken alive, foughton. At first they held out in the enclosuresurrounding the temple crowning the Byrsacitadel. Then, as their numbers declined,

they retreated to the temple itself and finallyto its roof before immolating themselves.

The city was then given over to plunderbefore the ruins were levelled to the ground.After six centuries Carthage had beendestroyed and the Phoenician race dispersedto suffer extinction, leaving no readilydiscernible religious, literary, political, orsocial heritage. An eastern civilisation hadbeen planted in the western Mediterranean,but after a period of luxuriant growth, ithad been violently uprooted andexterminated. Meanwhile Rome, in anunchallengeable position, was left free tosubdue and pacify Europe and, after theImperial City had become the Holy City,to spread the Christian religion throughoutthe world.

Portrait of a soldier

Hannibal Barcid andScipio Africanus

Since leadership plays such a vital part inall we have discussed, it seems appropriateto consider the qualities displayed by thetwo greatest leaders to emerge from thePunic Wars, Hannibal and Scipio; thoughit should be remembered that we have nocontemporary assessments, only later, oftenunsubstantiated, opinions and, of course,accounts of their doings and sayings. Thisdoes not mean that we cannot attempt topiece together a picture of the two men,though it does mean the end result will befar from complete and in some aspectsdistorted, even perhaps to the extent ofbeing factually incorrect.

Hannibal

In making any assessment of Hannibal'scharacter and the force which motivated himto pursue war with such single-mindedness,it is essential to understand his backgroundand upbringing. Born in 247 BC, Hannibalwas only six years old when the First PunicWar ended with his father's ignominiousexpulsion from Sicily. The event couldhardly have affected him personally hadit not been for his father's enduringdetermination to seek revenge. Slowly theenormity of the setback to Barcid pride andambitions must have been conveyed to theboy, then it was indelibly stamped upon hisconscience during a religious ceremony. In237 BC, when Hannibal was 10 years old andhis father was preparing to take his army toSpain, while propitiating the gods witha sacrifice, he took the opportunity to makehis son swear an oath on the sacrificialanimal that when he grew up, he wouldnever forget that Rome was the deadly enemy.Once in Spain, the mould of Hannibal'scharacter and motivating force behind his

life would have been forever cast. Therecould be no turning back, especially asHannibal, like his father before him, wasa warrior by nature.

Perhaps the highest tribute that can bepaid to Hannibal's ability as a leader is torecognise the remarkable way in which hewelded such a disparate force of unpatrioticmercenaries into a cohesive fighting force,inspired with self confidence and audacity,ready to face severe hardships and nearunbelievable risks. Some of this loyalty canbe ascribed to factors other than personaldevotion, such as the way his father hadbeen able to transform the various tribalsuperstitions into a mystical theologycentred on the Barca family - they ruled bydivine right - or, at the other end of thespectrum, the religious cynics, adventurersand materialists seeking plunder and rapine.

That Hannibal understood fully thecapabilities and limitations of those hecommanded is shown in the way hedeployed them on the battlefield. At Cannae,for example, it was the tough and reliableLibyans whom he placed in the two keyflank positions where the encirclingmovement was to be hinged; his dashingand opportunistic Numidian cavalry weredeployed on his open right flank.

Hannibal always led by example, whetherswimming a river first in Spain, to encouragehis men to follow, or, as Livy tells us, sharingtheir hardships and living like an ordinarysoldier when campaigning, always sleeping onthe ground wrapped only in his military coat.However much Hannibal's own powerfulpersonality was stamped upon his army, heknew how to decentralise authority, relyingon the intimate group of generals whocommanded its various components.Following the example of his father and thetraditional Punic custom of nepotism,

Portrait of a soldier 77

Hannibal appointed his close relations topositions of responsibility, hence his brotherHasdrubal being left in charge in Spain.Natural leaders from outside his clan were alsoselected for command, such as the two greatNumidian cavalry commanders, Carthalo andMaharbal, who protested at what they saw asHannibal's excessive prudence in notmarching on Rome after Cannae.

Having praised Hannibal for his soldierlyqualities, Livy proceeds to list, thoughwithout preliminary evidence, hisshortcomings, depicting him as 'excessivelycruel, with a total disregard for the truth,honour and religion, for the sanctity of anoath and all that other men held sacred'. Thecharge of cruelty might be a matter ofmistaken identity: one of Hannibal'scommanders is alleged to have advocatedthat his soldiers should be trained to eathuman flesh, thus easing the army's logisticsproblem. It is possible that this ferociousindividual, named Hannibal Monomarchus,committed acts of cruelty that weremistakenly attributed to Hannibal himself.

Admittedly Hannibal must have sharedmany of the characteristics of a harsher age,but as a professional soldier he wasundoubtedly a genius. His strategic visionthrew the Romans on to the defensive and,for the first five years of the Second PunicWar, permitted them to do little more thanreact to protect their homeland.

After the Third Punic War Hannibal wasforced into exile, but wherever he soughtrefuge the Romans pursued him, accusinghim of plotting against them - which heprobably was - and demanded his extradition.Finally there was no way of escape. As Plutarchwrote, Hannibal was cornered 'like a bird thathad grown too old to fly', a state of affairsHannibal himself must have recognised sincehe made no attempt to escape, contentinghimself with saying: 'Let us now put an endto the great anxiety of the Romans, who havethought it too lengthy and too heavy a taskto wait for the death of a hated old man.' Hetook poison, and in 183 BC, at the age of 64,the scourge of the Romans departed this life.

Scipio Africanus

Though Scipio was only accorded the title ofAfricanus at the end of the Second Punic Warupon entering Rome to receive the greatesttriumph ever, he has been referred to asAfricanus from the start, in order to savepossible confusion with his father, PubliusCornelius Scipio, after whom he was named.Scipio was born in 235 BC. During hisformative years he was greatly influenced byGreek philosophy and literature, but aboveall by Hellenistic rationalism which,combined with his instinctive pragmatism,induced a sceptical contempt for thesuperstitions of others. His tastes, however,were not all intellectual; he also appreciatedthe material comforts that the moreadvanced and sophisticated Greek civilisationhad to offer. He later came under criticismfrom the quaestor (financial administrator) forhis facility to imitate the Greeks and in sodoing incur excessive expenses while

Third or second-century BC Carthaginian monument atDugga, Tunisia. (Roger-Viollet)


Silver Carthaginian coin thought to show a portrait ofHannibal. (Roger-Viollet)

preparing for the invasion of Africa. Scipiopromptly sent him packing with the words: 'Ido not like so exact a quaestor.'

Compared to his contemporaries, Scipiomust have been unusually liberal minded,open to new ideas but still placing a highvalue on both intellectual and moral values.Perhaps he accepted the belief that byperforming just acts and acquiring goodhabits, a man's character is formed and thequalities of a leader established. Hismoderation and sense of justice weredisplayed by his attitude to Carthage afterher defeat, and his morality showed in hisbehaviour to women after the capture of New

Carthage. On one occasion a young womanof particular beauty was brought to Scipio bysome of his soldiers. Polybius relates howScipio 'was struck with admiration for herbeauty and replied that, if he had been aprivate citizen, he would have received nopresent which would have given him greaterpleasure, but as a general it was the last thingin the world he could accept'. Polybius alsorelates how after capturing New CarthageScipio refused to take anything for his ownprivate use, and when returning from Africaallowed nothing to be mixed up with hisprivate property. Following his retirement,however, he had a fracas with some officialswho had arrested his brother for financialirregularities, whereupon Scipio released him,destroyed the order for his arrest and said:

Portrait of a soldier 79

'I shall not give an account of four millionsof sesterces when I put two hundred millioninto the treasury. For myself, I have onlybrought back the title of Africanus.'

The self-assurance Scipio displayed wasin part derived from a sense of directcommunion with the gods, especially withJupiter, to whom he displayed a particulardevotion and from whom, reflecting theRoman religious belief, he could expectreciprocal favours. A thoroughly realistic andpragmatic association far removed from thereligious fanaticism that cleaves much of theworld today.

Whereas Hannibal virtually disassociatedhimself from political machinations bymaintaining his father's independent powerbase in Spain, Scipio found it necessary toenter into the political fray. With nearimpeccable credentials, as the son of asoldier killed on the battlefield, a participantin the first major clash with Hannibal afterhis crossing of the Alps and one of the fewsurvivors of Cannae, Scipio presentedhimself at the Forum for election as an aedile(responsible for public works and activities),which was an essential preliminary to higheroffice. Here his youthful vigour and ardentconvictions won the rapturous support ofthe people, long tired of endless defeat andyearning for an inspirational leader whowould offer them hope for the future.Having been elected aedile, he laterpresented himself as a candidate for consularcommand of the army in Spain, and thoughthere were some who resented thisprecocious youth, he was again elected.

Without detracting from his qualities,amongst which high intelligence and clarityof vision figured prominently, in many waysScipio was fortunate in that opportunitiespresented themselves; unlike Hannibal, hedid not have to create them. Had his fathernot been killed, Scipio would not have beengiven the chance to distinguish himself as a25-year-old in Spain, and without thatachievement he would not have been givencommand of an army and entrusted to carry

A bronze statue of Scipio Africanus. (Edimedia, Paris)

the war to Africa. When coming face to facewith Hannibal he was still a young man withthe full vigour of his youth, whereasHannibal had already been campaigning for17 consecutive years in Italy. It is notunreasonable to suppose the years had takentheir toll on Hannibal, both physically andmentally, and we should perhaps notdiscount the possibility of Hannibal feelinga bit below par at Zama.

As we have seen, however, Scipio's goodfortune did not endure after his retirement.For the first few years his reputation put himabove the political in-fighting with which hewas surrounded, but as time passed his criticsbecame more vocal until he went intovoluntary exile at Liternium, a disillusionedand embittered man, forgotten by thecountry which he had set on the path touniversal conquest of the known world. Hedied in 183 BC at the age of 52, and thoughthere are memorials to him in both Romeand Liternium, he has no known grave.

The world around war

The political, social andeconomic impact

In this chapter we will look at the effects ofthe war on the civilian population though,as has already been mentioned, since thereare no Carthaginian records and because theancient historians only lightly touched uponsuch matters, our examination can beneither even-handed nor complete. Thoughmuch will then be left to the reader to drawhis own conclusions, we can at least try toget a feel for the situation as it affected theordinary people.

The Carthaginians

During the First Punic War Hanno the Great,the leader of the aristocratic party inCarthage, who was implacably opposed tothe overseas expansionist policies of HamilcarBarca and the Barcid party, was authorised toexploit the Carthaginian agrarian empire inNorth Africa. This extension of the Libyanconquests, coupled with the task of subduingunrest amongst the Numidians whilesimultaneously maintaining a substantialfleet and sustaining the campaign in Sicily,was more than even the well-stockedCarthaginian treasury could afford. Anattempt was made to negotiate a loan fromPtolemy II of Egypt, but he sagaciouslydeclined on the grounds that he was a friendof both the Carthaginians and the Romans.One of these undertakings then had to berenounced, and since Hanno would not havecontemplated restricting his Africanenterprises and found it virtually impossibleto extricate the army in Sicily, he took theeasiest option and withdrew the fleet.Divided political interests then assured theRomans of naval superiority in Sicilian watersand, ultimately, of victory. We do not know ifthe financial burden of campaigning weigheddown on the Carthaginian people as a whole,

or whether it was just the aristocraticlandowners who were suffering, but whereverit fell, the mere fact that an attempt wasmade to raise an overseas loan indicates thatthe crisis was real enough.

As we have seen the Mercenary Revoltwhich followed the First Punic War arosebecause the Carthaginians were unwilling topay the mercenaries their due. Theenthusiasm with which the African citiesthrew in their lot with the mercenaries waslargely due to the harshness of the treatmentthey had received during the closing years ofthe war. Persuaded that the exigencies of thesituation justified such measures, theCarthaginians had commandeered one halfof the annual produce of the landsthroughout their subject territories anddoubled the annual tribute imposed uponthe cities. No compunction was shown inextorting these dues, regardless of thedevastating consequences for those living bya subsistence economy. Small wonder thatthe young men flocked to join the revolt,while the women and others who remainedbehind met together and solemnly swore notto conceal any of their possessions but tooffer them all to the common cause. As aresult, the two leaders of the revolt, Spendiusand Matho, were not only able to completethe payment of arrears due their men, butfrom that time on were able to defray thecost of the uprising. This suggests that thecause of such deep resentment was not somuch the actual raising of the money by theCarthaginians as the harshness andindiscriminate manner in which it was done.

According to Polybius, the Carthaginianswere by then nearly exhausted by thedemands of the recent prolonged war andfound themselves without any revenue tosupport an army. The situation cannot havebeen quite this forlorn since shortly

The world around war 81

afterwards the Carthaginians were able totake the field in considerable strength,obtain new mercenaries, refit their survivingwarships, arm all their able-bodied citizens,raise a new force of cavalry and muster the100 elephants remaining to them. Again, inthe absence of any Carthaginian records, toattempt to comment on the true situationand the extent of the suffering endured bythe Carthaginian people themselves wouldbe sheer speculation.

After Hamilcar Barca had established himselfin Spain, the wealth there not only enabledhim to meet his own requirements but also toreplenish the Carthaginian coffers andrecompense the authorities of Gades (Cadiz)for their loyalty when he had first crossed fromAfrica. We do not know the relative proportionof these three allocations, but the amountsupplied to Carthage must have beenconsiderable: not only did it enable the wardebt to be paid off to Rome, but it provideddiscreet payments to political supporters.

The political effect of the First Punic Warhad been to weaken the position of thegreat landowners who favoured goodrelations with Rome. The merchants nowsaw the riches of Sicily flowing into theRoman treasury instead of into their ownpockets, and the secure sea routesthroughout the Mediterranean threatened,if not actually broken; the commercialdomination they had enjoyed was dissolvingbefore their eyes. But it was not just themerchants who were discontented. The warwith Rome had virtually destroyed the navyand put a large number of Carthaginiancitizens connected with maritime activitiesout of work. The disquiet of these classesprovided a strong undercurrent of supportfor those like Hamilcar Barca who advocatedexpansion overseas. After the end of theSecond Punic War, the pendulum swungback, bringing the big landowners intopower. The commercial classes, and eventhe Barcid faction, which had supported firstHamilcar Barca and then Hannibal, nowaccepted the realities of the situation andsought an enduring accommodation withRome. However harsh the peace terms and

however reduced the opportunities for trade,the prospect of prosperous commercialactivity still remained.

The Romans

It was the succession of maritime disasters,resulting in the loss of at least 500 fullymanned warships and 1,000 transportswhich saw the First Punic War reach a lowebb for the Romans. Not only did the stateface bankruptcy and exhaustion, but apopulation census showed a fall of some17 per cent, excluding the allies. To call fornew taxes and further levies of manpowerrisked social unrest, and in 247 BC politicalchange became inevitable. The Fabii, withtheir policy of moderation towards Carthagein favour of their northern landed interests,were exerting increasing influence overpublic opinion, while the Claudii, who stoodto gain more from southern expansion, werebecoming discredited and faced accusationsof impiety - perhaps given substance byClaudius Pulcher, the member of theClaudian clan who cast the sacred chickensoverboard after they failed to providea favourable omen.

Perhaps the most significant politicaldevelopment followed the acquisition of Sicilyat the end of the First Punic War. Hitherto theRomans had never exacted payments in cashor kind from subjected territories, but insteaddemanded military service from those theytermed as allies and with whom they sharedthe spoils of war. Now, however, they found itmore convenient to adapt the entire conceptof government to the existing administrativesystem in Sicily: they would impose a tributeand rely on self-administration throughbureaucratically appointed councils, whileproviding the military garrisons themselves.These measures elevated Rome from mereleader of an Italian Confederation to animperial power.

There was also an important internalpolitical consequence of the First Punic War.As had occurred in the past, new plebeianfamilies who had distinguished themselves


were elevated to the Senate. Though this didnot lead to the creation of an influentialmilitary faction, it did mean that consulshipswere distributed with greater political andsocial evenness, though it is difficult toidentify any improvement in the quality ofleadership. Varro, who was responsible forthe disaster of Cannae, had been elected bythe plebeian party as their representative.

The losses at Cannae had causedunprecedented terror and confusion inRome. Only the previous year a consul andhis army had been lost at Trasimene and nowtwo more had suffered the same fate, leavingRome without an army in the field, nocommander of distinction and most of Italyoverrun. In an attempt to calm thepopulation, the Senate forbade women toleave their houses; they were to remain athome where they would be informed of theirpersonal losses. Silence was imposedeverywhere, family mourning was strictlycurtailed and the city gates were closed to keepthe people in as well as Hannibal out. As if themilitary disasters had not been enough, an actof gross impiety added to the general alarm.Two of the Vestal Virgins, charged withkeeping the sacred flame in the temple ofVesta alight, were convicted for illicit sexualactivity. One of them committed suicide andthe other was buried alive, while thedebaucher, the Lesser Pontiff, was beaten todeath by no less a personage than the PontifexMaximus himself. Similar panic and turmoiloccurred a few years later when Hannibal wastrying to relieve pressure on Capua bymarching on Rome. The fearful cry ofHannibal ad portas rang through the city andexaggerated reports abounded. Weeping andwailing women ran aimlessly around theshrines, sweeping the altars with theirloosened hair and appealing to the gods tosave them and their children.

As the war dragged on, people soughtsolace in the superstitions of eastern cults.Instead of worshipping in the privacy oftheir homes, crowds of women thronged theforum and other public places where theyoffered sacrifices and prayers in accordancewith unaccustomed rites. This gullibility gave

rise to a new breed of soothsayers andprophets who were quick to exploit theopportunity for personal gain. Of moreimmediate concern to the Senate, however,was the demand for new recruits.Commissioners were appointed, chargedwith searching for those fit to bear arms,even if this meant enrolling boys below theage of 17, while slaves were recruited andcriminals released from prison to fill thedepleted ranks of the legions.

Towards the end of the Second Punic War,shortly before Hannibal was recalled toCarthage, the Senate strove to achieve areturn to normality and, in particular, to getthe people back on to the land. This provedto be no easy task, since most of the free

The world around war 83

farmers had been killed in the war, slaveswere scarce, cattle had been carried off andfarm buildings destroyed. It was against thisbackdrop that Scipio had to persuade ananxious Senate to permit him to carry thewar to Africa. Concern was expressed aboutthe social consequences for the Romanpeople should he enter into a decisive battleagainst his formidable opponent, especiallyon his home ground. There was also thematter of public opinion to be considered:how would the Roman people and theirallies react to the inevitable demands foradditional manpower and resources to openup a new theatre of war? Twelve of the Latincolonies had already refused to make anyfurther contributions, and the people had

shown how near to exhaustion they hadbecome, but after referring the issue to thepeople, the Senate, somewhat evasively,granted Scipio his request so long as hejudged it to be in the interests of the state.

From all this it is apparent that theRomans remained a cohesive society in spiteof the appalling losses they suffered inhuman lives and material resources. We maynot know of any individual cases, but it isnot hard to imagine what it must have beenlike for the many thousands of familiesdeprived of their bread-winner and with nostate aid to fall back on.

Remains of the house of the Vestal Virgins in Rome. Thestatues are those of high priestesses. (AKG, Berlin)

P o r t r a i t of a civilian

Carthaginian trade;a Roman senator

The only Carthaginian politician ofprominence was Hanno the Great, but as solittle is known about him, his personality liesbeyond our reach; we will look instead atCarthaginian trade and colonisation, whichwere closely linked, the latter generallyfollowing the former, to create the bedrockof their civilisation.

It should be appreciated that theMediterranean climate during the thirdcentury BC was very different from that oftoday, affecting to some extent both what wastraded and so the siting of settlements. NorthAfrica, for example, was thickly wooded andsupported a multitude of game such aselephants, lions, panthers and bears, whileSicily produced an abundance of wheat, vinesand honey. Similarly, the Bible refers toPalestine as 'a land flowing in milk andhoney', which is confirmed by bore holessunk in the former Lake Hula by the Israelis,showing evidence of seeds and cultivationwhich died out in subsequent centuries.

Reflecting a more highly developedcivilisation than was general throughout theMediterranean, the Phoenicians exportedmanufactured articles such as householdfurnishings of ivory-inlaid cedar, bronze andsilver bowls, jewellery, glass vessels, purplecloth and small practical utensils liketweezers and razors. Imports supplied theraw materials - precious stones, ivory, gold,silver, copper and tin, the last two providingthe alloy from which many of the utensilswere made.

Trade was not confined to importing rawmaterials and exporting finished wares andproducts. Amongst many other things,Phoenician ships carried gold and silver toGreece and slaves to Near Eastern markets,while amphorae from Carthage were used fortransporting wine and olive oil throughoutthe Mediterranean.

Herodotus tells us how the Carthaginiansconducted their trade.

They unloaded their goods, arranged themtidily along the beach and after returning to theirboats raised smoke. Seeing the smoke, the nativesthen came down to the beach, placed a certainamount of gold on the ground in exchange for thegoods and then withdrew. The Carthaginians thencame ashore and if they thought the goldrepresented a fair price, they collected it and tookit and went away; if on the other hand theythought it too little, they would go back on boardand wait. The natives would then come and addto the gold until they were satisfied. There wasperfect harmony on both sides, the Carthaginiansnever touched the gold until it equalled in valuewhat they had offered for sale, and the nativesnever touched the goods until the gold had beentaken away.

Clearly this primitive sort of commercecould not endure, so first tradingsettlements were established and thencolonies similar to Carthage itself.

Diodorus Siculus gives an insight intohow this development occurred in Spain.

The country has the most numerous andexcellent silver mines ... The natives do notknow how to use the metal, but the Phoenicians,experts in commerce, would buy the silver inexchange for some other small goods.Consequently, taking the silver to Greece, Asiaand other people, the Phoenicians made greatearnings. Thus practising the trade for a longtime, they became rich and founded manycolonies, some in Sicily and on the neighbouringislands, others in Libya, Sardinia and Iberia.

Following the pattern of their trade,Carthaginian colonies were mainlyestablished along the coast on promontories

Portrait of a civilian 85

or small coastal islands facing lagoons of nogreat depth as their ships only required ashallow draught. The Greek colonies, on theother hand, which were being established atmuch the same time, were mostly sitedinland, reflecting the Greeks' agricultural andmore localised commercial interests.

To end this short survey we will take alook at Carthage itself, leaving aside thefortifications which have already beendescribed. As a maritime nation the port wasof supreme significance and consisted of twointerconnecting harbours. The inner circularharbour was for warships and the outerrectangular one for merchant vessels. It willbe remembered that when access throughthe mercantile harbour was blocked byScipio, a new outlet was cut from the innerharbour from which the warships sailed ina display of contempt for the Romanendeavour. Outside the city itself, DiodorusSiculus describes the surroundingcountryside as abounding with fruit treesand vines, irrigated by sluices and canals,pastured with sheep, herds of cattle andbreeding mares and populated by villagesdisplaying the wealth of their owners. Nodoubt, as in any society, there was also anunseemly side, but the overall picture is oneof great prosperity bordering on luxury.

Marcus Cato, the scourge of Carthage. (Roger-Viollet)

Marcus CatoAt the same time as the Scipios werebeing fêted with triumphs, Marcus Catoarose who, amongst many other things, wasto be the patrician family's greatest critic.It will be remembered how Scipio Africanussummarily dismissed Cato as his quaestorfor criticising Scipio's extravagance whilepreparing for the African expedition. Thiswas far from being an isolated incident.As a red-headed young man with penetratingblue eyes but of near barbaric appearance,Cato could alarm both friend and foe alike.He was so precocious that in his childhoodhe was called Cato (Catus, 'wise'), thoughhis family, presumably because of hisappearance, called him Porcius (swineherd).He seemingly did not have an easy start tolife: able, but born into an undistinguishedfamily when society was dominated by thearistocracy, he was driven by a neardemonic energy to succeed and had anunquenchable desire for recognition,ambitions which called for rigoroussingle-mindedness and relentlessself-discipline. Already gifted with a robustconstitution, Cato further hardened himselfphysically by manual labour; sharing thehardships of those with whom he worked onthe land, living frugally, drinking the samewine as his slaves and purchasing only thesimplest of food in the market. He indulgedin none of the excesses associated withyouthful ardour, but instead preparedhimself for higher purposes in life, becomingincreasingly attracted to the ideals ofsimplicity and self-discipline, while practisingand perfecting his oratory by appearing asan advocate for all who needed himwithout demanding a fee.

Like all those seeking political careers,Cato first served in the army and at the ageof 17 saw active service in Spain, beingwounded and distinguishing himself for hisgallantry. However, according to Plutarch:'He never stinted his own praise, and couldnever resist following up a great achievementwithout a boastful description of it.' Fromthis it seems reasonable to conclude thatself-advertisement prompted him to sell his


horse, rather than incur public expenditurein transporting it back to Italy. If his motivereally had been public economy, he couldhave paid the cost himself, but this wouldhave attracted little attention, exceptperhaps cynical disbelief.

Cato's treatment of his slaves also suggestsa callous ruthlessness - he sold them whenthey became too old to work. As Plutarch said:

I regard exploiting them to the limits of theirstrength, and then, when they were old, drivingthem off and selling them, as a mark of athoroughly ungenerous nature ...A kindly man will take good care of his horseseven when they are worn out in his services, andwill look after his dogs not only when they arepuppies, but when they need special attention intheir old age.

Though Cato is alleged to have been agood father and a kind husband, his deepsuspicion of Greek physicians who practisedin Rome, and perhaps his own frugality, ledhim to treat his family and slaves himselfwhen they fell sick. The results were hardlyreassuring. Both his wife and son died ofdisease, as probably did other unfortunatemembers of his household. His own physiquehad a more enduring quality as even inadvanced age he continued to indulge hissexual appetite, first comforting himself witha slave girl, then marrying the youngdaughter of one of his secretaries, much tothe surprise of the latter, who regarded Catoas being well past the age of marriage.

Cato's most enduring, if discreditable,reputation is for contributing to thedestruction of Carthage, not in the militarysense but as a result of his advocacy.Returning from a diplomatic mission toNorth Africa, Cato warned the Senate thatthe crushing defeats the Carthaginians hadsuffered had done little to impair theirstrength or diminish their recklessnessand over-confidence. They remained apotent threat to Rome. He ended his speechby dropping some gloriously over-sized

Relief of a Carthaginian merchant ship. (Roger-Viollet)

figs on to the floor of the Senate-house,declaring that where they came from wasonly three days' sail from Rome. Henceforthhe continually rubbed in the point whenever

Portrait of a civilian 87

his opinion was called for on any subject, byconcluding with the words: 'And furthermoreit is my opinion that Carthage must bedestroyed.' He never lived to see his wish

fulfilled, dying shortly after the Third PunicWar began. He was an austere, single-mindedand ruthless man, but one who possessedboth physical and moral courage.

Conclusion and consequences

Expansionism andthe disposition for war

Since the history of the Punic Wars is writtenalmost entirely from a military point of view,inevitably the conclusions will also bemilitary. The consequences, however, whichwill be considered at the end of this chapterare not so restricted. But let us first look atthe causes for war, then briefly consider itsconduct by both antagonists, before drawinga broad conclusion as to why theCarthaginians were vanquished.

The causes of war are seldom explicit orsimple, nor do they lend themselves tobroad generalisations, such as commercialrivalry, social unrest or religious fanaticism.Usually there are also a number ofinteracting, if subsidiary, factors. These caninclude national or individual ambitions,prejudices and fears, all heightened by agenerous measure of misunderstanding andmiscalculation. To isolate one of thesefactors risks over-simplification, whileto follow several can result in confusion.

Then there are the theorists: someconsider war to be a cyclical process, therevulsion of a generation which hasparticipated in a prolonged conflict beingreplaced by the romantic ardour of thenext. Others put forward the theory ofdelinquency: nations are human beingswrit large who inevitably squabble andthen fight. A third group believes that warsarise from ignorance, which, throughincreased commercial, personal, culturaland other contacts, can be abolished.Although such explanations all containelements of truth, in the light of experiencenone has given grounds for thinking thatit is capable of standing alone.

If so much contemporary analysis andtheorising has been devoted to determiningthe causes of war, it may well be asked whatpurpose will be served by considering whathappened over 2,000 years ago. The available

evidence is fragmentary, the opinionsexpressed often hearsay, even at the time,and the relevance of such distant events isquestionable. Even so, there are two clearly-identifiable factors which made the FirstPunic War more probable and remain justas relevant today. First, the Romans sawan opportunity to gain a foothold in Sicilyby aiding the Mamertines; and secondly,because they saw that the Carthaginianswere unprepared militarily, they succumbedto the temptation.

The seemingly obvious cause of theSecond Punic War was Hannibal'sdetermination to avenge the loss of Sicilyand his father's humiliation. This wascertainly the immediate cause of the warbut the overall setting was far morecomplex. There was an undeniablemomentum behind Roman expansion:periods of peace were temporary interludesto be broken when a favourableopportunity for advancement presenteditself. So it was with Sardinia, which theRomans seized in 238 BC and thenunconvincingly claimed that it was one ofthe islands referred to as Tying betweenSicily and Italy' ceded to them followingthe First Punic War. In Italy itself, theRomans annexed Ager Gallicus on theAdriatic coast from the Gauls andincorporated the Etruscans into theirconfederation. Given Rome's clear culturaldisposition for war, another conflict withCarthage was inevitable, only the timingwas uncertain until decided by Hannibal.

The cause of the Third Punic War can beattributed to the loss of Scipio Africanus'moderating influence when he fell victimto political in-fighting, and his replacementby Cato with his advocacy of vigorousconfrontation with Carthage. We can seethe timelessness of these events by looking

Conclusion and consequences 89

back to the Cold War, when the Sovietsincorporated most of Eastern Europe intotheir brand of confederation, attemptedto secure Berlin by blockade and drew downthe Iron Curtain. Fortunately the West wasmore able to defend itself againstconfrontation than was Carthage.

Looking at the events of the three PunicWars, we can see how important it is to adjustforce structures to changing political andmilitary requirements, and then to conductwar with a purposeful strategic aim. As wehave seen, the Romans began a war whichclearly had a major maritime dimensionwithout possessing a navy, while theCarthaginians had an army which, without along period of mobilisation, was incapable ofdefending its widely dispersed possessions.Then there was the direction of the war itself.The Romans initially had the limited, short-term objective of securing a foothold in Sicily;but by failing to define their long-term aim,they drifted into a prolonged conflict.

In the Second Punic War the Romans wereinitially thrown on to the defensive byHannibal's superior generalship, until helacked the strength to maintain the offensiveand defend the cities he had gained.Ultimately the Romans prevailed on thebattlefield because, however incompetent anddivided the leadership was at times, militaryservice formed a part of every aspiringcitizen's upbringing. In sharp contrast, theCarthaginian politicians were mainlymerchants, irreconcilably divided betweenthose wishing to preserve their overseasinterests by opposing Rome and thosewanting to compromise in order to expandtheir African possessions. This was a politicaldivision which precluded any clear strategicnational aim. In the end it was this, togetherwith the inattention paid in peace-timeto the provision and training of competentcommanders, that led to Carthage's downfallrather than, as has sometimes beensuggested, the Romans' greatly superiorhuman and material resources.

Finally, let it be repeated: human naturedoes not change, only the circumstances withwhich it is surrounded. We should then never

be led astray by wishful thinking, especiallyabout totalitarian regimes, as was Chamberlainby Hitler at Munich, and Roosevelt by Stalinat Yalta; both were deceived and ultimatelybetrayed at terrible cost.

Since Carthage was obliterated and itspopulation dispersed, it is only the Romanswith whom we are concerned, so we cannotdo better than begin by relating theprediction made by Scipio Africanus'grandson, Scipio Nasica. Shortly before theThird Punic War he warned the Senate thatthough Rome's position as a dominantpower should be preserved, Carthage shouldnot be destroyed as a rival. Were this tooccur, there would be no check to Rome'sarrogant disregard for the legitimate interestsand concerns of smaller states. Moreover, inthe absence of any external threat, theRoman Confederation would be in danger ofdisintegrating as fractious political and socialgroups pursued their own self-interestedends. Events proved Scipio's prediction to beremarkably perspicacious.

With ruthless determination the Romansextended their boundaries to the Euphrates,Danube, Rhine and Atlantic Ocean. A singlecity had expanded into an immense empire,but its arrogance brought its nemesis. Thelegions were no longer a citizen militiacontrolled by the Senate and enrolled tomeet a passing need, but a long-service forceof independent contingents whose loyaltieshad been transferred from a distant state toits immediate military commanders, manyof whom had political ambitions. So it wasin 49 BC when, at the head of five cohorts,Caesar crossed the Rubicon, the rivermarking the boundary between CisalpineGaul and Roman Italy, to unleash a civil warwhich was to extend from the Italianpeninsula to Greece, Syria and Cappadocia,down through Africa, Sicily and Sardinia toSpain. Internecine struggles first weakenedthen extinguished the military vigour of theRoman world until Rome itself was sackedin AD 410 by Alaric the Visigoth.

The relentless expansion of the RomanEmpire transformed the social and economicfabric of the Italian Confederation as the


spoils of war poured into Italy. While theyoung men were drafted into the legionsdeployed along the empire's distant frontiers,they were replaced by tens of thousands ofslaves who worked on the land or indomestic service. This could includeconcubinage, as was provided for Cato, ormore debauching vices such as paedophilia,a practice acquired from the Greeks. But astime passed many slaves were enfranchisedand became Roman citizens, though judgingby Scipio Aemelianus' rebuke of those oncethronging the Forum - 'Silence, spurioussons of Italy!' - of intemperate if notinsolent behaviour. Thus a new breed ofpeople arose who, holding different beliefs,customs and expectations, frequentlyrejected the social discipline and solid virtuespractised by their Roman predecessors.

There had been an equally traumatic shiftin economic conditions. Much of thenew-found wealth found its way into thepockets of the powerful, including members ofthe Senate, who bought up land which theythen worked with slave labour, displacingthose peasant farmers who remained. Theresulting impoverishment of the peasant classwas further aggravated by long-serving soldiersbeing obliged to surrender land which theywere unable to manage, leaving themhomeless and destitute once they hadcompleted their military service. A resentfulclass of Rome's once-loyal citizens thenswelled the ranks of those seeking socialjustice. In 133 BC Tiberius Gracchus, a tribuneand bold reformer, was assassinated forattempting to reverse this trend, as was hisyounger brother Gaius, when he tried to revivethe reform. In this way the old inculcatedRoman virtues of uprightness and duty to thestate slipped into a decline marked byselfishness and insatiable greed.

In spite of the wealth that had flowedinto Italy following the Romans' overseasconquests, its misappropriation andeconomic mismanagement necessitatedhigher taxes, a burden that was shifted bythe rich and powerful on to the poorerclasses, who, as Gibbon expressed it, 'borethe weight without sharing the benefits of

society'. The rot at home invited theintervention of ambitious overseascommanders who, as we have seen, werenot slow to pursue their own interests.

So Scipio Nasica's second prediction wasfulfilled: internal disintegration would followfrom the defeat of Carthage; a disintegrationwhich ultimately led to the collapse of theRoman Empire. On the positive side, however,we should recall that Rome's defeat ofCarthage paved the way for Westerncivilisation and the establishment of theChristian religion. For a brief period Romeunified most of modern-day Europe, to suchan extent that, though the centre of gravityhas shifted northwards, it is comparable withwhat is occurring some 2,000 years later.Gibbon, however, had harsh words to sayabout the impact of Christianity:

The clergy successfully preached the doctrinesof patience and pusillanimity; the active virtuesof society were discouraged; and the last remainsof the military spirit were buried in the cloister; alarge portion of private and public wealth wasconsecrated to the specious demands of charityand devotion.

However, to balance this criticalassessment, he went on to say:

The pure and genuine influence ofChristianity may be traced to its beneficial,though imperfect, effects on the Barbarianproselytes of the North. If the decline of theRoman Empire was hastened by the conversion ofConstantine, his virtuous religion broke the violenceof the fall, and mollified the ferocious temper of theconquerors. This awful revolution may be usefullyapplied to the instruction of the present age.

A knowledge of history plays an importantpart in understanding how we got where weare and in helping us to decide what weshould do in the future; which brings us backto Polybius' contention, quoted at thebeginning of this book: 'There are two sourcesfrom which any benefit can be derived; ourown misfortunes and those which havehappened to other men.'

Glossary of names

Agathocles Tyrant of Syracuse who eludedthe Carthaginian siege of the city andcarried the war into their North Africanhomeland. He died in 289 BC.

Archimedes The most famous mathematicianand physicist in antiquity. Native ofSyracuse, whose war machines devastatedthe Roman fleet during the siege inwhich he was killed when the city fellin 212 BC.

Cato Roman senator who fought in Spain.His implacable hatred of Carthage was amajor cause of the Third Punic War andthe city's destruction.

Fabius, Maximus Quintus Roman consulnicknamed Cunctator (Delayer) because heshadowed Hannibal in the Second PunicWar, hoping to wear him down withoutgiving battle.

Flaminius, Gaius Roman consul killed withmost of his men at the battle of LakeTrasimene in 217 BC, when trapped by-Hannibal.

Hamilcar Barca Father of Hannibal.Commanded the Carthaginian forces inSicily during the First Punic War. Suppressedthe Mercenary Revolt in Africa (240-237BC). Created an independent power base inSpain, where he was drowned when tryingto escape across a river.

Hannibal Son of Hamilcar Barca. Secured thefamily base in Spain after the death of hisfather. Led his army from Spain over theAlps into Italy to begin the Second PunicWar. After being called back to defendCarthage, he was defeated by ScipioAfricanus at Zama in 202 BC.

Hanno (The Great) Leader of the aristocraticparty in Carthage from 240-200 BC.Favoured development of the Africanprovinces, so was the chief opponent ofHannibal and the Barcid party seekingoverseas expansion.

Hanno Carthaginian general sent to Sicily atthe outbreak of the First Punic War.Defeated at the naval battle of Ecnomusin 256 BC.

Hasdrubal Barca Left in command in Spainwhen his brother Hannibal crossed theAlps to campaign in Italy at the beginningof the Second Punic War. Later tried tojoin Hannibal but was killed on theMetaurus in 207 BC.

Hiero King of Syracuse who sided with theCarthaginians over the Mamertineproblem in 264 BC but after beingdefeated by the Romans, changed sidesand gave his allegiance to the latter.Remained a faithful Roman ally until hisdeath in about 214 BC.

Maharbal Numidian cavalry general whocrossed the Alps with Hannibal in 218 BC.Fought at the battles of Trasimene in217 BC and Cannae in 216 BC.

Marcellus, Marcus Claudius Four timesconsul and Rome's most vigorous fieldcommander in Sicily and Italy during theSecond Punic War. Took Syracuse but waskilled in battle in 208 BC.

Paulus, Lucius Armilius Roman consulsharing dual command with Varro at thebattle of Cannae, where he fell in 216 BC.

Philip V King of Macedonia who enteredinto an alliance with Hannibal during theSecond Punic War in 225 BC. Driven outof Illyria by the Romans and finallydefeated in the Second Macedonian Warin 192 BC.

Regulus, Marcus Atilius Roman consul whodefeated the Carthaginians in the navalbattle of Ecnomus in 256 BC. InvadedNorth Africa, where he was defeated byXanthipus in the following year.

Scipio, Gnaeus Cornelius Uncle of ScipioAfricanus. Killed with his brother PubliusCornelius Scipio in Spain in 211 BC.


Scipio, Publius Cornelius Roman consuland father of Scipio Africanus. Carried thecampaign to Spain in the Second PunicWar, where he was defeated and killedwith his brother Gnaeus Cornelius Scipioin 211 BC.

Scipio Africanus After the deaths of hisfather and uncle in battle, he was givencommand of the Roman army in Spain in209 BC and captured New Carthage.Landed in Africa in 204 BC and defeatedHannibal at Zama two years later.

Scipio, Nasica Grandson of Scipio Africanuswho, after the Second Punic War, tried topersuade the Senate that it was in Rome'sown interest not to destroy Carthage.

Spendius Roman deserter who, with theLibyan Matho, led the Mercenary Revoltin 240 BC.

Syphax King of Numidia who sided with theCarthaginians and was defeated in theGreat Plains by Scipio Africanus andMasinissa in 209 BC.

Varro, Marcus Terentius Roman consulsharing command with Lucius ArmiliusPaulus but under whose direction the battleof Cannae was fought and lost in 216 BC.

Xanthipus Spartan mercenary who trainedand led the Carthaginian army whichdefeated the Romans under Marcus AtiliusRegulus in North Africa during the FirstPunic War in 255 BC.

Further reading

Primary sources Other references

Bagnall, N.T., The Punic Wars, London (1990)Bartoloni, P., 'Ships and Navigation', in

The Phoenicians, Milan (1988)Bartoloni, P., 'Commerce and Industry' in

The Phoenicians, Milan (1988)Blaney, G., The Causes of War, London (1978)Bondi, S.F., 'City Planning', in The

Phoenicians, Milan (1988)Bondi, S.F., Cambridge Ancient History (Vols

VII and VIII), Cambridge (1991)Caven, B., The Punic Wars, London (1980)Michelet, J., The Roman Republic, London

(1847)Moscati, S.,'Colonization of the

Mediterranean', in The Phoenicians, Milan(1988)

Plutarch, Makers of Rome, London (1965)Polybius, The Histories, London 1899)Smith, R.B., Carthage and the Carthaginians,

London (1890).Thiel, J.H., A History of Roman Sea Power,

Amsterdam (1954)

Adcock, F.E., The Roman Art of War,Cambridge, Mass (1940)

Arnold, T., The Second Punic War, London(1886)

Cicero, The Offices, London (1894)De Beer, G., Hannibal, London (1969)Diodorus, S., Corpus Historicum, London

(1700)Gibbon, E., The Decline and Fall of the Roman

Empire, London (1775)Grimal, P., The Civilization of Rome, London

& New York (1963)Harris, W., War and Imperialism in Ancient

Rome, London (1979)Herodotus, The Histories, London (1962)Liddel, Hart B., A Greater than Napoleon,

Edinburgh and London (1926)Livy, The Early History of Rome, London

(1965)Livy, Rome and Italy, London (1965)Livy, The War with Hannibal, London (1965)Mahan, A.T., The Influence of Sea Power on

History, London (1980)Momsen, T., The History of Rome, New York

(1987)Picard, G.C., The Life and Death of Carthage,

London (1968)Ribichini, S., 'Beliefs and Religious Life', in

The Phoenicians, Milan (1988)Rollin, B.M., The Ancient Histories, Edinburgh,

(1825)Scullard, H., The History of the Roman World,

London (1953)Scullard, H., Scipio Africanus, New York

(1970)Schuckburgh, E., The Histories of Polybius,

London (1899)Wallbank, F., Polybius: an Historical

Commentary, Oxford (1957)

Index

References to illustrations are shown in bold

Aemilii family 17Aetolia 61African campaigns 40-41, 67-68Agrigentum 36Allobroges tribe 49Archimedes, death of 60, 61Archimedes' counter-weighted beams 61, 64-65army, Carthaginian 20-21

infantry 55army, Roman 24-26 see also Roman infantryAstarte (Tanit) 13Aufides (Ofante), River, colonnade at 70-71

Baal Hannon 13Balearic slingers 20, 26Barca family 48, 76 see also Hamilcar Barca;

Hannibal Barca; Hasrubal BarcaBon, Cape 41, 42-43

Camarina 41Cannae, battle of 26, 54, 54-55, 76Capua 66-67Cartagena (New Carthage) 48, 56-57, 78Carthage 40, 41, 67, 68, 69, 72

Acropolis at 73aristocracy in 13, 15constitution of 13, 15corruption in 15description of 68, 85founding of 11-12siege of 68, 72, 75

Carthage and its neighbours 46Carthage today 69Carthaginian army 20-21

infantry 55Carthaginian empire and dependencies 14Carthaginian navy 20, 21, 24, 40Carthaginian trade 84-85Carthaginians 21

character of 12effects of the war on 80-81religion of 12-13

Carthalo 77Cato, Marcus 85, 85-87, 88Catulus, Lutatius 44cavalry, Numidian 20

cavalryman 21cavalry, Spanish 20Ceres (Demeter) 17Christianity, impact of 90Cicero 12, 13civilian, portrait of 85-87Claudii family 15, 17, 81Claudius, Appius 36Claudius Pulcher, Publius 16, 43, 81climate, Mediterranean 84

coin, bronze Mamertini 31coin, silver Carthaginian 78consuls 17corvi 27, 37, 38-39

Demeter (Ceres) 17Demetrius 45-46, 56Drepana 43Dugga, Tunisia 77

Ecnomus, battle of 40, 42elephants 20-21, 22-23, 41

Fabii family 15, 17, 45, 81Flaminius, Gaius 52

Gallic invasion 45Gauls 20, 45, 49

warrior 57Gibbon 90Gracchus, Tiberius 90

Hamilcar Barca 38, 44, 46, 47, 48, 81Hannibal Barca 48, 52, 66, 67, 68, 78, 88, 89

at battle of Cannae 55portrait 76-77in retreat 66-67strategy 50, 56

Hanno 35, 36Hanno the Great 80Hasdrubal Barca 43, 48. 56, 57, 67Herodotus 12, 84Hiero of Syracuse 34, 36, 56Hieronymus of Syracuse 56, 60-61human sacrifice 11. 13

Ilipa 57Illyria 61, 66, 74Illyrian expeditions 45-46infantry

Carthaginian 55Libyan 20Roman see Roman infantrySpanish 20

Italy, southern 74Izoard, Col d' 49-50, 62-63

Latins 19legionaries, Roman 28-29 see also Roman armyLibyan infantry 20Libyans 42-43, 76Lilybaeum 44

siege of 43Livy 76, 77

Maharbal 52, 77Mamertines 34, 35Matho 44, 80

Index 95

Maximus, Fabius 52, 54mercenaries 21mercenary revolt 44, 80Messana 34-35, 36Messina, straits of 32-33Metaurus river 67Milazzo (Mylae) 39

naval tactics 24, 27, 37, 38-39navy, Carthaginian 20, 21, 24, 40navy, Roman 26-27, 39-41Neptune 18New Carthage (Cartagena) 48, 56-57, 78Numidian cavalry 20

cavalryman 21

Ofante (Aufides), River, colonnade at 70-71

Palermo (Panormous) 41-42, 43Patricians 17Paulus, Lucius Aemilius 54, 55Peloponnese 74Philip V of Macedon 56, 61, 66Phintias 40Phoenicians 11-12, 84Plebeians 17Plutarch 85, 86Polybius 12, 17, 45, 55, 78, 80, 90Pontifex Maximus (Chief Priest) 16-17, 82Pontiffs, College of 16-17priests holding an infant for sacrifice 11 see also

Pontifex MaximusPtolemy II of Egypt 80Punic War, First 36-44

African campaign 40-41maritime dimension 38-40Sicily 36, 38, 38, 41-44

Punic War, Second 48-68, 51the Ebro to the Alps 48-50the epic years 50, 52, 54-55Hannibal in retreat 66-67Illyria 61, 66Romans carry the War to Africa 67-68Sardinia 57, 60Sicily 60-61Spain 56-57the waning years 66the war expands 56

Punic War, Third 68-75Pyrrhus, King of Epirus 15, 15, 30

Queyras, Chateau 49, 50quinqueremes

Carthaginian 21, 24, 27, 36Roman 24, 27

Regulus, Marcus Atilius 40, 41Rhegium 35Rhone, River 48-49, 58-59Roman army 24-26 see also Roman infantryRoman Empire, expansion and collapse of 89-90Roman infantry see also Roman army

cohorts 25, 26command 26hastati 25-26legionaries 28-29legions 25. 26maniples 25

princeps 25triari 25

Roman navy 26-27, 39-41Romans

character of 16effects of the war on 81-83religion of 16-17

Romans carry the war to Africa 67-68Rome 66, 82

constitution of 17, 19founding of 15house of the Vestal Virgins 82-83

Sacred Band 21sacrifice, human 11, 13Saguntum 48, 53Sardinia 56, 57, 60, 88Scipio, Gnaeus and Publius 55, 56Scipio Aemelianus 68, 72, 90Scipio Africanus 56-57, 67, 68, 79, 83, 85, 88

portrait of 77-79Scipio Nasica 89, 90Senate 17, 34, 35, 54, 82-83Servilius, Geminus Gnaeus 52shell, murex 12, 12ship, Roman 37 see also quinqueremes, Roman;

trireme, Romanships, Carthaginian 21, 24, 86-87 see also

quiqueremes, Carthaginian; triremes,Carthaginian

Sicily 15, 30, 60-61, 67, 81First Punic War in 36, 38, 38, 41-44

Siculus, Diodorus 13, 84, 85slingers, Balearic 20, 26soldiers, portrait of 76-79Spain 46, 48, 56-57Spanish soldiers 20Spendius 44, 80states, allied 19stele 72sword, Roman 27Syracuse 61

tactics, naval 24, 27, 37, 38-39Tanit (Astarte) 13Taranto (Tarentum) 15, 67Teuta, Queen 45trade, Carthaginian 84-85Trasimene, Lake 55

battle of 52, 54Traversette, Col de la 49-50Treaty of Friendship, Third 30trireme 25

Roman 39triremes, Carthaginian 21, 24

Varro, Marcus Terentius 54, 55, 82Venus 19Virgins, Vestal 82-83, 82

war, levels of 35weapons, Carthaginian 20weapons, Roman 25, 26

sword 27

Xanthipus 41

Zama 68

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