ensuring european energy security in russian ‘near abroad’: the case of the south caucasus
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Ensuring European energy security inRussian ‘Near Abroad’: the case of theSouth CaucasusSamuel James Lussac aa Research Centre SPIRIT, Institute of Political Science ofBordeaux , University of Bordeaux , FrancePublished online: 22 Dec 2010.
To cite this article: Samuel James Lussac (2010) Ensuring European energy security in Russian‘Near Abroad’: the case of the South Caucasus, European Security, 19:4, 607-625, DOI:10.1080/09662839.2010.526939
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2010.526939
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Ensuring European energy security in Russian ‘Near Abroad’: the caseof the South Caucasus
Samuel James Lussac*
Research Centre SPIRIT, Institute of Political Science of Bordeaux, University of Bordeaux,France
(Received 20 April 2010; final version received 22 September 2010)
Why has the European Union been so little involved in South Caucasian pipelinepolitics in the last two decades? Deconstructing the European Union (EU)around the Caspian hydrocarbons transportation network, this article tries todemonstrate how European beliefs toward Russia prevented further EU involve-ment in the South Caucasus. Until the 2006 Russian�Ukrainian gas crisis, most ofthe European actors gave more importance to the EU�Russian partnership thanto the relations with the South Caucasian states. But the rising concerns overRussia as a reliable energy partner have led to a reconfiguration of the Europeanexchanges with the South Caucasus. Since 2006, the energy cooperation betweenthe EU and Azerbaijan and Georgia has considerably increased, to such an extentthat the former is about to become a central component of the Caspianhydrocarbons transportation network. Despite the division among member statesand inside the European Commission, this increasing cooperation is especiallyvivid regarding the implementation of the Southern Gas Corridor. The decreaseof confidence between Russia and the EU has thus paved the way for furtherinvolvement in pipeline politics in the South Caucasus, leading to a new definitionof European energy security in Russian ‘Near Abroad’.
Keywords: European Union; South Caucasus; energy security; perceptions;Russia
Introduction
The implementation of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in May 2009 has been the
latest step of the increasing involvement of the European Union (EU) in the South
Caucasus. Since the Russian�Georgian war in August 2008, Brussels has been very
active in this region, to such an extent that some wonder if it is about to become a
new ‘superpower’ in the region. Such a temptation has existed from a long time in the
minds of European analysts and politicians. However, it has often flinched in the face
of tough competition for Eurasian energy resources between Russia and the USA,
and even China and India.
The case of the East�West Energy Corridor from the Caspian to Europe illustrates
this European attitude toward the South Caucasus. It is made of three pipelines and a
railroad: the Baku�Tbilisi�Ceyhan (BTC) and the Baku�Supsa oil pipelines, the
South Caucasus gas Pipeline (SCP) and the Baku�Batumi railroad. In 2009, these
routes have transported around 45.5 million tons of oil and 6.1 billion cubic meters of
*Email: [email protected]
European Security
Vol. 19, No. 4, December 2010, 607�625
ISSN 0966-2839 print/ISSN 1746-1545 online
# 2010 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2010.526939
http://www.informaworld.com
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gas.1 In addition to this corridor, there is the Baku�Novorossiysk oil pipeline, also
known as the Northern Route Export Pipeline (NREP). The Azerbaijani oil company,
State Oil Company of Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) is the only one to use this
pipeline, which may transport 2.6 million tons of oil in 2010. The oil transported
through these pipelines mainly comes from the Kazakhstani field of Tengiz and from
the Azerbaijani fields of Azeri�Chirag�Guneshli (ACG). Since August 2010, some
Turkmen oil is also going through the BTC pipeline. The only gas flowing through theSCP is produced in the giant gas field of Shah Deniz. All these routes are encompassed
within what I refer to the Caspian hydrocarbons transportation network.2
Several kinds of actors are involved in this network: international financial
institutions (the World Bank Group financed the BTC pipeline), oil companies
(British Petroleum (BP) is the largest investor in Azerbaijan), the USA (it strongly
supported the implementation of pipelines bypassing Russia in the 1990s (LeVine
2007)) and so on. One might consider that the EU acts as a unique and coherent
actor within this process. On the contrary, I will demonstrate below that it cannot be
the case. As Lavenex (2008) demonstrated regarding the European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP), the EU external influence cannot be summarized to a simple, coherent
and unified policy on a specific issue toward particular actors. It is rather divided
into different agents, which are sometimes competing with each other. The EU is
made up of three dominant institutions � the Commission, the Council and the
Parliament � that are then made up of several structures (general directorates within
the European Commission, for instance). These institutions or their branches areinvolved in the Caspian hydrocarbons transportation network. The graph below
summarizes the whole range of EU agents involved in the latter. But to mobilize and
act as a sole, coherent and consistent actor within this network, a consensus has to
emerge among this set of actors. (see Figure 1)
It is usually admitted that this fragmentation of EU agents leads to a lack of
coherence in the external policy of the EU, especially in the field of energy (Finon
2009). However, such fragmentation is not new and, still, the EU has been involved
at the very beginning of the Caspian hydrocarbons transportation network. If it has
been less active in the latter then, the fragmentation of the EU sounds too short to
explain the under-involvement of the EU in the South Caucasian energy issues.
Therefore, I assume that, for a long time, some EU actors have been reluctant to
promote European activism in the South Caucasus due to Russia’s longstanding
influence there. The increasing involvement of the EU, both at a political level and an
economic one, may hence result from a change of European perceptions of the South
Caucasus. This policy shift came in parallel to rising concerns about EU energy
security. Despite its constant � not to say redundant � use, this concept surprisinglylacks a genuine definition. As Ciuta (2010) demonstrates, several logics (a logic of
war, a logic of subsistence and a ‘total’ logic of security) conflicts on this concept.
However, its general use prevents us from simply getting rid of it. Following
Haghighi’s work, I would propose an easy-to-understand and broad definition of
energy security, understood as ‘the adequacy of energy supply at a reasonable price’
(Haghighi 2008). This means energy security results not only from an adequate price3
for producers, but also from reasonable transit tariffs for transit states and from
relevant selling prices for consumers.
The research hypothesis of this paper is that the weakness of EU involvement
within the Caspian hydrocarbons transportation matters results from different
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perceptions of the South Caucasus within the EU, among them the belief that this
region is Russia’s chasse gardee. Such differences may undermine the ability of EU
agents to draw a consensus on the external policy to develop toward the South
Caucasus and may prevent the EU from acting as a sole, consistent and coherent
actor in the Caspian hydrocarbons transportation issues. Thus, this paper aims at
evaluating to what extent the increasing activism of the EU within the latter sheds
light on the evolution of beliefs toward Russia within the EU.
To understand the relationship between the EU and Russia in the South
Caucasus, the history of the EU’s involvement in this region has to be recalled. First,
the EU has helped to develop the South Caucasian hydrocarbons transportation
routes, mainly thanks to the Transport Corridor Europe�Caucasus�Asia (TRACE-
CA) and Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) programs.
Despite these two initiatives, the EU remained pretty inactive in this region until the
establishment of the ENP. However, this activism was linked more to democratiza-
tion than to oil and gas transportation, so the EU would not compete directly with
Russia. Finally, in recent years, some European institutions and member states
appear to be very wary of Russia. From this point of view, the issue of oil and gas
transportation has outlined the emerging competition between the EU and Russia in
the Russian Near Abroad.
Helping to develop a Caspian hydrocarbons transportation network
In 1989, the Scotland-based oil company Ramco Energy was the first to arrive in
Azerbaijan, opening the door for the other foreign oil and gas corporations. They
Caspian Hydrocarbons Transportation Network
European Commission
European Council
European Parliament
DG Energy
DG RELEX
DG COMP
EUSRs
Ashton Cabinet
Member-States
TRACECA
INOGATE
DGEnlargement
DG EuropeAid
Figure 1. The EU agents around the Caspian hydrocarbons network in the 2000s.
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were all attracted by the important potential oil reserves of Azerbaijan, depicted then
as a new Arabian�Persian Gulf.4 The EU also took part in this movement and
became officially active in the South Caucasus in 1992. However, its activism has
been quickly undermined by the reluctance of some member states to see the EUdeveloping a separate foreign policy toward the South Caucasian states.
Back to the roots: the European-backed Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europeand Transport Corridor Europe�Caucasus�Asia programs
In July 1991, the Commission launched a program aimed at helping the Soviet Union
to improve and reinforce its economy. A few months later, after the collapse of the
USSR, this program was renamed Technical Assistance to the Community ofIndependent States (TACIS). It wanted to help these new independent states to
implement reforms in the administrative, institutional and legal sectors. Being active
in 13 post-Soviet states,5 TACIS dealt with nine specific dimensions: the development
of the civil society, the reinforcement of the social sector, energy, education, the
development of the private sector, the distribution of land property rights,
agriculture, statistics and transport. After 1992, TACIS became the main EU tool
to interact with the South Caucasian states. It acted at two levels. At the national
one, it developed actions adapted to each of the member states. For instance, inAzerbaijan, it mostly focused on the diversification of incomes in order to prevent a
too heavy dependency of the Azerbaijani economy toward oil and gas exports. In
Georgia, it aimed at contributing to the economic development of the Samtskhe-
Javakheti and Kvemo-Kartli regions, respectively, populated by ethnic Armenians
and Azeris. At the regional level, TACIS wanted to develop cooperation between
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Two programs expressed this ambition:
TRACECA and INOGATE.
In 1992, some highly placed European civil servants from the Commission tookadvantage of the TACIS budget to go to Central Asia and the Caucasus. They then
launched the TRACECA program. Following a proposition made by the Georgian
administration, they organized a regional conference on transportation in Brussels
in May 1993. During that time period, the task manager on transport, Francois
Lamoureux, contacted several specialists on transports to prepare that conference.
This initiative particularly interested Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Turkmens and
Uzbeks. TRACECA, even if it was not named yet, gave them the opportunity to
decrease their dependence on the Russian corridor to trade with Europe. But they didnot anticipate the internal limits of the EU: the bureaucratic burden (the
Commission focused then its actions toward Belarus, Russia and Ukraine), the
lack of personnel and the difficult context in the South Caucasus (Helly 2003).6 After
1995, TRACECA emerged again, thanks to the EU programs of food assistance.7 In
October, a working group met in Vienna and decided to implement a transportation
corridor between Europe and Asia through the South Caucasus. The members of the
Commission dealing with this project highlighted its political importance, especially
to promote the autonomy of this region vis-a-vis Russia. This was successful and, atthe end of 1995, nine projects were signed within a month. A new step was reached
on 8 September 1998. An international conference on the ‘Restoration of the Silk
Road’ took place in Baku. It was a diplomatic success that led to the signature of
an UN-registered Basic Multilateral Agreement on International Transport for
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Development of the Europe�Caucasus�Asia Corridor. Thus, TRACECA became
a regional institution with an intergovernmental secretariat in Baku. This program
contributed substantially to the development of the Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani oil
transportation networks. For instance, the Baku�Batumi railroad was notably
improved. It also delivered in 2003 on behalf of the EU two block trains to the
Azerbaijan State Railways, which transports oil from Tengiz and from ACG oil
fields.
The roots of the INOGATE program also lie in the 1992�93 period. Among the
highly placed European civil servants from the Commission visiting the new
independent states were specialists on energy issues. They were motivated by
a humanitarian aim: they wanted to solve as soon as possible the energy crises in
these countries.8 In 1995, the European Commission decided to institutionalize
INOGATE. It is made up of 21 participants states, has a general secretariat in Kiev
and a regional office in Tbilisi. It focuses on six pillars: the audit of the existing
energy networks, the institutional improvement of trade and interstate transporta-
tion of hydrocarbons, the identification of development opportunities for new
networks, the improvement of the safety and security of energy infrastructures, the
transfer of know-how to energy operators and the coordination of investments in
strategic energy projects. On 22 July 1999, an Umbrella Agreement on the
Institutional Framework for the Establishment of Interstate Oil and Gas Transpor-
tation Systems was signed, implementing the further institutionalization of
INOGATE. Until 2004, this program focused on the three first pillars. Officially,
it only provided a technical assistance in the establishment of the SCP pipeline.
Thanks to TRACECA and INOGATE, the Commission has taken part in the
implementation of hydrocarbons routes in the South Caucasus. Indeed, both
programs helped framing interactions between energy actors such as Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan and Georgia. However, despite its early presence in the South Caucasus
and the activism of the two task managers of INOGATE and TRACECA, the EU
did not turn into as a leader in the management of these energy networks.
A limited European Union activism
Both INOGATE and TRACECA suffered from the same problems, even if the latter
encountered more success than the former. First, the European managers of these
programs faced the complexity of the administrative transition of the member states.
Regarding TRACECA, managers had to implement ex nihilo structures to manage
their projects. However, some local administrations have expressed their reluctance
to cooperate with other institutions, often perceived as competitors (Helly 2003). For
this reason, TRACECA’s projects have been really slow to be implemented. Since
1998, TRACECA also suffers from the member states’ and the General Secretariat’s
inertia. For instance, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan demanded the completion of a
feasibility study on the transportation of liquefied gas in the Caspian Sea. If this
project did not turn into reality for obvious reasons (the Caspian Sea is landlocked,
which considerably limits the opportunity to liquefy gas), neither Astana nor Baku
informed the TRACECA General Secretariat that the project has been dropped out.
The effectiveness of the latter largely depends on its leader: if he/she is active and
submits propositions, the program is successful; if not, it is largely useless. In these
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conditions, for INOGATE as for TRACECA, the main decisions are still taken in
Brussels.But, within the Commission, some European civil servants sometimes disagreed
about INOGATE and TRACECA. Those working on Russia or Turkey had a very
limited interest in these programs (Helly 2003). They considered the latter had to
take further into account the opinions of Russia and Turkey while designing policies
toward these countries’ neighbors. These European civil servants also felt that a
European focus on Central Asia and the South Caucasus might limit the budgets
available to deal with their target countries. The actions of the Commission in the
South Caucasus reflect these disagreements and highlight the inability of the EU to
benefit from the power vacuum in the post-Soviet space after the collapse of the
USSR. It sheds light into the absence of consensus within some EU agents on the
policy to develop toward the South Caucasus. Brussels launched only a few political
actions in the region, focusing most of the time on specific assistance projects (Food
Aid, INOGATE and TRACECA). Besides, after 1991, the Commission opened only
one delegation office in Tbilisi, dealing with both Armenia and Georgia. Azerbaijan
was left on the sidelines, despite its huge energy potential. Anyway, the European
member states criticized any attempt by the European Commission to endorse a
political role in the South Caucasus. According to them, it did not have the strength,
the economic, political and financial capacity to play a more active role there (Helly
2003). On behalf of this statement, some member states monopolized the political
management of the South Caucasus.
The Big Three � France, Germany and the UK � were among the first to open
embassies in this region in the early 1990s. They were not willing to see the EU
playing a stronger role in the South Caucasus. They wanted to keep their bilateral
relations with the South Caucasian states. During their respective presidencies of the
European Council, London (in 1992 and 1998) and Paris (in 1995 and 2000) refused
to put the South Caucasus on the European agenda. Both also rejected the
Europeanization of the Minsk Group or the Group of the Friends of the UN
Secretary General for Georgia (Coppieters 1999). Lastly, this Big Three limited the
capacity of the EU to develop a common policy in the South Caucasus. In 1992, the
European Council started to negotiate Partnership and Cooperation Agreements
(PCAs) with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. These PCAs were finally signed on
22 June 1999 in Luxembourg. Their aim was to develop a framework for political
dialog between these states and the EU, to support democracy and market economy
in the signature countries, and to encourage cooperation between, on the one hand,
Brussels and, on the other hand, Baku, Yerevan and Tbilisi. However, it soon
appeared that they were totally ineffective: rules were established but their
application was not controlled afterwards. But, despite this situation, the Council
of Foreign Affairs, reuniting all the heads of the member states’ foreign services, still
demanded that any European policy in the South Caucasus went through the PCA
channel. Thus, the competing interests between the Big Three and other agents
within the EU put a stop to further European political role in the South Caucasus.
Rather than paving the way for further EU involvement in this region, and more
broadly in the Caspian hydrocarbons transportation network, these PCAs prevented
the establishment of new connections related to the energy sector between the EU
and this region.
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Therefore, despite the great promise of INOGATE and TRACECA, the EU’s
activism in the South Caucasus remained pretty weak in the 1990s. The perceptions
of this activism among European actors may explain such a weakness. First, even if
the two task managers of INOGATE and TRACECA were mainly inspired by astrong will to develop a European foreign policy, their programs were perceived as
‘anti-Russian’. As they wanted to promote European activism in Russia’s Near
Abroad, some actors (member states and civil servants within the Commission) felt
that their aim was to undermine Russia. The Big Three were reluctant to see the EU
becoming involved in the South Caucasus in the 1990s. This region was subject to
important geopolitical tensions at that time. The USA and Russia were competing to
take control of the emergent Azerbaijani oil transportation network. For instance, in
August 1995, President Shevardnadze faced an assassination attempt. According tohim and to Turkish diplomats, this attempt was orchestrated by Russia to force him
to support the NREP. Thus, Berlin and Paris considered that the South Caucasus
was a too sensitive issue to be handled by Brussels. Any EU political involvement
could harm the relationship between Europe and Russia. This led to the paradox
that, being one of the founding fathers of the Caspian hydrocarbons transportation
network, the EU was prevented by its own members from becoming active in the
South Caucasus.
The EU’s attitude toward the South Caucasus in the 1990s reflects the debatewithin EU institutions on the perceptions of post-Soviet Russia. While some civil
servants from the Commission wanted to take advantage of the geopolitical vacuum
in this region, others besides the European great powers preferred to prevent too
political an involvement there by the EU in order to save their relations with Russia.
The different beliefs toward Russia among EU agents prevented the EU from acting
as a coherent, consistent and unique actor in the South Caucasus. Even if it helped
producing the Caspian hydrocarbons transportation network, the EU as a whole has
been unable to mobilize and take an active part in it.
Looking for a balanced European Union policy in the South Caucasus
The reluctance of the European great powers to see the EU becoming involved in theSouth Caucasus is counter-balanced by the wish of other member states (Finland
and Sweden9) to promote a strong EU role in this region. While these states
succeeded, step by step, in promoting this view within European institutions
(especially within the Parliament), parts of the European Commission took
advantage of the establishment of the East�West Energy Corridor to (re) open the
door of the hydrocarbons transportation network to the EU.
The emergence of the European Neighbourhood Policy and of the EU SpecialRepresentative
Despite their relative ineffectiveness, the PCAs have paved the way for an increased
role for the European Parliament in defining a common European policy toward theSouth Caucasus. Indeed, these agreements promote cooperation between the
European Parliament and their South Caucasian counterparts. Of course, the fact
that Members of European Parliament (MEPs) were not familiar with this region has
limited their ability to act. However, the appointment of Per Gahrton as rapporteur
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on the South Caucasus for the European Parliament on 23 September 1999
facilitated their work. This Swedish MEP benefited from the presidency of the
European Council by his native country to manifest the importance of the
Parliament in the European policy toward the South Caucasus. A new stage was
reached in 2003. On 11 March, the Commission published a communication named
‘Wider Europe � Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern
and Southern Neighbours’. This document aims at defining the relations of the EUwith its neighbors in a different framework from admission procedures. It followed a
letter from the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jack Straw, to his counterpart,
Josep Pique, sent in January 2002 to attract the attention of the then President of the
EU concerning the need to deal with the security issues about to emerge with the
2004 enlargement. This concern was then expressed by the President of the
Commission, Romano Prodi, who, in November 2002, called for the establishment
of a new framework of cooperation with the Mediterranean states. Finally, a working
group ‘Wider Europe’ was established within Direction Generale Relations Exter-
ieures (DG RELEX) to think about which states had to be integrated in this new
framework. This working group was notably made of specialists of the post-Soviet
space within DG RELEX and of officials from DG Enlargement. They were
supposed to get in touch with the states that would take part in the new framework.
At that time, the South Caucasian states were excluded for geographical reasons.
Some members of the working group, mostly from DG Enlargement, considered that
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were not neighbors of Europe. The South
Caucasus was thus reduced to a footnote mentioning that, ‘for the moment’, it didnot fit into this new framework of cooperation.
But this exclusion was a source of discontent among European institutions. In
November 2003, the European Parliament published an opinion on the Commis-
sion’s communication from March 2003, advocating the inclusion of the South
Caucasus within the neighborhood initiative. The Rose Revolution in Georgia, which
happened at the same time, reinforced the statement of the Parliament and affected
the way European leaders looked at Georgia and, more broadly, at the South
Caucasus. With the arrival in power of Mikheil Saakashvili, a new generation of
outspoken pro-European reformers took over the leadership of the Georgian state.
Brussels could only be glad about such a change. On 26 January 2004, the European
Council invited the Commission to present a communication on the policy to be
developed toward Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. A month later the Parliament
adopted the Gahrton report on ‘The policy of the European Union towards the
South Caucasus’. Finally, on 12 May 2004, the Commission asked the European
Council to include this region in the ENP, which was officially established on 14 June
2004. In little more than a year, the South Caucasus, which used to be a footnote,became a neighbor of Europe.
At the same period, on 7 July 2003, the European Council appointed an EU
Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus, the Finnish diplomat Heikki
Talvitie, in order to play ‘a more active’ role in the region (Lynch 2003, p. 186). This
appointment put an end to two years of negotiations, after the initial proposal of the
German presidency of the EU in 2001, subsequently taken forward by the Greek
presidency. During these 2 years, several questions emerged regarding the mandate of
this EUSR. For some states, such a position was considered to be expensive (no more
funds were available on the 2003 budget for the EUSRs) and would not bring
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significant political added value. These states, mainly France and Germany, were
notably afraid that such a EUSR would be just another actor on the South Caucasian
geopolitical scene and would upset Russia (Coppieters 2003). Thus, Talvitie’s
mandate reflected this power struggle. Only four member states proposed candidatesto this position: Finland, Greece, Italy and the UK. Talvitie’s application has been
successful because, among other things, he was co-president of the Minsk
Conference of the OSCE in 1995�96. His mandate, consisting in a succession of
periods of 6 months renewable, is made up of four dimensions:
� to help South Caucasian states implement and complete their economic and
political reforms;
� to prevent the emergence of new conflicts and to contribute to solving existingones with the available tools;
� to promote the return in the conflict regions of internally displaced people or
refugees; and
� to encourage and support intra-regional cooperation on issues such as the
economy, energy or transportation.
The EUSR for the South Caucasus enjoys relative autonomy. He is not attached
to any framework of negotiations for the resolution of local conflicts or to anyEU-backed programs. But, in 2003 and 2004, Talvitie had few means to exert his
mandate. When he arrived in the South Caucasus, he did not have any envoy to
brief him and to help him implement his projects. Besides, the budget of the
EUSR for the South Caucasus was pretty low: in 2004, Talvitie and his team were
only granted 396,000 Euros to complete their mission. But this situation would
improve, thanks to the inclusion of the South Caucasian states within the ENP.
Indeed, after the signing of the ENP, the Commission opened a permanent
representative office in Tbilisi, which also became the office of the EUSR for theSouth Caucasus.
Therefore, at the end of 2005, the South Caucasus was high on the EU’s agenda.
One might have even thought that a consensus exist within European institutions in
the policy to develop toward this region. Indeed, the Parliament was pushing
forward for an EU increased role, the Commission was in charge of defining an ENP
and the EUSR was directly referring to the European Council. However, the
European actions were mostly focused on the promotion of democracy in the region
and on the resolution of frozen conflicts. Paradoxically, while the region waswitnessing the construction of the ‘project of the century’, i.e. the BTC pipeline, the
EU did not get involved in energy issues.
Democratization rather than energy: the unofficial activism of the European Union
During summer 2003, some officials from DG RELEX decided to promote the
inclusion of the South Caucasus within the ENP. They then raised the importance
of moving closer to a region that is about to become a neighbor of the EU, thanksto the 2004 enlargement. At that time, the construction of the BTC pipeline had
just started. For the first time, hundreds of thousands of barrels of oil would go
directly from the Caspian to the Mediterranean Sea.10 For the first time,
Azerbaijan would not rely at all on Russia to export its hydrocarbon resources.
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The officials from the Commission (not only from DG RELEX, but also from DG
EuropeAid and DG Energy) have witnessed a huge amount of pressure Moscow
put on Baku and Tbilisi in the 1990s. They were aware of the rumours that Russia
might spend 50 million dollars to support the NGOs protesting against the BTC
pipeline. They knew that all the actors involved in the implementation of the East�West Energy Corridor were convinced that Russian spies were watching them
(Lussac 2009). This situation made these European civil servants wary of Russia.For them, it was more and more obvious that the EU had to get involved in the
South Caucasus in order to prevent Azerbaijan and Georgia, at least, from
returning to the Russian sphere of influence.
But, at that time, there was little interest in Caspian oil and gas. On 30 October
2000, during a summit in Paris, Brussels and Moscow decided to implement an
energy dialog: the main aim was to reinforce energy interdependence between the
EU and Russia. The latter was looking for a reliable customer while the former
hoped that the convergence of the European and Russian markets might support
the liberalization of Russia, notably in the energy sector. Energy interdependence
between Russia and the EU was then a strong political choice, supported by the
heads of the Commission and by the European great powers (Finon and Locatelli
2006). From this perspective, energy issues in the South Caucasus did not attract a
lot of interest within European institutions. Some also feared that, if the EU
engages in these matters, it would upset Russia. Paradoxically, to focus on
democratization in this region then appeared to be safer than to become involvedin the hydrocarbons transportation issues. The common belief within the EU was
that democratization of the South Caucasus was not a problem for Russia while the
involvement on energy matters was.
Afterwards, it seems that the interests of Russia were opposed. In the early 2000s,
Moscow understood that it was very unlikely the construction of the BTC pipeline
would ever stop. Despite some efforts to change the route of this pipeline or to delay
its implementation, it rather focused on the export of Kazakhstani oil. Since May
1992, Russia has been involved in the construction of the Caspian Pipeline
Consortium (CPC). This pipeline aims at transporting the Kazakhstani oil from
Tengiz to Novorossiysk and is 24 per cent owned by Russia. Its commissioning ended
in November 2001, ready to transport 350,000 oil barrels a day. Even before the BTC
pipeline, the CPC is the first major pipeline built in post-Soviet times transporting
Kazakhstani oil to world energy markets. At that time, a widely shared opinion in
Russia was that Azerbaijani oil resources were not so important and viable. In the
end of November 2002, the Russian oil company Lukoil sold its 10 per cent share in
the ACG oilfields. It did not want to participate in the BTC pipeline, which wasabout to transport most of the ACG oil, and it considered that the production of this
oil is too expensive compared to current oil prices (Blum 2003). In comparison, the
Kazakhstani assets of Lukoil seemed to be far more interesting.11 Paradoxically,
whereas the EU was afraid of upsetting Russia in supporting the construction of the
East�West Energy Corridor, this very same country was pulling out its assets from
the South Caucasus.
But some within the EU remembered the reactions of Russia during the ‘golden
age’ of INOGATE. From 1997 to 1999, this program funded two pre-feasibility
studies regarding oil and gas transportation across the Caspian Sea. First, ILF
Consulting Engineers, Partex and Snamprogetti, analyzed the opportunity to build a
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Transcaspian gas pipeline between Turkmenbashi in Turkmenistan and Baku. Such a
pipeline would transport Turkmen gas to Azerbaijan and, then, to Europe through
the South Caucasus and Turkey. It would undermine the monopoly Russia enjoys,
transporting Central Asian gas to Europe through the Russian territory. This projectwas very badly received in Moscow and Russia prevented Ashgabat from supporting
it. It was abandoned anyway after the discovery of the Shah Deniz gas field in 1999
in Azerbaijan. In the meantime, INOGATE funded another pre-feasibility study,
made again by ILF Consulting Engineers, regarding the construction of a submarine
oil pipeline between Jetybay in Kazakhstan and Baku. Such a pipeline would
compete with the CPC, heavily supported by Russia. Once again, Moscow protested
against this project and it was abandoned. After these criticisms, most of the EU
officials were convinced that EU support to the Caspian hydrocarbons routes wouldundermine the dialog between Brussels and Moscow. A greater priority was then
given to the reinforcement of energy connections between Moscow and Brussels
compared to further EU involvement within this energy network. The EU was
condemned to simply play a technical role.
Some officials from the Commission and from the EUSR for the South Caucasus
were not willing to cope with this decision. They took advantage of their personal
networks in the South Caucasus � built during the 1990s as managers of INOGATE
� to represent the EU in pipeline politics. For instance, in the early 2000s, an officialfrom DG EuropeAid conducted analyses on political risks of the construction of the
BTC pipeline in Javakheti. All the general managers of BP Georgia from 2000 to
2004 also had regular meetings with EU representatives, mostly related to the EUSR.
Finally, the latter played an important role in providing, this time officially, technical
assistance to the construction of the SCP pipeline. They lobbied strongly in Brussels,
so that the EU would support the construction of this gas pipeline linking the
Caspian to the Turkish, and then European, gas markets. Thus, rather than getting
directly involved in the Caspian hydrocarbons transportation network, some EU‘mavericks’ decided to implement the conditions for an expansion of the latter, while
staying on its margins.
Therefore, the involvement of the EU in the South Caucasus has resulted from
careful political balances within European institutions, between the EU and Russia
and between different issues. It sheds light on how the perceptions of Russia and of
its political attitudes determine European policies in this region, leading to an
outspoken support for democratization and to unofficial activism within the
hydrocarbons transportation network. Such a strategy resulted from complexbalances and compromises among EU agents.
Promoting European energy security: how to compete with Russia in its Near Abroad
The implementation of the ENP and the enlargement of the EU in 2004 definitely
changed views of the South Caucasus as well as the perceptions of Russia in this
region. The concerns about the European energy security progressively rose, with a
climax during the second Russian�Ukrainian gas crisis in January 2009.12 This newcrisis, after the one in January 2006, may be the turning point in EU policy toward
the South Caucasus. More and more EU agents advocate a strong involvement in the
hydrocarbons transportation issues, to such an extent that the EU may become a new
leader there.
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The increasing concerns on European energy security
After 2004, Brussels increased its number of initiatives toward the Black Sea�South
Caucasus�Caspian space. If all the initiatives did not focus on energy, they still
considered it as a very important issue. On 13 November 2004, a conference on
energy was organized in Baku. Ministers from all the littoral states of the Black and
Caspian Seas as well as some of their colleagues from Central Asia (Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan) met to discuss the future of energy relationships between their countries
and the EU, represented by the Commission. This conference established the second
phase of INOGATE. Also labeled the Baku Initiative, it mainly intends to promote
the convergence of the neighboring energy markets with the European one. But, if
the neighboring states welcome this initiative, they are very sceptical about it. The
producing states want their relations with the EU to be based on the purchase price
of the gas they produce rather than on European directives dealing with energy.
However, this did not stop the signature of a memorandum of understanding on
energy between Azerbaijan and the EU in November 2006. This memorandum
(signed a month before the one between Kazakhstan and the EU), as well as the
name of the second phase of INOGATE, highlight the new role devolved to
Azerbaijan. According to Brussels, this country must become a EU strategic partner,
both as a producer and as a transit state. That is why it was then integrated within the
Black Sea Synergy initiative, launched on 11 April 2007. It came after a
communication from the European Commission to the Council and the Parliament
called ‘Black Sea Synergy � A Regional Cooperation Initiative’. This initiative aims
at developing a common European policy in the Black Sea, defined as a single region
encompassing the littoral states as well as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece and
Moldova. It defines 13 domains of European action, including energy security,
ranked fourth in the order of priority (Emerson 2008).
The institutionalization of relations between Brussels and its new Eastern
neighbors is partly linked to the very specific energy context in this space in 2006.
Since December 2004 � the presidential election of Victor Yushchenko in Ukraine �the relationship between Kiev and Moscow is becoming worse and worse. In 2005,
both parties negotiated the price of gas transiting through Ukraine to the EU.
Ukraine wanted to receive European prices while the Russian company Gazprom
claimed that Kiev should buy the gas it consumed according to the world prices �between 160 and 230 dollars per 1000 cubic meters. The Ukrainian presidency
proposed then that the gas price rise gradually to the world gas prices. It suggested
that it should first pay 80 dollars per 1000 cubic meters of gas. Gazprom rejected this
proposal and, on 1 January 2006, it stopped the supply of gas to Ukraine, with direct
repercussions in the EU. The day after, all the countries dependent on gas from
Russia announced that there has been a significant decrease of their gas supply,
between 14 per cent (Poland) and 40 per cent (Hungary). From 1 to 3 January, Italy
also announced it has lost 32 million cubic meters of gas. Gazprom and Ukraine
blamed each other. According to the Russian company, Kiev was hijacking the gas it
is sending to Europe. For Ukraine, Gazprom was no longer supplying the volumes of
gas planned in the contracts. The crisis was finally solved on 4 January: Gazprom
and the Ukrainian company Naftogaz agreed to form a consortium in charge of the
gas supply to and of the gas transit through Ukraine (Stern 2006).
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Before this crisis, most of the European actors were not concerned that Russia
would supply 70 per cent of the European gas imports in 2020 (International Energy
Agency 2005). Afterwards, it suddenly realized the fragility of its energy security.
Further, the Western member states have finally understood the concerns of the Easternstates that had entered the EU in 2004. For some European great powers like France,
these member states were inspired by revenge and did not recognize the changes Russia
had faced in the previous years. These countries also did not realize that an ‘iron
curtain’ of sorts was still in place between the West and the East of Europe: while Russia
only represents 25 per cent of France’s gas imports, the Baltic States or Slovakia are
100 per cent dependent to Russian gas supply. Even if some civil servants from the
Commission claimed that Ukraine was as responsible as Russia for this crisis, a broader
opinion considered that Russia was not as reliable as it was supposed to be. TheEuropean civil servants working on the South Caucasus spread this view, claiming they
had witnessed for the last 10 years how Russia had used the ‘energy weapon’ to defend
its national interests. In a few months, the European agenda dramatically changed:
energy security became a top priority and Russia’s credibility decreased within large
parts of the European Commission. The reinforcement of energy links between
Brussels and Moscow was no longer a prominent issue. Energy security provided by
Russia was then considered as too expensive both politically and commercially (insofar
as some EU member states have not received any gas for a few days).The European views of the East�West Energy Corridor considerably changed.
Germany, although one of the most ‘pro-Russian’ member states, promoted, during
its presidency of the European Council in the first half of 2006, the diversification of
European gas supply, advocating further links with Central Asia. Such a decision
was badly welcomed in Russia insofar as Moscow has always looked at this region as
its own chasse gardee.13 On 8 March, the Commission published a Green Paper
called ‘A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive, and Secure Energy’. This
new strategy intends to change the European energy landscape: the nature and thegeographical sources of European energy supply must be diversified. In October
2006, the French diplomat Pierre Morel was appointed as the new EUSR for Central
Asia.14 He had a message: Brussels was willing to support new gas transportation
infrastructures between the Central Asian producing states and the EU, bypassing
Russia (Mangott and Westphal 2008). The signature of a memorandum of
understanding between Azerbaijan and the EU and the implementation of the
Black Sea Synergy fit into this new doctrine. The EU wants to play a more active role
within the Caspian hydrocarbons transportation network, no matter what Russia’sopinion is. The priority is no longer to support a European�Russian dialog but to
establish strong links between the Caspian and Europe. Thus, the revival of the
dormant EU programs helps renewing European activism within the Caspian
hydrocarbons transportation network, paving the way for new connecting flows
between the EU and the South Caucasus. It came in line with a broader consensus
among EU agents on the development of a common policy toward this region in the
energy field.
A new leader within the Caspian hydrocarbons transportation network?
The EaP was launched on 7 May 2009 in Prague. It deals with six states, defined as
Europe’s Eastern neighbors: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and
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Ukraine. The budget of this new initiative is between 450 million and 785 million
Euros for the 2008�13 period. It aims at implementing a dual approach toward these
Eastern countries, bilateral and regional. Notably, it proposes the creation of
association agreements to replace the PCAs. Such agreements would deal with the
creation of a free-trade area between the EU and each partner, the implementation of
mobility and security pacts and the safety of energy supply.15 The final objective is
then to establish a Neighborhood Economic Community. According to Russia, theEaP is a new attempt to undermine Russian positions in Europe and to establish
a European sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space (Benes 2009).
The second gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine was the straw that broke the
camel’s back in EU�Russia relations. From 1 to 21 January, most of the Eastern EU-
members’ Russian gas supplies were interrupted. This new crisis was a turning point
for the EU. It confirmed what has been announced when the idea of an EaP came
out: the EU has to invest more in the Caspian hydrocarbons transportation network.
Some parts of DG RELEX � the same people who setup INOGATE and then
worked for DG EuropeAid � advocate using the EaP to play a more active role in the
latter. Their ambition is to see the EU being an energy leader in the region. It would
then be able to influence the choice of export routes for Caspian resources (especially
from Turkmenistan) and the actors involved in these matters. The EU is one of the
producers of the Caspian hydrocarbons routes: it funded one of the first pre-
feasibility studies for the Transcaspian pipeline project and assisted in the
construction of the SCP. It now aims at influencing this transportation networkwith the enrollment of new pipelines � the Southern Corridor project.16
However, the European role in the Caspian hydrocarbons transportation network
is still a matter of disagreement both within the European Council and within the
Commission. While the UK and the 2004 entrants of the EU argue for a stronger EU
involvement in the development of the South Corridor, other member states, mostly
Germany and France, seem to accord less importance to this question. The
discussion on EU financial support to Nabucco illustrates this disagreement. In
March 2009, Angela Merkel opposed the spending of 250 million Euros for
Nabucco, whereas such an amount had been agreed at the Budapest Summit on
Energy Security on 27 January 2009. Officially, the financial crisis motivated this
opposition. But Germany is willing to keep good relations with Russia, especially
regarding gas trade. The two countries are building a pipeline system � Nord Stream �on the Baltic Sea seabed between their two countries that may increase Russian�German gas interdependency. The French utility companies EDF and GDF also
joined in spring 2010 the Russian-backed pipeline projects South Stream and Nord
Stream, respectively. In the meantime, London wishes the EU would be more activein the energy business in the Caspian. For instance, the British embassy in Baku is
the only European one to have an attache dealing solely with oil and gas in this
country.
Such a division also exists within the European Commission. President Barroso is
well-known for having very difficult relations with Vladimir Putin. The latter has
regularly refused to talk with the former, considering that he was not a ‘real’ head of
state. During the second Russian�Ukrainian gas crisis, he rejected the phone calls
from the President of the Commission, preferring to talk with German Chancellor
Merkel and with the Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis. Officials within DG RELEX
share this wary feeling toward Russia. According to them, it cannot be trusted
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anymore. Even worse, it puts the energy security of the EU and also of its Eastern
neighbors in danger. Consequently, they demand that the EaP create, as a flagship
initiative, an energy security platform between the EU and its partners. Such a
platform would prevent any impact of an interruption, deliberate or not, of the gasflow between these countries. For instance, with such a platform, the EU would have
provided gas to Georgia during the gas crisis between this country and Russia in
January 2006. But, for DG Energy and DG Competition, such an initiative would be
contrary to the European rules on competition, as it would pave the way for a closed
energy market. This view is also based on the opinion that such a platform would
further upset Russia. The EU is therefore caught between two stools. It is on the
verge of becoming an energy leader within the Caspian hydrocarbon transportation
network. In the meantime, some actors within the European Institutions (France,Germany and DG Energy) are reluctant to bridge such a gap, not wanting to
antagonize the relationship with Russia.
The EU is establishing new flows of communications with the South Caucasus.
Thus, it is influencing the energy actors in the South Caucasus, challenging the
confidence given in the past to the Russian hydrocarbons transportation routes. The
last 5 years have been of great importance for EU�Russia relations. During this
period, Moscow lost a lot of credibility as a reliable partner and the longstanding
advocates of EU activism in Russia’s ‘Near Abroad’ have become quite outspoken,making a considerable difference in the EU policy toward the South Caucasus and,
more broadly, toward Russia. The changes of this political landscape has helped
building further consensus, even if it is not complete yet, on the necessity of more EU
involvement in the Caspian hydrocarbons transportation network. Brussels has
partially overcome the differences of perceptions and disagreements among agents
within the EU, leading to the development of a more common, coherent and
consistent policy toward the South Caucasus.
Conclusion
Russia’s perceptions within the EU have evolved in parallel to the activism of the EU
in the South Caucasus. Highlighting the role of the EU in the implementation of the
Caspian hydrocarbons transportation network, this paper has demonstrated that, in
the 1990s, the beliefs among EU agents toward Russia have been a corollary to the
slow activism of the EU in this region. Then, the dominant will to establish energy
interdependency between the EU and Russia in the early 2000s led the EU toconcentrate its interests in the South Caucasus on democratization. Finally, the two
Russian�Ukrainian gas crises have undermined most of the confidence in Russia as a
reliable energy partner and led to the development of a straightforward competition
between Brussels and Moscow on the export of Caspian oil and gas. From
INOGATE and TRACECA to the EaP, the EU’s presence in the South Caucasus
has considerably changed, as well as the Russian perceptions of it. Today more than
ever, Russia is convinced that the EU is willing to increase its sphere of influence over
the South Caucasus, having already admitted the former socialist states of CentralEurope in 2004 and 2007. The main issue now lies on the attitude of European
institutions toward this new deal.
While most of the European Commission is likely to encourage competition with
Russia, at least in the energy sector, some of the member states remain reluctant to
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endanger the relationship between the EU and Russia. Two trends need to be
highlighted in this debate. First, the 2004 enlargement of the EU completely
reshaped the position of the European Council toward Russia. Before 2004, most of
the member states were willing to develop cooperation with Moscow. After the
integration of the former socialist countries, the European Council has become far
more divided when it comes to Russia. The UK and the new member states want to
defy Russia in its own backyard, considering that it is the EU’s duty to support and
help the former Soviet countries. On the contrary, France and Germany still think
that the EU may balance its policy between the latter and Russia. This would mean
avoiding upsetting Russia, for instance, in merging the European-backed pipeline
Nabucco and the Russian-backed pipeline South Stream.17 Secondly, the Commis-
sion is confused regarding the policy to establish toward Russia. While DG RELEX,
and to an extent DG Energy, want to use energy to compete politically with Russia,
DG Competition still argues for maintaining purely economic strategies.
However, if some of these disagreements remain, the situation may change in a
near future. Firstly, the arrival to power of a new and more Russian-friendly
government in Ukraine in December 2009 has made the South Stream project less
needed. This has hence decreased the political tensions around Nabucco. Secondly,
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has importantly influenced the face of the
EU external policy. While the way to understand and implement this treaty remains
debated in Brussels, some European institutions have lost influence, especially in the
makings of a European policy toward the South Caucasus. The former Solana
Cabinet, now managed by the Baroness Catherine Ashton,18 is focusing on the
implementation of the External European Action Service, which also undermines
DG RELEX. In this context, DG Energy has been able to take solely the lead of the
external energy policy of the EU.19 Both features may help developing a common,
coherent and consistent policy toward the South Caucasus, and more broadly the
Caspian, especially but not only in the energy sphere.
In the meantime, the EU is now at a turning point regarding its relations with
Russia. It is very likely that an increased role for Europe within the Caspian
hydrocarbons transportation network would reflect a shift in EU policy vis-a-vis
Moscow. On the one hand, the implementation of an energy platform between the
EU and its partners, such as the establishment of the Caspian Development
Corporation (CDC),20 would characterize a new phase in the relationship between
these two powers. It would mean that Russia, even if still a partner, would be
regarded more and more with distrust, especially in the energy sector. On the other
hand, if the CDC and the energy platform project were abandoned, the EU would
send the signal that it is not willing (yet, at least) to compete further with Russia in its
Near Abroad. Whatever is the final decision, the relationship between Brussels and
Moscow will never be the same and it will take time to re-establish confidence
between the actors within these two parties.
List of interviewees
This paper is largely based on the more than 170 interviews the author has conducted
for his Ph.D. research. However, for sake of clarity, he chose to mention below only
the interviewees that have been instrumental in the makings of this article.
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BP, BOTAS, Council of the European Union, CERA, DG Energy, DG RELEX,
French Representation to the EU, Georgian International Oil Corporation, German
Representation to the EU, INOGATE, Nabucco Company, Office of the EU Special
Representative for the South Caucasus, Representation of the European Council
in Azerbaijan, SOCAR, Statoil, Total, TRACECA, Turkish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, UK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and World Bank.
Acknowledgements
This paper was originally presented at the BASEES/UACES/University of Birminghamconference on ‘Russia: Part of Europe or Apart from Europe?’ in November 2009. The authorwould like to thank Terry Adams, Derek Averre, David Galbreath, Slawomir Raszewski andthe anonymous reviewers for their useful comments on this paper. All errors and omissionsshould be attributed solely to the author.
Notes
1. Source: BP (2010).2. The word ‘network’ is here understood in this paper in a normative way. It does not refer
to the range of network theories.3. The price is here understood as the value of money as well as the conditions in which the
exchange is made.4. Nowadays, the Caspian Sea is considered as a ‘new North Sea’, with 48 billion barrel of oil
and 12.5 trillion cubic meters of gas.5. These states are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.6. Georgia was then in the midst of a civil war and Armenia and Azerbaijan were fighting to
conquer Nagorno-Karabakh.7. In order to deliver food aid to Central Asia and the South Caucasus, reliable roads were
needed. This is why the Food Aid and TRACECA programs have been so intertwined(Helly 2003).
8. For instance, in 1993, the inhabitants of Tbilisi in Georgia only benefited from 5 to 6hours of electricity each day.
9. Sweden was the first President of the European Council to send a European mission to theSouth Caucasus in February 2001: the Swedish minister of Foreign Affairs Anna Lindh,the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) JavierSolana and the Commissioner for External Relations Christopher Patten went toArmenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to talk about a new framework of cooperation betweenthese states and the EU.
10. The other export routes stop on the Black Sea, either in Batumi, Poti or Novorossiysk.11. Lukoil has 15 per cent in the Karachaganak oil field and 2.7 per cent in Tengiz. Thanks to
a joint venture with Arco, it also owns 6.75 per cent of the CPC.12. The new gas crisis between Belarus and Russia in June 2010 did not help mitigating these
concerns.13. For instance, in the 1990s, Russia has put huge pressure on Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan
not to ship their hydrocarbon resources to the world energy markets through other meansthan Russian infrastructures (hence the construction of the CPC and the failure of theTranscaspian).
14. This position was created in October 2005. Pierre Morel is the second EUSR for CentralAsia, after the Slovak diplomat Jan Kubis.
15. For instance, the negotiations for the association agreement between Azerbaijan and theEU have been opened in July 2010.
16. This corridor is made of four pipelines projects: the Interconnection Turkey�Greece�Italy(ITGI), Nabucco, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and White Stream. For an overviewof these projects, see International Energy Agency (2008).
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17. Such a proposal was made in a report ordered by the French Government and written byClaude Mandil, the former French President of the International Energy Agency. Itrecently and surprisingly came out again in a speech made by the CEO of ENI, PaoloScaroni, during the HIS CERA Week conference in Houston in early March 2010.
18. Since December 2009, Catherine Ashton is the High Representative of the Union forForeign Affairs and Security Policy. She succeeded Javier Solana, who was HighRepresentative for CFSP.
19. For instance, DG Energy is now handling alone the mediation between Azerbaijan andTurkmenistan, which concerns the transit of Turkmen gas through Azerbaijan as well asthe delimitation of the borders in the Caspian Sea. A first meeting took place in Brusselsin June 2010 and more are about to be organized during the autumn 2010.
20. This is a project of a gas purchase mechanism in order to provide the Caspian gas-producing states with only one buyer. It aims at competing with Russia and China to buyTurkmen gas. However, it is a matter of discussions between DG RELEX (supporting theproject), DG Energy and DG COMP (contesting it, as it may not be in compliance withEuropean competition rules).
Notes on contributor
Samuel Lussac is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Political Science of Bordeaux and was aresearch fellow at the University of Oslo from September to December 2009. He has recentlypublished a book called Geopolitique du Caucase Au carrefour energetique de l’Europe del’Ouest (Geopolitics of the Caucasus. At the Energy Crossroads for Western Europe), (Paris:Editions Technip).
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