Trias v. Araneta15 SCRA 241

DOCTRINE: Sellers of land may validly impose reasonable easements and restrictions as conditions for contracts of sales; the same may not be overturned by courts merely on the ground that it impacts dominical rights. FACTS:JM Tuason and Co. owned a piece of land that was part of a subdivision. Thru broker Araneta Inc (of Araneta Coliseum fame), this civic-minded company sold the land to Mr Lopez with the condition that said lot should never be used to erect a factory. This imposition was annotated to the TCT.A series of transfers and conveyances later, the lot ended up in the hands of the gorgeous Ms. Rafael Trias. She was dismayed with the annotation that stated 5. That no factories be permitted in this section.

Ms. Trias felt that the annotation impaired her dominical rights and therefore illegal and existed as mere surplusage since existing zoning regulations already prevented the erection of factories in the vicinity. Worse, the annotation possibly hindered her plans to obtain a loan. She accordingly raised the issue to the court and received relief.

Later on, Gregorio Araneta moved for reconsideration stating that the imposition resulted from a valid sales transaction between her predecessors in interest. He alleged that the court held no authority to overrule such valid easement and impaired the right to contract. ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition was valid. HELD:The imposition was valid. The prohibition is an easement validly imposed under art 594 which provides that every owner of a piece of land may establish easements he deems suitable xxx and not in contravention to the law, public policy and public order

The court ruled that the easement existed to safeguard the peace and quiet of neighboring residents. The intention is noble and the objectives benign. In the absence of a clash with public policy, the easement may not be eroded.

The contention of surplusage is also immaterial. Zoning regulations may be repealed anytime, allowing the erection of factories. With the annotation, at the very least, the original intent to bar factories remains binding.

ORTIGAS v. FEATI BANK

Facts:Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA, Mandaluyong, Rizal.On March 4, 1952, plaintiff entered into separate agreements of sale with Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles over 2 parcels of land (Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision). On July 19, 1962 the vendees transferred their rights and interests over the said lots to Emma Chavez. The plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez upon payment of the purchase price. Both the agreements and the deeds of sale thereafter executed contained the stipulation that the parcels of land subject of the deeds of sale shall be used by the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes. The restrictions were later annotated in the Transfer Certificates of Titles covering the said lots issued in the name of Chavez.Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots No. 5 and 6 with the building restrictions also annotated in their corresponding TCTs. Lot No.5 was bought directly from Chavez free from all liens and encumbrances while Lot No.6 was acquired through a Deed of Exchange from Republic Flour Mills.Plaintiff claims that the restrictions were imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and development of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of its big landed estate where commercial and industrial sites are also designated or established.Defendant maintains that the area along the western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River, has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per ResolutionNo.27of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong. It alleges that plaintiff completely sold and transferred to third persons all lots in said subdivision facing EDSA and the subject lots thereunder were acquired by it only on June 23, 1962 or more than 2 years after the area xxx had been declared a commercial and industrial zone.On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began construction of a building devoted to banking purposes but which it claims could also be used exclusively for residential purposes. The following day, the plaintiff demanded in writing that the construction of the commercial building be stopped but the defendant refused to comply contending that the construction was in accordance with the zoning regulations.Issues:1. Whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power.2. Whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee.Held:1. Yes. The validity of ResolutionNo.27was never questioned. In fact, it was impliedly admitted in the stipulation of facts, when plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the same. Having admitted the validity of the subject resolution, plaintiff-appellant cannot now change its position on appeal.However, assuming that it is not yet too late to question the validity of the said resolution, the posture is unsustainable.Municipalities are empowered by law through Sec.3 of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) to to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the municipality. The law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that ResolutionNo.27is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment of the word regulation under the provision.An examination ofSec.12of the same law reveals that the implied power of a municipality should be liberally construed in its favor and that any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist. An exception to the general welfare powers delegated to municipalities is when the exercise of its powers will conflict with vested rights arising from contracts. The exception does not apply to the case at bar.2. While non-impairment of contacts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. Invariably described as the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers and the greatest and most powerful attribute of government, the exercise of police power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.ResolutionNo.27, S-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial or commercial zone was passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong in the exercise of police power to safeguard/promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. EDSA supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution which are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. The Municipality of Mandaluyong was reasonably justified under the circumstances in passing the subject resolution.Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons may be subjected to all kinds of restraint and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state, and to this fundamental aim of the Government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.

REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC.,petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and CRISPIN E. LAT,respondents.francisD E C I S I O NBELLOSILLO,J.:REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. (REMMAN), and CRISPIN E. LAT are adjoining landowners inBarangay Bugtong Na Pulo,Lipa City. The land of Lat containing an area of 1.8 hectares is agricultural and planted mostly with fruit trees while REMMAN occupies a land area of fifteen (15) hectares six (6) hectares of which are devoted to its piggery business. REMMAN's land is one and a half (1) meters higher in elevation than that of respondent Lat.Sometime in July 1984 Lat noticed that REMMAN's waste disposal lagoon was already overflowing and inundating one-fourth (1/4) of Lat's plantation. He made several representations with REMMAN but they fell on deaf ears. On 14 March 1985, after almost one (1) hectare of Lat's plantation was already inundated with water containing pig manure, as a result of which the trees growing on the flooded portion started to wither and die, Lat filed a complaint for damages with preliminary mandatory injunction against REMMAN. Lat alleged that the acidity of the soil in his plantation increased because of the overflow of the water heavy with pig manure from REMMAN's piggery farm.REMMAN denied all the allegations of Lat and raised as an affirmative defense that measures such as the construction of additional lagoons were already adopted to contain the waste water coming from its piggery to prevent any damage to the adjoining estates.After conducting an ocular inspection and evaluating the evidence of both parties the Regional Trial Court found that indeed REMMANs waste disposal lagoon overflowed with the contaminated water flooding one (1) hectare of Lat's plantation. The waste water was ankle-deep and caused death and destruction to one (1) jackfruit tree, fifteen (15) coconut trees, one hundred twenty-two (122) coffee trees, and an unspecified number of mango trees, bananas and vegetables. As a consequence, the trial court ordered REMMAN to indemnify LatP186,975.00 for lost profits for three (3) crop years andP30,000.00 as attorney's fees.[1]marieThe decision of the courta quowas affirmedin totoby the Court of Appeals.[2]In thisPetition for Review on CertiorariREMMAN prays that we pass upon the findings of the trial court as well as of the appellate court. REMMAN insists that factual findings of lower courts may be passed upon, reviewed and reversed: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (f) when the conclusions of the Court of Appeals are not supported by the evidence on record; (g) when facts of substance were overlooked which, if correctly considered, might have changed the outcome of the case; and, (h) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are not in accord with what reasonable men would readily accept are the correct inferences from the evidence extant in the records.[3]Indeed, in the abovementioned instances, the factual milieu of a particular case may be passed upon, reversed or modified by this Court. But examination of the record reveals that all the above instances are unavailing. From this point of view alone the instant petition is dismissible. Nevertheless, we shall discuss them hereunder to dispose finally of the contentions of REMMAN.First,REMMAN argues that its liability for the damages suffered by Lat was not clearly established.We disagree. During the ocular inspection conducted by the lower court where representatives of both parties were present, it was established that the waste water containing pig manure was continuously flowing from REMMAN's piggery farm to Lat's plantation. The water was ankle-deep and flooded one (1) hectare of Lat's plantation. The overflow of the "acidic, malodorous and polluted water" continued from June 1984 to March 1985 thus destroying one (1) jackfruit tree, fifteen (15) coconut trees, one hundred an twenty-two (122) coffee trees, and an unspecified number of mango trees, bananas and vegetables.[4]In addition, the appellate court found that there was indeed negligence on the part of REMMAN which directly caused the damage to the plantation of Lat. Thus -noverox x x Negligence was clearly established. It is uncontroverted that the land of appellee was flooded on account of the overflow of acidic, malodorous and polluted water coming from the adjacent piggery farm of appellant sometime in May 1984. This resulted in the impairment of the productivity of appellee's land as well as the eventual destruction and death of several fruit trees, such as coconuts, coffee, jackfruits, bananas and other plants x x x x Appellant cannot avoid liability because their negligence was the proximate cause of the damage. Appellee's property was practically made a catch-basin of polluted water and other noxious substances emptying from appellant's piggery which could have been prevented had it not been for the negligence of appellant arising from its: (a) failure to monitor the increases in the level of water in the lagoons before, during and after the heavy downpours which occurred during the rainy months of 1984; (b) failure to augment the existing lagoons prior to the incident, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the flooding, the piggery had grown to a capacity of 11,000 heads, and considering that it was reasonably forseeable that the existing waste disposal facilities were no longer adequate to accomodate the increasing volume of waste matters in such a big farm; and more importantly, (c) the repeated failure to comply with their promise to appellee.[5]Second,REMMAN argues that the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals should not have rejected its request for the production of Lat's income tax returns. According to REMMAN had Lat's income tax returns been produced, the issue of the alleged damages suffered by Lat would have been settled.This argument is moot, if not trite. For this matter has been laid to rest when we affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in an earlier case involving the same parties.[6]In sustaining the trial court's quashal of the subpoenaduces tecumpreviously issued compelling Lat to produce his income tax returns for the years 1982-1986, the appellate court explained that the production of the income tax returns would not necessarily serve to prove the special and affirmative defenses set up by REMMAN nor rebut Lat's testimony regarding the losses he sustained due to the piggery. The tax returnsper secould not reflect the total amount of damages suffered by Lat, as income losses from a portion of the plantation could be offset by any profit derived from the rest of the plantation or from other sources of income. Conversely, losses incurred from other sources of income would be totally unrelated to the income from the particular portion of the plantation flooded with waste matter coming from REMMAN's piggery.[7]Third, REMMAN contends that the damages allegedly sustained by Lat have not been satisfactorily established.nigelWe a not convinced. The factual findings of the courta quorightly support its conclusions on this respect -Coming now to the issue of damages, We find appellant's allegations not well-taken. Appellant contends that actual and compensatory damages require evidentiary proof, and there being no evidence presented as to the necessity of the award for damages, it was erroneous for the lower court to have made such award. It must be remembered that after the ocular inspection, the court a quo rendered an inventory of dead and rotten trees and plants found in appellee's property. Appellee also testified on the approximate annual harvest and fair market value thereof. Significantly, no opposition or controverting evidence was presented by appellant on the matter. Hence, appellant is bound thereby and cannot now be heard to complain. As correctly held by the court a quo:An ocular inspection has been conducted by the trial court. The inventory of the trees damaged and the itemized valuation placed therein by private respondent after the ocular inspection which is not rebutted by the petitioner, is the more accurate indicator of the said amount prayed for as damages. If the valuation is indeed unreasonable, petitioner should present controverting evidence of the fair market value of the crops involved. The trial court held that the private respondent himself had been subjected to extensive cross and re-cross examination by the counsel for the petitioner on the amount of damages.[8]Finally,REMMAN complains that the damages, if any, were due to a fortuitous event.Again cannot agree with petitioner. We defer instead to the findings opinions expressed by the lower courts -Even assuming that the heavy rains constituted an act of God, by reason of their negligence, the fortuitous event became humanized, rendering appellants liable for the ensuing damages. InNational Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals,233 SCRA 649 (1993), the Supreme Court held:ellaAccordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by private respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. This event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human factor - negligence or imprudence - had intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.As regards the alleged natural easement imposed upon the property of appellee, resort to pertinent provisions of applicable law is imperative. Under the Civil Code, it is provided:Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry with them.The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase the burden.A similar provision is found in the Water Code of the Philippines (P.D. No.1067), which provides:Art. 50. Lower estates are obliged to receive the water which naturally and without the intervention of man flow from the higher estates, as well as the stone or earth which they carry with them.The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this natural flow, unless he provides an alternative method of drainage; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase this natural flow.marinellaAs worded, the two (2) aforecited provisions impose a natural easement upon the lower estate to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from higher states. However, where the waters which flow from a higher state are those which are artificially collected in man-made lagoons, any damage occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower or servient estate to compensation.[9]On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it is crystal clear that REMMAN is directly accountable to Lat for the damages sustained by him. The negligence of REMMAN in maintaining the level of waste water in its lagoons has been satisfactorily established. The extent of damages suffered by Lat remains unrebutted; in fact, has been proved.

RELOVA v. LAVAREZ- Easement and Servitude

The enjoyment of the plaintiff of an easement for the maintenance of an irrigation aqueduct and a dam on the lands of defendant for a period of more than 20 years confers title thereto upon the plaintiff by virtue of prescription and burdens the lands of the defendants with a corresponding servitude.

FACTS: The plaintiff is the owner of a tract of rice land which is cultivated with the aid of water brought from a river through an aqueduct which passes over the land of the defendants. This was by virtue of an easement the use of which had been with the plaintiff for more than thirty years. On the land of the defendants there was a dam with a small gate or aperture in its face which was used to control the flow of the water in the aqueduct, by permitting a greater or less quantity to escape in a drainage ditch, also on the land of the defendants.

One of the defendants completely destroyed the dam and let all the water escape by the drainage ditch, so that none flowed on the land of the plaintiff. At the time when the dam was destroyed the plaintiff had some five cavanes of land prepared to plant rice, but because of the escape of the water resulting from the destruction of the dam he was unable to raise his crop. Defendants claim that the plaintiff is not the owner of any lands watered by the aqueduct of the class known as padagat (rice lands planted in May). It was also alleged that the plaintiff suffered no damage by the destruction of the dam, because all the lands of plaintiff which are cultivated with the aid of water from the aqueduct are of the class known as binanbang (rice lands planted in August or September), and the destruction of the dam in May and the consequent failure of water in the aqueduct at that period did not, and could not, damage the plaintiff or interfere with the proper cultivation of his lands.

Lastly, defendants say that that the evidence on record does not establish the existence of the servitude in the lands of the defendants in favor of the lands of the plaintiff landowner for the maintenance of the aqueduct and dam in question.

ISSUE:Whether or not there was a valid servitude between the parties.

HELD:Save for the issue on the existence of the servitude, all other allegations of defendants were outrightly disregarded as they were clearly unmeritorious in light of the findings of fact. However, the Court ruled that there was a valid easement in light of the fact that the aqueduct and the dam had been in existence for more than 30 years, during which time the plaintif had exercised its use. It was alleged that no benefit was granted to the plaintiff since his (plaintiff's) land is situated higher than defendants' land. Moreover, even if defendants had the right to open the gates of the dam to prevent destructive overflow upon their land, this does not give them the right to stop the flow of water altogether.

In this case the servient estate was the higher one.

Valisno v. Adriano161 SCRA 398

DOCTRINE: Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance

FACTS: Plaintiff Valisno file against the Defendant Adriano an action for damages. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija. Plaintiff bought the land from the defendants sister, Honorata. Both parcels of land had been inherited by defendant and her sister from their father. At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal about 70 meters long, traversing the appellee's land. Adriano levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Valisno was deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land. Plaintiff Adriano filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a complaint for deprivation of water rights. A decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant asked for a reinvestigation of the case and was granted. Meanwhile, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense because of urgency. He also filed a complaint for damages in the CFI against respondent. Defendant Adriano claims that he merely allowed his sister to use his water rights when she still owned the adjacent land. According to the appellant, the water right was the primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property would be unproductive. ISSUE: WON the water rights pass with the conveyance of the land. -- YES HELD:Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person. The fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does detract from its permanency as property right, which survives the determination of the necessity. As an easement of waters in favor of the plaintiff has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference such as the appellee's act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.

Case Digest on NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)Plaintiff National Power Corporation (Napocor), for the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, its lines have to pass the lands belonging to respondents Matias Cruz, heirs of Natalie Paule and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Recardo Malit. Unsuccessful with its negotiations for the acquisition of the right of way easements, Napocor was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings. Trial courts ordered that the defendant spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed provisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00 deposited by the plaintiff to cover the provisional value of the land to proceed their construction and for the purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due the defendants, the court appointed three commissioners, comprised of one representative of the plaintiff, one for the defendants and the other from the court, who then were empowered to receive evidence, conduct ocular inspection of the premises, and thereafter, prepare their appraisals as to the fair and just compensation to be paid to the owners of the lots. The lower court rendered judgement ordered Napocor to pay defendant spouses the sum of P10.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable compensation for the right-of-way easement of the affected area and P800.00 as attorney's fees'. Napocor filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the Court of Appeals committed gross error by adjudging the petitioner liable for the payment of the full market value of the land traversed by its transmission lines, and that it overlooks the undeniable fact that a simple right-of-way easemen transmits no rights, except that of the easement. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed by its transmission lines. RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that "Normally, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of the title to, and possession of, the expropriated property, but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of title or possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way." In this case, the easement is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the transmission lines, the limitations imposed by the NPC against the use of the land (that no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed below the lines) for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation which should neither be more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just equivalent has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The price or value of the land and its character at the time of taking by the Govt. are the criteria for determining just compensation.

Costabella Corp. v. CA193 SCRA 333

DOCTRINE:An easement of right of way is discontinuous and as such cannot be acquired by prescription. Convenience of the dominant estate is not a gauge for the grant of compulsary right of way.

While a right of way is legally demandable, the owner of the dominant estate is not at liberty to impose one based on arbitrary choice. Under Article 650 of the Code, it shall be established upon two criteria: (1) at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (2) where the distance to a public highway may be the shortest.

FACTS: Petitioners owned a lot wherein they started constructing their beach hotel. Before such construction, the private respondent, in going to and from their respective properties and the provincial road, passed through a passageway, which traversed the petitioners property. As a result of the construction, this passageway, including the alternative route, was obstructed. Private respondent filed for injunction plus damages. In the same complaint the private respondents also alleged that the petitioner had constructed a dike on the beach fronting the latters property without the necessary permit, obstructing the passage of the residents and local fishermen, and trapping debris of flotsam on the beach. The private respondent also claim that they have acquired the right of way through prescription. They prayed for the re-opening of the ancient road right of way (what they called the supposed easement in this case) and the destruction of the dike. Petitioner answered by saying that their predecessor in interests act of allowing them to pass was gratuitous and in fact, they were just tolerating the use of the private respondents. CA ruled in favor of the private respondents.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not easement of right and way can be acquired through prescription? -- NO2. Whether or not the private respondents had acquired an easement of right of way in the form of a passageway, on the petitioners property? -- NO HELD:1. Easement of right of way is discontinuous thus it cannot be subject to acquisitive prescription.

2. One may validly claim an easement of right of way when he has proven the: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at point least prejudicial to the servient estate. The private respondent failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their respective properties to a public highway; in fact the lower court confirmed that there is another outlet for the private respondents to the main road (yet they ruled in favor of the private respondents).

Apparently, the CA lost sight of the fact that the convenience of the dominant estate was never a gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. There must be a real necessity and not mere convenience for the dominant estate to acquire such easement. Also, the private respondents made no mention of their intention to indemnify the petitioners. The SC also clarified that least prejudicial prevails over shortest distance (so shortest distance isnt necessarily the best choice).

EDWIN CASE,petitioner-appellant,vs.THE HEIRS OF TUASON Y SANTIBAEZ,opponents-appellees.Hartigan and Rohde, and Roman Lacson for appellant.Rosado, Sanz and Opisso for appellees.TORRES,J.:On the 7th of December, 1906, the attorneys for Edwin Case filed a petition with the Court of Land Registration requesting that the property owned by the applicant, described in the petition, be registered in accordance with the provisions of Land Registration Act. After a written opposition was presented by Felipe R. Caballero on the 6th of June, 1907, on behalf of the heirs of late Pablo Tuason and Leocadia Santibaez, counsel for the applicant, Case, on August 2, 1907, amended the original petition and set forth: that said property, situated in Calle Escolta, district of Binondo, consists of a parcel of land and the building erected thereon bearing Nos. 142 and 152; it is bounded on the northwest, approximately, by the estero of Santa Cruz and the property of Carmen de Ayala de Roxas; on the southeast by the River Pasig; on the southwest by the property of the heirs of Tuason and Santibaez; and on the northwest by Calle Escolta and the aforesaid property of Carmen de Ayala de Roxas; that the total area is 3,251.84 square meters, its description and boundaries being detailed in the plan attached to the petition; that according to the last assessment made for the purposes of taxation the land was valued at P170,231 and the buildings thereon at P30,000; that the property is free from all incumbrance, and no one has any interest therein or right thereto; that on the northeast side the property has in its favor the right of easement over some 234.20 square meters of land owned by the said Ayala de Roxas, and that the applicant acquired the property by succession from Doa Clotilde Romree.In the written opposition above alluded to, counsel for the heirs of Pablo Tuason and Leocadia Santibaez alleged that the parties whom he represents are owners in common of the property adjoining that of the petitioner on the southwest; that the latter, in making the plan attached to his petition, extended his southwest boundary line to a portion of the lot of the said heirs of Tuason and Santibaez in the form indicated by the red line in the annexed plan; that the true dividing line between the property of the petitioner and that of the said heirs is the walls indicated in black ink on the accompanying plan; that said walls belong to the opponents, and that about two years ago, when the applicant made alterations in the buildings erected on his land, he improperly caused a portion of them to rest on the wall owned by the parties whom he represents, at point 12, 13, and 14 of said plan; for which reason the opponent prayed the court to direct the applicant to amend the line marked in his plan with the letters Y, X, U, T, S, and R, so that it may agree with the wall indicated by the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 on the plan which accompanies the written opposition, reducing the area to whatever it may be after the amendment has been made; that the applicant be compelled to remove the supports that he placed for his buildings on the wall of the representatives of the petitioner, and that he be sentenced to pay the costs.The case was brought to trial, both parties adduced evidence, and their exhibits were made of record. The court, assisted by the interested parties and their respective experts, made an inspection of the two properties, in view of which it entered judgment on the 31st of July, 1908, sustaining the opposition offered by the representative of the heirs of Pablo Tuason Leocadia Santibaez, and after declaring a general default granted the registration of the property described in the application filed by Edwin Case, with the exclusion of the wall claimed by the opponents and shown on their plan by the lines numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14; and in view of the fact that the lines drawn on the plan offered in evidence by the applicant under letter G are not correctly drawn, once this decision shall have become final, let the dividing line of both properties be fixed by common accord between the two parties and their experts, taking as a base for the same the amended line of walls drawn on the plan of the opponents, but should they not reach an agreement a surveyor of the Court of Land Registration shall be detailed to fix the same at the expense of the parties; the court also ordered the cancellation of the registration entries of the property entered in the name of Clotilde Romree, principal of the petitioner, at page 142 and those following of volume 15, section of Binondo and 52 of the register, property No. 828, first entry.On the 12th of August, 1908, the petitioner moved for a new trial on the ground that the evidence was not sufficient to justify the decision of the court in excluding the wall claimed by the opponents; that said decision was contrary to the law, in so far as it excludes the said wall, and that the conclusions of fact therein are openly and manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence in so far as they referred to the exclusion of said wall. The said motion was overruled on the 15th of same month, to which overruling the applicant excepted and announced his intention to perfect the corresponding bill of exceptions which was filed, approved, and submitted to this court together with the proper assignment of errors.In the appeal interposed by the applicant against the decision of the Court of Land Registration, now before this court, the questions set up are merely of fact.The question is whether the wall that with slight interruption runs from Calle Escolta to the River Pasig, and which divides the adjoining properties of the applicant, Edwin Case, and of the opponents, belongs to the former, as he claimed in the first instance, or is a dividing wall as affirmed in his brief in this second instance, or is the property of the said opponents, the heirs of the late Tuason and Santibaez.lawphi1.netThe trial court after considering the evidence adduced by both parties to the suit, found that the wall in controversy belongs to the opponents for the reason, among others, that in the public document by which one of their original ancestors acquired on the 19th of April, 1796, the property now possessed by them, it appears that property was then already inclosed by a stone wall. This document, which was offered in evidence by the opponents, has not been impugned by the applicant. On the contrary, it was acknowledge as the title deed of the property adjoining that of the applicant by the witness Juan B. Tuason, who knows the one and the other.It is fully proven that two walls extend from Calle Escolta to the interior of both properties, the one backing the other, and which respectively support the edifices of the petitioner and of the opponents from points 36, 35, 34, 33, 32, 31, and 30 on the plan of the petitioner corresponding to points 1 to 6 on that of the opponents.This section of the wall of the opponents embraced within the points mentioned in the plans offered in evidence by the parties, for very reason that it supports only the property of the opponents and not that of the petitioner, can not be a party wall, one-half of which along its entire length would belong to the adjoining building owned by Mr. Case. There is not sufficient proof to sustain such claim, and besides, the building erected thereon disproves the pretension of the petitioner.It should, however, be noted that the portion of the wall between the numbers 3, 4, 5, and 6 on the plan of the opponents, which corresponds to numbers 33, 32, 31, and 30 of that of the petitioner, and which constitutes the cesspool on the property of the latter, belongs to him, and it has so been admitted by counsel for the opponents, for the reason that the petitioner had acquired it by prescription, the opponents having lost control over the area of land covered by the said cesspool together with the walls that inclose it.Under article 572 of the Civil Code the easement of party walls is presumed, unless there is a title or exterior sign, or proof to the contrary, among others, in dividing walls adjoining buildings up to the common point of elevation.The legal presumption as to party walls is limited to the three cases dealt with in the said article of the code, and is that ofjuris tantumunless the contrary appear from the title of ownership of the adjoining properties, that is to say, that the entire wall in controversy belongs to one of the property owners, or where there is no exterior sign to destroy such presumption and support a presumption against the party wall.lawphi1.net(Art. 573, Civil Code.)The intermediate portion of the walls in question, lying between numbers 6 and 13 on the defendants' plan, equivalent to a little more than numbers 30 to 25 on the plan of the petitioner, is the portion against which no other wall appears to have been erected on the land owned by Mr. Case. In spite of this it can not be presumed that the aforesaid portion was a party wall, and that it was not exclusively owned by the defendants, inasmuch as the latter have proven by means of a good title that has not been impugned by the petitioner, that when one of their ancestors and principals acquired the property the lot was already inclosed by the wall on which the building was erected; it must therefore be understood that in the purchase of the property the wall by which the land was inclosed was necessarily included.The above documentary evidence has not been overcome by any other presented by the petitioner, but apart from that record discloses the existence of certain unquestionable signs. These consist of constructions made by the petitioner himself on his own property which entirely destroy any presumption that it is a party wall, and indeed gives rise to a presumption against it.Three openings have been made in the wall , undoubtedly to allow the passage of air and light. Two of them are beveled on the side toward the land of the objectors, and the third has recently been beveled on the other. A rafter or lintel was found imbedded in the wall on the side of the property of the opponents. These things constitute exterior signs and were recorded as the result of personal inspection by the trial court in company with the experts of both parties. These signs positively and conclusively prove that the said wall is not a party wall, but the exclusive property of the defendant. This is further confirmed by the testimony of the witnesses at the trial.The fact that the petitioner built a wall and backed it against the one in question to support the edifice he had constructed between points 21 and 13 of the corrected plan is a further indication that the neighboring wall is not a party one. He knew perfectly well that he had no right to rest his building on the latter. That he built a terrace about four years previously over the wall between points 30, 29, 28, and 27 does not prove that the whole of the wall, from the Escolta to the River Pasig, is a party wall, but it does show that he usurped a portion thereof to the prejudice of the real owner.Neither can it be presumed that that part of the wall bordering on the River Pasig comprised between points 13 and 14 is a party wall. It was shown in the proceedings as resulting from the above-mentioned ocular inspection that the side of the said wall, which is rather a low one, there is another, a higher one erected on the petitioner's land and backed against the one in question. The first one, as has been said, forms part of that which has surrounded the property from the date of its acquisition, more than a century ago, until the present date. It is absolutely independent of that built by the petitioner, and that it is the exclusive property of the objectors and is not a party wall can not be denied.It therefore appears from the proceedings that, with the exception of the small portion of the wall in question occupied by the latrine on the property of the petitioner, and which the opponents admit that he has acquired by prescription, the whole of said wall from the Escolta to the River Pasig can not be presumed to be a party wall; the evidence to the contrary conclusively proves that it belonged exclusively to the defendants, and it has been further shown in the case that at one time an old building belonging to the opponents used to rest on a portion of the wall near the river.lawphi1.netIn view of the foregoing, and considering that the judgment appealed from is in accordance with the law and the merits of the case, it is our opinion that the same should be affirmed in full, as we do hereby affirm it, with the costs against the petitioner. So ordered.VALENZUELA VS UNSON32 PHIL 19 OCTOBER 20, 1915

PONENTE: Johnson, J.:

FACTS: On December 11, 1912, the plaintiffs presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of 34 parcels of land in Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna. With such, respondents Pedro Unson and Felix Unson presented their opposition to the registration of a portion of lot No. 1 which portion is known as lot No. 1-A, representing a stone wall, simply, constructed between lot No. 1 and the lot belonging to the said objectors. This wall extends from the street running in front of the lots owned by the plaintiffs and defendants, between said lots, for a distance of about thirty meters. It is about 38 centimeters wide and separates the lots claimed by the parties. At intervals along the wall, there are buttresses, which are constructed on both sides of the wall. About midway between the street and the rear end of the lots, resting on the wall, there is a kitchen belonging to the defendants which is about forty years old. About 8 meters from the street there is a cross wall, on the property of the plaintiff, which is joined to the wall in question. Along the street and in front of the lots, there is a sidewalk which is in front of the properties wherein it divides on the plaintiffs side of the wall. The wall appears to have been built as one wall. The plaintiffs attempt to show, in support of their claim of ownership of the wall that the kitchen referred to above was built so as to rest upon the wall, by the express permission given by them to the objectors, or their predecessors. That fact is strongly denied by the objectors. They claim that the kitchen was built without permission and without the objection on the part of the plaintiffs. Later a motion for a rehearing was made by the petitioners. Upon a consideration of said motion, the lower court, on the 15th day of December, 1913, modified that part of its first decision relating to lot No. 1-A, and declared that the same was a party wall. The lower court did not decree the registration of the wall. From the decision the objectors appealed to this court. The petitioners did not appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said wall belongs to the petitioners and registrable in their name.

HELD: No. Article 572 of the civil code states that When there is no title or exterior marks or proofs to the contrary, there is a presumption that a dividing wall between two adjoining properties is a party wall. Considering the fact that both parties have used the wall for the purpose of supporting the structures on their respective lots, that the plaintiffs have a wall joined to the wall in question and that they and the defendants have used as a partial support for the kitchen, and considering the conflicting character of the testimony with respect to ownership of the wall, we are of opinion that the said wall is a party wall that it belongs to the petitioners and objectors jointly. One of two or more joint owners of land cannot have the same registered against the opposition of the other joint owners.

DECISION: The judgment of lower court be affirmed without any finding as to costs, so ordered.

Cortes v. Yu-Tibo2 Phil. 24

DOCTRINE: An easement of light and view is a negative easement. When easement is negative, there should be a formal act of opposition for prescription to run. FACTS:Cortes wife owns a house (No. 65) in which certain windows open on the adjacent property (No. 63), a neighboring house on the same street. This setting has been in existent since 1843. The tenant of the adjacent property raised the roof of house No. 63 in such a manner that half of the windows of house No. 65 has been covered, thus depriving it of a large part of air and light. Plaintiff contends that by the constant and uninterrupted use of the windows for 59 years, he acquired from prescription an easement of light in favor of house No. 65, and as a servitude upon house No. 63. Consequently, he has acquired the right to restrain the making of any improvement in the latter house which may be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the easement. Further, he contends that the easement of light is positive; and that therefore the period of possession for the purposes of the acquisition of a prescriptive title is to begin from the date on which the enjoyment of the same commenced, or, in other words, from the time that said windows were opened with the knowledge of the owner of the house No. 63, and without opposition on this part. Defendant contends that the easement is negative, and therefore the time for the prescriptive acquisition must begin from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate may have prohibited, by a formal act, the owner of the servient estate from doing something which would be lawful but for the existence of the easement. Lower court ruled in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff appealed the case. ISSUE:WON the easement is positive/negative HELD:Easement is negative. The easement of light which is the object of this litigation is of a negative character, and therefore pertains to the class which cannot be acquired by prescription as provided by article 538 of the Civil Code, except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate has, in a formal manner, forbidden the owner of the servient estate to do an act which would be lawful were it not for the easement. In consequence, the plaintiff, not having executed any formal act of opposition to the right of the owner of house No. 63 to make improvements which might obstruct the light of house No. 65, at any time prior to the complaint, has not acquired, nor could he acquire by prescription, such easement of light, no matter how long a time have elapsed. Because the period which the law demands for such prescriptive acquisition could not have commenced to run, the act with which it must necessarily commence not having been performed.

Ruling 2 -GENERAL RULE: No part owner can, without the consent of the other, make in a party wall a window or opening of any kind (Art. 580) The very fact of making such opening in such a wall may be the basis for acquisition of a prescriptive title without the necessity of any active opposition because it always presupposes the express or implied consent of the owner of the wall, which in time, implies a voluntary waiver of the right to oppose.EXCEPTION: When the windows are not opened on the neighbor's side, there is need of a prohibition from exercising that neighbor's right to build on his land or cover the closed window on the party wall. The period of prescription starts to run from such prohibition if the neighbor consents to it. Note: The law refers to all kinds of windows, even regulation windows. According to article 528, windows with "similar projections" include sheds. The exception applies in this case because1) what is concerned is a party wall;2) there was no prohibition on Yu-Tibo to build anything that would cover the Cortes' window (Yu-Tibo wanted to raise his roof which would in effect cover 1/2 of the window).

AMOR v. FLORENTINO- Easement

FACTS:Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin (warehouse). By a will, she transferred the house to Jose Florentino and the warehouse to Maria Florentino. Maria sold the warehouse to Amor. Amor then demolished the old warehouse in order to build a new 2-storey structure. The problem is it will shut off the light and air that come in through the window of the adjacent house owned by Jose. Hence the latter files for prohibition claiming there is a negative easement prohibiting Amor from constructing any structure at any height that would block the window. Amor counters that there is no easement. Moreover, since the death of testator was before the Civil Code took effect, the rules on easement do not apply.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not there is an easement prohibiting Amor from doing said construction.2. Whether or not the Civil Code may be applied

RULING:1. Yes. Easement are established by law or by will of the owners or by title. Under Art. 624, there is title by the doctrine of apparent sign. When the estate is subsequently owned by two different persons and the service (it cannot be an easement before the transfer) is not revoked in the title nor removed, an easement is established.The Cortez case cannot be invoked by Amor because it involved acquisition by prescription. Art. 624 is acquisition by title.

2. Amor failed to prove that the death of the testator occurred before the effectivity of the Old Civil Code. The facts show that it happened after the effectivity of the said code so the law on easement is already applicable. In any case, even if we assume Amors supposition, the law on easement was already integrated into the Spanish Law and in fact, had been established by Jurisprudence.Therefore, Amor is prohibitied from constructing the warehouse above the level of the window.

DISSENTING OPINION OF OZAETA.1) The Majority opinio committed a travesty on justice when it ignored the evidence produced by Amor that the testators death occurred before the effectivity of the Code.

2) Hence, the law on easement will not apply. Moreover, the Spanish Law and the Partidas provided for only three ways of acquiring easements: 1) contract 2) testament 3) prescription. There was no provision similar to the doctrine of apparent sign.

3) There is no doctrine established by the Spanish Tribunal regarding the doctrine.

4) In this modern age of flourescent lights and air conditioning devices, the easement of light and view would be obsolete and deterrent to economic progress especially when in the cities, buildings are side to side with each other.

Gargantos v. Tan Yanon108 Phil. 888

Doctrine: Art. 624 provides that when two adjoining estates were formerly owned by one person who introduced improvements on both such that the wall of the house constructed on the first estate extends to the wall of the warehouse on the second estate; and at the time of the sale of the first estate, there existed on the aforementioned wall of the house, doors, windows which serve as passages for light and view, there being no provision in the deed of sale that the easement of light and view will not be established, the apparent sign of easement between the two estates is established as a title. FACTS: The late Francisco Sanz was the previous owner of a land which he subdivided into several lots. One lot was sold to Guillermo Tengtio, who sold to Vicente Uy Veza. Another lot with a house constituted thereon was sold to Tan Yanon. A third portion with a warehouse was sold to Gargantos. The problem arose when Gargantos asked from the Municipality for a permit to demolish the warehouse in order to construct a higher one. Tan Yanon opposed the application for it would block his window and impair his right of light and view. Both the provincial fiscal and district engineer of Romblon recommended granting of the building permit to Gargantos. Tan Yanon then filed against Gargantos an action to restrain him from constructing a building that would prevent plaintiff from receiving light and enjoying the view through the window of his house, unless such building is erected at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line between the lots of plaintiff and defendant, and to enjoin the members of Municipal Council of Romblon from issuing the corresponding building permit to defendant. ISSUE: Whether the property of respondent Tan Yanon has an easement of light and view against the property of petitioner Gargantos. -- YES HELD: Art. 624 provides that when two adjoining estates were formerly owned by one person who introduced improvements on both such that the wall of the house constructed on the first estate extends to the wall of the warehouse on the second estate; and at the time of the sale of the first estate, there existed on the aforementioned wall of the house, doors, windows which serve as passages for light and view, there being no provision in the deed of sale that the easement of light and view will not be established, the apparent sign of easement between the two estates is established as a title.

RONQUILLO vs. ROCO- Easement of Right of Way

Easements of right of way may not be acquired by prescription because it is not a continuous easement.

FACTS:Petitioners parcel of land was connected to the Naga Market Place and Igualdad St. by an easement of a right of way through the land of the Respondents, which they have been using for more than 20 years. On May 1953, however, respondents built a chapel right in the middle of the road, blocking their usual path to the marketplace. One year after, by means of force, intimidation, and threats, the owners (respondents) of the land where the easement was situated, planted wooden posts and fenced with barbed wires the road, closing their right of way from their house to Igualdad St. and Naga public market.

ISSUE:Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be acquired by prescription?

HELD: No.Art. 620 of the CC provides that only continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by prescription. The easement of a right of way cannot be considered continuous because its use is at intervals and is dependent on the acts of man.

Minority Opinion (including the ponente):Easements of right of way may already be acquired by prescription, at least since the introduction into this jurisdiction of the special law on prescription through the Old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190. Said law, particularly, Section 41 thereof, makes no distinction as to the real rights which are subject to prescription, and there would appear to be no valid reason, at least to the writer of this opinion, why the continued use of a path or a road or right of way by the party, specially by the public, for ten years or more, not by mere tolerance of the owner of the land, but through adverse use of it, cannot give said party a vested right to such right of way through prescription.

The uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment of a right of way necessary to constitute adverse possession does not require the use thereof every day for the statutory period, but simply the exercise of the right more or less frequently according to the nature of the use. (17 Am. Jur. 972)"It is submitted that under Act No. 190, even discontinuous servitudes can be acquired by prescription, provided it can be shown that the servitude was actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants'.

Valisno v. Adriano161 SCRA 398

DOCTRINE: Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance

FACTS: Plaintiff Valisno file against the Defendant Adriano an action for damages. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija. Plaintiff bought the land from the defendants sister, Honorata. Both parcels of land had been inherited by defendant and her sister from their father. At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal about 70 meters long, traversing the appellee's land. Adriano levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Valisno was deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land. Plaintiff Adriano filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a complaint for deprivation of water rights. A decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant asked for a reinvestigation of the case and was granted. Meanwhile, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense because of urgency. He also filed a complaint for damages in the CFI against respondent. Defendant Adriano claims that he merely allowed his sister to use his water rights when she still owned the adjacent land. According to the appellant, the water right was the primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property would be unproductive. ISSUE: WON the water rights pass with the conveyance of the land. -- YES HELD:Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person. The fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does detract from its permanency as property right, which survives the determination of the necessity. As an easement of waters in favor of the plaintiff has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference such as the appellee's act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.

Benedicto v. CA25 SCRA 145

DOCTRINE: The easement is perpetual in character and was annotated on all the transfer certificates of title issued to Heras and to Benedicto. Absence of anything that would show mutual agreement to extinguish the easement, the easement persists.

FACTS:Heras filed an action with the Court of First Instance to recover a portion of land enclosed and walled by Benedicto and to demand the reopening of an easement of way between his and Benedictos real property. Hendrick sold portions of her property to several personalities including Recto and Heras. When portion of the property was sold to Herras, he closed and walled the part of land serving as easement of way. Trial court found that the easement of way was found entirely within Benedictos property contrary to the stipulation in the deed of sale between Hedrick and Recto that it should be between their properties with each contributing an equal portion of his property. Thus, trial court directed the parties to equally contribute to the maintenance of the passageway between Herras and Benedicto. ISSUE:Whether or not Benedicto may enclose his property. HELD:In this case, the easement is perpetual in character and was annotated on all the transfer certificates of title issued to Heras and to Benedicto. Absence of anything that would show mutual agreement to extinguish the easement, the easement persists.

TKDCBenedicto v. CA25 SCRA 145

DOCTRINE: Under Art. 624, an easement may continue by operation of law. Alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not a ground for the extinguishment of easements, absent a statement extinguishing it. FACTS:Private respondent Antonio Cardenas was the owner of 2 parcels of land situated in Cebu City. An apartment building was constructed on Lot A, while on Lot B stands a 4-door apartment, a 2-storey house, a bodega, and a septic tank for the common use of the occupants of Lots A and B. A small portion of the apartment building on Lot A also stands on Lot B. Cardenas sold Lot A to petitioner Eduardo C. Taedo. On the same day, Cardenas also mortgaged Lot B to Taedo as a security for the payment of a loan. Cardenas agreed that he would sell Lot B only to Taedo in case he should decide to sell it. However, Cardenas sold Lot B to the respondent spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim. Upon learning of the sale, Taedo offered to redeem the property from Romeo Sim, but the latter refused. Instead, Sim blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building of Eduardo Taedo built on Lot A, to the septic tank in Lot B. He also asked Taedo to remove that portion of his building enroaching on Lot B. As a result, Taedo filed an action for legal redemption and damages against Spouses Sim and Antonio Cardenas, invoking the provisions of Art. 1622 of the Civil Code. Respondent judge, Juanito A. Bernad, dismissed the complaint for legal redemption, as well as petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE:W/N the alienation of Lots A and B is a ground for the extinguishment of the easement of drainage. -- NO HELD:The finding of the trial court that Taedo's right to continue to use the septic tank on Lot B ceased upon the subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners who do not have the same interest, also appears to be contrary to law. Article 631 of the Civil Code enumerates the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. From its provisions, the alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not one of the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is continued by operation of law. Article 624 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more persons. In the instant case, no statement abolishing or extinguishing the easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot A to Taedo. Nor did Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by the occupants of Lot A before he sold said lot. Hence, the use of the septic tank is continued by operation of law. Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim the new owners of the servient estate (Lot B), cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude.