epq - why did north korea not collapse in the late 1990s and early 2000s?

7/25/2019 EPQ - Why Did North Korea Not Collapse in the Late 1990s and Early 2000s?

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2016

Why did North Koreanot collapse in the late1990s and early 2000s?



Section 1: Introduction

An introduction to North Korea and my report

North Korea (or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as it is officially known) came into

existence on the 9th of September 1948, following its liberation from Japanese rule. Prior to the

Japanese occupation, Korea had existed as a single political entity for almost a millennium, however

the US and USSR agreed to split it arbitrarily along the geographically and culturally insignificant 38th

parallel, creating North Korea and South Korea (The Republic of Korea). Apart from a brief period of

rapidly shifting boundaries during the Korean War, the two Koreas have retained these borders ever

since. Ever since the departure of the occupying Soviet forces, the Kim dynasty has ruled Korea,

through Kim Il Sung, his son Kim Jong Il, and currently Kim Jong Il’s son Kim Jong Un.

North Korea was originally a socialist state, however gradually moved away from that towards its

own ideology of Juche – that is, self-reliance, along with Korean nationalism, militarism, and the

necessitation of a totalitarian leader for the revolution. An important method of North Korean state

control of its population is the total lack of free press in North Korea (North Korea is rated 2nd last

out of 180 countries in the World Press Freedom Index), and the extreme restriction they put on the

information that is allowed to leave the country.1 In short, this means that information coming from

inside North Korea is not a reliable source and should not be trusted, although can be used to

establish general information and look at propaganda. This means that reliable information about

North Korea is very hard to come by, as typically reliable sources only have access to estimated data

and anecdotal evidence.2 This will mean that, although I was able to collate lots of sources of

evidence, we will never be able to truly analyse North Korea until it begins to release reliable

information that its government has gathered, which is the main limitation of my report.

In my report, I will look at the famine itself, internal reasons why North Korea did not collapse – that

is, what the North Korean state does to keep its people in line; and external reasons why NorthKorea did not collapse – how North Korea deals with foreign countries that threaten it and even uses

them to its advantage. I will conclude with my personal thoughts on why North Korea did not

collapse.

Key Terms

The Kims – The Kim Dynasty of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un. Kim Jong Il is the leader at

the time of the famine, however due to limited sources and the consistency of the regime’s

repression over time, I often speak about policies in the periods of other leaders.

North Korea or the North – The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

South Korea or the South – The Republic of Korea

The Famine – The North Korean famine of the 1990s and early 2000s, existing chiefly from 1994-

1998, known as the Arduous March in North Korea

US – United States of America

1 Unknown, ‘2015 World Press Freedom Index’, https://index.rsf.org/#!/index-details, last accessed 20th

February 20162

Daniel Goodkind and Loraine West, ‘The North Korean Famine and Its Demographic Impact’, Population andDevelopment Review, 27:2 (June 2001), p.219-238

https://index.rsf.org/#!/index-details






The North Korean Famine

Traditionally, North Korea imported food from the Southern region, however after the partition of

the country this was no longer viable, and therefore the policy of Juche encouraged self-sufficiency

to amend this. However, due to a mixture of natural conditions and government policy, this was

never the case. The arable land, which is of limited supply to start with, is of low fertility. It has beencalculated that even pre-famine, a grain shortfall of 12% is likely.3 This has led to the overuse of

fertilisers, causing soil depletion, acidification and decreasing crop yields. Equally, the state run

farming system is very poorly managed, with extreme inflexibility caused by near-total

centralisation.4

As a member of the Communist bloc, North Korea relied extensively on its fellow socialist nations for

trade and aid, especially the USSR, which was its main trading partner and provider of agricultural

help.5 However, beginning in the late 1980s, the USSR declined and collapsed, eventually ceasing to

exist in December 1991. Exports from Russia fell in value from $1.97bn to $0.58bn from 1990-91,

and continued to fall afterwards.6 This caused an immediate, and hefty, impact on food production

and their ability to import food. They began to run a propaganda campaign: “Let’s eat only twomeals a day” to encourage the country to consume less, and unusually, even began to publically

admit food shortages.7 The two economies practically fell in parallel, as shown in the graphs below.

Figure (1) shows North Korean GDP Growth, and Figure (2) shows the USSR and post-Communist

Russia’s GDP.

A series of devastating natural disasters only served to compound the situation. These first arrived in

July and August 1995, with severe flooding. This allowed the North Korean government to go public

about their economic woes (as they could now blame an external factor). Although damages were

overestimated, the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations) and WFP (United

Nations World Food Programme) stated that “2.1 million children and 500,000 pregnant women”

were at risk of starvation.8 More floods arrived in July 1996. These natural disasters were surely

helped by poor agricultural practises – the increasing need for land and energy directly lead to

deforestation, and as trees absorb water, floods were more likely. The floods were so great that the

North Korea government was forced to ask for UN assistance in late 1995, after producing only

3.49mn tons of grain, 3 million less than required.9 Furthermore, crops in 1997 were hindered by a

major drought, and 1998 by an accumulation of this and extended snowfall the previous winter. An

inability to import fuel and repair equipment further compounded the issues.

3

Daniel Goodkind and Loraine West, ‘The North Korean Famine and Its Demographic Impact’, Population andDevelopment Review, 27:2 (June 2001), p.219-2384 Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, Tao Wang, ‘Famine in North Korea: Causes and Cures’, Economic

Development and Cultural Change, 49:4 (July 2001), pp.741-7675 Daniel Goodkind and Loraine West, ‘The North Korean Famine and Its Demographic Impact’, Population and

Development Review, 27:2 (June 2001), p.219-2386 Daniel Goodkind and Loraine West, ‘The North Korean Famine and Its Demographic Impact’, Population and

Development Review, 27:2 (June 2001), p.219-2387 Barbara Demick, ‘The unpalatable appetites of Kim Jong-il’,

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/8809102/The-unpalatable-appetites-of-Kim-

Jong-il.html, last accessed 21 Jan 20168 Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, Tao Wang, ‘Famine in North Korea: Causes and Cures’, Economic

Development and Cultural Change, 49:4 (July 2001), pp.741-7679 Daniel Goodkind and Loraine West, ‘The North Korean Famine and Its Demographic Impact’, Population and

Development Review, 27:2 (June 2001), p.219-238

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/8809102/The-unpalatable-appetites-of-Kim-Jong-il.html







The Public Distribution System – which had previously provided food to 62% of the population – had

almost entirely broken down, with 95% of people now reliant on informal markets.10 Those who did

not have access to these markets, and workers at ravaged farms, were hence most adversely

affected by the famine.11 It was thought even with increasing aid that 90% of this was diverted

directly to government officials and the military, leaving only 10% of food for the truly needy.12 In

“The North Korean Famine and its Demographic Impact”, using various sources of data, Goodkindand West sum up that there were 600,000 to 1 million famine-related deaths from 1995-2000.13 Yet,

despite a near total breakdown in its socialist food and employment system and the deaths of nearly

5% of the population, North Korea did not collapse.

A lot of the traditional thought on the issue surrounds the idea that North Korea does not collapse

because China is absolutely indignant that it will not collapse, and protects it from foreign

intervention. It is absolutely true that these potential events would be devastating for China, and

China does support North Korea financially, but I argue the actions of the North Korean government

– especially in state control and nuclearisation – are the real reasons it did not collapse.

14 (1)

10 Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, Tao Wang, ‘Famine in North Korea: Causes and Cures’, Economic

Development and Cultural Change, 49:4 (July 2001), pp.741-76711 Daniel Goodkind and Loraine West, ‘The North Korean Famine and Its Demographic Impact’, Popula tion and



Development Review, 27:2 (June 2001), p.219-23814 Marcus Noland, ‘North Korean Economic Performance in 2011’,

http://blogs.piie.com/nk/files/2012/08/New-Picture-10.jpg, last accessed 13 Jan 2016

http://blogs.piie.com/nk/files/2012/08/New-Picture-10.jpg





15 (2)

Section 2: Internal Reasons as to why North Korea did not collapse

North Korea is the most authoritarian state in the world. In the World Freedom Index, it is given the

worst rating for both political rights and civil liberties. 16 In the Democracy Index, it is ranked last

with a score of just 1.08, being described as an authoritarian regime.17 It has never held free

elections and leadership of the country passes down family lines. But how does North Korea keep

such control over its people?

State Control

The state has total control over all aspects of society. There is no legal North Korean organisation

that is not operated and controlled by the Korean state. Hence, the groups have no independence,and are simply organs of the state with the purpose of benefitting the state. For example, the Kim Il-

sung Socialist Youth League is charged with indoctrinating those aged eighteen to twenty-eight.18 In

theory, people are also totally reliant on the state for food, employment, education, and healthcare,

however in recent times many of these support systems have broken down. Nonetheless, the state

retains its repressive measures of control, even if the state cannot provide as many positive

incentives for the people to support it anymore. Kim Jong Il felt these were more important to retain

when the famine crunched the North Korean budget.

Upon birth, North Koreans are grouped into a specific class based on their family background – for

example, if their family fought in the Korean War (good), or if their family were immigrants from

Japan (bad). “Songbun” involves 5 classes (from best to worst): special, nucleus, basic, complex, and

15 Gail Tverberg, ‘Is it really possible to decouple GDP Growth from Energy Growth?’,

https://ourfiniteworld.com/2011/11/15/is-it-really-possible-to-decouple-gdp-growth-from-energy-growth/,

last accessed 21 Jan 2016 16 Arch Puddington and Tyler Roylance, ‘Freedom in the World 2016’,

https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2016/overview-essay-anxious-dictators-wavering-

democracies, last accessed 31st March 201617 The Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Democracy Index 2015’, http://www.yabiladi.com/img/content/EIU-

Democracy-Index-2015.pdf , last accessed 31st

March 201618 Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, ‘Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North

Korea’, International Security 35:1, (pp.44-74)

https://ourfiniteworld.com/2011/11/15/is-it-really-possible-to-decouple-gdp-growth-from-energy-growth/

https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2016/overview-essay-anxious-dictators-wavering-democracies



http://www.yabiladi.com/img/content/EIU-Democracy-Index-2015.pdf











hostile. 19 Assigned from birth, under most circumstances your Songbun cannot change. Songbun will

influence an entire person’s life – for example, a poor Songbun will mean they are kept away from

the showpiece capital where a food distribution system exists and living standards are higher, and

you can’t enter university, limiting job opportunities. This allows the North Korean state to limit

people from birth, to prevent those deemed politically dangerous from ever reaching positions

where they have power or influence. Furthermore, it means they can easily keep ties on people – itis far easier to know who to monitor if people have already been classified as dangerous.

The extent to which the North Korean state (and the North Korean people) monitors society is

massive, largely conducted by the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the North Korean secret police.

Their scope is huge – they have offices in every town, and aim to have an informant in 1 in 5

households.20 The police regularly conduct surprise home visits to check on people and are installed

in factories and farms to check on the workers.21 Even the secret service is not immune – there are 9

competing information bureaus across the nation, to prevent one becoming too powerful and to

make sure the others stay loyal.22

Furthermore, people are either financially incentivised or coerced into giving information to thepolice, which leads to a massive network of informants. All North Koreans belong to a

neighbourhood “inminban” which is watched over by a middle-aged woman who informs on them

all and makes sure they are up to the required standards. 23 This creates an atmosphere of terror in

the country, and means that people cannot easily organise resistance organisations as they fear

being spied upon. If people do want to resist, they would have to keep those thoughts to themselves

due to the pure number of informants.

The MSS is also in charge of the North Korean prison camp system. Harking back to Soviet gulags and

Nazi concentration camps, these camps either temporarily or permanently contain dissident North

Koreans – some for crimes as small as crossing the Chinese border. If you are imprisoned in a

maximum security political prison camp, you will never be released. The three-generations policy

also means your close family members will be sent there as well. The three-generations policy allows

the state to hold its people to ransom – for example, a potential defector knows that his entire

family will be severely punished should he defect, deterring him.

Once arrested, North Koreans go through the preliminary investigation phase, which legally can only

last up to two months but often extends to two years.24 Here they are tortured for information and

kept in inhumane conditions. Any pregnant woman entering this stage will have her pregnancy

terminated, often through physical violence; they are then often made infertile through the use of

19 Fyodor Tertitskiy, ‘Are you special, basic or complex? Behind North Korea’s caste system’,

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/04/are-you-special-basic-or-complex-behind-north-koreas-

caste-system, last accessed 13th Jan 201620 Ji-Min Kang, ‘Neighbourhood Watch: Inside North Korea’s secret police system’,

https://www.nknews.org/2014/02/neighborhood-watch-inside-north-koreas-secret-service-system/, last

accessed 18th Jan 201621 Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, ‘Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North

Korea’, International Security 35:1, (pp.44-74)22 Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, ‘Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North


Korea’, International Security 35:1, (pp.44-74)24 Sang Hun Kim, Eyewitness: A Litany of North Korean Crimes Against Humanity Prima Facie Evidence, (North

Korean Human Rights, the Third Way, 2012), p.24

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/04/are-you-special-basic-or-complex-behind-north-koreas-caste-system



https://www.nknews.org/2014/02/neighborhood-watch-inside-north-koreas-secret-service-system/







extreme heat.25 Although physical violence is often not the most effective way to gain information in

torture, it does create a huge deterrence to the rest of the population and the “criminal” to not

commit crimes – even in the earliest stages of the justice system. It also serves to break down their

remaining morale and resistance.

With or without a show trial, the North Koreans are then sent to the prison camps. Conditions at thecamps are appalling. There is a limited water supply, and the one toilet inside the cell is not cleaned.

There is no heating system beyond a stove in the corridor, and with temperature averages as low as

-12oC in winter, many prisoners die of cold-related illnesses.26 Prisoners are undernourished, being

provided with only 300-400 grams of rations per day. Despite this, they are made to work from

around 9am until very late in the evening, in dangerous jobs such as mining or working with

radioactive materials.27 It is through this that the North Korean state reaps benefits from its

prisoners, as they can be made to work in awful conditions with no real reward.

Torture and atrocities are a fact of life in the North Korean prison system. Examples of punishments

are sexual violence, physical violence, being made to do exercises and stand in painful positions, and

being put in a tiny cage (3). There are two major benefits of these awful acts, considering theprisoners will never be released: to keep them disciplined and hardworking within the camp; and to

deter others in the country from doing anything that may hurt the North Korean state.

25 Sang Hun Kim, Eyewitness: A Litany of North Korean Crimes Against Humanity Prima Facie Evidence, (North

Korean Human Rights, the Third Way, 2012), p.2926 Unknown, ‘Pyongyang Monthly Climate Average, North Korea’,

http://www.worldweatheronline.com/pyongyang-weather-averages/kp.aspx, last accessed 18th

February 201627 Sang Hun Kim, Eyewitness: A Litany of North Korean Crimes Against Humanity Prima Facie Evidence, (North

Korean Human Rights, the Third Way, 2012), p.86

http://www.worldweatheronline.com/pyongyang-weather-averages/kp.aspx





(3)28

Loyalty: Propaganda, The Cult of Personality, and Information Control

Repressive measures of control are not sufficient to control a population. The state endeavours frombirth to indoctrinate people into supporting the North Korean state, loving the leaders, and fearing

foreign countries.

Over time, an extensive personality cult has been built around Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Aspects of

history have been substantially altered for this end – for example, that Kim Jong Il was born on the

holy Mount Paektu, rather than in the Russian military camp at Vyatskoye. Mount Paektu is an

incredibly sacred place for Koreans, supposedly being the birthplace of the united Korea’s first

kingdom’s legendary founder, Dangun. Through this, instead of Kim Jong Il being portrayed as a

foreigner, he is instead intrinsically linked to the Korean nation and is embedded with mystical

qualities.

In a similar way, Kim Il Sung is portrayed as the sole torchbearer of the anti-Japanese struggle, and

the sole reason why the Japanese were eventually defeated and removed from Korea with little

credit to the USSR and none to the USA, or rival guerrillas.29 This leads to a feeling of gratitude to the

Kim dynasty, as it is shown that without them it would be impossible for Korea to have been

liberated. Also, it sets the Kims out special – only they were responsible for the survival of Korea. A

key aspect of Juche is the revolutionary role of the leader – which sets it apart from traditional

Socialist thought, as it is traditionally a movement lead by the masses, and should eventually devolve

28 Sang Hun Kim, Eyewitness: A Litany of North Korean Crimes Against Humanity Prima Facie Evidence, (North

Korean Human Rights, the Third Way, 2012), p.13929 Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, ‘Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North




into a leaderless society. By portraying Kim Il Sung as the sole liberator, he is legitimised as the

revolutionary leader – the Suryong – and is made a necessary part of the North Korean state.

According to Bruce Cumings, “Loyalty and filial piety form the deepest well-springs of Korean

virtue”.30 In North Korea, the state attempts to transfer this loyalty from the biological father to the

leader – Kim Jong Il, or Kim Il Sung, who remains eternal president and was given the moniker“Fatherly Leader”. Fatherly qualities and roles are supplied to them - for example, as the provider. In

December 2015, an article from the state-run Pyongyang Times newspaper carried an article stating

that “The Korean people are now enjoying happy life in better-equipped houses under the care of

supreme leader Kim Jong Un.”31 The state attempts to inspire a great degree of love, and also a great

degree of duty, to the Kims by reproducing them as fatherly figures.

Korea has always been an extremely religious, spiritual, and superstitious nation. The North Korean

regime has cracked down on the previous religions – with Western missionaries sent to labour

camps for attempting to distribute the Bible.32 It has replaced these with a new mythology

surrounding the Kim dynasty. When Kim Jong Il died, the KCNA (Korean Central News Network)

claimed that nature itself mourned – ice on Lake Chon cracked and a snowstorm arrived.33 The factthat Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung are godlike figures inspires devotion and respect from the people.

Partially separated from the personality cult, a lot of propaganda is around the political ideology of

Juche, which centres around self-reliance. This pervades into economic, political and military

independence. It justifies refusing to yield to foreign pressure, and the huge military that North

Korea maintains. Economically, it should mean that North Korea is an autarky, although this isn’t

true in practise as it relies on a huge amount of aid. In terms of effects, Juche-related propaganda

has two key messages: the first being that man is the master of his own destiny, which translates

into Korea’s improvement coming through the hard work and devotion of the people.

The second message is of independence and a “North Korea against the world” ethos. This is backedup by extreme nationalism and xenophobia in North Korea. North Korea nationalism is “deeply

racist” with Americans and Japanese described as “bastards, jackals, and swine”.34 America is

entirely blamed for the division of the peninsula, and Japan is despised for its occupation in the

1900s. South Koreans are seen contaminated by America. The nationalism even extends to genetics

– Korean women in China who are repatriated while pregnant will have their children forcibly

aborted.35 This means that North Korea is presented as the only morally just country, and it uses this

to drum up fear in the people that they are at constant threat of invasion. Also, as North Korea is

presented as a victim of US sanctions, foreign countries are blamed for North Korea’s shortages and

poor economic situation, diverting blame from the North Korean leadership. This will further mean

30 Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, ‘Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North

Korea’, International Security 35:1, (pp.44-74)31 Jong Sun Bok, ‘State gives homes to workers free of charge’,

http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/order/pytimes/?page=Culture&no=21317, last accessed 24th January 201632 Ju-min Park, ‘Kenneth Bae, Jailed American, Plotted To Overthrow Government, North Korea Charges’,

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/10/kenneth-bae-plotted-overthrow-government_n_3250241.html ,

last accessed 27th January 201633 Unknown, ‘Kim Jong-il death: ‘Nature mourns’ N Korean leader’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-

16297811, last accessed 2nd February 201634 Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, ‘Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North

Korea’, International Security 35:1, (pp.44-74)35 Sang Hun Kim, Eyewitness: A Litany of North Korean Crimes Against Humanity Prima Facie Evidence, (North

Korean Human Rights, the Third Way, 2012), p

http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/order/pytimes/?page=Culture&no=21317


http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/10/kenneth-bae-plotted-overthrow-government_n_3250241.html


http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16297811










the people are more willing to make sacrifices, as they feel they are constantly at threat and that the

sacrifices are a necessity.

Of course, it is not just sufficient for the North Korean state to just say these things – they must

convince the people to believe them. An absolutely pervasive system of indoctrination is required. In

schools, 35% of elementary (primary) school education is “political” (that is, on the Kim Dynasty,Juche, foreign enemies etc.), and this rises to 40% at university level.36 In schools, even standard

subjects are filled with nationalistic content, for example maths questions on tanks and American

bastards.37 Figure (3) shows a typical North Korean textbook.

(4)38

The cult of personality is just as pervasive. As well as being included in education, it also extends to

over 35,000 statues across North Korea. The calendar of North Korea begins in Juche 1, which is the

year of Kim Il Sung’s birth. While North Korea suffered through its terrible famine, $1 billion dollars

were spent expanding Kumsusan Memorial Palace where Kim Il Sung’s body lies in state.39 In the

media, even the names of the Kim’s are put in a bigger font. Their day-to-day visits are presented as

huge news – for example, Kim Jong Il visiting and advising the Rason Taehung Trading Company.40

The final factor that makes the propaganda more believable is the almost complete restriction on

foreign information entering the country. There is no internet access (just the state run intranet),and TVs and radios are only tuneable to government stations. Citizens are not allowed to travel

abroad unless they are part of the elite or are kept in special compounds, separate from the country


Korea’, International Security 35:1, (pp.44-74)37 Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, ‘Pyongyang’s Surviva l Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North

Korea’, International Security 35:1, (pp.44-74)38 Yang Jung A, ‘North Korean Education from 7 Years Old, “Become the Dictator’s Soldier”’,

http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=1028, last accessed 3rd March 201639 Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, ‘Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North

Korea’, International Security 35:1, (pp.44-74)40 Unknown, ‘Kim Jong Il Inspects Trading Company, http://www.kcnawatch.co/newstream/1451886788-

427167088/kim-jong-il-inspects-trading-company/, last accessed 21 February 2016

http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=1028


http://www.kcnawatch.co/newstream/1451886788-427167088/kim-jong-il-inspects-trading-company/









they are living in. However, since the famine, where it was necessary for the regime to turn a blind-

eye to smuggling and free markets, there has been a decrease in information control. Nonetheless,

harsh punishments still exist for consuming foreign information.41

Co-Optation of Elites

Despite North Korea clearly being a dictatorship, a leader cannot maintain control as just one man.

Kim Jong Il’s power was backed up by political and military elites. Under Kim Il Sung, his fellow

guerrilla fighters made up his inner circle; however, leading up to and following his death, Kim Jong Il

replaced them with classmates from university as well as military might. The policy of Songbun,

which was proclaimed in 1995 by Kim Jong Il, is a “military first” policy – placing military spending,

research, and social status above the rest of the nation. Even now, military spending is at 20.8% of

GDP, and 40% of the population is in some way a member of the armed forces. 42 Kim Jong Il also

elevated the National Defence Commission to the most powerful body in North Korean decision

making.43 This, along with bellicose posturing towards foreign powers in recent times, was Kim Jong

Il’s way of showing the military that he supported them – and this in return meant he was

guaranteed their support.

This co-optation of elites extends beyond the military. Instead of distributing benefits and rewards

equally among all contributing citizens, the vast majority will go to the “politically important”.44

These benefits include: lucrative government posts; better housing; luxury goods; business

opportunities; opportunities to go abroad; and funding for pet projects.45 This is an incredibly

powerful strategy: instead of having to please the masses as in a democracy, the only people who

have to be satisfied are those controlling the masses. This is far more affordable for the North

Korean government, and means that the powerful in society will support them.

During the famine, the hardships were shifted from the elites to political opponents.46 The “core

class” – broadly those in Pyongyang; military members; and bureaucrats and administrators in theoutlying regions – received far more and far better quality food, as their own food distribution

system continued while the Public Distribution System broke down. As part of the Songbun system,

people of the hostile and wavering classes were often sent to live in rural areas - the thirty-five worst

affected counties in the famine were all rural.47 This was an active effort by the leadership to defend

the core classes, while disposing of those he either did not care for or actively distrusted. Working

down the food-chain, the elites control the various organs that control the people, keeping the

population subservient to the regime.


Korea’, International Security 35:1, (pp.44-74)42 Unknown, ‘Military Spending’, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/budget.htm, last

accessed 18 February 201643 Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, ‘Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North






http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/budget.htm






However, even the elites are kept in check by methods that go beyond pure bribery. It cannot be

assumed that North Koreans keep the elites happy and this on its own keeps them totally loyal to

the state. Above the elites were Kim Jong Il’s inner circle: people of close family ties and old

university associates from the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School.48 There is also a sense of reliance

for the elites on the continued existence of the regime – without it, not only would they lose

benefits, but they would be accountable to a new regime who would presumably crack down onthem for human rights abuses and corruption. Kim Jong Il has his own paramilitary force, reporting

directly to him, which could defend him against the army. Although positive, incentivising methods

are used to keep control of the elites, there is always a high level of control and repression.

Section 3: External Reasons as to why North Korea did not Collapse

North Korea began its nuclear weapons program in the 1980s. Exact dates and details are unknown:

it was a largely secret nuclear weapons program, and remains so. It is highly likely that they did this

with either direct or indirect help from the USSR: the USSR had provided a research reactor in the

1960s, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of its nuclear scientists moved there.49 By

the 1990s, North Korea had a 5 MW atomic reactor; two larger 50MW and 200MW reactors underconstruction; and a plutonium reprocessing plant.50 Despite its protestations of peaceful, electricity-

generating reasons for its programs, it also developed delivery systems: by 1998, it had the Nodong

missile which could theoretically hit anywhere in South Korea and most of Japan, and soon extended

this to be able to reach the US West Coast.51

To understand the power of nuclear weapons, it is important to acknowledge MAD, Mutually

Assured Destruction. The theory goes that if a country used nuclear weapons on another nuclearised

country, it would retaliate, leading to the complete annihilation of both sides. This meant a

nuclearized North Korea was an incredibly grave risk to the United States, South Korea, and Japan.

Crucially for North Korea, it benefitted from the fact that the United States now could not attack it

without risking severe destruction even in its early stages of nuclear weapons production, and that

the breakdown of North Korea would be a grave risk to geographically close countries such as China,

giving them incentives to prevent regime change – by defending the Kim regime, and becoming

North Korea’s most important trading partner.

North Korea appeared to support denuclearisation in the lead up to the 1990s, by signing the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985 and pledging not to possess nuclear weapons in

1991.52 It allowed one inspection of its facilities, however rejected a second approach and

announced in 1993 it intended to withdraw from the NPT.53 This led to the first time North Korea

began to use its nuclear weapons development program as a blackmailing chip to gain concessions


Korea’, International Security 35:1, (pp.44-74)49 Larry A. Niksch, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program’,

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk24.pdf , last accessed January 12th 201650 Larry A. Niksch, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program’,



http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk24.pdf , last accessed January 12th

201653 Larry A. Niksch, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program’,

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk24.pdf , last accessed January 12th 2016

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk24.pdf

















from the US, with the US administration agreeing to high-level talks in return for North Korea

suspending its withdrawal in June 1993.54

The Agreed Framework of 1994 agreed that North Korea would halt operations and infrastructure

development of its Nuclear Weapons program.55 This however was not free, and brought a great

many benefits to North Korea as it struggled through the beginnings of the famine. North Koreawould receive two light water nuclear reactors (purely for generating electricity); 500,000 tons of

heavy oil until these reactors were constructed; resolutions to enter into full diplomatic relations;

lifting of economic sanctions; and its own security guaranteed by the United States. Especially in

terms of energy needs, this went someway to making up the void left by the collapse of the USSR.

However, if America thought this would be the conclusion to the issue of a nuclearized North Korea,

its awarding of concessions simply inspired North Korea to keep going.

North Korea carried out a missile test in 1998, and in 2002 revealed that they were running a secret

nuclear weapons program.56 It had traded ballistic missiles with Pakistan in return for the know-how

of enriching uranium. The US immediately ended shipments of heavy oil, and North Korea acted

angrily in response, restarting plutonium based nuclear facilities and expelling weapons inspectors.57 However, the opinion of the 6 key parties involved in talks – North Korea, the US, Russia, China,

Japan, and South Korea – shifted in North Korea’s favour (except for the USA). Benefitted by South

Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” of peaceful coexistence and aid without any requirements from the North,

the North exploited the talks for their own gain.

China now bribes North Korea to take part in nuclear talks – with cash and energy aid.58 South Korea

literally paid North Korea to attend the 2000 summit, and has provided extra economic incentives

such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which employed 54,000 North Korean workers, contributing

$2 billion in trade by its closure in February 2016.59 The USA paid a fee in order to be allowed to

inspect a nuclear facility, and provided 500,000 tons of food aid prior to a 2008 deal.60 In total, this

“nuclear extortion” provided North Korea with $6 billion dollars in direct aid. Obviously, this money

was incredibly useful for propping up the economy, military, and the elite. However, North Korea’s

ability to repeatedly harangue on their promises and deals meant that North Korea could keep

coming back for more, which they got. This could even be brought back to a fear of North Korea’s

nuclearisation, as the other nations were so afraid of North Korea becoming even more of a

provocateur that they were willing to do anything to try and de-escalate tensions, and keep North

Korea from proliferating their nuclear weapons.

As a final point, it must be noted how much it is in China’s interest for North Korea not to collapse.

North Korea’s collapse would almost certainly lead to a flood of refugees into China along the largely

54 Larry A. Niksch, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program’,




http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk24.pdf , last accessed January 12th 201658 Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, ‘Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North

Korea’, International Security 35:1, (pp.44-74)59 Unknown, ‘What is the Kaesong Industrial Complex’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-22011178, last

accessed 18th

January 201660 Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, ‘Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North










http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-22011178










unprotected border (compared to the fortified South Korean border). It would almost certainly not

break down cleanly: rival military factions would go to war with one another causing chaos. And the

nuclear technology and weapons that North Korea owns could end up in one faction’s possession.

Right now, regardless of how the foreign media portrays it, North Korea absolutely is a rational actor

– it will not launch nuclear missiles without severe provocation. A highly volatile military faction

attempting to gain control would be extremely irrational, and may launch nuclear missiles withinKorea. Therefore, the North’s continued existence is absolutely in China’s interest, which is why it

receives so much financial backing from China, and why China puts so much effort into making the

talks – which benefit North Korea so – go ahead.61

Therefore, North Korea’s foreign policy in the late 1990s and early 2000s can be summed up as such:

it scares nations, and then it plays on that fear to gain benefits from them. When it gains benefits, it

scares them further by reneging on the deals they make. It does this all while never putting the

continued existence of the North Korean state at risk, largely due to its nuclear weapons system.

However, North Korea’s “nuclear blackmail” is not as key a factor as emphasised in previous

research. Although it did bring in some funds, the proliferation of weapons technology itself was also

profitable, and in the grand-scheme of the economy, the money was not huge. It was North Korea’s

ability to keep its nuclear weapons that was the true success of its negotiation tactics.

Section 4: Conclusion

In conclusion, I believe the key reasons North Korea did not collapse are due to the extreme levels of

state control, the co-optation of elites, and its possession of nuclear weapons. China’s support of

North Korea is a factor but not a vital one – although North Korea would undoubtedly suffer if China

withdrew its support, North Korea has survived losing the support of a key benefactor previously,

when the USSR collapsed in 1991. North Korea survived then, despite the terrible famine, due to the

policies of its government, not intervention from foreign ones, and it seems extremely likely that

North Korea would again survive due to government policy. The idea that North Korea is defended

by China is also overstated: it would be incredibly dangerous to invade North Korea regardless of

Chinese support due to its possession of nuclear weapons.

The level of state control over the population is unquestionably at the greatest level in any country

in the world. With Songbun, people are classified from birth; with the MSS and other security

services, people are watched throughout their entire lives; and with the prison camp system, people

are either severely deterred from crimes or severely punished for committing them. There is no

benefit to the people of any sort of rebellion or dissidence, and extreme consequences for it. This

concurs with the opinion of the Minister of Parliament I wrote to, Fiona Bruce MP. She wrote back

that the reason the state did collapse is due to: “the remarkable, almost unprecedented level ofstate control that the regime manages to impose on its people, preventing all possibility of

dissidence within the country”.

The co-optation of elites, in order that they keep control of the lower classes in society is also vital.

Kim Jong Il’s inner circle could not control the entire population of North Korea single-handedly, but

by keeping a proportion of the population satisfied, they are able to. This is far cheaper than keeping

the entire population satisfied, and was therefore a viable tactic during the famine and economic

collapse.

The development of a nuclear weapons program was the key factor in preventing foreign threats.

Whatever the North Korean government does to its people, and however provocative it gets, it will

61 Anne Wu, ‘What China Whispers to North Korea’, The Washington Quarterly 28:2 (2005)



remain an extreme risk for a foreign country to directly intervene in North Korea. This means the

state can be as brutal internally as it wishes, and keep greater control of its population, without

significant, regime-ending foreign action against it.

Overall, I cannot see North Korea collapsing for the foreseeable future. In recent times, the world

has changed tact, focusing more on sanctions than aid, especially hitting methods such as co-optation by limiting luxury goods. However, the transfer of power to Kim Jong Un has been relatively

smooth, and he seems to have gained the army’s support with his bellicosity in 2012 and onwards.

Any problems North Korea face now are not as great as the problems caused by the famine, and

they continue to have the state organs in place to deal with them, they still have the support of the

elites, and they still retain nuclear weapons. Sadly, this means that the people of North Korea will

continue to suffer in the most authoritarian regime in the world.

Word Count: 5513

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epq - why did north korea not collapse in the late 1990s and early 2000s?

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