effects of displacement on land tenure systems in

Effects of displacement on land tenure systems in Northeast Nigeria 1

Effects of displacement on land tenure systems in Northeast NigeriaJuliette Syn

2Effects of displacement on land tenure systems in Northeast Nigeria

This document covers humanitarian aid activities implemented with the financial assistance of the European Union. The views expressed herein should not be taken, in any way, to reflect the official opinion of the European Union, and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.

Cover photo: Makeshift tent erected by displaced persons in Shuwari camp, Dikwa, Northeast Nigeria. Credit: Aliyu Hassan/NRC


Effects of displacement on land tenure systems in Northeast NigeriaJuliette Syn

Published August 2019by the Norwegian Refugee Council


TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I: INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7PART II: BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A. PRE-COLONIAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1. Customary Land Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2. Sokoto Caliphate / Fulani Empire – Bringing Islam to the North . . 10 B. BRITISH COLONIAL RULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 C. INDEPENDENCE TO THE PRESENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1. Land Tenure Law of 1962 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2. Land Use Act of 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3. Problems Implementing the Land Use Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) . . . . . . . . 15 D. INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS . . . . . . . . . 15 1. International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (ICESCR, accession 29 July 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, accession 29 July 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3. African Union Convention for the Assistance and Protection of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the “Kampala Convention,” ratification 17 April 2002) . . . . . . . . . . 16PART III: ANALYSIS: CHANGES SINCE THE CONFLICT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 A. LAND GOVERNANCE & EVOLVING CUSTOMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 1. Land Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2. Land Acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3. Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 B. LAND DISPUTES & INCREASED TENURE INSECURITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 1. Before the Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2. A Brief Note on the Problem Between Farmers & Herders . . . . . . . . 20 3. Cost of Accessing Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4. Secondary Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5. Multiple Sales and Reallocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6. Overcrowding and Pressure on Natural Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 7. Security Conditions and Military Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 8. Eviction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 C. UNINTENDED EFFECTS: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE SEEN AS A SOURCE OF INCOME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27PART IV: CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 A. VOICES FROM THE FIELD: “WE NEED SECURITY AND JUSTICE” . . . . 28 1. “Security is the cause of all their problems.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 2. Justice: “The government and the leaders should give justice to the people.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3. Assistance to Cope With and Recover From the Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . 29 B. RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 1. Addressing Security Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 2. Addressing Cries for Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3. Future Research & Areas of Engagement/Advocacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33ANNEX 1 – Summary of Data Collected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36SOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40


The death and destruction that has resulted from the violence in Northe-ast Nigeria has been catastrophic. Of the six states in the region, Borno, Adamawa and Yobe have been the most affected by the violence, much of which is attributed to Boko Haram and the resulting military operations.1 In a survey carried out for the World Bank in the northeast, 49 percent of households reported experiencing at least one event of conflict between 2010 and 2017, the majority of which were caused by Boko Haram. Over 20 percent of the households had a member who was displaced, or had their dwelling robbed.2 This protracted crisis has displaced over two million people, particularly those in the rural areas.

At the same time, the Nigerian government is seeking to modernise and improve its systems of land administration. The country’s land policies are built on an overlaying mix of customary law, Islamic law, and colonial and modern statutory law, and while all play some role in managing land affairs in Northern Nigeria, it is not always clear what each role is. The region also has a long history of violent

1. Introduction

Displaced women carrying their belongings in Dikwa, North east Nigeria. Photo: Anja Riiser


struggle to use and control land, from the Fulani conquest in the 15th century, to the long-standing contest between farmers and herders, to the recent destru-ction wrought by Boko Haram. All of these factors have converged to create a situation where massive num-bers of people have been displaced, all of whom need land to either live or work; and a shrinking amount of land to meet these needs. This has resulted in increa-sing levels of tenure insecurity for internally displaced persons (IDPs), host communities, and returnees alike, and the objective of this report is to better understand the barriers to accessing land for the conflict-affected population in Northern Nigeria.

METHODOLOGY & LIMITATIONSInformation for this report was gathered through a combination of desk study of existing literature and fieldwork conducted between November 2018 and Janu-ary 2019. Although access to people and areas was more limited than initially anticipated as a result of evolving security conditions, the study attempted to capture as many views and experiences relating to land tenure as possible. The fieldwork included 20 focus group discussions, 12 key informant intervi-ews and household visits in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states. The findings here are based on these discussions with IDP, host community, and returnee men and women, and local authorities (bulamas and lawans). Due to the sensitivity of the subject, all names of people whose stories are included in this report have been changed to protect their privacy. A few limitations of this research should also be noted: Where this study refe-rences information reported by other people, it is important to understand that this is how the speaker perceived the situation; and it is unsurprising that there were conflicting accounts from different people. This is due in part to the vari-ety of contexts that exist in Northern Nigeria, but is also to be expected when speaking to different groups under the disruptive circumstances of conflict and displacement.


Much of the existing literature discusses significant changes to Nigeria’s land tenure systems as happening in: pre-colonial times; the British Colo-nial period; and post-Independence. A brief summary of key developments is included here to provide some background of Nigeria’s land tenure sys-tems, and will also make mention of some key legal frameworks.

A. PRE-COLONIAL

1. Customary Land LawDescriptions of customary land tenure systems in Nigeria tend to emphasize the communal nature of landholding, whether by family, clan, village or community, and the inalienability of land without the consent of principal members of the group concerned.3 In customary land tenure systems, land is often viewed as a medium that unites past, present and future generations, and is meant to be handed down from one generation to the next.4 Much of the literature about customary land law focuses on Southern Nige-ria; customary land tenure in Northern Nigeria was supplanted by Islamic land tenure laws after the Fulani conquest in the early 1800s. Nevertheless, other literature indicates that some practices about land use were common throughout the country. Research on the Zaria Emirate in the north notes that while there is not much primary data on land tenure before the Fulani conquest, historical data suggests that local land customs were similar to those seen in other parts of Nigeria: the tenure system was communal. Individu-als had the right to cultivate selected portions for family use; land was acquired on a “first-come first-serve” basis, and worked by family unit called a gandu – a term used to describe a domestic work unit based on kinship of male adults.5 There are differing descriptions of who managed overall land affairs. Some mention a category of Gandayes – emirs, district heads, wealthy families, or large estate holders – who acted as managers of this system, with the oldest man in the relevant family carrying out these administrative functions.6 Others describe a situation where a head of the community acted as a custodian for community resources, who could allocate land to newcomers to the community, or decide to withhold approval if doing so might interfere with others’ use rights (similar to the role of the bulamas today).7 However, he held no greater claim to land than anyone else; local customs provided for collective and equal interests. Land could not be alienated by sale, rental or mortgage, but could be transferred through inheritance, gift, or loan. The custom of primogeniture was followed for inheritance.8 The borrowing of land was common, due in part to the fallow system of agri-culture. A man whose land was fallow could approach other members of the

2. Background


community to borrow land for the period of the fallow to cultivate for subsis-tence (cash crops could not be grown), and some payment in kind was generally expected – usually some portion of the harvest.9

2. Sokoto Caliphate / Fulani Empire – Bringing Islam to the NorthBefore the period of British colonization, the current region of Northeast Nigeria was a territory under the control of the Bornu Empire, predominantly populated by Kanuri-Muslims.10 However, a description of the Fulani jihad and the establis-hment of the Sokoto Caliphate on its western border is helpful, as this precipita-ted the widespread use of Islamic land tenure principles into Northern Nigeria. The Fulani arrived in the Hausa states in the 15th century as pastoralists, but the relationship soured over time, and in 1804, a Fulani clan head and Muslim religious leader called for a jihad against the Hausa unbelievers.11 When the Hausa rulers in Northern Nigeria were conquered during this Fulani jihad, their lands became a part of the Sokoto Caliphate, which followed Islamic principles for land management. A fundamental premise of this system is the belief that land is a gift from God, and so while everyone can use it, it belongs to nobody.12 Land was held in trust by the emir (head of the caliphate), who granted rights of use.13 The emir was assisted by a network of subordinate officials who acted as roving, territorial administrators.14 As a Muslim state, land tenure was organised according to Maliki Islamic laws of inheritance.15 Under Maliki law, land is divided into five broad categories:

1. Land held in absolute ownership by individuals (mamluka). 2. State-owned land (amiriyyu). The usufruct of amiriyya may be granted

by the ruler. 3. Common land (matruka); generally land close to settlements and used

for common purposes such as grazing and wood collection. 4. Deadland (mawat); land remote from a residential area that could be

acquired by any individual by cultivation or building upon it. 5. Wakf – either private wakf (land dedicated to religious purposes) or

territorial wakf (territories conquered by Muslims).16

Research about this period suggests that the restructuring of the land tenure system introduced a new system of taxation based on the category of land, but did not substantially change the practical rights to land of small-holding far-mers.17 Pierce describes a continuing set of cooperative relationships among rural farming families, which included family farming, communal farming, and sharecropping, and concludes that while people had farmlands that could be taken away, their concerns were “less insecurity of tenure per se than quasi-legal or irregular expropriation – tax levels improperly set at impossible levels, farms not awarded to their rightful owner and no recourse granted in court.”18 Howe-ver, Ega notes that the imposition of high taxes led to greater tenure insecurity, as the failure to pay could lead to confiscation of one’s land19 by the emir. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, Ega notes a more fundamental long-term effect of Fulani control, which was the granting of rights to land as part of a patronage system, which ran counter to the customary tenets of equal rights of land access, and which “led to a situation whereby the land acquired by an individual was not a function of his mere membership in the community, but of his social and economic status and, generally, his relationship to the authority.”20


B. BRITISH COLONIAL RULE21

English tenure and ownership principles entered Nigeria through the signing of the Treaty of Cession by King Dosumu of Lagos in 1861, through which, “All land comprising the colony of Lagos was declared Crown Land and […] divided into various settlements and grants. The English statutes governed rights and dealings in land within the colony. No customary land law applied except in matters relating to the use and enjoyment of land.”22 In 1900, the Land Procla-mation Ordinance further specified that any land transaction from a native to a non-native had to be approved by the High Commissioner.23 Statutory regulation of land rights was established under Proclamation No. 8 of 1900 and Proclamation No.13 of 1902, which provided that “natives could continue to acquire lands as they were used to under the native law and custom while no non-native should hold any interest in land except on the lease of the Government”.24 The Proclamation of 1902 divided the land into Crown Lands and Public Lands, though this distinction vanished a few years later with legislation that vested all land rights in the Governor.25 When the British took control of Northern Nigeria, the newly installed High Commissioner requested an inquiry into land issues, noting that, “It is essential, before working out the eventual system upon which land revenue should be assessed and collected, to determine the policy of the Government with regard to land tenure in Northern Nigeria, more particularly native tenure.”26 In 1908, a Lands Committee was established, and their work led the British to conclude that traditional tenure was communal, in that the emir owned land and assigned use rights to others with an obligation to pay taxes.27 On the basis of this report, all lands in the Northern provinces were declared to be held in trust for the peo-ple by the Governor, and no title to use or transfer land was valid without the Governor’s approval.28 The Land and Native Rights Act enacted in 1916 amended the Lands and Native Rights Ordinances of 1910, and vested all rights over the native lands in Northern Nigeria in the colonial Governor:

All native lands and right over the same are hereby declared to be under the control and subject to the disposition of the Governor, and shall be held and administered for the use and common benefit of the natives of Northern Nigeria and no title to the occupation and use of any such lands shall be valid without the consent of the Governor.29

Other powers bestowed on the Governor included the ability: to grant rights of occupancy to “natives” and “non-natives;” to demand and set rents for these grants; to void any attempted alienation of a right of occupancy without the Governor’s consent; and to revoke any grants for “good cause.”30

C. INDEPENDENCE TO THE PRESENT

1. Land Tenure Law of 1962Nigeria gained its independence from the British in 1960 and became a republic in 1963. After independence, private ownership of land became the norm in the southern states of Nigeria. However, in the north, the Land Tenure Law of 1962 maintained the principles established by the British, and declared lands in the north to be “native lands” that were to be managed and controlled by the Minis-ter for Lands and Surveys for the use and common benefit of the natives.31 Udo-


ekanem et. al notes that “natives” were those whose fathers were members of any tribes indigenous to each state in Northern Nigeria; all others were deemed “non-natives.”32 Natives were granted a right of occupancy for a limited term of years, which essentially guaranteed an exclusive right to land against all persons other than the Minister. However, the Minister’s consent was required to sell, mortgage, or transfer any lawful improvement on the land.33

2. Land Use Act of 1978The difficulties of using both English and customary tenure principles became increasingly apparent in Southern Nigeria, where unlike in the north, private ownership was more common. There, the increased ability to alienate land cre-ated new challenges in land administration, including a rise in multiple (fraudu-lent) sales of the same piece of land and land speculation.34 In 1977, the federal government appointed a Land Use Panel to study the land tenure situation and recommend steps to streamline the various land tenure practices in the country; examine the implications and feasibility of a uniform land policy for the country; and examine steps to control future land use.35 As seen in the Land Use Act, the government decided to make land administration in the south more like that of the north, by implementing uniform state ownership of land throughout the country, and stipulating that any attempts to transfer or confer rights over of land that do not conform to the Act are automatically deemed null and void.36

Section 1 of the Land Use Act vests all land of the Federation of Nigeria in the governors of the states, and declared that such land shall be held in trust and administered for the use and common benefit of all Nigerians in accordance with the provisions of the Act.37 The governor is responsible for management of land in urban areas, and local governments are responsible for land in non-ur-ban areas.38 However, as the trustee, the governor can grant statutory rights of occupancy to anyone over any land, and can set and change the corresponding rental fee as he sees fit.39 Additionally, he has the power to designate any part of the state as an urban area.40

Revoking a Right of Occupancy: Section 28 of the law provides that the governor can also revoke any right of occupancy for purposes of the public interest or bre-aches of the terms of the certificate of right, though he must pay compensation for any improvements made on the land:41

Land Use Act, Section 28: Power of Governor to Revoke Rights of Occupancy

(1) It shall be lawful for the Governor to revoke a right of occupancy for overriding public interest.

(2) Overriding public interest in the case of a statutory right of occupancy means-

(a) the alienation by the occupier by assignment, mortgage, transfer of possession, sub-lease, or otherwise of any right of occupancy or part thereof contrary to the provisions of this Act or of any regulations made thereunder;(b) the requirement of the land by the Government of the State or by a Local Government in the State, in either case for public purposes wit-hin the State, or the requirement of the land by the Government of the Federation for public purposes of the Federation;


(c) the requirement of the land for mining purposes or oil pipelines or for any purpose connected therewith.

(3) Overriding public interest in the case of a customary right of occupancy means-

(a) the requirement of the land by the Government of the State or by a Local Government in the State, in either case for public purposes wit-hin the State, or the requirement of the land by the Government of the Federation for public purposes of the Federation;(b) the requirement of the land for mining purposes or oil pipelines or for any purpose connected therewith;(c) the requirement of the land for the extraction of building materials;(d) the alienation by the occupier by sale, assignment, mortgage, transfer of possession, sub-lease, bequest or otherwise of the right of occupancy without the requisite consent or approval.

(4) The Governor shall revoke a right of occupancy in the event of the issue of a notice by or on behalf of the President if such notice declares such land to be required by the Government for public purposes.

(5) The Governor may revoke a statutory right of occupancy on the gro-und of-

(a) a breach of any of the provisions which a certificate of occupancy is by section 10 of this Act deemed to contain;(b) a breach of any term contained in the certificate of occupancy or in any special contract made under section 8 of this Act;(c) a refusal or neglect to accept and pay for a certificate which was issued in evidence of a right of occupancy but has been cancelled by the governor under subsection (3) of section 9 of this Act.

(6) The revocation of a right of occupancy shall be signified under the hand of a public officer duly authorized on the behalf of the Governor and notice thereof shall be given to the holder.

(7) The title of the holder of a right of occupancy shall be extinguished on receipt by him of a notice given under subsection (6) of this section or on such later date as may be stated in the notice.

Statutory Rights of Occupancy: Land held under a statutory right of occupancy cannot be alienated by assignment, mortgage, lease, or other means without approval of the governor.42 The statutory right of occupancy granted by the governor is the strongest right to land in Nigeria; it allows the holder to use or occupy land to the exclusion of all other persons (except the governor), and is granted for a maximum holding period of 99 years, subject to the payment of rent determined by the governor.

Customary Rights of Occupancy: Local governments are empowered to grant customary rights of occupancy over non-urban lands within their jurisdicti-on.43 A “customary right of occupancy” is defined as “the right of a person or community lawfully using or occupying land in accordance with customary law and includes a customary right of occupancy granted by a local government under this Act;” while an “occupier” is further specified to mean “any person lawfully occupying land under customary law and a person using or occupying


land in accordance with customary law and includes the sub-lessee or sub-lessee of a holder [sic].”44 A single customary right of occupancy can cover no more than 500 hectares for agriculture, and no more than 5000 hectares if for grazing, unless consent is obtained from the Governor.45 A customary right of occupancy cannot be sold without the governor’s consent; any other transfer of interest in the right requires the approval of the local government.46

Transitional Provisions: The Land Use Act includes “transitional provisions” for non-urban land, albeit arguably vague ones.47 Referring to land over which no right of occupancy – either statutory or customary – is held, section 36 notes that any non-urban land used for agricultural purposes at the time the law came into effect, whether held “under customary rights or otherwise,” will be treated “as if a customary right of occupancy had been granted to the occupier or holder” as long as the land continues to be used for agricultural purposes.48 This is a key part of the law, as without specifying a timeframe in which a user must convert to a right of occupancy registered under the law, section 36 arguably allows rural land users to maintain their land rights under these transitional provisions, even if they never go through a formal registration process. However, any attempt to transfer this land to another will be deemed void and any party to such a transa-ction will be subject to punishment of a fine or imprisonment.49

A person using/holding land under such conditions who wishes to apply for a customary right of occupancy can do so by providing a sketch or diagram, or other sufficient description of the land, to the local government,50 but this is often a difficult condition to meet for people who obtained land through oral agreements in the past. At least one author notes: “The appropriate ministry or department of lands is often at a loss as to how to process such applications without these documents, and in some cases the applicants are advised to go and get deeds of conveyance back-dated to any date before the commencement of the Act to enable them to process the applications.”51

As may be hinted at by the above discussion, the role of customary law, and areas in which it conflicts with statutory, are not entirely clear and has remained the subject of much debate as the country has begun steps to craft and imple-ment land reform measures.

3. Problems Implementing the Land Use ActThe Land Use Act came into force on 29 March 1978, but there is no time limit by which a pre-existing right must be converted to a right of occupancy, so many land users may feel little urgency to do so, particularly as this action can be complex, lengthy, and would likely incur additional costs.52 The procedure to prove the chain of title needed to obtain a certificate from local governments in non-urban areas can take over two years and require as many as 20 steps, and one observer notes that unregistered customary land can change hands more than 10 times before someone seeks official consent and registration.53 While each step may be done in good faith, these transactions may be legally void under the Act, and creates a situation that is ripe for fraud. Additionally, it becomes more difficult for each new land user to actually obtain statutory rights should they wish to do so, and subdivisions make future plan-ning of these areas much more difficult.54

Fees may also serve as a deterrent:

Fees typically include registration fees and stamp duties each equaling 2-3 percent of the asset value, capital gains of 2-3 percent of net land sale proce-


eds, and a transfer fee that can range from 8-30 percent of the value of the property, depending on the state. Total fees for a sale of rights can range from 15 percent to over 30 percent of the land value.55

The Land Use Act called for the establishment of Land Use and Allocation Committees at the state level (to assist the governor), and Land Allocation Advi-sory Committees at the local level, to handle new allocations of land.56 However, this process has been slow and underfunded, and it has been reported that less than three percent of the country is formally registered with a certificate of occupancy.57

Some analysts note that this has allowed the allocation of land to become a significant form of patronage, and in 2009, Transparency International found that one third of Nigerians reported having paid a bribe to someone working in land services to acquire statutory land rights through official processes.58 Addi-tionally, community actors have continued to allocate, partition, and transfer interests in land as they did before the law came into force. As pre-existing inte-rests in land are explicitly recognised as valid under the law, one author points out that these more recent grants of land interests can use back-dated documents as evidence (as already mentioned above), to apply for an official certificate of occupancy,59 which may also open the door to competing claims to the same piece of land.

4. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999)In addition to the laws discussed above, the 1999 Constitution also enshrined several principles regarding land rights:

• Article 16 directs the State to ensure “that the material resources of the nation are harnessed and distributed as best as possible to serve the common good; and that suitable and adequate shelter […] are provided for all citizens.”

• Article 43 states that, “Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, every citizen of Nigeria shall have the right to acquire and own imm-ovable property anywhere in Nigeria.”

• Article 44 guarantees that no person’s moveable property or any inte-rest in immoveable property can be seized.

D. INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS Nigeria is party to several international and regional instruments that require the State to protect and promote housing, land and property (HLP) rights. As detailed discussion on the import of these instruments is readily available elsew-here, this section only briefly highlights some of the most salient points.

1. International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (ICESCR, accession 29 July 1993) The right to adequate housing (which incudes the component of security of tenure) is protected by Article 11(1) of the ICESCR, and includes an obligation on the part of States to, at a minimum, refrain from violating such rights through their actions, and to take reasonable measures to prevent foreseeable violations by non-state actors. In General Comment No. 4, the Committee on Economic,


Social and Cultural Rights, specifies that the right to adequate housing consists of the following elements: 1) legal security of tenure (which guarantees legal protection against forced eviction, harassment and other threats); 2) the availa-bility of adequate services, especially water and sanitation; 3) affordability; 4)habitability; 5) accessibility; 6) a location that provides access to employment opportunities, education and health services and social facilities; and 7) cultural adequacy.

2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, accession 29 July 1993)Article 17 of the ICCPR also provides that everyone has the right to protection of the law against any arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, or home.

3. African Union Convention for the Assistance and Protection of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the “Kampala Convention,” ratification 17 April 2002)The Kampala Convention, adopted by African governments in 2009 and entering into force on 6 December 2012, stresses that States bear primary responsibility for protecting and assisting IDPs within their borders. As a signatory, the Nige-rian State has a responsibility to promote measures that “prevent or mitigate, prohibit and eliminate root causes of internal displacement as well as provide for durable solutions,”60 prevent arbitrary displacement, and protect the human rights of IDPs.61 States must also provide IDPs, to the fullest extent practicable, with adequate assistance including food, shelter and sanitation, and extend this assistance to local and host communities where appropriate.62

Returnees from Maiduguri settling in at Motor park, Dikwa Northeast Nigeria. Credit: Aliyu Hassan/NRC


The previous section attempted to provide some basic understanding of the legal structure underpinning Nigeria’s land administration, but field-work for this report suggested that such formalities had little meaning to those most directly affected by the current crisis, who are often living in rural areas governed by customary principles that have evolved to adjust to increased competition and modern realities. And as elsewhere, people have developed practices and markets by which to gain access to and transfer claims to land, regardless of the processes that the Nigerian government may be trying to establish by law.

A. LAND GOVERNANCE & EVOLVING CUSTOMS

1. Land GovernanceMost people interviewed during the fieldwork for this study acknowledged that federal and state law, Shari’a law, and customary practices all played some role in regulating how land is accessed and used, though it was not clear that there was an accurate understanding of what practices fell under which category. Some participants stated that inheritance was governed by Shari’a law, and that this was never a problem because the distribution formula was clear. Howe-ver, others said that custom was used instead, noting that inheritance was only received by men; daughters in particular would not inherit from their fathers because it was expected that they would marry and become a part of their hus-bands’ families.63

In practice, customary and statutory principles were also intertwined. For example, many people seemed to acknowledge that land was owned by the government and the state, and there was a growing desire to have documents for protection. However, instead of formalising title and obtaining certificates of occupancy, most people used papers that evidenced a sale or other transfer of right over land that was witnessed and/or approved by customary authorities, typically either the bulama (ward head) or lawan (village head), though a few did make reference to the district head as well.

3. Analysis: Changes since the conflict


Recognising the Importance of Documentary Evidence A father sold a piece of his land to another person wherein the transa-ction was put into writing and a receipt issued thereafter. On the demise of the land seller, his son who was not aware of the transaction tried laying claims to the land as his deceased fathers’. The documentary proof of the transaction saved them from a situation that might be really pre-carious at that time. This they all noted underscored the importance of documentary evidence in land transaction.– Man in Gongulong

Traditional leaders – and bulamas in particular – were described as having an integral role in nearly every aspect related to land. Bulamas were described as being responsible for allocating land that a person could buy or be given, acting as a broker between a buyer and a seller, or a witness to any land transaction, and/or resolving disputes related to land. Most people expressed a measure of satisfaction with the customs that were followed, and felt that the traditional leaders would protect them. However, there were growing feelings of animosity toward bulamas as a source of land conflicts, and displaced men in Bulabulin expressed skepticism to one resear-cher about the way bulamas handled land transactions, and felt that bulamas should be monitored by higher authorities like the lawan.64

The rules are fine, but people in charge are corrupt.– Host community male, Dikwa, Borno state

2. Land Acquisition Historically, the bulama was understood to act as a custodian for land, which was a communal asset to be allocated among families for use, free of charge, as needed. However, they had no right to give out land that was no longer under their care, as explained by a man from Gwoza Local Government Authority in Borno state:

[F]arms and lands are owned by communal and family lines, and neither the bulama nor the lawans has any right to sell or give off lands, especially if such lands are not theirs […]. Although individuals that have a means can still purchase the same.65

Additionally, many respondents said that idea of free land was now something of the past:

Our grandfathers used to trade kolanuts for land. Now once you inherit that kind of land, it gets taken away.” – Woman in Zabarmari66

Several traditional leaders interviewed for this study described the notion of allocating a land right to an individual that could be transferred outside the family as relatively new. Nevertheless, people today identified inheritance or purchase, either from a private seller or from the bulama, as the most common methods of acquiring land at present time. If the land was privately owned, the bulama might still act as a broker. Prospective buyers or sellers would inform the bulama of their intention to buy/sell, and if an agreement is made, the parties will come with their witnesses and the bulama would approve the agreement.


The buyer would then go to the lawan, who would issue documents recognising and authenticating the transaction. People who reported having documents for their land were typically referring to such signed sales agreements, as there was a general feeling that they provided sufficient protection for a claim to land. Those wishing to go further could take the document to the local or state government to obtain a customary certificate of occupation, as described in the Land Use Act. However, while many had some level of awareness about this process, the majority did not feel the need for such papers, with some expressing that the presence of witnesses to attest to the transaction would suffice to prove a person’s claim. As one man in Khaddamari said, “They use the papers, but they don’t take it seriously.”67

In general, respondents were of the view that anyone with money would be able to acquire land. However, interested buyers or renters from outside the community (including IDPs) would have to undergo some background investiga-tion to ensure that they were “morally good.” For example, one person explained that sex workers and “those who lured young boys” would not be allowed to own property in their community.68 Answers diverged more in regards to women’s ability to access land. Some respondents felt that as long as a woman had money, she could get land, but many others felt that only married women, or those who had another male stan-ding for them, could buy property. Several women also complained that land-lords were biased against women with children, and were less likely to agree to rent to them. However, most respondents said that no one could obtain new land now because it was too expensive. As explained by one man in Khaddamari:

Housing lands are usually not sold, coupled with the fact that most of them are too poor to even think of buying land […] farm lands can be sold to prospective buyers for farming purposes. However if such farm land are required for temporary usage, depending on their agreement, the tenant pays a tribute (in the form of some products of the harvest on the land).69 – Man in Khaddamari, Borno state

3. TaxesUnder previous customary tenure systems, the traditional leaders were seen as holding and managing the land in trust for the community members, and typically received some kind of tribute or payment from land users. While a few respondents said that payment of taxes was done to protect their claims to land, most felt that while such payments were made “in the old days,” it was not necessary now. Some areas reported still paying some kind of tribute (such as a portion of the crops that they harvest), but the general view was that that once a person acquired the land, it was not necessary to pay any kind of recurring tax or other payment to keep the land. Other authors have noted that the refusal of customary users of land to pay customary tributes, on the basis that ownership was vested with the governor, rather than the customary leader, have previously led to cases being filed in court.70

B. LAND DISPUTES & INCREASED TENURE INSECURITYThe increased competition over land that has occurred during the conflict has heightened fears about being able to access, or losing access, to land. Problems about competing uses of land will be discussed below. As other publications have


gone into greater detail about customary dispute resolution process, this report will focus mainly on the effect of the current crisis on the type and prevalence of reported land disputes.

1. Before the ConflictIn general, people reported having HLP-related disputes, like boundary and inheritance problems, prior to the conflict, but felt that they were relatively few in number and could be solved by traditional leaders. Many respondents also indicated high feelings of tenure security before the conflict. As one IDP living in Maiduguri reflected:

We were confident that no one would take our place. It’s really unthinkable nobody saw this conflict and displacement coming. The system/customs administered by the traditional community leaders help to protect rights over land.71

While some mention of inheritance disputes was made, most respondents did not highlight these problems, generally asserting that religious law was clear and so such problems did not occur in great numbers. Yet in practice, Shari’a principles do not seem to have been upheld with consistency. For example, host community women in Dalori near Maiduguri note that only men in their family inherit because “a woman leaves her father’s house and goes to her husband’s family and she is considered a part and parcel of that family.”72 Additionally, NRC’s Displaced Women’s HLP study also notes that neither divorced nor wido-wed women were guaranteed rights such as nafaqa or inheritance as provided under Shari’a law.73

2. A Brief Note on the Problem Between Farmers & HerdersFulani pastoralists immigrated into Hausa land and Borno over several cen-turies, and used to pay tribute to local leaders in pre-jihad times in return for grazing rights and protection from the people.74 Some scholarship posits that the new tax system imposed after the jihad may have impacted the pastoralists harder than the farmers; the cattle tax remained, but the variation in payments suggested this tax increased in proportion to the financial needs of the emirs, and Adebayo hypothesizes that some movement of the pastoralists was driven by the search for lower taxes.75 Some suggest that while conflict between the two groups has existed throug-hout history, the constant movement of pastoralists and necessary trade between the two groups kept violent clashes to a minimum until the 20th century.76 One man from Gwoza Local Government Aauthority in Borno state recalls customary practices that helped resolve problems in the past:

The farmer and herder disputes were to some extent worked on to be resolved especially by the efforts of our late emir with the name Alhaji Idris Timta of blessed memory. He used the mechanism of sulhu (collaborative dispute resolution) between the farmers and the herders. He did this by allo-cating land to be used by the herders for grazing alone and without farming of any sort. He further made it a practice based on the agreement of par-ties concerned that upon the successful harvest of farm lands by farmers, the herders have to negotiate with them on terms before they are allowed access with their cattle to graze. That has really resolved the incessant conflicts experienced before now.77


However, increased pressures on land, changing resource access rights, inade-quate land for grazing, and a decline in social cohesion exacerbated the conflicts, and destruction of crops and property by cattle became a common flashpoint that remains today.78 The International Crisis Group further notes that the advent of the conflict with Boko Haram has brought additional layers of violence by adding ethnic tensions and involving military and militia actors.79

The transition away from peaceful interaction was described by one respon-dent in Dalori in Borno state:

Cordiality between [us] as farmers and herders was a smooth one wherein the herders only bring their cattle on the farmlands for grazing when the farm produce was harvested without destructions. Sometimes the herders even seek [our] consent as farmers even after harvest for them to graze the farmlands with their cattle. This peaceful trend has over the years changed and we don’t have much explanation for the sudden change. The herders don’t come on our farm land during raining season when our farm produced are planted, they only come when our produced are either ripe for harvest or are newly harvested and graze on it with their cattle, thus destroying what we had labored for to eat. It is rather wicked and dishe-artening […]. In defence of their cattle they don’t hesitate to kill anyone especially the farmers.80

Interestingly, other farmers noted that problems with herders have significantly reduced since the start of the conflict, because the few areas of farmland that can be accessed are better secured (preventing the herders from grazing there), and because the herders have lost much of their livestock during this crisis. Nevertheless, this is an issue that is bound to recur unless rules of access that can address the needs of both groups can be re-established.

A flooded camp in Maiduguri comprising of IDPS and retur-nees. Photo: Anja Riiser


3. Cost of Accessing LandGenerally, people agreed that it was still possible for outsiders to get land, even with the ongoing conflict, but there is a longer process of investigating a person’s background now because of increased tensions and suspicions. Additionally, there are perceptions that the process of obtaining initial access to land is beco-ming more unfair and prone to corruption. One of the greatest effects of the con-flict has been on the price of land and property, and many participants feel that this has increased corruption. Several say that the land agents and community leaders who facilitate access to land are demanding higher prices, because they are taking percentages of the final price:

The rules should be changed because the Joro (community leaders) don’t care about processes during land purchases; all they care about are percen-tages. – Men in Wuro Gude81

Several participants referred to past practice when bulamas would allocate land for free, but that now they are asking for more and more money:

We are poor and these rules are exploitative to us.

Before you look for a house you need to inform the bulamas and all expect you to pay.– Women in Bulabulin82

While many people expressed relative confidence that both customs and laws protected their land rights, it was also common to hear complaints that “the rich can claim the property of the poor.” Women in Wuro Gude said that if a person was poor and vulnerable, their land could be taken away by someone who was richer and more powerful:

The rich claim the land, bribe the judge and community leaders to get the land and deprive the real owner.– Women in Wuro Gude83

4. Secondary OccupationThe crisis has increased the number of displaced persons and decreased the amount of land that is safe for use, so it seems in some way inevitable that land and houses that appear vacant will be put to use. Returnees report that they often come home to find other IDP families in their homes, and must then negotiate with these occupants. As one woman in Gajiram put it, “Yes, returnees regain access to their land but if you meet IDPs on your land then you have no option but to cohabitate with them until they leave.”84

Fortunately, most property owners expressed empathy about the difficulties faced by everyone (having been displaced themselves). One solution that was reported would be to allow the IDP family to stay in one room in the house, while the other rooms would be used by the returning family. Respondents note that as long as it is understood that the IDP family’s stay is temporary, parties seem to be able to work out arrangements, but tension remains:

There is this fear that even after the conflict some of them may not agree to leave the land and can later claim ownership. – Women in Dalori85


Unsurprisingly, IDPs harbored fears that they would be in their hosts’ situation when they returned home, and many had mixed feelings about whether they would be able to regain access to their property upon return. While some felt that the sales agreements and other documents they had for their land would protect their claims, others voiced concerns about their land being encroached upon, or resold, if they are gone for a long time.

5. Multiple Sales and ReallocationA more difficult situation arises when someone comes home to find that their land has been sold to someone else. Multiple sales/allocations of the same piece of land and boundary disputes were consistently reported as primary sources of tension in recent years.

The land a Lawan will sell you may belong to someone else, they tend to sell lands of people that don’t use their land. When you come to start building on the land someone will come out with another legitimate document and claim is theirs.– Man in Maiduguri86

Many blamed the bulamas for these problems, and reported concerns about having their land given to someone else if they were gone for some period of time, or left their land fallow. They assert that the bulamas are not consulting the land users as they are supposed to, and are allocating land so they can collect money. While reports of this situation are increasing, it is unclear how they are being resolved, though several respondents expressed a sense of injustice:

If there are multiple sales, the person who is less privileged or poor will be dominated over by the rich one and the land will be taken from him.– Women in Bulabulin87

Yes, land can be taken away. This land is mostly taken away by other people with better financial power.– Men in Wuro Gude88

Additionally, more vulnerable members of society may be forced to shoulder an undue burden or be taken advantage of, as in the case below.

Female Returnee, Khaddamarai, 13 January 2019Elizabeth is from Khaddamari. Her late father was the lawan, and she inherited farmland from him when he died 20 years ago. She fled during the crisis, and when she returned, she was not able to access the land because it was now in the custody of the “lawan’s wakil.” She is a widow, and needs access to land to care for herself and her children. She says that other farm land in the area has been given to IDPs to live on and that the only available land is too dangerous to use as a farm because it is on the outskirts of town.

She says that the current lawan is her uncle, and she has asked him to speak with the wakil so she can get her land back, but nothing has happe-ned. She then reported the issue to the shehu, and is now waiting to see if she’ll be able to get her land back.


6. Overcrowding and Pressure on Natural ResourcesIssues such as secondary occupation and multiple allocations of land are indi-cative of the fact that an increasing number of people are relying on the same, limited resources, including that of land, leading to a severe problem of over-crowding. Host community members report a multitude of issues as they try to cope with an overflow of IDPs in their villages, saying that “IDPs are everywhere,” on their lands, cutting down trees, and destroying property, and that they will not stop when asked. This puts pressure on other important resources like food and water:

We also face the problem of tree falling by the IDPs our community is hosting. This trend is really leading to great desertification in our area. We have warned the IDPs several times about this but they have been so adamant. The only response they tell you is that they don’t have means of livelihood and they have to sell these woods to survive, and there is barely anything we can do, no matter how hard we shout. This practice has really exposed us to all forms of environmental hazard, because after felling such trees, they don’t even replace it.– Men in Gongulong89

[B]efore the influx of the IDPs [we] had no problem with accessing good water supply because there were two boreholes, one powered by solar and the other one by a generating set. However, the influx of IDPs exerted pressure on the boreholes, thereby making them to break down. They are not repaired till date. We have to trek for kilometers before accessing good water to use. Furthermore, we don’t have food because we don’t even farm.– Man in Khaddamari90

A returnee settlement in Maiduguri, Northeast Nigeria. Photo: Anja Riiser


Others complained that the IDPs are dirty and causing health problems, and their presence limits everything from the ability to farm to their children’s edu-cation:

The IDPs lack maintenance and are dirty; they cause break outs of disease.– Women in Gongulong91

[B]efore now my children go to private schools with better teaching, but they now have to even hustle to make it to public schools with a far lesser quality because there are no private schools and even the facilities of the available public schools are occupied by the IDPs as their accommodation […]. The farm lands available around them are now housing most of the IDPs and they have gross limited land to farm on. More than 80 percent of our children are presently out of school.– Man in Dalori92

Desperate IDPs explain their troubles in finding spaces in which to sleep, and the lack of land to plant any subsistence crops that might feed their family. Even those who could pay often found it difficult to overcome suspicions of the host community, as illustrated by one IDP man living in Maiduguri.

It’s never easy to find a place here, the demand is high. The land is too expensive and hard to find. The community at first didn’t even want to rele-ase land or houses for rent to displaced like us due to suspicions and lack of trust but eventually I got a house to rent though expensive.– Man in Maiduguri93

7. Security Conditions and Military ActionRespondents in several areas reported that military actors have either taken con-trol of their lands themselves, or assumed authority over its use. In one instance, a man came home to find that military actors had given an international NGO permission to build on his land, despite not having the authority to do so. This was corroborated by local leaders as well:

What will improve such situation is for government and we the traditional rulers to get involved in assisting these people, because some of their land or housing were occupied by influential people like the security agencies, and getting it back now is a problem, especially farms which they are denied cultivating on. So the state needs to stand for them or provide anot-her land or housing.– Lawan in Yobe state94

In another, women in Bulabulin described how government security forces tried to demolish their houses because insurgents were hiding in the area. The governor ignored their pleas and brought in graders for the work, and the women described their only recourse as “prayer.” Fortunately for the community, the graders did not work, and their homes were not destroyed, but the story illustra-tes how easy it can be for an entire village to lose their lands and homes.

Our houses were targeted because our area was the hideout of the insur-gents, and the military and government wanted to come and demolish the entire area. The governor said he did not know about the area so the area should be demolished. They brought in graders to demolish the houses but


the people in the community prayed and the grader did not work. So the governor and the military had to cave and took the car away.– Women in Bulabulin95

Respondents also talked about security forces not allowing people to go to their land because of fears about unexploded ordinances and general insecurity. The story below shows how one man has lost access to his lands because of a conflu-ence of such factors.

Male Host Community Member, Khaddamarai96 Victor has farmland in Khaddamari, where he grew maize, millet, beans, and other crops before the conflict. Now there is a security checkpoint installed on his land, and he has not been able to plant on that land for the last three years. He has another piece of land, but he has been una-ble to plant on that land for the last two years because IDPs have settled there. The crisis has changed his life; before, he harvested his crops to feed himself and his family, and could also sell some produce to meet other needs. Before, he could also help other people, but under the cur-rent circumstances, he now needs assistance himself, since he has lost his source of livelihood. Despite the difficulties he faces, he explains:

I don’t intend to take any steps because we also need the presence of the security forces in our village because we cannot live here safely and peace-fully without them and even if I decide to ask them to vacate my land, there is likelihood that they will relocate to another land which also belongs to someone thereby putting the person in the same hardship as that faced by me. So, I have therefore come to terms with the fact that, I have to continue being patient up to when we will find lasting peace which will therefore warrant them to vacate my land. But for now, I don’t intend to take any steps because we also need their presence in our community.

Regarding the other land in which IDPs are residing on, I also do not intend to take any steps because first of all, it’s not their choice to become IDPs and what happened to them can also happen to me or anyone else and besides, if I should evict them from the land, the question is where will they go? So, I have to still be patient until when their villages are safe for them to go back. However, if after everywhere is safe and they still refuse to vacate the land, then I will take the appropriate steps necessary to evict them from my land which is by involving the relevant authorities and stakeholders.

Increased food insecurity is an additional knock-off effect, because many people had farms in more remote areas:

Yes, since the start of the conflict we experience lots of restrictions espe-cially in the aspect of moving to farms in our remote areas because of the fears of been attacked and even killed. So for our safety, we no longer go to our remote farms. This has greatly affected food production in our area.– Men in Gongulong97


8. EvictionIDPs were often afraid that they would be evicted because they could not pay their rent. Women in Monguno interviewed by the research team said, “it is difficult to find land to live on or to use because it is not our village and we are displaced and so have to pay for such lands before use,” and reported that the landowners and bulamas had given them notice that they had to leave.98

Others do not receive as much courtesy:

They allow you [to] stay for some months, they will forcefully evict you, throw your things out and say your children will fill their toilets and destroy their property. Some landlords even go to the extent of removing the roof of the building.– Women in Bulabulin99

It is also difficult to know who to deal with in trying to make arrangements to find a place to live, and problems may arise when the custodian and the owner of a property are of different minds:

Sympathetic custodian; Angry ownerDaniel lived in Dalori, and had seen how tensions were escalating bet-ween IDPs and his community. Most IDPs lived in rented homes, but had difficulty paying their rents. He said that he had once allowed IDPs to use a property that he was given custody over, but when the owner returned and found out what happened, he “went to extremes by reporting this matter to the police to see to the immediate eviction of the poor IDPs from the property. This I felt was the height of discrimination against the needy IDPs.”100

C. UNINTENDED EFFECTS: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE SEEN AS A SOURCE OF INCOME Northern Nigeria has been in a state of crisis for nearly ten years, and another disturbing trend that was noted during the field work for this report was the view that because IDPs are getting humanitarian assistance, bulamas and land-lords could ask them for more money. Some humanitarian workers were also of the opinion that bulamas are now refusing to allow NGOs to use land for projects to assist those affected by the crisis without payment; this is a worrying develop-ment that should be watched, as it can prevent people from receiving much needed assistance, and would also represent a significant conflict of interest in the ability of bulamas to serve as fair custodians of communal land.


While it is not possible to make generalised statements that would apply in all areas, this report would note that many people have unjustly lost access to their lands and properties. Some were forced to flee because of violence, and some found people in need living in their homes. Untangling the reality of overlapping needs and claims of right is complicated at best. The crisis has increased the number of displaced persons and decreased the amount of land that is safe for use, so it seems in some way inevitable that problems will occur.

A. VOICES FROM THE FIELD: “WE NEED SECURITY AND JUSTICE”

1. “Security is the cause of all their problems.”– Women in Khaddamari101

One of the primary barriers to access to land is security. The feeling that the government must to do more to provide security (against Boko Haram) was widespread, as decreasing the amount of land that can be safely accessed exa-cerbates all other problems. For example, while host community members understand the dire situation of the IDPs, and understand that they need land on which to live, they are also being squeezed:

[We] cannot access farmlands. People have restricted movements and the-refore no food and means of livelihood.

There was information of an attack from Boko Haram, so those who went to get firewood had to go home.

The roads are closed from 4pm and they don’t have hospitals around, and therefore should anybody get sick within those hours, he/she becomes helpless.

Since they can’t farm they need more water and food aid.

– Women in Khaddamari102

It is not illogical for host community members to feel frustrated about giving land to IDPs when they themselves feel they do not have enough for their needs:

4. Conclusion & recommendations


For now the outsiders will not find a place to farm due to the insurgency and limitation of access to land.– Women in Zabarmari103

The lack of security is a recurring source of frustration, largely because many people feel that it is both within the responsibility and the power of the govern-ment to provide it:

The government, especially the state government, should be responsible for finding solution […] they should provide security […] they are able to do it.– Men in Wuro Gude104

We need peace so as to go back home. We are suffering.– Women in Monguno105

2. Justice: “The government and the leaders should give justice to the people.”IDPs, returnees, and host community members all demanded justice for the wrongs they felt they were suffering: Landowners felt the government should protect their land rights, and that bulamas should not be allowed to let other persons use their land. IDPs felt the government should protect their rights, and guarantee them access to land and homes, even if they had no money. Host communities were angry that IDPs were putting strains on their limited resour-ces. Returnees wanted to be able to use their homes and get back to some sem-blance of a normal life. All respondents consistently described the increasing price of land as unfair, and there was widespread belief that the rich could take land from the poor if they wanted to. Defining “justice” is difficult, as it takes on many forms, depending on who is speaking:

The waziri, Joro, and government (leaders) should ensure no one occupies the land that does not belong to them […]. The government and the leaders should give justice to the people.– Women in Wuro Gude106

Authorities should help in providing free legal services by employing the services of a lawyer to help the masses resolve HLP cases.– Women in Zabarmari107

Nothing has been done because land owners keep on increasing the price of land […]. The government, traditional leaders and the court should punish those caught in the act of corruption in regards to land sales.– Women in Wuro Gude108

We think government can compel the traditional leaders and land owners against [carrying out] evictions [… and] help us access land without paying any money.– Women in Monguno109

3. Assistance to Cope with and Recover From the CrisisOverall, respondents felt that the government needed to do more to help those who had been affected by the conflict. Several respondents felt that the govern-ment should provide permanent land for IDPs to use, and provide more assis-


tance for people who are returning to rebuild their homes. At the moment, local communities and IDPs are coping as best they can, but the longer the situation continues and the more they are forced to compete for the same resources, the tenser things will become. One researcher recounts his conversation with men in Gongulong:

The respondents were unanimous in stating that relevant authorities and organisations should look into the food and livelihood plights people are currently facing and try to effectively address it because people are in real hunger.110

Respondents also talked about the property destruction that has happened, and their inability to rebuild homes and lives. Men who had returned to Wuro Gude said some people could not regain access to their homes because “the property is no longer standing or is in a bad condition,” and described their problems as “mostly finance related because the majority of these people lack the financial capacity to reconstruct their property.”111

Local leaders also emphasized the importance of assistance to help people reco-ver:112

There is a need for government to provide housing and ease the laws to reduce the cost for IDP returnees to access land. This is because 80 percent of Buni Yadi houses and structures were burnt […]. The biggest problem is financial problem. [The people] should be given means of livelihood and money to begin a new life and care for their family and access things like land […]. Government should come to their aid because most of them can-not afford even their three daily meals.– Lawan, Yobe state113

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Addressing Security ConditionsHumanitarian actors can document the effects of the insecurity and diminishing spaces that are available for Nigerian citizens in northern Nigeria, and stress the importance of addressing the security concerns of those affected by the con-flict, but it is only the government who has the authority and means to improve security, as all respondents are asking for.

2. Addressing Cries for Justice

a. Include host community members / land owners in discussions about how to find space for IDPsThat bulamas act as custodians of the land does not appear to be in dispute. However, whether they are acting in bad faith or not, it appears that people are losing trust in their judgment, and becoming more convinced of corruption in the system. Yet, it should be acknowledged that local leaders are faced with difficult decisions and few resources. Many IDPs have no money, and are unable to pay rent, which drives them to settle wherever they find space, and compete with the hosting community over the use of other resources. Leaders are unable to create new swathes of land to keep up with the increasing number of people in their communities, and rightly or wrongly, many are forced to come up with


some prioritization of needs; host community and IDP respondents both agree that land is usually taken so IDPs have a space to sleep, but acknowledge that land will not be taken for IDPs to farm. Yet there were also been stories of communities coming together to discuss how to best cope with this crisis. For example, one group of female returnees described a communal method of finding a solution:

If you are an IDP people in the community will take you to the authorities and ask for the consent of landowners who are not using their lands, and sometimes occupiers of houses with extra lands can be asked to assign a portion for the IDP.– Woman in Zabarmari114

Such stories can serve as an example of how to address the stress of overcrow-ding. When asked directly, most host community members admitted understan-ding the situation of the IDPs and their needs, in no small part because many had been displaced themselves. Their anger often stemmed from having their lands taken without their permission or knowledge. Including them in the discussion about how to find space for IDPs may help ameliorate some tension.

b. Make the process of allocating and accessing land more transparentMany wanted the government to address the problem of multiple sales and felt that there should be better monitoring and oversight of the bulama’s abilities to sell and allocate land. IDPs in particular had more negative perceptions of the behavior of bulamas, though this may be because they have to go through the bulamas in order to access any land. People in some areas felt that the lawans are more just, though others felt they were equally to blame. As the cost of land is also a key point of contention, transparency should be brought into the entire process. Humanitarian actors can work with community members, bulamas, and lawans to establish a space for everyone to discuss the process by which land is determined to not be in use and thus available for allo-cation. This may include coming to agreement about a background investigation into a land’s current use, so that bulamas can either assign a different piece of land, or provide only temporary use rights. Bulamas should also be given an opportunity to explain why they are asking for higher amounts of money, and how that money is being used. This would simultaneously ensure that the people for whom this land is being held in trust can have a chance to hold their leaders accountable. Now may also be the time to discuss some process or mechanism by which local leaders can better track who is using what land. While this may not have been an issue in the past, the increased demand and strains on land are bringing this issue to the forefront and should be addressed.

c. Organise Inclusive Grievance and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Host community respondents understand the plight of the IDPs, but they need help in addressing the distressing reality that an increasing number of people that are relying on limited natural resources, which is creating significant pro-blems. Similarly, IDPs understand the strain they are causing their hosts, but feel they have no other options. IDP women in Wuro Gude described their challenges as facing theft, eviction, insufficient toilets and bathrooms, and were frustra-ted because they said they could not complain, and asked for assistance to get landlords and community members to treat them with integrity.115 Everyone is aggrieved with varying levels of justification, and most feel that no one is listening to them.


As the land disputes that have been outlined here are likely to continue as the crisis wears on, it would be helpful to establish more inclusive mechanisms that would allow a more transparent and effective way of addressing problems. Most respondents indicated that either the bulama or the lawan could help resolve disputes, but given that the bulama may be seen as an antagonist in the process, and the reality that it is difficult for a few leaders to resolve many problems, more people should be involved in the process, and help ensure that the voices of all stakeholders can be heard. Such mechanisms could be responsible for other activities, such as creating written agreements for temporary use of vacant houses or land, so that IDPs can make clear that they are not trying to take some-one’s land or home, and the returnees/host communities do not fear the same.

d. Strengthen Tenure Security and Better Protect Land RightsGiven the current circumstances, that the number of multiple sales, encroach-ment, and boundary disputes is rising is not surprising. As referenced throughout the report, people are increasingly convinced of the importance of documents, with some going so far as to say that if you had no documents you had no prote-ction. Whether certificates of occupancy or something less formal, people believe that the government should help ensure that they all have some form of paper evidence of their land rights.

[The government] should have records to prevent selling land twice […] and provide documents for people who buy land.– Women in Wuro Gude116

Members of the displaced community in Gajiganna stand by a hole as a community worker works on the construction of latrines. Photo: Hajer Naili/NRC


While those why buy land now will typically have a sale agreement, land that is passed down via inheritance may not be documented, and many respondents expressed fear that they could lose such land, particularly if they had to flee. Local authorities also note the need to raise awareness about the law and process of obtaining formal land documentation, and that the government should simplify these processes. As one local authority explained:

The rules are clear, but not everyone understands. They should be simpli-fied. Once someone sells your land (fraudulently), you’ll hardly ever get it back.117

For many, the cost and complexity of obtaining certificates of occupancy is pro-hibitive. Given the fact that the majority of people feel secure with sales agree-ments as evidence of their claim to land, one possibility may be to explore a more systematic way of tracking these transactions and capturing spatial or other indicators for the lands in question. Several bulamas and lawans emphasized that they should be involved in discussions about implementing and reforming laws and procedures related to land:

We community leaders should be involved in this issue of law review or implementation process because some of the arising issues comes back to the community people, and on the housing and land issue, government need to create an easy means to access land especially to this IDPs who have lost everything.– Bulama in Yobe state118

Additionally, the government should ensure that the process to formally register land is not used to disenfranchise its rural and more vulnerable citizens. More investigation should be done to determine what additional checks and processes may be needed before assigning formal land rights in areas where displacement is widespread.

3. Future Research & Areas of Engagement/AdvocacyFinally, while this report has tried to help better understand the tenure issues faced by those affected by the current crisis, significant gaps remain in how such problems are being addressed and their impact on those involved. More rese-arch should be conducted to better understand what is happening, including, but not limited to:

• How competing claims to land and property (such as secondary occupa-tion and multiple sales/allocations of land) are being resolved, inclu-ding actors that are involved and principles used to determine which rights are favored over others;

• What kinds of outcomes are being obtained and how the parties feel about them;

• Whether parties have any recourse if they are unhappy with the outcome;

• Types of documents being seen in competing claims to land (e.g., infor-mal sales vs certificates of occupancy);

• Where such problems have occurred, what steps (if any) have been taken by authorities to prevent their recurrence;

• The motivations and explanations offered by bulamas accused of con-ducting multiple sales;

• Tracking and comparing costs for land in areas of displacement;


• Types and variations of land documents that are being used for specific transfers (e.g., sales, rentals, pledges, inheritance);

• Better understanding of the penetration of formal land and property documents, like customary or statutory certificates of occupation, in areas of interest, and how they may be acquired.

There are also areas of engagement and advocacy that can be taken up, and humanitarian actors can:

• Coordinate with mine-clearing actors and/or security actors to increase access to safe land;

• Advocate with government actors to improve security, and coordinate with local leaders to identify less areas for military use that cause less stress to local communities;

• Advocate and coordinate with local leaders about the importance of ensuring access to land for humanitarian interventions (and stress that humanitarian assistance should not be viewed as “income”);

• Capitalize on any lessening tensions between farmers and herders, and attempt to establish dialogue or relationships between the two groups;

• Assist with improving communication and relationships between land-lords and tenants;

• Start building an inventory of documents being used by local people to demonstrate land rights, which can be used during times of return, and potentially in advocacy messages during ongoing discussions about the country’s land reform efforts.


ANNEX 1

Summary of Data Collected

Focus group discussions

Date Location Gender

FGD 1 19-Nov-2018 Bulabulin Female

FGD 2 19-Nov-2018 Bulabulin Lawanti Male

FGD 3 19-Nov-2018 Bulabulin Lawanti Female

FGD 4 19-Nov-2018 Bulabulin Lawanti Female

FGD 5 21-Nov-2018 Zabarmari Female

FGD 6 22-Nov-2018 Gajiram Male

FGD 7 22-Nov-2018 Gajiram Female

FGD 8 22-Nov-2018 Monguno Male

FGD 9 22-Nov-2018 Monguno Female

FGD 10 23-Nov-2018 Dikwa Male

FGD 11 21-Nov-2018 Zabarmari Female

FGD 12 27-Nov-2018 Mubi Male

FGD 13 27-Nov-2018 Wuro Gude Male

FGD 14 27-Nov-2018 Wuro Gude Female

FGD 15 27-Nov-2018 Wuro Gude Female

FGD 16 11-Jan-2019 Gongulong Female

FGD 17 11-Jan-2019 Gongulong Male

FGD 18 12-Jan-2019 Dalori Female

FGD 19 13-Jan-2019 Khaddamari Male

FGD 20 13-Jan-2019 Khaddamari Female


Key informant interviews


KII 1 21-Nov-2018 Monguno Male

KII 2 24-Nov-2018 Damaturu Male


KII 4 25-Nov-2018 Wuro Male

KII 5 26-Nov-2018 Abbari Damaturu Male

KII 6 26-Nov-2018 Kareto Mobbar Damasak Male


KII 8 26-Nov-2018 Maiduguri Male

KII 9 27-Nov-2018 Yola Male

KII 10 12-Jan-2019 Dalori Male

KII 11 13-Jan-2019 Khaddamari Male

KII 12 13-Jan-2019 Khaddamari Female

Household interviews


HH 1 19-Jan-2019 Maiduguri Male


HH 3 21-Jan-2019 Online Male



Sources

1. Adeoye, N.O. (2017) “Land Use Conflict Between Farmers & Herdsmen in Kano, Yobe & Borno States of Nigeria: Nomads’ Viewpoints.”

2. Adebayo, A.G. (1995) “Jangali: Fulani Pastoralists and Colonial Taxation in Northern Nigeria,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1.

3. Arowosegbe, J.O. (2016) “Citizenship and Resource Competition in Nige-ria.”

4. Azad et. al. (2018) “Conflict and Violence in Nigeria: Results from the North East, North Central, and South South Zones,” WB, Poverty & Equ-ity Global Practice.

5. Bakar, A. and Saleh, A. (2011) “A Survey of Information Resources Requ-ired by Ulama to Perform their Work Roles: A Case study of Borno State, Nigeria.”

6. Boone, C. (2018) “Property and Land Institutions: Origins, Variations and Political Effects,” in N. Cheeseman (Ed.), Institutions and Demo-cracy in Africa: How the Rules of the Game Shape Political Develop-ments (pp. 61-91). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

7. Butler, S. (2012) “Nigerian Land Markets and the Land Use Law of 1978,” Focus on Land in Africa Brief, available at http://www.focuson-land.com/countries/nigerian-land-markets-and-the-land-use-law/

8. Ega, L.A. (1982) “Societal Formation and the Evolution of Land Tenure System in the Zaria Emirate of Northern Nigeria.”

9. Ezeomah, C. (1985) “Land Tenure Constraints Associated with Some Recent Experiments to Bring Formal Education to Nomadic Fulani in Nigeria.”

10. Ghebru, H. and Okumo, A. (2016), “Land Administration Service Deli-very and Its Challenges in Nigeria.”

11. Ghebru, H., Edeh, H., Ali, D., Deininger, K., Okumo, A., and Woldeyo-hannes, S. (2014) “Tenure security and demand for land tenure regu-larization in Nigeria: Empirical evidence from Ondo and Kano states,” NSSP Working Paper 25. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). http://ebrary.ifpri.org/cdm/ref/collection/p15738coll2/id/128170

12. Hare, J. “How Northern Nigeria’s Violence Explains Boko Haram,” National Geographic, 14 Mar 2015, available at https://news.natio-nalgeographic.com/2015/03/150314-boko-haram-nigeria-borno-ra-bih-abubakar-shekau/

13. Hartman, A. (2019) “‘One has to be patient’: The Housing, Land and Pro-perty Rights of Conflict-Affected Women in Northern Nigeria.”

14. Hoffman, L.K. (2014) “Who Speaks for the North? Politics & Influence in Northern Nigeria.”

15. Ike, D. (1984) “The System of Land Rights in Nigerian Agriculture.”


16. International Crisis Group (2018) “Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Far-mer-Herder Violence,” Africa Report No. 262.

17. Mabogunje, A. (2007) “Land Reform in Nigeria: Progress, Problems & Prospects.”

18. Maduekwe, N. (2014) “The Land Tenure System Under the Customary Law.”

19. McDonnell, T. “Farming becomes the new frontline in Boko Haram War,” Irin News, 26 June 2017, available at https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/06/26/farming-becomes-new-frontline-boko-haram-war

20. McDowell, C.M. (1970) “The Interpretation of the Land Tenure Law of Northern Nigeria.”

21. McDowell, C.M. (1973) “Trespass and Title to Land in the Northern Sta-tes of Nigeria.”

22. Norwegian Refugee Council (2018) “Assessment of Dispute Resolution Structures and HLP Issues in Northeast Nigeria.”

23. Nwabueze, R.N. (2009) “Alienations Under the Land Use Act and Express Declarations of Trust in Nigeria,” Journal of African Law, Vol. 53, No. 1.

24. Okolo, P. (2015) “The Concept of Dualism of Title to Land in Nigeria.”25. Oshio, P.E. (1990) “The Indigenous Land Tenure and Nationalization of

Land in Nigeria,” 10 B.C. Third World L.J. 43. 26. Pierce, S. (2013) “Pointing to Property: Colonialism & Knowledge about

Land Tenure in Northern Nigeria.”27. Udoekanem, N., David, A., and Onyema Onwumere, V. (2014) “Land

Ownership in Nigeria: Historical Development, Current Issues and Future Expectations,” Journal of Environment and Earth Science.

28. UNDP (2018) National Human Development Report 2018: Achieving Human Development in North East Nigeria.


1. Azad et. al. (2018).2. Id.3. Ike (1984).4. Id.5. Ega (1982); Pierce (2013).6. Ghebru and Okumo (2016).7. Ega (1982).8. Id.9. Ike (1984).10. UNDP (2018).11. Ega (1982).12. Ghebru & Okumo (2016).13. Pierce (2013).14. Id.15. Ezeomah (1985).16. Ega (1982).17. Pierce (2013).18. Id.19. While it is not clear whether or what kind of records of

tax practices from this period exist, Ega (1982) provides interesting discussion of the types of new taxes levied during the Fulani administration – such as religious tithes, death duties, and taxes on traders, special industries, and commercially valuable crops. Additionally, Adebayo (1995) offers an interesting history of the transition of the taxation system under the Fulani to that of the British Colonial period.

20. Ega (1982).21. Principal legislation of this time included the Treaty of

cession (1861), Land Proclamation Ordinance (1900), Land and Native Rights Act (1916), Niger Lands Transfer Act (1916), Public lands Acquisition Act (1917), Native lands Acquisition Act (1917), State Lands Act (1918) and Town and Country planning Act (1947). Udoekanem et. al. (2014).

22. Maduekwe (2014).23. Udoekanem et. al (2014); Ghebru & Okumo (2016).24. Maduekwe (2014).25. Id.26. Pierce (2013).27. Id.28. Ike (1984).29. Udoekanem N. et. al (2014).30. Id.31. Oshio (1990).32. Udoekanem, N. et. al (2014).33. Id.34. Oshio (1990); Mabogunje (2014).35. Oshio (1990).36. Land Use Act, Sec. 26.

37. Udoekanem et. al (2014). Section 5 of the Land Use Act provides a list of the governor’s powers as trustee, which include the granting of statutory rights of occupancy and related easements, setting and revising rental payments, imposing penalties for violations by the right holder, and waiving or exempting the right holder from specific obligations.

38. Oshio (1990).39. Land Use Act, Sec. 5.40. Land Use Act, Sec. 3.41. Udoekanem et. al (2014).42. Id.43. Oshio (1990); Land Use Act, Sections 6 and 9.44. Land Use Act, Sec. 51.45. Land Use Act, Sec. 6(2).46. Land Use Act, Sec. 21.47. The Land Use Act also preserves other aspects of

customary law. For example, under section 24, if certain conditions are met, the inheritance of either a custom-ary or statutory right of occupancy can be regulated by customary law.

48. Land Use Act, Sec. 36.49. Land Use Act, Sec. 36.50. Land Use Act, Sec. 36.51. Oshio (1990).52. Oshio (1990).53. Butler (2012).54. Id.55. Id.56. Land Use Act, Sec. 2.57. Ghebru et. al. (2014).58. Butler (2012).59. Oshio (1990).60. Kampala Convention, Art. 2.61. Kampala Convention, Art. 3.62. Kampala Convention, Art. 9.63. For more on this topic, see Hartman’s “One Has to be

Patient: The Housing, Land and Property Rights of Con-flict-Affected Women in Northern Nigeria.”

64. FGD, Bulabulin, 19 November 2018. 65. Household Interview, Male, Mairi, 19 January 2019.66. FGD, Female, Zabarmari, 21 November 2018.67. FGD, Male, Khaddamari, 13 January 2019.68. FGD, Female, Bulabulin, 19 November 2018.69. FGD, Male, Khaddamari, 13 January 2019.70. Oshio (1990).71. Household Interview, Male, Mairi, 19 January 2019.72. FGD, Female, Dalori, 12 January 2019.73. Hartman (2019).

Notes


74. Adebayo (1995).75. Adebayo (1995).76. Adeoye (2017).77. Household Interview, Male Mairi, 19 January 2019.78. Adeoye (2017).79. International Crisis Group (2018).80. KII, Male, Dalori 12 January 2019.81. FGD, Male, Wuro Gude, 27 November 2018.82. FGD, Female, Bulabulin, 19 November 2018.83. FGD, Female, Wuro Gude, 27 November 2018.84. FGD, Female, Gajiram, 22 November 2018.85. FGD, Female, Dalori, 12 January 2019.86. Household Interview, Male, Maiduguri, 19 January 2019.87. FGD, Female, Bulabulin, 19 November 2018.88. FGD, Male, Wuro Gude, 27 November 2018.89. FGD, Male, Gongulong, 1 November 2018.90. FGD, Male, Khaddamari, 13 January 2019.91. FGD, Female returnees, Gongulong, 11 January 2019.92. KII, Male, Dalori, 12 January 2018.93. Household Interview, Male, Maiduguri, 19 January 2019.94. KII, Male Lawan, Yobe state, 24 November 2018.95. FGD, Female, Bulabulin, 19 November 2018.96. KII, Male, Khaddamarai, 13 January 2019.97. FGD, Male, Gongulong, 11 January 2019.98. FGD, Female, Monguno, 22 November 2018.99. FGD, Female, Bulabulin, 19 November 2018.100. KII, Male, Dalori, 12 January 2019.101. FGD, Female, Khaddamari, 13 January 2019.102. FGD, Female, Khaddamari, 13 January 2019.103. FGD, Female , Zabarmari, 21 November 2018.104. FGD, Male, Wuro Gude, 27 November 2018.105. FGD, Female, Monguno, 22 November 2018.106. FGD, Female, Wuro Gude, 27 November 2018.107. FGD, Female, Zabarmari, 21 November 2018.108. FGD, Female, Wuro Gude, 27 November 2018.109. FGD, Female, Monguno, 22 November 2018.110. FGD, Male, Gongulong, 11 January 2019.111. FGD, Male, Wuro Gude, 27 November 2018.112. KII, Male Lawan, Yobe state, 24 November 2018.113. KII, Male Lawan, Yobe state, 24 November 2018.114. FGD, Female, Zabarmari, 21 November 2018.115. FGD, Female, Wuro Gude, 27 November 2018.116. FGD, Female, Wuro Gude, 27 November 2018.117. KII, Male Local Authority, Yola, 27 November 2018.118. KII, Male Bulama, Yobe state, 26 November 2018.

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