Aristotle's Concept of Praxis in the PoeticsAuthor(s): Elizabeth BelfioreReviewed work(s):Source: The Classical Journal, Vol. 79, No. 2 (Dec., 1983 - Jan., 1984), pp. 110-124Published by: The Classical Association of the Middle West and SouthStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3297245 .Accessed: 31/03/2012 15:26

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ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF PRAXIS IN THE POETICS

In Poetics 6 (1449b24) Aristotle defines tragedy as mimesis praxeos, "imitation of action. " Praxis, "action," in this context is often taken to refer to the deliberate action of a rational being, a technical sense the term sometimes has in Aristotle's ethical writings. Fergusson, for example, writes that "Action (praxis) does not mean deeds, events, or physical activity: it means, rather, the motivation from which deeds spring. "' But a study of Aristotle's use of praxis in the Poetics shows that this view is wrong. When used of the actions imitated by tragedy, epic and comedy, the term praxis never means "a morally (or ethically) qualified action, " that is, an action for which one may appropriately be praised or blamed.2 Praxis refers to a mere event, a killing, for example, and not to heroic self-defense or vicious murder. Whenever a poet represents a character as having certain moral qualities or as acting in a morally qualified way, he does so by using ethos or dianoia rather than by imitating a praxis.

A brief look at the ethical works of Aristotle will help to clarify our distinction between the two senses of praxis. In the Nicomachean Ethics, as Joachim observes, praxis has two meanings. In one sense, a praxis is "the subject of moral predicates. "9 "By doing just acts," writes Aristotle, "we

'E Fergusson, introduction to Aristotle's Poetics, translated by S. H. Butcher (New York 1961) 8. The view that a praxis is not merely an event is very widely held. Some representative statements are those of D. W. Lucas, Aristotle's Poetics (Oxford 1968) 96 (hereafter Lucas): Praxis "means, not any random act like opening one's mouth or crossing the street, but an action initiated with a view to an end and carried on in pursuit of it"; G. Else, Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument (Cambridge, Mass. 1967) 256 (hereafter Else): "It is not merely an action but a transaction, a decisive change in the whole posture of a life. For a 7rp&fts is not a mere act or event"; S. H. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art (London 1895; 4th edition, London 1932) 123 (hereafter Butcher): "The 7rp&f t that art seeks to reproduce is mainly an inward process, a psychical energy working outwards; deeds, incidents, events, situations, being included under it so far as these spring from an inward act of will, or elicit some activity of thought or feeling"; G. Gresseth, "The System of Aristotle's Poetics," TAPA 89 (1958) 314: "This [sc. that of the Nicomachean Ethics] is the conception of action and of man's life, which is in this sense an action, and therefore the conception of drama and plot and related matters which dominates the Poetics" (emphasis added).

The idea that praxis in the Poetics has a technical, ethical sense is often assumed rather than

argued for, and the question has received very little attention. To my knowledge, there has been only one full-length study of the problem: J. Hitt, "A Study of IPAI in the Major Works Attributed to Aristotle. .. ," Diss., Princeton 1954. This very inadequate work is typical in that it assumes that praxis in the Poetics can be explained by reference to the ethical writings of Aristotle (e.g. p. 212).

2The term "moral" has unfortunate non-Aristotelian connotations, but "ethical" has equally unsatisfactory associations with ethos. As used here, both "moral" and "ethical" describe any predicates that confer praise or blame such as "just, " "unjust, " "brave," "cowardly. "

3H. Joachim, comm., The Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford 1955) 78 (hereafter Joachim).

110

ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF PRAXIS 111

become just" (EN 1105al7-18). Again, using praxis in this morally qualified sense, Aristotle says in the Eudemian Ethics that only rational beings, and not children or animals, are capable of "acting" (EE 1224a28-30; cf. EN 1139a20).

In a second sense, however, praxis refers to an event without moral qualifications. As Joachim again explains: "The mere praxis-the external movements resulting in a man's death-is morally colourless, the material equally, for example, of legitimate self-defense, heroic patriotism, or murder. "4 In the ethical writings, of course, the way in which an action is performed by an agent is the primary consideration in any assessment of the moral qualities of the action. In most cases, the moral qualities of an action are determined by the way in which it was done by an agent. Thus, when Aristotle says that "By doing just acts we become just, " he goes on to explain that the acts we do to become just are not just in the same, full sense of the word as applied to acts done by someone who is already just. They are only "such as a just person might do" (EN 1105b5-7). To be just in the full sense, he writes, an act must be done by an agent with knowledge, choosing (proairoumenos) the act, choosing it for its own sake, and having a stable hexis, disposition (EN 2.1105a28-33). The exceptions prove the rule. For even when Aristotle allows that an act can have moral qualities apart from the agent's doing of it, the focus is still on the agent rather than the act. In EN 5.8, for example, he allows that an act can be just or unjust apart from any assessment of the agent. But he is also careful to distinguish between acts done justly and acts done justly only "accidentally" (Kar' o (TUE'8 •

K'KO). An agent, he writes, cannot be praised or blamed for doing an action that is in fact just or unjust if he acts out of ignorance, under compulsion, or in some other "accidental" way.5

Praxis, then, in the ethical works, can mean either: (1) the subject of moral predicates, or (2) an event that is not the subject of moral predicates. In both cases, the agent is the primary consideration.

In the Poetics, however, Aristotle's focus is on the action and not on the agent: tragedy is imitation of action and not of human beings (50a16-17).6 A poet must imitate an action, if he can be said to write a tragedy at all. But he need not always give us enough information about how this action is done to allow us to determine whether the agent deserves praise, blame or neither.

4Joachim, 91. 51It is difficult to be more precise about Aristotle's distinction between mere actions and actions

done in a certain way. J. L. Ackrill, in "Aristotle on Action, " Mind 87 (1978) 595-601, discusses some of the problems involved. On the relevance of EN 5.8 to the question of Oedipus' hamartia see R. Sorabji, Necessity, Cause, and Blame (Ithaca 1980) 295ff., and below, note 21.

6This difference in focus of the ethical works and of the Poetics is corrrectly noted by R. Dupont-Roc and J. Lallot, Aristote. La Poetique (Paris 1980) 196: the Poetics, they write, "renverse la perspective de l'ethique. Ce qui est au premier plan ici, c'est non plus l'agent, mais l'action. ... " However, they fail to realize that the theoretical basis of both the Poetics and the ethical works is the same. They continue: "et, parce que cette action doit ̂ etre qualifice en termes ethiques, les actants doivent 1 etre egalement .. "

112 ELIZABETH BELFIORE

Hence, praxis in the Poetics does not mean "a morally qualified action. " I argue below that several considerations support this view: (1) the distinction in the Poetics between praxis and ethos, (2) a survey of the occurrences of praxis and cognates in the Poetics, (3) Greek usage of praxis and cognates, and (4) examples of dramatic action.

1. Praxis and Ethos Aristotle's distinction between praxis and ethos is strong evidence in favor

of the view that praxis does not mean "a morally qualified action" in the Poetics. What ethos means, in this work and elsewhere, is of course a major problem in itself.7 For our present purposes, however, it is sufficient to recognize that when and if moral qualities enter into the drama, they do so by means of ethos (and/or dianoia), and not by means of praxis alone. I do not mean to imply that ethos is always, or even usually, associated with moral qualities. That it can have some moral aspects, however, is clear from the two definitions of ethos (ethe) given in the Poetics.

1. 50a4-6: "I mean by ethe that according to which we say that those acting are qualified" (Xhyw yap ... Tra 8 8 r, Ka 0' TroLoYU rtvaq E~vat

4aLVE Prov 7ip&arrovraq).

2. 50b8-9: "Ethos is that which indicates choice" (o'Vrw 8 ~\1o / Eiv 7rb 70otoW ov

' 8Xrl4ot t'v iTpoatpEo-wv).8

It would be a mistake to assume that the qualities of the first definition are exclusively moral, or that proairesis should be translated "moral purpose, " as Butcher translates it.9 On the other hand, there is no evidence to justify the conclusion that moral qualities and choices are meant to be excluded from ethos in the Poetics. Aristotle seems to be saying that ethos can indicate (moral) choice and confer (moral) qualities. And he never suggests that anything else (except dianoia), which is also to be connected with the agent rather than with the action,10 does this.

Aristotle states, then, that these properties define ethos, but he never suggests that they can enter into an account of praxis alone. Further, he insists that praxis is distinct from ethos and that praxis, but not ethos, is essential to tragedy: praxis does not imply ethos. We may reasonably conclude, then, that praxis does not have the properties that define ethos, that it does not indicate choice or serve to qualify the agent.

7Among the recent works on this controversial topic are: E. Sch'iutrumpf, Die Bedeutung des Wortes ithos in der Poetik des Aristoteles (Munich 1970); J. Pollitt, The Ancient View of Greek Art (New Haven 1974), 184-89; E. Keuls, Plato on Greek Painting (Leiden 1978) 95-109. Keuls' view that ethos in the Poetics means "dramatic passage indicative of character" (97) is surely the correct one, though I cannot agree with her that ethos lacks a moral factor (97, note 28).

81 follow the text of R. Kassel's OCT (1965) unless otherwise noted. All translations are my own.

9Butcher uses this translation of proairesis at 50b9 and at 54a17-18. The term does not have a narrowly moral sense even at EN 3.2 (111lb4-1112a17), where it is used in a technical sense which we are not justified in importing into the Poetics.

'0Poetics 49b36-50a3 states that dianoia, as well as ethos, serves to qualify those acting and (in a passage bracketed by Kassel) that it is a cause of action.

ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF PRAXIS 113

Aristotle draws a distinction between ethos and praxis in several ways. First, he tells us repeatedly thatpraxis, or, strictly speaking, the mythos (plot) which is the systasis pragmaton (50a4-5), is the most important aspect of tragedy: "The structure of the actions is the first and most important part of the tragedy. "11 Moreover, he insists that there can be tragedies without ethos (ethe): "They do not act in order to imitate the ethe, but they include the ethe within [the outline of] the actions;12 so that the actions and the plot are the end of tragedy, and the end is the most important of all. Again, without action there could be no tragedy; without ethe there could be; the tragedies of most of the modem poets are without ethe . . .; the first principle and as it were the soul of tragedy is the mythos; the second is the ethe" (50a20-26, 50a38-39). Thus, while a tragedy without ethos is certainly inferior (ethos is "second"), it is nevertheless a tragedy.

The statement that there can be tragedies without ethos should be taken literally: there can be tragedies in which choice is not indicated and qualities of those acting are not given.13 Aristotle's repeated insistence that praxis is primary and ethos inessential to tragedy indicates that praxis never implies ethos.

Since ethos is associated with the agent, and not with the action, as Aristotle's definitions of ethos make clear, those passages in which he insists that tragedy is imitation of actions and not of agents also make the point that praxis never implies ethos: "Tragedy is imitation not of human beings but of actions and [the events] of a life" (50al6-17);14 "it is imitation of action and

"150b22-23; cf. 50al5, 50a22-23, 50a29-b3.

120KKOVV O17(Or a 7 7tq /Al/ •LY7••(vatoL

irpaTTovrLv, &Xa a hh i' 7it lvArEpLXaavoovLrL 8th a'ra Trp(4etL (50a20-22). L. Pearson, "Characterization in Drama and Oratory-Poetics 1450a20," CQ 18 (1968) 76-83, presents a good survey of the textual problems of this passage and of the difficulties of interpretation, though I do not agree with his conclusions. I would like to think that Aristotle has in mind the comparison given at 50a39-b3, which I take to be between plot and outline on the one hand and ethos and color on the other: the outline of the plot is "colored in" by ethos, as in a child's coloring book. I have not, however, been able to find an instance in which

OV.l1T•EpL•ap4a,&vELv is used in this sense.

13avEv "LtEvrpV 4EoW o( OVrv LKWyVOiTO po Tpay "8tpa, aVEV 8bE "tov

yivOL, ' LWLv y•atp tratwv

VEWV 7r&v 'TXEITh tv &•LaC" 7rpayq8tIat E'Tiv (50a23-26), has been particularly subject to

misinterpretation. Many, for example A. Gudeman, Aristoteles. Peri Poietikes (Berlin and Leipzig 1934) 180; I. Bywater, Aristotle on the Art of Poetry (Oxford 1909) 167, believe that "without character" should be taken in only a relative sense. A. Dale, "Ethos and Dianoia: 'Character' and 'Thought' in Aristotle's Poetics," AUMLA 11 (1959) 8, followed by Sch'iutrumpf (above, note 7) 92, wants to blur the distinction between ethos and praxis by means of a theory of "implicit" and "explicit" ethos. Others try to make ethos an essential part of praxis in some other way. Pearson, for example (above, note 12) 79-80, states that "it is by representing people's actions that one shows what kind of people they are. " H. House, Aristotle's Poetics (London 1956) 74 correctly interprets the passage, though he misunderstands the relationship between ethos and action. Some additional support for my view is 50a12: o01K b6XiyoL a&PTiv, incorrectly put in obeli by Kassel. A new defense of 50a12 and of the literal interpretation of 50a23-26 is given by R. Janko, Aristotle, Poetics II on Comedy: An Epitome, now in press. I wish to thank Prof. Janko for allowing me to read his unpublished manuscript.

14•g ithP Elpse (7r ) th at, rTe K ra V XXctonEoVKal chht p V ~ iov. I cannot

agree with Else (257) that fLioq here has implications of conscious purpose.

114 ELIZABETH BELFIORE

most of all because of this it is imitation of those acting" (50b3-4); "since it is imitation of action and is acted by people acting . . . " (49b36-37).

Finally, at 61a4-9, Aristotle explicitly states that the qualities of actions are not inherent in them, but are derived from the agents. We cannot tell, he writes, whether an action is o-rrov6aiov or 4aicvov without considering the agent:

In deciding whether something was well or not well said or done by a person, one must not only consider whether the thing itself which was said or done was noble or base (orrTov8aiov " awAXov) but one must also consider the doer or sayer, to whom or when or how or for what reason he acted or spoke, for example, to bring about a greater good or to prevent a greater evil.•5

It might be objected that several passages in the Poetics seem to imply that praxis at least sometimes entails ethos. For example, Aristotle writes at 54a17-19 that speech and praxis can have ethos: "It will have ethos if, as was said, the speech or praxis makes clear what some choice is." And again, Aristotle writes that "by means of these [sc. ethos and dianoia ] we say that the actions also are qualified; for there are two causes of actions, dianoia and ethos . .." (49b38-50a2).'6 These passages, however, simply indicate that ethos or dianoia can be added to praxis. A praxis that may be said to "make clear what some choice is" is a combination of praxis and ethos, and it is ethos and not praxis that does the indicating. A similar account may be given of 49b38-50a2. If it were a general rule that every praxis has a cause, this passage would indicate that praxis entails ethos. But if a tragedy can lack ethos a tragic praxis can certainly lack a cause. Thus, a praxis that may be said to be qualified is also a combination of praxis and the ethos or dianoia that alone indicate what caused the action.

50a16-20, the passage in which Aristotle associates praxis with eu- daimonia, presents special problems. Kassel's text reads:

" Yap

Tpay,6"a Ai'qroi ixv Ov'K &v

T(.'TToV oVaXXa&I& l EpcWEov KaL

/3'iov [Kai EV'aL/LOvUY Ka'L KaKO8a4LuovLa v T(JC4EL iOwTV, KaC rb rTXo~ rrpc i~ Loo-r V, oi- 1Todjrq~ ECULV8' Kara LV r roLOL TWVE9, KaTra 6ETaq

i Tp4~EL EV6aqALoVEq TroiVvaVTioV]. There are excellent reasons for following Kassel in bracketing the passage as he does. 17 e68aovia, EvaigovEg occur nowhere else in the Poetics, and,

15The passage is cited by L. Golden, "Is Tragedy the 'Imitation of a Serious Action'?" GRBS 6 (1965) 285, note 7, as evidence in favor of his view that "Aristotle conceives of noble action as conditioned by and dependent on nobility of character. " I disagree with Golden, however, about the meaning of spoudaion in this passage, on which see below, section 2, discussion of #6.

'650al-2: 7T•rOvKEV

a Tir r0 TWo ov rp64Eov Eiva, btivota KaYL (00o

may not be genuine. It disrupts the sequence of ideas in this passage, is bracketed by Kassel, Lucas, Else, and was moved by T. Gomperz, Aristoteles' Poetik itbersetzt und eingeleitet (Leipzig 1897) 101.

'7The text is corrupt and has been much amended and discussed. For a defense of the passage bracketed by Kassel and a discussion of the controversy surrounding it see H.-J. Horn, "Zur Begrindung des Vorrangs der rrp&cf t vor dem 10og in der Aristotelischen Tragodientheorie," Hermes 103 (1975) 292-299.

ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF PRAXIS 115

as Lucas notes, KaKO8aL.LOVia is not Aristotelian.18 Nevertheless, even if the entire passage is genuine, we are not forced to conclude that it indicates that praxis means "a morally qualified action. " The term ev6Satqovia should, if the passage is genuine, be read in a non-ethical sense, as a synonym of

In 50a16-20 Eii8aLpovia and KaKO8aL/.LovaR are the two endpoints of the tragic change.'9 Other passages use terms related to rviXr to describe this change: Kar&u 7TraTa [sc. Tpg4EI] Ka TrYXavVVOUtLV Kat &lrorvtyX- &vovovw rwavrE (50a2-3);

ovipaLvEL EL'; EvbrvXUiav K 8vo-riXta

- q

ETbrvX'a E•i• KvorvX'iav tLErafahXXEvhw (51a13-14); E5 o6 /ETaJaiLvEL E E~i EIbrvXtav

- qEiL larvXtav (55b27-28). Now it is clear from Aristotle's example of a tragic change in Poetics 13 that

rvXrb, "luck," and its cognates do not have ethical implications.20 The best tragedy, Aristotle writes, shows someone "not excelling in arete and justice, nor changing to 8vo-rvXia because of evil or vice, but because of some hamartia,21 someone who is one of those with great good reputation and Ei-rvXla, such as Oedipus and Thyestes and famous men of such families" (53a8-12). Butcher rightly translates [Ev] E1YrvuXi as "prosperous." In this passage, the social advantages of good reputation, fame and nobility of birth are associated with iYrvxua. And the term is explicitly dissociated from arete and justice: the person with EirrvXUa should not excel in these qualities if the tragedy is to be good. Tragedy, in Aristotle's view, should deal with people who are conspicuously in possession of those things the Greeks traditionally considered to be advantages. This is not a moral requirement. It is simply an observation that the misfortunes of a person who "has everything" are more

'8Lucas, 102. The phrase E•6attL/ovLca

Kal KaKoGLMOLva 'v 1"rp4EtL

iEoriv appears to be a distortion of EN 6.1139a34-35:

Ebnrpa',ao y ap

Kt• rb evOavTov Ev n7•p4Et

a'vEv &avoiac' Kal

Wiov obrK nUTLV. Just above, at EN 6.1139a31, rp4E~rc i v oiv axpX,) rTpoatploaq., is remarkably similar to the suspected passage Poetics 50al-2 (note 16, above). It is possible that this passage in the Ethics influenced the intrusion of both Poetics passages.

19Else (256) rightly connects the passage with the account of the tragic change later in the Poetics, though he misinterprets the change itself.

207vrb, "luck, " has been thought, like EbSatLLovi•a,

to have ethical implications: A. Neschke, Die Poetik des Aristoteles (Frankfort 1980) 1.132-133 cites Ar. Physics 197a36ff. to show that the term ri'Xq can be used of what happens to moral agents alone. M. Schofield, "Aristotelian Mistakes," Proc. Cambridge Philological Soc. n.s. 19 (1973) 66-70, offers some good evidence against interpreting xirvxia in this way in the EN.

21Hamartia of course cannot be dealt with adequately here. Briefly, I take the fact of the change from good to bad fortune to be central, and the exact nature of the agent's "error" that brings it about to be relatively unimportant. As Adkins notes, commenting on hamartia in Greek tragedy: "What is important in all these actions is that a character or characters have passed from good fortune to ill. . . . Before such a change of condition can take place there must have been an 'error,' &xapria, of some kind . . . but the exact nature of the 'error' is of ... small importance, compared with the change of condition . . ." ("Aristotle and the Best Kind of Tragedy," CQ 16 [1966] 89). Sorabji (above, note 5) gives some excellent reasons against interpreting hamartia in the Poetics in the light of the Ethics, and rightly remarks that "Greek tragedies were not always portrayals of a weakness punished, but were sometimes studies of the sheer pity and horror of human situations" (296).

116 ELIZABETH BELFIORE

impressive, produce more pity and fear, than those of an ordinary human being.22

In ordinary Greek ELbaLLgovia was often synonymous with E brvX'La in the sense of "prosperity," and had, in Adkins' words, "the strongest possible flavour of 'wealth.' "23 Aristotle, even in the Nicomachean Ethics, empha- sizes the external goods that go to make up EibSaLgovia,24 and Oedipus himself was called

E•b6ailwov by Euripides.25 There is, then, every reason to interpret Eab8atgLovaia in 50a16-20 in a non-

ethical sense, as synonymous with EbrvXta, meaning "prosperity." The passage must, if genuine, mean: "Tragedy is imitation not of human beings but of events and of [the events of a human] life. Prosperity and adversity result from events and the result is an event, not a quality. Human beings are qualified by their ethe, and are prosperous or the opposite because of events."

2. Occurrences of Praxis and Cognates in the Poetics A second reason for believing that praxis does not have an ethical sense in

the Poetics is provided by a survey of the occurrences of praxis and its cognates in this work. These words are never modified by specifically ethical terms (e.g. dikaios, andreios), and the actions they describe are never considered to have ethical properties of their own.

In the following section, all occurrences of praxis and cognates in the Poetics are grouped in tables according to usage or context. I follow the rubrics of Kassel's index: rrp&y/pa, Tp&'KTLKOV, rpa~ , Trp&TTErr , po- TErlpay.giva. His index is incomplete, however, and I supplement it with

other occurrences I have found. A discussion of each heading follows the tables. Two or more occurrences in the same line are listed separately: e.g. 51a37, 51a37. [ ] designates occurrences bracketed by Kassel. * designates words listed under more than one heading.26 The totals of each heading and subheading (1, 2, 2a, etc.) include cross-listed occurrences; the total of all headings (1-7) counts cross-listings only once.

22See R. Lattimore, "The Legend in Greek Tragedy, " in Literature in Western Civilization. I: The Classical World, D. Daiches and A. Thorlby eds., (London 1972) 173-91, for an excellent discussion of Aristotle's requirement that tragedy deal with human beings of high social status. He notes Euripides' Hipp. 1465-6: r&v yarp p/.ya'Xcv &asorrE0-ELdg/IqE aL

a•L XXoV

Ka•TE- Xov~rv. See also Lucas, 63-64.

23A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility (Oxford 1960) 254; cf. 257-258, note 12 on eudaimonia.

24See EN 1.1099a31-b8, where Aristotle also notes the popular connection of eudaimonia with eutychia, and Rhetoric 1.5 (1360b).

25Sv Oii0 rrpov;

To rrp&rrov

Ev8atgwv av-qp ... E.L' E.yevETo a&, &XYAufrao09 /3porWv. Eur. Antigone fr., cited in Aristophanes Frogs 1182, 1187 (=Nauck, fr. 157, 158). This use of eudaimon as a synonym of EbrvX-v is noted by J. T. Sheppard, The Oedipus Tyrannus of Sophocles (Cambridge 1920) xxix and note 2. Sheppard notes another interesting use of eudaimon in OT 1190ff.

26For convenience, I limit the number of cross-listings included.

ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF PRAXIS 117

Tables

1. Uses irrelevant to imitation: 48bl, 50b35, 51a10 Total: 3

2. "Technical" uses 2a. 7rp&ytLa: 51b22, 54a14, 54b6, 55a17, 56a20

Total: 5 2b. Tp&aKTKOV : 60al

Total: 1 2c. rrpa&tq : 47a28, 51b29, 51b33, 52a13, 52a37, 52bll

Total: 6 2d. Trp&rrEtv : 48a23, 49b31, 52a36, 52a36, 55a25, 59a15, 59b24, 60a14

Total: 8 2e. 7rpolTErTpay/ vaa : 55b30

Total: 1 Total 2a-e: 21

3. Associated with E•KO'.,

aVayKIq : *51a28, 51b9, 51bl11, 52a22, 52a29, 54a35, *56b2

Total: 8 4. Associated with "one," "whole," or "complete:" *49b24, 50b24, 51a18,

51a19, *51a28, 51a31, 51a33, *52a2, 52a14, 59a19, 59a22, 59bl, 62b8, 62bll

Total: 14 5. Associated with pity and fear: *52a2, 52bl, 53b2, 53b5, 53b13, *53b16,

*56b2 Total: 7

6. Associated with KaX0q or or7TovU8daio : 48al, 48a27, 48b25, *49b24, *61a5, *61a6, *61a7

Total: 7 7. Passages particularly relevant to Aristotle's theory of praxis:

7a. Poetics 14: kinds of praxeis: *53b16, 53b27, 53b30, 53b30, 53b36, 53b38, 54a2, 54a3, 54a3

Total: 9 7b. Praxis most important aspect of tragedy: 50a15, 50a22, 50a32, 50a37, 50b22

Total: 5 7c. 49b36-50a6: 49b36, 49b36, 49b37, 50al, [50a2], 50a4, 50a5, 50a6

Total: 8 7d. 50a16-22: 50a16, [50a18], [50a18], [50a20], 50a21, 50a22

Total: 6 7e. Other: 50a24, 50b3, 50b4, 54a18, *61a5, *61a6, *61a7

Total: 7 Total 7a-e: 35 Total 1-7 (cross-listings counted only once): 87

118 ELIZABETH BELFIORE

Discussion

#1. 48bl says that prattein is the Attic for poiein; in the other two occurrences pragma means "thing."

#2. In the passages in which these instances occur, tragedy is called mime- sis praxeos, the plot is called the systasis pragmaton, or some similar reference is made to action as the sphere of drama, and nothing relevant to ethics is said.

#3. The rule of probability or necessity is a formal requirement, having no bearing on ethical questions.

#4. The rule that a praxis should be one, whole and complete is closely connected with the "norm of length" within which the tragic change is comprised (51al2-15). I argue above, in the discussion of 50a16-20, that this change should not be thought of in ethical terms.

#5. Pity and fear are primarily a response to the plot (53bl-7) and we will see below, in the discussion of #7a, that the actions which make up plots are described in non-ethical terms. Aristotle does say that pity is felt for the

&v&eo• and fear for the i4lows~ (53a5-6), but a&vrao6 and 6/owgo do not

have narrowly ethical senses27 and in any case they describe the agent, not the action. What Aristotle means is that a persona without these qualities will interfere with the audience's tragic response to the plot.28

#6. In seven instances praxis is associated with spoudaios or kalos. At 48al and 48a27 spoudaios describes people who happen to be acting, and not the actions themselves. And, as we have seen, 61a4-9, where three other instances occur, states that we cannot tell whether or not an action is spoudaion orphaulon without considering the agent.

At 48b25-27 Aristotle states that when poetry originated, the better sort of poets imitated 7Ya'

KaXh• . .. 7Tpa0EL' Ka't 7

•r' oV roo'rWoV, writing

hymns and encomia, while the inferior sort imitated ratq [Trp&a6Et] i70V a•ai hov, writing invectives (ftf6yot). Since encomia are written to praise, as

invectives are written to blame, kalas must attribute an ethical quality to praxeis, in this one instance. However, Aristotle is now discussing a stage of

poetry that precedes and differs from that of epic, tragedy and comedy.29 Comedy, Aristotle tells us, only appears when the earlier invectives are replaced by "the laughable" (48b37), which is "some defect or ugliness that is painless and not destructive" such as the comic mask (49a34-37). That is, while the objects of invective are blameworthy, and hence morally qualified, those of comedy are merely laughable. The development of epic and tragedy

27This was convincingly demonstrated by Adkins, "Aristotle and the Best Kind of Tragedy" (above, note 21).

28T. Stinton, "Hamartia in Aristotle and Greek Tragedy," CQ 25 (1975) 238-39, rightly notes that Aristotle is concerned with proscribing the character traits that interfere with our tragic pleasure, causing us to feel "outrage," mairon, (Po. 13.52b36) instead of pity and fear. I take this same concern to govern Aristotle's requirements that characters be "better" (53a16) and "good" (54a17).

29This much, at least, is clear, whether or not we follow Else (137ff.) in assigning everything before 48b32 to the pre-poetic stage of improvisation.

ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF PRAXIS 119

from encomia may be analogous to the development of comedy from invective, though our corrupt text does not describe it in detail. Aristotle does, however, tell us that Homer's Margites is to comedy what his Iliad and Odyssey are to tragedy (48b38-49a2) and he replaces the kalas praxeis imitated by the earlier encomia with ta spoudaia when he discusses epic (48b34). It is possible, then, that just as comedy replaces the blameworthy with the laughable, so epic and tragedy replace the praiseworthy with spoudaia that are not objects of praise. Whether or not this is a correct account of the development of epic, we are certainly not justified in simply equating the kalas praxeis of a pre-epic stage with the spoudaia of the Homeric stage of poetry, especially since kalas praxeis are nowhere in the Poetics said to be the objects of epic, tragedy or comedy.

This brings us to Aristotle's definition of tragedy as imitation of a spoudaia praxis at 6.49b24. It might be argued that, since in Poetics 2 Aristotle tells us that tragedy imitates people who are spoudaioi or "better" in some moral sense, spoudaia must also have a moral sense at 6.49b24.30 Even if we grant the premise, however, 61a4-9 proves that Aristotle does not hold that every action of a morally good person must itself be morally good.

On the other hand, there is good evidence that spoudaia in Poetics 6 means "worth serious attention" and that it describes the formal structure of a plot. In his definition at 49b24 Aristotle states that "tragedy is imitation of a spoudaia and teleia praxis, having magnitude. " Then, in Chapter 7.50b23- 25, he substitutes hole for spoudaia, writing that tragedy was defined as "imitation of a teleia and hole praxis, having magnitude. " This substitution is no accident. The holon, Aristotle writes, is something that has a beginning, middle and end, according to probability or necessity (50b27ff.). Then, in Chapter 9, he states that what happens according to what is probable or necessary is the katholou, "the universal" (51a6-11), and that because poetry is more concerned with the universal, history with the particular, poetry is more philosophical and spoudaioteron than history (51b5-6). Poetry is spoudaioteron, then, because it imitates a hole praxis, and a spoudaia praxis is a hole praxis, one that follows probability or necessity.31

Since, then, spoudaia describes the formal structure of a tragedy, it is best translated "worth serious attention. " Spoudazesthai is used to mean "to take seriously" at 49bl, where Aristotle writes that comedy has no history because it was not "taken seriously"; it was not, for example, given a chorus until late. And as Else has shown, spoudaioi people in the Poetics are "those who take themselves and life seriously and therefore can be taken seriously. "32 It may be that we cannot say of someone that he or she takes life seriously without making a positive moral judgment. However, there is no reason to suppose

30For an argument along these lines see Golden (above, note 15) 283-89. 310n the connection between the spoudaion and the probable or necessary see M. Weitz,

"Tragedy, " in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, P. Edwards, ed. (New York 1967) 8.155 and the excellent remarks of H. D. E Kitto, "Catharsis," in The Classical Tradition, L. Wallace, ed. (Ithaca 1966) 144.

32Else, 77. See also Lucas, 63-64, on the social connotations of spoudaios.

120 ELIZABETH BELFIORE

that an action worth taking seriously must be a praiseworthy action. All serious students of ethics, including Aristotle himself, consider blameworthy actions to be worth considering at least as seriously as praiseworthy acts.

#7a. This category is particularly interesting because all of these instances occur within the context of an exhaustive list of kinds of actions which tragedy may imitate (Poetics 14). Aristotle begins by asking what sorts of events

(orvurrttvreov: 53b15) are pitiable and fearful. Such praxeis, he continues,

would have to be those of philoi, enemies, or of those who are neither (53b15-17). And again, he writes, (53b27-37) the actions would have to be done or not done, and by those with knowledge or without knowledge of the relationship (Ivayvwpio-at rlvy thXiav: 53b31). "And there is no other possibility besides these, " Aristotle remarks (53b36).

In all of these cases, certain facts about the agent-his relationship to someone else and his knowledge or ignorance of this relationship-are a part of the action. These facts alone, however, are not sufficient to give moral qualities to the actions. Someone, for example, who killed a relative knowing of this relationship, might not be culpable, if he acted under compulsion or for the sake of a greater good. Again, someone who killed a relative would not necessarily be absolved from blame if he did not know of the relationship. This act might be vicious murder regardless of the relationship, or the agent might himself be responsible for his ignorance. We cannot praise or blame on the basis of such scant knowledge.33 As if to underline this fact, praxis at 53b16 is used as a synonym of

or1,vuir7Tnov in the previous line: a word with

fewer ethical connotations could hardly have been found.34 #7b-#7e. These occurrences have been discussed in section 1, above.

3. Greek Usage of Praxis and Cognates If praxis apart from ethos never refers to a morally qualified action in the

Poetics, this is entirely in line with the usage of Aristotle and of other Greek writers. Bruno Snell showed long ago that the verb dran is used of actions in which guilt or innocence is in question, while prattein "nowhere touches on this question of good and evil. "35 In Ag. 1467, for example, Helen, as cause of the Trojan War, is said to have "brought to pass incurable pain"

33J. Jones, On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy (Oxford 1962) 48-49, rightly argues against a tendency to read psychological implications into Poetics 14 when he tells us that mellei, at 53b21, for example, should not be translated "intends" (Butcher) but "on the point of."

34Compare 53b4-6, where the pragmata are identified with symbainonta: &(TE TOV •b

iKOU ra T srpaypLara yw6o•LEva

Kat 4pPiTTEL KaCL •EXEEV K 7•V oTvUpawvrtVOV . 35 "Das irpajrTet ruhrt nirgends an diese Frage nach Gut und B'ose"; B. Snell, "Aischylos

und das Handeln im Drama," Philologus suppl. 20 (1928) 14. (Snell, however, fails to apply his findings correctly to the Poetics, p. 16.) Those who cite Snell's article do not mention this important conclusion, concentrating solely on what Snell says about prattein's connection with completion: Else, 241, note 73; J. Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Iliad (Chicago 1975) 64-65 and note 49, 236: and J. H. Schmidt, Synonymik der griechischen Sprache (Leipzig 1876, rpt. Amsterdam 1967) 1. #23:

"Ap&valrpaccEwv,r, ropoViELVw," who is wrong when he states that a praxis is always the activity of a person (399). A good counterexample is Aristotle, De Caelo 292bl-3: 86e voA/t4EV KaL T7*V

7•TV OarTppov Trp4 w PvaL'aL TOLairrVV Oa 7TEp 7 TdV T XW V Ka.L

4•vr&v. (This passage is noted by D. S. Margoliouth, The Poetics of Aristotle [London 1911] 40).

ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF PRAXIS 121

(&eY4crarov &ayog ETrpaeEv): "it happened by means of her." Snell contrasts Ismene's confession of guilt in Antigone 536: 8ESpaKa 70ropyov.36 In legal contexts also, the pragmata can be the undisputed facts of a case as distinct from the disputed correct legal interpretation. A good example is Antiphon's Second Tetralogy, where the defendant, while admitting that his son threw a javelin (the pragmata), nevertheless argues that his son did not kill the person he struck "according to the truth of the things he did" (KaTr yE

T•7v &aXh•EaV i••

E0Tpa4Ev).37 Aristotle himself uses prattein in this sense in a legal context in Rhetoric 1.13: a person may admit that he did something (QE7Trpax(vat) but deny that his act should be described in a certain way; for example, he may admit that he took something but deny that he stole it; he may admit that he struck but deny that that he committed hybris.38 Plato uses praxis in a similar way in the Euthyphro: Ip &?E•jw Tvwo' 7riptL 8a- OEpO/.LEVOL Ot /.LEV 6LKaUi a cXr •TLV OaiT-iiv 7TEITp&XXCXL, O& 68 E•6LKW.39 Even in the ethical works, Aristotle frequently uses praxis in a completely non-moral sense. Sorabji notes that in Aristotle's view "the same action can belong to one category under one description, and to another under an- other, "40 and cites EE 2.9 and EN 5.8. In the latter passage prattein is not distinguished from

7o'yXEM : 7TOhhXX yap KtC 7r)v boUEL inrapX6vrcov

EL~'iTE' Ka L K 7pa77TTo0l Kc oLKaITXOI.EV O , V OlOEV ov0 0 KOb(TULO Ov oT'

aKOVroWV aoLVW, o07v b Trp&vy p 7aroiTv47oUKELw (1135a33-b2). Mar- goliouth gives many other examples of this usage in which prattein is not distinguished from

7"rI&XEW•.41 4. Examples of Dramatic Actions Finally, some examples of dramatic praxeis support the view that apraxis is

not a morally qualified event, while ethos, that which gives (moral) qualities and indicates (moral) choice is something added on to the tragedy by means of specific speeches and descriptions of attendant circumstances.

In distinguishing plot from episode, Aristotle gives an outline of the plot of the Odyssey and of the Iphigeneia in Tauris. He describes the latter as follows:

A certain girl after being sacrificed and disappearing from the view of those sacrificing her was settled in another land where the custom was to sacrifice strangers to the goddess, and she came to hold that priesthood.

36Snell (above, note 35) 13. P. Chantraine, Dictionnaire etymologique de la langue grecque 1 (Paris 1968) 297, notes that 6p&v is used to emphasize "la responsabilite prise plut6t que . . . la realisation d'un acte." On iromev, 6p&v and irp&rr'E see also B. Snell, "Das Bewusstsein von eigenen Entscheidungen im fruhen Griechentum, " Philologus 85 (1930) 141-58, esp. 152-58; A. Braun, "I verbe del 'fare' nel greco, " Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica 15 (1938) 243-96.

372.3, following the ms. reading i3ahXe p•Ev, obiK aTErKTELVE 8E Oiiva. I owe this example to M. Gagarin, "The Truth of Persuasion in Antiphon's Second Tetralogy," paper read at the annual meeting of the Philological Association of the Pacific Coast, Stanford University, November, 1981.

38Rhetoric 1.73b38ff.; cf. Rhet. 58b30ff. For a discussion of the legal questions Aristotle refers to, see W. Grimaldi, Aristotle, Rhetoric I. A Commentary (New York 1980) 294.

39Euthyphro 8e6-8. This passage is noted by Grimaldi (above, note 38) 294. 40Sorabji (above, note 5) 279; cf. 295. 41Margoliouth (above, note 35) 37-41.

122 ELIZABETH BELFIORE

A while later, the brother of the priestess happened to arrive. That the god ordered him to go there and for what purpose he came is outside the plot (rb 86 E(TtL 7VEL XEV0 '&% 1EWMb EEL KEL

Ka•L 0 f' 6" E r CE T70o

pinOov).42 He arrived, was seized, and when on the point of being

sacrificed, he made himself known, either as Euripides or as Polyidus wrote it, saying, as he was likely to do, that not only his sister but himself also had to be sacrificed, and because of this he was saved (Poetics 17.55b3-12).

This plot outline explicitly excludes any indication of proairesis: "That the god ordered him to go there and for what purpose he came is outside the plot. " Also excluded are not only the names of the characters, but also any of their individual qualities. Without this ethos, the bare action has no moral qualities of its own.

Aristotle's outline of the Odyssey plot also excludes ethos:

A certain man is away from home for many years, carefully watched by Poseidon and alone. Moreover, things at home are in such a state that his possessions are wasted by the suitors and his son is plotted against. He himself arrives, storm-tossed, and making himself recognized by some, attacks and is himself saved while he destroys his enemies. This is what is proper to the plot; the rest is episode (Poetics 17.55b17-23).

In this example also, ethos, anything indicative of choice or descriptive of individual qualities, is excluded.43 Aristotle avoids using ethically loaded words, such as KXho'Tr, oLtOLXELa,

av vpo•Ovita4 to describe the actions, though he could well have used them all. Gomperz remarks perceptively about Aristotle's two plot outlines: "For our philosopher, the daughter of Agamem- non, the most powerful among the Greek princes, is thus merely a 'maiden'; Ulysses is not a hero and a mighty warrior before Troy, but simply a 'man.' "45

An excellent way of illustrating and testing our interpretation of Aristotle's concept of praxis is to apply it to three plays with the same basic plot: Aeschylus' Libation Bearers, Sophocles' Electra and Euripides' Electra. If we base a plot outline of all three plays on Aristotle's examples of the Odyssey and the Iphigeneia in Tauris plots, we will get something like this:

A woman has killed her husband, a king, and now rules in his stead, along with her lover, who helped in the killing. She has, by her dead husband, a son, living in exile, and a virgin daughter. The son returns

42The text reads thus with the deletion of the words bracketed by Kassel. The textual questions have no bearing on my point.

43The importance of these two plot outlines for understanding Aristotle's view that there can be

tragedy without ethos is noted by C. Lord, "Tragedy Without Character: Poetics VI. 1450a24," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 28 (1969-70) 55-62.

44EN 1107a9ff. lists these as names for actions that include baseness; cf. Rhetoric 1374a11-15. 45T. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers (Griechische Denker, Leipzig 1896), trans. G. G. Berry

(London 1912) 4.414.

ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF PRAXIS 123

from exile, makes himself known to his sister by means of tokens, gains access to his mother and her lover by means of craft and kills them.

This plot, common to each of the plays, tells us absolutely nothing about the ethical quality of the act of Orestes in killing his mother. In fact, the plot is such that we cannot in principle determine this ethical quality from the act alone. As a general rule, it is right to avenge one's father. And, again, as a general rule it is wrong to kill one's mother. But what may be said of avenging one's father by killing one's mother? Each play solves this ethical dilemma in a different way, by attributing different motives and qualities to the agent; that is, by the use of ethos.46

In the Libation Bearers, Orestes is made to give his reasons for the matricide early in the play. They are: the oracle, grief for his father, and loss of his patrimony, which, he says, entails the servitude of the very men who sacked Troy (297-305). Of these, all noble motives, the oracle is by far the most important. When about to act, Orestes hesitates and asks Pylades, "What shall I do?" (rt 6p&oro;).47 Pylades answers, "What of the oracle? Count all men enemies except the god." Orestes answers, "You are right," and does the deed (899-904). These passages have ethos, for they indicate why something is chosen. And they clearly show that the choice is a noble one. Orestes is never given any unworthy motives at other times; he is never given a reason to distrust the god, and he is never shown to be the sort of person who would take advantage of a divine oracle for selfish purposes. Orestes, therefore, is shown by the poet's use of ethos to be morally justified and is vindicated by the gods in the Eumenides.

The motives of Orestes in Sophocles' Electra are very different. He also gives them in a speech early in the play: (1) desire to win fame, (2) desire to destroy his enemies, and (3) to regain his patrimony (59-72). He does not give as reasons the oracle, love of his father, desire to free the land from tyranny. We conclude, and other speeches in the play bear this out, that Orestes' motives in the Sophocles play do not justify a matricide. Here, ethos shows that Orestes is blameworthy.

In Euripides' Electra, Orestes' motives are shown not by speech so much as by the circumstances attending his action: another form of ethos. Orestes kills Aigisthus during a sacrifice, and he kills Clytemnestra while she is preparing for a sacrifice.48 He brings Aigisthus' corpse to Electra and asks her to maltreat it as she wishes (896 ff.). He doubts the oracle (971) but does the

46There is some indication that Aristotle would have looked at the three plays in this way. In Poetics 14.53b20-26, he includes a matricide in his list of plots and mentions the murder of Clytemnestra by Orestes as one of the received legends the poet cannot change (Tobiq p ev oiVV

trape*X-Tlqpj•vov pJiOovi XV•EL

oi'K TLwv) but should handle skillfully. This passage makes no suggestion that the bare plot represents an action of any specific ethical quality. On the other hand, when Aristotle mentions two actual treatments of the matricide, he does condemn the son's action: Rhet. 2.1401a35-b3 (Theodectes' Orestes) and EN 3.1110a26-29 (Euripides' Alcmaeon).

47This and Eur. El. 1244 (page 00, below) are good examples of the typical Greek preference for dran over prattein when ethically qualified actions are in question. See above, section 3.

48An interesting parallel to this kind of ethos is provided by an example given by Pollitt (above,

124 ELIZABETH BELFIORE

deed anyway. All this shows a lack of concern for the gods, and for human standards of decency. Such a man can have no motive for matricide that can justify this act. This is in fact what the Dioscuri tell Orestes: "She has received justice, but you did not act justly " (8WKataux EV VV, 8o' EXEL, T) 86' obi'v 86p&, 1244).

These three plays, then, do seem to have a bare plot that imitates an action without moral qualifications. The agent is, in each case, given a different quality by ethos.

We have found, then, that in Aristotle's dramatic theory, action, a mere event, is primary and that ethos, that which indicates choice and confers quality, is of secondary importance and is not a necessary part of all tragedies. Plot is the "first principle and soul of tragedy" (50a38-39), while psychology and ethics are of much less importance.49 We have also found that Aristotle's concept of praxis can be applied fruitfully to the Greek plays themselves. The playwright, if our examples are typical, begins with a bare action that is a given and "colors" it, as an artist paints a statue, with readily distinguishable and identifiable ethos. It would require a much more detailed study to determine whether the Greek plays also justify Aristotle's view that the action is a great deal more important than the ethos. If he is right, however, many of our questions about the characterization and motivation of the personae of these plays may be irrelevant as well as unanswerable.50

ELIZABETH BELFIORE University of Minnesota

note 7) of ethos in painting. A painting of Polygnotus was said to depict Ajax swearing at an altar while Cassandra sat holding the image of Athena to which she clung as a suppliant when Ajax dragged her away (188). Here also, attendant circumstances, the altar and the image, clearly show the quality of Ajax' act of sacrilege.

49See P. Turner, "The Reverse of Vahlen," CR 9 (1959) 214, for a good criticism of our

tendency to interpret Aristotle in the light of our modern interest in psychology, a subject with which the Poetics has little concern.

50An earlier version of this paper was read at the annual meeting of the American Philological Association, San Francisco, Dec. 1981. I wish to thank Profs. George Sheets and Kathleen Wilkes for their helpful criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper.