Rome Threatens Sardiniain the First Punic War'The First Punic War began in 264 as acontest between Rome, Syracuse andCarthage for control of eastern Sicily.Rome defeated Syracuse early on,and the war expanded as a clashbetween the Carthaginian and Romanempires. However, as long as Romelacked a fleet, she could threaten onlySicily. Sardinia, and Africa, were safebehind the patrols of theCarthaginian navy. Punic raids werelaunched from Sardinia against theItalian coast, while the Punic navybrought support to beleaguered citieson the Sicilian coast. Within theRoman Senate, the realization camethat this war could never be wonunless Carthage was challenged atsea. So, in 260 Rome built her firstbattle fleet, and with ingeniousboarding ramps (the corvus) defeatedthe Punic navy at Mvlae.

In 259 the consul Lucius Cornel iusScipio led the first Roman expedition

against Corsica and Sardinia . He hadsome success against the garrisons,before being driven off by a reinforc -ing fleet Under H annibal, son ofGisgo. In the following year, theconsul Gaius Sulpicious Palerculuscampaigned with a Roman fleet inSardinian waters, defeating Hannibaland capturing or destroying all hisships. Hannibal was crucified by hisown officers for his repeated failures.Another Punic Fleet under Hannoarrived to restore the situation, andthe Romans departed.

As the long war dragged on, Romaninterest in Sardinia waned. Theimmediate objective of ending navalraids on Italy had been accomplished.Rome turned to a more directstrategy of invading Africa. Whenthis effort was foiled by disaster onland (the Battle of the Bagradasfeatured in SPQR) and sea (256-55),Rome reverted to a strategy ofattrit ion on Sicily. Sardinia wasnever again threatened during the

First Punic War. Rome finally wonthe long war with a naval victory atthe Aegates Islands in 241. In thePeace of Lutatius that ended the warCarthage lost Sicily and had to pay anenormous indemnity, but retainedcontrol of Sardinia and Corsica.

The Rape of SardiniaThe end of the First Punic Warbrought no relief to Carthage. Hardon the heels of this war came therevolt of the mercenaries, theTruceless War, 240-238 (featured inC3i Nr. 7). While this brutal warraged in Africa, the contagion ofrebellion spread to Carthage'smercenary garrison on Sardinia in239. These sold iers of fortune roseup, and slew their Carthaginiancommander Bostar and his officers.In response, Carthage sent anexpedit ion under (another) Hanno topunish the rebels, but his troopsdeserted and joined the mutineers.The rebels crucified Hanno, then ranrampant over the island, slaying allthe Carthaginian settlers. Once theeuphoria of the ini tial uprising hadworn off , these mercenaries began todread retribution from Carthage. Sothey sent an offer to Rome to surren-der Sardinia to them.

The Roman Senate refused the offer.The senators decided to honor theterms of the Peace of Lutatius, whichexpressly forbid taking as an ally anyally of the other power. Meanwhile ,on Sardinia the mutinous mercenariesturned on the local populace. Theirdepredations at length drove thenative tribes to rise up and attackthem. The mercenaries were expelledfrom the island in 238, and Sardiniawas briefly independent. Carthage,as soon as the rebel mercenaries inAfrica had been suppressed, beganpreparing an expedition tore-conquer the island.

In Rome, however, there was achange of heart. The senate reverseditself and proclaimed the annexation

of Sardinia and Corsica, in flagrantdisregard of the Treaty of Lutatius.When Carthage complained, Romethreatened war and increased theindemnity Carthage had to pay tokeep the peace. This aggressionbecame known as the Rape of Sardinia.Rome may have gained a valuableprovince, but she also earned theundying hatred of Hami lcar Barcaand his sons (Hannibal , Hasdrubaland Mago), a matter of no smallconsequence.

The Roman ProvinceVictory in the First Punic Warbrought Rome her first two overseasprovinces, Sicily and Sardinia. Thehighly civi lized island of Sicilybecame a profitable and peacefulpossession. Wild, untamed Sardiniawas another story. Carthage hadnever conquered the enti re island,content with coastal enclaves anddiplomatic, commercial and culturaldomination of the island. Romanways were different. A series ofexpedit ions were sent to the island topacify it completely. Both consulsfought on the island in 238, and aftera brief interlude consular armies weredispatched every year for five years,from 235 -231. The first of theseexpedit ions was led by the consulTitus Manlius Torquatus, of whommore wil l be heard anon .

Finding the administration ofoverseas provinces a burden on thelimited officers of the Roman govern -ment, the number of praetors wasexpanded from two to four in 227.The first praetor of Sardinia in thatyear was Gains Flaminius, destinedto meet his end at Hannibal's handsby Lake Trasimene. In 225 the consulGaius Atil ius Regulus was dispatchedwith his arm' to quell anotheruprising on Sardinia. His coll eague,Lucius Anielius Papus remained inItaly to guard against an expectedCeltic invasion. Atilius Regu lussuppressed the Sardinian revolt andreturned to Italy in tine to take par tin the Battle of Telamon (featured inC3i Nr. 6). On the eve of the Second

Punic War Sardinia was a provincebarely pacified. A generation ofRoman commanders and legionnai reshad their chief battle experience fromcampaigns on this island.

The Second Punic WarSardinia did not figure prominentlyin the opening campaigns of theSecond Punic War. The island washeld for Rome only by a garrison ofall ied troops, probably no more than5,000 men. Hannibal's surprisecrossing of the Alps, and his firstmajor victory at Trebbia, convincedthe Romans that this war would beneither easy nor short. The Romansenators knew that Carthage wouldattempt to regain Sardinia at the firstopportuni ty. Therefore, early in 217the praetor Aulus CorneliusMammula was sent to reinforce theisland's garrison with Legion V, aful l-strength double legion with some1),000 foot and 800 horse. CorneliusMammula maintained a tenuouscontrol of Sardinia over the next twoyears, as Hann ibal's continuing stringof victories over Rome excited theanti-Roman passions of the nativetribes . The praetor had to exact everincreasing taxes and tribute from hisprovince to support the war, whichcontributed greatly to the risingdiscontent.

The counci l in Carthage also tookmore direct action to break Sardinia

away from Rome's grasp. A general ,Hanno, infiltrated onto the isl and asan agent provocateur, to fomentrebellion. Hanno soon made conl111011 cause with Hallipsicora, tileleading Sardinian chieftain, toprepare a massive island -wideinsurrection. Cornelius Mammlula,however, was a wary and circum -spect govern or. Even after the Bat tleof Cannae, when much of southernItaly rebelled, Hanno andHamp sicora bided their time. Theyawaited a more favorable moment toraise the cry of 'freedom from Rome!' .

The opportuni ty they sought camesoon enough. At the end of 216, thepropraetor Cornelius Mammula wasrecalled to Rome, pending the arr ivalof his successor. The praetor QuintusMucius Scaevola arrived early in 215,and immediately came down with aserious, incapacitating illness.

Cornelius Mammula, alarmed by theturn of even ts, hurried back to Rometo make his report . Leader less, theRoman garrison was unable to reactas Hanno and Hampsicora nowunleashed the long simmeringrebellion. The insurrection quicklyspread across the island. Legion Vhunkered down in its bases andwaited.

Hanno and CorneliusPlea forReinforcementThe opposing generals, Hanno andCornelius Mammula, both hurried toget urgent pleas for reinforcingexpedit ions to their home govern -ments. Cornel ius Mammula reportedin person to the senate on theimpending revolt and the incapacita-tion of Mucius Scaevola. Rome,unfortunately, had jus t about scrapedthe bot tom of her manpower barrel.After Cannae in the fall of 216, Romehad barely managed to conscript onenew consular army of two legions.Additional armies were formed fromthe survivors of Cannae and a force aslave and convict volunteers, thevolones. Then another disaster befellRome in the winter of 216-215. Thepraetorian artily of two legion, inCisalpine Gaul leas ambushed andannihilated in the Litani forest byCeltic tribes, instigated by Hannibal.This brought to ten the number of

legions completely destroyed so far inthe war. The senate had reluctantlyconcluded in early 216 that noadditional forces could be raised, andthat the Litani ambush must go un -avenged for now. It was in thissituation that Cornelius Mammulamade his plea for reinforcements.Despite their many difficult ies, thesenate ordered a levy to be raised.Somehow, the urban praetor, QuintusFulvius Flaccus, managed to scrapeup a reinforced Roman legion, theXIV. Its strength was 5,000 foot and400 horse. It was most likely composed of teen-agers, old men andthose earlier rejected as unfit forservice. But Legion XIV would haveto do.

Hanno's message met an entirelydifferent response in Carthage, Theway had been paved by Mago Barca'smission to the council followingCannae in the autumn of 216. Magohad poured a bushel basket of goldrings cut from the fingers of deadRoman nobles and knights onto thecouncil chamber floor. Mago'srequest for 20,000 infantry and 4,000cavalry was readily approved. WhenHanno s emergency dispatch arrived,Mago Barca was on the point ofsailing for Italy with the first contin-gent of this levy, 12,000 foot, 1,500horse and 20 elephants . Arriving atnearly the same time as Hanno's pleato re-conquer Sardinia came news ofHasdrubaI Barca's disastrous defeatat Dertosa in Spain (featured in C3iNr. 4). The council was forced toallocate resources amongst threecompeting theaters - Ita ly, Spain andSardinia. The councilors' decisionrevealed their strategic priori ties.Mago and his army were diverted toprotect Spain. A mere 4,000 cavalryand 40 elephants were sent withBomilcar and the home fleet toreinforce Hannibal in Italy. (It wasthe only reinforcement lie everreceived.) A new army of 12,000infantry, 1,500 cavalry and 20elephants was prepared for anexpedit ion to Sardinia.

The expeditionary army was prob-ably formed of a core of sonic sixthousand solid Libyan spearmen,supported by over 1,000 superbNumidian light cavalry and heavy

Carthaginian horse. There was alsoavailable a force of 13,850 Iberianinfantry and 1,200 cavalry from theThersitae, Mastiani, Oretes andOlcades tribes. ']'his uni t had beenposted to Africa in 218 by Hannibal,in keep ing with his policy of defend-ing Spain with African troops andAfrica with Iberians. Probably aboutsix thousand of these Iberian foot,with supporting cavalry wereass igned to the Sardinia bound army.This Iberian contingent was by nowwell dri lled, after three years ofgarrison duty in Africa.

The CommandersSo both Carthage and Rome preparedexpedit ions for Sardinia in the spr ingof 215. But these armies neededcommanders, and this posed aproblem for both empires. TheRoman Senate habitually turned toexperienced consulares (formerconsuls) to lead her armies inemergencies of this nature , however,few were available . Fives consulareshad already been slain in the firstthree years of this war: GaiusFlaminius (Trasimene); LuciusAemi lius Paullus, Marcus Minuciusand Gnaeus Servilius Geminus(Cannae); and Lucius PostumiusAlbinus (Litani). TiberiasSempronius Longus (Trebbia) andGains Terentius Varro (Cannae) werein disgrace. Quintus Fabius Maximusand Tiberias Sempronius Gracchus asconsuls, and Marcus ClaudiusMarcellus as proconsul facedHannibal, while Gnaeus and PublicsCornelius Scipio were in distantSpain. There were few triedleaders left. The praetor FulviusFlaccus, charged with designating atemporary commander for Sardinia,chose Titus Manlius Torquatus.

Manlius was one of the elder statesman of Rome, a stern, harsh manknown for his conservative, tradi-tional views. His intransigenceplayed a key role in the rejection ofHannibal's offer to ransom the 8,000Roman prisoners taken at Cannae,condemning these men to a life ofslavery. He was probably alreadyover 60 years of age, and likeMarcellus, he had probably served asa junior officer against HamilcarBarca in Sicily. His first consulship

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been served in Sardinia in 235.second consulship had been in, leading a punitive expedit ioninst the Celts after the invasion ofamon. 'tradition dictated that no

serve more than two consuls. Even though Fabius, Marcellusothers ignored this provision anded multiple consulships duringSecond Punic War, Manliusld have none of it. Later, in 210,r the leading century had elected, he forced them to annul the votebegin anew. Again in 207 lield refuse to stand for the consulwhen it was offered. But in this

e he agreed to serve temporari lyhe deputy of the stricken praetorcius, probably as a propraetor .nlius would return to Sardinia atwo decades since hi, firs tmand on the island.

thage had as yet los t no seniormanders in this war. Neverthe-, Carthage was also short oferienced generals. The veteranmanders of the Iberian conquestall accompanied Hannibal.drubal, his chief of staff, Hanno,of Bomilcar, Maharbal, Magonites, Hamilcar and Carthaloe all with the army in Italy.drubal Barca, his deputy Himilcohis brother Mago were engagedpain. With the best commandersady commit ted, the council inthage selected Hasdrubal the Baldead the Sardinian expedition. Hes not seem to have been a veteranhe Iberian campaigns, butdrubal may have campaignedinst the tribes on Carthage'sican frontier. The council ased Hasdrubal a deputy com-der, Mago. This general was saide a close relative of Hannibal,bably a cousin. Hasdrubal could

rely on the support of the generalno, already in Sardinia.

Race is Onthaginian and Roman expeditionse both prepared for Sardinia inspring of 215. The question was,ch would arrive first? Hasdrubalout first from Carthage, his army3,500 escorted by 60 quinqueremes.e could arr ive first, he could joinrebel Sardinian army to his own

and besiege the leaderless Romantroops in their bases. But fate took ahand. When in the open sea betweenCarthage and Sardinia, Hasdrubal 'sfleet was caught by a savage stormand hurled some 300 miles west ontothe Balearic Islands. Loss of life wasnot severe, but Hasdrubal found hehad to repair many of his ships beforecontinuing the journey. Hasdrubaltook advantage of this unexpecteddiversion to reinforce his army with astrong body of the renowned Balearicslingers.

While the Carthaginians cooled theirheels in the Balearics, Manlius set outwith his 5,400 men escorted by some40 quinqueremes. The Romanvoyage to Sardinia was uneventful,and Manlius put in at the provincialcapitol, Caralis (modern Cagliari) .The Romans had won the race, with ahelping hand from Neptune. ButManlius still faced a serious situation,with the island in full revolt and thegarrison disheartened and demoral-ized. Manlius took command ofMucius ' Legion V and added the

original garr ison allied troops to hisgreen Roman Legion XIV to form asecond double legion. This gave hima full consular army of about 18,000infantry, but with only 1,200 cavalry.Manlius was not sat isfied. To swellhis ranks, he grounded his fleet andpressed the marines and rowers intoservice as infantry. The crews of 40quinqueremes would provide over1,500 marines and 8,000 rowers.Manlius formed the marines intocohorts, and selected some 2,500 ofthe most capable rowers to serve aslightly armed veli tes. This added4,000 men to his army, bringing hisforce up to 22,000 foot and 1,200horse.

Manlius undoubtedly would haveappreciated some time to drill hisforce and develop more cohesionamongst his V and XIV Legions,garrison troops and naval infantry,but there was no time to spare.Manlius had to suppress theSardinian rebellion, before therumored Carthaginian expedition

arrived. So Manlius led his dis jointedarmy out of Caralis, seeking the mainrebel concentration. As fate wouldlave it, when Manlius came upon therain rebel host, Hampsicora wasaway, recrui ting amongst the Goatskintribes of the mountains. He had lefthis son Hostus in command of thearmy, which may have numbered15,000 men. Hostus was young andreckless and immediately attackedthe larger Roman army when itapproached. Manlius predic tablyrouted the rebel army. Its losses wereonly 3,000 killed and 800 takenprisoner, indicating that most of therebels fled before the figh ting got toohot .

Hasdrubal and Company ArriveHampsicora established a new base atCornus with his Goatskin lightinfantry and began collecting thescattered remnants of his army.Manlius, as soon as lie learned ofHampsicora's location, advanced onCornus to finish off the insurrection.The war in Sardinia would have beenover, but just then word came that aCarthaginian fleet had landed on theWestern coast. Hasdrubal the Baldquickly disembarked his force of over14,000 men, then dismissed his fleet.Manlius chose a cautious course,abandoned the field and withdrewback to his base at Caralis.Hasdrubal joined with Hampsicora,who by now had rallied an army ofover 12,000 Sardinian tribesmen toreinforce the Carthaginian expedi -tion. The combined armies nownumbered nearly 27,000 men.

Manlius' hasty retreat seems a hitpremature in retrospect. A moreaggressive commander could haveheld the field and possibly preventedthe juncture of Hasd rubal andHampsicora. Manlius, however, wasnot chosen for his aggressiveness. Itwas his steady, cautious nature thatthe Roman senate counted on.Manlius knew well that ten Romanlegions had already been lost in thiswar. He wasn 't about to lose twomore. A younger noble, in his firstpraetorship or consulship, mighthave felt compelled to risk battle toestabli sh his reputation. Manliusalready had his share of glory, and

could freely put the interest of Romeahead of his own. Besides, the Punicsuperiori ty in cavalry mean t that hecould have had lit tle intelligence onthe size or intentions of Hasdrubal 'sarmy. The prudent course was to fallback on his secure base, develop thesituation, and engage in battle onlyunder clearer, safer circumstances.

Hasdrubal, with an army slightlylarger than the Roman force, fol lowedManlius, looting and pil laging thevil lages of any pro-Roman tribesalong the way. Manlius fell back allthe way to Caralis, gradually piecingtogether a clearer picture of theinvading army he faced. Though theforce was large, a great portion of itsstrength was from the often beatenirregular Sardinians. Hasdrubal'shard core of professional mercenarieswas much smaller than the Romanarmy. In any case, Manlius could notallow the pil lage of Rome's loyalsubjects to continue indefinitely.Manlius took the field just outside,Caralis. Hasdrubal accepted thechallenge of battle with no reluctance.

The Battle of CaralisUnfortunately, Livy 's account of thebattle (Book XXIII, Chapter 40) istypically vague and muddled, but itis the only one we have. Hasdrubalhad about 25,000 foot, 2,000 horseand 20 elephants. Some 2,000 of hisinfantry would have been left behindto guard his camp. Manlius had22,000 infantry and 1,200 cavalry, andwould have detailed a camp guard ofsimilar size. All we know for sureabout the deployment is thatHasdrubal the Bald deployed hisarmy in two wings - the Carthaginianexpedit ionary force on one side andthe Sardinian levies on the other. Thiswould have been similar toHasdrubal Barca's later deploymentat the Battle of the Metaurus. Like hisnamesake, the bald Hasdrubal mayhave tried to reinforce his weaker(Sardinian) wing with a secu re flank,defensible terrain and his elephants.Manlius most likely deployed hisarmy in standard formation - twoRoman legions in the center, withItalian allies and the marine s androwers on the flanks.

The bat tle was hotly contested, thefighting reportedly lasting fourhours. The Carthaginian wing washaving the best of it on its side, whilethe Romans gradually gained theupper hand over Hampsicora'slevies. Finally, the Sardinians wererouted. The Roman legion whichoverpowered the Sardinians nextswung around to fall on the flank andrear of the Carthaginian wing. TheAfrican and Iberian mercenaries weretrapped and practically annihi lated.The Romans counted 12,000 slain onthe battlefield, and took 3,700prisoners.

Hostus had died fighting. His father ,Hampsicora, fled with a few horsemen. When he learned of themagnitude of the defeat, and thedeath of his son, Hampsicora fell onhis sword that night. Hasdrubal,Mago and Hanno were all capturedalive, an unusual occurrence perhapsbrought about by the envelopment ofthe Carthaginian wing. Captivitywas surely a cruel fate, but certainlybetter than the crucifixion thatawaited so many ear lier unsuccessfulCarthaginian commanders inSardinia.

AftermathThe war for Sardinia was over. Theremnants of Hasdrubal's army werehunted down. The captured merce-nar ies may well have been taken intoRoman service, as happened later inSicily. Manlius, when the campaignwas complete, gathered up his sai lorsand re-manned his fleet. Thewizened Manlius then laid down hiscommand in Sardinia, and sailedhack to Rome. The senate kept a fullconsular army of two legions inSardinia for most of the remainder ofthe war, to guard against the threatfrom Carthage. In the event,Carthage never mounted anotherattack on this island province.

The failure of Hasdrubal the Bald'sexpedit ion was one of a number ofdisappointments that ruined the onlychance Carthage had to win the war,during the campaign of 215. FirstHasdrubal Barca had been defeatedat Dertosa, then Hasdrubal the Baldlost this bat tle in Sardinia and finallythe ambassadors negotiating thetreaty between Hannibal and KingPhilip V were captured by Romannaval patrols, delaying theMacedonian entry into the war for awhole year. The momentum ofvictory, painstakingly generated atTrebia, Trasimene and Cannae, wassquandered on the fields of Dertosaand Caralis.

Notes on the ScenarioLegions probably didn't havepermanent numbers at this time, sothe designat ions V and XIV are nothistorical, but rather chosen to matchthe uni ts in the SPQR counter-mix.The deployment for both armies isonly an educated guess, and playersmay Wish to use free deployment. Ifusing this opt ion, allow the Romanplayer to select the map and deployfirst. The Carthaginian player mayobserve the Roman dispositions andthen deploy his forces, the advantageof a superior mounted force.