e-dossier 4 .pdf

Lee H. Hamilton,

Director

BOARD OF TRUSTEES:

Joseph A. Cari, Jr.,

Chairman Steven Alan

Bennett, Vice Chairman

EX OFFICIO MEMBERS

: The Secretary of

State Colin Powell, The Librarian of

Congress James H. Billington,

The Archivist of the United States John W. Carlin, The Chariman of

the National Endowment for the

Humanities William R. Ferris, The Secretary of the Smithsonian

Institution Lawrence M.

Small, The Secretary of

Education Roderick R. Paige,

The Secretary of Health & Human Services Tommy

G. Thompson

Documents on the Soviet Invasion of

Afghanistan

e-Dossier No. 4

Christian F. Ostermann,

Director

ADVISORY COMMITTEE:

Dr. William Taubman

(Amherst College) Chairman

Dr. Michael Beschloss

(Historian, Author)

Dr. James Billington

(Librarian of Congress)

Dr. Warren I.

Cohen (University of

Maryland-Baltimore)

Dr. John Lewis

Gaddis (Yale University)

Dr. James G. Hershberg

(The George Washington University)

Dr. Samual F.

Wells, Jr. (Woodrow Wilson

Center)

Dr. Sharon Wolchick

(The George Washington University)

Cold War International History Project

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Washington, D.C.

November 2001

Editor's Note: The following documents from Russian and (East) German archives on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan were previously published by the Cold War International History Project. They are re-published in this CWIHP e-Dossier for the convenience of interested readers. (Interested readers may also download individual documents after searching CWIHP's "Virtual Archive" (see link on the frontpage of the CWIHP website). This CWIHP e-Dossier is only available online. Please note that the page numbers refer to the pages in this dossier. Future CWIHP e-dossiers will feature previously unpublished materials on the war in Afghanistan from the former Soviet bloc archives.

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The Soviet Union and Afghanistan – CWIHP BULLETIN Documents

Bulletin 3 Soviet Policy in Afghanistan, 1979: A Grim Assessment Pg. 8 - 10 Bulletin 4 From Hesitation to Intervention: Soviet Decisions on Afghanistan, 1979 Pg. 12 - 13 Record of Meeting of A.N.KOSYGIN, A.A.GROMYKO, D.F.USTINOV and Pg. 13 - 15 B.N.PONOMAREV with N.M.TARAKI Record of Conversation Brezhnev-Taraki, 20 March 1979 Pg. 15 - 16 Soviet Helicopters to Afghanistan, April 1979 Pg. 16 - 17 Bulletin 8/9 CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 1 February 1980, with telegrams to Soviet Ambassador To West Germany (Willy Brandt) and Finnish Socialist Democratic leader K. Sorsa (not printed) Pg. 20 - 23 Concerning the situation in "A": New Russian Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan Pg. 18 - 22 by Odd Arne Westad Political Letter from USSR Ambassador to Afghanistan A. Puzanov to Soviet Foreign Ministry Pg. 28 “About the Domestic Political Situation in the DRA,” 31 May 1978 (notes) Record of Conversation, Soviet Ambassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, 18 June 1978 Pg. 29 Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan Pg. 29 A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, 18 July 1978 Information from CPSU CC to GDR leader Erich Honecker, 13 October 1978 Pg. 29 - 31 CPSU CC Politburo Decision on Afghanistan, 7 January 1979 Pg. 31 Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Discussions on Afghanistan, 17-19 March 1979 Pg. 31 - 40 CPSU CC Politburo Decisions on Afghanistan, 18 March 1979 Pg. 40 Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin Pg. 40 - 41 and Afghan Prime Minister Nur Mohammed Tarki, 17 or 18 March 1979 Meeting of Kosygin, Gromyko, Ustinov, and Ponomarev with Taraki in Moscow, 20 March 1979 Pg. 41 - 45 Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Session on Afghanistan, 22 March 1979 Pg. 45 - 46

2

Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan Pg. 46 A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, 22 March 1979 Report of the chief of the Soviet military advis ory group in Afghanistan Pg. 46 Lt. Gen. L.N. Gorelov, with H. Amin, 14 April 1979 (excerpt) CPSU CC Politburo Decision and Instruction to Soviet Ambassador in Afghanistan, 24 May 1979 Pg. 47 Record of Conversation Between Soviet Ambassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, 9 June 1979 Pg. 47 Gromyko -Andropov-Ustinov-Ponomarev Report to CPSU CC Pg. 47 - 48 on the Situation in Afghanistan, 28 June 1979 Record of Conversation Between Soviet Ambassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, 10 July 1979 Pg. 48 Boris Ponomarev, Reports from Kabul, 19-20 July 1979 (excerpts) Record of Conversation Pg. 48 between Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan A.M. Puzanov and H. Amin, 21 July 1979 Conversation of the chief of the Soviet military advisory group in Afghanistan Pg. 48 - 49 Lt. Gen. Gorelov, with H. Amin, 11 August 1979 Report from Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Army Gen. Ivan Pavlovskii Pg. 49 during visit to Afghanistan, 25 August 1979 CPSU CC Politburo Decisions on Afghanistan, 13 September 1979 (excerpts) Pg. 49 CPSU CC Politburo Decision Pg. 49 - 50 15 September 1979, with report by Gromyko, Ustinov, and Tsvigun Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Soviet Representatives in Kabul, 15 September 1979 Pg. 50 Information from CC CPSU to GDR leader E. Honecker, 16 September 1979 Pg. 50 Excerpt from transcript, CPSU CC Politburo meeting, 20 September 1979 Pg. 51 Excerpt from transcript, Meeting of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Pg. 51 Afghan Foreign Minister Shah-Valih, New York, 27 September 1979 (excerpt) Information from the CC CPSU to GDR leader Honecker, 1 October 1979 Pg. 51 Transcript of Brezhnev-Honecker summit in East Berlin Pg. 51 - 52 4 October 1979 (excerpt on Iran and Afghanistan) Information of KGB USSR to CC CPSU International Department, 10 October 1979 Pg. 52 Gromyko -Andropov-Ustinov-Ponomarev Report to CPSU CC, 29 October 1979 Pg. 52 - 53 Record of Conversation Between Soviet Ambassador Puzanov and Amin, 3 November 1979 Pg. 53

3

Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov, Report to CPSU CC on Mission to Afghanistan Pg. 53 of Deputy Defense Minister Army -Gen. I. G. Pavlovskii, 5 November 1979 Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan F.A. Tabeev and H. Amin Pg. 53 6 December 1979 Extract from CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 6 December 1979 Personal memorandum, Andropov to Brezhnev, n.d. [early December 1979] Pg. 54 Andropov-Gromyko -Ustinov-Ponomarev Report on Events in Afghanistan on 27-28 December 1979 Pg. 55 - 56 dated 31 December 1979 Meeting of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Afghan Foreign Minister Shad Mohammad Dost Pg. 56 - 57 4 January 1980 CC CPSU Politburo transcript, 17 January 1980 (excerpt) Pg. 57 - 58 CPSU CC Politburo decision, 17 January 1980 Pg. 58 CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 28 January 1980, with Report by Pg. 58 - 60 Gromyko -Andropov-Ustinov-Ponomarev, 27 January 1980 Andropov Report to CPSU CC on Talks with Afghan Leaders, 5 February 1980 Pg. 60 CC CPSU Politburo transcript, 7 February 1980 (excerpt) Pg. 60 - 61 CPSU CC Politburo Decisions on Afghanistan, 7 February 1980 Pg. 61 - 62 CPSU CC Politburo Decision on Soviet Policy on Afghanistan, 10 March 1980 Pg. 62 - 65 with report on Proposal by Fidel Castro to Mediate between Afghanistan and Pakistan and approved letter from L.I. Brezhnev to Fidel Castro CPSU CC Politburo Decision on Afghanistan, 10 April 1980 Pg. 65 - 67 with report by Gromyko -Andropov-Ustinov-Zagladin, 7 April 1980 CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 8 May 1980, with Politburo Commission Report Pg. 67 - 69 6 May 1980, and Approved Cable to Soviet Ambassador in Kabul CPSU CC Politburo decisions, 19 June 1980 Pg. 69 Information from the CC CPSU to Erich Honecker, 21 June 1980 Pg. 69 - 70 CC CPSU Plenum, 23 June 1980 (excerpt) Pg. 70 - 71 Information from the CC CPSU to Erich Honecker, 18 July 1980 Pg. 71 Report by Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov to CPSU CC Pg. 71 - 72 “Foreign Interference” in Afghanistan, 2 October 1980 CPSU CC Politburo transcript (excerpt), 10 March 1983 Pg. 72 - 73

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CPSU CC Politburo Transcript (excerpt), 20 March 1986 Pg. 73 CPSU CC Politburo transcript (excerpt), 13 November 1986 Pg. 73 - 74 CPSU CC Politburo Decision of 24 January 1989, with attached report of 23 January 1989 Pg. 75 - 79 CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 13 May 1989, with report by Zaikov-Shevardnadze-Yazov-Kryuchkov Pg. 79

NEW FINDINGS ON THE KOREAN WAR

Translation and Commentary by Kathryn Weathersby

COLD WARINTERNATIONAL

HISTORY PROJECTBULLETIN

Issue 3 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.

FROM THE

RUSSIAN ARCHIVES

War, 1950-53, and the Armistice Ne-gotiations,” is one such find. It is asurvey of Soviet and Chinese involve-ment in the Korean War that wascompiled in 1966 by so far unidenti-fied members of the staff of the SovietForeign Ministry archive. The appar-ent purpose of this internal historywas to provide background informa-tion for the small group of Sovietofficials who were at that time en-gaged in discussions with the People’sRepublic of China and North Viet-nam over possible Soviet assistanceto the Viet Cong in their war with theUnited States.1 This document thustells us something about Soviet atti-

continued on page 14

Fall 1993

While the opening of Soviet ar-chives brought high expectations forquick answers to long-standing ques-tions about the Cold War, those of usworking in the Soviet archives havefound that they are like other historicalcollections; individual documents con-tain only fragments of the informationwe seek. It is only after laboriouslysifting through a great and varied massof records that we can begin to piecetogether even one part of the intricatestory of the Cold War.

Occasionally, however, we comeupon a single document that directlyanswers a major question. The docu-ment excerpted below, “On the Korean

Soviet Foreign Policy During the Cold War:

A DOCUMENTARY SAMPLER

On 12-15 January 1993, in the presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciencesbuilding in Moscow, the Cold War International History Project sponsored the firstscholarly conference on Cold War history to be based on newly available archivalsources in the former Soviet Union. CWIHP organized the conference in collabo-ration with the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences andthe Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (SCCD, or TsKhSD, itsRussian acronym), which houses the post-1952 records of the CPSU CentralCommittee. Over four days Russian and American scholars presented roughly threedozen papers, on topics ranging from the Cold War’s origins to the Sino-Soviet splitto the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia to the superpower crises overSuez, Berlin, the Taiwan Straits, and Cuba. (Several of these papers have since beenpublished by CWIHP in revised form as Working Papers—by Hope Harrison andVladislav Zubok on the Berlin Crisis, 1958-62, and by Kathryn Weathersby on Sovietpolicy and the origins of the Korean War, 1945-50—and more are slated to appearas working papers and in a forthcoming edited volume.)

An essential precondition to the holding of the conference was a writtenagreement by SCCD that all participants, whether Russian or foreign, would receiveequal access to released materials, that all materials released for the conferencewould be made available to the world scholarly community, and that “no restric-


INSIDE:

Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia (Part 2) 2Russian Foreign Ministry Archives 26, 27Soviet Tactical Nuclear Weapons and the Cuban Missile Crisis: An Exchange 40, 41Warsaw Pact Planning: A Response 51Update 70

ARCHIVAL RESEARCH IN MOSCOW:Progress and Pitfalls

by Mark Kramer

The British writer and literary critic LyttonStrachey once remarked that “ignorance is the firstrequisite of the historian — ignorance, which simpli-fies and clarifies, which selects and omits.”1 By thiscriterion, historians studying the Soviet Union wereremarkably lucky until very recently. Unlike scholarsof American politics and foreign policy, who had thedaunting task each year of poring through thousandsof newly declassified documents, specialists on theSoviet Union normally were forced to go about theirwork without reading a single item from the Sovietarchives. Soviet authorities exercised tight controlover all official documents and archival repositories,and no procedures were in place to release any of thesematerials to the public. For nearly 75 years, theinformation available about Soviet policy-makingwas so sparse that Western scholars often had to relyexclusively on published sources, supplemented by afew interviews.

Now that the Soviet Union has ceased to exist,several of the key Soviet archives have finally beenopened — if only on a limited and sporadic basis — forscholarly research. This development has broughtboth benefits and drawbacks. The focus here will bemainly on the drawbacks, but that does not mean thebenefits have been negligible. As recently as three tofour years ago, the notion that Western and Russianscholars would be permitted to examine sensitivepostwar documents in the archives of the SovietForeign Ministry or the Central Committee of the


COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 67DOCUMENTATIONquestions, prepares the agenda and materials forconsideration by the National Security Councilunder the chairmanship of the President (thisorgan under Nixon began to work regularly,meeting no more rarely than once or twice aweek). As recognized by Nixon himself, at mylast meeting with him, Kissinger every week“pesters” him (that is, meets with him) signifi-cantly more often than any other aide.

Judging by my personal observations andcompared with, for example, the relation of Presi-dent Johnson with his aide [Walt] Rostow, I cansay that Kissinger conducts himself much morefreely than his predecessors in the presence of thePresident: one feels the certain confidence of aman who has won for himself a solid position atthe White House (at the State Department theysay directly that if “Henry”—Kissinger’s firstname—speaks against that or some other pro-posal, then Nixon will most probably reject it).

Kissinger himself, though he is a smart anderudite person, is at the same time extremely vainand in conversations with me, especially during aprivate lunch (we have established a pretty goodpersonal relationship), not averse to boastingabout his influence. During our last conversationhe, for example, without any excessive humility,announced that in all of Washington “only twopeople can answer precisely at any given momentabout the position of the USA on this or thatquestion: these are President Nixon and he,Kissinger.” Regarding this he suggested to methat if it is necessary to precisely define some-thing really important “for the correct under-standing in Moscow of Nixon’s policy on aconcrete question,” I should quietly appeal di-rectly to him.

I should say that he himself readily wel-comes the Soviet Ambassador or visits us in theEmbassy for a private conversation immediatelyfollowing a request from our side. He himselfoften takes the initiative to arrange such meet-ings. Evidently, he also cites all this as a confi-dential channel of communication with the So-viet side in order to strengthen his own personalposition with Nixon. In this connection I shouldmention that Kissinger holds under his own per-sonal control all communication of members ofhis staff with our Embassy personnel, and sternlyrequires that all such conversations are reporteddirectly to him, and if he considers it necessary,that he himself report to the President. Mostrecently, his tendency to limit the number of suchcommunications and subsume them all into theflow of his personal contacts with the SovietAmbassador has been noticeable.

Evidently, it would be expedient over timeto more and more actively develop and use thechannel with Kissinger in order to influence andthrough him drive home directly to PresidentNixon our points of view on various importantquestions, especially in situations where a certaindelicacy is called for or where any sort of public-

ity is undesirable, which is often not possible toachieve when acting through the State Depart-ment. It goes without saying that we will asalways have to handle routine and official mat-ters, especially those where it is necessary to fixour position, through ordinary diplomatic chan-nels. Secretary of State Rogers has noticeablybegun to gather strength and operate more ac-tively in the area of American foreign policy,leaning on the wide apparat of the State Depart-ment and Foreign Service. And all the same, it isnecessary to take into account that Kissinger’sinfluence on the formulation of Nixon’s foreignpolicy course, judging by all our observationsand information in our possession, for now re-mains commanding.

A. DOBRYNIN

(Source: SCCD, F. 5, Op. 61, D. 558, LI. 92-105.)

Document Six:Soviet Policy in Afghanistan, 1979:

A Grim Assessment

The following CPSU Central Committeedocument, dated 1 April 1979 and signed byForeign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Defense Min-ister Dmitrii Ustinov, KGB chief Yurii Andropov,and CC International Department head BorisPonomarev, provides a strikingly candid assess-ment of the deteriorating situation in Afghanistanthat the Soviet Politburo confronted in spring1979. The report attributes the increasing suc-cess of the Islamic opposition (i.e., the AfghanMujaheddin) to the “miscalculations and mis-takes” of the PDPA (People’s Democratic Partyof Afghanistan) regime that seized power follow-ing the April 1978 “revolution.” The PDPA’sdraconian social measures and “unjustified re-pression” are cited as key factors responsible forthe alienation of the army (“which still remainsthe main basis for the regime”) and the generalpopulace. The document reveals that the Sovietleadership has earlier rebuffed a PDPA requestfor direct military support in response to fightingin the provincial city of Herat and correctlypredicts “the serious political consequences whichwould have followed if the Soviet side had grantedtheir request....”

Nevertheless, despite these cautionarywords, seven months later the Soviet Govern-ments did approve direct military intervention inAfghanistan to enforce the continuation of com-munist rule in Kabul. (For a detailed analysis ofSoviet policy in Afghanistan in 1978-79, usingnewly available CPSU CC materials, see theforthcoming article by Odd Arne Westad of theNorwegian Nobel Institute in the February 1994issue of International History Review.) Introduc-tion by Robert S. Litwak, Woodrow Wilson Inter-

national Center for Scholars; translation by LorenUtkin; document provided by Mark Kramer.

* * * * * *

[The report was found attached to the followingcover memorandum:]

Return within 3 days Proletariat of the worldto the CC CPSS unite!(General department, First sector)

Communist Party of the Soviet Union,CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRETSPECIAL PAPERS

No P149/XIU

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov,Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev,

Pusakov, Baibakov, Skachkov, Zamiatin.

Memorandum on protocol no. 149 of themeeting of the Politburo (CC CPSU) on April

12, 1979

Our future policy in connection with the situationin Afghanistan.

Comrades Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov,Ponomarev are in agreement with the consider-ations on the given question, which are laid out inthe memorandum (enclosed).

SECRETARY OF THE CC [Central Committee]

[The report is appended:]

In reference to point XIU of protocol no. 149

Top secretSPECIAL PAPERS

CC CPSU

In accordance with the 3/18/79 request weare reporting an analysis of the reasons for thesituation in the Democratic Republic of Afghani-stan which have recently worsened and ourthoughts about our possible further steps in help-ing the leadership of DRA strengthen its positionand stabilize the situation in the country.

Last April’s revolution in Afghanistan oc-curred in an economically weak, backward feu-dal country with primitive economic forms andlimited domestic resources. The old regime lefta great variety of social, economic, and politicalproblems.

In the conditions of a severe class struggle,the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistanappeared on one pole, representing the interests

68 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETINDOCUMENTATIONof the working class, facing the forces expressingthe interests of the gentry-feudal class, the bour-geoisie, and the most reactionary part of theclergy on the other.

The Afghan reactionary forces are veryskillfully taking advantage of the almost com-plete illiteracy of the population, complex inter-national and intertribal conflicts, religious fa-naticism and nationalism.

Subversive actions, sabotage and the resis-tance of the overthrown class of exploiters aredeepening the economic problems, lowering in-dustrial and agricultural output, as well as ham-pering business activity, raising prices and re-ducing the influx of revenue into the state budget.The actions of reactionary forces, which are atpresent headed by Muslim leaders, who rely onthe “Muslim Brothers” organization, have bandedtogether on the basis of their common negativerelation to the new order in separatist and nation-alist groupings and in the pro-Maoist organiza-tion “Shoalee Javid.”

The reactionary forces have consolidatedsomewhat recently after overcoming the confu-sion following the rapid and rather unexpectedvictory of the April revolution. They have startedto change the forms of struggle, shifting fromcovert subversive actions to open armed forms ofactivity. They were able not only to regroupwithin the country but also to build wide connec-tions with imperialist and clerical groups abroad,which supply them with active propaganda sup-port as well as money and weapons. The tactic ofthe enemies of the revolution is to widen the frontof the struggle, to force the government to dis-perse its forces across different regions of thecountry.

Reactionary forces use slogans of extremeanticommunism and antisovietism. Their mainpolitical goal is the overthrow of the revolution-ary democratic order and the creation of a “freeIslamic republic” in Afghanistan.

The program of the People’s DemocraticParty of Afghanistan anticipates the implemen-tation of wide political and social-economic re-forms in the interests of the working people. Butthis program is just beginning to be realized andtherefore only a small portion of the populationhas felt the advantages of the new order and itsprogressive character. The new authorities mustovercome centuries of backwardness of the coun-try, remove difficulties, and solve problems.This requires time as well as a thoroughly plannedand well calculated approach. The leaders ofdemocratic Afghanistan have to create a newstate apparatus, reorganize and strengthen thearmy, and gather practical experience in buildinga state and party.

The weak side of the people’s authority isthe fact that it has not yet established a firm basisof support in the provincial and urban adminis-trative political organs through which the work-ing people would be involved in the management

of the state from the center and particularly fromdistant areas.

The new authority is experiencing seriousproblems because of its relationship with theclergy and opposition tribal leaders which are themost influential forces in Afghanistan. The reso-lution of this problem, which requires circum-spection and a careful approach, has not yet beenfound and both forces continue to be dangerousopponents of the present regime. They play amajor role in the counterrevolutionary struggle.The situation in Iran and the spark of religiousfanaticism all around the Muslim East was theunderlying cause of the activization of the struggleagainst the government of Afghanistan.

The difficulties which the leadership of DRAfaces are growing more complex because thePDPA has not yet become a mass political orga-nization. The best workers and poorest peasantsare becoming involved very slowly. The party isstill unable to attract the layers of society whichcould accept the revolutionary aspects of therevolution: the intelligentsia, white-collar em-ployees, the small bourgeoisie, and lowest layersof the clergy.

The party itself split following the Aprilrevolution and weakened its position, influence,and prestige. PDPA continues to be not onlysmall in number but also has been weakenedseriously by the internal struggle between the“Khalq” and “Parcham” groups. The most popu-lar leaders of the “Parcham” group were eitherphysically destroyed or purged from the party,army, and state apparatus. Some of them foundthemselves abroad as political refugees. Thissituation has hurt the party’s remaining “Parcham”members. The people have demonstrated fear,suspicion, and distrust of the PDPA leadership.Rapid changes in the leaders of important admin-istrative units in the center as well as the peripheryand constant changes in the army have made thesituation even worse.

The enemies of the revolution are acting notonly from within the country but from abroad,especially from Pakistan and Iran where many ofthe opponents of the new order have emigrated.According to our sources, Western special ser-vices, particularly American and Chinese agen-cies, are involved in the organization of the struggleagainst the government inside the country. Theyhave taken advantage of the fact that Afghanistan’sborders with Pakistan and Iran are practicallyopen. Not only subversive and terrorist groups,but also large armed bands are sent across thoseborders.

The internal and external counterrevolution-ary forces are trying to use not only the objectivedifficulties of the new order, but also the miscal-culations and mistakes of the Afghan leadership.It is known that following the victory in the Aprilrevolution, extreme measures and unjustified re-pression were often allowed in solving both inter-nal party and government problems. There were

cases of financial corruption, as well as violencetowards arrested persons during investigations.

The dissatisfaction with unjustified repres-sion affected the army, which still remains themain basis for the regime. This makes the coun-terrevolutionary task of dictating the system notonly from within the country but also from abroadsignificantly easier. Many commanders feel un-certain and fear arrest after witnessing their col-leagues’ arrest and disappearance. These fearswere confirmed by events in Herat, where notonly a large portion of the population but alsosome army units, on their commanders’ orders,sided with the counterrevolution.

The Herat events also revealed the weak-ness of the political, agitational, and propagan-distic work of the PDPA among the people. Thedestabilizing activities of the enemies of the newsystem, including the reactionary clergy, are muchmore active and widespread than the work of theparty.

The Soviet leadership has many times givenrecommendations and advice to the leaders of theDRA, and on a very high level. They havepointed to their mistakes and excesses. But theAfghan leaders, displaying their political inflex-ibility and inexperience, rarely heeded such ad-vice.

The insufficient political experience of theDRA leaders was apparent during the conflict inHerat, where they displayed a lack of understand-ing of the serious political consequences whichwould have followed if the Soviet side had grantedtheir request to call in Soviet troops.

It is clear that due to the internal nature of theantigovernmental opposition, the use of Soviettroops in repressing the Afghan counterrevolu-tion would seriously damage the internationalauthority of the USSR and would set back theprocess of disarmament. In addition, the use ofSoviet troops would reveal the weakness of theTaraki government and would widen the scope ofthe counterrevolution both domestically andabroad, bringing the attack of antigovernmentalforces to a much higher level. The fact that thegovernment was able to suppress the rebellion inHerat with its own forces should hold back thecounterrevolution and demonstrate the relativestrength of the new system.

Therefore, our decision to refrain from sat-isfying the request of the leadership of DRA tosend Soviet military units to Afghanistan wascorrect and this policy should be continued fur-ther because the possibility of new rebellionsagainst the government cannot be excluded.

Of course, we should continue to do any-thing we can to assist the leadership of Afghani-stan with their struggle against counterrevolutionand in their stabilization of the situation of thecountry. We have to help the governmentstrengthen its influence and to lead the peoplealong the path of socialist reform.

The Soviet Union has been providing active

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 69DOCUMENTATIONpolitical support to the new government, as wellas widespread economic and military assistanceand has been participating in the training ofskilled personnel from the first days followingthe victory of the April revolution. Large num-bers of advisers and specialists were sent toAfghanistan at the request of the Afghan govern-ment to assist in solving the problems faced bythe DRA leadership.

Taking into account the recent additionaldecisions, in order to continue this work it isnecessary:

1. To continue to support the leadership of theDRA in improving the combat efficiency andpolitical awareness of the Afghan army, ensuringits loyalty and dedication to the revolutionaryleadership, and in strengthening and improvingthe efficiency of the security organs, includingthe border patrol. It should be noted that in connection with thelatest events, large amounts of arms and militarytechnology have been sent and an additionalamount will be sent into Afghanistan. In addi-tion, the training of military specialists for thearmed forces of the DRA has been expanded inmilitary academies in Afghanistan itself as wellas in the Soviet Union. It should be emphasizedthat modern and effective mastering of the sup-plied weapons and technology is essential. Thesame applies to aid provided to the security or-gans.2. As much as is possible, to examine and solveproblems connected with provided economic as-sistance to Afghanistan, especially that whichwould accelerate and strengthen the political po-sition of the revolutionary-democratic regime inthe country. To advise the Afghan leadership ondeveloping the principal sectors of the economywhich would strengthen the productive capacityof the country, resolve social problems, and pro-vide employment to the population.3. In contacts with the leadership of the DRA atall levels to always emphasize the importance ofwidening the political base which supports theparty and the government. The importance of theconsecutive implementation of the planned re-forms, such as land reform, should be instilled inthe leaders of the DRA. This has to be donecarefully, devoting essential attention to the po-litical and ideological side of reform. For ex-ample, the peasants should be convinced thatthey are getting the land only because of therevolution and will lose it if they will not protectthe revolutionary authority. Similar explanationsshould be made in cases of other socio-economicreforms.

To widen the political base of the PDPA, theAfghan leadership should be made to understandthat it is essential to gradually create electoralorgans, yet, of course, the leading role of theparty should be maintained and strengthened inthe state and political structure of the country.

They should also understand that it is advisable todevelop and enact a constitution which will se-cure the democratic rights of the people andregulate the activity of the state organs.4. It should be emphasized to the Afghan leader-ship that as the party ranks grow numerically, it iscrucial to maintain the unity of the party leader-ship and membership. They should also be re-minded about the advisability of collective deci-sion-making on the most important issues alongparty and state lines. The People’s DemocraticParty of Afghanistan and the leadership of DRAshould be given practical assistance in establish-ing the party organization, spreading mass infor-mation, and preparing party and state cadres.5. To continue to draw the attention of the Afghanleadership to the necessity of carrying out appro-priate work among the Muslim clergy of thecountry in order to fractionalize it and reduce theinfluence of reactionary Muslim leaders on thepeople. This influence could be diminished byencouraging religious freedom and demonstrat-ing that the new power does not persecute theclergy as a class, but only punishes those who actagainst the revolutionary system.6. The DRA leaders should be convinced of thenecessity of the introduction and strict obser-vance of law and order, based on revolutionarylegality, as well as the necessity of a more reason-able approach to the use of repressive measures.This does not mean, however, that repressivemeasures should not be used against true infidelsor those who engage in active counterrevolution-ary activity. A person’s fate should not be de-cided on the basis of circumstantial and unverifi-able evidence, or verdict by two- and three-mancommissions, without a true investigation andtrial. This applies both to party and militarycadres.7. Considering the importance of personal con-tacts in communicating our views and thoughtson the above questions to the DRA leadership,visits on various levels should be practiced on amore regular basis in order to normalize thesituation in Afghanistan.8. To continue, along official diplomatic andspecial channels, to work against the interferenceof other countries, particular neighboring ones, inthe internal affairs of Afghanistan.9. To help Afghan friends conduct political workamong the people, including radio propaganda,which due to the high percentage of illiteracyplays a special role in Afghanistan.

In our propaganda concerning Afghanistan,the traditional friendship and wide base of mutu-ally beneficial cooperation between our two coun-tries should be emphasized. This relationship notonly exists today, but will continue to develop inthe future. The achievements in socio-economicdevelopment of the Central Asian republics dur-ing the Soviet period should be described in awide and clearly understandable manner; theserepublics should be used as an example to demon-

strate the falsity of assertions concerning repres-sion of religious expression, the Muslim faithincluded.10. To periodically inform brother socialist coun-tries about our steps in aiding the leadership ofDRA in stabilizing the situation in the country,thereby orienting them to render similar politicaland material support of Afghanistan.

Concrete proposals on the above positions,as well as any other measures, will be included asneeded.

Please review these materials.

A. Gromyko. Y. Andropov. D. Ustinov. B.Ponomarev.

April 1, 1979 No 279/gs No 25-S-576

(Source: SCCD, Fond 89, perechen [list] 14,dokument 28.)

IREX

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Issue 4 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. Fall 1994

SOVIET NUCLEAR HISTORY

primarily with two topics: the struc-ture and development of Sovietnuclear forces, and Soviet thinkingabout nuclear war and the role ofnuclear weapons in war. Some ofthese works retain considerable value,but the range of issues they could

examine was necessarily lim-ited.1 They were based pri-marily on data published bythe U.S. government aboutSoviet nuclear weapons sys-tems and on the statements ofSoviet leaders about nuclear

weapons, as well as on Soviet publi-cations about foreign policy and mili-tary strategy, operational art, and tac-tics. It was not possible to analyzeSoviet policy in terms of the interplayof individuals, institutions, and cir-cumstances. The way in which weunderstood Soviet nuclear policy wastherefore very different from the wayin which we could think about Ameri-

continued on page 2

Soviet Cold War Military Strategy:Using Declassified History

by William Burr

“The history of the Soviet strategicprogram is at the same time a history ofU.S. perceptions.”1 So wrote a team ofhistorians and political scientists in a oncehighly classified Pentagon history of theCold War strategic arms race. The au-thors were describing an important prob-lem: so long as primary sources wereunavailable, academic and governmentanalysts interested in explaining Sovietmilitary policy had to resort to “infer-ences drawn by long chains of logic” tointerpret the scattered data available to

continued on page 9

Nuclear Weapons after Stalin’s Death:Moscow Enters the H-Bomb Age

by Yuri Smirnov and Vladislav Zubok

By the time Stalin died, on 5 March1953, the Soviet Union had become a nuclearpower whose army was preparing to re-ceive, in several months, its first atomicweapons.1 The task set by Stalin, to liqui-date the U.S. atomic monopoly and to de-velop the Soviets’ own nuclear arsenal, was“overfulfilled” on 12 August 1953, whenthe USSR successfully tested the world’sfirst transportable hydrogen bomb. Thework on this bomb had been in progresssince 1948, and Stalin failed by only fivemonths to live to see his triumph.2


INSIDE:

SOVIET SCIENCE SOURCES 2MOSCOW’S BIGGEST BOMB 3STALIN ’S SECRET ORDER 5RESPONSE: KOREAN WAR ORIGINS 21KGB VS. CIA 22GERMANY & THE COLD WAR:

CWIHP CONFERENCE REPORT 34EAST GERMAN ARCHIVES 34MYSTERIES OF TIUL ’PANOV 34GDR ORAL HISTORY 35KHRUSHCHEV’S 1958 ULTIMATUM 35

SOVIET ESPIONAGE AND THE BOMB

ASSESSING SPY STORIES 50THE REPORT TO STALIN 50WHO USED WHOM? 51

DOCUMENTS: M ORE SOVIET TRANSLATIONS 60RUSSIAN ARCHIVES NEWS 86UPDATE 90

For historians of the Cold War, theSoviet nuclear weapons program is atopic of obvious importance. Thenuclear arms race was a central elementin the Cold War, and much of the histo-riography of American Cold War policyhas focused on nuclear weapons—onthe decisions to build them, andon their role in foreign policyand military strategy. ButAmerican policy is only one partof the history of the Cold War.Comparable studies of Sovietnuclear policy are needed for afull understanding of the U.S.-Sovietnuclear competition, which dominatedworld politics for more than 40 years.This note reviews briefly some of themain sources I used for my Stalin andthe Bomb: The Soviet Union and AtomicEnergy, 1939-1956 (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 1994).

An extensive literature on Sovietnuclear policy was published in theWest during the Cold War. This dealt

BOHR, THE BOMB, AND SOVIET ATOMIC ESPIONAGE:Ex-KGB officer Pavel Sudoplatov sparked a controversy when healleged in his memoirs that Nobel-winning physicist Niels Bohrpassed atomic secrets to Moscow. Now the original 1945 KGBreport on the espionage approach to Bohr, sent by secret police chiefLavrenti Beria to Joseph Stalin, has surfaced. What does it say, andwhat does it mean? See pages 50-59.

SOURCES FOR STALIN AND THE BOMB

by David Holloway

70 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

military advantage, as a result of which thegeneral strategic balance would be changed tothe advantage of the USSR. The NSC pointedout that the means of forward basing could be asubject for discussion during negotiations be-tween NATO and Warsaw Treaty Countries onthe question of balanced limitation of armedforces in Europe.

According to certain information, one ofthe variants studied by the NSC provides for theAmerican side to put forward a proposal tosimultaneously “freeze” the existing number ofSoviet intermediate and medium range missilesand the American means of forward basing if,due to great differences in points of view onmeans of forward basing, the negotiations willcome to a dead end and appear to be under threatof breakdown.

Through unofficial channels the Americansinform us that Nixon’s government, while “sin-cerely wishing” to achieve concrete results dur-ing the negotiations, at the same time “can’t waitendlessly” and is interested in achieving an agree-ment with the USSR by the end of 1971, becausethe beginning of the electoral campaign willmake it difficult for him to bargain with theUSSR. But the intent of these statements, itseems, is to influence the position of the USSRduring the negotiations. According to existinginformation, Kissinger in a private talk said thatfrom a political point of view it may be morebeneficial for Nixon if the agreement with theUSSR were to be achieved closer to the presiden-tial elections. According to a statement by theAmerican representative to the DisarmamentCommittee in Geneva, the USA is ready to con-duct at least three more rounds (the present oneincluded) of negotiations, striving first of all toget the agreement of the USSR on limitation ofstrategic offensive weapons.

At the same time, not being sure that theywill manage to obtain the agreement of the USSRon a complex accord on the limitation of ABMsystems and strategic offensive weapons on termsacceptable to the U.S., the Americans might putforward a proposal for partial agreement. Mostprobably it would be a proposal to limit ABMdeployment to the “Safeguard” system for theUSA and an ABM system around Moscow forthe USSR.

And if American attempts to obtain a sepa-rate, favorable to them, agreement on ABMsystems fail, they would prefer just to concludea treaty on measures for reducing the danger ofan outbreak of nuclear war between the USA andUSSR.

CC CPSU is informed.

Head of the State Security Committee

[signature] ANDROPOV

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 63, D. 193, Ll. 33-

38.)

VI. From Hesitation to Intervention:Soviet Decisions on Afghanistan, 1979

Despite the declassification of numer-ous high-level Soviet documents, the precisereasons behind the USSR’s massive, ill-fatedmilitary intervention in Afghanistan in De-cember 1979 remain murky. If anything, theunveiling over the past few years of recordsof internal Kremlin deliberations and So-viet-Afghan exchanges in the months prior tothe intervention have in some ways intensi-fied the mystery, because they demonstratethat Soviet leaders, including CPSU GeneralSecretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, were keenlyaware that the direct introduction of outsidemilitary forces for use against the Kabulgovernment’s opponents would be a politi-cal catastrophe, incurring bitter resentmentamong the Afghan people and handing apropaganda victory to Soviet opponentsaround the world. Yet, ultimately, the deci-sion to go ahead with the intervention wastaken anyway. (Two English-language ac-counts of the run-up to the invasion thatmake extensive use of the new Soviet docu-mentation are Odd Arne Westad, “Preludeto Invasion: The Soviet Union and the Af-ghan Communists, 1978-1979,” InternationalHistory Review 16 (Feb. 1994), 49-69; andRaymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confron-tation: American-Soviet Relations fromNixon to Reagan, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution, 1994), 977-1075.)

The documents below offer some indica-tion of the apprehension Soviet leaders feltabout sending military forces in the spring of1979, as well as of the secretiveness sur-rounding the actual decision to intervenewhen it was finally made. The first docu-ments concern a visit to Moscow in March1979 by Afghan Prime Minister NurMohammad Taraki, whose communistPeople’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan(PDPA) had come to power in the bloodyApril 1978 coup or revolution (the termdepends on who tells the story) that over-threw the non-aligned Daoud government.Since then, his regime had faced rising inter-nal opposition—from Islamic activists whoresented the imposition of atheistic and mod-ernistic ideas, from fiercely independenttribes who disliked increasing centraliza-tion, and, after the dissolution of a short-lived alliance, from the PDPA’s own

“Parcham” faction, which Taraki’s moremilitant “Khalq” faction had methodicallypurged from the government.

Taraki’s hastily-arranged trip to Mos-cow had been occasioned by the most seri-ous outbreak yet to threaten his rule, aviolent rebellion in the Afghan city of Heratthat broke out in mid-March which saw thedefection of army units and the killing ofSoviet advisers and Khalq officials. CPSUCC Politburo records show that from theoutset of the uprising, Soviet leaders consid-ered, yet rejected, urgent telephone appealsfrom Taraki and his powerful deputy,Hafizullah Amin, to send in Soviet militaryforces to help the evidently shaky Afghanarmy suppress the spreading revolt. Duringa Politburo meeting “About the Exacerba-tion of the Situation in the Democratic Re-public of Afghanistan and Our PossibleMoves” on March 17, when the situation inHerat appeared grave, the discussion seemedto focus on the unacceptability of allowingthe government’s opponents to get the upperhand, as the following comments by ForeignMinister Andrei A. Gromyko and Prime Min-ister Alexei N. Kosygin indicated:

GROMYKO. We have to discuss what wewill do if the situation gets worse. Today, thesituation in Afghanistan for now is unclear tomany of us. Only one thing is clear—we cannotsurrender Afghanistan to the enemy. We have tothink how to achieve this. Maybe we won’t haveto introduce troops.

KOSYGIN. All of us agree—we must notsurrender Afghanistan. From this point, we haveto work out first of all a political document, to useall political means in order to help the Afghanleadership to strengthen itself, to provide thesupport which we’ve already planned, and toleave as a last resort the use of force....

Yet, on March 18, as the Politburo contin-ued to deliberate, a consensus emerged, ledby KGB chairman Andropov, against directSoviet military intervention. Even Gromyko,despite his admonition only a day beforethat Afghanistan must not be surrendered,gave an impassioned, indeed prescient warn-ing against dispatching troops.

ANDROPOV. We know Lenin’s teachingabout a revolutionary situation. Whatever type ofsituation we are talking about in Afghanistan, it isnot that type of situation. Therefore, I believe thatwe can suppress a revolution in Afghanistan onlywith the aid of our bayonets, but that is for usentirely inadmissable. We cannot take such a

DOCUMENTATION

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 71

of the CPSU, March 17 [and 18 and 19], 1979],“Ob obostrenii obstanovki v DemokraticheskoiRespublike Afganistan i nashikh vozmozhnykhmerakh” [“On the Aggravation of the Situation inthe Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and OnOur Possible Measures”], translations by MarkH. Doctoroff, CWIHP; see also Garthoff, Detenteand Confrontation, rev. ed., pp. 992-93.)

On March 20, Taraki traveled to Mos-cow to plead in person with Soviet leadersfor renewed economic and military supportto overcome the Afghan government’s do-mestic enemies. The records of the ensuingconversations make clear that the primequestion on the agenda was Kabul’s requestfor external military intervention. Prior toseeing Brezhnev, Taraki met first with PrimeMinister Kosygin, Foreign MinisterGromyko, Defense Minister Dmitri F.Ustinov, and Politburo member Boris N.Ponomarev. Buoyed by reports that troopsloyal to him were regaining control in Herat,Taraki listened as Kosygin explained thePolitburo’s decision—vowing eternal So-viet-Afghan friendship and enhanced Sovietdiplomatic, economic, and military aid, buturging the Afghans to be self-reliant when itcame to actual fighting (using an eerilyironic example). Introductions by JimHershberg, CWIHP director; translationsbelow by Danny Rozas; documents providedby Mark Kramer, Center for Foreign PolicyDevelopment, Brown University, and Rus-sian Research Center, Harvard University.

* * * * * *

Distributed to the membersand candidate members

of the Politburo of CC CPSU

Subject to return(General office, 1st sector)

No. P499

Top SecretSPECIAL FILE

RECORD OF MEETINGx

of A.N.KOSYGIN, A.A.GROMYKO,D.F.USTINOV and B.N.PONOMAREV with

N.M.TARAKI

20 March 1979

A.N. KOSYGIN. The Politburo has entrusted usto discuss with you all questions which youbelieve necessitate an exchange of opinions. As

I have already mentioned to you, your meetingwith L.I.Brezhnev is scheduled for 18-18.30.

At first we proposed that the first wordshould be given to you, but since one importantquestion from your side has already been raised,I would like to first set forth our opinion, and thenwe will attentively hear you out.

First of all, I would like to emphasize that thefriendship between Soviet Union and the Demo-cratic Republic of Afghanistan is not conditional,dictated by some temporary viewpoints, but cal-culated for ages. We have given and will con-tinue to give you assistance in the fight against allenemies which act against you at the present timeand against those enemies with which you mayclash in the future.

We have carefully discussed the situationwhich has developed in your country, we lookedfor ways to assist you which would best serve theinterests of our friendship and your relations withother countries. There may be various ways ofsolving the problems which have developed inyour country, but the best way is that whichwould preserve the authority of your governmentamong the people, not spoil relations betweenAfghanistan and neighboring countries, and notinjure the international prestige of your country.We must not allow the situation to seem as if youwere not able to deal with your own problems andinvited foreign troops to assist you. I would liketo use the example of Vietnam. The Vietnamesepeople withstood a difficult war with the USAand are now fighting against Chinese aggression,but no one can accuse the Vietnamese of usingforeign troops. The Vietnamese are bravelydefending by themselves their homeland againstaggressive encroachments. We believe that thereare enough forces in your country to stand up tocounter-revolutionary raids. They only need tobe genuinely united, and created into new mili-tary formations. During our telephone conversa-tion with you we spoke of the need to beginalready to create new military groups, keeping inmind that a certain amount of time will be neededfor their training and preparation. But even at thegiven time you have at your disposal a sufficientforce in order to deal with the present situation.One only needs to deal with the matter correctly.Let’s take the example of Herat. It seemed that allwould fall apart, that the enemy would quicklyentrench itself there, that the city would becomea center of counter-revolution. But when youreally took charge of the matter, you were able toseize the situation. We have just received wordthat today, at 11 o’clock in the morning, themilitary town in Herat where the mutinous part ofthe 17th infantry division is located, after air-bombardment strikes has been taken by a batallionof [paratroops?] supported by tanks fromKandahar. Troops loyal to the government arestrengthening and evolving success.

Our assignment for the current time periodas we see it is to defend you from various interna-

risk....GROMYKO. I fully support Comrade

Andropov’s proposal to exclude a measure as theintroduction of our troops into Afghanistan. The[Afghan] army there is unreliable. Thus ourarmy if it enters Afghanistan will be an aggres-sor. Against whom will it fight? Against theAfghan people first of all, and it will have toshoot at them. Comrade Andropov correctlynoted that indeed the situation in Afghanistan isnot ripe for a [socialist] revolution. And all thatwe have done in recent years with such effort interms of a détente in international tensions, armsreductions, and much more—all that would bethrown back. Of course, this will be a nice gift forChina. All the nonaligned countries will beagainst us. In a word, serious consequences areto be expected from such an action. There will nolonger be any question of a meeting of LeonidIlych [Brezhnev] with [U.S. President Jimmy]Carter, and the visit of [French President Valery]Giscard d’Estaing at the end of March will beplaced in question. One must ask, and whatwould we gain? Afghanistan with its presentgovernment, with a backward economy, withinconsequential weight in international affairs.On the other side, we must keep in mind that froma legal point of view too we would not be justifiedin sending troops. According to the UN Chartera country can appeal for assistance, and we couldsend troops, in case it is subject to externalaggression. Afghanistan has not been subject toany aggression. This is its internal affair, arevolutionary internal conflict, battle of one groupof the population against another....

KOSYGIN. Maybe we should invite[Taraki] here and tell him, that we will increaseour assistance to you, but we cannot introducetroops, since they would be fighting not againstthe army, which in essence has gone over to theadversary or is just sitting and waiting it out, butagainst the people. There would be huge mi-nuses for us. A whole bouquet of countrieswould quickly come out against us. And thereare no pluses for us at all....

GROMYKO. ...We would be throwingaway everything which we achieved with suchdifficulty, particularly détente, the SALT-II ne-gotiations which would fly by the wayside, therewould be no signing of an agreement (and how-ever you look at it that is for us the greatestpolitical act), there would be no meeting ofLeonid Il’ich with Carter, and it is very doubtfulthat Giscard d’Estang would come to visit us, andour relations with Western countries, particu-larly the FRG, would be spoiled.

And so, despite the difficult situation inAfghanistan, we cannot embark on such an act asthe introduction of troops....

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 25, Dok. 1,“Zasedaniye Politbyuro TsK KPSS 17 marta1979 goda” [“Meeting of the Politburo of the CC

DOCUMENTATION


tional complications. We will give you assis-tance with all available means—ship weapons,ammunition, send people who can be useful toyou in managing military and domestic matters ofthe country, specialists to train your militarypersonnel for use of the most modern types ofweapons and military machinery, which we aresending you. But the deployment of our forces inthe territory of Afghanistan would immediatelyalarm the international community and wouldinvite sharply unfavorable multipronged conse-quences. This, in effect, would be a conflict notonly with the imperialist countries, but also aconflict with one’s own people. Our mutualenemies are just waiting for the moment whensoviet forces appear on Afghan territory. Thiswould give them an excuse to deploy on Afghanterritory military groups hostile to you. I wouldagain like to underline that the question of de-ploying our forces has been examined by us fromevery direction; we carefully studied all aspectsof this action and came to the conclusion that ifour troops were introduced, the situation in yourcountry would not only not improve, but wouldworsen. One cannot deny that our troops wouldhave to fight not only with foreign aggressors, butalso with a certain number of your people. Anda people does not forgive such things. Besides, assoon as our troops cross the border, China and allother aggressors will be vindicated.

With direct Soviet military intervention ruledout, Kosygin and Taraki go on to discussdiplomatic and political steps to bolsterKabul, particularly in regard to neighbor-ing countries. Kosygin notes that Moscowsent notes to Iran and Pakistan to warn them“in all seriousness not to meddle” in Afghanaffairs, and had received a promise to re-spect Afghan sovereignty and only deliverhumanitarian aid to refugees from Pakistanileader Mohammed Zia ul-Haq—a commit-ment Taraki finds hard to credit, since heblames Zia for “creating camps” to armguerrillas against his rule. “We are not sonaive as to believe every word of Zia-ul-Haq,” replies Kosygin, “but whatever thecase may be, the statement has been madeand it is binding.” The implications of arecent Iranian order to expel foreign work-ers are also discussed, with Taraki speculat-ing that exceptions may be made for Ameri-can helicopter specialists and Kosygin not-ing that “it is possible that we may havemore specialists in Iran than do the Ameri-cans.” Taraki expresses concern that amass influx of Afghan workers expelled fromIran might include rebel sympathizers.Though he insists that “the majority of peopleremain on our side” and that “We are doing

everything [possible] to rule the country notby force of arms, but by revolutionary-demo-cratic means,” Taraki then shifts the conver-sation to requests for additional militarysupplies, probing again for the possibility ofSoviet (or other foreign socialist) combat-ants to use them:

N.M. TARAKI. I wanted to touch on thequestion of the needs of the Afghan army. Wewould like to receive armored helicopters, anadditional number of armored transports and mili-tary infantry vehicles, as well as modern means ofcommunication. Also, maintenance personnelwould be of great help to us.

D.F. USTINOV. It seems that we are talkingabout MI-24 helicopters, which have bullet-proofarmor. We will give you 6 such helicopters duringJune-July and 6 more in the fourth quarter of thisyear.

N.M. TARAKI. We have great need forthese helicopters, and it would be good if theyarrived together with pilots.

A.N. KOSYGIN. We can send you mainte-nance specialists, which would take care of thesehelicopters at the airport, but, of course, not battlecrews. We have already spoken about the matter.

D.F. USTINOV. You must prepare yourown pilots. We are training your officers, and wecan expedite their release.

N.M. TARAKI. Perhaps we can get helicop-ter pilots from Hanoi or some other country, forexample, Cuba?

A.N. KOSYGIN. As I have already saidearlier, we have helped and are helping Vietnama great deal, but they never asked us to send themour pilots. They only asked for technical special-ists. We are training 400 Afghan officers. Choosethe people you need, and we will expedite theirtraining.

N.M. TARAKI. We would very much likethe delivery of helicopters to be expedited. Wehave a great need for them.

D.F. USTINOV. But, at the same time, youmust worry about pilots for these helicopters.

N.M. TARAKI. Of course we will do that. Ifwe cannot find them in our country, then we willlook elsewhere. The world is big. If you do notagree with that, then we will search for pilots fromamong the Afghanis studying with you, but weneed trustworthy people, and among the Afghanofficers who we sent to study in the Soviet Unionearlier there are many “Muslim brothers” andChinese sympathizers.

D.F. USTINOV. This year 190 Afghanofficers are finishing their training, among whom16 are airplane pilots and 13 [are] helicopterpilots.

N.M. TARAKI. Good. However, the prob-lem is that we don’t know the people belonging tocounter-revolutionary groups by name. We onlyknow that, during Daoud’s regime, members ofthe “Muslim Brotherhood” and the pro-Chinese

DOCUMENTATION“Shoalee Javid” organizations were sent over tothe Soviet Union. We will try to work this out.Promised an assortment of free militaryassistance—not only helicopters but recon-naissance vehicles, anti-aircraft units, trooptransports, technical advisers, and train-ing—Taraki bargains for increased ship-ments of free wheat, pleading poverty, poorharvests due to land confiscations, and ab-rogations by Turkey and Pakistan of prom-ised deals. Kosygin, bargaining hard, notesthat the Afghans lack the capacity to trans-port deliveries of wheat beyond what theSoviets were offering, and that since Kabulwas “ready to pay for Pakistani wheat, youmust have money.” He suggests giving theavailable funds to Moscow, which couldthen purchase American wheat and transferit to Afghanistan: “Find as much as you can,and with that sum we will buy you wheat.”Taraki then requests that Moscow build forKabul a 1000-kilowatt radio station, “whichwould allow us to broadcast propagandathroughout the world. Our radio station isweak. While any slanderous declaration ofsome religious leader is spread throughoutthe world through foreign organs of masspropaganda, the voice of our radio stationremains almost unheard.” Ponomarevcounters that “We are taking energetic mea-sures to spread propaganda about the suc-cesses of the DRA [Democratic Republic ofAfghanistan],” for instance reprintingTaraki’s speech in Pravda and broadcastingit to Moslem countries, and offers to send a“specialist in propaganda.” Kosygin defersthe radio request for further study. Then thequestion of military advisers crops up again,and Taraki once more seeks an opening tosecure Moscow’s support for using foreignpilots and tank operators, to the obviousirritation of Kosygin, who not only rebuffsthe idea sharply but issues a pointed warn-ing to Taraki to act more judiciously towardhis own advisers:

D.F. USTINOV. Concerning additionalshipments of military machinery, a need willarise for additional military specialists and advis-ers.

N.M. TARAKI. If you believe that such aneed exists, then, of course, we will accept them.But won’t you allow us, after all, to use pilots andtank operators from other socialist countries?

A.N. KOSYGIN. When referring to ourmilitary specialists, we mean mechanics whoservice military machinery. I cannot understandwhy the question of pilots and tank operatorskeeps coming up. This is a completely unex-


A.A.Gromyko, D.F.Ustinov and B.N.Ponomarev.

L.I. BREZHNEV. Over the last few days wehave been watching with alarm the developmentof events in Afghanistan. From what you said inconversation with our comrades, it seems theAfghan friends are gravely alarmed as well.

We must take steps to correct the situationthat has developed and eliminate the threat to thenew order in the DRA. And not only eliminate thethreat, but also work to strengthen the gains of theApril revolution.

As we see it, it is very important to widen thebase which supports the leadership of the partyand the country. First of all, of great importancehere is the unity of your party, mutual trust, andideo[logical]-political solidarity throughout itsranks from top to bottom.

It is worth thinking about creating a singlenational front under the aegis of the People’sdemocratic party of Afghanistan as the recog-nized leader of the people. Such a front couldinclude already existing socio-political organiza-tions and be supported by groups of workers,peasants, petty and middle bourgeoisie, the intel-ligentsia and students, youth, and progressivewomen. Its purpose would be to consolidate anti-imperialist and national patriotic forces againstdomestic and foreign reactionaries. It could alsoserve in the political upbringing of the popula-tion.

In rural areas it would be expedient to orga-nize poverty committees consisting of property-less and petty peasants and metayers [sharecrop-pers] to repel feudalists and capitalist landown-ers.

And, of course, everything must be done sothat the army is staunchly on the side of thepeople’s revolutionary government.

It is important that the commanding ranks inthe army feel assured of the stability of theirpositions. One cannot expect much from an armywhen commanding cadres are frequently replaced.This is even more true if the cadre changes areaccompanied by arrests. Many commanders,seeing their colleagues arrested and disappear-ing, begin to feel unsure of their own future.

All of this does not mean that repressivemeasures should not be taken with regard to thosewho have serious evidence of untrustworthinessto the revolutionary government. But this weaponis very sharp and must be used with the utmostcaution.

As for the events in Herat, the normalizationof the situation in this city would have a positiveinfluence on the situation of the country as awhole and would have a chilling effect on circlesill disposed towards the revolutionary govern-ment.

It seems that the work carried out by thevarious types of enemies of the new order, includ-ing the reactionary clergy, to undermine the neworder is much more active and on a greater scale

pected question for us. And I believe that it isunlikely that socialist countries will agree to this.The question of sending people who would sit inyour tanks and shoot at your people—this is avery pointed political question.

N.M. TARAKI. We will see how we can usethose Afghani soldiers who were sent to studywith you earlier. Perhaps we will ask you toaccept for training those people who we willselect ourselves.

D.F. USTINOV. We will, of course, acceptthem for training.

A.N. KOSYGIN. To sum up this conversa-tion, we can ascertain that there remains thequestion of the construction of a powerful radiostation. There remains also the question of expe-diting the deliveries of military technology. You,as we understand, will select helicopter pilotsfrom the officers training with us. If you have anyother requests or desires, you may inform usthrough the Soviet ambassador and the chiefmilitary adviser. We will carefully review them,and will react accordingly.

We will continue to use political means todefend the DRA from its imperialist aggressors.Our press will also support the DRA.

We think it important that within your coun-try you should work to widen the social support ofyour regime, draw people over to your side,insure that nothing will alienate the people fromthe government. And finally, not as a matter ofdiscussion but as a wish, I would like to expressmy ideas on the importance of a very careful andcautious approach towards your staff. One shouldtake care of one’s staff and have an individualapproach towards it. Have a thorough and goodunderstanding with each person before hangingany labels on them.

The meeting breaks up after Kosygin as-sures an obviously disappointed Taraki thatMoscow would reconsider its stand againstsending troops should Afghanistan be sub-jected to foreign aggression:

A.N. KOSYGIN. If an armed invasion ofyour country takes place, then it will be a com-pletely different situation. But right now we aredoing everything to insure that such an invasiondoes not occur. And I think that we will be ableto achieve this.

N.M. TARAKI. I pose this question be-cause China is persistently pushing the Pakistanisagainst us.

A.N. KOSYGIN. When aggression takesplace, then a completely different situation arises.The Chinese were convinced of this through theexample of Vietnam and are biting their elbowsnow, so to speak. As for Afghanistan, we havealready taken measures to guard it from aggres-sion. I have already said that we have sentcorresponding messages to the president of Paki-stan, [Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah]

Khomeini, and the prime minister of Iran.N.M. TARAKI. Must I tell the members of

our Politburo that the Soviet Union will give theDRA only political support and other aid?

A.N. KOSYGIN. Yes, both political supportand extensive assistance in the line of military andother shipments. This is the decision of ourPolitburo. L.I. Brezhnev will tell you about thisduring the meeting with you, which will start in 10min[utes]. I think that you will return to Afghani-stan confident of our support, confident of yourown actions.

21.III.79.AK-786ss

30 copies21.III.79.___________________x) This record has not been seen by the partici-pants

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 14, Dok. 26.)

Taraki is then ushered into Brezhnev’sKremlin office. The Soviet leader uses theoccasion not only to reaffirm the decisionagainst dispatching troops—a decision, hestresses, that should be kept strictly secret—but to preach to Taraki the importance ofwidening the base of the government’s sup-port among the Afghan people through po-litical and economic means, and of taking amore moderate attitude toward the military,the clergy, and others in order to lessen fearsof persecution. He also expresses mystifica-tion at the “abnormal” situation of openborders between Afghanistan and its neigh-bors given the infiltration of armed rebels.Taraki’s response—essentially defending hispresent approach—could not have satisfiedhis Moscow interlocutors.

Subject to return to CC CPSU(General Office, 1st sector)

No. P486

Distributed to the membersand candidate members

of the Politburo of CC CPSUTop Secret

SPECIAL FILE

RECORD OF CONVERSATIONx

of L.I.Brezhnev with N.M.Taraki

20 March 1979

Also present: comr[ade]s. A.N.Kosygin,

DOCUMENTATION


than the political work of the government repre-sentatives in the area. This point is of exceptionalimportance not only in Herat, but in the rest of thecountry as well.

Appropriate work must be done with theclergy in order to split their ranks; this could wellbe achieved by getting at least apart of the clergy,if not to actually support the government openly,then to at least not speak out against it. This couldbe best of all achieved by showing that the newgovernment is not trying to persecute the leadersand representatives of the clergy, but only thosewho speak out against the revolutionary govern-ment.

And now for the question of the possibilityof deploying soviet military forces in Afghani-stan. We examined this question from everyangle, weighed it carefully, and, I will tell youfrankly: this should not be done. This would onlyplay into the hands of the enemies—yours andours. You already had a more detailed discussionof this question with our comrades.

Obviously, to announce publicly—either forus or for you—that we are not intent on doing thisis, for understandable reasons, not advisable.

We will give you all necessary politicalsupport. Already, we are addressing Pakistan andIran with strong warnings not to interfere in theinternal matters of Afghanistan.

It would be well if soviet economic aid,especially things like the delivery of 100 thou.tons of wheat and the increase in the price ofnatural gas supplied [exported] by Afghanistan,were made known to the Afghan people in thenecessary manner, using the means of mass infor-mation. This is of foremost importance in strength-ening the position of the Afghan government.

The arms and military technology that weare additionally supplying you with will increasethe strength of the Afghan army. However, thiswill only be true if the arms are placed in trust-worthy hands and not in the hands of the enemy.

As you have asked, we have sent you numer-ous advisers and specialists both in military andother matters. You have working for you 500generals and officers. If necessary, we can sendan additional number of party workers, as well as150-200 officers.

One more question: how do you explain thefact that, despite the complications in the situa-tion and the deployment of a thousand armedpeople from Iran and Pakistan, your borders withthese countries were, in effect, open, and it seemseven now are not closed? This is an abnormalsituation, and, in our opinion,it should be fixed.

Finally, I would like to emphasize oncemore that in the current situation the most impor-tant factor will be the ability to draw greatercircles of the population to your side throughpolitical and economic means. It is important toalso re-examine the arsenal of methods utilizedand eliminate those that may cause legitimatealarm in people and give them a desire to protest.

N.M. TARAKI. With regard to creating asingle national front in Afghanistan, I would liketo say that it essentially exists in the shape ofparty, komsomol, trade unions and other masspublic organizations, which function under theleadership of the People’s democratic party ofAfghanistan. However, it cannot yet firmly es-tablish itself in the socio-political life of Afghani-stan because of its economic backwardness andas yet insufficient level of political developmentin a certain part of the population.

However, under the current situation theleadership of the country cannot avoid the use ofextreme measures when dealing with accom-plices of international imperialism andreactionism. The repressive measures takenagainst ranks of representatives of the clergy,Maoists, and other persons partaking in opencombat against the new people’s government arecompletely in accordance with the law and no oneturns to persecution without lawfully establish-ing the guilt of the accused.

The Afghan people do not want war withIran and Pakistan, but if war does break out, thenit will not be to their advantage—the Pashtunsand Baluchis would be on the side of Afghani-stan. I would like to point out that the presentgovernment of Pakistan, and not without the helpof China, is trying to play an important role in theincitement of anti-Afghan elements, includingAfghanis showing up in Pakistan. Our party andgovernment are trying to react calmly to theseaspirations on the part of Pakistan and not worsenthe relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The question of closing our borders withIran and Pakistan is rather difficult. We areunable to do this because of the absence of thenecessary means. Besides, the closing of theAfghan-Pakistan border would create discontentamong Afghani and Pakistani Pashtuns andBaluchis who maintain close family ties, and inthe final result would significantly damage theprestige of the current government in Afghani-stan.

30 copies.21.III.79. [21 March 1979]

x) This record has not been seen by the partici-pants.


Moscow’s dissatisfaction with the Af-ghan leadership and its handling of eventsand concern with its lack of support amongthe Afghan people was evident in a 1 April1979 special report for the Politburo pre-pared after Taraki’s visit by Gromyko,Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev and re-printed in the previous issue of the Cold War

International History Project Bulletin (Issue3, pp. 67-69). That report reaffirmed thecorrectness of the Soviet refusal to sendmilitary forces to repress the “counter-revo-lution.” But despite the repression of theHerat rebellion the anti-government activ-ity persisted and so did Kabul’s desire fordirect Soviet military support. Shortly afterhis return to Kabul, Taraki was replaced asprime minister by his Khalq deputy,Hafizullah Amin. In April, Amin reiteratedthe now familiar appeal to Moscow for So-viet helicopter pilots for use against rebelforces, eliciting the following Politburo re-sponse, together with the instructions sent tothe chief Soviet military adviser in Kabul fortransmission to Amin.

* * * * * *

Proletariat of all countries, unite!

Subject to return in the course of 3 daysto CC CPSU (General office, 1st sector)Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

CENTRAL COMMITTEETOP SECRET

SPECIAL FILE

P150/93

To Comrs. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov,Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev,Smirtyukov.

Extract from protocol #150 of the CC CPSUPolitburo sessionfrom 21 April 1979__________________________

On the inexpediency of the participation of sovietmilitary helicopter crews in the suppression ofcounter-revolutionary activities in the DemocraticRepublic of Afghanistan.

1. To agree with the proposal on this questionsubmitted in the memorandum by the Ministry ofDefense on 18 April 1979, #318/3/0430.2. To ratify the draft of instructions to the chiefmilitary adviser in the DRA (attached).

SECRETARY of CC

* * * * * *

[attached] to article 93 protocol # 150


DOCUMENTATION


KABULTO CHIEF MILITARY ADVISERInform the Prime-Minister of the Demo-

cratic Republic of Afghanistan H. Amin that therequest to send 15-20 military helicopters withsoviet crews has been delivered to the Sovietgovernment.

Tell him that the Afghan government hasalready been given explanations on the inexpedi-ency of direct participation of soviet military sub-units in the suppression of counter-revolutionaryactivities in the DRA, as such actions would beused by the enemies of the Afghan revolution andforeign hostile forces in order to falsify sovietinternational aid to Afghanistan and to carry outanti-governmental and anti-soviet propagandaamong the Afghan population.

Emphasize that during March-April of thisyear, the DRA has already been sent 25 militaryhelicopters which are equipped with 5-10 com-plete sets of combat ammunition.

Convince H. Amin that existing combathelicopters with Afghan crews are capable, alongwith subdivisions of land-based forces and com-bat aircraft, of solving the problems of suppress-ing counter-revolutionary actions.

Work out for the Afghan command the nec-essary recommendations pertaining to this ques-tion.


Yet between May and December 1979,the situation continued to deteriorate, andfor reasons that are still not entirely clear,Moscow changed its mind about sendingtroops. Why the turnabout? Several poten-tial explanations exist. One factor was un-doubtedly the grave internal situation inAfghanistan, which Moscow viewed withgrowing concern, receiving reports from aparade of special emissaries sent to urgeKabul to modify and moderate its course.While blaming outside countries (Iran, Pa-kistan, China, the United States) for exacer-bating the situation, Soviet leaders recog-nized deep problems with the Afghan leader-ship itself, and rumors arose that Moscowwas angling to replace the Khalqi Taraki-Amin regime with one headed by BabrakKarmal, head of the Parcham faction. Mu-tinies and rebel attacks continued, and Mos-cow began to increase its security presencein the country, though still short of sendingmilitary forces. In September-October 1979,tensions between Taraki and Amin and theirsupporters exploded into open warfare, end-ing with Amin in control and Taraki dead—a result clearly contrary to the Kremlin’swishes. Surface cooperation between Kabul

and Moscow continued, with Amin even re-questing the disptach of Soviet troops. ButSoviet leaders were privately convinced ofAmin’s “insincerity and duplicity” (the quo-tation is from a report for a Politburo meet-ing of 31 October 1979, cited in Trud (Mos-cow), 23 June 1992, and Garthoff, Detenteand Confrontation, rev. ed., 1011) and hisinability to successfully contain the rebelinsurgency, and may well have begun plot-ting to remove him—although much remainsunclear about this period, as it is for the fewmonths immediately preceding the interven-tion that the fewest internal Soviet docu-ments have so far become available. Still,even the likely defeat of the clearly unpopu-lar government would not alter the reasonswhy Moscow had rejected intervention theprevious spring—so what else had changed?One possibility concerns the continuinggrowth of Islamic fundamentalism in theregion, and most importantly the Iranianrevolution of 1978-79, which had deposedthe Shah after a quarter-century in powerand installed in his place a theocracy domi-nated by the Ayatollah Khomeini. In their 1April 1979 report to the Politburo, Gromyko,Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev hadpointed to the “situation in Iran and thespark of religious fanatacism all around theMuslim East” as the “underlying cause” ofthe anti-Kabul agitation. Moscow may wellhave also feared the spread of religious zealinto the mostly-Moslem Central Asian re-publics of the USSR itself—a latent threatthat would not become evident to the rest ofthe world for another decade to come. Sincethe spring, the fundamentalist tide had onlybecome stronger, with Islamic radicals tak-ing firmer control of the Iranian revolution(and seizing the U.S. Embassy in Tehran inNovember), sparking unrest in Saudi Arabia,and calling for a jihad against other Arabregimes and against both superpowers.These developments related to the largerquestion of the changed international con-text since the spring’s decision against non-intervention. Although Brezhnev and Carterhad met in Vienna in June 1979 to sign aSALT II treaty, US-Soviet ties had beensinking ever since, with acrimony stirred bythe “Cuban brigade” brouhaha later thatsummer—the flap, regarded by Moscow as aprovocation, over the presence of Soviettroops in Cuba that U.S. intelligence hadlost track of—and by the failure of the Senateto ratify, or even vote on the ratification of,

the SALT II treaty. The concerns Gromykohad expressed in March about the negativeinternational repercussions of a Soviet mili-tary intervention in Afghanistan were, infact, no less valid, but he and other Sovietleaders may have come to feel that there wasless to be lost in that sphere anyway—thatdétente was already effectively dead. Fi-nally, still to be resolved is the argumentadvanced by some analysts that U.S. irreso-lution in responding to the Iranian Revolu-tion and the capture of the U.S. Embassy inNovember 1979 emboldened Moscow toadvance toward its purported goal of a warm-water port in the Persian Gulf. If anything,however, the weight of the evidence in thedocuments that have become available sug-gest that Moscow’s considerations were moreinfluenced by fear of losing Afghanistan toIslamic radicalism than by hopes of usingthe country as a military springboard todominate the region.

Still, it must be emphasized that thearchival documents that have become avail-able so far do not permit a clear reconstruc-tion of Soviet decision-making in late 1979.Further evidence, particularly Politburotranscripts, may reside in the Russian Presi-dential Archives. But the closest documentto a “smoking gun” for the intervention thathas emerged is a memorandum dated 12December 1979, apparently in Chernenko’shandwriting. Six days earlier, the Politburohad approved sending a 500-man “Spetznaz”(military intelligence special unit) force toAfghanistan. And now, the Politburo sub-group of Andropov, Ustinov, and Gromyko(Ponomarev was absent), together withChernenko, obtained Brezhnev’s signed con-sent to implement the agreed-upon mea-sures leading to the deployment of 50-75,000Soviet troops in Afghanistan later that month,and (using the “Spetznaz” force mentionedabove) to the killing of Amin and his replace-ment by Babrak Karmal as Afghan leaderand head of the PDPA. That a full CPSU CCPolitburo meeting was not held to approvethe invasion until it had taken place, and thatthe memorandum was hand-written to avoidinforming typists, phrased euphemisticallyto avoid explicit reference to troops, or evento Afghanistan (“A”), reflect the secrecywith which the fateful step ultimately cameabout. More Russian documents on theAfghan events will appear in future issues ofthe CWIHP Bulletin.

DOCUMENTATION



Issues 8-9 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.

NEW EAST-BLOC EVIDENCE ON

The Cold War in the Third Worldand the

Collapse of Détente in the 1970s

Winter 1996/1997

In January 1976, during several days of negotiations in Moscowwith Kremlin leaders, U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissingerpleaded for a Soviet gesture to ease the superpower confrontation inAngola, where the USSR’s airlift of military equipment and Cubantroops had allowed the leftist government in Luanda to withstand anassault by guerrilla forces backed by South Africa. The action coulddo “irreparable damage” to detente, Kissinger warned, underminingsupporters of that policy (above all Kissinger himself) in the UnitedStates. And that would be a “tragedy” since neither Moscow norWashington had any significant interests in Angola, and “Five yearsfrom now it will make no difference.”

According to recently declassified transcripts of the talks, ob-tained under the Freedom of Information Act by the NationalSecurity Archive, Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Le-onid I. Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko rebuffedthe American’s increasingly plaintive entreaties with the curt re-sponse that any complaints should be taken up with Havana, sincethe Cuban intervention was the result of decisions made betweentwo sovereign states, Angola and Cuba, and the USSR could notspeak for them. At a Friday morning session with Gromyko at theForeign Ministry’s Tolstoi House, Kissinger finally gave up, wist-fully calling it “a pity that this has come to pass when manyopportunities existed for two great powers to settle this in a far-sighted way.” “It wouldn’t be the first time in history,” he rued, “that eventsthat no one can explain afterwards give rise to consequences out ofproportion to their intrinsic significance.” Five years later, détente had indeed collapsed, in large measuredue to a series of superpower conflicts in the Third World—overAngola, the Horn of Africa, Cuba, and Afghanistan, among otherlocations—and another U.S. Secretary of State, Alexander M. Haig,Jr., confronted another communist interlocutor in an even more

secretive setting. This time, in the fall of 1981, at the height ofthe public hostility between the Reagan Administration andFidel Castro’s Cuba, Haig was clandestinely meeting theCuban Vice President, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, in a MexicoCity suburb. And one key subject for debate was a review ofrecent history: How had Cuba become involved in Africa, andwhy did U.S.-Cuban relations begin to “go very poorly” in1975-76 and continue to deteriorate thereafter? (The record ofthat meeting remains classified in U.S. and Cuban archives,but the Cold War International History Project Bulletin in thisissue publishes a translated transcript obtained from the Rus-sian archives.)

While Haig, repeating charges made during the CarterAdministration, insisted that Cuba had acted as a Soviet proxyor puppet by intervening in Angola and the Horn of Africa,Rodriguez maintained just as stoutly that Havana had actedindependently, out of its own interests, albeit (especially in thelatter case) in coordination with Moscow; if anything, hedeclared, far from Moscow pulling the strings, it had beenCastro, not Brezhnev, who had been the most ardent advocateof sending military support to revolutionary leaders in Africa.

“The outward geopolitical character of these events iscompletely at odds with the essence of the true facts . . . Historywill bring all of this to light,” Rodriguez is quoted as tellingHaig, adding: “One fine day, all of this will come to light. Youcan believe me or not, but some day this will be commonknowledge.”

That “fine day” has not quite arrived—much remainsclassified or hidden in archives and memories on all sides ofthe events—but with this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin, it hascome palpably closer.

continued on page 4

*FOR IMPORTANT SUBSCRIBERINFORMATION, SEE INSIDE BACKCOVER (P. 421) !!! *VISIT THE CWIHP WEBSITE:http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/cwihp

ALSO IN THIS ISSUE:* MORE NEW EVIDENCE

ON THE COLD WAR IN ASIA* MORE RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS

ON THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

* NEW EVIDENCE ON SOVIETDECISION-MAKING AND THE 1956POLISH AND HUNGARIAN CRISES

* RESEARCH NOTES—SOVIETNUCLEAR HISTORY


TABLE OF CONTENTSNew Evidence on the Cold War in the Third World and the Collapse of Detente in the 1970s

Editor’s Introduction............................................................................................................................................................................1New Evidence on the Cold War in Southern AfricaHavana’s Policy in Africa, 1959-76: New Evidence from Cuban Archives, by Piero Gleijeses...............................................................5Fidel Castro’s 1977 Southern Africa Tour: A Report to Honecker............................................................................................................ 8Moscow and the Angolan Crisis: A New Pattern of Intervention, by Odd Arne Westad...........................................................................21Soviet Documents on Angola and Southern Africa, 1975-1979................................................................................................................32Anatomy of a Third World Cold War Crisis: New East-bloc Evidence on the Horn of Africa, 1977-1978Introduction, by James G. Hershberg........................................................................................................................................................ 38The Horn, the Cold War, and New Documents from the Former East-bloc: An Ethiopian View, by Ermias Abebe................................40Moscow, Mengistu, and the Horn: Difficult Choices for the Kremlin, by Paul B. Henze........................................................................ 45East Germany and the Horn Crisis: Documents on SED Afrikapolitik, by Christian F. Ostermann......................................................... 47Russian and East German Documents on the Horn of Africa, 1977-1978................................................................................................ 50U.S.-Soviet Relations and the Turn Toward Confrontation, 1977-1980: New Russian & East German DocumentsIntroduction, by James G. Hershberg........................................................................................................................................................ 103Russian and East German Documents....................................................................................................................................................... 104New Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in AfghanistanConcerning the Situation in “A”: New Russian Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, by Odd Arne Westad.................. 128The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents from the Russian and East German Archives............................................ 133U.S.-Cuban Relations and the Cold War, 1976-1981: New Evidence from Communist ArchivesIntroduction, by James G. Hershberg........................................................................................................................................................ 185Russian and East German Documents....................................................................................................................................................... 186Cuba as Superpower: Havana and Moscow, 1979, by Jorge I. Dominguez.............................................................................................. 216A “Moment of Rapprochement”: The Haig-Rodriguez Secret Talks, by Peter Kornbluh......................................................................... 217

More New Evidence on the Cold War in AsiaIntroduction, by James G. Hershberg........................................................................................................................................................ 220More on Mao in Moscow, Dec. 1949-Feb. 1950....................................................................................................................................... 223Fighting for Friendship: Mao, Stalin, and the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1950, by Odd Arne Westad..........................................224Translated Russian and Chinese Documents on Mao Zedong’s Visit to Moscow, December 1949-February 1950.................................226The Discrepancy between the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao’s 2 October 1950 Message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the Korean War: A Chinese Scholar’s Reply, by Shen Zhihua........................................................................................................237Stalin, Mao, Kim and Korean War Origins, 1950: A Russian Documentary Discrepancy, by Dieter Heinzig......................................... 240Khrushchev vs. Mao: A Preliminary Sketch of the Role of Personality in the Sino-Soviet Split, by William Taubman..........................243A New “Cult of Personality”: Suslov’s Secret Report on Mao, Khrushchev, and Sino-Soviet Tensions, December 1959...................... 244A Crucial Step toward the Sino-Soviet Schism: The Withdrawal of Soviet Experts from China, July 1960, by Chen Jian.....................246The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives, by M.Y. Prozumenschikov........................................................................................................................................ 251New East-bloc Documents on the Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959 & 1962.....................................................................................................258

Mor e New Evidence on the Cuban Missile CrisisMore New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: More Documents from the Russian Archives, by James G. Hershberg.................... 270More on Bobby and the Cuban Missile Crisis, by James G. Hershberg....................................................................................................274Russian Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis...................................................................................................................................... 278The Mikoyan-Castro Talks, 4-5 November 1962: The Cuban Version..................................................................................................... 320The “Lessons” of the Cuban Missile Crisis for Warsaw Pact Nuclear Operations, by Mark Kramer.......................................................348

Special Feature: New Evidence on the 1956 Polish and Hungarian CrisesConferences in Budapest, Potsdam Spotlight Cold War Flashpoints........................................................................................................ 355Togliatti on Nagy, 30 October 1956: Missing Cable Found...................................................................................................................... 357New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises, by Mark Kramer..............................................358The “Malin Notes” on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956, translated and annotated by Mark Kramer.......................................... 385

Research NotesThe Russian Nuclear Declassification Project: Setting up the A-Bomb Effort, 1946, by G.A. Goncharov, N.I. Komov, and A.S. Stepanov.................................................................................................................................................................................................410Khrushchev’s 1960 Troop Cut: New Russian Evidence, by Vladislav M. Zubok.....................................................................................416

IMPORTANT SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION: TO KEEP RECEIVING THE BULLETIN , TURN TO PAGE 421

Staff


tions with the USA. The negotiations were,frankly speaking, very difficult and this notonly because of their intensity. The largestdifficulties were connected with the natureof the questions with which we dealt, withthe differences, yes, even with direct con-trasts between our views.

As you know, it is not our habit to avoiddifficult questions. The Middle East, South-east Asia, the situation in Southern Africa,the relationship between the USA and China- on all these questions I explained our ba-sic point of view. With great determinationI conveyed to Carter our opinion on thewrong theses of American propaganda withrespect to the “Soviet threat” as well as withrespect to the “violation of human rights”in the Socialist countries. Carter’s situation,as the recent rearrangement in Washingtonproved, is not easy. A bitter battle over thecoming into force [ratification] of the SALTII-Treaty is now being waged. If the treatyfailed in the Senate, this would be, I think, apolitical catastrophe for Carter. But it wouldalso be an extremely severe blow to the in-ternational prestige of the USA.

You will of course understand that, byand large, the prospect of the failure of thetreaty is not desirable for us. But even insuch a case, we will probably not lose po-litically because then the entire world willrecognize who is consistently seeking dis-armament and who is working in the oppo-site direction. But we all should try - in theframework of our means - to make sure thisimportant matter will have a different end.

And now to the European matters. Hereobviously much depends on proceeding withour initiatives in the field of disarmamentwhich we have taken at the meeting of the[Warsaw Pact] Political Consultative Com-mittee in Moscow and later at the meetingof the Committee of Foreign Ministers inBudapest.

The reaction to our proposal has beena bit vague. The NATO countries seem tohave acknowledged the positive direction ofthe efforts of the Warsaw Pact countries butan audible “yes” was not to be heard. It isgood that currently the necessary link isbeing established at the level of foreign min-istries between the European conference onmilitary detente as proposed by us and theEuropean meeting [of the Conference onSecurity and Cooperation in Europe(CSCE)] in Madrid in 1980.

If our proposal on the conclusion of a

treaty on the non-first use of nuclear weap-ons as well as other kinds of arms is ac-cepted, it would, I must say, constitute a tre-mendous advantage for the cause of detente.By the way, I have also talked about thiswith Carter. We have proposed to him a dec-laration to the effect that both sides wouldforego the first use of either nuclear or con-ventional arms against the other side or itsallies. Initially Carter declared that he wouldagree and said that one could try to arrangefor an agreeable formula. But later theAmericans put on the reverse gear. But onehas to understand that after all we wrestledsix years over the conclusion of SALT II.

The Chinese problem still demandsgreatest attention.

The nature of Chinese foreign policyrevealed itself in China’s aggression againstVietnam. The Chinese are now negotiatingwith the Vietnamese comrades but they areconducting the negotiations in a way that itbecomes obvious that they do not want anormalization of relations but Vietnam’scapitulation. Moreover, there is a real dan-ger of new Chinese provocations againstVietnam. One has to take that seriously. Thisobliges all of us, of course, not to weakenin the slightest manner our support and ourhelp for the Vietnamese people as well asfor the peoples of Laos and Cambodia. Thereare more than enough problems and ex-tremely difficult problems. Let’s take the“refugee” matter. The enemies of Vietnamhave undertaken everything in order to makeuse of this problem to create a bad image ofVietnamese policy. To be sure, they did notmanage to turn the Geneva conference intoa trial of Vietnam. But obviously the mattercannot be put to rest. The Vietnamese friendsare facing a great political and propagan-distic job. We all have to support them inthis task.

Now briefly on our imminent negotia-tions with the Chinese about which you havelearned from the newspapers. One cannotexpect quick progress in the Soviet-Chinesedialogue. The negotiations with China willrequire great patience, circumspection, andexact calculation of each of our steps.

That having been said, I think it is im-portant for all of us not to relent in our op-position against China’s policy which runscounter to the cause of peace and interna-tional security.

A few words on the Middle East. Thefact that the question of prolonging the terms

for the presence of UN special forces on theSinai Peninsula does not appear any moreon the agenda of the Security Council un-doubtedly constitutes a success for our com-mon line. Hence the attempts to bless Israel’sseparate agreement with Egypt directly withthe authority of the UN failed. And that wasexactly what Cairo, Tel Aviv and Washing-ton persistently tried to achieve. But nowthe UN special troops have to be withdrawn.

With respect to international questions,Erich, I would like to briefly touch upon thesituation in Africa.

Recently we have had quite active con-tacts with representatives of the progressiveAfrican states. To generalize these talks andthe observations made by our comrades, andour CC comrades as well, the task of politi-cally strengthening the independent Africancountries is still in the forefront. But theproblem of our economic relations withthese states is already posed in its fullestextent. It is important and valuable that wevigorously oppose colonialism and racism.But the task which we have to meet togetherhas larger dimensions. It is necessary to in-volve the African countries to a larger de-gree in cooperation with us in the economicfield. This will be of advantage to us as wellas the Africans. Your trip through a numberof African countries, Erich, proved very use-ful. We highly appreciate your efforts insupport of the progressive forces in Africa.

[concluding remarks]

Honecker: [report on domestic Issues]

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 JIV 2/201/1313; document obtained and translated byC.F. Ostermann (CWIHP/National SecurityArchive); copy on file at the Archive.]

Document 10: CPSU CC PolitburoDecision, 1 February 1980, with

telegrams to Soviet Ambassador to WestGermany (for Willy Brandt) and

Finnish Social Democratic leader K.Sorsa (not printed)

Proletariats of all countries, unite!Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

CENTRALCOMMITTEETOP SECRET

No. P182/2

To Comrades Brezhnev, Suslov, Andropov,Gromyko, Kirilenko,Pel’she, Ponomarev,


Zimianin, Zamiatin, Rusakov

Extract from protocol No. 182 of thesession of the Politburo of the CC CPSU

of 1 February 1980

Re: Information for the Chairman of theSotzintern [Socialist International] W.Brandt and the Chairman of the Social-Democratic Party of Finland, K. Sorsa.

1.Confirm the text of a telegram to theSoviet Ambassador to the FRG (Attachment1).

2.Confirm the text of information fortransmittal to K. Sorsa (Attachment 2).

SECRETARY OF THE CENTRALCOMMITTEE

Attachments to No. 300s

[attachment 1]

Re: Item 2, Protocol No.182

SECRETAttachment 1

BONNTO SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Meet personally with W. Brandt, tellhim that you are authorized to communi-cate certain views on the international situ-ation that has developed, and expound onthe following text.

Recently, especially in connection withdecisions of the December session of theNATO Council, events have transpired thathave sharply complicated the internationalsituation.

It is possible that we do not share thesame views on everything. One way or an-other, under present circumstances, preciseand first hand information about assess-ments and intentions becomes especiallynecessary. The important thing is to find acommon language on the issue that has al-ready been the topic of our mutual preoccu-pation for many years - how to support theaim of strengthening international security.

Our general assessment of, and our po-sition on, the current international situation,are known to you from the responses ofComrade L. I. Brezhnev to questions put for-ward by the newspaper “Pravda,” publishedon January 13 of this year. That documentreflects the principled position of the Cen-tral Committee of the CPSU, from which

we shall proceed.We would like to communicate to you

our viewpoint on several concrete issues.The “Carter Doctrine.” The general as-

sessment of it by the Soviet side is set forthin the leading article of the newspaper“Pravda” dated January 29 of this year. Inour view, the platform articulated in theAmerican President’s speech, with whichyou are familiar, expresses in a concentratedform the course of the present Americanadministration, which was not just adoptedtoday, in connection with the events in Af-ghanistan. This course had already emergeda long time ago.

Fact No. One. At the May 1978 spe-cial session of the General Assembly of theUnited Nations in New York, the urgent is-sues relating to disarmament were dis-cussed, in connection with which the com-prehensive program of actions proposed bythe Soviet Union occupied the center of at-tention.

However, during the very same periodof days, in Washington, a session of theNATO Council at the highest level adopteda “long term program” of acceleration in ar-maments, calculated over a period of ten tofifteen years. At the same time, PresidentCarter proclaimed a doctrine of global ac-tions by NATO, expanding the “sphere ofresponsibility” of that military bloc intowidening regions, significantly exceedingthe framework stipulated in the agreementthat created the North Atlantic Bloc. In theapplication of this plan, NATO has appro-priated to itself theright to interfere militar-ily, particularly in Africa (recalling theevents of Zaire). Finally, at the same time,American official powers for the first timeopenly proclaimed a tie between their inter-ests, the interests of NATO, and the inter-ests of the Chinese Government, which, asis known, blatantly undermines the policyof detente.

Fact No. Two. A little more than half ayear ago, Carter signed the SALT II Agree-ment and spoke of its great significance forthe cause of peace and security. However,in the last year, the American administra-tion has essentially ruined the chances forratification of the agreement.

Fact No. Three. In the autumn of thisyear, the American government has under-taken active measures to organize a provoca-tive outcry concerning “Soviet forces inCuba.” This Cuban “mini-crisis” has been

necessary in order to whip up military fearsand further propagate the myth about a “So-viet threat,” to complicate the process forratification of SALT II and to justify newmilitary measures aimed at the reinforce-ment of the hegemonic and imperialistic as-pirations of the USA. This was a distinc-tive rehearsal for that which is presentlybeing perpetrated in connection with theevents in Afghanistan.

Fact No. Four. In October and Novem-ber of last year, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev putforward a comprehensive program to ad-vance the cause of military detente in Eu-rope, called for immediate negotiations, andthe Soviet Union also undertook unilateralsteps, with which you are familiar, aimed atthe lessening of military confrontation inEurope.

The USSR has adamantly called for theinstitution of negotiations for the reductionof intermediate range nuclear weapons inEurope prior to the adoption of a decisionon new American missiles.

And what was the response of theUSA? The American administration liter-ally untied the hands of its confederates andset about in such a way that the Decembersession of the NATO Council adopted a de-cision to produce and deploy in Western Eu-rope new nuclear missile armaments, rep-resenting a substantial increase in the al-ready existing American arms deployed atthe frontline and aimed at the Soviet Union.

Fact No. Five. Immediately followingthe NATO session and despite the voicesresonating there about intentions to strivefor a reduction in the level of military con-frontation in Europe, President Carter ispushing through Congress a five year pro-gram of automatic (that is, irrespective ofany changes in the international situation)build-up in the arms race.

Fact No. Six. Already this year, citingthe events in Afghanistan, President Carteris embarking upon full blown measures tocurtail Soviet-American relations and evento apply so-called economic sanctionsagainst the Soviet Union. The SALT IIAgreement has been withdrawn from con-sideration and its ratification has been post-poned for an indefinite period.

On the heels of this the “Carter Doc-trine” is proclaimed.

In it is a summary of the measures un-dertaken by the American administration inrecent time to escalate the arms race and in-


flame international tensions. We are talk-ing about efforts to resurrect the doctrinesfrom the days of the Cold War - “contain-ment” and “rolling back” of Socialism, and“brinkmanship.”

During meetings with the workinggroup of the Sotzintern [Socialist Interna-tional] in Moscow, the issue was discussedas to where the policy of President Carter isleading. Now, that is fully apparent. Weare literally talking about the destruction ofthat which was achieved in the last ten years,accomplished by men of good will, includ-ing the Social Democrats.

Under these circumstances it is man-datory to reaffirm the policy of detente ininternational tensions. Great significanceadheres in pronouncements to the effect thatit is now important to “preserve cool headsand continue the process of negotiations,”that “hysteria must not substitute for ratio-nal policy,” and that “it is necessary to be-ware of ill-conceived and hypertrophied[sic] reactions which do not conform to thereality of events and which, in their entirety,could lead to an even worse situation.”

Our position is to seriously, responsi-bly, and adamantly adhere to the principlesof peaceful co-existence, and to everythingpositive in the development of normalized,mutually advantageous relations betweengovernments that was achieved in the pro-cess of detente.

Events in Afghanistan. We would re-quest you to examine them without theprejudice and hysteria characteristic of theCarter Administration.

We think it would be useful to bringthe following information to your attention.

The facts establish that only a shorttime after the April revolution of 1978, anintense “undeclared war” was instigatedagainst Afghanistan. Bands of mercenar-ies, financed with money from the CIA andBeijing, have literally terrorized the civil-ian population of that country. Pakistan hasbecome the principal staging ground for thiswar. Here, more than twenty bases and fiftysupport points have been created, at whichterrorist and military detachments aretrained under the direction of American,Chinese, Pakistani and Egyptian instructors.In just the period between July 1978 untilNovember 1979, the training of not less than15,000 individuals was carried out there.They are equipped with American and Chi-nese weapons and then dispatched into the

territory of Afghanistan. Moreover, they donot conceal their aim - to liquidate the Aprilrevolution, to reinstate the previous anti-popular order, to convert Afghanistan into astaging ground for aggression against theUSSR, with which that country has a 2,000kilometer border.

These plans were carried out by theprevious leader of Afghanistan, H. Amin,sustained, as the facts attest, in large part bythe CIA. Having entered into a contract withemigre leaders, he prepared a counter-revo-lutionary coup and carried out acts of re-pression against genuine patriots on an un-precedented scale. After seizing power,Amin physically destroyed H. M. Taraki,president of the Democratic Republic ofAfghanistan, a veteran soldier against Af-ghan despotism. The government of Af-ghanistan, led by B. Karmal, turned onceagain to the Soviet Union for help, as Tarakihad done.

Responding to the request of the Af-ghan government for help in the struggleagainst interventionist activity directed byWashington and Beijing, we acted in accor-dance with Article 4 of the Soviet-AfghanTreaty on Friendship, Neighborly Relationsand Cooperation, concluded in 1978. Ourassistance is also fully in accord with Ar-ticle 51 of the United Nations Charter, pro-viding for the right of any government tocollective self-defense, that is, the right toappeal to any other country for help in de-fending against aggression. And in the caseof Afghanistan - and we want to emphasizethis once more - there was and continues tobe external aggression, the form of which,as defined by the 29th Session of the U.N.General Assembly, consists of “the sendingof armed bands, groups or regular forces ormercenaries by a government or in the nameof a government, which carry out acts in theapplication of military force against anothergovernment.”

In fulfillment of our treaty commit-ments, we were obligated to defend the na-tional sovereignty of Afghanistan against ex-ternal aggression. Moreover, we were un-able to stand by idly, in view of the fact thatthe USA is attempting (with the assistanceof China) to create a new and dangerousmilitary-strategic staging ground on oursouthern border.

We would like to emphasize that ouractions in no way affect the legitimate na-tional interests of the United States or any

other government. We have never had anddo not have any expansionist plans in rela-tion to Afghanistan, Iran, or Pakistan. Wereject as a malicious lie any talk that ourgoal is to expand into the “third world” ortoward sources of oil. As soon as the rea-sons have dissipated which caused the Af-ghan government to address us with a re-quest for the dispatch of Soviet forces, theywill be withdrawn from Afghanistan.

At the present time, the military inter-vention by Washington and Beijing in theaffairs of Afghanistan has by no means cometo a halt. Washington is openly accelerat-ing the delivery of arms to the so-called in-surgents. As illustrated by the visit of theminister of foreign affairs for the PRC,Huang Hua, Beijing does not lag behindWashington. Huang Hua assured the ring-leader of the mercenaries that China willalso henceforth render them assistance andsupport “without any limitations.”

Washington and Beijing are also at-tempting to enlist several Arab states in theiraggressive actions against Afghanistan(Egypt, Saudi Arabia and others). In thisfashion, Washington and Beijing are specifi-cally following a course designed to createa hotbed of international tension in theMiddle East.

At the same time a profusion of un-mitigated nonsense is being voiced aboutsome kind of occupation by us in Afghani-stan or about a usurpation of that country’ssovereign rights by the Soviet Union. Ev-ery one who is in Afghanistan these days,including correspondents from the Westerninformation services, acknowledges that cir-cumstances are normalizing there. The newAfghan leadership, headed by BabrakKarmal, is pursuing a rational and soberpolicy, attempting to eliminate the remnantsof the policies of H. Amin, and to reinstatedemocratic freedoms. All political detain-ees, representatives of the intelligentsia andthe clergy have been released from prison.Relations are improving with the nomadicpopulation, the Muslim clergy, although,speaking candidly, the situation in the south-east and eastern provinces, where terroristsare operating, remains tense.

The Afghan government has declared- and has confirmed by means of practicalmeasures - its firm intention to pursue apolicy of international peace and friendshipand a policy of non-alignment. It is under-taking all measures toward the establishment


of normalized relations with neighboringstates based on principles of peaceful coex-istence and non-interference in the internalaffairs of one another. Such is the truth aboutAfghanistan.

Our position on the decisions of the De-cember session of the NATO Council. Youare already aware of our principal assess-ment of its results. Here are several addi-tional observations.

As you are aware, the Soviet Union haswarned more than once, that if NATO inDecember implements its decision, then itwill knock the ground out from underneathnegotiations and destroy their basis. Ouragreement to negotiations in the face of theNATO decision would mean conductingthem as to the reduction only of Soviet de-fensive capacity at the same time as theUnited States is carrying out, in full stride,preparations for new nuclear missile sys-tems.

In the communique from the sessionof the NATO Council, the condition was laiddown in the harshest of terms that negotia-tions shall be conducted only in regard toAmerican and Soviet tactical nuclear inter-mediate land based missile systems. Ex-cluded from these proposed “negotiations,”and to be preserved inviolable, are all of theother means of front line deployment be-longing to the USA, and the nuclear arse-nals of other Western European countries,that is to say, everything in respect to whichthe Soviet intermediate range forces serveas a counterbalance. They are demandingof the Soviet Union a sharp reduction in itsexisting defensive forces with a simulta-neous preservation of the entire existingpowerful NATO nuclear potential, aimedagainst the USSR and its allies.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in his recentinterview with the newspaper Pravda, statedthat “the present position of the NATO coun-tries renders negotiations on this questionimpossible.” At the same time, ComradeBrezhnev emphasized that “we are for ne-gotiations, but honest and co-equal oneswhich conform to the principal of parity insecurity.”

Our long term intentions

It is apparent that Carter and Brzezinskiare gambling on the prospect of intimidat-ing the USSR, on the isolation of our coun-try, and on the creation of difficulties wher-

ever possible. This policy is doomed to fail-ure, because it is impossible to intimidatethe USSR or to shake its determination.

In this complicated situation, the lead-ership of the CPSU does not intend to adopta policy of “fighting fire with fire.” We shallhenceforth exhibit a maximum degree ofcool-headedness and reasonable judgment.We shall do everything possible to preventthe Carter administration from drawing usinto confrontation and undermining detente.We shall not engage, as the American ad-ministration is doing, in impulsive actswhich can only intensify the situation andplay into the hands of the proponents of the“Cold War.”

The American side, forgetting the el-ementary principals of restraint and pru-dence, is conducting a policy leading to thedestruction of all the inter-governmental tieswhich were constructed with such difficultyduring the past years. Moreover, and thiscan no longer be doubted, the Carter admin-istration is striving to spoil the relations ofthe West European countries with the So-viet Union, and is demanding support fromthem for its dangerous line, i.e., that theysubject themselves to that policy whichWashington considers necessary.

A great deal that is positive and con-structive could be achieved in connectionwith the meetings that have taken place inMadrid by the conference on issues of Eu-ropean security and cooperation, as well ason the path to implementation of the pro-posal of the Warsaw Pact countries concern-ing the conduct of a conference on militarydetente and disarmament.

In a word, despite all the gravity of thedeveloping international situation, we be-lieve that there is a possibility of bringingto a halt the dangerous development towardwhich the present administration in Wash-ington is pushing.

The entirety of these circumstances de-mands joint efforts from all who value thecause of peace and detente.

In Moscow, the meetings with you inthe Soviet Union are fondly recalled, and itis believed that they were useful.

If Mr. Brandt should request a text,deliver it to him, translated into German.[a similar telegram was approved to be sentto Sorsa (not printed)—ed.]

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 4; ob-tained by D. Wolff; trans. M. Doctoroff.]

EUROPE IN THECOLD WAR

Call for Contacts: from the EuropeanProject Group “Europe in the Cold War”

A group of European historians has re-cently taken an initiative in setting up aproject to reappraise the Cold War in Eu-rope from 1943-1989. We believe that, now that the archives inMoscow and in several Eastern Europeancountries are increasingly being opened toscholars, this is a timely and important op-portunity to examine the realities of the ColdWar and its impact on the countries of West-ern and Eastern Europe. We have set up a long-term researchproject on the subject, which will involve atleast seven Euro-international conferences.It is hoped that the proceedings of each con-ference will be edited and published as aseries of books. The first conference, on“The Failure of Peace in Europe, 1943-1948,” took place in Florence in June 1996.The second conference, on the period fromthe Berlin Crisis to the death of Stalin, is tobe held in Paris in the autumn of 1998. We are interested in building our contactswith historians of the Cold War in Europeand especially those from Russia and East-ern Europe. Those with inquiries, sugges-tions, or contributions may contact any ofthe following members of the Steering Com-mittee:

ITALY (Co-ordinating Centre):Prof. Ennio Di Nolfo/Prof. AntonioVarsori, Dipartmento Di Studi SulloStato,Universita Degli Studio Di Firenze,fax: 0039-55-2345486 BRITAIN:Dr. Saki Dockrill/Dr. D.B.G. Heuser, De-partment of War Studies, King’s College,London, fax: 0044-171-873-2026. FRANCE:Prof. Georges-Henri Soutou, EcoleDoctorale Mondes contemporaines,Universite de Paris, IV-Sorbonne, fax: 0033-1-404-62588. GERMANY:Prof. Dr. Wilfried Loth , Kulturwissen-schaftliches Institut, Essen, fax: 0049-201-460674Prof. Dr. Klaus Schwabe, HistorischesInstitut, RWTH, Aachen, fax: 0049-241-8888357. USA:Prof. Vojtech Mastny, Woodrow Wilson In-ternational Center for Scholars, Washington,D.C., fax: 001-49-357-4439


by Odd Arne Westad

In the winter of 1994-95, as Rus-sian tanks and planes were pounding theChechen capital of Groznyi into rubble,I felt a painful, almost menacing, senseof déjà vu. I had just returned fromMoscow where I had been conductinginterviews and collecting documents fora book on Soviet-era interventions, andI was struck by how rhetorically andstructurally similar the Chechen opera-tion was to the invasions of Hungary(1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Af-ghanistan (1979). At the heart of all ofthese interventions was an inabilitywithin the Soviet (or Russian) leader-ship to communicate effectively and toreach settlements once a conflict hadreached a certain level. In terms of per-sonalities, all of them were directedagainst former “allies”: Imre Nagy,Alexander Dubcek, Hafizullah Amin,and Dzhokar Dudaiev had little in com-mon beyond having spent most of theirlives serving a Communist party. In allfour cases it seems like it was the bro-ken trust, the sense of betrayal and in-gratitude, which propelled the men inthe Kremlin past initial doubts and hesi-tations up to the moment when some-one said, “Go!”

From what we know, the Kremlinprocesses of decision-making on for-eign policy crises have stayed remark-ably intact since the Bolshevik revolu-tion. Although the degree of absolutecentralization on such issues has dif-fered—from the one-man rule of Stalin,Gorbachev, and (when healthy, at least)Yeltsin to the small collectives of theKhrushchev and Brezhnev eras—thenumber of people actually involved inpreparing and making essential foreignpolicy decisions has remained ex-tremely limited. As in most bureaucra-

cies, the men at the second level spendmost of their time trying to second-guess what their bosses really want interms of alternatives and conclusions.Add to this the paranoia and fear bredby an authoritarian political system, andthe result is a distorted, dysfunctionaldecision-making process, in which es-sential commodities like time, informa-tion, and trust are even scarcer than inthe West.

The most immediate parallel to theChechen crisis was of course the inter-vention in Afghanistan. In both cases,the final decision to commit troops wasmade by an ailing and isolated leader;reports on conversations with BorisYeltsin from late 1994 through late 1996sounded remarkably similar to conver-sations with Leonid Brezhnev duringthe period surrounding the decision toinvade Afghanistan fifteen years earlier.Their political attention span and fieldof vision much reduced, both tended toview decisions in strongly personalizedterms. To Brezhnev, Amin was the“dirty fellow” who usurped power bykilling President Nur MohammedTaraki just days after the president hadbeen embraced by Brezhnev in Mos-cow. To Yeltsin, Dudaiev was a “scoun-drel” who tried to blackmail him andchallenged his manly courage. Neithercould be permitted to remain if the self-image of the ailing Kremlin leader wasto stay intact.

Around the sickly heads of state,factional politics flourished, with insti-tutional rivalries particularly strong.During both crises the heads of the mili-tary and security institutions droveevents—in 1979 and 1994 it was thedefense ministers, Dmitri Ustinov andPavel Grachev, who made the final pushfor intervention. Because of depart-mental jealousies, in operational terms

both interventions consisted of twoseparate plans—one political and onemilitary—which, at the last moment,were merged to form one operation,more substantial and therefore moredifficult to manage. Since nobody inMoscow could define exactly who theenemy was, massive force became auseful drug against the painful searchfor political and military precision.

In the fall of 1995, a group of schol-ars and former Soviet and Americanofficials with special knowledge of theAfghanistan intervention and its effecton Soviet-American relations gatheredfor a three-day meeting in the Norwe-gian village of Lysebu, outside Oslo.1

Among the participants on the Ameri-can side were Carter Administrationveterans Stansfield Turner, then Direc-tor of Central Intelligence; WilliamOdom and Gary Sick, assistants to Na-tional Security Adviser ZbigniewBrzezinski on Soviet and Near Easternaffairs, respectively; and MarshallShulman, then Secretary of State CyrusR. Vance’s main adviser on the SovietUnion. On the Russian side sat severalkey survivors of the Brezhnev era, ledby former ambassador to the UnitedStates Anatolii F. Dobrynin and Gen.Valentin Varennikov, then Commanderof Soviet ground forces. There werealso some lesser known faces: Gen.Leonid Shebarshin, former head ofKGB foreign intelligence (and in thelate 1970s head of the KGB station inTeheran), and Karen Brutents, formerDeputy Head of the International De-partment of the Central Committee ofthe Communist Party of the SovietUnion (CC CPSU).

The conference was the latest in aseries of such gatherings of former So-viet and American officials to explorethe reasons behind the collapse of su-

Concerning the situation in “A”: New Russian Evidence on the

Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan


perpower detente in the mid-1970s, andwhether those events suggested any les-sons for current and future Russian-American relations. They were orga-nized as part of the “Carter-BrezhnevProject,” spearheaded by Dr. James G.Blight of the Thomas J. Watson Insti-tute for International Studies at BrownUniversity. Among the scholarly orga-nizations supporting the Project’s ef-forts to obtain fresh evidence fromAmerican, Russian, and other archiveswere the National Security Archive, anon-governmental research instituteand declassified documents repositorybased at George Washington Univer-sity; the Cold War International HistoryProject, at the Woodrow Wilson Inter-national Center for Scholars in Wash-ington; the Norwegian Nobel Institute;and the Institute for General History,Russian Academy of Sciences.

Prior to the Afghanistan session,which took place in Lysebu on 17-20September 1995, the Carter-BrezhnevProject had organized two other majororal history conferences on the eventsof the late 1970s: on SALT II and thegrowth of U.S.-Soviet distrust, held atthe Musgrove Plantation, St. SimonsIsland, Georgia, on 6-9 May 1994; andon U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the ThirdWorld, held in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida,on 23-26 March 1995. For each con-ference, a briefing book was preparedby the National Security Archive withsupport from CWIHP and other Projectaffiliates, containing declassified U.S.documents and English translations ofdocuments obtained from Russian (andEast German) archives, including thoseof the Russian Foreign Ministry and theformer CC CPSU.2 Many of thesetranslations appear in this Bulletin.

In the case of the Afghanistan-re-lated documents printed below, thetranslations include, for the most part,materials declassified by Russian au-thorities as part of Fond 89, a collec-tion prepared for the Russian Constitu-tional Court trial of the CPSU in 1992and now stored at the Center for theStorage of Contemporary Documenta-tion (TsKhSD) in Moscow; translationsof these documents—most of whichwere obtained and provided to CWIHPby Mark Kramer (Harvard Univer-

sity)—were commissioned by CWIHP.(CWIHP also expresses thanks toRaymond L. Garthoff and SeligHarrison for providing copies of Rus-sian documents on Afghanistan.) Othermaterials were gathered and translatedas a result of research by the present au-thor and for the Lysebu conference. Inaddition to the documents published inthis issue of the Bulletin, my summaryof Soviet decision-making on Afghani-stan from early October to mid-Decem-ber 1979 is based on the transcript ofthe Nobel Symposium of Afghanistanand conversations with former seniorSoviet officials at that meeting.

The Lysebu meeting’s aim was toretrace the final steps of Soviet deci-sion-making on the Afghanistan inter-vention and to investigate the U.S. re-sponse. The method is known as criti-cal oral history: groups of formerpolicymakers query each other on mo-tives, issues, and actions, prodded bygroups of scholars using newly declas-sified documents. As in previous meet-ings of this kind—for instance the se-ries of conferences held in 1987-1992on the Cuban Missile Crisis3—morethan history was up for discussion.“Lessons” and relevance for today’sleaders were on everybody’s mind andthe conversations were filled with“presentisms.” In this conference, ifsomeone had suddenly replaced “Af-ghanistan” with “Chechnya” or somepossible site for future Russian inter-ventions, I do not think that the coreissues of the conversation would havechanged much.

In retrospect, the Afghanistan in-tervention stands as an avoidable trag-edy, a tragedy in which the final scriptwas ordained by perceptions, person-alities, and ideology far more than “in-terests” and “strategies.” Although sub-stantial resistance to the invasion plansemerged within the Soviet hierarchy, thereal story is how easily this oppositioncould be overcome by a tiny group ofpeople at the pinnacle of power.4

The documents published in thisBulletin show how the Soviet leadersgradually increased their commitmentto the Afghan Communist party (thePeople’s Democratic Party of Afghani-stan, or PDPA) after the Communist

coup in April 1978 (the “Saur [April]Revolution”). In spite of their misgiv-ings about the lapses and limitations ofthe Afghan Communist leaders, themembers of the Soviet Politburo couldnot bring themselves to give up on thebuilding of socialism in a neighboringcountry. As the political and militarypredicament of the Kabul regime deep-ened, Soviet advisers came to substi-tute for the “revolutionary masses” andthe “Afghan Communists,” keeping theregime going while the “progressivestrata” had time to develop. In the pro-cess, institutional and personal linkswere forged between Soviets and Af-ghans, increasing the Kremlin’s senseof commitment as well as the Kabulleadership’s ability to avail themselvesof Moscow’s resources.5

As seen from Moscow, the devel-opments in Iran in the winter of 1978-79 suddenly increased the importanceof the Afghan revolution. The rise ofthe Islamic radicals in Teheran took theSoviets by surprise and created politi-cal instability in the region, forcing theKremlin to devote more attention to thesituation along the USSR’s southernborders. The overthrow of the Shahpresented both opportunities and dan-gers to the Soviet leadership: Many ofthose reporting to the Kremlin on Ira-nian and Afghan affairs expected theIranian Communists to graduallystrengthen their position. But at thesame time, Washington’s “loss” of Iranalerted the Politburo for the first timeto the possibility—however remote—that the Americans would attempt toreplace their lost positions there withfresh outposts in Afghanistan.6

When the introduction of Soviettroops was first discussed in March1979, after a rebellion had broken outagainst the Communist regime in West-ern Afghanistan (and particularly in themajor city of Herat), the Kremlin lead-ers hesitantly concluded that “in no casewill we go forward with a deploymentof troops in Afghanistan.” Politburomembers Prime Minister AlekseiKosygin and CC Secretary AndreiKirilenko, who until the end opposed aSoviet invasion, argued that the AfghanCommunists themselves were to blamefor the rebellion. “We gave [them] ev-


erything,” Kirilenko told the Politburo.“And what has come of it? Nothing ofany value. After all, it was they whoexecuted innocent people for no reasonand told us that we also executed peoplein Lenin’s time. You see what kind ofMarxists we have found.”7

It was President Taraki’s murder byhis second-in-command HafizullahAmin in October 1979—shortly after hehad stopped off in Moscow for a cor-dial meeting with Brezhnev on his wayback from a non-aligned summit meet-ing in Havana—which set the Sovietson the course to intervention. In lightof past Soviet support for Taraki, theKGB suspected Amin of planning whatShebarshin called “doing a Sadat onus”: a wholesale defection from theSoviet camp and an alignment with theUnited States—as Egyptian PresidentAnwar Sadat had done earlier in the1970s—which would allow the Ameri-cans to place “their control and intelli-gence centers close to our most sensi-tive borders.” The KGB closely moni-tored Amin’s meetings with U.S. offi-cials in Kabul in late October, believ-ing that Washington was eying a re-placement for its lost electronic intelli-gence collection posts in northern Iran.8

Although no political orders hadyet been issued concerning a possibleintervention, the military chiefs of staffin late October 1979 began preparationsand some training for such a mission.These orders reflected the increasedconcern of Defense Minister DmitriUstinov over the Afghan issue, and hissense that proposing an interventionmight soon become politically accept-able to his colleagues. In the not-too-subtle game of who would succeedBrezhnev—which by late 1979 was infull swing in the Politburo—a premiumwas being placed on both caution andenterprise: “Recklessness” or “being aNapoleon” were potentially deadly epi-thets to hurl at a politically ambitiousDefense Minister, while “forcefulness”and “looking after our interests” couldbe used as arguments in his favor.

Ustinov’s colleague, collaborator,and sometime rival, KGB chief YuriAndropov, also started leaning towardmilitary intervention in late 1979. TheKGB had overseen several Soviet bids

since the summer to remove Amin fromthe Afghan leadership, including twoassassination attempts. None of theseefforts had succeeded, a fact which can-not have pleased the ambitiousAndropov and may have weakened hispolitical position. In late November,after Amin had demanded the replace-ment of Soviet ambassador to KabulA.M. Puzanov, Andropov and Ustinovdecided that the only way to resolve theAfghan issue was the combination of aSoviet military intervention and thephysical elimination of HafizullahAmin. Amin’s persistent calls for in-creased USSR military aid, includingSoviet troops, enboldened them andmade it easier for them to present theirsuggestions to the Politburo.

The increasing strains in East-Westrelations—including in the essentialfield of arms control—over the lastmonths of 1979 may also have influ-enced Andropov and Ustinov’s deci-sion, and certainly made it easier forthem to convince some of their col-leagues. The long-awaited Carter-Brezhnev summit in Vienna in June1979 had, despite the signing of a SALTII treaty, failed to generate much mo-mentum toward an improvement in tiesbetween Washington and Moscow.Moreover, the NATO decision that fallto deploy a new class of medium rangenuclear missiles in Europe and the in-creasing reluctance of the US Senate toratify the SALT II pact removed theconcerns of some Politburo-membersover the effects a Soviet interventionmight have on detente. As one of theSoviet conference participants put it inOslo, “by winter of 1979 detente was,for most purposes, already dead.” Thebleak outlooks on the diplomatic fronthelped carry the day with Foreign Min-ister Andrei Gromyko, who at the bestof times was a somewhat pusillanimousparticipant in Soviet high politics, op-posing intervention in March only af-ter being sure which way the wind wasblowing in the Politburo discussions.

The KGB and Defense Ministryheads had two remaining obstacles toovercome in their determination to sendSoviet troops to Afghanistan. First, theyhad to narrow the field of participantsin the decision-making process to an

absolute minimum, to make sure thatthe decision was not delayed by the for-mal submission of reports from variousdepartments and ministries to the Po-litburo. In this effort, they were assistedby ideology chief Mikhail Suslov andBrezhnev’s chief adviser on foreignpolicy, Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov.Brutents, the deputy head of the CPSUCC International Department, told theLysebu meeting that in early Decem-ber 1979, as he was preparing a reporton the issue of a potential Soviet mili-tary intervention in Afghanistan, he gota telephone call from Alexandrov-Agentov. “First, he asked me what Iwas doing. When I told him, he asked,‘And what exactly are you writingthere?’ When I told him that I was go-ing to write a negative opinion, he said:‘So, do you suggest that we should giveAfghanistan to the Americans?’ Andhe immediately ended the conversa-tion.” Brutents’ report was not in thematerials prepared for the Politburomembers at the climactic meetings.

The last obstacle on the path to in-tervention was winning over, or at leastneutralizing, those Politburo members,such as Kosygin and Kirilenko, whothroughout the crisis had vocally op-posed the idea of sending in Soviettroops. Ustinov and Andropov realizedthat the only way to ensure that a pro-posal for intervention would carry theday in the Politburo was to convinceBrezhnev of the need to strike fast. Theparty head—by nature cautious and cir-cumspect on international issues—waspersuaded by arguments closely tied tohis personal status on the world stage.Gen. Aleksandr Liakhovskii told theLysebu meeting that after Amin’s coup,“Brezhnev’s attitude to the entire issuehad changed. He could not forgiveAmin, because Brezhnev had person-ally assured Taraki that he would be ableto help him. And then they disregardedBrezhnev completely and murderedTaraki. Brezhnev used to say, ‘howshould the world be able to believe whatBrezhnev says, if his words do not countin Afghanistan?’”

Andropov’s remarkable personaland handwritten letter to Brezhnev inearly December—read aloud byDobrynin to the Lysebu conference


from notes he had taken in the RussianPresidential Archives—summed up thecase for intervention. According to theKGB chief, Amin was conducting “be-hind-the-scenes activities which maymean his political reorientation to theWest.” In addition, Andropov told thechronically ill and enfeebled leader,Amin “attacks Soviet policy and theactivities of our specialists.” ButAndropov dangled before Brezhnev apossible remedy for his Afghantroubles: A group of anti-Amin AfghanCommunists, mostly belonging to theminority Parcham faction, who hadbeen living under KGB tutelage in ex-ile, had, “without changing their plansfor an uprising, appealed to us for as-sistance, including military assistanceif needed.” Although Andropov evi-dently still felt unwilling to askBrezhnev directly and explicitly to sup-port sending in Soviet troops, his lettermade the case for such an intervention,the framework of which was already be-ing discussed between the KGB headand the defense minister.

Although agreeing with Andropovconcerning the political purpose of theuse of Soviet troops, Defense MinisterUstinov was not willing to accept a lim-ited operation along the lines recom-mended by the KGB head. Varennikov,who headed operational planning in theGeneral Staff, told the Lysebu meetingthat Ustinov wanted 75,000 troops forthe operation for two main reasons:First, he wanted to make sure that thetoppling of Amin’s regime could be car-ried out smoothly, even if some of theAfghan army groups in Kabul decidedto resist. Second, he believed that So-viet forces should be used to guardAfghanistan’s borders with Pakistanand Iran, thereby preventing outsidesupport for the Afghan Islamic guerril-las. On December 6, Andropov ac-cepted Ustinov’s plan.

Around noon on December 8, thetwo met with Brezhnev and Gromykoin the general secretary’s office in theKremlin. In addition to the concernsAndropov had raised with Brezhnevearlier, he and Ustinov now added thestrategic situation. Meeting two daysafter West Germany had given its vitalsupport for NATO’s two-track missile-

deployment decision, states one in-formed Russian account, “Ustinov andAndropov cited dangers to the south-ern borders of the Soviet Union and apossibility of American short-rangemissiles being deployed in Afghanistanand aimed at strategic objects inKazakhstan, Siberia, and elsewhere.”9

Brezhnev accepted the outlined plan foran intervention which the heads of themilitary and the KGB presented to him.

Right after seeing Brezhnev,Ustinov and Andropov met with thehead of the General Staff, Marshal N.V.Ogarkov, in the Walnut Room, a smallmeeting room adjacent to the hall wherethe Politburo usually sat. The two in-formed Ogarkov of their conversationwith Brezhnev. Ogarkov—who to-gether with his deputies Gen.Varennikov and Marshal SergeiAkhromeyev had earlier warnedUstinov against an intervention—onceagain listed his reasons why Soviettroops should not be sent in. Ustinovoverruled him, and in the evening calleda meeting of the senior staff of the De-fense Ministry and told them to imple-ment preparations for the intervention.The decision to send in troops was cer-tain to come, Ustinov said.

On December 12, the Politburo metand formally ratified the proposal tointervene. Gromyko chaired the meet-ing, after having co-signed the proposaltogether with Ustinov and Andropov.Konstantin Chernenko wrote out, byhand, a short protocol accepting the pro-posal—entitled “Concerning the Situa-tion in ‘A’”—and had all Politburomembers present sign their names di-agonally across the text. Kosygin, whoalmost certainly would have opposed anintervention, was not present. Kirilenkosigned after some hesitation. Brezhnev,who entered the room after the briefdiscussion was finished, added hisname, in quivering handwriting, at thebottom of the page.10

Two days later, the General Staffoperative team, headed by MarshalAkhromeyev, was in place in Termez,Uzbekistan (USSR), near the Afghanborder. A group from the operationalteam arrived at Bagram airforce baseoutside Kabul on December 18.

The main operation started at 3 pm

sharp on Christmas Day: airbornetroops from the 103rd and 105th air di-visions landed in Kabul and in Shindandin western Afghanistan, and units fromthe 5th and 108th motorized rifle divi-sions crossed the border at Kushka andat Termez. Just before nightfall on De-cember 27, Soviet paratroopers, assistedby two KGB special units, attackedAmin’s residence at Duraleman Palace,and, after overcoming stiff resistancefrom the Palace Guards, summarily ex-ecuted the president and several of hisclosest aides. It was—we were told inLysebu by the men who devised it—awell-organized and successful opera-tion, in which all the “strategic objec-tives” were reached on time.

The intervention in Afghanistanwas the start of a war of almost unlim-ited destruction, leaving more than onemillion Afghans dead or wounded andalmost four million driven into exile.For the Soviets the war became a death-knell, signalling Moscow’s interna-tional isolation, its leadership’s incon-stancy and fragmentation, and itspublic’s growing disbelief in the pur-pose and direction of Soviet rule. Bythe time its forces left in early 1989, theSoviet regime was crumbling; two yearslater it was gone. The Afghan War wasnot only the first war which the SovietUnion lost: It was the last war it fought.

The post-December 1979 docu-ments included in the Bulletin show theslow and painful road which the Sovietleaders travelled toward realizing thefailure of their Afghan venture. Alreadyafter Andropov’s visit to Kabul in lateJanuary 1980, the Politburo understoodthat the troops would have to stay inAfghanistan for the indefinite future.Almost immediately, Moscow started toseek a political settlement as an alter-native to war. Gromyko and Andropovseem to have been at the forefront inthis cautious and awkward examinationof the possibilities for getting the So-viet troops out.

As the documents show, the Polit-buro members just could not make uptheir minds as to what constituted So-viet minimum demands for a troopwithdrawal. Brezhnev’s letter to FidelCastro on Afghanistan in March 1980demonstrates that Soviet expectations


The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989:

Frequently used abbreviations:

APRF = Archive of the President, RussianFederationCC = Central CommitteeCom. = ComradeCPSU = Communist Party of the SovietUnionDRA = Democratic Republic of Afghani-stanGKEHS = State Committee for EconomicCooperationsMFA = Ministry of Foreign AffairsPDPA = People’s Democratic Party of Af-ghanistanSAPMO = Stiftung Archiv der Partaien undMassorganisationen der DDR imBundesarchiv (Berlin)TsKhSD = Center for the Storage of Con-temporary Documentation, Moscow

Political Letter from USSR Ambassadorto Afghanistan A. Puzanov to Soviet

Foreign Ministry, “About the DomesticPolitical Situation in the DRA,”

31 May 1978 (notes)

It is noted that the “basic precondi-tions” for the overthrow of [Mohammed]Daoud in April 1978 “flowed from the ob-jective domestic political and economic de-velopment of the country after 1973.”Daoud expressed the interests and class po-sition of bourgeois landowners and rightistnationalist forces, and therefore was not ca-pable of carrying out a reformation “in theinterests of the broad laboring masses,” pri-marily agricultural reform.

In conditions of a worsening economicsituation in the country and Daoud’s depar-ture from the programmatic declaration of1973, which led to “a constant growth inthe dissatisfaction of broad strata of thepopulation,” Daoud huddled ever moreclosely with the “domestic reaction,” whichwas supported by the “reactionary Islamicregimes” and by “American imperialism,”and followed a course toward the “strength-ening . . . of a regime of personal power.”

This led to an “abrupt sharpening of

the contradictions between the Daoud regimeand its class supporters and the fundamentalinterests of the working masses, the voiceof which is the PDPA.”

Daoud’s order to arrest the PDPA fa-cilitated the fall of his regime.

The Taraki government’s program (dec-laration of 9 May 1978) is worked out onthe basis of the PDPA program of 1966. Themain task, is providing for the interests ofthe working population on the basis of fun-damental perestroika of the social-economicstructures of society, and “the liquidation ofthe influence of neocolonialism and imperi-alism.”

In a conversation with the Soviet Am-bassador on April 29, Taraki said that “Af-ghanistan, following Marxism-Leninism,will set off on the path of building socialismand will belong to the socialist camp,” but itis necessary to conduct that line “carefully”and of his true goals the PDPA will informthe people “later.”

In foreign policy the DRA is orientedtoward the Non-Aligned movement, but itwill give its priority to cooperation with theUSSR.

About the reaction of the West: theoverthrow of Daoud was “a total surprise,”and in the press of the Western and “reac-tionary Moslem countries” a “campaign offalsehoods” was deployed against the newgovernment.

At the same time, “according to infor-mation which we have” the embassies of theUSA and other Western countries receivedinstructions to search out all means to holdon in Afghanistan, including promises to pro-vide economic assistance.

The Afghan leadership “is not show-ing haste” in concluding economic agree-ments with the West, “proceeding from anintention to reorient its foreign economicrelations primarily towards the USSR andthe socialist camp.”

The measures which have been under-taken by the new government in the monthit has been in power bear witness to its “firmintention” gradually to create the precondi-tions “for Afghanistan’s transition to the so-cialist path of development.”

The coming to power of the PDPA andits actions “were met with approval by thepeoples’ masses.” At the same time the “in-ternal reaction, while so far not deciding onan open demonstration,” is activating “un-derground efforts” (propaganda, the drop-ping in of weapons, and diversionary groupswhich are being prepared in Pakistan).

The friction between the Khalq andParcham factions is having a negative in-fluence.

The main point of disagreement is gov-ernment posts. The representatives ofKhalq, especially in the army, are dissatis-fied with the naming of Parcham represen-tatives to a number of leadership posts. Theleader of Parcham, B[abrak]. Karmal, in histurn, objected to the the widening of theRevolutionary Council for the benefit ofmilitary officers. The Ambassador and “ad-visors on Party relations” in conversationswith the new leadership stressed the neces-sity of “overcoming the tensions” and“strengthening the unity” of the leadershipand the party. As a result, on 24 May 1978the Politburo of the CC PDPA made a deci-sion to eliminate the names Khalq andParcham and to affirm the unity of thePDPA.

The Afghans asked the USSR to senda “large group of advisors and consultants”to work in the state apparat, and also to helpin putting together a five year plan. TheUSSR has “favorably” resolved these issues.

This will facilitate “the growth of sym-pathy for the USSR, the further fortifyingand strengthening of our positions in Af-ghanistan.”

Conclusions: The situation in the coun-try “overall is stabilizing more and more,”the government is controlling all its regionsand is taking measures “to cut off...the dem-onstrations of the domestic reaction.”

The most important factor for the fur-ther strengthening of the new power will bethe achievement of unity in the leadershipof the PDPA and the government. But “thetension so far has not totally been clearedaway.” The embassy jointly with a groupof Party advisors is undertaking measuresto overcome the disagreements in the Af-

Documents from the Russian and East German Archives


ghan leadership.

[Source: Based on notes taken by Odd ArneWestad on materials at the Center for theStorage of Contemporary Documentation(TsKhSD), fond (f.) 5, opis (op.) 75, delo (d.)1179, listy (ll.) 2-17.]

Record of Conversation, SovietAmbassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki,

18 June 1978

The meeting took place in connectionwith the arrival in Kabul of a group of [So-viet] Party advisors headed by V.I.Kharazov.

[The Ambassador] informed N.M.Taraki about the arrival in Kabul on July 27of the first group of Soviet advisors for workin the Afghan ministries and departments.

[...] Further Taraki requested that onlythe Soviet Ambassador and V.I. Khazarovremain and said that B. Karmal had arrived,and wants to express a number of thoughts.

Coming into the office, B. Karmal saidthe following.

Recently more frequently it has beenheard that there is no unity in the PDPA.This, without doubt, reflects negatively onthe Party itself, on the state apparatus, thearmy, the revolution, on the prestige of theSoviet Union and might lead to difficultconsequences. People are different, and thisdistinction might be used for provocativegoals. Unfortunately, our position (theParchams) in the Party, state apparatus, andarmy is subject to a number of provocations.But insofar as I am sure that the Party, stateand army, under the leadership of N.M.Taraki and [First Deputy Prime Minister]H[afizzulah]. Amin, with the great assis-tance of the Soviet Union, are building so-cialism in Afghanistan, then, feeling a debtto the revolution, I do not intend to createproblems, so that neither a friend nor anenemy can take advantage of my situation.Regarding the June 17 decision of the CCPDPA Politburo to send a number of com-rades to foreign countries as ambassadors, Iand N.A. Noor . . . also consider it useful togo abroad as ambassadors or under the pre-text of medical treatment, so as not to givegrounds for provocations against noble andhonest people. In such a way, N.M. Tarakiand H. Amin may be able to fulfill the men-tioned program. Unfortunately, said B.Karmal, I have no possibility either in the

Party or in the army to defend my thesis —it is difficult to fulfill the May 24 resolutionof the Party on unity and the directives ofthe Politburo, they remain paper, nothingmore.

[. . .] Further, B. Karmal in a conditionof extreme excitement said the following.

In both the Party and in the govern-ment I occupy the second post after N.M.Taraki. Despite this, I do not know what isgoing on in the country — they have iso-lated me, I am not engaged in either domes-tic or foreign policy issues, I live as if in agilded cage. For me, as a communist, thisis a heavy tragedy. In the presence of N.M.Taraki, PDPA Politburo member H. Aminsaid that to provide unity it is necessary tocarry out extremely decisive measures.N.M. Taraki really wants unity. However,for this to happen, thousands of honest com-munists in Afghanistan will be subject toterror, persecutions, their names will be slan-dered. I myself live under the threat thatthey will subject me to persecution. In con-clusion, B. Karmal declared that the matteris moving towards a split in the Party, ev-erything is moving into the hands of thegovernment and army.

N.M. Taraki declared decisively that allissues in the ruling organs of the PDPA aredecided on the basis of democratic central-ism, and nobody threatens anyone. Thereis no split in the Party, unity is beingstrengthened, although certain people aredemonstrating against it. If someone movesagainst the revolution and the unity of theParty, then there will be a purge of the Party.There is no terror, however, if it will be reck-oned that this or some other person presentsa danger for the revolution, then decisivemeasures of punishment may be applied tohim, right up to capital punishment.

On this N.M. Taraki interrupted theconversation and let it be known that he doesnot wish to continue the discussion with B.Karmal. B. Karmal said good-bye and left.

Remaining with N.M. Taraki, [theAmbassador and Khazarov] once againnoted the necessity of taking into accountwhen making some or other appointmentsthe political resonance and consequenceswhich they might prompt. They stressed thatenemies must not be given grounds for us-ing similar issues for their own goals.

N.M. Taraki said that the Party is unitedand its unity is becoming ever stronger, butas to those who will demonstrate against

unity “we will crush them as if with a steam-roller [proidemsia zheleznym katkom]. Suchmeasures will only strengthen the Party.”

Sent to Kozyrev, C.P., Ponomarev, B.N....

[Source: Notes of O.A. Westad, TsKhSD, f.5, op. 75, d. 1181, ll. 22-27.]

Record of Conversation between SovietAmbassador to Afghanistan A.M.Puzanov and Taraki, 18 July 1978

[The Ambassador] also said that theobservations expressed by the leadership ofthe DRA about the necessity for effectivedefense of the airspace of the DRA had beenattentively studied in the General Staff ofthe USSR Armed Forces, and the necessarymeasures had been worked out for use inthe event that there should appear a dangerto the DRA from the air. In addition, withthis goal in mind the delivery of an addi-tional quantity of anti-aircraft installationsfor the present and future years had beenreviewed. The deliveries of weapons willbe fixed in an agreement, for the signing ofwhich, according to the agreement, a del-egation headed by Major-General V.E.Kuznetsov is arriving today.

Taraki informed the Ambassador aboutthe situation in the country and about hismeeting on July 13-14 with the Deputy Sec-retary of State of the USA D[avid D].Newsom.

In the conversation with me, said N.M.Taraki, the Deputy Secretary of State spokeabout the USA government’s concern aboutthe one-sided orientation in the foreignpolicy of the DRA and the chill in Afghan-American relations.

D. Newsom asked a provocative ques-tion — what actions will the government ofthe DRA take in the event of an attack bythe Soviet Union.

N.M. Taraki pointed out the inappro-priateness of a question like that.

[Source: Notes of O.A. Westad, TsKhSD, f.5, op. 75, d. 1181, ll. 36-40.]

Information from CC CPSU to GDRleader Erich Honecker, 13 October 1978

Highly confidential

According to the instructions of CC


CPSU, candidate member of the PolitburoCC CPSU secretary comr. B.N. Ponomarevwas in Kabul from 25 to 27 September ofthis year, to meet with the leadership of thePeople’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan(PDPA) and the Democratic Republic of Af-ghanistan (DRA) to discuss certain press-ing questions concerning the unfolding po-litical situation in that country and questionsregarding Soviet-Afghan relations. Meet-ings took place with the general secretaryof CC PDPA, chairman of the Revolution-ary Soviet, prime minister of DRA comr.Nur Taraki and member of the Politburo,secretary of CC PDPA, deputy prime min-ister and minister of foreign affairs of theDRA comrade Hafizullah Amin.

The main objective of the trip was toput a stop to the mass repressions whichhave taken on increasing proportions follow-ing the revolution in Afghanistan, includ-ing repressions against the “Parcham” fac-tion, which took part in the overthrow ofthe despotic regime.

During the meetings special emphasiswas placed by our side on questions con-cerning the unjustified repressions in theDRA. In addition, it was pointed out thatwe are doing this out of our brotherly con-cern for the fate of the Afghan revolution,especially since certain aspects of the un-folding events in Afghanistan directly affectthe Soviet Union and CPSU.

First to recognize the new state ofthings in Afghanistan, the USSR demon-strated its solidarity with Afghanistan infront of the whole world. This position wasagain authoritatively affirmed in L.I.Brezhnev’s speech in Baku. It is widelyknown that we are in every way assistingand supporting the new government. Un-der these conditions, hostile propagandawithin Afghanistan itself as well as outsideits borders is currently being aimed at show-ing that any events in Afghanistan - espe-cially the negative aspects of these events -are connected to the direct or indirect par-ticipation by the Soviet Union.

The attention of the Afghan leadershipwas focused on the fact that in recent timesrepressions have taken on mass proportions,are being carried out without regard to law,and are directed not only at class enemiesof the new regime (“Moslem Brothers,” sup-porters of the monarchy, etc.), but also atpersons who could be used for revolution-ary interests; that brings out discontent

among the populace, undermines the author-ity of the revolutionary government andleads to the weakening of the new regime.

Our ideas were attentively heard out,but with visible tension. Without disputingthem directly, the Afghan leaders tried tojustify their policy by accusing Parchamists(members of the “Parcham” faction who,together with the “Khalq” faction, organizedthe unification of the PDPA in 1977) of anti-government activities.

Even before the revolution we did nottrust “Parcham,” said N. Taraki, and theunion with the Parchamists was strictly aformality. They took almost no part in thearmed uprising. But following the victoryof the revolution the leader of theParchamists B. Karmal demanded that thetop ministerial and departmental positionsbe divided equally. He laid claim to play-ing the leading role in building the party,declaring: “You have the army; give us theparty.” In addition, when their demandswere not met, they threatened to start anuprising. Under the given circumstances,said N. Taraki and A. Amin, there was butone choice: either them, or us.

Besides, N. Taraki was trying to show,the measures being taken against the lead-ing activists of “Parcham” did not exhibitany negative influence on people’s senti-ments. The Afghan people support the newregime and the Khalqist leadership of thePDPA. The PDPA leadership, Revolution-ary Council, and DRA government, said N.Taraki, understand completely the apprehen-sions of the CC CPSU, but assure [it] thatthe latest events in the country do not inter-fere with the advancement of the Afghanrevolution and the strengthening of thepeople’s democratic regime.

Considerable attention was paid by ourside to questions of party expansion andimprovement of the ability of the People’sDemocratic Party of Afghanistan to governthe nation and the populace. Emphasis wasalso placed on the importance of creatingand strengthening the party throughout allof the country’s territories, on the adoptionof prompt measures to normalize the activi-ties of party organs from top to bottom, onorganizing agencies of the people’s govern-ment, and on focusing increased attentionon economic problems. The people mustexperience concrete results of the revolu-tion in their own lives. That is why the im-provement of people’s lives should be the

primary focus of the new government.From our side it was continuously

stressed that right now the primary objec-tive should be to strengthen the people’sdemocratic regime, adopting a measured andflexible policy to isolate the counter-revo-lution from the people, to deprive it of theopportunity to take advantage of the back-wardness of the masses. In the short timesince the establishment of the new govern-ment, large enterprises have already beenset up to serve the interests of the people.Along with this, enormous constructive op-portunities opened up by the Afghan revo-lution are still waiting to be discovered andput to practical use.

During the meetings, the Afghan rep-resentatives also touched on the question ofAfghan relations with imperialist countries.Imperialism, said N. Taraki, places in frontof us every kind of obstacle, including theuse of “soft” methods. Westerners andAmericans are clearly trying to exploit aidin order to force us to steer away from thechosen path. At the present time we are haveno intention of spoiling our relations withthe West, though we understand that theiroffers are not entirely unselfish. From ourside it was emphasized that in dealing withthe West one should not allow oneself to belured into a trap.

Concerning the China question, N.Taraki unreservedly condemned the Maoistleadership and its actions, noting that theleaders of China have closed ranks with theenemies of communism. The PDPA haspurged Maoist elements from the army andthe state apparatus.

The meetings with N. Taraki and H.Amin left the impression that the persecu-tion of Parchamists is primarily the resultof factional infighting and personal hostili-ties. In addition, the Afghan leadership isclearly underestimating the negative influ-ence that the repressions are having on theoverall situation in the country and on sen-timents within the army and the party.

The discussions were marked by an airof comradeship. All in all, [it was] a warmwelcome by the Afghan leadership; theirattentive attitude towards the opinions of theCC CPSU and readiness to discuss with usthe most delicate questions is an indicationof the importance they place on the friend-ship with Soviet Union and socialist coun-tries. Taraki asked to relay to the CC CPSUthat “Afghanistan will always stand next to


Soviet Union, aligned together with theother socialist countries.”

The CC CPSU submits that Afghani-stan will heed our judgment in their contin-ued activities, although, it seems, this willonly be demonstrated by their actions in thefuture. Incoming information indicates anabatement in repressions in the country andthe beginning of the process of partial reha-bilitation of party functionaries from the“Parcham” faction.

CC CPSU

[Source: Stiftung Archiv der Partaien undMassenorganisationen der DDR imBundesarchiv (SAPMO), Berlin, J 2/202, A.575; obtained by Vladislav M. Zubok (Na-tional Security Archive).]

CPSU CC Politburo Decision onAfghanistan, 7 January 1979

Proletariat of all countries, unite!Communist Party of the Soviet Union.CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRETSPECIAL FILE

To Comrs. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Gromyko,Ustinov, Ponomarev, Ryabov, Skachkov,Serbin,and Smirtyukov.

Extract from protocol # 137 of the CC CPSUPolitburo session from 7 January 1979

The question of the Ministry of defense andthe State committee of the USSR on foreigneconomic ties.

1. Approve a draft of orders from theUSSR Council of Ministers on this ques-tion (attached).

2. Ratify the attached draft of instruc-tions for the soviet ambassador to the Demo-cratic Republic of Afghanistan.SECRETARY of CC13-af[attached] to article 27 protocol # 137


Draft

USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERSINSTRUCTIONS

from January 1979

Moscow, Kremlin

1. In connection with the request ofthe Government of the Democratic Repub-lic of Afghanistan and with the partialchanges of instructions from the USSRCouncil of Ministers from 20 November1978, # 2473, give assent to the distributionof expenditures related to the dispatchingof Soviet specialists, at the expense of theSoviet side, for work in the armed forces ofthe Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Instruct GKEhS to propose to the Af-ghan side that it provide, at its own expense,for Soviet specialists and interpreters dis-patched to work in the armed forces of Af-ghanistan and furnish them with living quar-ters with necessary equipment, transport forofficial purposes, and medical service.

2. Expenditures related to the dispatch-ing of Soviet specialists to Afghanistan inaccordance with present instructions mustbe made: in Soviet rubles from the accountappropriated by the state budget of theUSSR for the rendering of free assistanceto foreign governments, and in foreign cur-rency from the account appropriated by thecurrency plan of GKEhS.

Chairman of the Council of MinistersA.Kosygin14-ri

[attached] to article 27 protocol # 137


KABULSOVIET AMBASSADOR

Spec.# 978. Visit H. Amin or another indi-vidual ordered to receive you, and, refer-ring to the instructions, inform him that therequest of the Afghan side concerning therealization of deliveries of goods for thegeneral use of the armed forces, in accor-dance with the guidelines governing theshipment of special equipment throughGKEhS, as well as the dispatching, at So-viet expense, of specialists for work in thearmed forces of the Democratic Republicof Afghanistan, has been carefully exam-ined.

Say that the Government of the USSR,based on the friendly relations between ourcountries, is rendering assistance, with veryfavorable conditions, aimed at reinforcing

the Afghan military. Special equipment andextra parts are shipped to the DemocraticRepublic of Afghanistan at 25 percent ofcost on a 10-year loan with 2 percent yearlyinterest. It should be noted that the Demo-cratic Republic of Afghanistan is in a morefavorable situation when compared to otherfriendly countries receiving aid.

Explain that according to our existingrules, the shipment of general civilian equip-ment, including auto-transports, and civil-ian airplanes and helicopters, is exclusivelya matter of the Ministry of Foreign Tradeand conditions governing commercial trade,irrespective of whether this equipment isused in the armed forces or other depart-ments.

Further, say that the Soviet governmenthas made the decision to grant the Afghanrequest that the dispatching of all special-ists for work in the armed forces of theDemocratic Republic of Afghanistan bemade at the expense of the Soviet side.

Telegraph the execution [of the orders].

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, perechen (per.) 14,dokument (dok.) 24; document provided byMark Kramer (Harvard University); trans-lation by Daniel Rozas.]

Transcript of CPSU CC PolitburoDiscussions on Afghanistan,

17-19 March 1979

TOP SECRETONLY COPY

WORKING TRANSCRIPT

MEETING OF THE POLITBUROOF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THESOVIET UNION

17 March 1979

Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV, PresidingIn attendance: Y.V. ANDROPOV, A.A.GROMYKO, A.N. KOSYGIN, A.Y.PELSHE, K.U. CHERNENKO, D.F.USTINOV, P.N. DEMICHEV, B.N.PONOMAREV, M.S. SOLOMENTZEV, N.A.TIKHONOV, I.V. KAPITONOV, V.I.DOLGIKH, M.V. ZIMYANIN, K.V.RUSAKOV, M.S. GORBACHEV

Re: Deterioration of Conditions in theDemocraticRepublic of Afghanistan and


Possible Responses From Our Side

KIRILENKO. Leonid Ilych[Brezhnev] has asked us to commence ourPolitburo session today at this unseasonablehour, and he will then join us tomorrow, inorder to discuss the circumstances that haveemerged in the Democratic Republic of Af-ghanistan. The situation is urgent. Com-rades Gromyko, Andropov, and Ustinov to-day have put together some proposals whichhave been completed and are now in frontof you. Let us consider this matter closelyand determine what measures we ought totake, what actions should be undertaken.Perhaps we should hear first from ComradeGromyko.

GROMYKO. Judging by the most re-cent communications that we have receivedfrom Afghanistan in the form of encryptedcables, as well as by telephone conferenceswith our chief military advisor Comrade[Lt.-Gen. L.N.] Gorelov and temporarycharge d’affaires Comrade Alekseev, thesituation in Afghanistan has deterioratedsharply, the center of the disturbance at thistime being the town of Herat. There, as weknow from previous cables, the 17th divi-sion of the Afghan army was stationed, andhad restored order, but now we have re-ceived news that this division has essentiallycollapsed. An artillery regiment and oneinfantry regiment comprising that divisionhave gone over to the side of the insurgents.Bands of saboteurs and terrorists, having in-filtrated from the territory of Pakistan,trained and armed not only with the partici-pation of Pakistani forces but also of China,the United States of America, and Iran, arecommitting atrocities in Herat. The insur-gents infiltrating into the territory of HeratProvince from Pakistan and Iran have joinedforces with a domestic counter-revolution.The latter is especially comprised by reli-gious fanatics. The leaders of the reaction-ary masses are also linked in large part withthe religious figures.

The number of insurgents is difficultto determine, but our comrades tell us thatthey are thousands, literally thousands.

Significantly, it should be noted that Ihad a conversation this morning at 11:00with Amin — Taraki’s deputy who is theminister of foreign affairs — and he did notexpress the slightest alarm about the situa-tion in Afghanistan, and on the contrary, withOlympian tranquility, he said that the situa-

tion was not all that complicated, that thearmy was in control of everything, and soforth. In a word, he expressed the opinionthat their position was under control.

KIRILENKO. In short, judging fromthe report of Amin, the leadership of Af-ghanistan is not experiencing the slightestanxiety in connection with these events.

GROMYKO. Exactly. Amin even saidthat the situation in Afghanistan is just fine.He said that not a single incident of insub-ordination by a governor had been reported,that is, that all of the governors were on theside of the lawful government. Whereas inreality, according to the reports of our com-rades, the situation in Herat and in a num-ber of other places is alarming, and the in-surgents are in control there.

As far as Kabul is concerned, the situ-ation there is basically calm. The bordersof Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran areclosed, or more accurately, semi-closed. Alarge number of Afghans, formerly work-ing in Iran, have been expelled from Iranand, naturally, they are highly dissatisfied,and many of them have also joined up withthe insurgents.

The measures that we have drawn outfor the aid of Afghanistan are set forth inthe proposals that you have in front of you.I should add that we have appropriated anadditional 10 million rubles to Afghanistanin hard currency for the protection of theborder.

Inasmuch as Pakistan, in essence, isthe principal place from which the terror-ists are infiltrating into Afghanistan, it wouldappear to follow that the leadership of Af-ghanistan should send a letter of protest toPakistan or issue a declarations; in a word,to come out with some kind of written state-ment. However, the Afghan leadership hasnot done that. To be sure, it looks verystrange.

I asked Amin, what kind of actions doyou consider necessary from our side? I toldhim what kind of aid we might be able torender. But he had no other requests, he sim-ply responded that he had a very optimisticappraisal of the circumstances in Afghani-stan, that the help you have given will standus in good stead, and that all of the prov-inces are safely under the control of lawfulforces. I asked him, don’t you expect anyproblems from neighboring governments ora domestic counter-revolution, and so forth?Amin answered firmly that no, there are no

threats to the regime. In conclusion, he con-veyed his greetings to the members of thePolitburo, and personally to L.I. Brezhnev.And thus was my discussion today withAmin.

After a short time, approximately twoor three hours, we received news from ourcomrades that chaos had erupted in Herat.One regiment, as I already indicated an ar-tillery one, fired on its own troops, and partof the second regiment went over to the in-surgents. Consequently, only a portion ofthe 17th division, which is guarding Herat,remains loyal to the Government. Our com-rades also tell us that tomorrow and the nextday, new masses of insurgents, trained onthe territory of Pakistan and Iran, may in-vade.

About a half hour later, we again re-ceived news from our comrades that Com-rade Taraki had summoned the chief mili-tary advisor Comrade Gorelov and charged’affaires Alekseev. And what did they dis-cuss with Taraki? First of all, he appealedto the Soviet Union for help in the form ofmilitary equipment, ammunition, and ra-tions, that which is envisioned in the docu-ments which we have presented for consid-eration by the Politburo. As far as militaryequipment is concerned, Taraki said, almostin passing, that perhaps ground and air sup-port would be required. This must be un-derstood to mean that the deployment of ourforces is required, both land and air forces.

In my opinion, we must proceed froma fundamental proposition in considering thequestion of aid to Afghanistan, namely: un-der no circumstances may we lose Afghani-stan. For 60 years now we have lived withAfghanistan in peace and friendship. Andif we lose Afghanistan now and it turnsagainst the Soviet Union, this will result ina sharp setback to our foreign policy. Ofcourse, it is one thing to apply extreme mea-sures if the Afghan army is on the side ofthe people, and an entirely different matter,if the army does not support the lawful gov-ernment. And finally, third, if the army isagainst the government and, as a result,against our forces, then the matter will becomplicated indeed. As we understand fromComrades Gorelov and Alekseev, the moodamong the leadership, including ComradeTaraki, is not particularly out of sorts.

USTINOV. Comrade Gorelov, ourchief military advisor, was with Taraki alongwith Comrade Alekseev, our charge


d’affaires in Afghanistan. I just spoke withComrade Gorelov by telephone, and he saidthat the leadership of Afghanistan is wor-ried about the state of affairs, and that mat-ters in the province of Herat are particularlybad, as well as in the province of Pakti. Thebad part is that the division which is sup-posed to be guarding Herat has turned outto be ineffective, and the commander of thedivision at this time is located on the air-strip, more to the point, he is seeking refugethere and, obviously, he is no longer com-manding the actions of any regiments re-maining loyal to the government. Bear inmind that tomorrow (March 18), operationalgroups will be deployed into Herat.

We advised Comrade Taraki to rede-ploy several forces into the regions wherethe insurgency has erupted. He, in turn, re-sponded that this would be difficult inas-much as there is unrest in other places aswell. In short, they are expecting a majorresponse from the USSR, in the form of bothland and air forces.

ANDROPOV. They are hoping that wewill attack the insurgents.

KIRILENKO. The question arises,whom will our troops be fighting against ifwe send them there[?] Against the insur-gents? Or have they been joined by a largenumber of religious fundamentalists, that is,Muslims, and among them large numbersof ordinary people? Thus, we will be re-quired to wage war in significant part againstthe people.

KOSYGIN. What is the army like inAfghanistan—how many divisions arethere?

USTINOV. The army in Afghanistanhas 10 divisions, including more than 100thousand soldiers.

ANDROPOV. Our operational datatells us that about three thousand insurgentsare being directed into Afghanistan fromPakistan. These are, in main part, religiousfanatics from among the people.

KIRILENKO. If there is a popularuprising, then, besides those persons com-ing from Pakistan and Iran, who for the mostpart consist of terrorists and insurgents, themasses against whom our troops are en-gaged will include ordinary people of Af-ghanistan. Although it is true that they arereligious worshipers, followers of Islam.

GROMYKO. The relationship be-tween the supporters of the government andthe insurgents is still very unclear. Events

in Herat, judging from everything, haveunfolded violently, because over a thousandpeople have been killed. But even there thesituation is unclear enough.

ANDROPOV. Of course, the insur-gents coming into the territory of Afghani-stan will be joined first of all by those whowould rebel and solicit the Afghan peopleto their own side.

KOSYGIN. In my view, the draft de-cision under consideration must be substan-tially amended. First of all, we must notdelay the supply of armaments until Aprilbut must give everything now, without de-lay, in March. That is the first thing.

Secondly, we must somehow givemoral support to the leadership of Afghani-stan, and I would suggest implementationof the following measures: inform Tarakithat we are raising the price of gas from 15to 25 rubles per thousand cubic meters. Thatwill make it possible to cover the expensesthat they will incur in connection with theacquisition of arms and other materials by arise in prices. It is necessary in my opinionto give Afghanistan these arms free ofcharge and not require any 25 percent as-sessment.

ALL. Agreed.KOSYGIN. And third, we are slated

to supply 75 thousand tons of bread. I thinkwe should reexamine that and supply Af-ghanistan with 100 thousand tons. Theseare the measures that it seems to me oughtto be added to the draft of the decision and,in that fashion, we would lend moral assis-tance to the Afghan leadership. We mustput up a struggle for Afghanistan; after all,we have lived side by side for 60 years. Ofcourse, while there is a difficult struggle withthe Iranians, Pakistanis, and Chinese, nev-ertheless Iran will lend assistance to Af-ghanistan—it has the means to do so, all themore so since they are like-minded reli-giously. This must be borne in mind. Paki-stan will also take such measures. There isnothing you can say about the Chinese.Consequently, I believe that we must adoptthe fraternal decision seriously to assist theAfghan leadership. I have already spokenon the subject of payments, to talk more ofthat is unnecessary, and moreover, as herewritten, in freely convertible hard currency.Whatever freely convertible currency theymay have, we are not going to receive anyof it in any event.

USTINOV. Everything that is de-

scribed in the draft declaration in connec-tion with the supply of arms to Afghanistan,all of that is being done, shipments and de-liveries of this equipment are already tak-ing place. Unfortunately, I do not knowwhether we will be able to supply every-thing before April; that is going to be verydifficult. I would request that we adopt thedecision in connection with the supply ofarms that is set forth here. As far as con-cerns payment for the arms, I would deletethat.

KOSYGIN. All the same, we mustdispatch everything, literally beginning to-morrow.

USTINOV. Fine, we are doing that,and we will ensure that all of these thingsare shipped by tomorrow.

KIRILENKO. Let us authorize Com-rade Kosygin to implement those amend-ments to the draft of the decision of theCouncil of Ministers of the USSR. whichwe have before us, as relates to those pointswhich we have discussed. Tomorrow he willpresent the document to us in final draft.

KOSYGIN. Absolutely. I will comehere tomorrow morning and do everything.

KIRILENKO. We must undertakemeasures to ensure that all of the militarysupplies are sent in March.

KOSYGIN. And if, as ComradeUstinov has pointed out, it is impossible toship everything completely in March, thenperhaps, a second portion can remain forApril, but let that portion be insignificantlysmall.

I also want to raise another question:whatever you may say, Amin and Tarakialike are concealing from us the true stateof affairs. We still don’t know exactly whatis happening in Afghanistan. What is theirassessment of the situation? After all, theycontinue to paint the picture in a cheerfullight, whereas in reality, we can see what ishappening there. They are good people, thatis apparent, but all the same they are con-cealing a great deal from us. What is thereason for this, that is hard to say. In myview we must decide this question with theambassador, Andrey Andreevich[Gromyko], as soon as possible. Althoughas a practical matter he is not authorized,and he doesn’t do what is required of him.

In addition, I would consider it neces-sary to send an additional number of quali-fied military specialists, and let them findout what is happening with the army.


Moreover, I would consider it neces-sary to adopt a more comprehensive politi-cal decision. Perhaps the draft of such apolitical decision can be prepared by ourcomrades in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,the Ministry of Defense, or the Foreign De-partment of the KGB. It is clear that Iran,China, and Pakistan will come out againstAfghanistan, and do everything within theirpower and means to contravene the lawfulgovernment and discredit its actions. It isexactly here that our political support ofTaraki and his government is necessary. Andof course, Carter will also come out againstthe leadership of Afghanistan.

With whom will it be necessary for usto fight in the event it becomes necessary todeploy troops - who will it be that risesagainst the present leadership of Afghani-stan? They are all Mohammedans, peopleof one belief, and their faith is sufficientlystrong that they can close ranks on that ba-sis. It seems to me that we must speak toTaraki and Amin about the mistakes thatthey have permitted to occur during thistime. In reality, even up to the present time,they have continued to execute people thatdo not agree with them; they have killed al-most all of the leaders - not only the top lead-ers, but also those of the middle ranks - ofthe “Parcham” party. Of course, it will nowbe difficult to formulate a political document- to do that our comrades will be required towork, as I have already said, for a period ofthree days.

USTINOV. That is all correct, whatAleksey Nikolaevich [Kosygin] says, thismust be done as soon as possible.

GROMYKO. The documents must beprepared immediately.

KOSYGIN. I don’t think that weshould pressure the Afghan government torequest a deployment of forces from us. Letthem create their own special units, whichcould be redeployed to the more difficultregions in order to quell the insurgents.

USTINOV. In my view we must not,under any circumstances, mix our forceswith the Afghan forces, in the event that wesend them there.

KOSYGIN. We must prepare our ownmilitary forces, work up a statement relat-ing to them, and send it by special messen-ger.

USTINOV. We have prepared twooptions in respect to military action. Underthe first one, we would, in the course of a

single day, deploy into Afghanistan the105th airborne division and redeploy theinfantry-motorized regiment into Kabul;toward the border we would place the 68thmotorized division; and the 5th motor artil-lery division would be located at the bor-der. Under this scenario, we would be readyfor the deployment of forces within threedays. But we must adopt the political deci-sion that we have been talking about here.

KIRILENKO. Comrade Ustinov hascorrectly stated the issue; we must come outagainst the insurgents. And in the politicaldocument this must be clearly and pointedlystated.

In addition to that, we must bear uponTaraki; if we are already talking about thedeployment of forces, then the question mustbe considered thoroughly. We cannot de-ploy troops without a request from the gov-ernment of Afghanistan, and we must con-vey this to Comrade Taraki. And this mustbe directly stated in a conference betweenComrade Kosygin and Taraki. In additionto this, Taraki must be instructed to changehis tactics. Executions, torture and so forthcannot be applied on a massive scale. Reli-gious questions, the relationship with reli-gious communities, with religion generallyand with religious leaders take on specialmeaning for them. This is a major policyissue. And here Taraki must ensure, withall decisiveness, that no illicit measureswhatsoever are undertaken by them.

The documents must be prepared nolater than tomorrow. We will consult withLeonid Ilych as to how we can best accom-plish this.

USTINOV. We have a second optionwhich has also been prepared. This onedeals with the deployment of two divisionsinto Afghanistan.

ANDROPOV. We need to adopt thedraft of the decision which we have exam-ined today, accounting for those changes andamendments which have been discussed. Asfar as the political decision is concerned, thatalso must be immediately prepared, becausebands are streaming in from Pakistan.

PONOMAREV. We should sendaround 500 persons into Afghanistan in thecapacity as advisors and specialists. Thesecomrades must all know what to do.

ANDROPOV. Around Herat there are20 thousand civilians who have taken partin the rebellion. As far as negotiations withTaraki are concerned, we must get on with

it. But I think it is best for Comrade Kosyginto speak with Taraki.

ALL. Agreed. It is better for Com-rade Kosygin to speak with him.

ANDROPOV. We must finalize thepolitical statement, bearing in mind that wewill be labeled as an aggressor, but that inspite of that, under no circumstances can welose Afghanistan.

PONOMAREV. Unfortunately, thereis much that we do not know about Afghani-stan. It seems to me that, in the discussionwith Taraki, all these questions must beraised, and in particular, let him explain thestate of affairs with the army and in the coun-try generally. After all, they have a 100,000-man army and with the assistance of our ad-visors, there is much that the army can do.Otherwise, 20 thousand insurgents are go-ing to achieve a victory. Above all, it willbe necessary to accomplish everything thatis necessary with the forces of the Afghanarmy, and only later, if and when the neces-sity truly arises, to deploy our own forces.

KOSYGIN. In my view it is neces-sary to send arms, but only if we are con-vinced that they will not fall into the handsof the insurgents. If their army collapses,then it follows that those arms will beclaimed by the insurgents. Then the ques-tion will arise as to how we will respond inthe view of world public opinion. All thiswill have to be justified, that is, if we arereally going to deploy our forces, then wemust marshal all of the appropriate argu-ments and explain everything in detail. Per-haps one of our responsible comrades shouldtravel to Afghanistan in order to understandthe local conditions in greater detail. Per-haps Comrade Ustinov or ComradeOgarkov.

USTINOV. The situation in Afghani-stan is worsening. We ought to speak now,it seems to me, about political measures thatwe have not yet undertaken. And, on theother hand, we must fully exploit the capa-bility of the Afghan army. It seems to methere is no point in me going to Afghani-stan; I have doubts about that. Perhaps somemember of the government should go.

KOSYGIN. You must go there none-theless, Dmitri Fedorovich [Ustinov]. Thepoint is that we are sending into Afghani-stan a large volume of armaments, and it isnecessary that they remain in the hands ofthe revolutionary masses. We have about550 advisors in Afghanistan, and they must


be apprised of the state of affairs in the mili-tary.

USTINOV. Even if one of us goes toAfghanistan, still nobody is going to learnanything in just a couple of days.

GROMYKO. I think that negotiationswith Taraki should be undertaken by A.N.Kosygin or D.F. Ustinov, and more likely,in the end, by Comrade Kosygin.

KOSYGIN. Before speaking withTaraki, it will be necessary for me to getapproval from Leonid Ilych [Brezhnev]. Iwill speak with Leonid Ilych tomorrow andthen talk to Taraki.

ANDROPOV. And the essence of ourdecisions here today must be communicatedto Leonid Ilych in detail.

GROMYKO. We have to discuss whatwe will do if the situation gets worse. To-day, the situation in Afghanistan for now isunclear to many of us. Only one thing isclear - we cannot surrender Afghanistan tothe enemy. We have to think how to achievethis. Maybe we won’t have to introducetroops.

KOSYGIN. All of us agree - we mustnot surrender Afghanistan. From this point,we have to work out first of all a politicaldocument, to use all political means in or-der to help the Afghan leadership tostrengthen itself, to provide the supportwhich we’ve already planned, and to leaveas a last resort the use of force.

GROMYKO. I want to emphasizeagain the main thing, which we must con-sider thoroughly, and that is to come up withan answer as to how we will react in theevent of a critical situation. Taraki is al-ready speaking of alarm, whereas Amin todate has expressed an optimistic attitude. Ina word, as you can see, the Afghan leader-ship, in my view, has incorrectly assessedthe state of affairs in the army and in thecountry generally.

PONOMAREV. The Afghan armyachieved a revolutionary coup d’etat, and Iwould think that under skillful leadershipfrom the government, it could hold to itsown position in defense of the country.

KIRILENKO. The problem is thatmany of the commanders in the army havebeen imprisoned and executed. This hasresulted in a major negative impact on thearmy.

GROMYKO. One of our principaltasks is to strengthen the army; that is themain link. Our entire orientation must fo-

cus on the political leadership of the coun-try and the army. And all the same, we haveto acknowledge that the Afghan leadershipis concealing a great deal from us. For somereason they do not want to be open with us.This is very unfortunate.

ANDROPOV. It seems to me that weought to inform the socialist countries ofthese measures.

KIRILENKO. We have spoken atlength, Comrades, and our opinions areclear; let us come to a conclusion.

1. Comrade Kosygin shall be autho-rized to clarify the document which has beenpresented to us, to add to it the supply of100 thousand tons of bread, an increase inthe price of gas from 15 to 25 rubles, and toremove the language about a percentage, andhard currency, etc.

2. Comrade Kosygin shall be autho-rized to communicate with Comrade Taraki,to ascertain how they evaluate the situationin Afghanistan and what is necessary fromus. In this discussion with Taraki, ComradeKosygin shall be guided by the exchange ofopinion that has taken place here in the Po-litburo.

3. The third point that we have dis-cussed here consists of authorizing Com-rades Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov andPonomarev to prepare a political documentdealing with an exchange of opinions re-garding our policy in connection with Af-ghanistan.

4. We must appeal to Pakistan, throughour channels in the Ministry of Foreign Af-fairs, that the Pakistani government not al-low any interference in the internal affairsof Afghanistan.

5. I think that we should accede to theproposal of Comrade Ustinov in connectionwith assistance to the Afghan army in over-coming the difficulties that it has encoun-tered by means of the forces of our militaryunits.

6. To send into Afghanistan our bestmilitary specialists, through our channelswith the Ministry of Defense, as well asthrough the KGB, for a detailed explicationof the circumstances prevailing in the Af-ghan army and in Afghanistan generally.

7. Our draft of the decision must con-tain a provision for the preparation of mate-rials that expose the interference in the in-ternal affairs of Afghanistan on the part ofPakistan, Iran, the USA, and China, and forpublication of those materials through third

countries.8. Comrades Ponomarev and Zamyatin

shall be authorized to prepare materials re-lating to the intervention of Pakistan, theUSA, Iran, China and other countries inAfghanistan and to dispatch such materialto the press as it becomes available.

9. We must think carefully about howwe will respond to the accusations that willbe leveled against the USSR by other coun-tries, when we are charged with aggressionand so forth.

10. The Ministry of Defense shall bepermitted to deploy two divisions on theborder between the USSR and Afghanistan.

And finally, as has been suggested here,it will be necessary for us to inform the so-cialist countries of those measures which wehave adopted.

Are there any other proposals, Com-rades?

ALL. It’s all been covered.KIRILENKO. I will now attempt to

make contact with Comrade Chernenko andcommunicate our proposals to him.

ALL. Agreed. [Recess.]KIRILENKO. I have just spoken with

Comrade Chernenko. He believes that theproposals set forth here are correct, and hewill attempt to inform Leonid Ilych aboutthem.

Let us adjourn this session for today.[Session adjourned.]

[March 18 Session:]

KIRILENKO. Yesterday we agreedthat Comrade A.N. Kosygin should commu-nication with Comrade Taraki. Let us lis-ten to Comrade A.N. Kosygin.

KOSYGIN. As we agreed, yesterdayI made contact with Comrade Taraki twiceby telephone. [Ed. note: See transcript ofKosygin-Taraki telephone conversation be-low.] He informed me that on the streets ofHerat, the insurgent soldiers were fraterniz-ing with those who support the government.The situation in that town is very complex.If, in the words of Comrade Taraki, the So-viet Union does not lend its assistance atthis time, we will not hold out.

Further, Comrade Taraki said that Iranand Pakistan are supplying arms to the in-surgents, and that, at the time, Afghans werereturning from Iran, but it turned out thatthey were not Afghans but rather soldiersof the Iranian army dressed in Afghan cloth-


ing. And they stirred up agitation and in-surrection. Consequently, in a number ofprovinces of Afghanistan, and especially inthe town of Herat, events have unfolded thatbring with them a most serious danger.Comrade Taraki said further that the issuecould be resolved in a single day. If Heratfalls, then it is considered that the matter isfinished.

I then put the question to him: in Af-ghanistan there is a 100 thousand man army,not all of which is situated in Herat; there isonly the one 17th division there. Could itreally be impossible to form several divi-sions and deploy them to Herat in order toassist the supporters of the government?Comrade Taraki responded that several di-visions were being formed, but that untilthey were formed, there would be no garri-sons loyal to the government in Herat.

In that connection they would like toreceive reinforcements in the form of tanksand armored cars for the infantry. I thenasked him, will you be able to musterenough tank crews to place the tanks intoaction? He responded that they have no tankcrews, and therefore he requested that wedispatch Tajiks to serve as crews for tanksand armored cars, dressed in Afghan uni-forms, and send them here. I then statedagain, Comrade Taraki, there is no way youwill conceal the fact that our military per-sonnel are taking part in battle operations;this fact will be immediately uncovered, andpress correspondents will broadcast to thewhole world that Soviet tanks are engagedin a military conflict in Afghanistan.

I also asked Comrade Taraki what wasthe population of Kabul. In response he toldme that the population was 1 million 200thousand. I then asked him, would it reallybe impossible for you to form part of a divi-sion from the population of Kabul to assistthe various provinces, to equip them and, inlike fashion, to arm them? To that he re-sponded that there was nobody to train them.I then said to him, how is it possible, givenhow many people were trained in the mili-tary academic academies in the SovietUnion, given how many of the old militarycadres have come out on the side of the gov-ernment, that there is now nobody to do thetraining? How then, I asked him, can wesupport you? Almost without realizing it,Comrade Taraki responded that almost no-body does support the government. InKabul we have no workers, only craftsmen.

And the conversation again turned to Herat,and he said that if Herat falls, then the revo-lution is doomed. And on the contrary, if itholds out, then survival of the revolution isassured. In his opinion, the army is reli-able, and they are depending on it. How-ever, uprisings have emerged throughout theentire country, and the army is too small tobe able to pacify the insurgents everywhere.Your assistance is required, Comrade Tarakiagain declared.

As far as Kabul is concerned, there, itis obvious from the telegrams we receivedtoday, the situation is basically the same asin Iran: manifestos are circulating, andcrowds of people are massing. Large num-bers of persons are flowing into Afghani-stan from Pakistan and Iran, equipped withIranian and Chinese armaments.

KIRILENKO. In Herat the 17th divi-sion numbers 9 thousand men. Can it re-ally be that they are all in a state of inactionor have gone over to the side of thegovernment’s opponents?

KOSYGIN. According to our data, theartillery and one infantry regiment havegone over, although not entirely, and the restcontinue to support the government.

USTINOV. As far as the Tajiks areconcerned, we don’t have separate [deleted]

KOSYGIN. An antiaircraft battalionlocated in Herat has also gone over to theside of the rebels.

USTINOV. Amin, when I talked tohim, also requested the deployment of forcesto Herat to quell the insurgents.

KOSYGIN. Comrade Taraki reportsthat half of the division located in Herat hasgone over to the side of the rebels. The re-maining portion, he thinks, also will notsupport the government.

USTINOV. The Afghan revolution hasencountered major difficulties along its way,Amin said in his conversation with me, andits survival now depends totally on the So-viet Union.

What is the problem? Why is this hap-pening? The problem is that the leadershipof Afghanistan did not sufficiently appreci-ate the role of Islamic fundamentalists. It isunder the banner of Islam that the soldiersare turning against the government, and anabsolute majority, perhaps only with rareexceptions, are believers. There is your rea-son why they are asking us to help driveback the attacks of the insurgents in Herat.Amin said, albeit somewhat uncertainly, that

there is support for the army. And again,like Comrade Taraki, he appealed for assis-tance.

KIRILENKO. It follows that they haveno guarantee in respect to their own army.They are depending on only one outcome,namely, on our tanks and armored cars.

KOSYGIN. We must, obviously, inadopting such a determination in respect toassistance, seriously think through the con-sequences that will flow from this. Thematter is really very serious.

ANDROPOV. Comrades, I have con-sidered all these issues in depth and arrivedat the conclusion that we must consider very,very seriously, the question of whose causewe will be supporting if we deploy forcesinto Afghanistan. It’s completely clear tous that Afghanistan is not ready at this timeto resolve all of the issues it faces throughsocialism. The economy is backward, theIslamic religion predominates, and nearlyall of the rural population is illiterate. Weknow Lenin’s teaching about a revolution-ary situation. Whatever situation we aretalking about in Afghanistan, it is not thattype of situation. Therefore, I believe thatwe can suppress a revolution in Afghani-stan only with the aid of our bayonets, andthat is for us entirely inadmissible. We can-not take such a risk.

KOSYGIN. Maybe we ought to in-struct our ambassador, ComradeVinogradov, to go to Prime Minister of Iran[Mehdi] Bazargan and inform him that in-terference in the internal affairs of Afghani-stan cannot be tolerated.

GROMYKO. I completely supportComrade Andropov’s proposal to rule outsuch a measure as the deployment of ourtroops into Afghanistan. The army there isunreliable. Thus our army, when it arrivesin Afghanistan, will be the aggressor.Against whom will it fight? Against theAfghan people first of all, and it will haveto shoot at them. Comrade Andropov cor-rectly noted that indeed the situation in Af-ghanistan is not ripe for a revolution. Andall that we have done in recent years withsuch effort in terms of détente, arms reduc-tion, and much more - all that would bethrown back. China, of course, would begiven a nice present. All the nonalignedcountries will be against us. In a word, se-rious consequences are to be expected fromsuch an action. There will no longer be anyquestion of a meeting of Leonid Ilych with


Carter, and the visit of [French President]Giscard d’Estang at the end of March willbe placed in question. One must ask, andwhat would we gain? Afghanistan with itspresent government, with a backwardeconomy, with inconsequential weight in in-ternational affairs. On the other side, wemust keep in mind that from a legal point ofview too we would not be justified in send-ing troops. According to the UN Charter acountry can appeal for assistance, and wecould send troops, in case it is subject toexternal aggression. Afghanistan has notbeen subject to any aggression. This is itsinternal affair, a revolutionary internal con-flict, a battle of one group of the populationagainst another. Incidentally, the Afghanshaven’t officially addressed us on bringingin troops.

In a word, we now find ourselves in asituation where the leadership of the coun-try, as a result of the serious mistakes it hasallowed to occur, has ended up not on thehigh ground, not in command of the neces-sary support from the people.

KIRILENKO. Yesterday in Afghani-stan the situation was different, and we wereinclined toward the conclusion that weought, perhaps, to deploy some number ofmilitary detachments. Today the situationis different, and the discussion here quitecorrectly has already taken a somewhat dif-ferent course, namely, we are all adheringto the position that there is no basis whatso-ever for the deployment of forces.

ANDROPOV. Yesterday, when wediscussed this issue, the Afghans were nottalking about the deployment of troops; to-day the situation there has changed. InHerat, not just one regiment has gone overto the side of the rebellion but the wholedivision. As we can see from yesterday’sdiscussion with Amin, the people do notsupport the government of Taraki. Wouldour troops really help them here? In such asituation, tanks and armored cars can’t saveanything. I think that we should say toTaraki bluntly that we support all their ac-tions and will render the kind of support thatwe agreed upon yesterday and today, but thatin no case will we go forward with a de-ployment of troops into Afghanistan.

KOSYGIN. Maybe we should invitehim here and tell him that we will increaseour assistance to you, but we cannot deploytroops, since they would be fighting notagainst the army, which in essence has gone

over to the adversary or is just sitting andwaiting it out, but against the people. Therewould be huge minuses for us. A whole con-tingent of countries would quickly come outagainst us. And there are no pluses for us atall.

ANDROPOV. We should state directlyto Comrade Taraki that we will support youwith all measures and means except for thedeployment of troops.

KOSYGIN. We should invite him hereand tell him that we will support you withall means and measures but we will not de-ploy troops.

KIRILENKO. The government of Af-ghanistan itself has done nothing to securethe situation. And it has a 100 thousand manarmy at that. What has it done? What goodhas it accomplished? Essentially nothing.And after all, Comrades, we gave very, verygood support to Afghanistan.

ALL. Agreed.KIRILENKO. We gave it everything.

And what has come of it? It has come tonothing of any value. After all, it was theywho executed innocent people for no rea-son and even spoke to us of their own justi-fication, as though we also executed peopleduring the time of Lenin. So you see whatkind of Marxists we have found.

The situation has changed since yes-terday. Yesterday, as I already said, we wereunanimous as to the rendering of militaryaid, but we carefully discussed the matter,considered various options, searched fordifferent ways, other than the deploymentof troops. I believe that we should presentour point of view of Leonid Ilych, inviteComrade Taraki to Moscow and tell himabout everything that we have agreed on.

Maybe it is true we should send spe-cial declarations to [Ayatollah Ruhollah]Khomeini and Bazargan in Iran and Paki-stan?

ANDROPOV. We should invite Com-rade Taraki here.

KOSYGIN. I think we should consultwith Leonid Ilych and send a plane to Kabultoday.

KIRILENKO. Comrade Kosyginneeds to speak with Comrade Taraki. If hewants to come to Moscow and not remainin Tashkent, then perhaps Leonid Ilych willsee him.

GROMYKO. I think it would be bet-ter for us to prepare a political documentafter the discussion with Comrade Taraki.

ANDROPOV. We have to begin pub-lishing articles about Pakistan and its sup-port for the insurgents.

USTINOV. I assume we will continuewith the aid measures that we agreed onyesterday.

ALL. Agreed.USTINOV. The only thing is that we

must rule out the possibility of deployingtroops.

KOSYGIN. In short, we are not chang-ing anything in connection with aid to Af-ghanistan except the deployment of troops.They themselves will relate more responsi-bly to the determination of questions con-cerning the government’s management ofaffairs. And if we do everything for them,defend their revolution, then what remainsfor them? Nothing. We have 24 advisors inHerat. We should pull them out.

ZAMYATIN. As far as the supply ofpropaganda is concerned in connection withthis undertaking, we have articles preparedabout Afghanistan. We also have articlesprepared about Pakistan and the assistancerendered to the Afghan insurgents by China.We must get these articles to press today.

ALL. Agreed.CHERNENKO. Comrades, we must

decide who will invite Comrade Taraki.KIRILENKO. This should be done by

Comrade A.N. Kosygin. Let him make thecall and invite him to come to Moscow orTashkent, whichever he prefers.

[With this the session of March 18 wasadjourned.]

[March 19 session:]

BREZHNEV. Comrades, since thebeginning of the events that have unfoldedin Afghanistan, I have been informed aboutthem. I have been informed about the dis-cussions of Comrade A. A. Gromyko withAmin, of Comrade D. F. Ustinov also withAmin, about the latest events that have takenplace there in the course of yesterday, andin that connection about the discussion ofComrade A.N. Kosygin with ComradeTaraki.

I have signed documents authorizingthe delivery of additional supplies of spe-cial materials, including military propertyand armaments, and also dealing with theissue of a number of measures having a po-litical and organizational character, and au-thorizing Comrade A.N. Kosygin to com-


municate with Comrade Taraki, and to briefour press and other media outlets in con-nection with the events in Afghanistan. Ina word, all of the measures that were setforth in the draft decision of the CentralCommittee of the CPSU submitted on Sat-urday, all of the measures that have beenadopted in the course of Saturday and Sun-day, in my view, are entirely correct.

The question was raised as to the im-mediate participation of our troops in theconflict that has arisen in Afghanistan. Inmy view the Politburo has correctly deter-mined that the time is not right for us to be-come entangled in that war.

We must explain to Comrade Tarakiand our other Afghan comrades, that we canhelp them with everything that is necessaryfor the conduct of all activities in the coun-try. But the involvement of our forces inAfghanistan would harm not only us, butfirst of all them. Accordingly, it would ap-pear that we ought now to hear the report ofComrades A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov,Y.V. Andropov and A.N. Kosygin, and withthat conclude this phase of the adoption ofmeasures which were necessary to imple-ment in connection with the conflict in Af-ghanistan.

GROMYKO. We must discuss todaythe very acute question concerning the situ-ation in Afghanistan. We have closely fol-lowed the developing events in that coun-try and have given instructions to our em-bassy personnel, advisors and so forth. Wehave systematically, I would say, very regu-larly, in the course of the day, received com-prehensive information from our represen-tatives in Afghanistan.

What do we have as of today? In anarray of provinces in Afghanistan, first andforemost in Herat, there has been an upris-ing of insurgents. Where did they comefrom? They were dispatched from the ter-ritory of Iran and Pakistan. These are allelements hostile to the government of Com-rade Taraki. In order to conceal their de-ployment into Afghanistan, they weredressed in Afghan uniforms, and in num-bers amounting to several tens of thousandsthey appeared in Herat, instigated this in-surrection, and we unexpectedly began toreceive reports about the events in Herat.There is one government division locatedthere, which was supposed to maintain pub-lic order. But as a result of the fact that partof the government forces went over to the

side of the insurgents, shooting broke outand there were many casualties; more thana thousand were killed.

I discussed all aspects of the situationin Afghanistan with the Deputy Premier andMinister of Foreign Affairs Amin. But Imust say candidly that his assessment wassomehow rather relaxed. We were underthe impression conveyed by his assessment,and then suddenly the mood of Aminchanged for the worse, and he himself be-gan to speak about the fact that the entiredivision located in Herat had gone over tothe side of the insurgents. At the height ofthe events in Herat, Dmitri Fedorovich[Ustinov] spoke with Amin, who bluntlyexpressed the view that the USSR shoulddeploy troops in Herat. It begins to looklike a detective novel, how superciliouslythe Afghan leadership posits such seriousquestions.

After that, Comrade A. N. Kosyginspoke with Comrade Taraki, who told himthat the situation in Afghanistan was bad,and he also requested a deployment of troopsto Herat. The border of Afghanistan, bothwith Iran and Pakistan, is open. Our advi-sors promptly articulated a series of propos-als, but they didn’t listen to them.

Today we have received reports indi-cating that the situation in Herat is not allthat bad: two regiments remain loyal to thegovernment after all. Where lies the truth, Ican’t say, but these are the reports we havegotten.

We may assume with full justificationthat all these events, not only in Afghani-stan but in the neighboring governments,including those in China, are being directedby the hand of the USA. China, Pakistan,and Iran are playing a role here that is not atall far behind.

There are several heartening notes inthe fact that in Kabul, yesterday, a massivedemonstration took place in support of thegovernment. But all the same the govern-ment position in Afghanistan is not in con-trol as it ought to be.

Naturally, we cannot avoid the need toconfront the questions relating to the situa-tion in Afghanistan. But I believe that wewill have to adhere to our line, our policy,and follow our course with a view to all ofthe peculiarities. If, for example, we takeupon ourselves the risk of deploying troops,we will obtain not as many pluses as mi-nuses. To this time we still don’t know how

the Afghan army will behave. And if it doesnot support our measures or remains neu-tral, then it will turn out that we have usedour forces to occupy Afghanistan. In doingthis we will create for ourselves an incred-ibly difficult complication in our foreignpolicy. We would be largely throwing awayeverything we achieved with such difficulty,particularly détente, the SALT-II negotia-tions would fly by the wayside, there wouldbe no signing of an agreement (and how-ever you look at it that is for us the greatestpolitical priority), there would be no meet-ing of Leonid Ilych with Carter, and it isvery doubtful that Giscard d’Estang wouldcome to visit us, and our relations with West-ern countries, particularly the FRG [FederalRepublic of Germany], would be spoiled.

And so, despite the difficult situationin Afghanistan, we cannot embark on suchan act as the deployment of troops (Paren-thetically, it is entirely incomprehensible tous why Afghanistan has been so indulgentwith Pakistan, which is obviously engagedin intervention against Afghanistan. Yes-terday the government of Afghanistan pub-lished a proclamation, but it was not suffi-ciently strident.)

We are rendering major aid to Afghani-stan. How the government of Afghanistanwill conduct itself henceforth is difficult topredict; determining the situation there isalso problematic. However, there is no ba-sis whatsoever to conclude that all is lostthere. I believe that if the Afghan govern-ment can find in itself the strength to coor-dinate its actions properly, then mattersmight turn out there for the best.

KOSYGIN. I had the opportunity tospeak with Comrade Taraki yesterday ontwo occasions. He says that everything thereis falling apart and that we must send troops,that the situation is the same in all of Af-ghanistan as it is in Herat. He says that ifwe lose Herat, then everything will fall.Pakistan, in his opinion, is sending a largenumber of men, dressed in Afghan uniforms.According to his data, 4,000 such personshave been dispatched. There are 500 mensituated on the airfield in Herat at this time.I asked him, who in Herat is on your side?Comrade Taraki responded that in essencethe entire population there has fallen underthe influence of the religious fundamental-ists. He said that there are 200-250 personsthere who are organizing the entire thing. Iasked him, are there any workers there? He


said, that there are about two thousand work-ers. I asked him what, in your opinion, arethe prospects for Herat? He said to mebluntly that Herat will fall tomorrow, but thatit is holding on for the time being.

They are talking about forming newunits and sending them to Herat. In the opin-ion of Comrade Taraki, all who have gath-ered from the ranks of those dissatisfied withthe new regime will then unite and set outfor Kabul, and that will be the end of hisgovernment. Again he requested assistancefrom our troops. I said that I could not an-swer his request at this time. I said that wewere intensively studying the question, andthat we would deliberate and then respond.

As you can see, the discussion withComrade Taraki yielded no constructive re-sults whatsoever. He spoke of the fall ofHerat and requested a deployment of ourtroops. I asked him what was required fromour side in order to combine political mea-sures with those of a military character.Taraki then said to me, you should placeAfghan insignias on your planes and tanks,and let them move on Herat from across theborder. I then said that this would be directaggression on the part of the USSR againstAfghanistan.

I asked him, can you muster soldiersand special drivers for tanks and armoredcars from the ranks of the Afghans? He saidthat this could be done, but only a very few.

I told him of our decision to rendercomprehensive assistance to Afghanistan, tosend an additional number of advisors andspecialists.

Naturally, we must preserve Afghani-stan as an allied government. In addition, itwould appear that we must appeal to Paki-stan with a warning that intervention againstAfghanistan is intolerable. The same mea-sure must be taken in respect to Iran. Themessage must be directed to Khomeini andto Bazargan. We must also come out with asimilar document in respect to Iran.

It would be good if the borders withPakistan and Iran could be closed.

It seems to me that it would make senseto take the further step of sending a goodambassador to Afghanistan. From the dis-cussion with Comrade Taraki I learned thathe doesn’t even know to whom the govern-ment should turn. A great political task isnecessary there, and only in that event canwe save Afghanistan as an ally.

BREZHNEV. Letters to Pakistan and

Iran must be sent today.USTINOV. Amin spoke with me yes-

terday morning. Having consulted before-hand with Leonid Ilych, I told him aboutthe massive aid that we are turning out andwill continue to render. Amin said that theSoviet Union is our closest and principalfriend. He then started to lament about thefact that Pakistan and Iran are sending largenumbers of saboteurs that are being trainedon the territory of Pakistan by Chinese ad-visors, being equipped with Chinese arms,and are then being sent across the borderinto Afghanistan.

There is strong opposition in Afghani-stan on the part of the feudal lords.

He then turned the discussion to Heratand, just like Taraki, asked us to send tanks.I told him about the aid that we had deter-mined to give Afghanistan in the form of asupply of armaments. He said that such aidwas helpful, but what they really need is forus to send tanks.

BREZHNEV. Their army is fallingapart, and we are supposed to wage the warfor them.

USTINOV. We have a large numberof advisors in the Afghan army, as well asinterpreters. I told Amin that we can sendan additional number of interpreters.

Getting to the heart of the matter, inAfghanistan there is basically no informa-tion, no ties between Kabul and Herat.There is a single small electric power sta-tion there, and consequently the insurgentelements, having deserted the government,are heading into the mountains.

The situation in Herat today is some-what better. It is calm in the city. Technicalassistance, of course, will be necessary forus to send. We will send a great deal of it.We are forming two divisions in theTurkestan military district, and one divisionin the Central Asian military district. Wehave three regiments that could arrive in Af-ghanistan in literally three hours. But I amsaying this, of course, only to emphasize ourstate of readiness. Like the rest of my Com-rades, I do not support the idea of deploy-ing troops to Afghanistan. I would requestpermission that we conduct tactical exer-cises on the border with Afghanistan and toform regiments and divisions.

I must say that the Afghan leadershipis poorly handling very many matters, andthat working under such conditions is verydifficult for our advisors.

ANDROPOV. The first question thatmust be decided concerns the difficulty ofthe situation. In addition to that the situa-tion is increasingly unreliable. Just whatexactly is going on in Afghanistan? It hasto do with the leadership. The leadershipdoes not recognize the forces which supportit, and on which it could depend. Today,for example, a rather substantial demonstra-tion took place in Kabul and Herat, but theleadership did not exploit these massivemeasures to the necessary extent. Educa-tional efforts have been poorly managed notonly in the army but among the populationgenerally. They execute their political op-ponents. Nobody listens to the radio becausetransmissions are very weak. It will be nec-essary for us to assist them with mobile tele-communications facilities.

Amin has essentially had all of thepower in his hands, but only yesterday didthey ratify a new director of governmentsecurity and a chief of state. This is the wayto achieve some broadening of the politicalbase among the leadership.

On our part, we have advisors thereunder the direction of the chief advisor forparty policy Comrade Veselov. In my opin-ion he is not up to the task and is copingbadly with the situation. It might be betterif we were to send there some comrade fromthe Central Committee apparatus. There aremany advisors there. There are advisors inKGB channels, also in large numbers.

I think that as far as the deployment oftroops is concerned, it would not behooveus to make such a determination. To de-ploy our troops would mean to wage waragainst the people, to crush the people, toshoot at the people. We will look like ag-gressors, and we cannot permit that to oc-cur.

PONOMAREV. We have 460 Afghanmilitary personnel in the Soviet Union.These are all prepared officer cadres; theycould be sent into Afghanistan.

OGARKOV. The Afghans have ap-pealed to us with a request to speed up thetraining of 160 officers.

USTINOV. We have to speak withComrade Taraki about getting those peoplesent there and using them as officer cadres.

KAPITONOV. As far as our chief ad-visor on party policy Comrade Veselov isconcerned, he is a good man. He served asthe Central Committee inspector with us,and more recently worked as the second


secretary to the Bashkirskii general partycommittee. He is a young and energeticcomrade.

USTINOV. Our party advisors are notsufficiently qualified and there are very fewof them, in all, it seems to me, five men, butthe work has to be done very quickly.

KAPITONOV. That’s right, we reallydo have only five men there under the di-rection of Comrade Veselov. But we areright now selecting a number of additionalcomrades and will send them there.

BREZHNEV. I think that we shouldapprove the measures that have been workedout in the course of these few days.

ALL. Agreed.BREZHNEV. It follows that the ap-

propriate comrades should be authorized tocarry them out aggressively and if new ques-tions arise in connection with Afghanistan,to submit them to the Politburo.

ALL. Agreed.BREZHNEV. Accordingly, we are

adopting the decision:

To bring Comrade Taraki here tomor-row, March 20.

Discussions will be conducted byComrades A. N. Kosygin, A. A. Gromyko,and D. F. Ustinov, and then I will see him.

ALL. Very well.With this the session was adjourned.

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 25 dok.1, ll. 1,12-25; document provided by M. Kramer(Harvard University); translation by Carter-Brezhnev Project.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decisions onAfghanistan, 18 March 1979

Proletariats of all countries, unite!Subject to return within 3 days to the CCCPSU (General Department, 1st Sector)Communist Party of the Soviet Union.CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRETSPECIAL FILE

No.P147/II

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin,Andropov, Gromyko,Kirilenko, Ustinov,Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zimianin,Zamiatin,Smirtiukov.

Extract from protocol No. 147 of the CC

CPSU Politburo session of18 March 1979

About certain measures of a political andorganizational nature regarding the sharp-ening of the situation in the DemocraticRepublic of Afghanistan

1. Assign Com. Kosygin, A.N. to ne-gotiate by telephone with Com. N.M. Tarakiabout the possibility of a meeting with himin Moscow or Tashkent.

CC SECRETARY3-zm mk

[new document]

Proletariats of all countries, unite!Communist Party of the Soviet Union.CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No.P147/II

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin,Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Ustinov,Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zimianin, Zamiatin,Smirtiukov.

Extract from protocol No. 147 of the CCCPSU Politburo session of 18 March 1979

About certain measures of a political andorganizational nature regarding the sharp-ening of the situation in the DemocraticRepublic of Afghanistan

1. Special file.2. In relation to the sharpening of the

situation in the DRA, consider expedient theacceptance of a political document whichreveals the reasons for the sharpening of thesituation in Afghanistan, and defines ourpossible steps in providing assistance to theleadership of the DRA in the stabilizationof the the situation in the country.

Assign Coms. Gromyko, Andropov,Ustinov, Ponomarev to prepare a draft reso-lution on that issue, taking into account theexchange of opinions which took place atthe meeting the the CC Politburo.

3. Assign Coms. Ponomarev, Zimianinand Zamiatin to prepare materials for pub-lication in the press, transmission by televi-sion and radio, which unmasks the interfer-

ence of the USA, Pakistan, Iran, China inthe internal affairs of the Democratic Re-public of Afghanistan. As soon as these ma-terials are ready, send them to press.

4. Assign the MFA USSR and the CCCPSU International department to preparea draft of an appeal to the governments ofIran and Pakistan about the inadmissabilityof preparing diversionist and terroristic actson the territories of Iran and Pakistan, send-ing diversionist groups onto the territory ofAfghanistan, and intervention in the inter-nal affairs of the DRA.

5. Assign the KGB USSR and the CCCPSU Department of foreign political pro-paganda to prepare and send to third coun-tries materials about the interference in theinternal affairs of Afghanistan by the USA,Pakistan, Iran, China, and other countries.

SECRETARY CC

[Source: Archive of the President, RussianFederation (APRF), f. 3 op. 82, d. 137, ll.121-123; obtained by Carter-BrezhnevProject; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

Transcript of Telephone ConversationBetween Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin

and Afghan Prime Minister NurMohammed Tarki, 17 or 18 March 1979

Kosygin: Ask Comrade Taraki, perhapshe will outline the situation in Afghanistan.

Taraki: The situation is bad and get-ting worse.

Kosygin: Do you have support amongthe workers, city dwellers, the pettybourgoisie, and the white collar workers inHerat? Is there still anyone on your side?

Taraki: There is no active support onthe part of the population. It is almostwholly under the influence of Shiite slogans- follow not the heathens, but follow us. Thepropaganda is underpinned by this.

Kosygin: Are there many workersthere?

Taraki: Very few—between 1,000 and2,000 people in all.

Kosygin: What are the prospects?Taraki: We are convinced that the en-

emy will form new units and will developan offensive.

Kosygin: Do you not have the forcesto rout them?

Taraki: I wish it were the case.Kosygin: What, then, are your propos-


als on this issue?Taraki: We ask that you extend practi-

cal and technical assistance, involvingpeople and arms.

Kosygin: It is a very complex matter.Taraki: Iran and Pakistan are working

against us, according to the same plan.Hence, if you now launch a decisive attackon Herat, it will be possible to save the revo-lution.

Kosygin: The whole world will imme-diately get to know this. The rebels haveportable radio transmitters and will reportit directly.

Taraki: I ask that you extend assistance.Kosygin: We must hold consultations

on this issue. Do you not have connectionswith Iran’s progressives? Can’t you tellthem that it is currently the United Statesthat is your and their chief enemy? The Ira-nians are very hostile toward the UnitedStates and evidently this can be put to useas propaganda. What foreign policy activi-ties or statements would you like to see com-ing from us? Do you have any ideas on thisquestion, propaganda-wise?

Taraki: Propaganda help must be com-bined with practical assistance. I suggestthat you place Afghan markings on yourtanks and aircraft and no one will be anythe wiser. Your troops could advance fromthe direction of Kushka and from the direc-tion of Kabul. In our view, no one will beany the wiser. They will think these areGovernment troops.

Kosygin: I do not want to disappointyou, but it will not be possible to concealthis. Two hours later the whole world willknow about this. Everyone will begin toshout that the Soviet Union’s interventionin Afghanistan has begun. If we quicklyairlift tanks, the necessary ammunition andmake mortars available to you, will you findspecialists who can use these weapons?

Taraki: I am unable to answer this ques-tion. The Soviet advisers can answer that.

Kosygin: Hundreds of Afghan officerswere trained in the Soviet Union. Whereare they all now?

Taraki: Most of them are Moslem re-actionaries. We are unable to rely on them,we have no confidence in them.

Kosygin: Can’t you recruit a further50,000 soldiers if we quickly airlift arms toyou? How many people can you recruit?

Taraki: The core can only be formedby older secondary school pupils, students,

and a few workers. The working class inAfghanistan is very small, but it is a longaffair to train them. But we will take anymeasures, if necessary.

Kosygin: We have decided to quicklydeliver military equipment and property toyou and to repair helicopters and aircraft.All this is for free. We have also decided todeliver to you 100,000 tons of grain and toraise gas prices from $21 per cubic meter to$37.

Taraki: That is very good, but let ustalk of Herat. Why can’t the Soviet Unionsend Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens in ci-vilian clothing? No one will recognize them.We want you to send them. They could drivetanks, because we have all these nationali-ties in Afghanistan. Let them don Afghancostume and wear Afghan badges and noone will recognize them. It is very easywork, in our view. If Iran’s and Pakistan’sexperience is anything to go by, it is clearthat it is easy to do this work, they have al-ready shown how it can be done.

Kosygin: You are, of course, oversim-plifying the issue. It is a complex politicaland international issue, but, irrespective ofthis, we will hold consultations again andwill get back to you.

Taraki: Send us infantry fighting ve-hicles by air.

Kosygin: Do you have anyone to drivethem?

Taraki: We will find drivers for be-tween 30 and 35 vehicles.

Kosygin: Are they reliable? Won’t theyflee to the enemy, together with their ve-hicles? After all, our drivers do not speakthe language.

Taraki: Send vehicles together withdrivers who speak our language—Tajiks andUzbeks.

Kosygin: I expected this kind of replyfrom you. We are comrades and are wag-ing a common struggle and that is why weshould not stand on ceremony with eachother. Everything must be subordinate tothis.

[The first page has a hand-written footnote:At the Central Committee Politburo’s sit-ting on 19 March, Comrade Kosygin readthe transcript of these conversations in thepresence of Central Committee secretaries.]

[Source: Moscow Russian Television Net-work in Russian, “Special File” program,

14 July 1992, as translated in FBIS-SOV-92-138 (17 July 1992), pp. 30-31.]

Meeting of Kosygin, Gromyko, Ustinov,and Ponomarev with Taraki in Moscow,

20 March 1979


RECORD OF MEETINGx

of A.N.KOSYGIN, A.A.GROMYKO,D.F.USTINOV and B.N.PONOMAREV

with N.M.TARAKI

20 March 1979A.N.Kosygin. The Politburo has en-

trusted us with discussing with you all ques-tions which you think necessitate an ex-change of opinions. As I have already men-tioned to you, your meeting withL.I.Brezhnev is scheduled for 18-18.30.

At first we proposed that the first wordshould be given to you, but since one im-portant question from your side has alreadybeen raised, I would like to first set forthour opinion, and then we will attentivelyhear you out.

First of all, I would like to emphasizethat the friendship between Soviet Unionand the Democratic Republic of Afghani-stan is not conditional, dictated by sometemporary viewpoints, but calculated forages. We have given and will continue togive you assistance in the fight against allenemies which act against you at the presenttime and against those enemies with whichyou may clash in the future.

We have carefully discussed the situa-tion which has developed in you country,we looked for ways to assist you whichwould best serve the interests of our friend-ship and your relations with other countries.There may be various ways of solving theproblems which have developed in yourcountry, but the best way is that which wouldpreserve the authority of your governmentin the eyes of the people, not spoil relationsbetween Afghanistan and neighboring coun-tries, and not injure the international pres-tige of your country. We must not allow thesituation to seem as if you were not able todeal with your own problems and invitedforeign troops to assist you. I would like touse the example of Vietnam. The Vietnam-ese people withstood a difficult war with theUSA and are now fighting against Chinese


aggression, but no one can accuse the Viet-namese of using foreign troops. The Viet-namese are bravely defending by themselvestheir homeland against aggressive encroach-ments. We believe that there are enoughforces in your country to stand up to counter-revolutionary raids. One only needs to unifythem and create new military formations.During our telephone conversation with youwe spoke of the need to begin creating newmilitary groups, keeping in mind that a cer-tain amount of time will be needed for theirtraining and preparation. But even at thistime you have at your disposal a sufficientforce in order to deal with the current situa-tion. One need only deal with it correctly.Let’s take the example of Herat. It seemedthat all would fall apart, that the enemy hadfirmly entrenched itself there, that the cityhad become a center of counter-revolution.But when you really took charge of the mat-ter, you were able to seize control of the situ-ation. We have just received word that to-day, at 11 o’clock in the morning, the mili-tary town in Herat, the location of the muti-nous section of the 17th infantry division,has been taken by a battalion of paratroop-ers supported by tanks from Kandahar, fol-lowing air-strikes. Troops loyal to the gov-ernment are securing and further taking ad-vantage of this success.

In our opinion, our assignment for thecurrent time period is to defend you fromvarious international complications. We willgive you assistance with all available means- ship weapons, ammunition, send peoplewho can be useful to you in managing mili-tary and domestic matters of the country,specialists to train your military personnelin the operation of the most modern typesof weapons and military machinery whichwe are sending you. The deployment of ourforces in the territory of Afghanistan wouldimmediately arouse the international com-munity and would invite sharply unfavor-able multipronged consequences. This, ineffect, would be a conflict not only with im-perialist countries, but also a conflict withone’s own people. Our mutual enemies arejust waiting for the moment when Sovietforces appear on Afghan territory. Thiswould give them an excuse to deploy onAfghan territory military formations hostileto you. I would again like to underline thatthe question of deploying our forces hasbeen examined by us from every direction;we carefully studied all aspects of this ac-

tion and came to the conclusion that if ourtroops were introduced, the situation in yourcountry would not only not improve, butwould worsen. One cannot deny that ourtroops would have to fight not only withforeign aggressors, but also with a certainnumber of your people. And people do notforgive such things. Besides, as soon as ourtroops cross the border, China and all otheraggressors will be vindicated.

We have come to the conclusion thatin the given period, the most effective sup-port that we could give you would bethrough methods of our political influenceon neighboring countries and through therendering of extensive and manifold assis-tance. This way would accomplish muchmore than through the deployment of ourtroops. We are deeply convinced that we canovercome the enemy using the politicalmeans being undertaken both by your sideand by our side. We have already discussedwith you that Afghanistan should work to-wards good relations with Iran, Pakistan andIndia by eliminating any pretexts they mayhave for meddling in your affairs. As forus, today we are sending two documents tothe leaders of Iran and Pakistan, in whichwe tell them with all seriousness not tomeddle in the affairs of Afghanistan. Weare taking care of this matter ourselves, with-out drawing you into it. These are, in es-sence, the thoughts which we wanted toshare with you openly, as comrades.

N.M.Taraki. I am very grateful to youfor the detailed account of the position ofthe Soviet government on the questionwhich I wanted to discuss. I also speakforthrightly and openly, as your friend. Wein Afghanistan also believe that emergingproblems should first be dealt with throughpolitical means, and that military actionsmust be auxiliary in nature. In the politicalarena, we have taken a number of steps andare convinced that the majority of the peopleremain on our side. Within a day after myappearance on the radio where I explainedthe nature of events in Herat, throughout thecountry there took place 102 demonstra-tions, the participants of which carried plac-ards condemning Khomeini and his min-ions. This convinced us that our internalenemies are not so numerous. We were alsohappy to hear the news that a segment ofour armed forces, taking part in the mutiny,had put down their arms.

On my part, I also want to emphasize

that the relations between our countries aremore than just routine diplomatic ex-changes. They are based on a class founda-tion and on mutual ideology and politics.In our country, as in yours, the governmentbelongs to the working class and to the peas-ants, who wrested it from the hands of thearistocracy and the feudalists. Our revolu-tion has provoked a malicious reaction fromour class enemies. The revolutionary reor-ganization undertaken by us - liberation ofpeasants from dependency to landlords andfeudalists resulting from debt, redistributionof land to landless peasants, and other mea-sures - have secured the authority of our gov-ernment among the people of Afghanistan,and have had a positive response from thepeople of Pakistan and Iran. This has drivenfear into the reactionary forces of thesecountries, which have increased their sub-versive activities against our country, inten-sified slanderous propaganda, and begun tosend terrorist gangs into our territory. Theybegan their propaganda against us by pro-claiming us apostates of Islam. Then theybegan to accuse us of all other mortal sins.The Pakistani propaganda perverted themeasures undertaken by us towards socialliberation of women, whom we gave a dig-nified position in society. When we set towork on land reform, the ruling circles inPakistan, seeing its revolutionary influenceon their people, crossed over to the politicsof sabotage and subversive activities againstus. The rulers of Pakistan were very fright-ened by the demonstrations that rolled acrossthe country, protesting under banners “Longlive the Democratic Republic of Afghani-stan!” and “Long live Taraki!” Our countrywas not only being infiltrated by membersof “the Moslem brotherhood” who had fledthe country after the revolution, but also byentire subdivisions, dressed in Afghan mili-tary uniforms, which are involved in sub-versive activities and sabotage. After myvisit to Soviet Union and the signing of avery important Treaty between our coun-tries, the American imperialists and otherreactionaries became strongly antagonisticagainst the Democratic Republic of Af-ghanistan. They understood that Afghani-stan had been finally lost by the West.Through their means of mass informationthe USA, Pakistan, and Iran spread all sortsof slanderous material defaming us. It is inthe close friendship of Afghanistan and theSoviet Union that one finds the main rea-


son for anti-Afghan activity of imperialistsand reactionaries.

Today we spoke with you concerningthe fact that Afghanistan should maintaingood ties with Pakistan, Iran, and India. Thiswill be difficult to achieve, as Iran, and es-pecially Pakistan, don’t want friendship withus.

A.N. Kosygin. A statement has justbeen received from [Pakistani leader] Zia-ul-Haq, in which he notes that events inAfghanistan are the internal matter of thatstate and that Pakistan will not interfere inthem. This statement also notes that thegovernment of Pakistan will only deliverhumanitarian aid to the 35 thou. refugeesfrom Afghanistan as long as their activitiesdo not undermine relations between Paki-stan and Afghanistan.

N.M.Taraki. They only speak of hu-manitarianism, but are themselves creatingcamps to train commandos against us.

A.N.Kosygin. We are not so naive asto believe every word of Zia-ul-Haq, butwhatever the case may be, the statement hasbeen made and it is binding.

B.N.Ponomarev. It seems that the state-ment of Zia-ul-Haq is Pakistan’s reaction tothe story in the newspaper “Pravda.”

A.N.Kosygin. Clearly Pakistan hasbecome worried. They have felt the pres-sure from not only your side, but also fromours.

N.M.Taraki. The article in “Pravda,”analyzing the schemes against the DRA, waspublished exactly at the right time. Thisarticle has made a deep impression on ourneighbors. I, of course, agree with you thatit necessary to take active political steps, andthat war is a very risky proposition. It wouldbe superfluous to delve into the question ofwhy the Pakistanis, the Iranians, the Ameri-cans, and the Chinese are undertaking suchactive steps to undermine us. I would onlylike to emphasize that we have been and willcontinue to remain friends, and that we shallnever be as close to anyone as we are withyou. We have learned and continue to learnfrom Lenin. We are well aware of Lenin’sinstructions on how to build relations withneighboring countries. We strive towardsgood relations with neighbors, but we arehindered by the Americans who are tryingto increase tensions by undermining pro-gressive governments. They have acted thusagainst the young Soviet republic in the past,and are now continuing to act thus against

Cuba, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and SouthYemen. We are resisting these schemes, andare doing everything to rule the country notby the force of arms, but by winning thepeople’s respect through revolutionary-democratic reforms in the interest of theworking people. For this we have alreadyspent 200 bln. afghani. The people can tellwho is their friend and who is their enemy.Having seen that propaganda against ourgovernment has not found a broad responsefrom the Afghan people, the spiritual lead-ers have changed tactics and have begun toshout that Afghanistan has become pro-So-viet, pro-communist, that there are now 10thousand Soviet people in the country whoare bossing everyone around.

To sum up, I would like to say that weare worried by the possibility of infiltratorsbeing sent across from Iran and Pakistan,though, of course, your verbal confrontationwith the leaders of Pakistan and Iran will bevery useful, and will have a sobering effecton them.

A.N.Kosygin. Some more news. TheIranian government has issued a directiveordering all foreign workers to leave thecountry by April 21 and for foreign special-ists to leave by June 21. As for specialistsdeemed highly important for the Iranianeconomy, their cases will be dealt with onan individual basis.

N.M.Taraki. This remark most likelyis directed towards the Americans. We haveinformation that the Iranian government hasalready returned to the country Americanspecialists who have been working there onhelicopter assembly.

A.N.Kosygin. Yes, we have heardabout it as well, but it is possible that wemay have more specialists in Iran than dothe Americans. If there arises the questionof our specialists leaving, then a large met-allurgical factory as well as other importantenterprises in Iran will be unable to func-tion. And how many Afghans are workingin Iran?

N.M.Taraki. No less than 200 thou-sand people. They moved to Iran 5-6 yearsago, during the regime of Daoud and evenearlier. If they are going to be expelled, thenunder the guise of Afghan workers there willbe guerillas coming as well, since it is verydifficult to determine who is Iranian andwho is Afghan from one’s appearance. Iwanted to touch on the question of the needsof the Afghan army. We would like to re-

ceive armored helicopters, an additionalnumber of armored transports and militaryinfantry vehicles, as well as modern meansof communication. Also, maintenance per-sonnel would be of great help to us.

D.F. Ustinov. It seems that we are talk-ing about MI-24 helicopters, which havebullet-proof armor. We will give you 6 suchhelicopters during June-July and 6 more inthe fourth quarter of this year. Perhaps wewill be able to move up the timetable fordeliveries.

N.M.Taraki. We have great need forthese helicopters, and it would be good ifthey arrived together with pilots.

A.N.Kosygin. We can send you main-tenance specialists, which would take careof these helicopters at the airport, but, ofcourse, not battle crews. We have alreadyspoken about the matter.

D.F.Ustinov. You must prepare yourown pilots. We are training your officers,and we can expedite their release.

N.M.Taraki. Perhaps we can get heli-copter pilots from Hanoi or some othercountry, for example, Cuba?

A.N.Kosygin. As I have already saidearlier, we have helped and are helping Viet-nam a great deal, but they never asked us tosend them our pilots. They only asked fortechnical specialists. We are training 400Afghan officers. Choose the people youneed, and we will expedite their training.

N.M.Taraki. We would very much likethe delivery of helicopters to be expedited.We have a great need for them.

A.N.Kosygin. We will further exam-ine your request, and, if possible, will expe-dite the shipment of helicopters.

D.F. Ustinov. But, at the same time,you must worry about pilots for these heli-copters.

N.M.Taraki. Of course we will do that.If we cannot find them in our country, thenwe will look elsewhere. The world is big.If you do not agree with that, then we willsearch for pilots from among the Afghansstudying in your country, but we need trust-worthy people, and among the Afghan of-ficers whom we sent to study in the SovietUnion earlier there are many “Muslim broth-ers” and Chinese sympathizers.

A.N.Kosygin. Of course, you need tosort this out with the people we are train-ing. We can send the “Moslem brothers”back, and we can make early graduation ofthose people whom you trust.


D.F. Ustinov. This year 190 Afghanofficers are finishing their training, amongwhom 16 are airplane pilots and 13 - heli-copter pilots. We will send you, throughthe chief military advisor in Afghanistangeneral Gorelov, the list of graduates, bytheir specialization.

N.M.Taraki. Good. We will do that.However, the problem is that we don’t knowthe people belonging to counter-revolution-ary groups by name. We only know that,during Daoud’s regime, members of the“Muslim Brotherhood” and the pro-Chinese“Shoal-i-Jawid” organizations were sentover to the Soviet Union. We will try towork this out.

A.N.Kosygin. You seem to raise ques-tions about the deliveries of military machin-ery with regard to the resolution which wemade known in Kabul yesterday evening.In this resolution we speak of large militarydeliveries, of the delivery of 100 thou. tonsof wheat, and of the price increase of Af-ghan natural gas from 24 to 37 dollars per1000 m3. Are you familiar with this docu-ment?

N.M.Taraki. No. It seems that theydid not manage to brief me on it.

A.N.Kosygin. Most likely this docu-ment arrived in Kabul before your depar-ture to Moscow. Here are the decisions thatthe document contains: in March of this yearyou will be sent additionally and withoutcharge 33 pcs. of BMP-1, 5 pcs. of MI-25,8 pcs. of MI-8T, as well as 50 pcs. of BTR-60pb, 25 pcs. of armored reconnaissance ve-hicles, 50 pcs. of mobile anti-aircraft units,and an anti-aircraft unit “Strela” [Arrow].On March 18 we already sent 4 MI-8 heli-copters, and on March 21 you will receive4 more helicopters. All of this is deliveredto you without charge.

N.M.Taraki. Thank you for such greathelp. In Kabul I will acquaint myself ingreater depth with this document. Rightnow I would like to say that 100 thou. tonsof wheat is not enough for us. This fall wewill not be able to reap the entire harvestbecause the landlords whose land was con-fiscated did not sow it, and in a few placesthe crops were destroyed.

A.N.Kosygin. You will receive 100thousand tons of wheat at the rate that youcan transport it from the border to the coun-try. It seems that you will have difficultieswith the transport of wheat because, judg-ing from what transport specialists told us,

your transfer stations can only handle 15thousand tons of wheat per month. Whilethe 100 thou. tons are processed, we willthink about what to do in the future.

N.M.Taraki. Earlier, Pakistan prom-ised to sell us 200 thou. tons, but then re-canted on its promise. Turkey also declinedto deliver 70 thou. tons. We need at leastanother 300 thou. tons of wheat.

A.N.Kosygin. Since you were readyto pay for Pakistani wheat, you must havemoney? We can buy wheat from the Ameri-cans and transfer it to Afghanistan. For ex-ample, 200 thou. tons of wheat would cost25 mln. rubles (40 mln. dollars).

N.M.Taraki. It will be difficult for usto find such a sum.

A.N.Kosygin. Find as much as youcan, and with that sum we will buy youwheat.

N.M.Taraki. If we are unable to findthe means, then we will ask for your helpwith wheat. We would also like to receive adeferment of payment on your loans and ontheir interest. Our military budget is plannedwith the hope that such a deferment will begiven.

A.N.Kosygin. With the free deliveryof military technology we have alreadygiven you significant help for your militarybudget. We will further think about that soas to provide you certain deferral of pay-ments on the credits. We will review the is-sue and will inform you of what can be donewith regards to this question.

N.M.Taraki. We also need a large ra-dio station, which would allow us to broad-cast propaganda throughout the world. Ourradio station is weak. While any slander-ous declaration of some religious leader isspread throughout the world through foreignorgans of mass propaganda, the voice of ourradio station remains almost unheard.

B.N.Ponomarev. We are taking ener-getic measures to spread propaganda aboutthe successes of the DRA. We already spokeabout the article in “Pravda.” Today’s edi-tion contains your speech. It will be broad-cast by radio to Iran, Pakistan and othercountries. In this way we are helping com-pensate for the weakness of your radio sta-tion.

N.M.Taraki. Your help with propa-ganda is very valuable to us, but we wouldlike for the world to hear our own voice.That’s why we ask you to help us build a1000 [kilowatts] radio station.

A.N.Kosygin. We will study this ques-tion, but, as far as I know, building a radiostation requires a considerable amount oftime.

B.N.Ponomarev. We will send you aspecialist in propaganda. You may relate tohim your ideas on how to secure a large pro-paganda support through socialist countries.

D.F.Ustinov. Concerning additionalshipments of military machinery, a need willarise for additional military specialists andadvisors.

N.M.Taraki. If you believe that such aneed exists, then, of course, we will acceptthem. But won’t you allow us, after all, touse pilots and tank operators from other so-cialist countries?

A.N.Kosygin. When referring to ourmilitary specialists, we mean mechanicswho service military machinery. I cannotunderstand why the question of pilots andtank operators keeps coming up. This is acompletely unexpected question for us. AndI believe that it is unlikely that socialistcountries will agree to this. The questionof sending people who would sit in yourtanks and shoot at your people - this is avery a pointed political question.

N.M.Taraki. We will see how we canuse those Afghan soldiers who were sent tostudy with you earlier. Perhaps we will askyou to accept for training those people whowe will select ourselves.

D.F.Ustinov. We will, of course, ac-cept them for training.

A.N.Kosygin. To sum up this conver-sation, we can ascertain that there remainsthe question of the construction of a power-ful radio station. There remains also thequestion of expediting the deliveries of mili-tary technology. You, as we understand, willselect helicopter pilots from the officerstraining with us. If you have any other re-quests or desires, you may inform us throughthe Soviet ambassador and the chief mili-tary advisor. We will carefully review them,and will react accordingly.

We have also agreed to take politicalmeasures in defense of DRA from imperi-alists and plots of the reactionaries. We willcontinue to exert political influence on them.Our press will also provide continuous sup-port for the DRA.

We think it important that within yourcountry you should work to widen the so-cial support of your regime, draw peopleover to your side, insure that nothing will


alienate the people from the government.And finally, not as a matter of discussionbut as a wish, I would like to express myideas on the importance of a very carefuland cautious approach towards your staff.One should take care of one’s staff and havean individual approach towards it. Have athorough and good understanding with eachperson before hanging any labels on them.

N.M.Taraki. Are we talking about of-ficers and generals?

A.N. Kosygin. And about officers, andabout generals, and about political figures.But I repeat, I am saying this not for discus-sion, I am only expressing our wish.

N.M. Taraki. We try to be solicitous ofour cadres. However, the Herat events haveshown that “Moslem brothers” have pen-etrated into our midst, but we don’t hanglabels on those who are truly with us.

A.N. Kosygin. We aren’t making anykind of claims about you. We are simplysaying that mistakes in cadre policy are veryexpensive. We have experienced this our-selves. In Stalin’s time, many of our offic-ers were put in jail. And when the war brokeout, Stalin was forced to send them to thefront. These people showed themselves tobe true heroes. Many of them rose to highrank. We are not interfering in your internalaffairs, but we want to express our opinionregarding the necessity of behaving solici-tously toward cadres.

N.M. Taraki. As far as I have under-stood from this conversation, you are ren-dering and will render us assistance, but youare not giving us a guarantee against aggres-sion.

A.N. Kosygin. We have not discussedthe question with you from this angle. Wehave been speaking about what are now themost effective means for the political de-fense of your country. You should not un-derstand us as saying that we will leave youto the winds of fate.

N.M. Taraki. There are three types ofsupport - political, economic, and military.Two kinds of assistance you are already giv-ing us, but how will you act if there is anattack on our territory from without[?]

A.N.Kosygin. If an armed invasion ofyour country takes place, then it will be acompletely different situation. But rightnow we are doing everything to insure thatsuch an invasion does not occur. And I thinkthat we will be able to achieve this.

N.M.Taraki. I pose this question be-

cause China is persistently pushing Pakistanagainst us.

A.N.Kosygin. When aggression takesplace, then a completely different situationarises. The Chinese became convinced ofthis through the example of Vietnam and arewringing their hands now, so to speak. Asfor Afghanistan, we have already takenmeasures to guard it from aggression. I havealready said that we have sent correspond-ing messages to the president of Pakistan,Khomeini, and the prime-minister of Iran.

N.M.Taraki. The members of our Po-litburo are aware of my visit to Moscow.Upon arriving in Kabul I will have to in-form them of the results of our meetings.Must I tell them that the Soviet Union willgive the DRA only political support andother aid?

A.N.Kosygin. Yes, both political sup-port and extensive assistance in the line ofmilitary and other shipments. This is thedecision of our Politburo. L.I. Brezhnev willtell you about this during the meeting withyou, which will start in 10 min. I think thatyou will return to Afghanistan confident ofour support, confident of your own actions.

N.M.Taraki. Expresses great [appre-ciation] for the conversation that took placeand thanks for the great assistance that isbeing provided to Afghanistan during thiscritical moment.

Interpreted by the graduate student ofthe Diplomatic Academy of MFA USSR,comrade Kozin V.P., transcribed by the ad-viser of the Middle East Department of MFAUSSR comrade Gavrilov S.P.

_________21.III.79.# AK-786ss30 copies21.III.79.

[x This record has not been seen by the par-ticipants.]

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 14, dok. 26;provided by M. Kramer; translation by D.Rozas with assistance of K. Weathersby.]

[Ed. note: For a translation of the Russiantranscript of the 20 March 1979 meeting inMoscow of Brezhnev with Taraki immedi-ately after the above meeting, see CWIHPBulletin 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 73-74.]

Transcript of CPSU CC PolitburoSession on Afghanistan, 22 March 1979

Top SecretOnly copy

Working transcript

SESSION OF POLITBURO OF CC CPSU

22 March 1979

Chaired by Comrade Brezhnev, L.I.In attendance: Comrades Andropov, Iu.V.;Gromyko, A.A.; Kosygin, A.N.; Pelshe,A.Ia.; Ustinov, D.F.; Chernenko, K.U.;Demichev, P.N.; Kuznetsov, V.V.;Ponomarev, B.N.; Solomentsev, M.S.;Tikhonov, N.A.; Kapitonov, I.V.; Dolgikh,V.I.; Zimianin, M.V.; Rusakov, K.V.;Gorbachev, M.S.

I. Regarding the issue of the situation inAfghanistan

BREZHNEV. We reviewed the funda-mental issues about measures to assist Af-ghanistan at the last meeting of the Polit-buro on Monday, and the measures envis-aged by our decision are being realized inpractice.

The situation in Afghanistan is prettycomplicated. Now the affair seems to haveimproved.

GROMYKO. But all the same the situ-ation continues to remain complicated.

BREZHNEV. We will continue to pro-ceed for our common position which wedetermined at the last meeting of the Polit-buro, and we will not change anything whichwe noted regarding assistance to Afghani-stan. As we viewed it from the very begin-ning, our actions in relation to the situationin Afghanistan were entirely correct.

Comrade Taraki arrived in Moscow ina somewhat excited condition, but duringthe discussions he gradually cheered up andtowards the end he behaved calmly and sen-sibly.

In my conversation with ComradeTaraki I said that the main thing now is po-litical work among the masses and with par-ticular stress I repeated this. I said that theAfghan leadership should pay its main at-tention to the broadening of the base amongwhich it conducts revolutionary re-educa-tion. Here the activity of the People’sDemocratic Party and its ideo-political co-hesion has primary significance.


Taking into account that the Afghanleadership has made not a few mistakes re-garding repressions, in the conversation at-tention was paid to the fact that primarilypolitical and economic means should playthe main role in attracting broad strata ofthe population to support the current regime.I directly said to Comrade Taraki that re-pressions are a sharp weapon and it must beapplied extremely and extremely cautiously,and only in the case when there are seriouslegal grounds for it.

Comrade Taraki was told about thedecisions which we made in support of Af-ghanistan both in the international plane andin the area of bilateral cooperation. At thesame time it was directly declared that weconsider the introduction of Soviet militarydetachments inexpedient, insofar as in thecurrent situation this would only play intothe hands of our common enemy.

Comrade Taraki thanked us for receiv-ing him in Moscow and accepted thethoughts which had been expressed to himwith understanding. He assured me that theAfghan leadership is doing everything so asto continue the development of the countryalong a revolutionary path.

Overall I believe that the conversationswere useful. Demonstrating solidarity withthe Afghan revolution and our faith in theAgreement on Friendship and Cooperation,we at the same time warned the Afghanledership about the danger of extremism andthe underestimation of mass political work,and oriented him towards conducting a morewell-considered and thought-out course.

As was reported to me, Comrade Tarakiremained very satisfied with the discussionsin Moscow and left in a good mood.

Perhaps, the participants in the discus-sion will add something to what was saidabove?

KOSYGIN. I accompanied ComradeTaraki to the airfield. He thanked the Polit-buro [and] Leonid Il’ich for the nice recep-tion and for the favorable attitude towardsAfghanistan. The new year, by the way, hasbegun by their calendar. They celebrated ithere. Comrade Taraki said that he had notexpected that over such a short time it wouldbe possible to decide so many questions, toconduct such a broad consideration of allthe problems which so greatly interest theAfghan leadership.

About equipment, Comrade Taraki ex-pressed a request that measures be accepted

regarding an improvement in radio transmis-sions to Afghanistan, and in particular, askedfor a more powerful transmitter.

CHERNENKO. Proposals about thathave been received.

KOSYGIN. I said that were are review-ing that issue attentively.

ZAMIATIN. Yesterday that issue wasreviewed by the Ministry of Communica-tions and Gosteleradio [State Television andRadio]. Comrades Talyzin and Lapin sub-mitted proposals which are entirely accept-able. The issue is how to redirect a boostertransmitter with a strength of 1000 kilowattswhich is located close to Dushanbe near theborder with Afghanistan. This transmitteris sufficient for the entire territory of Af-ghanistan.

KOSYGIN. Herat for all intents andpurposes is now in the hands of the govern-ment.

ZAMIATIN, CHERNENKO say thatin Herat the situation is more normal now.

ZAMIATIN. The radio transmissionswill be conducted, of course, in the Afghanlanguage.

BREZHNEV. In conclusion, ComradeTaraki thanked us for the reception whichwas shown him and for the solutions to theissues which we announced to him. I thinkthat it would be possible to:

1. Approve the conversations which wehad with Comrade Taraki.

2. Agree with the proposals of Com-rades Lapin and Talyzin regarding the or-ganization of the radio relay to Afghanistan,and also to make a corresponding notationin the nature of an instruction regarding thecreation of a more powerful transmitter.

ANDROPOV. That is a very good mea-sure.

The proposal is accepted.

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 25, dok. 2;document provided by M. Kramer; transla-tion by Carter-Brezhnev Project.]

Record of Conversation between SovietAmbassador to Afghanistan A.M.

Puzanov and Taraki, 22 March 1979

Taraki informs [Puzanov] about hisconversations on high-frequency radio withBrezhnev, Kosygin, Ustinov, Gromyko, andPonomarev. The Soviet leadership has madea decision “to provide political and militaryassistance to the DRA in the event of ag-

gression from Iran, Pakistan,” and othercountries, to speed up the delivery of weap-ons by air, postpone the expiration of cred-its, present 100,000 tons of grain to theDRA, and raise the price of Afghan naturalgas bought by the USSR. Taraki givesthanks for the USSR declaration to Iran andPakistan with the condemnation of interfer-ence in the domestic affairs of the DRA.

[Source: Notes by O.A. Westad in TsKhSD,f. 5, op. 76, d. 1044, ll. 29-30.]

[Ed. note: For a translation of a report tothe CPSU CC Politburo on the Afghan situ-ation by Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov andPonomarev, dated 1 April 1979 and ap-proved by the Politburo on 12 April 1979,see CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 67-69.]

Report of the chief of the Sovietmilitary advisory group in Afghanistan,Lt. Gen. L.N. Gorelov, with H. Amin, 14

April 1979 (excerpt)

MoscowUrgent. Secret

...I was invited to see Com. Amin, who,at the behest of N.M. Taraki, requested thatwe send to Kabul some 15-20 combat heli-copters with ammunition and Soviet crewsso that, if the situation in the outlying andcentral regions deteriorates, they can be usedagainst bands of rebels and terrorists whoare being infiltrated from Pakistan.

In this regard, assurance was providedthat the arrival in Kabul and the use of So-viet crews will be kept secret....

L. Gorelov14 April 1979

INSTRUCTIONS: This should not bedone.[Marshal and Chief of Staff] N. V.Ogarkov

[Source: B. V. Gromov, Ogranichennyikontingent (Moscow: Progress/Kultura,1994), p. 78; translated by Mark Kramer.]

[Ed. note: For a translation of a CPSU CCPolitburo decison dated 21 April 1979 re-jecting the above-mentioned request fromAmin that Moscow send Soviet helicoptercrews to participate in the fighting, seeCWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 74-75.]


CPSU CC Politburo Decision andInstruction to Soviet Ambassador in

Afghanistan, 24 May 1979

Communist Party of the Soviet Union.CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No.P152/159

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andro-pov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev,Baibakov, Patolichev, Skachkov, Serbin,Smirtiukov

Extract from protocol No. 152 of the CCCPSU Politburo session of 24 May 1979

About Providing Supplementary MilitaryAssistance to the Democratic Republic ofAfghanistan

1. Approve the draft instruction of theUSSR Council of Ministers on this issue(attached).

2. Assign Gosplan USSR and the Min-istry of Foreign Trade to review withinweeks the request for the delivery to theDemocratic Republic of Afghanistan of1500 automobiles and to submit a proposalon this issue.

3. Affirm the text of the instruction tothe Soviet Ambassador in the DemocraticRepublic of Afghanistan on this issue (at-tached)

CC SECRETARY

[attachment:]Re: Point 159 Prot. No. 152


To KABULTO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Visit N.M. Taraki and, referring to theinstruction, inform him that the Afghanleadership’s request about the provision ofsupplementary military assistance to theDemocratic Republic of Afghanistan havebeen attentively reviewed.

Say that in Moscow they share the con-cern of the Afghan leadership in relation tothe activation of counter-revolutionary ac-tivity by the reactionary forces in Afghani-stan. The Soviet leadership, guided by a

strong desire to provide further internation-alist assistance in order to stabilize the situ-ation in the Democratic Republic of Af-ghanistan, has taken a decision to deliver toAfghanistan in the period 1979-1981, free-of-charge, special property in the sum of 53million rubles, including 140 guns and mor-tars, 90 armored personnel carriers (of which50 will represent an expedited delivery), 48thousand machine guns, around 1000 gre-nade throwers, 680 aviation bombs, and alsoto send in the form of an expedited deliveryin June-July 1979 medicines and medicalequipment in the sum of 50 thousand rubles.In terms of immediate assistance in May ofthis year, 100 incendiary tanks and 160single-use bomb cassettes. The delivery ofgas bombs with a non-toxic poison gas isnot considered possible.

As far as the request of the Afghan sidefor the dispatch to the DRA of helicoptersand transport planes with Soviet crews anda possible landing of our parachute troopsin Kabul is concerned, the question of us-ing Soviet military units was considered inmuch detail and from all points of view dur-ing Comrade M. Taraki’s visit to Moscowin March of this year. Such actions, we aredeeply convinced, are fraught with greatcomplexities not only in the domestic po-litical, but also in the foreign policy sphere,which no doubt would be used by hostileforces first of all to the detriment of the in-terests of the DRA and the consolidation ofthe victory of the April revolution.

Telegraph upon execution.

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 14, dok. 30, ll.1-3; provided by M. Kramer; translation byCarter-Brezhnev Project.]

Record of Conversation Between SovietAmbassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki,

9 June 1979

Puzanov reports the USSR’s demarcheto Islamabad about the inadmissability ofanti-Afghan activity from the territory ofPakistan, and about Zia-ul-Haq’s responseabout the Pakistanis’ readiness to clear awaythe tension and to meet with Taraki at anytime.

Puzanov puts forth his observations,that during such a meeting, in exchange forthe DRA’s obligation to support Pakistanupon its entry into the Non-Aligned Move-ment, it might be possible to get from it a

written agreement on a ban on Afghan refu-gees engaging in political activities, and theceasing of propaganda among the Pushtutribes and an end to the sending of armedgroups into Afghanistan.

[Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at TsKhSD,,f. 5, op. 76, d. 1044, ll. 47-51.]

Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-Ponomarev Report to CPSU CC on theSituation in Afghanistan, 28 June 1979

Top SecretSpecial File

To the CC CPSU

. . . Difficulties in the coming-into-be-ing of the DRA have a primarily objectivecharacter. They are related to the economicbackwardness, the small size of the work-ing class, the weakness of the People’sDemocratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).These difficulties are becoming more in-tense, however, as the result of subjectivereasons: In the Party and the government acollegial leadership is lacking, all power infact is concentrated in the hands of N.M.Taraki and H. Amin, who none too rarelymake mistakes and commit violations oflegality. . . .

The main support of the Afghan gov-ernment in the struggle with counter-revo-lution continues to be the army. Recently,security forces, border troops, and newly-created self defense forces have begun totake a more active part in this struggle.However, broad strata of the population areinvolved in the struggle with reaction onlyinsufficiently, the consequence of which isthat the measures which the DRA govern-ment has taken to stabilize the situation havebeen not very effective . . . .

Regarding this information, the MFAUSSR, KGB USSR, Ministry of Defenseand International Department of the CCCPSU consider it expedient to:

. . . 3. To assist the main military advi-sor, send to Afghanistan an experienced gen-eral and a group of officers to work directlyamong the troops (in the divisions and regi-ments). . . .

4. To provide security and defense forthe Soviet air squadrons at the Bagram air-field, send to the DRA, with the agreementof the Afghan side, a parachute battalion


disguised in the uniform (overalls) of anaviation-technical maintanence team.

For the defense of the Soviet Embassy,send to Kabul a special detachment of theKGB USSR (125-150 men), disguised asEmbassy service personnel. At the begin-ning of August, after preparations have beencompleted, send to the DRA (to the Bagramairfield) a special detachment of the GRUof the General Staff to be used in the eventof a sharp aggravation of the situation forthe security and defense of particularly im-portant government installations.

A. Gromyko, Iu. Andropov, D. Ustinov, B. Ponomarev

[Source: A.A. Liakhovskii, The Tragedy andValour of the Afghani (Moscow: GPI“Iskon”, 1995), p. 76. Liakhovskii notes thatthis the recommendations made in this docu-ment were approved during the CC CPSUPolitburo meeting of 28 June 1979, in Reso-lution No. P, 156/XI.]

Record of Conversation Between SovietAmbassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki,

10 July 1979

The conversation is about the negotia-tions with Pakistan. Puzanov “spoke ap-provingly” about the steps the Afghans hadtaken to open a dialogue with Pakistan. TheAmbassador noted that “the Pakistanis mustnot be given grounds for breaking the dia-logue.”

Taraki warned that Pakistan “is lead-ing things toward a break in the negotia-tions”...

Puzanov: “in any case the Afghan sidemust demonstrate reasonable restraint; if thePakistanis set out to break off the negotia-tions, let the blame for that fall entirely onthem.”

About Iran: It is impossible to evalu-ate the situation in that countryunidimensionally, “in the country leftistforces are operating.” He advises that afriendly step should be taken in relation toIran, analogous to the one made in relationto Pakistan.

Taraki “expressed satisfaction over thearrival and deployment in Bagram of theSoviet special group.” He would like alsoto confer with the Soviet comrades aboutmeasures to strengthen the border defenses.

[Source: notes by O. A. Westad of documentin TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d.1044, ll. 47-51.]

Boris Ponomarev, Reports from Kabul,19-20 July 1979 (excerpts)

Report From Kabul (Secret. Urgent)

. . . Taraki, and Amin as well, repeat-edly returned to the issue of the wideningof the Soviet military presence in the coun-try. They put forth the issue of introducingapproximately two [Soviet] divisions to theDRA in the event of emergency circum-stances “at the request of the legal govern-ment of Afghanistan.”

In regard to this pronouncement of theAfghan leadership it was declared that theSoviet Union cannot do that.

Ponomarev

7.19.1979

* * * * *

Report From Kabul (Secret. Urgent)

On July 19 a second meeting with N.M.Taraki took place . . . Taraki once again re-turned to the issue of the strengthening ofmilitary support from the side of the SovietUnion, saying in that regard that in the eventof the outbreak of an emergency situationthe landing of a parachute division couldplay a decisive role in crushing the mani-festation of counter-revolutionary forces.

In response, our position was put forthonce again, emphasizing that the SovietUnion cannot take such measures.

Ponomarev

7.20.1979

[Source: A.A. Liakhovskii, The Tragedy andValour of the Afghani (Moscow: GPI“Iskon”, 1995), p. 87.]

Record of Conversation between SovietAmbassador to Afghanistan A.M.

Puzanov and H. Amin, 21 July 1979

Amin transmitted a request to send toAfghanistan 8-10 helicopters with Sovietcrews in connection with the decommission-ing of the MI-24s which they have.

[The Soviet Ambassador] told H. Amin

that as the Soviet leaders had said repeat-edly, and as B.N. Ponomarev had stressedduring the most recent meetings in Kabul,the Soviet side cannot embark on the par-ticipation of Soviet personnel in combatoperations.

Later on Amin provided informationabout the situation in the country. He la-mented that he does not have the authorityto run military affairs, and that Taraki, whois concentrating the leadership in his ownhands, cannot to a sufficient extent controlthe execution of commands. The SovietAmbassador responded that per the experi-ence of the Great Patriotic War it would bepossible to create for operational leadershipan extraordinary group of 5-6 people, in-cluding Amin, the Minister of Defense, theChief of the General Staff, the Minister ofInternal Affairs, Chiefs of the Sarandoy andState Security. It is necessary to find a formwhich, on the one hand, preserves Taraki’sauthority, and from the other, facilitates animprovement in operational leadership.Amin agreed.

A ciphered telegram containing thecontents of the conversation was sent toUstinov and Ponomarev.

[Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at TsKhSD,f. 5, op. 76, d. 1045, ll. 94-97.]

Conversation of the chief of the Sovietmilitary advisory group in Afghanistan,

Lt. Gen. Gorelov, with H. Amin,11 August 1979

On August 11 a conversation withAmin took place at his request. During themeeting special attention was paid to therequest for the arrival of Soviet sub-units inthe DRA.

H. Amin convincingly asked me to in-form the Soviet leadership about the neces-sity of quickly dispatching Soviet sub-unitsto Kabul. He repeated several times that“the arrival of Soviet troops will signifi-cantly raise our moral spirit, will inspireeven greater confidence and calm.”

Further he said, “It is possible that theSoviet leaders worry that their adversariesin the world will view that as interferencein the domestic affairs of the DRA. But Iassure you that we are a sovereign and in-dependent state and solve all our problemsindependently. Your troops will not partici-pate in combat actions. They will be used


only in moments that are critical for us. Ithink that we will need the Soviet sub-unitsuntil spring.”

08.12.79 Gorelov

[Source: As cited in Znamya, no. 4, 1991,from the Archives of the General Staff of theUSSR Armed Forces.]

Report from Soviet Deputy Defense Min-ister Army Gen. Ivan Pavlovskii, duringvisit to Afghanistan, 25 August 1979

On August 25, together with the mainmilitary advisor [Gorelov], I met with Amin.

Amin once again raised the issue of theintroduction of our forces into Kabul, which,in his opinion, would free one of the twodivisions of the Kabul garrison for thestruggle with the rebels.

I responded to Amin that the introduc-tion of our troops might lead to the compli-cation of the military-political situation andthe strengthening of American assistance tothe rebels.

Pavlovskii08.25.79

Resolution of USSR Minister of DefenseD.F. Ustinov: “Submit to the CC CPSU.”

[Source: As cited in Znamya, no. 4, 1991,from the Archives of the General Staff of theUSSR Armed Forces.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decisions onAfghanistan, 13 September 1979

(excerpts)

CPSU CC Politburo meeting of 13 September 1979

Ratified the following directive to theambassador in Kabul:

First. The ambassador has been com-missioned to meet with Taraki and Amin andurgently express the hope that they will bothdemonstrate a sense of responsibility to therevolution. In the name of saving the revo-lution, they must come together and act inconcord from a position of unanimity. Arift in the leadership would be fatal to therevolutionary cause and the Afghan people.

If Amin does not consent to a jointmeeting with Taraki, then, with Taraki’sagreement, visit Amin separately and con-

vey to him the same message.Second. Guide yourself by the fact that

we cannot take it upon ourselves to arrestAmin with our own battalion force, sincethis would be a direct interference in theinternal affairs of Afghanistan and wouldhave far-reaching consequences. Indeed,this is practically unfeasible.

(Note: the second part of the telegram,in addition to ambassador [A.M.] Puzanov,was also sent to [Ivan] Pavlovski, [B.S.]Ivanov, and [L.N.] Gorelov.)

[Source: APRF, from notes taken by A.Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian NobelInstitute; provided to CWIHP by Odd ArneWestad, Norwegian Nobel Institute; trans-lation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decision,15 September 1979, with report by

Gromyko, Ustinov, and Tsvigun

Communist Party of the Soviet UnionCentral Committee

Top SecretNo. P168/5

To: Coms. Brezhnev, Andropov, Grishin,Gromyko, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Kunaev,Pel’she, Romanov, Suslov, Ustinov, Cher-nenko, Shcherbitskii, Aliev, Demichev, Kuz-netsov, Masherov, Ponomarev, Rashidov,Solomentsev, Tikhonov, Shevardnadze,Gorbachev, Dolgikh, Zimyanin, Kapitonov,Rusakov

Extract from Protocol No. 168 of theCPSU CC Politburo Session

on 15 September 1979

On the Situation in Afghanistan

Agree with the recommendations ex-pressed in the note from Coms. A. A.Gromyko, D. F. Ustinov, and S. K. Tsvigunon 15 September 1979, No. 793/gs (at-tached).

CC Secretary

Re: Point 6 of Prot. No. 168Top Secret

CPSU CC

According to information coming infrom all channels about the situation in the

leadership of Afghanistan, events in recentdays have developed along the followinglines.

Upon returning from Havana, Tarakiwas given an ultimatum by Amin demand-ing that the officials closest to Taraki—theminister of internal affairs, [Aslam]Watanjar, the minister of communications,[Syed] Gulabzoy, the minister of border af-fairs, [Sherjan] Mazdooryar, and the chiefof the security organs, [Asadullah]Sarwari—be dismissed and punished on thepretext that these officials were involved inan “imperialist conspiracy” against Amin.

Taraki’s attempts to persuade Amin todrop his demands and normalize the situa-tion in the leadership were of no avail. Allevidence indicates that Amin used Taraki’sabsence to lay the groundwork for ensuringthat all real power, including supervision ofthe army and state security organs, was con-centrated in Amin’s own hands.

Having discerned this turn of events,Taraki evidently was about to remove Aminfrom the leadership, but he displayed inde-cisiveness and hesitation, and it is possiblethat he lacked sufficient forces to carry outhis intention.

The CPSU CC Politburo’s appeal call-ing on Taraki and Amin to join forces in thename of the revolution and to present an out-wardly unified position was received posi-tively by them and others, but even so, Amincontinued actively preparing to achieve hisaims and Taraki, as before, was indecisiveand was clearly unable to put an end toAmin’s activities. As a result, all the leversof real power by now are essentially inAmin’s hands. He controls the leadershipof the armed forces, the state security or-gans, and the internal affairs organs.

In the process, Amin has completelyisolated Taraki through the use of force;there is no access to him at all, even for ourrepresentatives.

By having seized, in particular, on theepisode involving an exchange of gunfirein Taraki’s residence, which killed twopeople, including Amin’s bodyguard, Aminhas explicitly demanded that Taraki relin-quish all his posts.

According to recent information,which was picked up by our representativesduring a conversation with Amin, a plenumof the PDPA CC is supposed to be convenedon 16 September. Taraki will be advised togive up all his posts voluntarily on the


grounds of ill health, and even if he doesnot agree, a decision to this effect will beadopted.

Amin has ignored the repeated appealsof our comrades warning him that such astep might have dire consequences both forthe party and for the country.

In these circumstances, our position atthis stage should be along the followinglines.

First. Considering the real state of af-fairs as it has now developed, we must notrefuse to deal with Amin and the leadershipheaded by him. At the same time, we mustdo everything we can to restrain him fromcarrying out repressions against Taraki’ssupporters. We should use our contacts withAmin to get a definitive clarification of hispolitical outlook and intentions.

Second. Our military advisers assignedto the Afghan forces, and also our advisersto the state security organs and internal af-fairs ministry, should remain in place, car-rying out their direct functions connectedwith the preparation and conduct of combatoperations against rebel formations, butwithout taking any part, of course, in repres-sive measures against people who havefallen into Amin’s disfavor in the event thatarmy units are ordered to carry out suchmeasures.

Third. Shipments of Soviet weaponsand military equipment to Afghanistanshould be curtailed somewhat, being lim-ited mainly to supplies of spare parts andammunition needed for combat operationsagainst the rebels.

Fourth. We should appeal to Amin andexpress our view that if Taraki is removedfrom his posts, there is no need to exact re-pressive measures against him or to carryout any sort of trial.

Fifth. On the matter of how the Sovietpress organs should treat the ongoing eventsin Kabul, it would be advisable to limit cov-erage in coming days to purely factual ma-terial, reporting it calmly without express-ing any kind of assessments of the situationor commentaries.

We request consideration.

A. Gromyko D. Ustinov S. Tsvigun

15 September 1979No. 793/gs

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 173, ll. 72-

75; translated by Mark Kramer; first publi-cation in Russian in Novaya i NoveishayaIstoriia 3 (May-June) 1996, pp. 91-99 (docu-ment on 95-97), intro. G.N. Sevastionov.]

Cable from Soviet Foreign MinisterGromyko to Soviet Representatives in

Kabul, 15 September 1979

To Soviet Representatives in Kabul

1. It is acknowledged to be expedient,considering the real state of affairs as it isdeveloping in Afghanistan, not to refuse todeal with H. Amin and the leadership whichhe heads. In this regard it is necessary touse all means to restrain H. Amin from re-pressions of supporters of N. Taraki andother people who are not pleasing to him,who are not enemies of the revolution. Atthe same time it is necessary to use contactswith H. Amin for further discerning his po-litical personnel and intentions.

2. It is also acknowledged to be expe-dient for our military advisors who are at-tached to the Afghan forces, and also theadvisors in the organs of security and inter-nal affairs, to remain at their posts. Theyshould fulfill their immediate functions con-nected with the preparation and conduct ofmilitary actions agains rebel formations andother counter-revolutionary forces. They,it goes with saying, should not play any partin repressive measures against people whoare not pleasing to H. Amin in the event thatdetachments and sub-units to which our ad-visors are attached are involved in theseactions.

A. Gromyko09.15.1979

[Source: A.A. Liakhovskii, The Tragedy andValour of the Afghani (Moscow: GPI“Iskon”, 1995), p. 98.]

Information from CC CPSU to GDRleader E. Honecker, 16 September 1979

Highly Confidential16.9.79

In connection with the well-knownevents in Afghanistan, we would like to in-form our friends on several aspects of thedevelopment of events in that country.

Already for some time now, there hasbeen conflict and disagreement in the party

and government leadership in Afghanistan,in connection with Amin’s effort to removeall persons close to Taraki by concentratingin his hands all real power, including thecommand of the army.

In the last few days the situation amongthe leadership of Afghanistan has beensharply exacerbated and the conflict hastaken on an open and highly charged char-acter. Amin, alleging that during Taraki’strip to the conference in Havana a numberof individuals in the Afghan leadership at-tempted to discredit him, Amin, demandedtheir dismissal and punishment.

Taraki’s efforts to convince Amin towithdraw his demands and normalize thesituation obviously were not successful.Amin, though he did verbally voice his sup-port for Taraki, took a number of steps toisolate Taraki almost by use of force.

In connection with the latest events, afew days ago we urgently appealed to Tarakiand Amin, in the name of the CC CPSUPolitburo and L.I. Brezhnev personally, withan urgent call to unite and in the name ofsaving the revolution act in concord and withunity. We warned them directly that a splitin the leadership would be disastrous andthat it would be immediately taken advan-tage of by internal counter-revolution andforeign enemies of Afghanistan. We calledon the leaders of Afghanistan to demonstratea high degree of responsibility to the revo-lution.

Both Taraki and Amin at the time wel-comed positively our appeal. However, inactuality, judging by incoming intelligence,Amin continued his activities to realize hisplans, while Taraki demonstrated a highdegree of indecisiveness in suppressingthese activities. You know today’s results.The near removal of Taraki from govern-ment is unlikely to have relieved tension,given that he continues to enjoy the supportof a certain segment of members of thePeople’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan.All in all, the situation continues to be highlytense, and right now it is difficult to say inwhich direction events will lead. We, on ourpart, continue to follow the situation care-fully.

[Source: SAPMO, Berlin, J 2/202, A. 575provided by V. Zubok (National SecurityArchive); translated from Russian byCarter-Brezhnev Project.]


Excerpt from transcript, CPSU CCPolitburo meeting, 20 September 1979

Brezhnev reported on the situation inAfghanistan: “Events developed so swiftlythat essentially there was little opportunityfor us, here in Moscow, to somehow inter-fere in them... Right now our mission is todetermine our further actions, so as to pre-serve our positions in Afghanistan and tosecure our influence there.

“We should assume that the Soviet-Af-ghan relations will not sustain some sort ofmajor changes, and, it seems, will continuein their previous course. Amin will bepushed toward this by the current situationand by the difficulties which the Afghangovernment will face for a long time tocome. Afghanistan will continue to be in-terested in receiving from the USSR mili-tary, economic and other aid, and possiblyeven in increased amounts.

“Evidently, Amin will continue to fol-low at least outwardly the recommendationswe gave earlier (under Taraki)... But [our]job will be difficult and delicate.”

[Source: APRF, from notes taken by A.Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian NobelInstitute; provided to CWIHP by O.A.Westad, Norwegian Nobel Institute; trans-lation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.]

Excerpt from transcript, Meeting ofSoviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Afghan Foreign Minister Shah-Valih,

New York, 27 September 1979 (excerpt)

A.A.Gromyko: What is the USA re-action to the latest developments in Afghani-stan? We are under the impression that theAmericans are still wavering and cannotcome to a definite conclusion. Apparently,they have not worked out any specific evalu-ations. In our discussions with them— I al-ready met once with Secretary of State[Cyrus R.] Vance—they have not touchedupon this question.

[Source: APRF, from notes taken by A.Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian NobelInstitute; provided to CWIHP by O.A.Westad, Nobel Institute; translation forCWIHP by D. Rozas.]

Information from the CC CPSU toGDR leader Honecker, 1 October 1979

Highly Confidential

As we have informed you earlier, al-ready for some time now there have beenconflicts and disagreements in the party andgovernment leadership in Afghanistan.These were not disagreements over majorissues - the question is essentially in the ri-valry and the struggle for power betweensupporters of Taraki and Amin.

After Taraki’s return from his visit toHavana and Moscow, the situation if theAfghan government became even more dif-ficult. Amin sharply increased his activi-ties, trying to dismiss Taraki and those closeto him and concentrate all real power in hishands, including the control of the army.Despite our persistent calls for both sides toact in concord, in the interests of defendingand strengthening the revolution’s achieve-ments and not to exacerbate the situation,neither side took any appropriate measuresto reinstate unity.

Taking advantage of Taraki’s indeci-siveness and his inability to take any swiftand effective measures, Amin in the end dis-missed him from government, replaced thechief administrators of the security and in-ternal affairs organs, and commenced topurge the top ranks of the army. Of course,one cannot be uncritical of many of Amin’smethods and activities, in particular his ex-treme lust for power, ruthlessness in his re-lations with former colleagues, formingopinions and making decisionssinglehandedly. However, it is impossibleto ignore the currently existing situation, andwe must deal with the new leadership in Af-ghanistan.

Following his rise to power, Aminmade a number of statements from which itfollows that he intends to continue thecourse of expanding the revolution, onstrengthening cooperation with the SovietUnion and socialist collaboration. Aroundhim there are a number of honest people,real revolutionaries who support the tenetsof Marxism-Leninism and are favorably in-clined towards Soviet Union, having re-ceived their education in our country. Webelieve that Soviet-Afghan relations, just asAfghanistan’s relations with other socialistcountries, will not undergo some sort ofmomentous change. Amin will be pushedtowards this by the current situation and dif-ficulties which the Afghan regime will have

to confront for a long time to come. Af-ghanistan will continue as before to be in-terested in receiving economic and othertypes of material assistance from the USSRand other socialist countries.

We think that work will have to be donewith Amin, and that this work will be sub-stantial, rather difficult and delicate. As youknow, we sent Amin a congratulatory tele-gram (though without unnecessary praisesand overtures). In the future we will con-tinue to examine positively requests fromthe Afghan government to render them thisor that concrete assistance in developing thecountry and in its fight against counter-revo-lution. At the same time, our representa-tives on location will continue to try to in-fluence Amin, in order to avert repressionsagainst Taraki and his circle and in generalto prevent various excesses on the part ofAmin.

We will continue to follow carefullyAmin’s activities, observing whether he iskeeping his promises and will act as eventsdictate.

[Source: SAPMO, Berlin, J IV 2/202, A. 575;obtained by V. Zubok; translation from Rus-sian by Carter-Brezhnev Project.]

Transcript of Brezhnev-Honeckersummit in East Berlin, 4 October 1979

(excerpt on Iran and Afghanistan)

BREZHNEV: [...]Now briefly on the situation in Iran and

Afghanistan. - Tendencies of a not particu-larly positive character have lately surfacedin Iran. The Islamic leaders have begun topersecute the progressive forces. They ruth-lessly suppress the activities of nationalminorities. In addition, they try to blame usfor the instigation of activities.

Our initiatives with regard to the de-velopment of good neighborly relations withIran are currently not gaining any practicalresults in Tehran. We know all that.

But we also understand something else:The Iranian Revolution has undercut themilitary alliance between Iran and the USA.With respect to a number of internationalproblems, particularly with respect to theMiddle East, Iran is now taking anti-impe-rialist positions. Imperialism tries to regainits influence in the region. We are trying tocounter these efforts. We are patiently work-ing with the current Iranian leadership and


moving them to develop cooperation on anequal and mutually beneficial basis.

We have recently briefed you on thelatest events in Afghanistan. Supplement-ing this, I would like to say the following:We have given Afghanistan more than a littleeconomic support. We have sent our advis-ers there, civilian as well as military, andhave supplied them with significant amountsof weapons and military equipment.

The situation in the country has im-proved. In some provinces, however, mili-tary encounters continue with the hordes ofrebels who receive direct and indirect sup-port from Pakistan and direct support fromIran, from the USA, and from China. In ad-dition, there are tensions within the Afghanileadership. Our efforts were directed to con-tribute to the unity of the Afghani leader-ship and not allow for divisions to happen.But Amin has taken advantage of Taraki’sindecisiveness and, as you know, eliminatedhim; he has achieved the leadership. Amindid this even though he was held as Taraki’sfriend. You know that Taraki had a stopoverin Moscow on his way from Havana wherethe Conference of the Non-AlignmentMovement took place. I met him and ad-vised him to take measures to stabilize thesituation in his country and among otherthings begin with the work on a constitu-tion and to keep up revolutionary lawful-ness, etc. We now see that Amin is imple-menting what I told Taraki.

Frankly, we are not pleased by all ofAmin’s methods and actions. He is verypower-driven. In the past he repeatedly re-vealed disproportionate harshness. But withregard to his basic political platform, he hasdecidedly confirmed to the course of fur-ther development of the Revolution, of fur-thering cooperation with the Soviet Unionand other countries of the Socialist commu-nity.

It is a fact that many of Amin’s follow-ers and partisans are honorable people whoare faithful to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and take a good attitude towardsus.

By taking into consideration the actualsituation, we will continue to support Af-ghanistan and give it a variety of supportand help it in its fight against foreign ag-gression and the domestic counterrevolu-tion. [. . .]

[Source: SAPMO (Berlin), DY30 JIV 2/201/

1342; obtained and translated from Ger-man by C. Ostermann.]

Information of KGB USSR to CCCPSU International Department,

10 October 1979

The Leadership of Iran on the ExternalSecurity of the Country

According to KGB information, inAugust in Teheran a secret meeting was heldwith the participation of representatives ofthe Prime Minister, the Ministries of For-eign and Internal Affairs, the Intelligenceand Operational Administrations of the Gen-eral Staff, Gendarme and Police Adminis-trations of the General Staff and the Staff ofthe “Corps of Defenders of the Revolution,”with the goal of studying issues which touchon the security of Iran. It was noted that theUSSR and the USA, which have their owninterests in this region, are worried aboutthe victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran.It is presumed that the USA might resort toa direct military threat and realization of ablockade. But in the event that Iran will nottake sharp steps which hurt the USA, andwill obstruct the penetration of the Soviets,this will ease the position of the USA.

Evaluating the policy of the USSR inrelation to the Iranian regime, the partici-pants in the meeting came to the conclusionthat insofar as strengthening the Islamic re-public will lead to a weakening of the posi-tion of the regime in Afghanistan, exert acertain influence on the Moslem republicsin the USSR and will be “a brake in the pathof penetration of Communism in the re-gion,” the Soviet Union “will not turn awayfrom the ideological struggle and efforts toput into power in Iran a leftist government.”It was stressed that with the aim of weaken-ing the Islamic regime the USSR might or-ganize “provocational” activity among IraniKurds, Azeris, Turkmen, Baluchis, supportleftist forces, create economic difficulties,resort to a military threat on the basis of the[Soviet-Iranian] agreement of 1921.

It was noted that Afghanistan is not inany condition to undertake military actionsagainst Iran. However, border conflicts arenot excluded. In addition, Afghanistan is inneed of economic assistance from Iran,which might soften its position.

The positions of Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan,and Saudi Arabia were also analyzed.

[Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at TsKhSD,f. 5, op. 76, d. 1355, ll. 17-20.]

Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-Ponomarev Report to CPSU CC,

29 October 1979Top Secret

Special File

To the CC CPSU

The situation in Afghanistan followingthe events of September 13-16 of this year,as the result of which Taraki was removedfrom power and then physically destroyed,remains extremely complicated.

In the effors to strengthen Amin inpower, along with such superficial gestureslike the beginning of the reworking of thedraft of the constitution and the liberationof some of the people who had been arrestedearlier, in fact the scale of repressions in theParty, army, state apparat and civic organi-zations has widened. . . .

According to information which wehave, at the present time the execution of agroup of Politburo members (Zeray, Misak,Pandzhshiri) who are subject to fictitious ac-cusations of “anti-Party and counter-revo-lutionary activity,” is planned. At the ple-num of the CC PDPA which took place re-cently, Amin introduced into the ruling or-gans of the Party people who are more de-voted to him, including a number of his rela-tives. . . .

Recently there have been noted signsof the fact that the new leadership of Af-ghanistan intends to conduct a more “bal-anced policy” in relation to the Westernpowers. It is known, in particular, that rep-resentatives of the USA, on the basis of theircontacts with the Afghans, are coming to aconclusion about the possibility of a changein the political line of Afghanistan in a di-rection which is pleasing to Washington.

Taking account of this and startingfrom the necessity of doing everything pos-sible not to allow the victory of counter-revolution in Afghanistan or the political re-orientation of H. Amin towards the West, itis considered expedient to hew to the fol-lowing line:

1. Continue to work actively withAmin and overall with the current leader-ship of the the PDPA and the DRA, not giv-ing Amin grounds to believe that we don’t


trust him and don’t wish to deal with him.Use the contacts with Amin to assert appro-priate influence and simultaneously to fur-ther expose his true intentions....

Upon the availability of facts bearingwitness to the beginning of a turn by H.Amin in an anti-Soviet direction, introducesupplemental proposals about measuresfrom our side.

A. Gromyko, Iu. Andropov,D. Ustinov, B. Ponomarev

29 October 1979

[Source: As cited in A.A. Liakhovskii, TheTragedy and Valour of the Afghani (Mos-cow: GPI “Iskon”, 1995), p. 102.]

Record of Conversation Between SovietAmbassador Puzanov and Amin,

3 November 1979

The Soviet Ambassador reported thereadiness of the Soviet leadership to receiveAmin. He also informed [Amin] ofMoscow’s satisfaction about the measuresof the Afghan leadership in the area of Partyand State building. Further, Amin spokeabout the situation in the country. The So-viet Ambassador in his turn informed[Amin] of the agreement of the Soviet lead-ership to send a Soviet specialist to Herat totake down the drilling installation.

[Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at TsKhSD,f. 5, op. 76, d. 1045.]

Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov, Reportto CPSU CC on Mission to Afghanistanof Deputy Defense Minister Army-Gen.

I. G. Pavlovskii, 5 November 1979

Top SecretCPSU CC

On the Results of the Mission of theUSSR Deputy Defense Minister, Army-

General I. G. Pavlovskii, in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

In accordance with the CPSU CC’sDecree No. P163/62 of 15 August 1979, theUSSR deputy defense minister, Army-Gen-eral I. G. Pavlovskii, and a group of gener-als and officers were in the Democratic Re-public of Afghanistan from 17 August to 22

October with the aim of [1] reviewing thestate of the People’s Armed Forces of Af-ghanistan and the organization and meth-ods of their combat operations against therebels, [2] providing on-site assistance to theAfghan commanders in dealing with thesequestions; and [3] preparing recommenda-tions for the further strengthening of thecombat capabilities of the People’s ArmedForces of Afghanistan.

The work of Com. I. G. Pavlovskii’sgroup in providing assistance to the Afghanmilitary command was carried out in strictaccordance with the CPSU CC’s decisionand with instructions issued by the USSRminister of defense, taking account of themilitary-political situation in the country andalso the political and organizational mea-sures implemented within the Afghan armyby the DRA leadership.

On all matters that they studied, rec-ommendations were devised and transmit-ted personally by Com. I. G. Pavlovskii toH. Amin, offering them as proposals for thefurther strengthening of the Afghan armedforces.

The provision of comprehensive prac-tical assistance by our side to the People’sArmed Forces of Afghanistan enabled themto make a transition between August andOctober. Rather than continuing to rely ona passive defense and faltering operationsby small units against the rebels, they wereable to launch coordinated and active op-erations by larger groupings. This allowedthem to gain the initiative in combat and todestroy the most dangerous forces of coun-terrevolution in the provinces of Paktia,Ghazni, Parvan, Bamian, and several otherareas.

To prepare the troops for these actions,tactical exercises with live fire were held,and combat operations were conducted toresolve specific tasks. Soviet generals andofficers provided direct assistance in work-ing out the plans for operations and in car-rying them out. This experience in prepar-ing and conducting operations taught theAfghan commanders, staffs, and politicalorgans the methods and means of organiza-tion for undertaking active combat opera-tions in mountainous regions. Help was pro-vided to the Main Political Directorate inorganizing party-political work among thetroops according to the different categoriesof servicemen, so that they could be mobi-lized for the active pursuit of combat objec-

tives. Taking account of the combat opera-tions, drafts were also prepared of docu-ments providing basic guidelines for the or-ganization of combat and operational prepa-rations.

Despite these efforts to increase thecombat capability of the People’s ArmedForces of Afghanistan, a number of ques-tions are still unresolved.

Military regulations that were codifiedwith help from Soviet advisers have not beeninstilled in the People’s Armed Forces, andthey have no impact on the practical life ofthe troops. The commanders, staffs, politi-cal organs, and party organizations do notalways coordinate their work in resolvingtasks among the troops. Staffs at all levels,including the General Staff, have still notbecome a central, directing organ in the dailylife of large and small units and in the troops’combat activity.

Political work in the Afghan army, es-pecially with the officer corps, is still notconducted concretely or effectively enough.The combat morale and fighting elan of thetroops, the state of military discipline, andthe army’s willingness to act are still low.

During the final conversation with H.Amin, M. Yakub, and M. Ekbal, Com. I. G.Pavlovskii once again directed their atten-tion to the unresolved problems and our rec-ommendations for solving them. At the endof the discussion, H. Amin said: “We aretaking all measures to ensure that your rec-ommendations are fulfilled, and we will al-ways work in coordination with Soviet ad-visers and specialists. Our friendship is un-wavering.” Then he expressed the hope thatSoviet military advisers would be assignedto every battalion of the Afghan armedforces. In conclusion, H. Amin thanked thedelegation for providing help and requestedthat they transmit warm greetings and per-sonal thanks to Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, andalso to Comrades A.N. Kosygin, D.F.Ustinov, Yu.V. Andropov, and A.A.Gromyko, as well as all the other leaders ofthe CPSU and the Soviet government.

Overall, the group of generals and of-ficers headed by the USSR deputy defenseminister, Army-General I.G. Pavlovskii,fufilled the tasks assigned to them.

Reported for informational purposes.

D. Ustinov

5 November 1979


No. 318/3/00945

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 149, ll. 120-122; translated by Mark Kramer; first pub-lication in Russian in Novaya i NoveishayaIstoriia 3 (May-June) 1996, pp. 91-99 (docu-ment on 97-98), intro. by G.N. Sevastionov.]

Record of Conversation between SovietAmbassador to Afghanistan F.A.

Tabeev and H. Amin, 6 December 1979

The conversation concerned Amin’sjourney to Moscow. Amin made referenceto the agreement of the Soviet leaders, trans-mitted by Puzanov, and expressed concernthat he not be late. Further he spoke aboutthe necessity of thinking about the agree-ment on issues of inter-Party cooperation forthe upcoming 2-3 years in relation to theend of the term of action for the plan of in-ter-Party relations between the PDPA andthe CPSU for 1979.

[Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at TsKhSD,f. 5, op. 76, d. 1045.]

Extract from CPSU CC PolitburoDecision, 6 December 1979


To Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov,Gromyko, Suslov, Ustonov

Extract From Protocol No. 176 ofthe Meeting of the CC CPSU Politburo of

6 December 1979

About the dispatch of a special detachmentto AfghanistanAgree with the proposal on this issue setforth in the note of the KGB USSR and theMinistry of Defense of 4 December 1979.No. 312/2/0073 (attached).

CC SECRETARY L. BREZHNEV

[attachment]


To the CC CPSU

The Chairman of the Revolutionary

Council, General Secretary of the CC PDPA,and Prime Minister of the DRA H. Aminrecently has insistently been raising the is-sue of the necessity of sending to Kabul of amotorized rifle batallion for defense of hisresidence.

Taking account of the situation as it hasdeveloped and the request, H. Amin consid-ers it expedient to sent to Afghanistan thedetachment of the GRU of the General Staffwhich has been prepared for these goals,with a complement of about 500 men, in auniform which does not reveal its belong-ing to the the Armed Forces of the USSR.The possibility of sending this detachmentto the DRA was envisioned by the decisionof the CC CPSU Politburo of 06.29.79 No.P 156/IX.

Regarding the fact that issues relatedto the sending of the detachment to Kabulhave been agreed with the Afghan side, wepropose that it is possible to drop it in onairplanes of military transport aviation dur-ing the first half of December of this year.Com. Ustinov, D.F. is in agreement.

Iu. Andropov, N. Ogarkov

No. 312/2/00734 December 1979

[Source: As cited in A.A. Liakhovskii, TheTragedy and Valour of the Afghani (Mos-cow: GPI “Iskon”, 1995), p. 107.]

Personal memorandum, Andropov toBrezhnev, n.d. [early December 1979]

1. After the coup and the murder ofTaraki in September of this year, the situa-tion in Afghanistan began to undertake anundesirable turn for us. The situation in theparty, the army and the government appara-tus has become more acute, as they wereessentially destroyed as a result of the massrepressions carried out by Amin.

At the same time, alarming informa-tion started to arrive about Amin’s secretactivities, forewarning of a possible politi-cal shift to the West. [These included:] Con-tacts with an American agent about issueswhich are kept secret from us. Promises totribal leaders to shift away from USSR andto adopt a “policy of neutrality.” Closedmeetings in which attacks were made againstSoviet policy and the activities of our spe-cialists. The practical removal of our head-

quarters in Kabul, etc. The diplomaticcircles in Kabul are widely talking ofAmin’s differences with Moscow and hispossible anti-Soviet steps.

All this has created, on the one hand,the danger of losing the gains made by theApril [1978] revolution (the scale of insur-gent attacks will increase by spring) withinthe country, while on the other hand - thethreat to our positions in Afghanistan (rightnow there is no guarantee that Amin, in or-der to protect his personal power, will notshift to the West). [There has been] a growthof anti-Soviet sentiments within the popu-lation.

2. Recently we were contacted bygroup of Afghan communists abroad. Inthe course of our contact with Babrak[Karmal] and [Asadullah] Sarwari, it be-came clear (and they informed us of this)that they have worked out a plan for oppos-ing Amin and creating new party and stateorgans. But Amin, as a preventive measure,has begun mass arrests of “suspect persons”(300 people have been shot).

In these conditions, Babrak andSarwari, without changing their plans ofopposition, have raised the question of pos-sible assistance, in case of need, includingmilitary.

We have two battalions stationed inKabul and there is the capability of render-ing such assistance. It appears that this isentirely sufficient for a successful operation.But, as a precautionary measure in the eventof unforeseen complications, it would bewise to have a military group close to theborder. In case of the deployment of mili-tary forces we could at the same time de-cide various questions pertaining to the liq-uidation of gangs.

The implementation of the given op-eration would allow us to decide the ques-tion of defending the gains of the April revo-lution, establishing Leninist principals in theparty and state leadership of Afghanistan,and securing our positions in this country.

[Source: APRF, from notes taken by A. F.Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian NobelInstitute; provided to CWIHP by Odd ArneWestad, Director of Research, Nobel Insti-tute; trans. for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.]

[Ed. note: For a translation and facsimileof the handwritten document (12 Decem-ber 1979) entitled “On the Situation in ‘A’,”


recording the Soviet decision to approve themilitary intervention in Afghanistan, seeCWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), p. 76.]

Andropov-Gromyko-Ustinov-Ponomarev Report on Events in

Afghanistan on 27-28 December 1979,dated 31 December 1979

Top SecretCC CPSU

Regarding events in Afghanistanduring 27-28 December 1979

After a coup-d’etat and the murder ofthe CC PDPA General Secretary and Chair-man of the Revolutionary Council of Af-ghanistan N.M. Taraki, committed by Aminin September of this year, the situation inAfghanistan has been sharply exacerbatedand taken on crisis proportions.

H. Amin has established a regime ofpersonal dictatorship in the country, effec-tively reducing the CC PDPA and the Revo-lutionary Council to the status of entirelynominal organs. The top leadership posi-tions within the party and the state werefilled with appointees bearing family ties ormaintaining personal loyalties to H. Amin.Many members from the ranks of the CCPDPA, the Revolutionary Council and theAfghan government were expelled and ar-rested. Repression and physical annihila-tion were for the most part directed towardsactive participants in the April revolution,persons openly sympathetic to the USSR,those defending the Leninist norms of in-tra-party life. H. Amin deceived the partyand the people with his announcements thatthe Soviet Union had supposedly approvedof Taraki’s expulsion from party and gov-ernment.

By direct order of H. Amin, fabricatedrumors were deliberately spread throughoutthe DRA, smearing the Soviet Union andcasting a shadow on the activities of Sovietpersonnel in Afghanistan, who had been re-stricted in their efforts to maintain contactwith Afghan representatives.

At the same time, efforts were made tomend relations with America as a part ofthe “more balanced foreign policy strategy”adopted by H. Amin. H. Amin held a seriesof confidential meetings with the Americancharge d’affaires in Kabul. The DRA gov-ernment began to create favorable condi-

tions for the operation of the American cul-tural center; under H. Amin’s directive, theDRA special services have ceased opera-tions against the American embassy.

H. Amin attempted to buttress his po-sition by reaching a compromise with lead-ers of internal counter-revolution. Throughtrusted persons he engaged in contact withleaders of the Moslem fundamentalist op-position.

The scale of political repression wastaking on increasingly mass proportions.Just during the period following the eventsof September, more than 600 members ofthe PDPA, military personnel and other per-sons suspected of anti-Amin sentimentswere executed without trial or investigation.In effect, the objective was to liquidate theparty.

All this, in conjunction with objectivedifficulties and conditions specific to Af-ghanistan, put the progress of the revolu-tionary process in extremely difficult cir-cumstances and energized the counter-revo-lutionary forces which have effectively es-tablished their control in many of thecountry’s provinces. Using external support,which has taken on increasingly far-reach-ing proportions under Amin, they strived tobring about radical change in the country’smilitary-political situation and liquidate therevolutionary gains.

Dictatorial methods of running thecountry, repressions, mass executions, anddisregard for legal norms have producedwidespread discontent in the country. In thecapital numerous leaflets began to appear,exposing the anti-people nature of the cur-rent regime and containing calls for unityin the struggle with “H. Amin’s clique.” Dis-content also spread to the army. A signifi-cant number of officers have expressed dis-may at the domination of H. Amin’s incom-petent henchmen. In essence, a broad anti-Amin front was formed in the country.

Expressing alarm over the fate of therevolution and the independence of thecountry, and reacting keenly to the rise ofanti-Amin sentiments in Afghanistan,Karmal Babrak and Asadulla Sarwari, bothliving abroad as emigres, have undertakento unite all anti-Amin groups in the countryand abroad, in order to save the motherlandand the revolution. In addition, the currentlyunderground group “Parcham,” under theleadership of an illegal CC, has carried outsignificant work to rally all progressive

forces, including Taraki supporters from theformer “Khalq” group.

All earlier disagreements were elimi-nated and the previously existing schism inthe PDPA has been liquidated. Khalqists(represented by Sarwari) and Parchamists(represented by Babrak) have announced thefinal unification of the party. Babrak waselected leader of the new party center, andSarwari - his deputy.

In this extremely difficult situation,which has threatened the gains of the Aprilrevolution and the interests of maintainingour national security, it has become neces-sary to render additional military assistanceto Afghanistan, especially since such re-quests had been made by the previous ad-ministration in DRA. In accordance withthe provisions of the Soviet-Afghan treatyof 1978, a decision has been made to sendthe necessary contingent of the Soviet Armyto Afghanistan.

Riding the wave of patriotic sentimentsthat have engaged fairly large numbers ofthe Afghan population in connection withthe deployment of Soviet forces which wascarried out in strict accordance with the pro-visions of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978,the forces opposing H. Amin organized anarmed operation which resulted in the over-throw of H. Amin’s regime. This operationhas received broad support from the work-ing masses, the intelligentsia, significantsections of the Afghan army, and the stateapparatus, all of which welcomed the for-mation of a new administration of the DRAand the PDPA.

The new government and Revolution-ary Council have been formed on a broadand representative basis, with the inclusionof representatives from former “Parcham”and “Khalq” factions, military representa-tives, and non-party members.

In its program agenda announcements,the new leadership vowed to fight for thecomplete victory of the national-democratic,anti-feudalistic, anti-imperialistic revolu-tion, and to defend Afghan independenceand sovereignty. In matters of foreignpolicy, they pledged to strengthen in everypossible way the friendship and cooperationwith the USSR. Taking into account themistakes of the previous regime, the newleadership, in the practical application of itspolicies, is intent on giving serious consid-eration to broad democratization of sociallife and ensuring a law-abiding society, wid-


ening the social base and strengthening thestate throughout the country, and maintain-ing a flexible policy with regards to religion,tribes and ethnic minorities.

One of the first steps that has capturedthe attention of Afghan society was the re-lease of a large number of political prison-ers, which include prominent political andmilitary activists. Many of them (Kadyr,Keshtmand, Rafi, and others) have activelyand enthusiastically joined in the work ofthe new Revolutionary Council and the gov-ernment.

Broad masses of people met the an-nouncement of the overthrow of H. Amin’sregime with unconcealed joy and expresstheir eagerness to support the newadministration’s program. The commandersof all key formations and units of the Af-ghan army have already announced theirsupport of the new leadership of the partyand the government. Relations with Sovietsoldiers and specialists continue to remainfriendly overall. The situation in the coun-try is normalizing.

In Kabul’s political circles it is notedthat the Babrak government, evidently, mustovercome significant difficulties, inheritedby him from the previous regime, in estab-lishing order in domestic politics andeconomy; however, they express hope thatPDPA, with USSR’s help, will be able tosolve these problems. Babrak can be de-scribed as one of the more theoreticallyequipped leaders of PDPA, who soberly andobjectively evaluates the situation in Af-ghanistan; he was always distinguished byhis sincere sympathies for the Soviet Union,and commanded respect within party massesand the country at large. In this regard, theconviction can be expressed that the newleadership of DRA will find effective waysto stabilize completely the country’s situa-tion.

[signature] [signature] Yu. Andropov A. Gromyko [signature] [signature] D. Ustinov B. Ponomarev

31 December 1979No. 2519-A

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 42, dok. 10;provided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.]

Meeting of Soviet Foreign Minister

Gromyko and Afghan Foreign MinisterShad Mohammad Dost, 4 January 1980

No. P27Top Secret

SUMMARY

RECORD OF MAIN CONTENTS OFTHE MEETING OF A.A.GROMYKOWITH THE MINISTER OF FOREIGNAFFAIRS OF THE DRA, Sh.M.DOST

4 January 1980

A.A.Gromyko welcomed Sh.M.Dostas a representative of the new Afghanistan;informed him of the latest reports from theUSSR representative at the UN, O.A.Troyanovsky.

Sh.M.Dost. The situation in Afghani-stan remains difficult. The rebels were ableto capture a number of the country’s prov-inces, for example, Kunduz, Tokhar,Samangan, and Badakhshan. However, withthe help of the Soviet Union, the armedforces of DRA were able to push the counter-revolutionaries out from the mentionedprovinces. In the northern part of the coun-try they continue to hold only the adminis-trative center of Badakhshan-Faizabad.

During meetings of the CC PDPA Po-litburo, the Revolutionary Council and thegovernment of DRA, Babrak Karmal, con-tinually stresses the necessity to carefullypay attention to the friendly and timely ad-vice and wishes coming from the Sovietleaders.

Of great importance are Soviet recom-mendations concerning the expediency ofsending messages in the name of BabrakKarmal to Khomeini and Zia-ul-Haq (theyare being prepared right now), as well asthe organization of meetings between thechairman of the Revolutionary Council andambassadors from Iraq, India, and othernonaligned countries with the aim of ex-plaining the meaning of events that tookplace in Afghanistan and to actively influ-ence them to take a positive attitude towardsAfghan affairs.

There was also a press conference byB. Karmal for foreign journalists which tookplace on the evening of January 3.

The conference was successful, and theMinistry of Foreign Affairs of the DRA hasordered all ambassadors in foreign countriesto give out visas to any foreign journalistsinterested in visiting Afghanistan.

A.A.Gromyko. I would like to share afew thoughts about the current situation inthe Security Council as well as the charac-ter of your appearance at the upcoming ses-sion.

You, comrade minister, have every rea-son to appear as the accuser - not as the ac-cused. It seems there are enough facts forthis.

It is necessary to emphasize that thedeployment of a limited military contingentin Afghanistan has been undertaken by theSoviet Union as a response to repeated ap-peals by the DRA to the government ofUSSR. These requests had been voiced ear-lier by Taraki during his visit to Moscowand by Amin.

It would also be useful to remind theparticipants at the Security Council of Ar-ticle 51 of the UN Charter.

The change in the leadership of Af-ghanistan is solely the internal matter of Af-ghanistan. The representatives of Westerncountries, Thatcher in particular, are tryingto draw a correlation between the change inthe Afghan leadership and the deploymentof the Soviet military contingent in Afghani-stan. However, one should emphasize thatthere is no relationship here. This is purelycoincidental.

I can confidentially inform you that wehave evidence that Saudi Arabia intends toget six countries bordering it to break offdiplomatic ties with the DRA.

As you have requested, we have pre-pared for you a number of materials, in par-ticular concerning American military bases.

These materials will be sent to NewYork along with V.S. Safronchyuk who isgoing there to assist you as you have re-quested earlier.

When you are assaulted [with ques-tions] concerning the deployment of a So-viet military contingent in Afghanistan, youcan parry this by exposing the aggressivepolitics of the USA. In Cuba, the USA, de-spite the constant demands of the Cubangovernment and people, continues to main-tain its military base in Guantanamo. Thisis an example of open and rude interferencein the internal affairs of a sovereign nation.

Concerning contacts with Safronchyukand your conversations with him, it is de-sirable to use discretion and certain cautionduring conversations in New York, espe-cially inside premises. Meetings and ex-changes of opinion can be realized in turn


on the premises of the Soviet representativesto the U.N. or in the buildings of the Sovietconsulate-general. It is desirable not to ad-vertise that Safronchyuk arrived in NewYork to render you assistance. Officially,he is going in the capacity of a member ofthe Soviet delegation to the session of theGA [General A of the UN, which, as isknown, is still carrying on its work.

Sh.M.Dost. Should I say somethingregarding China, and, if so, in what capac-ity?

A.A.Gromyko. In the case that rudeaccusations and various kinds of insinua-tions are leveled in the direction of Afghani-stan, it will be necessary to respond with adecisive rebuff. However, in the course ofthe Security Council session it is hardly nec-essary to dwell on China, as in such an eventthe Chinese representative would be happyto hear it. Do not create an advertisementfor the Chinese, but certainly do give a re-buff.

Sh.M.Dost. Concerning the propa-ganda campaigns carried on by the USA andother Western countries on “human rights,”shouldn’t I speak at length about the factthat after the 27th of December in Afghani-stan, the new leadership of DRA has freedall political prisoners, regardless of class,religion, language, tribe or ethnicity, or po-litical views[?] We can, right now, invite toAfghanistan representatives from any coun-try and show them that our jails are empty.

A.A.Gromyko. This is a very wise andimportant measure on the part of the gov-ernment of DRA. You should certainlyspeak about it in detail.________7.I.80.# 020/gs


CC CPSU Politburo transcript, 17January 1980 (excerpt)

[handwritten] P179Top SecretOnly copy

Working Transcript

MEETING OF CC CPSU POLIT BURO

17 January 1980

Chaired by Comrade BREZHNEV, L.I.

Attended by Coms.Andropov, Iu.V.,Grishin, V.V., Gromyko, A.A., Kirilenko,A.P., Pel’she, A. Ia., Suslov, M.A.,Tikhonov, N.A., Ustinov, D.F., Chernenko,K.Y., Gorbachev, M.S., Demichev, P.N.,Kuznetsov, V.V., Ponomarev, B.N.,Solomentsev, M.S., Kapitonov, I.V.,Dolgikh, V.I.

8. Re: The Issue of the Situation inAfghanistan

BREZHNEV. You remember, Com-rades, that several months ago in relation toevents in Afghanistan we assigned a Com-mission made up of Comrades Andropov,Gromyko, Ustinov, and Ponomarev to in-form the Politburo, and if necessary, to pre-pare corresponding documents and submitthem to the Politburo.

I will say that that Commission did itswork well. Most recently a whole range ofresolutions were accepted and correspond-ing measures were implemented.

It seems to me that the situation in Af-ghanistan is still far from the time when itwill not require daily observation and theacceptance of corresponding operationalmeasures. Therefore, it seems to me that itis not necessary to create any sort of newcommission; instead, we will assign the verysame Commission to continue its work inthe same spirit as it conducted it up untilnow.

Will there be any objections to that pro-posal? No.

Then we will consider that the Polit-buro Commission will act, with its formermembership.

GROMYKO. In the leadership of Af-ghanistan, a consolidation of forces is go-ing on. The often appeal to us for advice.We give it. They make proclamations.There are no essential changes in the mili-tary situation. But it also has not worsened.This is a very important element. The Armysupports the leadership of Afghanistan.

The international situation around Af-ghanistan has taken a turn for the worse.The ruckus, which has unfolded particularybroadly in the USA, has also assumed asomewhat weakened form. In NATO thereis no unity regarding measures toward theSoviet Union. In any case the Western coun-tries — in particular, FRG, Italy, Turkey, and

other countries — did not follow the Ameri-cans, are not in agreement with the sanc-tions which the USA is applying.

The General Assembly session ended.Many delegates spoke over the three days.But it is necessary to say, that of the 104delegations which voted for the resolution,many voted without soul, 48 countries ab-stained and voted against. That is a full onethird. In such a way, the Americans man-aged to lump together the reactionary re-gimes and to force them to vote for the reso-lution.

I think that there will be some kind ofmomentum in the American press, and inthe press of other countries. But at the sametime, countries like Argentina and Brazil donot agree with the the Americans, for ex-ample, on the sale of grain to the SovietUnion. Canada too.

BREZHNEV. Vance came out againstthe participation of the USA in the OlympicGames.

GROMYKO. Yes, Vance, it’s true, didexpress such a thought unofficially. But onall types of measures the English are verycomplacent. Giscard d’Estaing sent a mes-sage. It is better. An Islamic conference ismeeting in Islamabad. K. Babrak appealedto us for advice, whether he should go tothe conference. We advised him that it isbest not to go outside the borders of thecountry.

ANDROPOV. In the last ten days inAfghanistan all the organs of party and stateleadership were created; even a procuratorwas named. The Afghan leaders have startedmore bravely to [missing one or more lines.—trans]. There is one great difficulty in theirwork — there are many various groups.Despite it all, the difference between theParcham and the Khalq is still noticeable.Of course, it is necessary to carefully fol-low the state of affairs in the party andachieve, in accord with our recommenda-tion, unity. They considered the letter of theCC CPSU in the Politburo and at the CCPDPA plenum, and they prepared corre-sponding directives for the primary party or-ganizations.

The tribes play a big role there. It isvery important to win them over to theparty’s side. Three very imposing tribesannnounced their support for the Babrakregime. Babrak is doing great work regard-ing the strengthening of unity. In particu-lar, there are definite shifts in relation to


work with religious officials.USTINOV reports in detail the mili-

tary situation in various areas of Afghan ter-ritory; he says: overall, the military situa-tion is basically satisfactory, there are nowsignificantly fewer hotbeds of resistance bythe rebels.

PONOMAREV speaks about the typeof measures which have been taken regard-ing the creation of the party and the strength-ening of unity. He reports that yesterday agroup of our advisers consisting of 16people, with Com. Grekov, L.I. at the headof it, was sent to Afghanistan. BabrakKarmal listens very attentively to the adviceof our comrades. The leadership of the partynow has a backbone.

BREZHNEV. There is a proposal toaccept for consideration the information ofComs. Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, andPonomarev on this issue.

Assign Coms. Gromyko, Andropov,Ustinov, and Ponomarev to continue theirwork on the review and preparation of ma-terials connected with the situation inAfghanistance. Submit to the Politburo is-sues which require a decision.

ALL. Agreed.

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 44, ll. 31,42-44; trans. by M. Doctoroff.]

CPSU CC Politburo decision,17 January 1980

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIETUNION, CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Top Secret

#P179/USh

To: Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin,Andropov, Gromyko,Suslov, Ustinov,Ponomarev.

Excerpt from Protocol #179 of thePolitburo CC CPSU session of

17 January 1980

On the situation in Afghanistan.

1. To take into consideration the infor-mation presented by Comrades A.A.Gromyko, Y.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov, andB.N. Ponomarev on this question.

2. To entrust Comrades A.A. Gromyko,

Y.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov, and B.N.Ponomarev with continuing their work onanalyzing and preparing materials related tothe situation in Afghanistan.

All questions that need to be consid-ered should be submitted to the Politburoof the Central Committee.

Secretary of the CC

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 174, l. 117.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 28 January 1980, with Report by

Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-Ponomarev, 27 January 1980

TOP SECRETNo.P181/34To Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov,Gromyko, Suslov,Ustinov, Ponomarev,Rusakov.

Extract from protocol No. 181 of the CCCPSU Politburo session of

28 January 1980

About further measures to provide for thenational interests of the USSR in relation tothe events in Afghanistan

Agree on the whole with the consider-ations which are put forth in the attachednote of Comrades Gromyko, A.A.,Andropov, Iu.V., Ustinov, D.F., Ponomarev,B.N.

The MFA USSR, the Ministry of De-fense, the KGB USSR, and the InternationalDepartment of the CC CPSU are to beguided by these considerations in workingout and implementing practical measures onAfghanistan.

CC SECRETARY[attachment]

Re: Point 34 Protocol No. 181


To the CC CPSU

About further measures to provide for thenational interests of the USSR in relation

to the events in Afghanistan

The provision by the USSR of many-sided, including military, assistance to Af-ghanistan and the coming to power of thegovernment of Babrak Karmal created thenecessary conditions for the stabilization ofthe situation in the DRA and put an end tocertain tendencies in the development of thesituation in the Middle East which are dan-gerous for us.

Along with this the development ofevents bears witness to the fact that the USA,its allies, and the PRC have set themselvesthe goal of using to the maximum extent theevents in Afghanistan to intensify the atmo-sphere of anti-Sovietism and to justify long-term foreign policy acts which are hostileto the Soviet Union and directed at chang-ing the balance of power in their favor. Pro-viding increasing assistance to the Afghancounter-revolution, the West and the PRCare counting on the fact that they will suc-ceed in inspiring an extended conflict inAfghanistan, as the result of which, theybelieve, the Soviet Union will get tied up inthat country, which will negatively reflecton the international prestige and influenceof the USSR.

In the future as well, the necessity ofproviding for the broad foreign policy in-terests and the security of the USSR willdemand the preservation of the offensivenature of the measures which we undertakein relation to the Afghan events. In work-ing out and conducting them, we would sug-gest that it is expedient to be guided by thefollowing.

- Henceforth, in relations with theUSA, to maintain a firm line in internationalaffairs in opposition to the CarterAdministration’s provocative steps. Despitethe fact that Washington will in the futurecontinue to initiate an anti-Soviet campaignand will strive to impart a coordinated char-acter to the actions of its allies, to realiseour countermeasures proceeding from theinexpedience of complicating the entirecomplex of multi-level relations between theSoviet Union and the USA.

- To intensify our influence on the po-sitions of various NATO allies of the USA,particularly on France and the FRG, to thegreatest possible extent using in our inter-ests the differences which have been re-vealed between them and the USA in theapproach to the choice of measures in re-sponse to the actions of the Soviet Union inAfghanistan.


- Keeping in mind that the events inAfghanistan are being used by the USA andthe PRC as a convenient pretext for a fur-ther rapprochement on an anti-Soviet basis,to plan long-term measures to complicaterelations between Washington and Beijingin the context of the development of rela-tions within the bounds of the so-called triplealliance of the USA, PRC, and Japan.

- To consider with the leadership ofCommunist and working class parties ofcapitalist and developing countries the is-sue of the deployment of a broad campaignin support of the Afghan revolution andbrotherly assistance to the DRA from theSoviet Union. In addition, through unoffi-cial means to undertake measures to attractto this campaign other mass organizations,organs of the press, etc.

- In the Non-Aligned movement, us-ing the resources of Cuba and the SocialistRepublic of Vietnam, and also the countriesbelonging to the progressive wing of theNon-Aligned Movement, to inspire state-ments of support for the Afghan governmentand to avert possible attempts by the Westand China to provoke the Movement to con-demn the actions of the Soviet Union, to iso-late Afghanistan and to use the developingsituation to weaken the progressive wing inthe Non-Aligned movement.

- To concentrate the main efforts inopposition to the hostile activity of the USAand its allies regarding the Islamic countriesof the Middle and Near East, particularlyPakistan and Iran, and also such influentialcountries of Asia as India. To actively op-pose Washington’s policy of knocking to-gether a united front of the West and certainMoslem countries, and of reorienting Is-lamic fanaticism on an anti-Soviet course.

Proceeding from the fact that the USAand China are most actively trying to usePakistan and that the most important basesof the Afghan bandit formations are locatedon the territory of that country, constantlyexert a restraining influence on the regimeof Zia ul-Haq, including via special chan-nels, and to push him to accept measures tolimit the actions of the rebels from Pakistaniterritory.

- Bring into life measures directed atthe preservation of the anti-imperialist, pri-marily anti-American, elements in the for-eign policy of Iran, insofar as the continua-tion of the crisis in Iran-American relationslimits the potential possibilities of the

Khomeini regime to inspire anti-governmentuprisings on Moslem grounds in Afghani-stan.

- Taking into account that the possibili-ties of the West and China to achieve theirstrategic goals in Afghanistan are weakenedby the absence of a well-organized and in-fluential political opposition to the people’spower, direct serious attention to conduct-ing measures, including those of a specialnature, to demoralize organizations of Af-ghan immigrants and discredit their leaders.

- In relation to the U.N. GeneralAssembly’s consideration of the so-called“Afghan question,” to activate work on un-masking the anti-Soviet and anti-Afghanmachinations of the USA, its allies, andChina, and also on the neutralization of theconsequences of those actions which areunfavorable to the USSR and the DRA.

- While conducting foreign policy andpropagandistic measures, to use even morewidely the thesis that the Soviet Union’sprovision of military assistance to Afghani-stan cannot be viewed in isolation from theUSA’s provocative efforts, which have al-ready been undertaken over the course of along time, to achieve unilateral military ad-vantages in regions which are strategicallyimportant to the USSR.

In relation to the difficult domesticpolitical and economic situation in the DRA,along with the intensification of anti-Sovietmoods which are taking place among partof the Afghan population as the result of thecriminal activity of H. Amin and his circle,a certain period of time evidently will berequired for the normalization of the situa-tion in Afghanistan itself.

The consolidation of people’s power inthe country during the coming years and thestabilization of the domestic political andeconomic situation in Afghanistan will to agreat extent depend on the extent to whichthere will manage to be provided true unityin the ranks of the Party and the unificationof all progressive and national patrioticforces in the framework of a united front.

Taking this into account, provide helpand all-around support to the leadership ofPDPA in the realization of the goals of theApril [1978] revolution and in the fulfill-ment of our recommendations on the keyissues of Party and state construction andthe development of the economy, the fun-damental proposals of which may be

summed up as follows:- The consistent implementation in

Party life and Party constuction of the lineabout the unity of the Party which has beenrecommended to the Afghan comrades in theappeals of the CC CPSU to the leadershipof the PDPA. The identification and isola-tion, both in the center and in local regions,of people who may oppose that line, so thatthey will not be able to exert a demoraliz-ing influence in the Party.

- The utilization of the experience of arange of socialist countries (Czechoslova-kia, Bulgaria, and others) in the resolutionof the issue of the creation of a genuinelyrepresentative broad front of left and demo-cratic organizations headed by the PDPA.The strengthening of the influence of theParty on Afghan youth, especially amongthe student body, the creation, in assistanceto the Komsomol, of a range of sport, cul-tural, and other organizations.

- The utmost consolidation and devel-opment of the DRA’s progressive socio-po-litical foundations, the acceleration in theworking out and acceptance of a new con-stitution, the creation of opportunities forrepresentatives of tribes and national minori-ties to participate with full rights in the workof the Dzhirgs and local councils.

- The establishment of contacts and theconducting of negotiations with the leadersand elders of the most warlike tribes in theDRA and the search for ways to achieve thequickest compromise on conditions for theirceasing the anti-government struggle. Re-alization of a line on a gradual attack on theposition of the tribal reaction, the showingof flexibility and a differentiated approachto various tribes and socio-economic strata.

- The working out of a long-term planof work with the Moslem clergy which en-visions attracting moderate Moslem leadersto cooperate with the authorities, the isola-tion of representatives of reactionary cleri-cal circles, the establishment of contactswith the Shiite clergy, the inadmissabilityof any form (including economic) of dis-crimination against Shiites.

- The setting up of normal economiclife in the country, and, in particular, theimprovement of the material basis for work-ers in the city and village. The provision ofa balanced, mutually beneficial cooperationbetween the state and private sectors. Thepresentation of broader possibilities in thearea of domestic and foreign trade, and also


in the production sphere for the middle andespecially the petit bourgeoisie while main-taining state control.

Besides this, from our side:- To work with the leadership of the

PDPA to realize its foreign policy programand to work out further steps to consolidatethe foreign policy position of Afghanistan.

- To provide all-around practical assis-tance in military construction, keeping inmind the quickest creation of a militarilyprepared, organized and equipped people’sarmy. Facilitate the consolidation of thePDPA’s position among the command staff,and also the intensification of training of thearmy in the spirit of devotion to the people’spower of Afghanistan.

-Keeping in mind the complex taskswhich the special services of Afghanistanmust resolve, speed up fulfillment of theprogram to provide assistance via all chan-nels of work of the organs of state security,internal affairs, and people’s militias, bothin the center and in the local regions.

-Taking into account that in the springof 1980 in Afghanistan a further activationof the insurgent movement may take place,and also having in mind the well-knownhistoric and national particularities of theAfghans, conduct consultations with theMinistry of Defense and the government ofthe DRA and conclude appropriate agree-ments which define the status and legal po-sition of the Soviet military contingents forthe whole period of their presence in Af-ghanistan.


A. Gromyko Iu. AndropovD. Ustinov B. Ponomarev

27 January 1980

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 3; pro-vided by M. Kramer.]

Andropov Report to CPSU CC on Talkswith Afghan Leaders, 5 February 1980

Top SecretSpecial folder

CC CPSU

Concerning the discussions with the Afghanleaders.

In accordance with the assignment(#Pl80/XP), I held discussions with GeneralSecretary of the Central Committee ofPDPA, Chairman of the RevolutionaryCouncil of the DRA B. Karmal, and alsowith Member of the Politburo of the Cen-tral Committee of PDPA, Deputy Chairmanof the Revolutionary Council A. Sawari,with Minister of the Interior S.M.Gulyabzoy, Minister of CommunicationsM.A. Vatandjar, Member of the Politburoof the Central Committee of PDPA, Secre-tary of the Central Committee of PDPA N.A.Nur, member of the Politburo of the Cen-tral Committee of PDPA S.M. Zeray, andMember of the Presidium of the Revolution-ary Council of the DRA Major-General A.Kadyr in Kabul on January 31-February 1(notes on the conversations are attached).

During our conversation B. Karmalhanded me, for deliverance to the CentralCommittee of the CPSU, the text of the let-ter of the Central Committee of PDPA toparty organizations concerning the issues ofparty unity (attached).

During my stay in Kabul I had conver-sations with Soviet Ambassador to DRAComrade F.A. Tabeev, and with the head ofthe group of our party advisers Comrade L.I.Grekov, who raised several questions con-cerning our economic and party cooperationwith Afghanistan. The questions are re-flected in the appendices.

First Secretary of the Central Commit-tee of the Communist Party of UzbekistanComrade [Sharif] Rashidov, with whom Ihad a conversation during my stop inTashkent on my way to Kabul, believes thatconsidering the increase in the amounts ofcargo shipped between the Soviet Union andAfghanistan it is necessary for the centralministries to take measures to put an end tofalling behind the schedule in the construc-tion of the joint bridge crossing on AmuDarya river in the region of Termez-Hairaton(memo attached) and also to speed up theprocess of consideration of his proposal onorganizing an independent branch of theCentral Asian Railroad in Termez that hepresented to the Ministry of Transportation.

It would be advisable to request thatconcerned departments of the Central Com-mittee of the CPSU and other bureaus ex-amine the questions raised by Comrades Sh.R. Rashidov, F.A. Tabeev, and L.I. Grekovand submit their proposals in this regard inthe general order.

Y.V. Andropov

5 February 1980#271-A

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 175, ll. 3-4;appendices not printed.]

CC CPSU Politburo transcript,7 February 1980 (excerpt)

Top SecretOnly copy

Working Transcript

MEETING OF CC CPSU POLITBURO

7 February 1980

Chaired by Comrade BREZHNEV, L.I.Attended by Coms.Andropov, Iu.V., Grish-in, V.V., Gromyko, A.A., Kirilenko, A.P.,Suslov, M.A., Tikhonov, N.A., Ustinov,D.F., Gorbachev, M.S., Demichev, P.N.,Kuznetsov, V.V., Ponomarev, B.N., Kapi-tonov, I.V., Dolgikh, V.I., Zimianin, M.V.,Rusakov, K.V.

3. About Com. Andropov’s conversationswith the Afghan leaders about certain issuesof Soviet-Afghan cooperation

BREZHNEV. Comrade Andropov,Iu.V. traveled to Afghanistan in accord withthe Politburo’s decision. Let us listen toCom. Andropov.

ANDROPOV. I distributed a detaileddescription of the conversations which I hadwith the Afghan leaders, therefore I thinkthat there is no need to make a detailed re-port. But all the same I would like to makespecial note of several issues.

First of all it is necessary to note di-rectly that the situation in Afghanistan isstabilizing now. This is evident from all thedata. In the conversation which I had withCom. Karmal, he cited in great detail whathas been done in the month since the re-moval of Amin from power. Although thesituation in the country does continue to becomplex, and demands the most urgent andpressing measures aimed at its stabilization,the main thing is that now the leadership ofAfghanistan understands its fundamentaltasks and is doing everything possible so thatthe situation really does stabilize.

In my conversation, I particularly


stressed the necessity of establishing genu-ine party unity, heightening of the militaryreadiness of the army, strengthening rela-tions of the party and government with themasses, instituting normal economic life inthe country and activizing the foreign policyactivities of Afghanistan in accordance withthe demands of the situation. So, I concen-trated on these basis tasks, about which thereis plenty of material in the transcript of theconversations. Therefore, it seems to me,there is no need to develop it in detail.

Further, I had conversations with A.Sarwari, S. Gulabzoi, and M. Vatandzhar.Sarwari, as you know is the deputy chair-man of the Revolutionary Council andDeputy Prime Minister of the DRA,Gulabzoi is minister of internal affairs, andVatandzhar is Minister of Communications.All these comrades play major roles in theleadership of Afghanistan. Therefore, it wasvery important to me to find out how thesecomrades imagine the affairs to themselves,especially in view of the fact that several ofthem belong to a different group (as is wellknown, in the PDPA there are two groups,the Khalq and the Parcham). The task is toliquidate this rift so that they and others feelthemselves members of one unified party. Itold them directly that by using their influ-ence they could make a heavy contributionto the unification of the party.

I also spoke with them in detail aboutall the other questions. In particular, I paidattention to strengthening the organs of statepower, and the army, and particularly to con-ducting major work among the tribes so asto attract the people to the side of the partyand to strengthen the unity of the people withthe party, so that the people would believein the party’s ideals. A great deal was saidabout all these issues, and I should note thatall these comrades correctly understand thetasks in this regard.

Then I had a conversation with themember of the Politburo of the CC PDPA,and secretary of the CC PDPA, chairman ofthe organizational commission of the CC,Nur Ahmed Nur, member of the PolitburoCC PDPA S. Zeray, and member of the Pre-sidium of the Revolutionary Council of thePDPA, General Kadyr. With them, besidesall the issue I raised in the previous conver-sations, such as strengthening the party andconsolidation of the unity of Afghan com-munists, I stressed as well the necessity of aquick correction of all the shortcomings and

mistakes which had been tolerated earlier.I stressed the necessity of more fully usingthe breathing space which they have in or-der to liquidate the contradictions which hadarisen inside the party and in the country. Iparticularly pointed to the correct distribu-tion of responsibilities among the membersof the Politburo, and the conscientious ful-fillment of his responsibilities by every com-rade.

In the conversations much attentionwas paid to strengthening the army andteaching it attack maneuvers, and its mas-tering of the technology which has beendelivered in sufficient quantity. In the CCPolitburo a guidance for action for all mili-tary and civilian members of the PDPA wasaccepted. I have to say that it is a good guid-ance; it without doubt will help in strength-ening the unity of the party and raising thelevel of its defense preparedness.

Our ambassador and other representa-tives in the DRA presented several issuesof assistance to Afghanistan, including mostprominently the construction of an oil re-finery. Regarding this, there is an agree-ment made in 1972. Its capability was setto be 100 thousand tons per year. Now theAfghans request that its capability be in-creased to 500 thousand tons.

The second issue concerned the devel-opment of power engineering on the basisof a common scheme of power generationand supply for the northern regions of Af-ghanistan. Then they posed the issue of con-struction of a mining and ore-concentratingcombine at the base of the Ainak copperdeposit. They also posed such issues as theconstruction of a transit bridge across theriver Amdaryu and complex of installationson the Afghan [river] bank, and the recon-struction of the Kabul house building com-bine. These are essentially the issues aboutwhich I wanted to speak.

USTINOV. Iurii Vladimirovich hasmade a very thorough report about his jour-ney to Afghanistan. But I want to say thatwe must speak very carefully regarding awithdrawal of forces from Afghanistan. Ithink about a year will be needed, maybeeven a year and a half, [before] which thesituation in Afghanistan has not stabilized,and before that we can not even think abouta withdrawal of troops, otherwise we mayincur much unpleasantness.

BREZHNEV. I believe that we evenneed to increase the contingent of forces in

Afghanistan somewhat.GROMYKO. It seems to me that we

need to look ahead a little. Within sometime, it goes without saying that forces willbe withdrawn from Afghanistan, insofar asthey now are introduced at the request ofthe Afghan leadership and in accordancewith the agreement. Let’s say that hostilepropaganda from China, Pakistan, etc. willstop. Can we in this event speak about afull withdrawal of forces without gettinganything in return[?] It seems to me that itwould make sense to think about the kindof agreed obligations to set between thesides when it will happen that it will be pos-sible to withdraw the forces. We will nothave a full guarantee, I think, that some sortof hostile forces will not further attack Af-ghanistan. Therefore we have to providefor the full security of Afghanistan.

BREZHNEV. Comrade Andropov’svisit to Afghanistan was taken at the requestof Babrak Karmal. The conversations andconsultations which Iurii Vladimirovich hadwere very useful and substantive. I thinkthat it makes sense to approve the conver-sations conducted by Com. Andropov, andto accept the draft of the resolution whichhe presented.

ALL. Correct.It is accepted.

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 44, ll. 73,77-80; trans. by M. Doctoroff.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decisions onAfghanistan, 7 February 1980

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIETUNION, CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Top Secret

#Pl 82/S h.

To: Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov,Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev,Rashidov—full text; Baibakov, Sosnov,Skachkov—#3, 4 ; Pavlovski—#5.

Excerpt from Protocol #182 of the PolitburoCC CPSU session of 7 February 1980

On Comrade Y.V. Andropov’s discussionswith the leaders of Afghanistan concerningsome aspects of Soviet-Afghani coopera-tion.


1. To approve the discussions thatMember of the Politburo CC CPSU, Chair-man of the KGB USSR Comrade Y.V.Andropov held with the leaders of theDemocratic Republic of Afghanistan onsome aspects of Soviet-Afghan cooperation.

2. To ask the International Departmentof the Central Committee of the CPSU tosubmit proposals on the issues of party co-operation mentioned in the discussions withComrade B. Karmal and with other Afghanileaders, and also relating to the issues raisedby the head of the group of the party advis-ers of the CC CPSU, Comrade L.I. Grekov,to the Central Committee of the CPSU.

3. To entrust the State Committee onEconomic Cooperation (SCEC) and theMinistry of Transport Construction to ex-amine the proposals of the Central Commit-tee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan(Comrade Rashidov) on speeding up theconstruction work on the joint bridge cross-ing on the Amu Darya river in the region ofTermez-Hairaton, and to take necessarymeasures to increase the speed of work ofthe Soviet construction organizations. Also,to submit in the regular order proposals onconstruction of the structure on the Afghanbank (a transfer base) on the conditions ofthe general contract.

4. To entrust the Gosplan of the USSRand the SCEC with participation of relevantministries and bureaus to examine the con-siderations presented by the Soviet Embassyin Kabul on speeding up the construction ofthe oil-processing plant, power stations andelectric power lines according to the “Planof the electricity supply to the Northern re-gions of Afghanistan,” of the mining andprocessing group of enterprises on the cop-per deposits site in Aynak, and of the recon-struction of the housing construction groupsof enterprises in Kabul.

5. The Ministry of Transportationshould speed up the consideration of theproposals of the Central Committee of theCommunist Party of Uzbekistan (ComradeRashidov) on setting up an independentbranch of the Central Asian Railroad withthe terminal in Termez.

6. To entrust the Commission of thePolitburo CC CPSU on Afghanistan to thinkout the question of the new relations be-tween the Soviet Union and Afghanistanunder the treaty, having in mind the realiza-tion of this idea at corresponding time, and

taking into account the further developmentof the situation in Afghanistan and aroundit.

Secretary of the CC

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 175, ll. 1-2.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decision on SovietPolicy on Afghanistan, 10 March 1980,

with report on Proposal by Fidel Castroto Mediate between Afghanistan and

Pakistan, and approved letter from L.I.Brezhnev to Fidel Castro

TOP SECRETNo.P187/33

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin,Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov,Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zamiatin.

Extract from protocol No. 187 of the CCCPSU Politburo session of 10 March 1980

About our further foreign policy line in re-lation to Afghanistan and about a responseto F. Castro’s appeal

1. Approve the considerations con-tained in the note of Comrades Gromyko,Andropov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rakhmaninof 10 March 1980 (attached).

2. Affirm the draft instruction to theSoviet Ambassador in Havana (attachment1).

3. Affirm the draft instruction to theSoviet Ambassador in Kabul (attachment 2).

CC SECRETARY

[attachment]

Re: Point 33, Protocol No. 187Top Secret

To the CC CPSU

In accord with the instruction of 28February of this year (P185/I) and in con-nection with F. Castro to L.I. Brezhnev (tele-gram from Havana No. 167), we report thefollowing considerations.

Upon the determination of our furtherforeign policy steps on issues which con-cern Afghanistan, including taking accountof F. Castro’s proposal that Cuba provideits good offices to organize negotiations

between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it seemsto be necessary to take into account the fol-lowing points.

The situation in Afghanistan andaround it continues to remain complicated.Although the new measures which havebeen undertaken by the Afghan leadershipinside the country and in the internationalarena are facilitating the stabilization of thesituation in the country and the consolida-tion of the international position of the DRA,this process is going slowly. The combatreadiness of the Afghan forces for the timebeing remains low. The actions of the for-eign and domestic counter-revolution arecontinuing, dependent on the material, mili-tary, and political support from the USA,China, Pakistan, and from a range of otherMoslem countries with reactionary regimesas well.

Judging by everything, a successfulresolution of the internal problems and theconsolidation of the new structure in Af-ghanistan will demand not a small amountof effort and time, for the length of whichthe Soviet forces there will remain the ba-sic stabilizing factor standing in oppositionto the further expansion of the activity ofdomestic and foreign counter-revolutionaryforces.

Along with this, in the interests of cre-ating more favorable conditions for the sta-bilization of the situation in Afghanistan, itmight also make sense to use the apparentinterest in efforts to find a political solutionto that issue which has begun to appear inWestern and in Non-Aligned countries un-der the influence of our firmness on the Af-ghan issue. It is important, however, to di-rect the conduct of those searches in an ap-propriate way, to fill it with contents thatare advantageous to us, in counterweight tothe efforts of the Western countries, dis-guised as [seeking] a political settlement,to achieve simply a rapid withdrawal of So-viet troops from Afghanistan so as to changethe regime which exists there now.

In this regard, the thought expressedby F. Castro, that Cuba, in its capacity asChairman of the Non-Aligned movement,would propose an initiative to make its goodoffices available in the matter of organizingnegotiations between Afghanistan and Pa-kistan, might turn out to be useful.

Accordingly, in L.I. Brezhnev’s re-sponse to F. Castro it will be expedient toexpress our favorable attitude to his idea


about the provision by Cuba of its good of-fices in setting up negotiations between Af-ghanistan and its neighbors and in workingout corresponding guarantees of non-inter-ference in the internal affairs of the DRA.In this regard it is necessary, of course, toarrange with F. Castro that he from his sideand we from our own should talk over thisidea with B. Karmal. It is also necessary toexplain to F. Castro our approach to a pos-sible political settlement and in this regardthe complexity of the Afghan events, so thatCastro realistically evaluates the situationand does not feed on illusions of a simpleand quick achievement of a settlement.

Keeping in mind the task of providingfavorable conditions for the stabilization ofthe situation inside Afghanistan and the ne-cessity for the world to get used to the newsituation in that country and the SovietUnion’s role there, our approach to a politi-cal settlement of the Afghan situation couldharmonize both the initial and more long-range tasks. In this regard, the transition toa final resolution of the more long-term taskswould depend on the resolution of the ini-tial tasks, so it is possible to constantly bringinfluence to bear on that process.

In its general appearance the outline ofa political settlement could consist of a com-plex of bilateral agreements between Af-ghanistan and its neighbors, above all Paki-stan, and systems of corresponding guaran-tees from the USSR, USA, and certain otherstates, each of which should be acceptableboth to Afghanistan and to the opposing side.

The first task should become the startof consultations between Afghanistan andits neighbors aimed at a normalization oftheir relations. In this regard, continue totry to ensure that the neighbor-countries ofAfghanistan, and also the United States andother countries involved in anti-Afghan ac-tivities, from the very beginning of the po-litical settlement process, undertake practi-cal measures which would bear witness tothe cessation of their interference, includ-ing military, in the internal affairs of Af-ghanistan. Directly link this demand with apossibility of the positive development ofthe process of political settlement.

As far as the concrete content of theagreements which could be worked out be-tween Afghanistan and its neighbors is con-cerned, in them, besides the consolidationof the general principals concerning respectfor the sovereignty and readiness to develop

relations on the basis of principles of goodneighborliness and non-interference in eachothers’ internal affairs, obligations shouldbe fixed about the cessation of armed andany other hostile activity from the territoryof those countries against each other, andalso about the problem of refugees fromAfghanistan. In particular, a ban on the en-listment and the use of refugees in under-ground activity against the DRA and the liq-uidation of refugee camps located directlyon the border with Afghanistan, the repa-triation of refugees to Afghanistan, and theresettlement of those of them who do notwish to return in remote regions of Pakistanand Iran could be discussed. In the finalstage of the realization of such measures onthe territory of Pakistan and possibly of Irantoo, it would be possible to envision someform of verification with the participationof Afghanistan.

In the process of working out such bi-lateral agreements, evidently, there will arisethe issue of mutual respect for the currentborders between the participating states inthe agreement, keeping in mind that Paki-stan will strive to secure Afghanistan’s rec-ognition of the Durand Line. Historically,this issue is a complicated one for Iran. Itsfinal settlement is directly connected to thedevelopment of the situation in Afghanistanitself and around it. Correspondingly, itwould be inexpedient for the governmentof the DRA to prematurely—even before thetrue position of Pakistan will becomeclear—commit itself with a declarationabout its readiness to recognize the DurandLine. According to tactical considerations,it is more advantageous for the Afghans touse this issue to receive from Pakistan maxi-mal concessions on questions in which itholds an interest.

The negotiations aimed at the workingout of concrete agreements should be con-ducted directly between Afghanistan andPakistan, and also between Afghanistan andIran. This, on the one hand, wouldstrengthen the position of the governmentof the DRA, and on the other would excludethe “internationalization” of a political reso-lution of the Afghan issue, which is unde-sirable for us. The role of Cuba in its ca-pacity as chairman of the Non-Alignedmovement would consist of getting the bi-lateral negotiations started with the agree-ment of the participants and in a certain in-fluence on their conduct through its provi-

sion of good offices, but not in the replace-ment of the direct negotiations between Af-ghanistan and its neighbors.

Agreements which are achieved in thecourse of these negotiations would bebacked by appropriate guarantees, in the firstplace from the USSR and the USA, but alsofrom certain other countries from amongthose which would be acceptable both toAfghanistan and to the other side. Posingthe issue in this way would allow Afghani-stan to deflect, say, the candidacy of China.

Now it would be premature to deter-mine the detailed content of the guaranteesand the exact make-up of the participants,insofar as this will depend both on the con-tents of the agreements themselves and onthe development of the situation. The mainpoint of the guarantees should be that thecountries which provide the guarantees willrespect them and by their own authority willfortify the bilateral agreements of Afghani-stan with Pakistan and Iran. The USA mustaccept as well the obligation not to conductany sort of underground activities, includ-ing those from the territory of third coun-tries, against Afghanistan and its govern-ment.

In the context of considering the guar-antees it might be possible to pose as wellthe issue of the growth of the USA’s mili-tary presence in the region of the IndianOcean both in terms of the threat to the se-curity of the Soviet Union which that wouldcreate, and also from the point of view ofthe incompatibility of such actions with thetask of stabilizing the situation in the MiddleEast.

During the consideration of both theguarantees and the overall problem of a po-litical settlement, it makes sense to conductthe matter so that the governments of theparticipating states clearly understand thatissues which touch on the system whichexists in Afghanistan must not in any waybe the subject of negotiations. In the sameway it must be clear that issues which con-cern Afghanistan must not be considered anddecided beyond the government of the DRAor without its participation.

Drafts of L.I. Brezhnev’s response toF. Castro and our appeal in this regard to B.Karmal have been prepared taking into ac-count the considerations which have beenput forth above.



A. Gromyko Iu. Andropov D. UstinovB. Ponomarev O. Rakhmanin

10 March 1980

[attachment 1]

To the clause 33 of the Protocol No. 187

Top SecretSupplement I

ABSOLUTE PRIORITY [Vne ocheredi]

HAVANASOVIET AMBASSADORCopy:KABUL - SOV[iet]AMBASSADOR(for orientation)

Pay a visit to F. Castro and transmithim the following letter from L.I. Brezhnev:

“TO FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CCOF THE COM[MUNIST] PARTY OF

CUBA, TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THESTATE COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL

OF MINISTERS OF THE REPUBLICOF CUBA

Comrade Fidel CASTRO RUZ

Dear comrade Fidel,Regarding your letter, I would like to

report that we agree in general with its esti-mate of the existing situation in the worldand [with] your assessment that the Afghanissue is being artificially blown up by im-perialist forces to cover their encroachmentsagainst detente, peace, sovereignty, and in-dependent development of peoples. Eventsin Afghanistan, beyond any doubt, do notprovide the real cause of the present-dayaggravation of the international situation.Without these events, imperialism wouldfind some other pretext to aggravate the situ-ation in the world. To this testify the stepstaken by the United States even before therecent events in Afghanistan and out of anyrelation to them.

We are convinced, however, that a co-ordinated and firm policy of the SovietUnion, Cuba, and other fraternal countriesis a guarantee that socialism, in the finalanalysis, will prevail in the interest of peaceand of defusing the present situation, whichwas created by the actions of the most ag-gressive circles of imperialism.

We and our Cuban friends hold a unani-mous opinion on the present correlation of

forces in the Non-Aligned Movement. Withregret one has to state that many among thenon-aligned countries have recently fallenunder the influence of a campaign that isinimical to the cause of social progress.

We fully understand the present pre-dicament of Cuba in the Non-AlignedMovement in the status of its chairman andwe value even higher [Cuban] efforts to pre-vent the misuse of this Movement’s author-ity against the interests of socialism.

I believe, Fidel, you should know indetail the situation inside Afghanistan. Imust tell you straightforwardly that it re-mains complicated and tense. Domestic andexternal counterrevolution, supported bymaterial, military, and political aid from theUSA, China, Pakistan and a number of otherMuslim countries ruled by reactionary re-gimes, have intensified their subversive ac-tivities. A realistic estimate of the situationtells that some time will pass before the Af-ghan revolution becomes irreversible and itspolitical and social gains become firm. It istherefore not a coincidence that the imperi-alists and their fellow-travellers[pripeshniki] persist in attempting, one wayor another, to compel the immediate andcomplete withdrawal of Soviet troops fromAfghanistan.

However, when some people in theWest became convinced of our firmness,they began to take an interest in the searchfor political solutions of the problem con-nected with Afghanistan. However, behindthis lies visibly the same quest, achievementby political means of the same goals - achange of the existing regime in the DRA.Western countries blatantly ignore the gov-ernment of B. Karmal and attempt to con-duct affairs concrning Afghanistan behindthe back of the government of the DRA andwithout its participation. This approach topolitical settlement, of course, should becategorically rejected.

On our side, we stand for a politicalsettlement, but for a real settlement, aimedfirst and foremost at the liquidation of thecauses that brought about the existing situ-ation, i.e. at effective and guaranteed termi-nation of aggression and all other forms ofinterference into the affairs of Afghanistan;[we also stand] for a settlement that ensuresthe sovereignty [and] independence of Af-ghanistan and further a consolidation of thegains of the Afghan revolution. It is obvi-ous that the questions related to the existing

order in Afghanistan, [and to] the composi-tion of its government, cannot by in any waya subject of negotiations. Equally must itbe clear that the issues concerning Afghani-stan cannot be discussed and decided onbehalf of [i.e., without-trans.] the govern-ment of the DRA. We understand that thereis a unity of opinions with you on this issue,and that precisely these motives dictatedyour initiative regarding Cuba’s assistancein starting up talks between Afghanistan andPakistan.

It is known that the government of theDRA stated very clearly its intention tomaintain relations of peace and friendshipwith its neighbors, particularly Pakistan.Cuban assistance in the form of goodwillservice in establishing this kind of relationsbetween Afghanistan and its neighborscould, in our view, be useful. By the way,in our opinion the term “goodwill services”is more applicable here than “mediation.”

Of course, we will need a thoroughcoordination, first of all with the Afghanleadership, on the course of actions. It isimportant to prevent a substitution of somekind of international actions for direct ne-gotiations between the existing governmentof Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is thegoal of the authors of various plans that arebeing nurtured today in the West, who donot want to deal with the existing Afghanleadership. It seems inadvisable to us to haveany degree of involvement on the part theGeneral Secretary of the U.N in these af-fairs. This, among other aspects, wouldunavoidably be linked to the well-knownanti-Afghan resolution of the General As-sembly of the United Nations. As to thequestion about a possibility of assistingCuba in its goodwill services on the part ofsome other countries, members of the Non-Aligned Movement, this could probably betackled later with a view to the developingsituation; now this question should ratherbe left aside.

It seems to us that, in starting talks withAfghanistan and Pakistan, and then, prob-ably, also with Iran, we should from the verybeginning keep our eyes on the goal of de-veloping a complex of agreements among[those countries], agreements that, in addi-tion to general principles of respect of sov-ereignty, development of good-neighborlyrelations, and non-involvement into the in-ternal affairs of each other, would also con-tain clear and specific committments to a


cessation of hostilities and any other hos-tile activity conducted from the territory ofthese countries against each other and to thesettlement of the issue of refugees from Af-ghanistan. In particular, we should demanda ban on recruitment and use of refugeesfor subversive activity against the DRA and[demand the] liquidation of refugee campsin the immediate vicinity of the frontierswith Afghanistan, the repatriation of refu-gees to Afghanistan and resettlement ofthose among them who would not wish toreturn, to central areas of Pakistan and Iran.

Bilateral agreements that might beachieved in the course of such negotiationsbetween Afghanistan and its neighborscould be supported by appropriate guaran-tees from, first of all, the USSR and theUnited States, and other states, each ofwhom would be acceptable for Afghanistanas well as for the opposite side.

Such is in general terms a scheme ofpolitical settlement as we see it. Obviously,its realisation will demand considerable ef-fort and time, considering that the imperial-ist and other reactionary circles will putobstacles in the way. Therefore we have noillusions as to a possibility of fast movementtowards this solution.

So much for the considerations that wewanted to share with you, dear Fidel, in re-sponse to your letter. As a practical matter,we stand on the point that your idea [aboutthe mediation initiative] must be discussedin advance with B. Karmal. On our side wealso will approach him on this subject and,judging what his reaction could be, we ex-pect to continue to discuss with you the is-sues concerning realisation of your initia-tive. We also expect to hear your opinionconcerning the considerations that we havelaid out.

You are right, Fidel, in pointing that inthe existing situation Cuba has a chance tomove to a more active policy within theframework of the Non-Aligned Movementin defense of peace and international secu-rity. This is all the more important, since theimperialist forces are striving to see in Af-ghanistan the only cause of aggravation ofinternational tension, to divert attention fromtheir dangerous activities aimed at the sub-version of detente, to weaken the struggleof people for their rights.

In conclusion I would like to send youand the members of the leadership of theCC of the Communist Party of Cuba warm-

est regards and best wishes from myself andfrom all our comrades.

With comradely welcome,

L. BREZHNEV

10 March 1980".

Inform upon delivery by telegraph

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 5;documents provided by M. Kramer andRaymond L. Garthoff; translations byCarter-Brezhnev Project (report) andVladislav M. Zubok (Brezhnev to Castro).]

CPSU CC Politburo Decision onAfghanistan, 10 April 1980, with report

by Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-Zagladin, 7 April 1980

Top Secret#P191/IV

To: Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin,Andropov, Gromyko,Kirilenko, Suslov,Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zimyanin,Arkhipov, Zamyatin.

Excerpt from Protocol #191 of the PolitburoCC CPSU session of 10 April 1980

Concerning our further policy on issues re-lated to Afghanistan

To approve the considerations on thisissue submitted by the Politburo CC CPSUCommission on Afghanistan (memo at-tached).

The Commission should continuemonitoring the development of the situationin Afghanistan and around it closely, andsolve the emerging problems as they ariseaccording to the considerations stated in thememo, submitting relevant proposals to theCentral Committee of the CPSU as neces-sary.

The Departments of the Central Com-mittee upon consulting the Commissionshould carry out a coordinated propagandapolicy on the basis of the considerationsstated in the memo, and guide the centralorgans of the press, radio, and televisionaccordingly.

Secretary of the CC

[attachment:]

To #IV of Protocol #191

Top SecretCC CPSU

We are presenting some considerationsconcerning our further steps in relation tothe situation in Afghanistan and around it.

Situation in Afghanistan and the role of theSoviet troops.

1. The development of the situation inAfghanistan after the introduction of the lim-ited contingent of the Soviet troops in De-cember 1979 confirms our assessment thatit was a timely and a correct action. It un-dermined the plans to overthrow the revo-lutionary regime in DRA and prevented theemergence of a new hotbed of military threaton the Southern borders of the Soviet Union.It put an end to Amin’s adventuristic policyline, which led to the goals and objectivesof the April [1978] revolution being discred-ited, to abandoning cooperation with the So-viet Union, and to establishing close tieswith the West. The cadres of the People’sDemocratic party, the army, and the admin-istrative apparatus loyal to the revolutionhad been saved from physical execution.Gradually the conditions for active partici-pation in the revolutionary movement ofboth the former groups “Parcham” and“Khalq,” along with other representativesof patriotic and national-democratic forces,are being created.

The new leadership of the DRA headedby B. Karmal with comprehensive assis-tance from the Soviet Union in general cor-rectly outlined the tasks related to internalnormalization, the organization of militaryresistance to the internal and external coun-terrevolution, for overcoming the harmfulconsequences of the Amin regime, and forachieving a relationship of trust with thetribes and other strata of the population, andbegan to work on practical solutions to thoseproblems.

2. At the same time the situation inAfghanistan remains complicated and tense.The class struggle, represented in armedcounterrevolutionary insurrections, encour-aged and actively supported from abroad,is occurring in the circumstances where agenuine unity of the PDPA is still absent,


where the state and party apparatus is weakin terms of organization and ideology, whichis reflected in the practical non-existence oflocal government organs, where financialand economic difficulties are mounting, andwhere the combat readiness of the Afghanarmed forces and the people’s militia is stillinsufficient. The efforts that had been un-dertaken notwithstanding, such importantpolitical problems as establishing relationswith Muslim clergy, tribal leaders, andmiddle and petit bourgeoisie have not yetbeen solved. The agrarian reform has notbeen completed, especially in the Easternand Southern regions of the country.

3. The Soviet troops stationed in Af-ghanistan provide decisive assistance in es-tablishing control over the situation in thecountry. Together with the Afghan armedforces they have successfully carried outoperations for elimination of armed rebelformations in several provinces of the coun-try. As a result of those operations, the or-ganized armed forces of the counterrevolu-tion have suffered substantial losses, andthus the military threat to the existence ofthe new regime has been significantly re-duced.

These are all reasons to believe thatafter the military operations planned for theimmediate future are completed, there willbe a relatively long period during which,even with support from abroad, the coun-terrevolutionary forces would probably beunable to carry out any large-scale militaryactions. Such a prognosis is supported bythe fact that already now the counterrevo-lutionaries have had to change their tactics;they are mostly engaging in terrorist acts andsmall group actions. At the same time theyare putting their stakes on economic sabo-tage, disruption of transportation and foodsupplies, arousing religious, nationalist, andanti-Soviet feelings, [and] animosity towardthe government and its undertakings. How-ever, one should not exclude the possibilityof the counterrevolution making an effortto organize massive uprisings in certainprovinces of the country.

4. In these circumstances the need forcarrying out consistent and purposeful mea-sures for achieving a genuine ideological,political, and organizational unity in theranks of the PDPA, and for strengtheningits influence in the country, for unifying allnational-patriotic forces, for creating an ef-fective apparatus of local government, for

improving the combat readiness of the army,the state security forces, and the people’smilitia, for solving the primary economictasks, and for improving the work with triballeaders, assumes the primary importance.

5. Meanwhile our troops in Afghani-stan will have to continue to carry out theirtasks of defending the revolutionary regimein the DRA, defending the country from ex-ternal threats, including sealing off the bor-ders of the country together with the Afghanforces, ensuring the safety of the major cen-ters and communications, and also buildingup and strengthening the combat readinessof the Afghan armed forces. Only when thesituation in Afghanistan stabilizes, and thesituation around the country improves, andonly upon a request of the DRA leadership,may we consider the question of the even-tual withdrawal of our troops from the DRA.

Situation around Afghanistan and therelevant objectives.

The development of the situationaround Afghanistan has recently been char-acterized by a certain stratification of theforces hostile to the Democratic Republicof Afghanistan and to the Soviet Union.

1. The United States and China con-tinue to hold to a hard line aimed at chang-ing the political regime in Afghanistan andat the immediate withdrawal of the Soviettroops. Other countries exhibit a certainreadiness to search for compromise solu-tions for a political settlement in the exist-ing situation, even though those solutions,as a rule, are unacceptable.

Thus, in contradiction to the USA po-sition, the majority of the Western Europeancountries do not demand the withdrawal ofthe Soviet troops as a preliminary conditionfor any settlement, but consider it a part ofthe process of such a settlement. Graduallythe understanding emerges that there couldnot be any resolution of the Afghan ques-tion without accepting the fact that Afghani-stan, being the Soviet Union’s immediateneighbor, is a part of the zone of Soviet spe-cial interests. Our decisively negative re-action to the absolutely hopeless plan of“neutralization” of Afghanistan proposed bythe British, and aimed at the change of theAfghan political regime by removing its cur-rent leadership, definitely encouraged thisevolution in the positions of the WesternEuropean countries.

2. A tendency to abandon the initial

positions of sharp condemnation of the So-viet actions in Afghanistan by some of thecountries that held such positions before isemerging among the members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Their positions arechanging toward searching for such a settle-ment that would allow Afghanistan to main-tain its status as a nonaligned country. Thisis the line taken by India, which is concernedabout a possibility of Pakistan’s rearmamentwith the assistance of the USA and China,and about the buildup of the USA militarypresence in the Indian Ocean and in the Per-sian Gulf.

The government of Pakistan has re-cently been showing some signs of unwill-ingness to follow the USA policy on the Af-ghan question blindly. One such sign wasthe willingness to receive the Cuban For-eign Minister as a representative of the statechairman of the Non-Aligned Movement inIslamabad. Although the Cuban initiativeof offering good offices for bilateral nego-tiations between Afghanistan and Pakistanwith the goal of normalization of their rela-tions so far did not produce any concreteresults, such steps would be expedient in thefuture, and this is exactly what the Cubansare going to do, using their contacts withmany nonaligned countries.

3. At the same time, it would be advis-able for us to maintain our contacts with thecountries that express interest in searchingfor a political settlement of the Afghan situ-ation. During such meetings we should con-tinue to consistently develop the idea thatthe basis of any political settlement shouldbe a complete and guaranteed cessation ofall aggressive actions and all forms of sub-versive activities and interference in the in-ternal affairs of Afghanistan.

During our meetings with representa-tives of Western European and other coun-tries it is important, as always, to point outthat the questions concerning the currentregime in Afghanistan, the composition ofthe government and the like, could underno conditions be a subject of negotiations;and that any questions whatsoever concern-ing Afghanistan could not be discussed orresolved without the DRA government,without its current leadership.

4. Concerning the possible set of is-sues for discussion in connection with theAfghan settlement, besides the question ofreal guarantees of non-renewal of armed andforeign interference in the internal affairs


of Afghanistan, we should raise such ques-tions as the reduction of the USA militarypresence in the Indian Ocean and in the Per-sian Gulf, the creation of a zone of peace inthe Indian Ocean, and the liquidation of for-eign military bases there—all this againstthe USA efforts to limit the discussion toAfghanistan itself. Raising those questionswould allow us to put pressure on the Ameri-cans and to influence the negotiating pro-cess for our benefit. Besides, it would per-mit us to increase the number of countriesthat view our position on Afghanistan fa-vorably, or at least with understanding.

5. It is advisable to work on the ques-tion of encouraging other countries of thesocialist commonwealth to take a more ac-tive part in providing Afghanistan with as-sistance in political, economic, and otherspheres. This question needs special con-sideration.

6. Therefore, our policy in the ques-tions of an Afghan settlement should beaimed at, first, helping decrease the tensionwhich was created by the West in connec-tion with the introduction of the Soviettroops into Afghanistan; secondly, at creat-ing more favorable external conditions forinternal consolidation of the revolution inthe DRA, and for making the revolutionarychanges irreversible; and thirdly, at creat-ing conditions for the future eventual with-drawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan,when it would be justified by the politicaland military situation in the country and inthe region in general.

7. We should begin with the assump-tion that at certain point in time we couldsign a new treaty of friendship, cooperation,and mutual assistance between the SovietUnion and Afghanistan, which would makeit clear for everyone that we are ready toensure the defense of the Democratic Re-public of Afghanistan, of its socio-economicand political regime from all forms of ex-ternal aggression. This question could bediscussed in the future taking into accountthe development of the situation, but it needsto be solved positively. Those who inspirethe aggression against Afghanistan will nothave reasons for objections against a defen-sively-oriented treaty of the kind that theUSA has with dozens of countries.

Such a treaty will not mean that Af-ghanistan loses its status of a nonalignedcountry. One just needs to be reminded thatPakistan has been accepted into the non-

aligned movement regardless of the exist-ence of the American-Pakistani agreementof 1959, according to which the USA con-siders it to be “vitally important for nationalgoals and for general peace to preserve theindependence and the territorial integrity ofPakistan,” and pledges to take “necessarymeasures including the use of armed forces”in a situation of aggression against Pakistanand upon the request of the Pakistani gov-ernment.

In relation to this, it would be expedi-ent for Afghanistan not only to maintain, butalso to strengthen its role in the Non-alignedMovement, using it for building up its con-tacts with other non-aligned countries.

8. It is assumed that realization of theconsiderations mentioned above will requirea close and constant coordination of actionsbetween the Soviet Union and the DRAleadership on all aspects. Our rich experi-ence of relations with new Afghanistan willhelp ensure such coordination.

We are requesting your consideration.

A. Gromyko Y. Andropov D. Ustinov V. Zagladin

7 April 1980#0304/gs

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 176, ll. 9-17;translation by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 8 May1980, with Politburo Commission

Report, 6 May 1980, and ApprovedCable to Soviet Ambassador in Kabul

Proletarians of the world, unite!Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Top Secret

No. P[olitburo session] 195/[Issue] XYIII

For comrades Brezhnev, Kossygin,Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov,Ustinov, Ponomarev, Russakov, Zamyatin,Smirtyukov

Excerpt from the Protocol no. 195 ofthe session of the Politburo of the CC CPSUfrom 8 May 1980.

On the proposals for political settlement

concerning Afghanistan.

1. To agree with the considerations onthis issue laid out in the memorandum ofthe Commission of the Politburo CC CPSUon Afghanistan on 6 May 1980 (attached)

2. To approve the draft instructions tothe Soviet ambassador in Kabul (attachment1) and the Soviet ambassador in Havana(attachment 2) [not printed--ed.]

SECRETARY OF CC

[attachment]To the point XYII of the Protocol no. 195

Secret

CC CPSUIn accordance to the decision of 10

March 1980 (Pyongyang 187/33) a commonline has been worked out with the leader-ship of the DRA on the issue of a politicalsettlement of the situation around Afghani-stan. It was assumed in doing this, that later,particularly taking into account the imple-mentation of the Cuban initiative of good-will services and the overall developmentof the situation around Afghanistan, it willbe possible to return to a more specific defi-nition of a foundation where one could startin bringing about a political settlement.

At the present time it is advisable torecommend to the Afghan leadership to stepforward with an across-the-board programof political settlement stemming from thescheme of principles which has been agreedupon ealier. Such a step would make it easierto influence the developing situation aroundAfghanistan in a direction favorable for Af-ghanistan and the USSR. It would also pro-mote the international stature of the govern-ment of B. Karmal.

It is advisable to inform F. Castro ofour recommendations to B. Karmal concern-ing the promotion of such a program, sincethe Cuban comrades need to take these rec-ommendations into account while imple-menting their initiaitve of setting up talksbetween Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Submitting for consideration,

A. Gromyko Yu. Andropov D. UstinovB. Ponomarev

6 May 1980no. 391/gs


[attachment 1]

Concerning point XVII of theProtocol no. 195

SecretAttachment 1

KABULSOVIET AMBASSADOR

Pay a visit to B. Karmal and, referringto the order, give him the following infor-mation.

As has become known, it has beenagreed in the course of the exchange of opin-ions with the Afghan leadership regardingthe mission of goodwill services by Cubato continue joint coordination on the issuesconcerning the promotion of the idea ofpolitical settlement.

The analysis of the situation revealsthat at the present moment there is an ongo-ing divergence of approaches of variouscountries towards Afghanistan and whathappens around it.

On one side, the USA, China, and anumber of other states continue their hos-tile subversive activity against Afghanistan,actively strive to counteract consolidationof positions of the government of the DRAinside the ecountry and on the internationalarena. It is no coincidence, therefore, thatCuba’s intiative to set up a dialogue betweenAfghanistan and Pakistan evoked a sharpnegative reaction in those countries.

On the other side, the reaction of someother countries, particularly Arab states ofthe Steadfastness Front [against Israel-ed.],to the declaration of the government of theDRA in favor of a political settlement, tothe clarifications made by the Minister ofForeign Affairs Sh.M. Dost during his re-cent trip, and also to the useful efforts un-dertaken by Cuba concernining the missionof goodwill services, all this definitely in-dicates the emergence of more realistictrends. By the way, the mission of goodwillservices of Cuba turned out to be undoubt-edly useful for at least one reason: it becameclear today who really stands for a politicalsettlement and who would prefer to limitoneself to talks on this subject in order tomask the continuing interference into the af-fairs of Afghanistan.

All this testifies to the necessity of fur-ther and more intense efforts to promote the

idea of a political settlement, to fill it withcontent corresponding with our joint inter-ests. These interests, as we believe, will bewell served if the Afghan government wouldpromote an across-the-board program ofpolitical settlement, which would become alogical follow-up and specific developmentof the repeated declarations of the DRAabout its readiness to normalize relationswith Pakistan and Iran.

It is absolutely clear that realization ofbilateral agreements between Afghanistanand Pakistan, [and] between Afghanistanand Iran, constitute an obligatory key ele-ment of a political settlement. It is no coin-cidence, that this principled position is con-sciously ignored in all kinds of Westernplans, based on the intention to internation-alize the Afghan issue and to resolve it with-out the participation of the government ofthe DRA and against the interests of Afghanpeople.

The advancement of an across-the-board program of settlement by the Afghangovernment would be, in our opinion, verytimely today also from in view of exercis-ing appropriate influence on the position ofthe countires, participants of the next ses-sion of the Ministers of foreign affairs ofthe Islamic states, forthcoming in May ofthis year.

If our Afghan friends share this opin-ion, [they] could publish in the immediatefuture a Declaration of the government ofthe DRA, where, in the introductory partthey would formulate in a comprehensiveprogram some specific proposals concern-ing a political settlement.

The introductory part of the Declara-tion may point out that Afghan people, byproclaiming in April 1978 a national demo-cratic revolution, made its final choice andset itself upon the path of construction of anew society in the country, based on prin-ciples of equality and fairness, while pre-serving its Islamic character and respectinghistoric and national tradition, the societythat excludes exploitation of man by man.[The Afghan people] would like to build anew life for itself under peaceful conditions,developing friendly and cooperative rela-tions with all its neighbors, with Muslimcountries [and] all other states. However, itconfronted brutal interference, including bymilitary force, into its internal affairs, on thepart of the imperialist and other reactionaryforces.

To underline, that the people of Af-ghanistan is full of determination to defendthe freedom and independence of its Moth-erland, its right to define for itself a social-political order under which it would like tolive.

Then one could formulate the follow-ing specific postulates of the program ofpolitical settlement itself.

Affirming that in accordance to thebasic principles of the Democratic Repub-lic of Afghanistan the international affairsof the DRA are based on the principles ofpeaceful coexistence and on the policy ofpositive and active non-alignment, the gov-ernment of the DRA declares its intentionto achieve a political settlement to ensurecomplete and guaranteed cessation of ag-gressive actions against Afghanistan, sub-versive acts and any other forms of inter-ference from outside into its internal affairs,to liquidate the existing tension in the areaand to overcome the differences throughpeaceful means, by means of negotiations.To this end:

1) The government of the DRA pro-poses to the governments of Pakistan andIran to hold Afghan-Pakistani and Afghan-Iranian negotiations, having in mind thedevelopment of bilateral agreements aboutnormalization of relations. Such agreementsmight contain commonly accepted articlesconcerning mutual respect for sovereignty,readiness to develop relations on the basisof principles of good neighborliness andnon-interference into internal affairs, andmight include specific committments to sup-press military and any other hostile activityfrom their territory against each other.

2) The government of the DRA appealsagain to the Afghans who temporarily stay,for different reasons, on the territory of Pa-kistan and Iran, to return to the Motherland.It confirms that they would be respected andtheir liberties and personal protection wouldbe guaranteed, and they would be able tochoose freely their place of residence andtype of occupation. The government of theDRA appeals to the authorities in Pakistanand Iran to assist the free return of the afore-mentioned persons to Afghanistan. How-ever, if any part of those Afghanis prefersto stay [abroad], then the questions concern-ing their presence must also be discussedduring bilateral negotiations with a view toachieving appropriate agreements.

3) Upon achieving mutually satisfac-


tory solutions to the problems indicated inpoints 1 and 2, and upon normalization onthis basis of relations between Afghanistanand its neighbors, the government of theDRA would be ready to examine other is-sues of bilateral relations, including thosethat had long been a bone of contention.

4) Proposing to hold bilateral negotia-tions with Pakistan and Iran without anypreliminary conditions, the government ofthe DRA firmly stands on the view that thesenegotiations are incompatible with the con-tinuation of hostile activity against Afghani-stan. Correspondingly, from the very begin-ning of the process of political settlement,one should pass practical measures convinc-ingly testifying to the effecting of a cessa-tion of military and any other kind of inter-ference into the affairs of Afghanistan onthe part of all states involved in such inter-ference.

5) The government of the DRA con-siders that, besides a complex of bilateralagreements between Afghanistan and Paki-stan, [and] Afghanistan and Iran, anotherconstituent part of political settlement mustbe appropriate political guarantees of someother states that would be acceptable bothfor Afghanistan, and for all other partici-pants of bilateral agreements. Among those,in the DRA’s opinion, should be the SovietUnion and the United States. The chiefmeaning of the guarantees must reside inthe fact that the countries-guarantors willrespect themselves and by their authoritywill support bilateral agreements of Af-ghanistan with Pakistan and Iran. As to theguarantees on the part of the USA, they mustinclude a clearly stated pledge not to con-duct any kind of subversive activity againstAfghanistan, including from the territory ofthird countries.

6) The government of the DRA de-clares that the issue of the withdrawal ofSoviet limited military contingent from theterritory of Afghanistan should be resolvedin the context of a political settlement. Thecessation and the guaranteed non-resump-tion of military incursions and any otherforms of interference into internal affairs ofAfghanistan would remove the causes thatmade Afghanistan turn to the USSR withthe request to introduce the aforementionedcontingent into its territory. Specifically, theissue of the withdrawal of Soviet troopsfrom Afghanistan will depend on resolutionof the issue of effective guarantees to bilat-

eral agreements of Afghanistan with Paki-stan and Iran.

7) The government of the DRA favorstaking into account, in the process of politi-cal settlement, military-political activity inthe area of the Indian Ocean and PersianGulf by the states that do not belong to thisregion. While sharing the concern of otherstates regarding the build-up of the militarypresence of the USA in the Indian Oceanand Persian Gulf, the government of theDRA supports a proposal to turn this areainto a zone of peace, to liquidate foreignmilitary bases there, and to carry out othermeasures to reduce tension and increase se-curity.

While putting forward proposals on apolitical settlement, the government of theDRA once again with all determination de-clares, that the questions bearing on the in-terests of Afghanistan cannot be discussedmuch less resolved without the participationof the government of the DRA and along-side it. At the same time the Afghan gov-ernment considers as helpful the efforts ofother states that favor a start of negotiations.In this regard it welcomes and supports theinitiative taken by the Republic of Cuba inits capacity of chairman of the Non-AlignedMovement, to offer its goodwill services.

The government of the DRA expects,that the specific program of political settle-ment that it offers will meet adequate un-derstanding, first of all, on the part of Paki-stan and Iran, and will allow [them] to movein practical way to such a settlement throughnegotiations.

In the end tell B. Karmal that simulta-neously with the proposal of the programof political settlement it would be good totake measures for its broad disseminationusing the channels of media, as well asthrough Afghan embassies abroad and for-eign missions in Kabul.

On our side, we will give to this initia-tive of Afghanistan the required political,diplomatic, and propagandist support.

Report upon delivery by telegraph

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 8;provided by M. Kramer; translation byVladislav M. Zubok.]

CPSU CC Politburo decisions, 19 June 1980

TOP SECRET

No. P200/Vi

To Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, Grishin,Gromyko, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Kunaev,Pelshe, Romanov, Suslov, Tikhonov,Ustinov, Chernenko, Shcherbitskii, Aliev,Gorbachev, Demichev, Kuznetsov, Mash-erov, Ponomarev, Rashidov, Solomentsev,Shevardnadze, Dolgikh, Zimyanin,Kapitonov, Rusakov, Savinkin, Smirtyukov.

Extract from protocol No. 200 of thesession of the Politburo of the CC CPSU

of 19 June 1980

Measures on Afghanistan.

1. To approve Comrade Brezhnev’sproposals on the immediate measures on Af-ghanistan.

To proceed with the assumption thatthe Soviet Union will continue to providepolitical, military, and economic assistanceto Afghanistan in order to help ensure thenational independence and territorial integ-rity of Afghanistan, to strengthen thepeople’s democratic regime and the leadingrole of the People’s Democratic Party.

2. To consider expedient to withdrawseveral military units whose presence in Af-ghanistan now is not necessary.

To charge the Ministry of Defense ofthe USSR to make a decision on the num-ber and composition of the troops to be with-drawn and on the time frame and the orderof their withdrawal from Afghanistan.

To charge Comrade Iu.V. Andropov tocoordinate the issues concerning the with-drawal of some Soviet military units fromAfghanistan with B. Karmal.

3. To use the withdrawal of some So-viet military units from Afghanistan as le-verage for demanding that Pakistan and Irancease their hostile actions against the DRAand to stop sending interventions from theirterritory into Afghanistan.

Politburo CC CPSU

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 176, ll. 101-102; translation by Sveta Savranskaya.]

Information from the CC CPSU toErich Honecker, 21 June 1980

21.06.80Confidential


Following the traditions established inthe relationship between our parties, wewould like confidentially to inform you ofthe following.

At one time we sent you informationon the deployment of a limited Soviet mili-tary contingent in the territory of the Demo-cratic Republic of Afghanistan. At the timewe informed you that this action was takenas a result of numerous requests by the Af-ghan government in connection with a sharpincrease in imperialist aggression, primarilyby the USA, as well as by China, using for-mations of Afghan counterrevolutionarybandits who are entrenched in Pakistan andIran.

Given the current situation the CCCPSU, taking into account the fact that theinterventionists have been dealt a seriousblow and that with respect to this there isno longer a need for the presence of the en-tire initial military contingent deployed inAfghanistan, has deemed it expedient towithdraw several military units, the presenceof which is not critical at this time. Thismeasure is being carried out with the com-plete agreement of the Afghan government.

Of course, if the intervention directedagainst the progressive achievements of theAfghan people, against independence andthe territorial integrity of DRA continues,or worse still, increases, then all necessarymeasures will be taken not only tostrengthen the Afghan armed forces, but alsoour military contingent in Afghanistan.

The withdrawal of several Soviet mili-tary units from Afghanistan rests on the factthat Soviet Union will continue to renderpolitical, military and economic support toAfghanistan, with the aim of maintainingthe national independence and territorialintegrity of Afghanistan, buttressing thepeople’s democratic regime and the funda-mental role of the People’s DemocraticParty.

We intend to use the withdrawal of sev-eral Soviet military units from Afghanistanin order to secure from Pakistan and Iranthe cessation of hostile activities against theDRA and the smuggling of interventionistsinto Afghanistan from their territories. Wereckon that our friends will follow the samecourse.

[Source: SAPMO, Berlin, J IV 2/202, A. 575;obtained by V. Zubok.]

CC CPSU Plenum, 23 June 1980(excerpt)

PLENUM OF CENTRAL COMMITTEEOF THE CPSU23 JUNE 1980

Sverdlovsk Hall, 11:00 a.m.

[. . .]Brezhnev: Not a day goes bywhen Washington has not tried to revive thespirit of the “Cold War,” to heat up milita-rist passions. Any grounds are used for this,real or imagined.

One example of this is Afghanistan.The ruling circles of the USA, and of Chinaas well, stop at nothing, including armedaggression, in trying to keep the Afghanisfrom building a new life in accord with theideals of the revolution of liberation of April1978. And when we helped our neighborAfghanistan, at the request of its govern-ment, to give a rebuff to aggression, to beatback the attacks of bandit formations whichoperate primarily from the territory of Pa-kistan, then Washington and Beijing raisedan unprecedented racket. Of what did theyaccuse the Soviet Union[?]: of a yearningto break out to warm waters, and an inten-tion to make a grab for foreign oil. And thewhole thing was that their plans to drawAfganistan into the orbit of imperialistpolicy and to create a threat to our countryfrom the south crashed to the ground.

In the Soviet act of assistance to Af-ghanistan there is not a grain of avarice. Wehad no choice other than the sending oftroops. And the events confirmed that it wasthe only correct choice. (Continued ap-plause).

[. . .]Gromyko : [. . .] Given all that wasachieved by the fraternal countries in the in-ternational arena, especially in the 1970s,in the struggle for detente and peace, we notesomething else: the general situation in theworld has grown more complicated, tensionhas grown, above all in our relations withthe United States. The question arises: whatis the reason for this?

The opponents of detente do nottrouble themselves even with a minimaldose of objectivity in explaining the reasonsfor such a situation. They are building theirpolicy on deception of the peoples. Imperi-alist policy and deception of the peoples are

indivisible. From all corners they announcethat the Soviet Union has supposedlychanged its policy and by its own actionsthreatens the West and its interests. In ev-ery way they exaggerate in this regard theAfghan events, they cast it in a false light.In pursuit of these goals they break all theirformer records of trickery, lies, and evilpuffery.

Acting on the true course of events, theSoviet Union directly casts back in the faceof the officials of the imperialist states factslike the acceptance by the USA and NATO,in demonstrative form, of the decision toincrease sharply their military budgets, toabruptly whip up the arms race, to deploynew American intermediate range weaponsin Western Europe, to make ready the strike[“rapid development”-ed.] force in the In-dian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

To all this, to all of our well-foundedaccusations against the NATO bloc, they canraise no objection. And how can they ob-ject, if all this happened when the so-calledAfghan issue was not even mentioned.

. . . Comrades, for our actions in Af-ghanistan, for the fact that we fulfilled ourobligation to international solidarity in re-lations to revolutionary Afghanistan, for thefact that the aggressor already has receiveda solid rebuff, the Soviet Union does not in-tend to make any excuses to anyone, andthe inspirers of aggression against the Af-ghan state are beginning to feel that. Thoseshould ask for pardon who organized andstand behind the aggression against Afghani-stan, who concocted the criminal plans inrelation to that country, the independent ex-istence and security of which have a directrelation to the security of the Soviet Union.We accuse the organizers of the aggressionagainst Afghanistan and demand that thataggression be stopped. (Applause).

Of course, it would be premature tobelieve that the complexity in relation toAfghanistan is already behind us. The ex-ternal enemies of Afghanistan and the do-mestic reactionary forces will still makethemselves known. But the matter is nowon the correct path. Afghanistan will notreturn to the past. Our Party and our peoplecan be sure of that. (Applause).

For us now, as Leonid Il’ich an-nounced, there is no need to have in Af-ghanistan a military contingent even of thesize which it was when it was introduced.But if the situation demands it, we at any


time will be able to strengthen our contin-gent, so as to reliably work together to pro-vide for the independence and territorial in-tegrity of Afghanistan.

The possibility of reaching at an ap-propriate time a Treaty of mutual assistancebetween the Soviet Union and the Demo-cratic Republic of Afghanistan, which wouldclearly demonstrate the resolve of bothcountries not to allow any encroachmentfrom without on the independence and in-tegrity of the Afghan state, deserves seriousattention.

. . .We have proposed and propose thatWashington be led in our mutual relationsby the principles of equality, equal security,mutual advantage, non-interference in eachother’s domestic affairs. In a single word,we have built and are ready in the future tobuild our relations with the USA on the prin-ciples of peaceful coexistence.

Declaring our readiness to maintainnormal relations with the USA, we proceedfrom the fact that hostility between the twopowers is not only unwise, but also danger-ous. At the same time we more than oncehave warned the Americans, that they shouldtake into account the lawful interests of theSoviet Union and that the Soviet Union willnot permit anyone to trample on those in-terests. Many of you, evidently, have inyour memory how during the terms of of-fice of various Presidents throughout thepost-war period, American policy rockedfrom side to side. It cost the Soviet Unionconsiderable effort to lead the USA to anacknowledgement of the single reliable ba-sis of our relations—a policy of peacefulcoexistence.

Now the American administration hasonce again begun to veer wildly. The un-derlying cause of the current break in So-viet-American relations is Washington’s at-tempt to do whatever it takes to achievemilitary superiority over us.

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 14, dok. 40;provided by M. Kramer.]

Information from the CC CPSU toErich Honecker, 18 July 1980

18/7/80Confidential

DISPATCH

The other day, the President of Paki-stan Zia-ul-Haq addressed us with a pro-posal on holding talks with Afghanistan, Pa-kistan and Iran under the mediation of theSoviet Union. The goal of these talks shouldbe, in his words, the normalization of bilat-eral relations, the preservation ofAfghanistan’s status as independent andfriendly to the Soviet Union and the assur-ance of a guarantee not to interfere in itsinternal affairs.

In the opinion of Zia-ul-Haq, such ameeting could take place in Moscow dur-ing the second half of August of this year,first on the level of Foreign Ministers, andthen on the level of national and govern-ment leaders. The President of Pakistanannounced that so far he has not discussedthis idea of his with the government of Iran,but he expressed confidence that Iran willlend its support.

From the very beginning we were notsure of the seriousness of Zia-ul-Haq’s in-tentions. Nevertheless, after consulting withthe government of the Democratic Repub-lic of Afghanistan, we decided to express,in principle, a positive regard to his proposal.

However, following this, as we sus-pected, Pakistan essentially went back ontheir word. Under the guise of additional“explanations” of their proposal their startedto put forth completely unacceptable pre-conditions for these talks.

First of all, Pakistan directly and rudelydeclares the “unacceptability” of BabrakKarmal as the head of the Afghan govern-ment and that he must be replaced by some-one else. Secondly, Pakistan declares thatit will continue to act on the basis ofPakistan’s obligations stemming from thedecisions made by the Conference of IslamicNations. Thirdly, despite Zia-ul-Haq’s ear-lier conviction that Iran will support his pro-posal for direct talks with Afghanistan, Pa-kistan is distancing itself from that as well.

Obviously we have no intention to con-tinue the dialogue with Pakistan on the ba-sis of their current position, which consti-tutes a particularly rude interference in theinternal affairs of the Democratic Republicof Afghanistan.

[Source: SAPMO, Berlin, J IV 2/202, A. 575;document provided by V. M. Zubok.]

Report by Soviet Defense MinisterUstinov to CPSU CC on “Foreign

Interference” in Afghanistan,2 October 1980

Secret

CPSU CC

On Foreign Interference in the InternalAffairs of the Democratic

Republic of Afghanistan (DRA)

Following the victory of the revolutionin Afghanistan, the USA and its allies inNATO, as well as China, Pakistan, Iran, andseveral reactionary Arab countries, launchedsubversive actions against the DRA, andthese actions were greatly stepped up onceSoviet troops were sent into Afghanistan.

The USA and its allies are training,equipping, and sending into DRA territoryarmed formations of the Afghan counter-revolution, the activity of which, thanks tohelp from outside, has become the main fac-tor destabilizing the situation in Afghanistan.The most serious actions against the DRAare being launched from the territory of Pa-kistan, where armed detachments of Afghanreactionaries are being trained at 42 sites.In total, over 60,000 rebels, including morethan 50,000 who have been infiltrated intoDRA territory, have been trained in Paki-stan in 1980 with help from American, Chi-nese, Pakistani, and Egyptian instructors.

The Iranian leadership is openly sup-porting the Afghan reactionaries. There are13 training camps on Iranian territory forthe Afghan rebels. Some 5,000 people havebeen trained at these sites, including nearly3,000 who have been sent into Afghanistan.

American instructors are taking an ac-tive part in the training of rebels on the ter-ritory of Pakistan. These instructors havecome mainly from the Washington-based“International Police Academy” and theTexas-based school of subversion. In Marchand April of this year alone, the USA sent100 instructors through Karachi into the re-gions of Pakistan bordering on the DRA.Some of these instructors directly organizedthe operations of rebel units on the territoryof Afghanistan.

The USA is providing shipments ofweapons to the Afghan rebels mainlythrough third countries (Egypt and SaudiArabia). The direct supply of weapons tothe Afghan rebels in Pakistan is carried outvia transport assets of the Pakistani ground


and border forces, and also through the na-tional transport corporation.

The Carter administration is seeking tounite the Afghan counterrevolution, prom-ising its leaders that if they unite, they willreceive unlimited help in the form of weap-ons and money. The USA chief of missionin Pakistan, B. King, said this during a meet-ing this past March with the secretary ofPakistan’s defense ministry, Lieutenant-General D. Khan. The USA consulates inPeshawar and Karachi are working to unitethe scattered groups of the Afghan counter-revolution. An “Afghan section” that hasbeen created in the USA consulate inKarachi is supervising rebel operations andproviding them with weapons and equip-ment.

The American authorities are also in-stigating actions by anti-Afghan emigregroups in the United States itself. With thedirect participation of the CIA, the “Asso-ciation of American Aid to Afghan Refu-gees,” the “National Liberation Front ofAfghanistan,” the “Unity Council,” and the“Committee for Solidarity in Organizing theLiberation of Afghanistan” have been set upin the USA. These organizations have beengiven the task of coordinating the actionsof anti-Afghan forces abroad and of provid-ing financial aid to armed detachments ofthe Afghan counterrevolution.

The American CIA has devised specialrecommendations “for the use of religiousmovements and groups in the struggleagainst the spread of Communist influence.”In accordance with these recommendations,agents from the American special servicesin Pakistan are carrying out vigorous workamong the Pushtun and Beluga tribes, pro-voking them to carry out anti-governmentacts in Afghanistan.

Foreign interference in the DRA’s in-ternal affairs, above all by the USA, isthwarting efforts to normalize the situationin Afghanitan.

Reported for informational purposes.D. Ustinov

2 October 1980

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 177, ll. 84-86; translated by Mark Kramer; first publi-cation in Russian in Novaya i NoveishayaIstoriia 3 (May-June) 1996, pp. 91-99 (docu-ment on 98-99), intro. by G.N. Sevastionov.]

CPSU CC Politburo transcript

(excerpt), 10 March 1983

SESSION OF THE CCCPSU POLITBURO

10 March 1983

Chairman: comr. ANDROPOV Yu.V.Present: comrs. Aliev G.A., GorbachevM.S., Gromyko A.A., Pel’she A. Ya.,Tikhonov N.A., Chernenko K.U., DemichevP.N., Dolgikh V.I., Kuznetsov V.V.,Solomentsev M.S., Kapitonov I.V., andRyzhkov N.I.

[...] 6. On the situation in Afghanistan andadditional measures towards its improve-ment.

GROMYKO. In accordance with theresolution of the Politburo, a group of high-ranking party, soviet, military and produc-tion management officials traveled to Af-ghanistan. This group put in some goodwork there. They put together a set of pro-posals for the further stabilization of the situ-ation in Afghanistan. We examined theseproposals during meetings of the CC Polit-buro Commission on Afghanistan. Theseproposals contain problems that must bedecided in the immediate future by both theAfghan and the Soviet sides. Financiallyspeaking, this will cost approximately 300mln. rubles in the course of three years. Thisis a large, yet minimum sum, and it seemsthat we should make this expenditure.

On the whole, the situation in Afghani-stan is, as you know, difficult. Lately, cer-tain elements of consolidation have beenexamined, but the process of consolidationis moving slowly. The number of gangs[rebel groups] is not decreasing. The en-emy is not laying down its weapons. Thenegotiations with Pakistan in Geneva aremoving slowly and with difficulty. This iswhy we must do everything to find a mutu-ally acceptable political settlement. In ad-vance, it can already be said that this pro-cess will be a lengthy one. There are ques-tions which must be discussed separately.One should only keep in mind that for nowwe cannot give Pakistan consent on concretetime periods for the withdrawal of our troopsfrom the country. We must exercise cau-tion here. Yes, the situation is stabilizing.It is good that the Afghan army has grownto 140 thousand. But the main trouble isthat the central authorities have not yet

reached the countryside: [they] rarely in-teract with the masses, about one third ofthe districts is not under the control of thecentral authority, and one can feel the fra-gility of the state government.

In closing, I would like to say that evi-dently we need to take the steps which areoutlined in the recommendations given toyou for examination. It seems that it willbe necessary to hold a meeting with Karmaland a group of leading officials of thePeople’s Democratic Party of Afghanistansometime in April. It seems that it wouldalso be expedient for Yu. V. Andropov tomeet personally with Babrak Karmal.

TIKHONOV. When speaking of 300mln. rubles, this refers to free assistance.

ANDROPOV. You remember how ar-duously and cautiously we decided the ques-tion of deploying troops in Afghanistan. L.I.Brezhnev insisted on a roll call vote by themembers of the Politburo. The question wasexamined in the CC Plenum.

In deciding the Afghan problem wemust proceed from existing realities. Whatdo you want? This is a feudal country wheretribes have always been in charge of theirterritories, and the central authority was farfrom always able to reach each Kishlak [anAfghan district]. The problem is not inPakistan’s position. We are fighting againstAmerican imperialism which well under-stands that in this part of international poli-tics it has lost its positions. That is why wecannot back off.

Miracles don’t happen. Sometimes weare angry at the Afghans because they actillogically and work slowly. But let us re-member our fight with basmatchism [ban-ditry]. Why, back then, almost the entireRed Army was concentrated in Central Asia,yet the fight with basmatchi continued upuntil the mid-1930’s. And so in our rela-tions with Afghanistan there must be bothdemands and understanding.

As concerns the recommendations ofthe Commission, are they not a little impos-ing with exact instructions as to what shouldbe done by the Afghan side and by ours?

GROMYKO. Of course we will workto complete the recommendations.

ANDROPOV. Yes, so that it shouldbe a political document. It must be muchmore flexible.

PONOMAREV. We will completethese materials.

ANDROPOV. Evidently we do need


these talks with Karmal. It will probablybe advantageous to hold them in two rounds;moreover, my discussion with Karmalshould be organized last.

KUZNETSOV, TIKHONOV, GOR-BACHEV. That’s right.

ANDROPOV. Then, perhaps we willmake the following decision: To agree withthe findings reported by the Politburo Com-mission on Afghanistan and accept the ex-pediency of holding discussions with B.Karmal and a group of other leading offi-cials of the People’s Democratic Party ofAfghanistan in March-April of this year. Atthe same time we can ratify the draft reso-lution of the USSR Council of Ministers ongiving additional economic assistance to theAfghan Republic.

The resolution is approved.

7. On the Afghan-Pakistan negotiations onthe questions of political settlement

ANDROPOV. It seems that the ques-tion is clear.

GROMYKO. The Afghans, of course,must be given materials which would givethem the ability to prepare well for the ne-gotiations.

PONOMAREV. They very much needthese materials.

ANDROPOV. Then let us approve theresolution.

The resolution is approved.

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89 per. 42, dok. 51; pro-vided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.]

CPSU CC Politburo Transcript(excerpt), 20 March 1986

Top SecretOnly copy

(Draft)

SESSION OF CC CPSU POLITBURO20 March 1986

Chairing: com. GORBACHEV M.S.

Attending: com Aliev G.A., Gromyko A.A.,Zaikov L.N.,Ligachev E.K., Ryzhkov N.I,Solomentsev M.S., Chebrikov, V.M.,Dolgikh V.I., Eltsin B.N., Yeltsin B.N.,Sokolov S.L., Talyzin N.B., Biryukova A.P.,Zimianin M.V., Medvedev V.A., NikonovV.P., Razumovskii G.P., Yakovlev A.N.

GORBACHEV: Before we start dis-cussing the issues on the agenda, I wouldlike to inform you on some questions.

A troubling cable has arrived fromAden. They want to shoot 50 people there. Ithink we should issue an appeal, pointingout that the main thing today is unity. Andthe actions of this kind can aggravate inter-nal strife.

GROMYKO: RightGORBACHEV: Let Yegor Kuzmich

[Ligachev], Viktor Mikhailovich[Chebrikov] and the MFA prepare the nec-essary instruction.

LIGACHEV: The Bulgarians refusedto receive Muhammed.

GORBACHEV: We should not drama-tize it. They have to face certain difficul-ties, too, regarding this question.

According to information from confi-dential channels, [East German leader Erich]Honecker let himself speak in a way thattestifies to his misunderstanding of our pointof view about Socialist self-government ofpeople, that socialism itself is a self-gov-ernment.[pages missing-ed.]

GORBACHEV (reads a memorandumon Afghanistan). This is a strict party docu-ment. The situation is quite dramatic. B.Karmal is very much down in terms ofhealth and in terms of psychological dispo-sition. He began to pit leaders against eachother.

SOLOMENTSEV: A correct position.CHEBRIKOV: Karmal tells himself

that he cannot cope with his functions (hereads a cable).

GROMYKO: One could instructMikhail Sergeevich to speak with him.

[Source: f. 89, per. 36, d. 18; provided byM. Kramer; trans. by V.M. Zubok.]

CPSU CC Politburo transcript(excerpt), 13 November 1986

Top SecretOnly Copy

Working Draft

MEETING OF CC CPSU POLITBURO13 November 1986

Chaired by comr. GORBACHEV M.S.

Also present: comrs. Vorotnikov V.I.,Gromyko A.A., Zaikov L.N., Ryzhkov N.I.,Solomentsev M.S., Chebrikov V.M.,Shevardnadze Eh.A., Demichev P.N.,Dolgikh V.I.,Yeltsin B.N., Talyzin N.V.,Biryukova A.P., Dobrynin A.F., ZimyaninM.V., Medvedev V.A., Nikonov V.P.,Razumovskii G.P., Kapitonov I.V.

[...] 11. On [former Afghan king] ZakhirShah.

GORBACHEV. Have all comradesfamiliarized themselves with the memoran-dum from comrs. Chebrikov V.M.,Shevardnadze Eh. A., Sokolov S.L., andDobrynin A.F.?

POLITBURO MEMBERS. Yes, wehave.

GORBACHEV. Then let us exchangeopinions. I have an intuition that we shouldnot waste time. Najib needs our support.He objectively evaluates the situation andunderstands the difficulty of the existingproblems. He believes that the activisationof measures directed towards national rec-onciliation, strengthening of the union withthe peasantry, and consolidation of politi-cal leadership of the party and the countryis a pressing task.

Karmal is stalling. [translator’s note:Gorbachev here uses an idiomatic Russianexpression—“Karmal vydelyvnet Kren-delya”—which literally means, “Karmel iswalking like a pretzel.” The expression,derived from a term for the weaving andunsteady gait of a drunkard, in this case sig-nifies Gorbachev’s assertion that Karmal isnot behaving in a straightforward manner.]

We have been fighting in Afghanistanfor already six years. If the approach is notchanged, we will continue to fight for an-other 20-30 years. This would cast a shadowon our abilities to affect the evolution of thesituation. Our military should be told thatthey are learning badly from this war. What,can it be that there is no room for our Gen-eral Staff to maneuver? In general, we havenot selected the keys to resolving this prob-lem. What, are we going to fight endlessly,as a testimony that our troops are not ableto deal with the situation? We need to fin-ish this process as soon as possible.

GROMYKO. It is necessary to estab-lish a strategic target. Too long ago wespoke on the fact that it is necessary to closeoff the border of Afghanistan with Pakistan


and Iran. Experience has shown that wewere unable to do this in view of the diffi-cult terrain of the area and the existence ofhundreds of passes in the mountains. To-day it is necessary to precisely say that thestrategic assignment concludes with the car-rying of the problem towards ending the war.

GORBACHEV. It is necessary to in-clude in the resolution the importance ofending the war in the course of one year - atmaximum two years.

GROMYKO. It should be concludedso Afghanistan becomes a neutral country.Apparently, on our part there was an under-estimation of difficulties, when we agreedwith the Afghan government to give themour military support. The social conditionsin Afghanistan made the resolution of theproblem in a short amount of time impos-sible. We did not receive domestic supportthere. In the Afghan army the number ofconscripts equals the number of deserters.

From the point of view of evaluatingthe domestic situation in Afghanistan, wecan sign under practically everything thatNajib suggests. But we should not sharplycut off Karmal, as he serves as a symbol tohis people. A meeting of our representa-tives with him should be held. It is alsonecessary to try keep him on the generaltrack; to cut him off would not be the bestscenario. It is more expedient to preserve[his relations] with us.

Najib recommends a rather wide spec-trum of steps. They deserve attention. Onepath is to draw in the peasant masses on theway of supporting the government power;another - negotiations with Islamic partiesand organizations inside Afghanistan andbeyond its borders, which are ready to com-promise; third path - relations with theformer king. I think that we should not spurnthem. This should be done possibly in acombination other than proposed by Najib.Right now a more concrete stage of discus-sion with him concerning these questions isneeded. A certain plan of actions is neces-sary. Here, it seems, our participation isneeded, in particular, through the course ofour contacts with Pakistan.

Concerning the Americans, they are notinterested in the settlement of the situationin Afghanistan. On the contrary, it is to theiradvantage for the war to drag out.

GORBACHEV. That’s right.GROMYKO. It should be considered

how to link India into the settlement. A de-

lay in the resolution of these problems doesnot increase our opportunities for settlement.Right now the situation is worse than half ayear ago. In one word, it is necessary tomore actively pursue a political settlement.Our people will breathe a deep sigh if weundertake steps in that direction.

Our strategic goal is to make Afghani-stan neutral, not to allow it to go over to theenemy camp. Of course it is important toalso preserve that which is possible in thesocial arena. But most important - to stopthe war.

I would agree that it is necessary tolimit this to a period of one-two years.

SOLOMENTSEV. It would be goodto complete a political settlement for the70th anniversary of [the 1917] October[Revolution].

GROMYKO. It is difficult to talkabout such a period of time.

CHEBRIKOV. On this question manydecisions have been made. Much energy hasbeen put in. But, unfortunately, the situa-tion, both in Afghanistan and around it, con-tinues to remain difficult. I support the pro-posal of Mikhail Serge’evich [Gorbachev]that it is necessary to liven up and push theproblem towards a logical conclusion. In-deed, we posed the question of closing theborder. Andrei Andre’evich [Gromyko] ispartly right, speaking about the difficultiesof such a closing, due to the geographic andother conditions. But partly the failure inthe closing is also tied to the fact that noteverything was done that could have been.Right now the enemy is changing its tac-tics. He is going underground. It is neces-sary to look for the means to a political so-lution of the problem. The military path forthe past six years has not given us a solu-tion.

What should have been done? First ofall, it was necessary to receive Najib inMoscow. He has never visited us. It is pos-sible that Karmal’s conduct can be in someway explained by the fact that as of now wehave yet to invite Najib to come here. Therehave been telephone conversations with himthrough intermediaries, but that’s not[enough]. A direct conversation is neces-sary. It could clear up a great deal. It isimportant not to put off such a conversa-tion; a day or two should be found for thepurpose.

Another important question - the ques-tion of cadres.

GORBACHEV. Who is preventinghim from solving the cadre questions?

CHEBRIKOV. Well, each of us, a littlebit. Such was the case with Dost, with theminister of defense, with supplementing themembership of the CC PDPA Politburo.

GORBACHEV. I thought that we gaveDost agreement on deciding these questions.

CHEBRIKOV. Then why is nothingbeing decided? We speak less about Af-ghanistan than we do about where will Dostwork and where will the minister of defensebe sent. Then it is necessary to give instruc-tions to comr. Kryuchkov who is now inKabul, not to avoid these questions in meet-ings with Najib, but to tell him directly thathe must decide them as he finds necessary.

SHEVARDNADZE. Right now we arereaping the fruit of un-thought-out decisionsof the past. Recently, much has been doneto settle the situation in Afghanistan andaround it. Najib has taken up leadership.He needs practical support, otherwise wewill bear the political costs. It is necessaryto state precisely the period of withdrawalof Soviet troops from Afghanistan. You,Mikhail Serge’evich, said it correctly - twoyears. But neither our, nor Afghan comradeshave mastered the questions of the function-ing of the government without our troops.

After the trip to India, it would be ex-pedient to invite Najib to Moscow. We mustregard Afghanistan as an independent coun-try and entrust Najib to make decisions in-dependently. He wants to create a headquar-ters for the military command. Why shouldwe hinder him?

I expressed hesitation concerning thereplacement of Dost, as he is an experienceddiplomat and has a wide cultural horizon.But nevertheless, if the first secretary of thePDPA believes that it is necessary to replacehim, then we must give him the liberty tomake the decision.

Arguments are being made as to whomust accomplish the closing off of the bor-ders - the army or state security organs? Andthis question must be decided by Najib, notby us.

Bearing in mind the prospects for fu-ture development in relations with Afghani-stan, it is important to put stress on economiccooperation. Without this, our foundationsthere will be difficult in the future.

I support the proposition of VictorMikhailovich [Chebrikov] on the impor-tance of meeting with Najib.


GORBACHEV. We can give corre-sponding instructions to comr. Kryuchkov.

SHEVARDNADZE. Both comr.Kryuchkov and comr. Vorontsov are goodpeople, but their discussions cannot replacemeeting with the General Secretary.

GORBACHEV. Here, probably,Akhrome’ev S.F. hears about the organiza-tion of a headquarters for the military com-mand of DRA and smiles. Would theseheadquarters really command our troops?

DOBRYNIN. We must give liberty toNajib. Two questions arise here. First—the idea of national reconciliation, and sec-ond—the political settlement of the situa-tion around Afghanistan.

Karmal must be removed. But we mustremember that through national reconcilia-tion, not a single member of the CC PDPAPolitburo supports Najib. There is no con-cept of such reconciliation.

GORBACHEV. The concept of settle-ment exists—we have established that—butin practice the problem is being resolved.Sergei Fedorovich, perhaps you will solveit?

AKHROME’EV [USSR dep. ministerof defense]. No, it will not be possible tosolve it.

DOBRYNIN. The question of the con-cept has not become the most important forthe Afghan government. I come out in fa-vor of receiving Najib in Moscow. Rightnow a message could be given to comr.Kryuchkov about the meeting with Najib.Let him tell Najib that he himself shouldmake the decision concerning Dost, Karmal,but that this must be done without stirringup factionalism.

AKHROME’EV. Military actions inAfghanistan will soon be seven years old.There is no single piece of land in this coun-try which has not been occupied by a So-viet soldier. Nevertheless, the majority ofthe territory remains in the hands of rebels.The government of Afghanistan has at itsdisposal a significant military force: 160thousand people in the army, 115 thousand- in Tsarando and 20 thousand - in state se-curity organs. There is no single militaryproblem that has arisen and that has not beensolved, and yet there is still no result. Thewhole problem is in the fact that militaryresults are not followed up by political [ac-tions]. At the center there is authority; inthe provinces there is not. We control Kabuland the provincial centers, but on occupied

territory we cannot establish authority. Wehave lost the battle for the Afghan people.The government is supported by a minorityof the population. Our army has fought forfive years. It is now in a position to main-tain the situation on the level that it existsnow. But under such conditions the war willcontinue for a long time.

50 thousand Soviet soldiers are sta-tioned to close off the border, but they arenot in the position to close off all passageswhere cargo is transferred across the bor-der. I repeat that we can maintain the situa-tion at the current level, but we need to lookfor a way out and resolve the question, asAndrei Adre’evich [Gromyko] has said. Wemust go to Pakistan.

GORBACHEV. Why do you hinderNajib?

AKHROME’EV. He should not bebuilding headquarters, but a state commit-tee on defense. We allow him to make cadrechanges.

VORONTSOV. A few words to con-tinue the thought, just expressed by comr.Akhrome’ev S.F. Afghanistan is a peasantcountry (80 percent of the population arepeasants). But it is exactly they who haveleast benefitted from the revolution. Overeight years of the revolution agricultural pro-duction has increased by only 7 percent, andthe standard of living of peasants remainsat pre-revolutionary levels.

By the acknowledgment of comr. Najibhimself and a member of Politburo, comr.Zeray, in a conversation with me, the party“has still not reached the peasantry,” land-water reform has turned out unsuccessfuland has not been realized (now comr. Najibhas already taken up to review from a morestability-of-life oriented perspective), thepeasant has not received significant mate-rial benefit from the revolution. Even rightnow, in the words of comr. Zeray, when thereare only 5 mln. people out of a populationof 18 mln. under the control of the govern-ment (moreover, 3 mln. of them live in thecities and only 2 mln. in the country - this isno more the 300-400 thou. families), theparty and the government have not inher-ited from the previous government preciseplans on how to quickly raise the standardof living of these 300-400 thousand peas-ant households which are under the sphereof influence of the government.

By the declaration of the member ofthe Politburo responsible for the economy

and agriculture, comr. Zeray, “because ofvarious reasons, the status of peasants in thegovernment zone is in certain ways worsethan in regions of counter-revolutionaryactivity.” To the question of how this canbe explained, comr. Zeray told me that “theregions under the control of the counter-revolution are better supplied with goods offirst necessity (these goods are shipped thereby contraband from Pakistan). A similarsituation exists in Khost, Uruzgan, and otherborder regions. Sometimes a paradoxicalsituation arises when the peasants in regionsunder our control, said comr. Zeray, receivegoods not from us, but from zones of gang-formation.” Urgent measures are needed inthis most important question - the improve-ment of the situation of peasants in the gov-ernment zone.

Many members of PDPA leadership arewithout initiative, and have gotten used towaiting for recommendations from our ad-visors and have become sort of armless. Itseems that our advisors in the beginning fre-quently “struck them on the arms.”

Such is not comr. Najib. He createsthe impression of a talented and decisive per-son. He must be given the opportunity tomake decisions himself, only looking tomake sure that because of his [inexperience]he does not amuse himself with secondarydetails. And he must have the opportunityto himself create his own “command” [orteam].

GORBACHEV. In October of last year[1985] in a Politburo meeting we determinedupon a course of settling the Afghan ques-tion. The goal which we raised was to ex-pedite the withdrawal of our forces fromAfghanistan and simultaneously ensure afriendly Afghanistan for us. It was projectedthat this should be realized through a com-bination of military and political measures.But there is no movement in either of thesedirections. The strengthening of the mili-tary position of the Afghan government hasnot taken place. National consolidation hasnot been ensured mainly because comr.Karmal continued to hope to sit in Kabulunder our assistance. It was also said thatwe fettered the actions of the Afghan gov-ernment.

All in all, up until now the projectedconcept has been badly realized. But theproblem is not in the concept itself, but inits realization. We must operate more ac-tively, and with this guide ourselves with


two questions. First of all, in the course oftwo years effect the withdrawal of our troopsfrom Afghanistan. In 1987 withdraw 50 per-cent of our troops, and in the following[year] - another 50 percent. Second of all,we must pursue a widening of the social baseof the regime, taking into account the real-istic arrangement of political forces. In con-nection with this, it is necessary to meet withcomr. Najib, and, possibly, even with othermembers of the CC PDPA Politburo.

We must start talks with Pakistan.Most importantly, [we must make sure] thatthe Americans don’t get into Afghanistan.But I think that Americans will not go intoAfghanistan militarily.

AKHROME’EV. They are not goingto go into Afghanistan with armed forces.

DOBRYNIN. One can agree withUSA on this question.

GORBACHEV. We must give instruc-tions to comr. Kryuchkov to meet with Najiband give him an invitation to visit the So-viet Union on an official visit in December1986.

It is necessary to also tell comr. Najibthat he should make key decisions himself.

Entrust comrs. Shevardnadze Eh.A.(roll-call), Chebrikov V.M., Sokolov S.L.,Dobrynin A.F., Talyzin N.V., andMurakhovsky V.S., taking into account thediscussion which took place in Politburomeetings, to coordinate, make operativedecisions, and make necessary proposals onsolving the Afghan question and settling thesituation around Afghanistan.

POLITBURO MEMBERS. We agree.

The resolution is passed.


CPSU CC Politburo Decision of24 January 1989, with attached report

of 23 January 1989

Communist Party of the Soviet Union.Central Committee


No. P146

To Comrades Gorbachev, Ryzhkov,Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev,Iazov, Murakhovsky, Kriuchkov

Excerpt from Protocol No. 146 of themeeting of the Politburo of the CC CPSU

of 24 January 1989

Question of the Ministry of the ForeignAf fairs USSR, Ministry of DefenseUSSR, Committee of State Security USSR

To agree with the understandings set forthin the note of Comrades Shevardnadze E.A.,Yazov D.T., and Kryuchkov V.A. of 23 Janu-ary 1989 (attached)

Secretary CC

[attached] to article VI protocol #146Top Secret

SPECIAL FILE

CC CPSU

On the measures pertaining to theimpending withdrawal of Soviet forcesfrom Afghanistan

In the difficult situation characterizingthe state of affairs in Afghanistan, one canincreasingly feel the inner tension stemmingfrom the impending withdrawal of the re-maining units of Soviet troops. The atten-tion of the regime and the forces of the op-position is totally focused on 15 February,when, in accordance with the Geneva ac-cords, the term of stay of our military con-tingent must end. In addition, the giventimetable for Kabul is even more constrain-ing, as the last Soviet military units mustleave the Afghan capital in the beginning ofFebruary.

Practically throughout the entire coun-try, military engagements between the gov-ernment forces and the opposition continueto take place, in the course of which thegovernment has essentially been able tomaintain its positions, although with the helpof Soviet aviation. The enemy has thus beenunable to capture Jalalabad, Kunduz, andKandahar. However, everyone understandsthat the main battle is still ahead. Currentlythe opposition has even decreased its mili-tary activity somewhat, saving up its forcesfor the coming period. Comr. Najibullahbelieves that it is intent on expanding itsactivities simultaneously in several key di-rections after the withdrawal of Sovietforces.

It should be emphasized that the Af-ghan comrades are seriously worried as tohow the situation will turn out. In general,their resolve to resist the enemy is strength-ening; they are taking a number of emer-gency measures and trying to arrange morerationally the forces that are available. To acertain extent, the Afghan comrades arecounting on the continuation of their con-tacts with a fairly significant number ofcommanding officers within armed detach-ments of the enemy, on the strong disagree-ments which continue to exist within theopposition, and on the incompatibility ofsome of its leading political groups, in par-ticular the “Islamic Association of Afghani-stan” ([Burhanuddin] Rabbani) and the “Is-lamic Party of Afghanistan” ([Gulbuddin]Hekmatyar). Armed clashes between de-tachments of these and other oppositiongroups are not just continuing, but are tak-ing on wider proportions as well.

The president is even closely examin-ing such a possibility as declaring martiallaw or taking other extraordinary measuresin the country, thinking that this may facili-tate the adoption and execution of difficultdecisions in the critical period ahead. At firsthe was leaning towards implementing mar-tial law in our presence, but in the course ofthe discussions with him that have takenplace, he arrived at the conclusion that thiswould best be done after the Soviet forceshave left Afghanistan.

The Afghan comrades express theirunderstanding of the decision to withdrawSoviet forces and affirm it once again, but,in conjunction with this, having soberly as-sessed the situation, point out that they can-not manage completely without our militaryassistance. Such assistance, in their opin-ion, could be rendered in forms differentfrom today’s and on a limited scale, but, nev-ertheless, would be a serious support bothpractically and psychologically. The Afghancomrades believe that if, after the with-drawal of Soviet forces, the opposition isunable to capture the principal centers in aswoop, then the Peshawar “alliance ofseven” and the Teheran “union of eight” willhave to enter into negotiations with Kabulto work out the future government arrange-ment in Afghanistan, which they steadfastlyrefuse to do at this time. The most impor-tant thing, emphasize the Afghan friends, isto hold out for at least the first three-fourmonths after the departure of the Soviet


forces, after which the situation may gradu-ally begin to shift to their advantage. Suchan opinion is borne out by some remarksmade by representatives of the opposition,in the course of contacts with Soviet repre-sentatives in Islamabad. By these remarksit was implied that if the government ofNajibullah holds out, they will re-examinetheir current position of not recognizing itin the capacity of a negotiating partner.

In the given situation there arise for usa number of difficult elements. On the onehand, our departure from decisions, whichhave been made and announced, to completethe withdrawal of our forces on 15 Febru-ary may cause us extremely undesirablecomplications in the international arena. Onthe other hand, there is no assurance thatshortly after our departure there will notarise a very serious danger to the regime that,throughout the world, is associated with us.Especially since the opposition, during thedecisive period, may well manage to coor-dinate its actions for a given time, which iswhat the American and Pakistani militarycircles have been persistently urging themto do. Certain apprehensions also arise dueto the fact that there is still no real unitywithin the PDPA, and factional, tribal, andother disagreements remain. Impulsivenessand memories of past “injustices” are trans-parent in the thinking of some Afghan lead-ers. Feeble, to say the least, are the actionsof prime minister M.H. Sharq and manyministers in his cabinet.

A most serious factor remains the factthat violations of the Geneva accords byIslamabad have acquired not just an open,but a flagrant character. Pakistaniborderguards are directly participating inmilitary operations on Afghan territory.Bombardments of bordering regions of Af-ghanistan are taking place, arms flow con-tinuously, and armed bands are crossing overfrom Pakistan. As before, the headquartersof the Afghan opposition parties, their train-ing centers and bases continue to functionunimpeded in Peshawar and other cities. Allof this is done by inertia [concerning poli-cies] established under Zia-ul-Haq. It is un-likely that B[enazir]. Bhutto is in a positionto change the situation in the near future.

Both we and Afghanistan have beencontinuously, in a decisive manner, and cit-ing concrete facts, condemning and continueto condemn such actions of the Pakistanigovernment. Such a line is meant to be con-

tinued also in the future, including in theUN Security Council as well as in contactswith the Pakistani government itself.

1. The chief question on which de-pends the continuing evolution of the situa-tion boils down to this: will the governmentbe able to maintain Kabul and other largecities in the country, though above all thecapital? The situation in Kabul is difficult;indeed, the main problems are not even mili-tary, but economic. It is very clear that theopposition plans to organize an economicblockade of Kabul, close off its supply offoodstuffs and petroleum products, and pro-voke discontent and even direct insurgenceof the populace. Already, such a blockadeis virtually being carried out by the forcesof the opposition in the form of highwayrobberies and intimidation and bribery ofdrivers of Afghan ground-based freight ve-hicles destined towards Kabul. It should bepointed out that the present complicationswith flour and foodstuffs in general in Kabulare to a significant degree related to the factthat the directive to inflict defeat on AhmadShah, whose detachments present the great-est threat to the road between Kabul andHairaton, was not carried out when the timewas ripe.

At the present time, just the monthlyrequirement of flour in Kabul is around 15thou. tons. Recently, several thousand tonsof flour were delivered by Soviet motor andair transport. However, it is imperative tohave stored provisions for at least 2-3months, which would be controlled by thePresident and which would give the Afghanfriends the possibility of feeling secure inthis matter.

Since such large stores can be createdonly with the help of motor transport, weare talking about getting flour and otherfoodstuffs through the Hairaton-Kabul high-way. In the words of comr. Najibullah, ifthe road remains functionally secured untilMay, the survival of the regime is guaran-teed. Evidently, the Afghan friends will notbe able to secure the normal functioning ofthe road without our help. We must pro-ceed from the fact that a break in the func-tioning of the Hairaton-Kabul highway can-not be allowed. In addition, special atten-tion will have to be paid to the most vulner-able section of the highway, which is theSalang pass with its more than three kilo-meter-long tunnel.

In preparation for the delivery of such

assistance it is necessary, during the remain-ing time, to intensify through all channelsthe condemnation of the actions of the op-position, which is obstructing the deliveryof foodstuffs to Kabul and other large Af-ghan cities; moreover, one should lay stressnot on the fate of the present government,but on the situation of the population of thesecities, which is seriously suffering as a re-sult of such barbarous actions.

In principle, it is possible to considerthe following scenarios:

First scenario. Citing the difficult situ-ation of the civilian population, leave onedivision, i.e. approximately 12 thou. people,on the Hairaton-Kabul highway. The givenscenario is hardly desirable, as a questionmay arise at the UN that we did not com-pletely withdraw our forces. Despite the factthat Pakistan is not fulfilling its obligationsunder the Geneva accords, one may assumethat the majority of countries in the UNwould not support us because, for many, thequestion of the military is at the crux of theproblem.

Second scenario. Citing the threat ofstarvation in Kabul and other cities, appealto the UN to urgently provide a shipment offoodstuffs and petroleum products to thecities and send the UN troops to maintainthe highway in operation. Until the arrivalof the UN forces, leave our military subdi-visions in these positions to carry out strictlyhumanitarian functions - provide the popu-lation with foodstuffs and petroleum prod-ucts. In conjunction with this, affirm thatthe withdrawal of the Soviet military con-tingent has taken place. Announce that, af-ter the arrival of the UN forces, our subdi-visions will immediately return to the So-viet Union.

However, this scenario is practicallyunfeasible, since the deployment of UNforces requires a decision of the SecurityCouncil, on which we cannot depend.

Third scenario. Withdraw all troopsby 15 February, as planned; affirm this inthe international arena with pronouncementsby the governments of USSR and the Re-public of Afghanistan. Then, under the re-quest of the Afghan government with whichit will appeal to the countries of the world,begin the escort of convoys of civilian cargowith the apportionment of Soviet militaryunits for their defense. The escort of suchconvoys could start within approximatelytwo weeks after the withdrawal of Soviet


troops. Prior to this time, create a wide-spread general opinion with condemnationsof the actions of the opposition, which issentencing the population of Afghan citiesto death from starvation. With the backdropof such general opinion the escort of con-voys by our units would appear to be a natu-rally humanitarian step. In addition, underthis scenario, a number of sections of theroad would have to be surmounted with afight each time.

Fourth scenario. Withdraw almost allSoviet troops by February 15. Officially af-firm the withdrawal of the Soviet militarycontingent in a corresponding statement.But, under the pretext of transferring someposts on the Afghan Side of the Hairaton-Kabul highway, leave Soviet units in someof the more important points, including inthe Salang pass. Avoid creating much noise,on our part, about this action; note only thatthis is but a small number of Soviet militarypersonnel who were slightly delayed by thefact that the Afghan side has not yet takenover from them the stated posts. After sometime, as in the third scenario, begin escort-ing convoys to Kabul under our militaryprotection.

Under all these scenarios we can be-gin with the fact that these operations wouldbe undertaken by our regular units, but theymust be formed on a volunteer basis, pri-marily from among military personnel whoare serving out their duties in Afghanistanor those that have served their term and arenow in Soviet Union. In conjunction withthis, offer a salary of 800-1000 rubles permonth, partially in Afghan currency, for therank-and-file and significantly increase theofficers’ salaries as well.

Give international observers the right- and announce this widely - to verifywhether we are actually escorting civiliangoods. In the nearest future, talks shouldbe held with the UN Special coordinator ofhumanitarian and economic assistance pro-grams Aga Khan with the aim of using theseprograms and the mechanism of the Spe-cial coordinator in order to counteract theextremists’ plans to stifle Kabul and otherlarge Afghan cities with an economic block-ade.

In the talks with Aga Khan it shouldbe suggested that UN convoys of foodstuffs,petroleum products, and medical suppliesgo not only through Pakistan, but, to a sig-nificant extent,through Soviet Union.

In all of the four enumerated scenariosit is intended that at least an insignificantnumber of Soviet troops is to be left behindafter 15 February 1989.

There still remains to be examined yetanother, fifth, scenario - Soviet forces arewithdrawn completely before 15 February,but we give the Afghan Side additional as-sistance, including financial, in the organi-zation of the defense of the Hairaton-Kabulhighway using their own forces, up to thepoint of completely providing for these Af-ghan units for a determined time-period,though, undoubtedly, this would be tied toconsiderable difficulties, especially in en-suring a dependable convoy escort.

As for the Kabul airport, keeping inmind its importance, it is expedient to havethere, with the conclusion of correspondingagreements with the Afghan Side, our owncontrol tower staff, numbering up to 100people.

2. From the side of the Afghan gov-ernment a question has been raised concern-ing the continuation of air assaults and bom-bardments of the armed opposition forcescarried out by Soviet aviation from our ter-ritory after the withdrawal of Soviet troops.The difficulty of this question is being ex-plained to the Afghan comrades; they arebeing advised to think about how to makebetter use of the capabilities of their ownaviation under the new circumstances. Onthe whole, our explanations have been re-ceived with understanding, but, at the sametime, they say that in some of the more criti-cal situations, the use of Soviet aviation maybe simply indispensable. It appears that thisquestion cannot be examined without tak-ing into account all the internal and exter-nal factors.

3. The Afghan Side assigns serioussignificance to having at its disposal suchpowerful types of weapons as the R-300rockets and batteries of “Hurricane” multi-rocket launchers. These questions evidentlyrequire a differentiated approach to this oranother type of weapon, but the general lineshould be directed, inasmuch as is possible,towards a more complete satisfaction ofAfghan requests. It should be kept in mindthat the very fact of possessing such typesof weapons would strongly reinforce ourfriends psychologically and give them con-fidence in their forces. Taking this into ac-count, batteries of “Hurricane” have alreadybeen set up in the Special Guards and the

RA [Republic of Afghanistan] army. The R-300 rocket batteries, which are currentlywith the Soviet military contingent, may alsobe transferred to the Afghan Side after modi-fying them to an export model and after thepreparation of Afghan personnel for use andmaintenance of these units, which shouldbe quickly carried out on our territory.

4. It would be expedient to positivelydecide the question concerning the use ofthe USSR border force capacities in the Af-ghan border zone, keeping in mind, how-ever that the Soviet mobile border groupscurrently stationed there will not remain.

5. Lately, we have been doing quite abit to give the Afghan friends economic as-sistance in accordance with exactly thosedifficulties that Afghanistan is in. This as-sistance, despite all kinds of difficulties withwhich both we and the Afghans met duringits shipment and distribution, has without adoubt averted numerous undesirable turnsin the situation’s development.

Nevertheless, in view of the difficultyof the Afghan situation, we must once againvery carefully re-examine the current eco-nomic processes which are of the utmostimportance to its internal political situation.We must determine what can be done addi-tionally to improve the Afghan economywhich is in a critical state and, in effect, onthe brink of ruin; we must give operationalassistance to solve the acute problems whichare arising, in particular through the ship-ments if foodstuffs and goods of first ne-cessity to Kabul and various provinces ofthe country, including Badakhshan.

6. In conjunction with all these mea-sures, it is necessary, as before, to continuegiving the Afghan Side assistance in iron-ing out relations with the opposition in Pa-kistan, Iran, and Western Europe. We mustpay attention to every nuance of theopposition’s mood to catch the more suit-able moments when we can use the neces-sary influence to split it, separating the“moderates” from the extremists. In par-ticular, right now it is important to supportthe mission of the representative of the Sec-retary-General of the UN B. Sevan who hasagreed to work towards the creation of aconsulting panel for resolving the futuregovernment structure of Afghanistan.

Through our diplomatic channels, itwill be necessary to take continuing stepsin our work with all countries which are inone way or another connected to the con-


flict in Afghanistan.Special attention should be paid to-

wards supporting contacts with the PakistaniSide, using the upcoming talks involving theUSSR minister of foreign affairs inIslamabad.

8. It is essential to carry on even moregoal-oriented propaganda work concerningAfghanistan, for which all scenarios of de-velopments in the Afghan situation must bethoroughly analyzed ahead of time. Of par-ticular importance will be the securing ofpropaganda concerning the decision to in-troduce martial law in Afghanistan, if suchis taken by President Najibullah.

E.Shevardnadze V. ChebrikovA.Yakovlev D.Yazov V. Murakhovskii

V. Kryuchkov

23 January 1989#65/OS20 copies

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 10, dok. 4; pro-vided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 13 May 1989, with report by Zaikov-

Shevardnadze-Yazov-Kryuchkov

Proletarians of the World, Unite!Communist Party of the Soviet UnionCENTRAL COMMITTEE

No P158/6

To com. Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Zaikov,Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Yazov,Baklanov, Belousov, Kryuchkov, Belyakov,Pavlov A., Falin

Excerpt from the protocol no. 158 of thesession of the Politburo of the CC CPSU

on 13 May 1989

On additional measures to influence theAfghan situation

1. To agree wtih considerations of com.Zaikov L.N., Shevardnadze Ed. Y., YazovD.T., Kryuchkov V.A., reported in thememorandum of 12 May 1989 (attached)

2. For the Ministry of Defense of theUSSR, the Committee on State Security[KGB] of the USSR, the Ministry of For-eign Affairs of the USSR to take necessarymeasures for realization of the proposals in

the memorandum.3. For the State commission of the

Council of Ministers of the USSR on themilitary-industrial questions, the Ministry ofDefense of the USSR together with corre-sponding ministries and agencies to decideurgently on the possibility of an increase ofdelivery of R-17 missiles and their combatdivisions to Afghanistan [in the amount of]up to 10-12 units per day and to take ap-propriate measures for that.

SECRETARY OF CC

To point 6 of Protocol no. 158

Top Secret

CC CPSU

On additional measures to influencethe Afghan situation

During the almost three months sincethe withdrawal of Soviet troops from Af-ghanistan, the armed forces of the Republicmanage to oppose the opposition supportedby Pakistan, the USA, and Saudi Arabia.However, the enemy, who realises that itsplans to overthrow the government ofNajibullah may be in danger, does every-thing to increase its military pressure. It fo-cuses on the seizure of Jalalabad in order toset up its “transitional government” and tolay seige to Kabul.

In view of preparations for a new mas-sive assault on Jalalabad with a large in-volvement of the Pakistanis, all the way tothe sending of Army formations camou-flaged as “Malishi,” we published a Decla-ration of the MFA USSR and undertookother measures of a preventive nature, in-cluding ones in covert channels.

Taking into account this development,it would be advisable to carry out a numberof measures to bolster the government ofthe Republic of Afghanistan and to exert aconstraining influence on the Afghan oppo-sition and Pakistan.

1. Of special importance in the cur-rent situation is a constant display of pow-erful impact on the enemy by combat fire,its further intensification, the use of the mosteffective types of weaponry. In this regard,we should search for additional reserves toaccelerate delivery of armaments and am-munitions into Afghanistan, particularly the

armament like R-17 missiles, air-defenseequipment, and others.

2. The question about conductingbombing raids by Soviet aviation from theterritory of the USSR requires additionalstudy.

3. We should continue demonstrativerelocations of our aircraft from Soviet air-fields near the border with Afghanistan, hav-ing in mind that these relocations should bedone without any camouflage so that theycould be observed by the Pakistanis and theopposition. [We should] continue further theflights of the Soviet military reconnaissanceaircraft over Afghanistan, particularly in theareas of Jalalabad and Khost, possibly atlower altitudes, with the aim of obtainingaero-photografic data about military concen-trations of the enemy.

4. With regard to the idea of Najibullahabout sending foreign volunteers to Afghani-stan to render assistance to the governmentof the Republic in the repulsing of aggres-sion, there is nothing to object to, if the Af-ghan friends do this kind of work with anumber of countries, particularly Muslimones.

5. It is decided that we will continue aconstant political-diplomatic campaign withthe aim of influencing [public opinion] onthe Afghan issue in the United States, Paki-stan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and also insofar asone can use the capabilities of India, theNon-Aligned Movement. In particular, theAfghan theme will continue to be a focus inSoviet-American contacts. It is advisable toaccept the proposal of Saudi Arabia to playa mediator’s role between us and the Afghanopposition. We have in mind to take intoaccount the anti-Afghan line of Pakistan indeveloping bilateral ties with this country.

L. Zaikov E. Shevardnadze D. YazovV. Kryuchkov

12 May 1989no. 390/os

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 10, dok. 35;trans. by Vladislav M. Zubok.]