election alert #8: seeking competitive elections in venezuela (report, analysis)

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ELECTIONALERT2012 VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS

For free, fair, and competitive elections

Venezuelans’ historic turnout for the presidential elections of October 7 (80.48% of all registered voters) and acceptance of the results by all parties might indicate that this electoral process was an example for the democratic world.

Indeed, the efforts of political parties, non-governmental organizations and civil society in general to achieve the necessary conditions for elections recognized by all parties to be held are laudable and noteworthy. Nevertheless, the failure to comply with basic international electoral—and democratic—standards detracts from Venezuelans’ historic election turnout.

Initially, crucial problems could be identified in four areas: the use of institutional advertising (including officials broadcasts) and government resources to do political

Seeking Competitive Elections

This bulletin, which circulates bi-monthly, is produced by a group of Venezuelan social organizations, together with journalists and academics. The main objective of this publication is to alert the international community to developments in the electoral campaign for the forthcoming October 7, 2012 elections.

EDITORIAL

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proselytizing, unbalanced coverage by the media, involvement of public officials in the campaign (under pressure by third parties or of their own free will) and misinformation—or the concealment of information by the election authority—on vital processes and areas of the election’s organization that remained consistently outside the oversight of political parties. Although it cannot be affirmed that this lack of information—and access—influenced the outcome of the elections, it is one example of how the election authority ignored the basic principle of transparency and balance that should characterize an election.

Unbalanced coverage in the media, the use of public resources and involvement of public officials in the campaign are problems that could be prevented if the National Electoral Council (CNE) exercised the enforcement powers it is vested with pursuant to Venezuelan law. Unfortunately, however, the role of the electoral oversight body was geared toward allowing an unfair electoral advantage and avoiding the imposition of penalties for the use of public resources and government assets in order to favor one of the presidential candidates.

In this regard, in its preliminary report on the Venezuelan electoral process, the Carter Center explained the origin of these failures on the part of the Venezuelan electoral body. “Of its five current members, four, including its president, have ties to a greater or lesser extent to the Chávez administration and one has ties to the opposition. The CNE’s political leanings help to explain its scant enthusiasm for addressing some of the campaign’s issues, in particular those related to campaign regulations, as well as its inconsistent efforts in enforcing such regulations.”

Generally speaking, all political parties agreed that the automated voting system worked satisfactorily on October 7 thanks to the participation of the candidates’ electoral experts in 16 audits of the voting platform. Nonetheless, other issues still urgently require attention from the Venezuelan electoral authorities and the international community, as can be gathered from the

public communiqués of independent electoral experts who made up the five national observation organizations accredited by the CNE.

In order for Venezuelan elections to be truly competitive the recommendations that were issued six years ago in the report by the European Union’s International Observation Mission must be revisited. The electoral oversight body must give priority to mechanisms for penalizing violations that are provided for under the Basic Law on Electoral Processes [Ley Orgánica de Procesos Electorales]

(LOPRE), the Elections Authority Act [Ley del Poder Electoral] (LOPE), and the General Electoral Regulations of LOPRE so that violations committed are penalized during the campaign and not after the elections.

In order to prevent those in power from having an unfair electoral advantage, the CNE could follow the example of electoral legislation from Colombia, Brazil or Mexico in order to try and reduce—or eventually ban—the use of institutional advertisement of government works as a guise for electoral propaganda during the campaign.

In addition to regulating the use of public resources and assets, the technical issues listed below need to be urgently addressed:

· The CNE needs to be transparent with regard to the procedure it follows to select polling station coordinators and technical personnel, who are working in an increasingly complex Venezuelan voting system. According to national observers of the October 7th elections, “the problems that emerged both regarding center coordinators, as well as members of the Plan República, are noteworthy. There were cases in which coordinators took on roles that went beyond their purview, placing themselves above [the authority] of the chairs and other members of the election board, in clear violation of the regulations in force. This unlawful positioning was at the root of difficulties faced by several observers in doing their job.

- The CNE should report on how many members of the election boards selected randomly by the CNE were actually trained and worked at polling stations. This

“Of its five current members, four, including its president, have ties to a greater or lesser extent to the Chávez administration and one has ties to the opposition”

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information is crucial in order to clearly ascertain whether political activists have control of the election boards on election day.

- The regulations on disabled voters that are to be accompanied when voting remains unenforced and is used to pressure voters. According to a report by Asamblea de Educación (one of the five national observation groups endorsed by the CNE) at 6.3% of the polling stations observed, the regulations on companions for assisted voting were not respected. Based on the total number of polling stations, this would come to 2,477. It is impossible to know how many votes were cast under coercion.

- The CNE must clearly inform the Plan República, polling station coordinators and the community in general that polling stations may close at 6:00 PM if no voters are in line. National observers reported extensive lack of compliance (13%) with the rule that establishes the closing time of polling stations. This situation may have been aggravated by the CNE’s failure to announce in a timely manner the conclusion of voting.

- Opposition experts have demanded that the CNE improve its quality control procedures for voting machines and establish appropriate contingency procedures. It is unacceptable that at a given moment 1,400 machines at polling stations failed to work and that 400 machines were switched to manual voting. There were numerous cases of polling places where

voting continued until 10:00 PM, the time when the election results were being announced. Approximately 50,000 voters still do not know the results of their polling stations because the manual tabulation record was not adequately processed.

- The CNE must be accountable with regard to the functioning of the equipment for “biometric identification,” known as the Integrated Authentication System [Sistema de Autenticación Integrado] (SAI), which has been integrated into the voting machine. Specifically, the CNE should clarify to what extent this equipment effectively identified voters as compared to the CNE’s expectations and the equipment’s technical specifications.

Finally, it is noteworthy that given the absence of qualified international election observation missions in the country for the October 7th elections—with the exception of the efforts undertaken by the Carter Center—non-governmental organizations (NGOs), whether recognized or not by the CNE, played a vital role in monitoring electoral conditions. This kind of initiatives should be strengthened, especially in order to guarantee the Independence of NGOs’ work, as the only manner in which Venezuela will be able to hold elections in the future that are free, fair and competitive.

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This past October 7th the campaign for the Presidency of the Republic concluded. This was a campaign in which diverse actors of the Venezuelan State participated in actions which, although legal in form and appearance, had consequences that gave direct and indirect advantages to President Chávez. The official electoral campaign began on July 1st, but the string of abuses began well before that date. The use of forces of the powerful and millionaire Venezuelan state controlled by the President was effective in achieving the goal of maintaining his grip on power. The table below lists some of the most significant measures and decisions and outlines how the State and authorities clearly targeted their decisions to favor [Chávez’s] re-election.

ANALYSIS

The State Worked for [the Incumbent’s] Reelection

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In June 2012 The Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) wrested party leadership from the team that won the Patria para Todos (PPT) and Podemos’ internal elections, handing over control of the parties’ names and assets to minority factions that support Chávez.

The two cards of these parties on the electoral ballot totaled almost 400,000 votes for Chávez:PPT: 219,794 votesPodemos: 155,944 votes

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The party Unidad Democrática withdrew its support for Henrique Capriles Radonski in September, after the electoral ballots had been made, and threw their support behind the candidate Reina Sequera. The CNE accepted this change and refused to change the card on which Capriles’ photo and name remained.

Reina Sequera obtained:With her card: 4,451 votes Card with Capriles’ face: 65,909 votes

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Three parties: MAPVE, PIEDRA, PANA, withdraw their support for Capriles Radonski in September, when the electoral ballot with his photo and name had been approved. The votes cast for these parties were disquali�ed.

Disquali�ed: 66,696 votes from the parties MAPVE, PIEDRA, PANA

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From January 1 to October 1, 2012, there were a total of 104 “cadenas” [“chain broadcasts”] for a total of 8460 minutes, which translates into approxi-mately one radio and television “cadena” every three days.

4 Unlimited presence of the incumbent president in the media.What is the impact of a media campaign of this magnitude on the electorate’s decision? 50% of the “cadenas” took place when the other candidate was on the air because of an event. Several “cadenas” were pre-recorded, pre-produced programs.

The 10 minutes of TV and radio time provided to social organizations under the Social Responsibility on Radio and Television Act [Ley Resorte] to foster dissemination of society’s cultural activities were used to promote government measures and exalt Chávez.

In practice the incum-bent had 10 extra minutes, in addition to the 3 minutes per day on each channel that the electoral rules allow. This additional propa-ganda is on top of the institutional advertising by enterprises, ministries and social missions that exalted the �gure of the President of the Republic.

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Unfettered use of public resources and funds for the campaign. Ministries, public enterprises and other public agencies actively worked on the campaign, promoting the President’s candidacy with propaganda on its buildings, o�ces and web pages.

Feeling of obligation on the part of public servants as on some occasions they were made to participate and on other occasions they bene�ted from partici-pating in these events.

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Missions and resource provision. Provision of housing, promises of future provision and threats of losing or not receiving housing if the president lost. During President Chávez’s “cadenas” [“chain broadcasts”] and other programs, ministers and other members of his party repeated that if the other candidate won, people would lose their housing or other bene�ts they were receiving.Investment in social programs and missions in 2012 (as of October) has totaled Bs. 52,637,000,000 (US $12,241,000,000).

Formal and informal pressure to sway the vote in favor of the govern-ment. Vote buying and direct pressure in favor of President Chávez. How many votes does this translate into?

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Created fear, which was heightened by direct messages from the United Socialist Party of Venezuela [Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela] (PSUV).

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Lack of con�dence about secrecy of the vote. The CNE not only failed to promote the absolute guarantee of the secrecy of electors’ decisions, rather, to the contrary, it openly promoted this new direct cable connection of each voting machine with the Integrated Authentication System [Sistema de Autenti-cación Integrado] (SAI) (each �ngerprint one vote). According to a study by the �rm Datanálisis, 48% of the voters – prior to October 7 – had some kind of doubt about the secrecy of the vote in the presidential elections and admitted that this fear might impact how they voted. Another study done in 2011 by the �rm Delphos indicated that 46% of Venezuelans who belonged to segments D and E of the population (the poorest segments) were afraid to talk to their neigh-bors about politics and their electoral preferences.

Mistrust of Plan República, the group of military personnel that protects polling stations.

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Reports were submitted with photos and videos of military personnel collaborating with President Chávez’s campaign.

The opposition assures that the information from this equipment (voters’ gender and age range) was used to guide operations to mobilize Chávez supporters.

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Introduction of a veri�cation table at the entrance to the polling station, which is not provided for in its U-shaped layout. This became a chokepoint that delayed the process in the morning, during which voters had to wait four or �ve hours to vote. The electoral regulations do not speci�cally require the use of this data [veri�cation] station.

Increase in the frustra-tion of millions of Venezuelans, and along with it, their apathy and mistrust of the demo-cratic system.

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Groups of motorcyclists went around polling stations in the cities, causing concern, distress and fear. In some places they shot into the air, in others they merely played bugles and yelled.

Votes co-opted by the government from among recipients of bene�ts or housing, or those under recipients care.

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Placement of polling stations in shelters for disaster victims, in mission housing buildings, etc.

It is estimated that one million Venezuelans have left the country. 480,000 of them are of legal age and are entitled to vote, but only 100,000 were able to register.

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Obstacles for Venezuelans abroad to register to vote.

Of the hundreds of thousands Venezuelans in Florida, only 19,000 were able to register to vote. Of those, only 9,000 made it to New Orleans to cast their vote.

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The Venezuelan Consulate in Miami was closed and 19,000 voters, residents in the jurisdiction of Florida, were reassigned to New Orleans for purposes of voting.

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We believe that the worst consequence of these complex and extremely shady dealings is the frustration and apathy of many Venezuelans who see how public assets are used to favor one political group, while not one formal authority of the State stands up for equity, legality and balance. The rules are flexible and change or are interpreted as convenient. Each and every one of these actions were taken with the consent of the National Electoral Council (CNE), the same body that now has the responsibility of organizing and arranging the December 16 gubernatorial elections.

¿Budget for Elections?

As can been seen in the chart below, the investment in missions and social programs increased from Bs.21,000,000,000 to Bs. 52,637,000,000 during this election year through additional credits the executive requested and the National Assembly (with a majority from the party in power) approved without objection or questions. In other words, the president of the republic and his administration’s team had Bs. 52,637,000,000 (US $12,241,000,000) in 2012 to spend, with great fanfare, on some twenty-four social assistance programs of different kinds. It must be noted that we do not have access to information regarding objective data on these expenditures, nor the goals and objectives reached, other than what is stated in the propaganda.

Increase in the frustration of millions of Venezuelans, and along with it, their apathy and mistrust of the democratic system.

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As of the date this report was published, the CNE had not responded to the complaints �led by civil society organiza-tions and political parties. Likewise, they had not responded to the eight communiqués sent by Transparencia Venezuela with the reports on the complaints received and requests for information.

According to the report by Asamblea de Educación (one of the �ve national observation groups endorsed by the CNE) at 6.3% of the polling stations observed, the regula-tions regarding compan-ions for assisted voting were not respected. Based on the total number of polling stations, this would come to 2,477. It is impossible to know how many votes were cast under coercion.

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Assisted voting. Despite being prohibited on paper, in many remote areas and small towns, public servants, members of parties and the military went to the voting machines to “help” people cast their ballot.

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30

60

90

120

150

NATIONAL SYSTEM OF PUBLIC MEDIABs.284 Billion

Radio Mundial

Radio ZuliaRadio MargaritaNational Radio of Venezuela (RNV)

Venezuelan News Agency (AVN)

La Radio del SurVenezuelan Social Television (TEVES)

Ávila TvCorreo del OrinocoEDUMEDIAA.N RADIO

Media Campaigns

VTV

T.VSur

ANTV

2013

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corruption as elements of the National Armed Forces have been placed at the service of a partisan political group.

- Plans to deploy illegal surveillance and monitoring of opposition leaders.

The document “Operation for the Cohesion and Organization of the People’s Power – Bolivarian Militia – People’s Guard in Defense of the Plan República and the Leader’s Will” legally implicates the Bolivarian National Guard, the Ministry of the People’s Power for Defense and the Bolivarian Government of Venezuela, which are responsible for conceiving, drafting and implementing it on October 7 last, the day the presidential elections were held in our country.

This is a document that in and of itself contains decisive facts that allow for the Public Ministry to initiate a criminal investigation by means of notitia criminis in keeping with Article 68 of the Anti-Corruption Act [Ley Contra la Corrupción]. This Act provides for prison terms of one to three years for civil or military personnel who, in abuse of their office, use their position to favor a candidate in an election.

The statement published by the daily newspaper El Universal outlines unlawful arrangements and coordination with officers of the National Armed Forces who worked to mobilize citizens and carry out intelligence activities against rivals the day of the elections. This is a crime and underscores the partisanship and politically motivated actions of active military personnel at the service of the Bolivarian Revolution.

In the audio interview that El Universal publishes, high ranking military officers are mentioned by first and last name, including the President of Social Security and the Governor of Vargas State, and there are references made to illegal actions by the CNE itself. This matter does not seem to be of interest to the Public Ministry, which, despite having the authority to initiate an investigation of this operation implemented by the People’s Guard and the Bolivarian Militia with the knowledge of the Operational Strategic Command [Comando Estratégico Operacional], as revealed by El Universal, chooses to look the other way.In El Universal’s audio interview there is also convincing evidence that the information on voter turnout during the October 7th elections was shared with government authorities, which mobilized the national militia and the



–THE PEOPLE’S POWER – BOLIVARIAN MILITIA – PEOPLE’S GUARD OPERATION PROOF OF ELECTORAL CORRUPTION IN VENEZUELA

Throughout election day on October 7, it was obvious for the inhabitants of the Caracas metropolitan area and many regions of the country how citizens were compulsively taken to vote by government supporters after 2 in the afternoon. The most serious thing is what has been exposed by the daily newspaper El Universal (click here to see the article), known as the “Operation for the Cohesion and Organization of the People’s Power – Bolivarian Militia – People’s Guard in Defense of the Plan República and the Leader’s Will” [“Dispositivo para la cohesión y articulación del Poder Popular, Milicia Bolivariana, Guardia del Pueblo en defensa del Plan Republica y de la voluntad del soberano”] (click here to see the document), in addition to statements (click here to listen to them) that clearly implicate what is known as the Bolivarian National Militia [Milicia Nacional Bolivariana] in acts of electoral corruption that undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process in Venezuela.

The document and statements reveal:

- Political bias in the Bolivarian Militia and People’s Guard’s actions regarding the electoral process, by mentioning “the counter-revolutionary forces” as adversaries to be neutralized.

- Plans to deploy units of the National Command of the People’s Guard in perfect sync with the Bolivarian Militia and the People’s Power in all the districts of the Caracas Metropolitan Area and the states of Miranda and Vargas, with a large capacity for mobilizing groups loyal to the Bolivarian Revolution and in connection with the country’s political and military leadership. This is proof of electoral

Missions and Social Programs

20,87952,637 66,043

Real variation

4,47%

2012 2012* 2013

*plus additional credits

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“Electoral Favoritism Is A Crime”Summary of the content: On November 12, 2012, politicians and leaders of civil society participated in a forum called “Protesta y Vota” [“Protest and Vote”], with the aim of promoting citizen involvement in the elections of December 16, 2012.

In his presentation, the criminal lawyer Alberto Arteaga Sánchez stated that since 2003, with the approval of the Anti-Corruption Act [Ley contra la Corrupción] (LC), electoral favoritism is a crime. Said crime is provided for

under Article 68 of the aforementioned Act and can be punishable by one to three years of imprisonment. He affirmed that what happened during the presidential campaign, in other words, the opportunism, the use of public funds and assets without any kind of restrictions or oversight, among others, was “electoral favoritism” and the perpetrators or participants in these acts should be made to answer for them before criminal courts.

Analysis: The Basic Law on Suffrage and Political

territorial guard to compulsively transfer citizens to polling stations, especially individuals of humble origins who are beneficiaries of government missions.

If this goes unprosecuted prior to the upcoming elections on December 16 and those responsible go unpunished, not only will this modus operandi be repeated and perfected, but electoral corruption will become official in Venezuela, irreversibly and perilously jeopardizing the country’s immediate future.

www.controlciudadano.org

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Participation [La Ley Orgánica del Sufragio y Participación Política] (LOSPP), repealed by the current Basic Law on Electoral Processes [Ley Orgánica de Procesos Electorales] (LOPRE), provided for electoral crimes, misdemeanors and administrative infractions. Electoral crimes were punishable by terms of imprisonment, while the others entailed financial penalties. Ordinary criminal courts were charged with taking cognizance of these crimes and misdemeanors, while the National Electoral Council [Consejo Nacional Electoral] (CNE) heard administrative infractions.

The LOPRE, enacted by the National Assembly on July 31, 2009, did not include a chapter on electoral crimes, as the aforementioned LOSPP did. For this reason, these matters were to be regulated by a special law, which has yet to be promulgated. In this regard, Article 229 et seq. make reference to electoral infractions, but with regard to electoral crimes and misdemeanors “that are committed by citizens, vested or not with public functions, which are not provided for under this Law,” the LOPRE stipulates that these shall be the subject of regulation under a special law.

Although electoral crimes were not provided for under the current law, other laws do indeed make reference to criminal conduct that can occur during electoral processes. Thus the LC (Special Official Gazette No. 5.637 [Gaceta Oficial N° 5.637 Extraordinario] of April 7, 2003) stipulates that “public servants who, abusing their office, use their position to electorally favor or prejudice a candidate, group, or political party or movement, shall be punished with a term of imprisonment of one (1) to three (3) years.” Furthermore, Article 145 of the Constitution provides that public servants are at the service of the State and not any partisan group. Their appointment and dismissal may not be decided based on political orientation or affiliation. Both the Constitution, as well as the Law, seeks to prevent public servants from using their position to favor or prejudice any partisan political option.

Nevertheless, in addition to unlimited use of public resources, the aggressiveness of the campaign, and a strategy of fear mongering, the asymmetry between the party in power and the opposition, as regards the December 16th elections, has been strengthened by conduct such as that of the President of the Republic.



“public servants and

employees are at the

service of the State

and not of any political

or economic group,”

During a national radio and television “cadena” [“chain broadcast”], shown on Thursday, November 15, 2012, the President allowed the candidate from the United Socialist Party of Venezuela [Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela] (PSUV) for the governorship of Miranda state, Elías Jaua, to do campaigning during the broadcast.

This opportunistic action infringes the provisions set forth under the aforementioned Article 145 of the Constitution, Article 13 of the LC (pursuant to which “public servants and employees are at the service of the State and not of any political or economic group,” and thus “they may not allocate the use of public assets or resources that

are public property in order to favor political projects or parties or particular economic interests.”) and the General Regulations of the Basic Law on Electoral Processes, as it refers to electoral campaigns, which is why this should be penalized in a timely manner by the CNE.

After the electoral experience of October 7, 2012, it is imperative that the CNE, the lead agency in

the process, take serious measures to prevent abuses of power and guarantee free, fair and democratic elections. Experience has shown that the CNE and, in general, the authorities, have lined up to champion the partisan interests of the regime. For this reason, voters must take on an active role in standing up for electoral conditions and, report, as provided for under Article 27 of the LOPE, “the commission of any electoral crimes, misdemeanors or infractions,” and “become a party to the prosecution in the proceedings that are instituted as a result of these same violations.”

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Hearing before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

Freedom of Expression Under Ongoing Attack valists Association [Colegio Nacional de Periodistas] (CNP) and Espacio Público participated in a hearing before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on the situation regarding the right to freedom of expression.

The principal facts presented, which this article summarizes, documented some of the challenges society faces in its work to counter the recurring violations and restrictions on freedom of expression in Venezuela.

From January 1 to October 15, 2012, there were 166 cases involving violations of freedom of expression and information, among which 39 were cyber- attacks. These cases involve 282 violations of the right to freedom of expression and information. These numbers surpass the total that occurred for the same period studied in 2011, and even surpass the total number from the 12 months of the previous year in which there were 139 cases and 224 violations.

Access to Public Information

In a study that was conducted in 2011, out of a total of 61 requests [for information] submitted to public institutions, 85% received no response. Furthermore,

only 6.5% of the institutions responded adequately to a request for information.

Given this lack of response the requesters turned to the courts. Out of eight (8) legal actions, seven (7) cases were declared “inadmissible” and one (1) is awaiting trial. The legal protections for rights enshrined in the Constitution did not prove effective either.

Assaults and Attacks on Journalists

In Venezuela there is a persistent pattern of increasing election-related assaults and attacks on the media/journalists. In the period studied (01/01/2012 to 10/15/2012) there were 57 assaults on the media and journalists. The main targets are journalists and reporters, who make up more than half the victims (99). While covering the news in the streets, security forces tend to hamper the work of reporters, who are assaulted and stripped of their work gear. Likewise, when covering campaign events they risk assault by government or opposition supporters, depending on the media outlet for whom they work.

Impunity

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One enduring feature of these cases of assaults and attacks on journalists and the media is the failure of the State to investigate and punish the responsible parties. [The press] is consistently discredited by high-ranking officials and in the National System of Public Media [Sistema Nacional de Medios Públicos] (SNMP). This all helps to fuel a general attitude of dismissiveness toward these complaints, which serves to discourage the victim, thereby encouraging impunity.

“Cadenas” and Mandatory Radio and Television Broadcasts

The “cadenas” [“chain broadcasts”] and mandatory radio and televisions broadcasts remain a public policy and constitute a way to illegitimately restrict the unfettered dissemination of information. These broadcasts are completely unregulated, arbitrary, and discretional.

From January 1 to October 1, 2012 there were 104 “cadenas” in all, for a total of 8460 minutes, which equals approximately one radio and television “cadena” every three days. They are frequently used for partisan political promotion. In the context of elections, their repetition constitutes a government abuse that provides illegitimate advantages for disseminating messages

during electoral processes in which, several officials, including the president of the republic, are running for elected office.

In their conclusions, the organizations asked the IACHR to keep a close watch on the situation in Venezuela and to carry out legal scholarly studies on whether the use mandatory radio and television “cadenas” is in keeping with the content and scope of the obligations stemming from the international instruments of the Inter-American Human Rights System.

http://www.espaciopublico.org/

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News summariesOctober 16

The days running up to the presidential elections of October 7, 2012, saw a pattern of various irregularities on Venezuelan Internet sites, with both sides of the political contest suffering cyber-attacks, and election day being marked by distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, hacked identities on the Twitter social networking site, and the blocking of several websites.

http://espaciopublico.org/index.php/noticias/1-libertad-de-expresi/2502-ataques-informaticos-sacuden-las-redes-sociales-en-el-pais

October 11

In the morning hours of October 11, 2012, the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) heard the petition to declare the Presidential decree creating the National Center for Situational Studies [Centro de Estudio Situacional de la Nación] (CESNA) unconstitutional. The petition had been filed by the civic group Espacio Público, the National Association of Journalists [Colegio Nacional de Periodistas] (CNP), and the National Press Workers Union [Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Prensa] (SNTP).

http://espaciopublico.org/index.php/noticias/1-libertad-de-expresi/2499-hoy-se-realizo-en-el-tsj-la-audiencia-de-juicio-del-recurso-de-nulidad-por-inconstitucionalidad-contra-el-cesna

October 10

On Wednesday, October 10, 2012, Nelson Urbina, municipal councilman for Carirubana in the state of Falcón, was sentenced to three years of prison for ongoing defamation and libel against the mayor of the municipality of Alcides Goitía, for having published accusations of offenses in his weekly column in the daily newspaper La Mañana.

http://espaciopublico.org/index.php/noticias/1-libertad-de-expresi/2498-concejal-del-estado-falcon-sentenciado-a-tres-anos-de-prision-por-difamacion-e-injuria-

October 8

On October 8, journalists from Aragua reported hindrances in accessing sources of official information regarding vulnerabilities in the Lake Valencia, or Lake los Tacarigua, containment dike (in southern Maracay).

http://espaciopublico.org/index.php/noticias/1-libertad-de-expresi/2506-periodistas-de-aragua-denuncian-obstaculos-en-la-cobertura-de-los-sucesos-del-lago-de-valencia

On October 8, after having covered the electoral process in Venezuela, the Argentine reporting team headed by journalist Jorge Lanata was intercepted and detained by agents of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN). The group was taken to the basement of the Simón Bolívar International Airport, where they were subjected to intense interrogations for two hours and were stripped of their electronic equipment, for purposes of erasing its contents. http://espaciopublico.org/index.php/noticias/1-libertad-de-expresi/2501-detenidos-por-las-fuerzas-de-seguridad-periodistas-internacionales-despues-de-elecciones-del-7o-

October 7

On Election Day, October 7, the National Electoral Council (CNE) website fell victim to a hacker known as “Hack521,” who carried out a deface attack as a way to expose the “IT weaknesses” affecting the CNE’s Internet site.

http://espaciopublico.org/index.php/noticias/1-libertad-de-expresi/2497-pirata-informatico-desfigura-la-pagina-web-del-cne-

A Plan República official attacked Demetrio Caraindro, a graphic reporter for Correo del Caroní, while the latter was covering the close of polling stations in the El Olivo neighborhood of Puerto Ordaz, state of Bolívar, on October 7,2012..http://espaciopublico.org/index.php/noticias/1-libertad-de-expresi/2495-reportero-grafico-del-correo-del-caroni-agredido-durante-cobertura-electoral

The Noticiero Digital website was blocked by Cantv’s Aba service as of 2pm and could be accessed only from proxy servers and from abroad. Information on this situation was posted on its Twitter profile, @NDtitulares.

http://espaciopublico.org/index.php/noticias/1-libertad-de-expresi/2494-noticiero-digital-bloqueado-por-cantv

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http://espaciopublico.org/index.php/noticias/1-libertad-de-expresi/2487-mesa-de-la-unidad-democratica-denuncia-perfil-falso-mudemocratica

October 3

On October 3, 2012, Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN) officials detained the Argentine journalist Jorge Lanata for one hour, as he was entering the country. He believes that the security services were sending him a “message.”

http://espaciopublico.org/index.php/noticias/1-libertad-de-expresi/2485-periodistas-internacionales-denuncian-irregularidades-en-llegada-a-venezuela-por-comicios-electorales

October 2

On October 2, 2012, the Second Administrative Law Court handed down a decision establishing that the Scientific, Penal and Criminal Investigation Corps [Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas] (CICPC) is not the competent agency to provide information to citizens relating to crime statistics in Venezuela, despite the fact that Article 11 of the CICPC Law sets forth that the agency is competent to have such information.

http://espaciopublico.org/index.php/noticias/1-libertad-de-expresi/2500-tribunal-niega-acceso-a-la-informacion-en-materia-de-criminalidad-en-venezuela

Plan República forces prevented the reporting team from Nueva Prensa de Guayana from gaining access to the polling stations in Unare parish, state of Bolívar, during the elections held Sunday, October 7, 2012.

http://espaciopublico.org/index.php/noticias/1-libertad-de-expresi/2493-plan-republica-impide-al-diario-nueva-prensa-de-guayana-acceder-a-centros-de-votacion-en-unare

On Sunday morning, October 7, while engaging in news coverage of the events taking place at the Siembra polling station, in the Kennedy neighborhood in Macarao parish, the Últimas Noticias team was attacked by persons who identified themselves as “community communicators.”

http://espaciopublico.org/index.php/noticias/1-libertad-de-expresi/2492-equipo-de-ultimas-noticias-fue-atacado-durante-cobertura-informativa-en-la-urbanizacion-kennedy

October 5

The headquarters of the daily newspaper Nuevo Día in Coro was attacked with an explosive device on Friday, October 5, at approximately 7 p.m., resulting in the injury of a passer-by who was close to the building at the time.http://espaciopublico.org/index.php/noticias/1-libertad-de-expresi/2490-atacan-con-explosivo-sede-del-diario-nuevo-dia-en-coro

October 4

On October 4, the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD) coalition, Ramón José Medina, alerted users of the social network Twitter to the presence of a profile that was sending distorted messages under the name @MUDemocratica, pretending to belong to the organization he represents.

election alert #8: seeking competitive elections in venezuela (report, analysis)

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