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US Strategic Reassurance Lives OnWashington's commitment to Asian allies remains strong and represent a cornerstone of US's strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region. The Asia pivot will build on those alliances and partnerships and foster a new Pax Americana.

EAST ASIAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE

DIGEST nº 28

EDITOR’S NOTE - TIAGO MAURÍCIOResearcher at Kyoto University and Orient Institute

The Japanese Ground Self-Defence

Forces (JGSDF) have recently marched in the capital Tokyo in order to exercise its

capabilities to operate in an urban environment. The controversial decision by

the new Defence Minister to give the exercise the green light, just days after his

nomination, questioned the changing role of the SDF in contemporary Japanese

society.The exercise caused a mixed reaction.

More left-wing and pacifist voices decried the move by conservative Defence Minister

Morimoto, denouncing attempts to ease some of the constitutional restraints of

flexing the MOD's muscle in plain sight, whereas more right-wing, conservative

forces came out saying this is a necessary

element of Japan's constant quest to

achieve preparedness and efficiency when using the JGSDF in its many missions.

The truth is that such an exercise had not taken place in more than 40 years. But

it remains questionable whether clear right-left divisions within the Diet provide a

sufficient explanation of the impact of troops marching in the districts of Tokyo.

There are important undercurrents in Japanese public opinion and political

culture that demand discretion and moderation. That the deployment of troops

allows for an interesting assessment of Kasumigaseki's decision-making process

and overall guidelines in its relationship with public opinion, that it certainly does.

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Ground Self-Defence Forces Troops march in

Tokyo

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Can the Senate Reverse President Obama's Defence Cuts?

“The Republican-led U.S. House of Representatives is trying to reverse cuts announced by President Barack Obama earlier this year. The House’s proposed defense bill would reverse some of Obama’s planned cuts to ships, drones and warplanes. “The proposal is designed to put real combat power behind the President’s proposed pivot to Asia,” the House Armed Services Committee stated.”

“Will US Reverse Defense Cuts?” (David Axe - The Diplomat).

China's Military Modernisation is Greatest Threat to US's Asia-Pacific Influence

“"China's military modernization, if it continues apace, may allow it to decouple America’s allies from the US extended nuclear deterrent, to destroy US and allied fixed bases in the region, and to threaten US power projection forces. This, in turn, could allow China to coerce US allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region, hold US forces at arm's length, and control the seas along the Asian periphery." Thomas G. Mahnken, Daniel Blumenthal, Thomas Donnelly, Michael Mazza, Gary Schmitt, and Andrew Shearer in the just published Asia in the Balance: Transforming US Military Strategy in Asia.

Is the United States being chased out of the Asia-Pacific by China? What action (if any) should be taken? At a time when President Obama is promoting a pivot toward the Asia-Pacific and U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta is visiting the region, six strategic, military, and Asian studies specialists examine and analyze America’s current situation there. They propose a series of steps that the United States should take to safeguard US interests.

The authors find that the United States faces three fundamental strategic alternatives.”

“Asia in the Balance: how should the U.S. deal with China?” (Thomas Donnelly, Dan

Blumenthal, Gary Schmitt, Michael Mazza & Thomas Mahnken - American Enterprise

Institute).

China's "Peaceful Rise" Has Many Manifestations

“The tensions and related diplomatic pressures exerted on China have prompted unprecedented debate among China’s foreign-policy community. Policy makers and analysts have undertaken serious reviews of other countries’ policies and deliberated on appropriate responses and future policy options. These internal debates offer insight into China’s likely future policy in the South China Sea.

Although China is increasingly criticised for its growing assertiveness, very few Chinese analysts consider the country to have been at fault for the recent tensions and disputes over the South China Sea. They firmly believe that China’s actions were necessary, to protect their country’s legitimate interests, and were p redominan t l y j us t i fied reac t i ons to ‘provocations’ by other claimant states.”

“China’s non-confrontational assertiveness in the South China Sea” (Li Mingjian - East Asia

Forum).

Brzezinski Has Valuable Insights on Washington's Global Preeminence

“Brzezinski is the Democratic Party’s Henry Kissinger: an elder statesman whose contributions to U.S. foreign policy continue to shape debates even decades after he left government. In this crisp and stimulating book, Brzezinski speculates on the dangers that could result from the decline of the United States and offers his prescriptions to restore American leadership in a changing world. Brzezinski argues against the increasing U.S. tendency to write off Europe and concentrate on Asia. He suggests that creative American statesmanship could bring Russia and Turkey into a revived and rejuvenated West, which might help advance the kind of liberal order the United States seeks. He recommends that U.S. policy toward Asia rest on the advantages of being an offshore, maritime power, and that the main U.S. objective in Asia should be the maintenance of a balance of power, much like

British policy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the end, his message is reassuring: American decline is eminently preventable. For the United States, he argues, decline is a choice, not a fate.”

“Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global

Power” (Walter Russel Mead - Foreign Affairs).

Confrontations Over Hegemony Can Be Defused

“This month, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced that by 2020, 60 percent of the U.S. Navy will be deployed in the Pacific. Last November, in Australia, President Obama announced the establishment of a U.S. military base in that country, and threw down an ideological gauntlet to China with his statement that the United States will “continue to speak candidly to Beijing about the importance of upholding international norms and respecting the universal human rights of the Chinese people.” The danger of conflict does not stem from a Chinese desire for global leadership. Outside East Asia, Beijing is sticking to a very cautious policy, centered on commercial advantage without military components, in part because Chinese leaders realize that it would take decades and colossal naval expenditure to allow them to mount a global challenge to the United States, and that even then they would almost certainly fail.”

“Avoiding a U.S.-China War” (Anatol Lieven - New York Times).

China's Aviation Sector is Test Case for Modernisation

“But the revelation to me was all the other strands of US-Chinese interaction, which day

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by day and even through the years have made an enormous difference in China's relations with the outside world and the US in particular. The most important of these is simply the Boeing corporation. As I describe, the first engineer ever hired by Bill Boeing for his new company, nearly 100 years ago, was a Chinese student who had found his way to MIT and eventually went back to China. In many cases, Boeing has been the de facto third sovereign power in dealings between the US and China. In one of those cases, as I describe, Boeing played the crucial intermediary role in persuading the Chinese to move beyond their Soviet-model air 'safety' system, which was leading to a horrendous crash record, to something more like international standards for certification and inspection of people and machines.”

“James Fallows on China's take-off (1)” (Sam Roggeveen - The Lowy

Interpreter).

Engaging with China's Military Modernisation Through Arms Race is Strategically Unsound

“Panetta likely hoped his remarks would bolster the credibility of the administration's strategy. On closer examination, there is less to Panetta's Pacific naval buildup than meets the eye. The U.S. Navy's intelligence office, by contrast, expects China's naval expansion this decade to be more substantial, especially when it comes to its submarine force. The reinforcements that Panetta discussed and new ideas like the Air-Sea Battle concept are necessary but insufficient responses to the worsening military trends in the region. The United States should not expect to win an arms race in the Western Pacific. Instead, it will have to find other more enduring advantages if it hopes to craft a sustainable strategy for the region.”

“This Week at War: An Arms Race America Can’t Win” (Robert

Haddick - Foreign Policy).

Scarborough Dispute Is Opportunity for Washington

“Notwithstanding the value of the

measures it has taken to date, such as new Marine rotations through Australia and littoral combat ships rotating through Singapore, nothing will speak louder to the U.S. commitment than honor ing i ts t reaty obligations to the Philippines in the current stand-off with China around Scarborough Shoal.

No one is talking about war in the South China Sea. Indeed, drawing a red line around the Philippines will make armed conflict less likely, not more so. Chinese leaders aren’t irrational. They aren’t likely to miscalculate if they believe the immediate relevance of the U.S. treaty commitment. And although the U.S. doesn’t have a stake in the territorial dispute per se, its treaty is, indeed, highly relevant to the current impasse.”

“Scarborough Role for U.S.?” (Walter Lohman - Flashpoints).

Will ASEAN Come Out Strong on South China Sea Disputes?

“Some analysts propose a united front, while others propose a collective bargain between ASEAN and China that excludes powers from outside the region. While this latter approach does not explicitly propose a united front, it does imply that ASEAN would gain strategic and political force against China. But the question is whether ASEAN would gain by pinning China as its opponent. The answer is unlikely to be positive. ASEAN should be a fair, neutral and transparent facilitator of peace, rather than an aggressive opponent against China, when it comes to resolving the South China Sea dispute.”

“South China Sea: is an ASEAN united front desirable?” (Xunpeng

Shi - East Asia Forum).

Washington-Seoul Axis Is Bolstered to Tackle Regional Threats

“On June 14th, the United States and South Korea agreed to strengthen their joint defensive ties during the U.S.-Korea Ministerial Dialogue 2+2 Meetings (U.S. Departments of State Remarks found here and here) held in Seoul. U.S Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta met with South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Sung-Hwan and Minister of National Defense Kim Kwan-Jin in an attempt to hammer out a stronger alliance between the two nations, while committing to increased interoperability between the Republic of Korea military and the U.S. Forces Korea.”

“United States and South Korea Agree to Boost Combined Defensive

Posture” (Craig Scanlan - Asia Security Watch).

An Overview of China's Regional Impact

“How is the rise of China changing East Asia? In order to understand what is happening, we need to consider the impact of China’s growing influence from a number of different perspectives. In this article, I want to look at some of the ways in which an increasingly assertive China is shaping the regional order in East Asia, how other countries in the region are reacting to China’s rise, and the ways Chinese economic cooperation is changing the overall situation in East Asia.”

“The Rise of China and Its Significance for East

Asia” (Shiraishi Takahashi - Nippon.com).

Geopolitical Implications of a Sea-Land Alliance

“Having shamefully failed to convert a single student to the true religion of sea power, let me venture a few thoughts of my own about one of the chief pitfalls of land-sea coalitions – that continental states regard maritime states as undependable allies. Now, Mahan imbues sea power with romanticism. In the Napoleonic Wars, he writes in one of his best turns of a phrase, the “far distant, storm-beaten ships” of the Royal Navy, “upon which [Napoleon’s] Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the world.” By shielding the British Isles from a cross-channel invasion, interdicting French shipping, and protecting British merchantmen who conveyed raw materials and finished goods hither and yon, the Royal Navy kept Great Britain in the fight and prosperous enough to fund a series of coalitions with the likes of Prussia, Russia, and Austria. Eventually, one coalition held together long enough to overcome Napoleon, until then a master alliance-breaker. Sea power was the enabler for victory on land.”

“Hazards of Sea-Land Alliances” (Flashpoints).

Rumsfeld Has Interesting Op-Ed on China

“What's especially impressive is that the former Secretary of Defense managed to write a whole op-ed weighing the costs and benefits of this treaty without ever once mentioning

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either "China" or "South China Sea." By ratifying this treaty, the United States and its Pacific allies would put China into a corner on that and other disputes.

Instead, Rumsfeld ignores that particular argument. So, let's just come out and say it: Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is soft on China.”

“Today's sovereigntist absurdity watch” (Daniel Drezner - Foreign Policy).

Perceiving China as Competitor and Acting Accordingly is Mandatory

“Despite the trend lines over the last decade, there’s a frightening reluctance on the part of U.S. government officials to speak openly about the challenges we face from the People’s Republic of China. This needs to end. U.S. officials must come to accept that while there are plenty of opportunit ies for cooperation with China, there are also elements of our relationship that are and will remain competitive. Indeed, we are engaged in an extended peacetime competition with China that at its heart is a clash of visions for the international system. This isn’t to say that conflict between our countries is inevitable. But if U.S. leaders are expected to marshal the diplomatic and military resources necessary to engage in this long-term competition, they must first be willing to speak more candidly about Beijing’s growing capabilities and strategic intentions.”

“Admit It, China Is a Competitor” (Rep. Randy Forbes - The

Diplomat).

Bipartisanship at the State Department Is Required

“A couple of weeks ago, I proposed a howler of an idea in this space: If Barack Obama is lucky enough to be reelected, he should choose his Republican opponent, Mitt Romney, as his secretary of state.

The idea wasn't serious; the point behind it was. For the first time in a quarter-century, the United States has a bipartisan -- even

nonpartisan -- consensus on many of the core issues relating to the country's foreign policy. Briefly put, if you can get past the campaign rhetoric, there's not much difference between the candidates on Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, fighting terrorists, avoiding costly wars, the Arab Spring, and even, in the real world of imperfect options, how to deal with recalcitrant Russians and Chinese.”

“The Enemy in Foggy Bottom?” (Aaron David Miller - Foreign

Policy).

Military Contractors Are Making Faulty Material Amidst Crisis

“The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is the stealth fighter of the future for the United States and allies such as Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada. With unsurpassed capabilities in stealth, survivability, agility, and maneuverability, it represents the most dominant platform the world has ever seen. Yet amidst growing threats in the world and despite a strong alliance for the program, the Obama Administration has decided to dramatically cut the F-35 as part of its cost savings efforts. Not only will this drive up per unit costs for the program, it will deprive allies and U.S. forces alike the proper capabilities to continue to dominate the air. Please join us for this important event that will shed light on the capabilities the F-35 brings to the table, how the international cooperation of its partner nations builds security, diplomatic ties, and cost savings, and why cuts to the program and why cuts to the program will hinder its development.”

“The Future of Allied Participation for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program” (Steven

Bucci - The Heritage Foundation).

The Future of Cyberware Is in Flame

“Most noteworthy of the capabilities designed into this malware include the ability to perform a screen capture when high-value programs (such as email) are active on the monitor/screen.

It also has the ability to turn on the microphone in, or attached to, the computer, capture audio in the area directly adjacent to the device, compress the file and transmit it back to its controllers via a network of compromised intermediary servers.

If anyone doesn't think we have entered a new age of spying and a cyber arms race, discovering this sophisticated compromise on the heels of Stuxnet and Duqu will surely make them rethink their position.”

“Flame - The Swiss Army Knife Of Cyber Weapons” (Kevin Coleman -

AOL Defense).

Europe's Moderate Aspirations for an Asian Century

“Speaking recently at Chatham House, Herman van Rompuy – president of the European Council – used a theatrical metaphor to refer to Europe’s role on the world stage. He said: “faced with the new play of global interdependence and global governance, we [the EU] need a presence in all the world’s regions.” While acknowledging the importance of Asia for European interests, his message about Europe’s influence in that part of the world was straightforward: “Europe is clearly not a Pacific power and will not become one.””

“Can EU Be Relevant for Asia?” (Eleni Ekmektsioglou & Patryk

Pawlak - Pacific Forum CSIS).

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“With respect to Asia, I was struck (though not surprised) by the continued concerns that several people voiced about the credibi l i ty of the U.S. commitment to Asia. I can understand why the Japanese (and other U.S. partners) fret about this, and I can even understand why they bring this up when talking to Americans. But as I told my Japanese colleagues, their concerns are misp laced and cou ld become a dangerous source of friction within America's Asian alliances. In fact, the United States has gone to enormous lengths over the past five decades to reassure its allies around the world about its credibility, even though most of these allies need us far more than we need them. The United States spends a much larger share of its GDP on defense than its Asian allies do. It maintains a substantial military presence in Asia, even though U.S. security is not directly at risk there. So the idea that U.S. credibility is seriously in question is just plain wrong, and it won't help our relations with these states if they keep complaining about it, because it will make Americans wonder if they are being asked to do more for Asia than our Asian allies are willing to do for themselves.”

“Letters from Tokyo”

(Stephen Walt - Foreign Policy).

The Asia Pivot Is More Likely to Succeed is Japan Matures

“A good commenter noted that after WWII, the US wanted to make Japan into the ‘Switzerland of Asia,’ and that we are reaping what we sow. Absolutely. I do think Americans send mixed signals to allies. We don’t want them taking an independent line, we want them to do what we say, but then we complain that they free-ride. As I argued in the OP, all this US commitment ‘infantilizes’ US allies by not forcing them to deal with t h e i r o w n re g i o n a l i s s u e s . B u t Americans, or rather the neocon-liberal internationalist elite synthesis that dominates US foreign policy discourse, ultimately accept weak, dependent allies, because we are in love with our own hegemony. It fires our imagination to compare ourselves to Athens, Rome, or Britain. Neocons read Pericles’ Funeral Oration or Gibbon, and they tear up that America too is the noble, tragic ‘weary titan,’ carrying the great orb of its world-historical task of spreading democracy. Americans thrill to that kind

o f ‘nat iona l greatness ’ pseudo-metaphysics while Europeans roll their eyes in disillusionment and Asians wonder what we are even talking about. So yes, free-riding is pretty obvious to see, because we abet it.”

“More on US Allies (2): A Response to My Critics”

(Robert Kelly - Asian Security Blog).

Japan Has Firmer Legal Stance on Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute

“The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, eight inhabited islets/rocks, have been often reported as a hot button issue that could escalate into a military conflict between Japan and China. Why then the two countries are vesting their claims with the international rules and decisions if the “law of the stronger” seems to p reva i l ? I s i t poss ib le tha t the international law cannot help in settling the dispute? I will argue that the international customary law regulating the territorial acquisition and the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not offer enough clear, precise and equally applied rules to persuade the parties to submit the fate of their national interest into the hands of an international institution.”

JAPAN HIGHLIGHTS

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SELF-DEFENCE FORCE TROOPS MARCH THROUGH TOKYO

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Tensions over Senkaku are set to rise as Tokyo Moves in for Buy

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“Can International Law Help the Resolution of the Senkaku/

Diaoyutai Dispute?”

(Aleksandra Babovic - JFPO).

Japan's Leverage in Tehran

“When I ranian Pres ident Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was reelected in 2009, supporters of the reformist camp launched street demonstrations in protest. While a lack of freedom is one of the issues driving opposition to the government, economic problems figure prominently in the unrest. The country’s woes on the economic front h a v e a l s o w o r k e d t o h a r d e n t h e government’s stance on its nuclear program. In this situation, would not the best course be to make improving the economic situation the top priority, seeking thereby to induce the government to adopt a more flexible nuclear posture and to draw the count ry in to the in ter nat iona l community? What is required of Tokyo is to persuade Tehran to continue negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program and adopt a course that will avoid the imposition of even harsher economic sanctions. It is precisely when Iran finds itself internationally isolated that Japan should keep its channels of communication with the country open.”

“Upgrading Japan’s Policy Toward Iran”

(Miyata Osamu - Nippon.com).

With Interests Rising in East Asia, Will Russia Follow Suit?

“In his article on foreign policy, Putin expressed his wish to leverage the growth potential of the Asia-Pacific region, above all that of China, to invigorate Siberia and the Far East. In keeping with this idea, the Ministry of Economic Development has prepared a draft bill to establish a public corporation directly answerable to the President to undertake development of Siberia and the Far East; this bill is currently under consideration within the government. The draft bill would allow the public corporation to utilize the mineral, forestry and land resources in Siberia east of the Urals and in the Russian Far East (nearly 60% of the nation's territory by area!) free of federal restrictions and would grant it very significant tax benefits. Neither federal nor local agencies would be able to interfere in the activities of this public corporation, which would be subject to scrutiny only by the president and the Audit Chamber.”

“Russia's Eastwar Pivot”

(Hironori Fushita - AJISS).

There Are Pressing Concerning

Constitutional Revision in Japan

“The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) published its new draft constitutional amendment proposal in late April. The draft reflects a number of significant changes above and beyond those advanced in the proposal unveiled by the LDP in 2005. The proposal includes a complete overhaul of Article 9, the war renouncing provision of Japan’s so-called Peace Constitution. These changes to Article 9 are important, and on balance, dangerous. The nature of these proposed revisions, and how they would likely operate, deserve to be examined in some detail.”

“Dangerous Proposals for Amending Article 9 of the

Constitution of Japan”

(Craig Martin - Constitutional Making).

As the SDF Hosts Urban Exercise in Tokyo, Public Perceptions Change

“Japan adopted pacifism as the basis of its doctrine for Defense and Security after suffering the consequences of its pre-WWII militarist regime. The image of the Japanese Armed Forces seems to be of extreme importance, not only considering domestic concerns but also regional or global perceptions.

Despite the trends that supports the article 9 erosion or the normalization of Japanese Security and Defense, it seems clear that national consensus is still around the current status quo. The Yoshida Doctrine (Pacifism + Mercantile Realism), in its Defense and Security dimension, seems nevertheless to be reinterpreted, with an increasing role of the SDFs in the context of the PKO’s. Japan will also have to deal with a possible arms race in Asia, as for the first time in History, Asian military spending is expected to exceed Europe’s military”

“2012 Tokyo SDF's Military March”

(Rui Faro Saraiva - JFPO).

Interview with Alexandre Carriço - Part I

“Disclaimer: The views expressed by the re s p o n d e n t d o n o t re p re s e n t t h e Portuguese National Defense Institute or the Ministry of National Defense position on these issues

The Global War on Terror and the military commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq have dominated the international security debates in the previous decade. But as the wars wind down and attention is drawn to a power shift in Asia, China's rise appears to be defining the next fundamental topical issue in the agenda. Is this a statement you would agree with? The power shift in Asia and China’s rise is not a new or a next topical issue. It is an ever present issue in US security perceptions since the end of Cold War.

Indeed, before 9/11 2001, US and Asian security experts community were having the same debate that we are witnessing today between the so called “panda huggers and panda sluggers” and the necessity of the US to reshape its security commitments in the region through the “hub and spokes system”, which was deemed as a Cold War based regional security architecture.

In fact, back in the late nineties, Beijing fitted nicely the image of a future US strategic competitor in the region mainly because of its diverging ideology, cultural and societal values, geopolit ical gravitational weight and territorial disputes with some of the major US allies (Japan, Republic of China, Philippines, South Korea) and its continuous patronage of Pyongyang’s regime.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks changed all this because they forced the US to redirect its priorities away from Asia to Central Asia, providing an opportunity for Beijing to speed up the prosecution of its main strategic goals in the region, both under the so called New Security Concept and the 2020 time frame when, according to the political leaders, China would be able to assert herself as a “moderately p rosperous soc ie ty” and a defender of an “harmonious world”.

This American focusing on the GWoT in the Middle East and Central Asia - putting East Asia on the backburner - provided a w e l c o m i n g e n v i ro n m e n t o f regional stability for China vis-à-vis the foreshadowing security

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concerns pervading the US Defence Department over Beijing’s rise, and gave her room to manoeuvre almost freely and bilaterally with the majority of the regional states, the ASEAN ones but notably with Japan and South Korea.

China’s “symbolic support” to US GWoT was returned by giving her a growing leeway in WTO, one, if not the most important, engine of Chinese growth which made poss ib le her amaz ing rank climbing in less than a decade from the 6th major economy to being the second in the GDP (but not on a per capita basis).

Ten years later we are recycling the same debate but with different nuances, because of the US's refocus of its geopolitical attention to Asia (its “geographic right arm”), helped in part, by the current European Union financial malaise (its “geographic left arm”). From Washington the “Asia pivot” concept is now a pure rational and b a l a n c i n g r e g i o n a l a c t , a necessary upgrade of the “hub and spokes” architecture, which in the last decade was left in a semi-vegetative status and now faces a growing China which is perceived as a strategic competitor, because of the impressive pace of its rise, and accordingly, as a result, its growing assertiveness in regional security issues, which sometimes don’t match with Beijing’s political rhetoric. Let me qualify this.

China’s rise has been one of the most defining topics in the last d e c a d e , i f w e t a k e i n t o consideration the impressive quantitative, qualitative and mu l t id imens iona l academic research and edited books that have dealt with this “phenomena”.

China is rising indeed, but she is rising because it is embedded and is one of the prime beneficiaries of the current international system and order (right after the US). This point is important concerning Beijing’s potential revisionist intentions (we will return later to this issue). I think it’s important to put this rising in perspective.

First we need to take into account China’s starting economic base in the late seventies, which was quite low (and in some cases still is) in terms of all the major indicators of human development. Once the

“indigenous major productive forces of the society were liberated” by Deng Xiaoping reforms – especially after his nanxun in 1992 – and later with its admission to WTO in 2001 (one week after the 9/11), China’s rise i n t e r m s o f i t s “ n a t i o n a l comprehensive power” (where military power is one of the components) was based on a impressive “GDP cruise speed growth” of almost two digits on a yearly basis.

What impressed most western (and Asian) governments and induced a growing (in)security perception over a possible future “Chinese hegemony” – at least in East Asia - wasn’t the growth per se, but how it was achieved, compressed and continuing to show signs of resilience, in spite of the financial crisis of 2008 and to the disappointment of the ever-p re s e n t “ C h i n a ’s i m m i n e n t collapse forecasters community”. China’s rise is one like no other in human history and everybody is lacking a “road map of past experience” to deal with it - including the Chinese government, which has opted out by a cautious and progressive approach.

H o w e v e r, t h i s a p p a r e n t l y unstoppable growth generated a side effect: it provided fodder to t h e a rg u m e n t t h a t C h i n a ’s developmental model may have more virtues than other models, e s p e c i a l l y f o r t h o s e l e s s developed countries (e.g. Beijing C o n s e n s u s v s Wa s h i n g t o n C o n s e n s u s d e b a t e ) a n d contributed to infuse a growing sense of pride and patriotism amongst the Chinese population.

The country is now seen by its population not as rising but as a returning power, trying to recover the self-perceived ancient glory and the status of the great power that she had until the mid-nineteen c e n t u r y , r i g h t b e f o r e t h e tremendous psychological shock that was the occupation of parts of its territory by foreign powers, the ensuing lost of sovereignty and the inescapable humiliation to the national psyche. A mix of “nationalism and GDPism” is the new ideology of China, and together they are the two pillars of the Chinese Communist Party legitimacy test.

T o s u m u p , t h e r e c e n t reconfiguration of the everlasting

China rise debate is not a novelty and can be understood as part of a cycle. What is relatively new is t h e c u m u l a t i v e a n d a c u t e (in)security perceptions in the region, derived from its amazing rising in such a short period of time, the anxiety resulting from its growing comprehensive national p o w e r , i t s i n c r e a s i n g assertiveness in terms of security i n t e r e s t s a n d a p a r t l y dysfunctional process between his security discourse and practice - strategically and operationally speak ing - espec ia l l y over maritime territorial disputes, a reflex of an internal conditional a p p e a s e m e n t p r o c e s s t o nationalistic forces.

One of the gravest concerns of political and military leaders in the United States and its allies in East Asia is the lack of clarity of China's long-term strategic objectives. Questions surrounding its peaceful rise, economic might, territorial expansion, military assertiveness and the questioning of US's prominence in the region are frequently shared by public officials and the military brass. And yet Beijing's foreign and security policy appears to be more predictable than most would assume. How certain can one be of China's strategic rat ionale and how could a c learer perception better influence policy-making with regards to China's rising power?

I agree with the fact that in terms of political rhetoric, China’s foreign and security policy has been almost pristine and with a high level of congruence - if you look at the principles in which it is based (five principles of peaceful c o e x i s t e n c e , n e w s e c u r i t y c o n c e p t , p e a c e f u l r i s e /development, harmonious world).

We saw in the last decade a growing internal debate between Chinese academia, ministries and military think tanks (and public opinion - thanks to internet 2.0 in spite of the “great firewall”) not over these principles (which are a result of a historically enduring and long term CCP political vision) but over how to make strategic and operational adjustments to the growing fluidity and security challenges of the international system, without compromising the political liturgy of such vision.

But this is “where the buck stops”, because China has not developed a kind of grand strategy, at least as we may define it in western thinking (some Chinese specialists defend that she has a grand

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strategy and other argue that she doesn’t).

I t has approved consensual guidelines (Harmonious World) which are not more than a generic Confucian recipe - paying lip service to her multi-millennial c i v i l i s a t i o n a n d i n h e r e n t gravitational force argument. Accordingly there is a gap between the “political vision” and the operational level. This gap may justify, partly, the lag (or the “lack of harmony”) between political rhetoric and some operational actions, especially between the positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affa i rs and the Min istry of Defence/PLA when both have to discuss and deal with security risks and challenges in the region.

This leads me to another but interlinked issue: strategic goals and military transparency.

When we talk about China’s strategic objectives and her interpretation of what should be u n d e r s t o o d a s m i l i t a r y transparency we face an uphill struggle if we try to define a minimum and common conceptual and criteria base between western and Japanese approaches and the Chinese one.

China has a dyadic interpretation over its own power and the risks and threats she faces – a kind of Janus approach – manipulating them for the sake of its own security interests but generating in the process a typical side effect: it p r o p e l s r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y misperceptions and feeds the classic security dilemma dynamic.

The first face results from the fact that the political and military elites portray China as a developing country (which is true in some components of what it defines as comprehensive national power) and argue that the US and its regional allies are overreacting to h e r m i l i t a r y m o d e r n i z a t i o n program, which, like its economy, has started from a low base.

China doesn’t possess (yet) the kind of capabilities, technologies and combat experience that the US Armed forces have and continue to develop and integrate operationally. This public display of a “self-perception of selective and relative military weakness” vis-à-vis the US is useful to justify t h e n e c e s s i t y t o b e “ l e s s

transparent” and not to follow the same military transparency criteria that western States and Japan are push ing her to adopt . The argument goes as “we need to maintain a level of relative secrecy if we want to preserve some kind of a trump card in case of an undesirable conflict with the US”.

In other words, China sees herself (intentionally or not – depending if she is applying a classical Sun Zi approach or not) as weaker than the US in terms of mil itary capabilities, so the almost surgical control of military information (in spite of the profusion of Chinese military enthusiasts’ blogs and official internet sites) over her real military capabilities is a tool she manipulates to create doubts and uncertainty and increase the perceived risks of US strategists and military planners in case of a mi l i ta ry act ion wi th Ch ina . Accordingly it continues to resist to western appeals of more military transparency (the National Defence White Papers are a good starting point but they are not enough) because for Chinese military strategists transparency is a tool of the strong, not for the weak.

The second Janus face is a product of different systems - not concepts - o f categor iz ing “threats”. Both see threats as a product of capabi l i t ies and intentions, but they put a distinct emphasis in each variable of the equation. The US gives more emphasis in its threat analysis to capabilities while China gives priority to intentions. As a result, whenever there is a China or US threat analysis scenario there is a self-feeding process of generating and incrementing the mutually misperceived sense of threat.

In sum, there is a “clash of threat ana lys is processes” , which contributes, along with other security features to continuously augment the regional security d i l e m m a a l t h o u g h u n d e r a framework of congruent Chinese fore ign and secur i ty pol icy principles.

H o w c a n t h i s “ c u r s e ” b e overcome? I believe that only through an extended and time consuming process of security dialogue and cooperation between China, the US and Asian states, which is, by the way, what China advocates.

I t takes pat ience . Wi l l the democracies be able to assume t h i s c h a l l e n g e a l b e i t t h e i r respective electoral cycles and policy changes? This is the real question we should ask ourselves.

Following the previous question, in security and defence studies, there has been an i n t e r e s t i n g d e b a t e r e g a r d i n g t h e implications of China's rise to East Asia and the world. This debate is fostered by the b e l i e f t h a t t h e A r m e d F o rc e s a re substantially developing their capabilities ( a i rc r a f t c a r r i e r, s t e a l t h fi g h t e r s , modernisation of infantry forces, investment in cyber-tech, and so forth). In apparent response to th is mi l i tary bui ld-up, Washington has announced its Asia pivot, is dev is ing a A i rSea Bat t le Concept , proceeding to reinforce some of its alliances in the region and a whole range of other measures. How important are these new capabi l i t ies and what is their significance to China's interests?

The People’s Liberation Army m o d e r n i z a t i o n p r o g r a m i s i m p r e s s i v e i n d e e d a n d i s generating increasing suspicion and distrust in Asia, making more acute the regional secur i ty dilemma (at least on strategic and operational grounds). But the fact is that in spite of these remarkable advances, especially in the last d e c a d e , t h e P L A r e m a i n s technologically and qualitatively inferior compared to the US Armed Forces as a whole and the Japanese Self Defence Forces in some niche capabilities. There is an asymmetrical relationship in terms of military capabilities and force projection which continues to favour US and his Asian allies. However, several security analysts and think tanks are paying great attention and sometimes became excessively alarmists when they address some of the PLA’s “crown jewels programs” such as the J-20, the aircraft carrier, the submarine and ballistic missiles research and development (R&D) and cyber warfare capabilities and operations (which the US also conducts, although only those exploited by China are advertised – mainly because Beijing don’t want to show his weakness both to domestic and foreign audiences in case of a successful cyber intrusion in his systems).

I would like to emphasize that is not wise to underrate these developments in force multipliers but I think it’s more important to put them in a more moderate

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context, at least for now.

First, some of these programs are, at least for now, a little more than “military hardware start ups projects”, which will take a decade to be incorporated and optimized operationally by the PLA (e.g. aircraft carrier, J-20). They are quite expensive and have a dual purpose: to demonstrate China’s indigenous state of the art military technology; and to reinforce an image of military prowess and prestige, proper of a great power status.

But, if we want to believe they will be “mass produced” then we need to take into account that in order to be synergistically and efficiently deployed it will be critically important to complement them with a “software dimension” (joint and continuous military training involving the platforms and their respective human operators). Even if this dimension is properly addressed, you never know how these platforms interact with each other, unless you have an enduring battle test experience where you are able to test them under real and intensive environments - which are quite different from the military exercises.

The US Armed Forces are the only ones who have this kind of extensive experience in research, developing and testing in combat all his military systems and technology, while comparatively the last and limited combat experience that the PLA had was in 1979 (with Vietnam) - which resulted in a set of mix and dubious results in terms of lessons learned. In other words, the PLA has been a “library-laboratory researcher approach” while US Armed Forces has a “library-laboratorial researcher and real wor ld pract i t ioner approach”.

S o , w e a r e s e e i n g C h i n a developing a “lib-lab approach” w i th severa l doc t r ina l and strategic vectors: PLA historic missions, active defence, “winning local wars under information age conditions”, and access denial.

All these conceptual and doctrinal developments have a strategic direction which is China maritime surroundings, especially what has been commonly called the first island chain. Beijing aims to gain naval and aerial superiority in this

area and in some specific and geographically limited points to obtain naval and air supremacy vis a vis US and Japanese armed forces. It’s a “mare nostrum” vision of maritime sovereignty with the aim of creating a buffer zone between US armed forces and continental China, especially his main trading cities and ports. According to this conceptualization the further you can engage and erode your adversary capabilities (between the second and first island chain) the more difficult will be for him to present a terrifying menace to these strategic cities and ports (and Taiwan of course).

Besides, and even in a worst case scenar io , Bei j ing knows as Washington does, that Chinese strategic deepness makes her a “sponge of missiles”, so even US concepts of “global prompt strike” and air-sea battle, although they should be understood as a necessary doctrinal evolution to face new strategic and operational situations, they have limitations if applied to China.

The great side effect is that, as I said before, because of China’s emphasis on intentions when she c o n d u c t s t h r e a t a n a l y s i s s c e n a r i o s , t h e s e A m e r i c a n c o n c e p t s a r e s e e n h a s d e m o n s t r a t i o n s o f a c l e a r containment purpose, because from Beijing’s point of view US military capabilities are (still) unrivalled. Washington sees this dynamic under a different light, interpreting Chinese increase in military capabilities as a reflex of no t so peacefu l i n ten t ions (because of maritime disputes and Taiwan), in spite of the political rhetoric surrounding China’s peaceful rising and development.

I believe that, for now, Washington main purpose is to send a clear message of deterrence - not containment - of Beijing intentions concerning maritime disputes and Taiwan reunification, supporting and providing further assurance and credibility to the American commitment towards their Asian allies and their territorial disputes with Beijing. So the Asian pivot concept is a contemporary evolution of a US profile of continuity in the region (the hub and spokes).

To sum up, we are witnessing a double hedging game between China and US: each cooperating with each other when they can and deterring the other when they should.”

“Interview with Alexandre Carriço - Part I” (Tiago Mauricio -

JFPO).

[10]

“GSDF ranger unit marches through central Tokyo”

“Self Defense Force troops march through Tokyo neighborhoods”

“Ishihara presses on in bid for Senkakus”

“Japanese lawmakers continue to push against China for Senkaku Islands acquisition”

“Japanese elite forces march through central Tokyo”

“Armed GSDF troops march through Tokyo's urban areas for drill”

“Japan, China agree to deal with sensitive issues calmly”

“Lawmakers push Japan to get tough on isle dispute”

“Japan falls to fifth in peace ranking”

“Noda keen to visit Futenma relocation site”

“Clinton to visit Japan for Afghan conference on postconflict progress”

“Document confirms Chinese firm sold missile transport vehicles to N. Korea”

“North Korean missile launchers came from China: reports”

“Ishihara delivers blistering attack on Senkaku issue in Diet”

“U.N. optimistic on U.S. aid for North Korea, food still a problem”

“Ospreys add to Okinawa grievances”

“Joint naval exercise to be held by Japan, United States, South Korea”

“U.S. Osprey crashes in Florida; five hurt”“Trilateral drill raises concerns over regional

stability”

“US, S.Korea, Japan to hold joint drill”

“Japanese warships call at Kochi”

“U.S., S. Korea, Japan to have joint naval exercise”

“Agent Orange at base in '80s: U.S. vet”

“U.S., S. Korea, Japan set for joint drill”

“Stage set for first Noda-Putin meet”

“Govt suspends Osprey aircraft deployment”

“U.S. sticking to script on Ospreys, despite new crash”

JAPAN NEWS CLIPS

“JFPO's New Member - Aleksandra Babovic” by JFPO

“Aleksandra Babovic's Profile” by JFPO

“The 2012 Tokyo SDF's Military March” by Rui Faro Saraiva

“Explaining the AirSea Battle Concept?” by Tiago Maurício

“Can International Law Help the Resolution of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute?” by Aleksandra Babovic

“Interview with Alexandre Carriço - Part I” by Tiago Maurício

On our website this

week

EAST ASIAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE DIGESTEditor: TIAGO MAURICIOEditor’s Mailbox: mauricio.tiago.47x(at)st.kyoto-u.ac.jpKyoto, Japan

East Asia Security and Defence Digest covers expert analysis and news highlights on East Asian Security and Defence Affairs.

The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of JFPO.

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