dsa alert jan-2012

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J ANUARY 2012

SAARC COUNTRIES : US$ 20REST OF THE WORLD : US$ 25

9 7 7 0 9 7 6 2 0 6 0 0 3

I SS N 0 9 7 6 - 2 0 6 X

`

VOLUME 3 ISSUE 4

INDIA : 120

Against a Nuclear Backdrop

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do--

T

he 26 November attack on Pakistan Armys post in Mohmand Agency is a seminal event in a troubled relationshipbetween allies in a constant spat. Whatever the spin put out by the Pakistan Army, or United States militaryspokespersons, the truth of the matter will remain confined by the differing perceptions generated out of this

vexed relationship. Stories of vastly different interpretations abound, as they are expected to when the occasion is ofsuch magnitude. And it is of enormous magnitude, one that cannot be measured by merely the statistical recourse tothe number of casualties. 26 dead and at least half as many injured is a significant figure by any stretch of imagination.Even in the realms of South Asian negligence of the value of human life this is an enormous calamity that has hit thePakistan Army.

Pakistani spin masters have been quick to point to various loopholes in their domestic airspace management, rulesof engagement and the unequal nature of the relationship with the United States of America. What matters more tothem is that the convoluted justifications find news space, not that they necessarily absolve the Pakistan Army of allits wrongdoings. And the list of wrongdoings are legendary in their audacity, myopia and the sheer subversion of lawand good relations with all. The relations with the United States has been the bedrock as far as the Pakistani state is

concerned and more so its military. Beneficiaries of arms sales and slush funds by the billions the Pakistani militarymachine was on hire to the United States for the longest time. Both looked the other way when it came to protectingcore interests. If the Pakistani state allowed itself to become the frontline of anti-communist subversion it did so onits own volition. And if the United States slept over Pakistans nuclear shenanigans it did so with its eyes wide open.The problem, however, with looking the other way is that the earth is round and there comes a point when the twoopposing visions are bound to collide.

Which is precisely the basis of the ongoing tensions over happenings on both sides of the Durand Line. Even asthey may claim to be allies in the War On Terror, there is nothing to suggest that Pakistan and United States haveinterests anywhere near being common. The facts on ground clearly point to the fact that there is not convergence ofinterests between the two. In fact even as Pakistan draws coalition support funds from the United States its actionshave clearly been subversive of NATO / ISAF interests. In that Pakistan has always been consistent, especially adept

at pulling wool over the eyes. But such tactics have a limited shelf life and the expiry date was clearly crossed on13 September 2011 when the militant attack on US interests in Kabul left a trail leading directly to the ISI. The Rubiconwas crossed that day by Pakistan and 26 November is a direct outcome of that game. Suffice to say, the final whistle isa long way off.

manvendra singh

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hts reserved. reproduction and

n in any language in whole or inany means without permission from

and Security Alert is prohibited.

expressed are those of the individual

nd do not necessarily reflect those ofsher and / or editors. all disputes are

jurisdiction of delhi courts.

and security alert is printed,

d and owned by pawan agrawal

ted at graphic world, 1686, kucha

ai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and

d at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india).

anvendra singh.

der& ceoawal

chiefa singh

editorr) g d bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

ushanonsultant

anttant martins college of art & design,of arts, londonommunications

nghdheraingh

nd pantation

ptative (Jammu and Kashmir)a

dent (Europe)cosicndabeerr

wather

n & distributionwari

st name)@[email protected]: [email protected]: [email protected]

ment: [email protected]

& business officeli road110002 (India)23243999, 23287999,99583829993259666alert.orgert.org

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T h e E r a o f L i m i t e d W a r s

This months theme Limited Wars in South Asia: Againsta Nuclear Backdrop is by itself a controversial topicgiven that Pakistan believes it has shut any window

of opportunity that may have existed for a conventionallystronger India to exploit by officially unveiling itsbomb-in-the-basement programme in May, 1998 andthreatening that its nukes will be used in a First Strike mode.

India, on the other hand had clearly followed everymajor move by Pakistan to go nuclear at any cost

including, as the progenitor of the concept of Islamic Bomb former Prime MinisterZulfikar Ali Bhutto put it, eating grass if necessary. It was acutely aware of the transferof nuclear weapons technology from China to Pakistan, including blueprints forminiaturised warheads to be fitted on surface-to-surface missiles to be supplied byNorth Korea. Hence its unequivocal refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty(CTBT) that would have foreclosed Indias nuclear option and left the China-Pakistancollusive intent to hold sway in the emerging geopolitics. One cannot but recall withclarity the steely delivery of Indias Ambassador to the Conference on DisarmamentArundhati Ghosh who told the world in no uncertain terms that India would notsign the CTBT Not now, not ever!

Keeping a sharp eye on the ongoing China-Pak nuclear collusion, successive Indiangovernments from Indira Gandhi, who ordered the first nuclear test in 1974 to ensurethat India had got it right, up to the moment the Atal Behari Vajpayee led BJP coalitiongovernment decided to keep its election promise to exercise the nuclear option, withthree underground tests in Pokhran in the Rajasthan desert on 11 May 1998 followedby two on 13 May, all had made sure that India would not be caught napping. Thefinal straw may well have been the testing by Pakistan of a North Korean suppliedmissile in April, 1998. It illustrated that Pakistan now had both the bomb and the meansof delivery. In the face of American and its western allies attempt to put pressure onIndia to sign the CTBT even in the presence of so much evidence that Pakistan hadbeen pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme with extensive help fromforeign sources India remained steadfast on its nuclear option. The fact that Pakistanconducted five tests on 28 May showed that American expert Leonard Spector whohad said as early as in 1987 that Pakistans bomb-in-the-basement project was justtwo screwdriver turns away from completion was bang on target and that the Indiantests forced Pakistan to also go public.

With proven nuclear warheads and the means of delivery in its arsenal Pakistansmilitary establishment which has exclusive control of the project decided to takeadvantage of its newfound nuclear parity with India. Gen Musharraf dusted out anold plan to occupy the Kargil heights and threaten to disrupt the Leh supply line to theSiachen Glacier. He did just that and India did not discover the treachery for severalmonths. When it did, it responded with all its conventional weapons and within twomonths had rolled back the Pakistani Army Northern Light Infantry troops with

devastating effect on the Pakistani psyche.

The Kargil campaign highlighted the possibility of a limited war betweennations armed with nuclear weapons. Since then there has been heated debate andcold-blooded analyses about how deep Indian troops could penetrate Pakistani territorybefore Islamabad responds with nuclear weapons; how long would it be that the warescalated into a nuclear exchange between the two countries leading to what is knownas Mutual Assured Destruction or, appropriately, MAD.

In this editionDSA has once again brought before the Indian public a consolidatedready backgrounder on the whole gamut of issues involved in the concept oflimited war in the sub-continental context including one that says that for too long wehave allowed Pakistans nuclear deterrence to work to the detriment of Indian nationalinterests in Jammu and Kashmir.

Wishing our readers happy reading and an even happier and secure 2012.

Jai Hind!

xv do

The onset of limited wars

The country comes first - always and every time.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM

pawan agrawal

On the eve of its second Anniversary the DSA had held a path breaking Seminar onLimited Wars in South Asia: Against a Nuclear Backdrop. Three former Service Chiefs, aformer Foreign Secretary and Director, Centre for Air Power Studies had participated. The

Seminar was attended by young parliamentarians and a host of serving and retired service officersto include the CISC, DGMT and DGPP.

In this Issue we are publishing the highlights of the Seminar and a number of incisive articleson this theme by very senior retired officers and well known academics including one from the S Rajaratnam SInternational Studies, Singapore.

This is a live and burning issue. We may well have to fight Limited Wars against Pakistan or China or both. Thwill be fought against a Nuclear backdrop. The formulation that we will continue to prepare for a general conflicttwo World Wars) and that preparation can take care of any lesser contingency will not work anymore. Gen Maxwelof the US Army was emphatic on this subject. A Limited War fought against a nuclear backdrop has its own charaand limitations and requires very specific force structuring and preparation. A generalised, one size fits all, solutnot work in all cases related to limited wars. The Chinese are crystal clear on this subject. Since 1978, paramounDeng Xiaoping had come to the clear-cut determination that general global wars were a thing of the past and heChina would structure its armed forces and prepare to fight only Local Wars. The nature of these Local (or Limiteevolved in the Chinese perception to first "local wars fought under high-tech conditions" and now under what i"conditions of informatisation".

Today there is a vital need for wide-ranging and participative debate in India about the nature and characteristwars that we are likely to fight. There is a need to enunciate a Declaratory Doctrine for Limited wars that spells determination to uphold our vital national interests even against a nuclear backdrop and synergises the response othe three services but ensures a whole of the government approach to such situations.

We need to war game a series of response options and escalation ladders for such Limited Conflicts. The CCS wilaccord approval in principle for such contingencies in peacetime itself so that the transition to a limited war is smwell thought through and Escalation Dominance is ensured. There is an urgent need for India to field dominant convwar fighting capabalities in South Asia to generate credible response options to Pakistans asymmetric adventuChinese attempts at hegemonism. Our response so far has been characterised by an unexplicable meekness and timiarms acquisition process has been badly hobbled by inordinate delays and huge time and cost overruns and is procea glacial pace. This process will need to be speeded up urgently.

The deliberations of the Seminar and articles by many retired senior officers on this issue provide food for that will help us crystallise a Doctrine for Limited wars which is long overdue. We will have to go beyond ColLand Power centric approach and examine conflict initiation options that rely more on the far more flexible aAir Power and Sea Power to set the stage for such a conflict. We need to examine the nature of such a confmodus operandi and desired end states. We need to war game scenarios as escalation ladder generators and help ourclass overcome its astonishing diffidence and meekness in the face of external challenges.

Cold Fusion presents a revolutionary new form of energy which we must exploit to create a demassified / dis

energy grid that takes us beyond the fossil fuel era. As a vibrant civilisation we need to invest in this path breakinnow. This issue has a very interesting article on Table Top Fusion.

16th December was the 40th Anniversary of our landmark victory in the 1971 war that led to the birth of Banglaneed to learn our lessons from that seminal conflict which has crystallised the Indian way of war characterised by infodominance, the offensive use of asymmetric warfare to break the adversaries balance, methodical preparation andexecution based on shock and awe generated by massing effects. Lt Gen Jacob, one of the prime architects of therecounts the inside details of the war in this issue.

We would avidly look forward to your feedback on all these vital subjects and hope to kick-start a participawide-ranging debate in the country.

January 2012 Defence AnD security Alert

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for online edition log on to: www.dsalert.org

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Volume 3 Issue 4 January 2012

Limited Wars in South Asia ISSUE January 2012

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4 January 2012 Defence AnD security Alert January 2012 Defence AnD security Alert

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IstherespaceforaLimitedWarinSo

uthAsiabetweenthespectral endsof

Nuclearexchangeandsub-convention

alprovocations?

IfsowhatformshouldsuchaLimited

Wartake?Whatwouldbethedesir

stateandobjectives?Whatwouldbe

theprimarylimitations?Whatshould

modusoperandi?Whatwouldbethem

eanstoensureescalationdomin

suchaconict.Howdoweensureco

nictterminationonourterms?

IndiasDefenceMinistrysAnnualRepo

rtshavestatedthatIndiawouldpre

ageneralwar(alaWorldWarIorII)a

ndsuchpreparationcouldtakecar

lessercontingency.This is adeeply

awedapproach. LimitedWars havea

dialecticandneedspecicdoctrine,p

reparation,forcestructuresandtrain

ChinesePLA is specically preparin

gandstructuredfor LocalWarsor

Wars.

Keepingtheabove inview isthereaneedfor Indiatoenunciate

ade

DoctrineforLimitedWar againstanucl

ear backdrop?What shouldbethe

contoursofsuchadoctrine?

AnniversarySeminarofDefencean

dSecurityAlert(DSA)mag04November20

11attheConstitutionClub,NewD

LIMITEDWARS

INSOUTHASIA

Someexcerptsfromthew

elcomeaddre

AGAINSTANUCLEARBACKD

RO

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General V P Malik

SM, AVSM, VSM (retd)

KeynOte ADDress

may be several

s where both the

and the affected nation

ted to use conventional

and forces. The initiator

ed to give it a greater

th conventional forces

e the desired results, as

ned in 1947, 1965. In the

gil war, it did so despite

ear weapons capability.

ther hand, the affected

hen pushed to the wall,

its conventional forces

the proxy war into the

her than fight with all

ations of a no war no

uation. Pakistan did in

almost did in 2002.

Following is the text of the keynote address given by GeneralV P Malik, Former Chief of Army Staff during theKargil conflict at Anniversary Seminar of DSA onLimited Wars in South Asia: Against a Nuclear Backdrop.

LIMITED WARS IN SOUTH ASIAAGAINST A NUCLEAR BACKDROP

Ved Prakash Malik

d charge of the

Army, as the 19th

of Army Staff, on

ember 1997. He was

ed with the Param

Seva Medal (PVSM)

. He took over as

n of the Chiefs of Staff

ee with effect fromanuary 1999. He

ated and oversaw

nning and execution

peration Vijay to

fully defeat Pakistans

ed intrusion in

rgil sector during

uly 1999.


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Amb Dr Kanwal Sibal

This is the text of the talk by Ambassador (Dr) Kanwal Sibal,

former Foreign Secretary. It is remarkable for its analytical andvery clear-headed approach to the subject of limited wars inSouth Asia whether against China or Pakistan or both andprovides an invaluable civilian perspective to this vital issue.

Amb Dr Kanwal Sibal

the Indian Foreign Serv

1966. He reached the h

position in the Indian Fo

Service on his appoin

as Foreign Secretary t

Government of India

July 2002 to November

He is a member of I

National Security AdBoard. He is on the

of Directors of the New

based East-West Institu

is on the Advisory Bo

the Vivekanand Interna

Foundation. He has re

the high distinction of

Ofcier of the Ordre du

from France.

Limited Wars in South Asia:

A civilian Perspective

India has been ble

terrorism from Pakista

almost two decades and Even when dramatic attac

place against our Parliame

later in Mumbai, India

not take even limited reta

military action for fear

conflict escalating into a n

stand-off. This gives Pak

fairly free hand theoretic

use the terrorist weapon

us at a time of its choosing

liMiteD OPtiOns

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Air Cmde Jasjit Singh

AVSM, VrC, VM (retd)

the present trends in

military modernisation,

oncluded with a degree

ence that its future wars

ely to remain in keeping

centrality of local-border

s military doctrine; and

h more likely to shift

limited war where its

missile power are much

ely to be employed on

ge strikes with precision

, though on land it may

the local-border war

Following is the text of the talk given by Air Cmde

Jasjit Singh AVSM, VrC, VM (retd), Director of Centre for Air

Power Studies, New Delhi at Anniversary Seminar ofDSA on

Limited Wars in South Asia: Against a Nuclear Backdrop.

LIMITED WAR: Some Doctrinal Issue

iter is Director of

or Air Power Studies,

lhi. He is Fellow of

Academy of Science

and has been awarded

dma Bhushan for a

s contribution to

security and defence.

theOreticAl AsPects


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Amb Arundhati Ghosh

ready friable situation

be exacerbated to

le levels if the state

ollowing the trends

Pakistani society,

a theocratic intolerant

nt on the establishment

liphate in the region.

litary and non-state

re certain to have been

ned by India having

erred in 1999, following

il attack, in 2001 after

ck on Parliament and

n Parakram and more

2008, after the attack

bai. Would India react

y in the event of another

type attack?

An excellent civilian perspective onthe aspect of Limited wars against aNuclear backdrop. India is perhapsthe only country that faces thechallenges arising from having twonuclear neighbours, who closelycooperate with each others nuclearprogrammes and who maintainadversarial relations with her. Anuclear-weapon enabled terroristthreat is supported by strong andconsistent denials of culpabilityfor any such non-state attackand a reliance on its protector

and mentor, China, to handle theinevitable diplomatic furore thatis bound to rise if the taboo onnuclear weapons is broken withhowever limited an application.It would appear that Pakistan hasadopted a policy of battlefielduse of its nuclear weapons, alikely escalation of a conventionalconfrontation to a nuclear level,arrangements for rapid deploymentwhich could entail pre-delegationto unit commanders in the event ofa loss of communications, (whichis what apparently happened atSalala recently when 24 Pakistanisoldiers were killed in an ISAFair attack on two border posts).She asserts that there is a need to

slightly tweak our nuclear doctrine;the objective would be not tochange our No First Use policy,but to revert to the language of theDraft doctrine on the question ofretaliatory strikes - these should bepunitive rather than massive asnow exists. Lastly, she makes thevery bold assertion that in orderto disillusion the adversary of ourintent to retaliate, the control of theweapons should be placed squarelywith the Strategic Forces Command.

ter joined the Indian

Service in 1963 and

n various capacities in

stry of External Affairs

dian missions abroad.

incharge of economic

s when economic

were launched in

erved in the Branch

iat of the Ministry towith the Bangladesh

ment - in - exile in

during the birthpangs

nation-state. Served

bassador in Egypt,

orea and as Permanent

ntative to UNESCO

the UN Ofces in

As Ambassador to the

nce on Disarmament in

she etched in indelible

he sovereign resolve

ndian nation never to

Comprehensive Test

aty (CTBT). Her words

ate in Indian hearts to

She told the world in

ed, authoritative tones

a would never sign the

Not now! Not ever!.

nuclear neighbourhood:

challenges for India

PrAGMAtic enGAGeMent


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ey is the rapid fielding

matching conventional

ies. These will undo

s conventional

ce dialectic and forge the

mind space for waging

d War. What should be

of such a Limited War?

be simply to raise costs

mmetric adventurism

chieve deterrence by

ent. The aim should

terrain oriented but

ented. It should aim to

e adversarys strategic

erational reserves to

n his own territory

grade them seriously.

d aim at destroying /

g his infrastructure

r and decimating the

This is the text of the welcome Address delivered by theExecutive Editor of theDSA at the inauguration of the Seminaron Limited Wars in South Asia. It sets out the issues fordebate and discussion in perspective and flags the aspectsthat merit much deeper study and analysis. It highlights thecrying need for India to enunciate a Declaratory Doctrine forLimited Wars Against a Nuclear Backdrop. It also decries the,one size fits all approach of preparing for a general, totalconflict that can cater for any lesser contingencies. The Chinesehave emphatically recognised that the era of general wars isover and we need to prepare today for Local / Limited warsunder conditions of nuclear symmetry.

aj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi

SM, VSM (retd)

riter is a combat

of many skirmishes

Line of Control and

terrorist operations

mu and Kashmir and

He subsequently

ded the reputed

Force during intensive

terrorist operations in

ouri-Poonch districts.served two tenures

highly prestigious

ateGeneral of Militaryons. He is a prolic

on matters military

on-military and has

ed 24 books and

00 papers in many

ous research journals.

so Executive Editor of

and Security Alert

agazine.

LIMITED WARSIN SOUTH ASIA:

AGAINST A NUCLEAR BACKDROP

WelcOMe ADDress


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antonu Choudhry (retd)

iter retired as Vice

of Army Staff in

2005. He has served

Military Operations

Military Intelligence

ates and has been

tructor in Defence

s Staff College. He is a

ead ofcer who writes

y on national security.

some guesstimate

has approximately

120 warheads with

e number of delivery

in the shape of aircraft

rent varieties of nuclear

missiles including the

aheen I and Shaheen II.

they have developed /

ed cruise missiles Babur

ad which are nuclear

With enhanced capacity

uction of weapon grade

m they are in a position

four to six warheads

ar to their stockpile. To

latest vector which has

ded is a Tactical Missile

Nasr which Pakistan

s nuclear capable. This

has been tested during

exercise by Pak forces.

ly this also implies

y have in all likelihood,

out miniaturisation of

ear systems to be fitted

NasrMissile which are

to be highly mobile and

mounted

A highly cerebral former Vice Chief of the Army reflects uponthe recent introduction of Nasr Tactical Nuclear Missiles bythe Pak Army. He feels this constitutes a paradigm shift whichcalls for a rethinking of our nuclear and conventional war-fighting Doctrines. Pakistan has enough land based missilesto carry out such a first strike by launching Tactical NuclearWeapons, either as a demonstrative one or on a tactical targetto inflict sufficient damage to own troops and concentrationswhich are purely military in nature and thus be termed asCounter Troop. In all likelihood such a strike would be onIndian soil but be termed as defensive. He feels that thecurrent Indian doctrinal position of a full fledged Indiancounter value response to such tactical nuclear use may not

be viable. He recommends instead a matching response withown tactical warheads which will enable own conventionaloffensives to proceed apace.

tActicAl nuKes


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Lt Gen V R Raghavan

M, UYSM, AVSM (retd)

writer was Indias

General of Military

ons from 1992 to 1994.

urrently a Director at

hi Policy Group. He

n a visiting fellow at

nter for International

and Cooperation,

d University, USA.

d pointed out that

pid escalation to win

would probably risk

nflict, gradual escalation

volve the United States

racted and costly war.

red no solutions, but

y pointed out the fallacy

ng into the Vietnam

hout a clear purpose.

the most important

of Vietnam came from

Summers. His main

t concerning limited

that in Korea, while the

States limited its

s, it did not limit its

attain those objectives.

very resource available

an nuclear weapons.

ther hand, in Vietnam,

ed States reversed the

and consequently

price of a long war and

defeat

A highly perceptive article by a former DGMO and well knownMilitary analyst on the theme of Limited wars in South Asia.This article examines the possibility of limited war betweenIndia and Pakistan and the potential of such a conflict triggeringa nuclear war. It examines the considerations that could pusheach of the two countries to fight a limited war. It discusseshow such a war might be waged and the circumstances thatwould likely precipitate an escalation to a nuclear exchange.The doctrinal beliefs and decision making processes of thetwo countries are examined to trace the likely escalatory spiraltowards a nuclear war. The ar ticle concludes that the probabilityof a nuclear war between India and Pakistan is high in theevent the two countries engage in a direct military conflict.

Limited War and Escalation in

South Asia

DOctrinAl cOntrADictiOns


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Roger Rose took over as Chief Executive, Lockheed Martin India Private Ltd inAugust 2009. In this position, he is responsible for all Lockheed Martin corporatebusiness in the South Asia region that includes India, Sri Lanka, Nepal and theMaldives.

DSA: You have been the Chief Executive Officer, Lockheed Martin India Priv ate Limited, since 2009. How do yo u visualisehe business opportunities in the Indian Market?

Roger Rose:Lockheed Martin is pursuing a range of programmes in India and sees business opportunities across sectors.Our priority is to execute the contracts that we have signed. We have delivered the C-130Jto the Indian Air Force ahead ofchedule and significantly under-budget. This was an FMS sale. We have received a request for additional six C-130Js.

Lockheed is part of the Apache team in which Boeing i s the lead. We have the mission and missile systems on the platform.We are looking forward to a closure o n that contract. We are also part of the team wi th Raytheon onJavelin missiles. This willbe another FMS programme and we are currently at the Letter of Request (LoR) stage. The Indian Army has not only seenhe missile firing during Exercise Yudh Abhyaas in which the US Army had brought theJavelin, but also fired it. There is a lotf interest in Javelin in the Indian Army. Lockheed is also looking at offerings for Coastal and Homeland Security. We havelso offered theMH60R to the Indian Navy.

We have been talking about naval combat system. The Indian Navy has been looking at creating aircraft carrier battlegroups. The best system to protect a carrier battle group is the Aegis Combat System. It is a mature, developed system whichhas been there for 30 years and the only one that can stop an incoming modern missile system.

DSA: Lockheed Martins presence in the Indian m arket is more than 20 years now. What measures and strategies are beingormulated to strengthen and better support Indias Military Sector?

RR: Lockheed Martin has maintained a presence in New Delhi for more than 20 years. With the Indian economygrowing at more than 8 per cent and the simultaneous strengthening of the Indo-US relationship in the past decade,Lockheed Martin has increased its presence in India. In 2005, the Corpo ration expanded its office to better supp ort the IndianMinistry of Defence (MoD) and its global security needs.

Recently, Lockheed Martin has aggressively pursued opportunities for all three military services (Navy, Army andAir Force) apart from civil applications in the fields of renewable energy and civil aviation. Lockheed Martins sale of sixC-130Jspecial mission transports to the Indian Air Force (IAF) in 2008 represented the first major military deal between thewo countries.

DSA: India is strenuously trying to build a Military Industrial Complex in the Private sector. What role can LM play inctualising this vision. What partnerships, if any, do you have in mind?

RR: Tata LM Aerostructures Pvt Ltd, our joint venture with Tata Group, is our fi rst initiative in this direction. This will addignificantly to defence manufacturing capabilities in the country. We are always looking at more opportunities where wean partner with domestic industry to build lasting partnerships.

DSA: Indias Offset Policy is designed to help build capacities for military production in our private sector. How effectives this policy? What can LM do to promote the growth of a Military Industrial Complex in our Private sector via this route?

RR: Indias offset policy is evo lving. We at Lockheed Martin have a lot of experience in executing offsets and I am su re thatwe can work with Indian industry to create a win-win situation for all stakeholders.

India is fast becoming part of the global supply chain of some of the biggest defence suppliers in the world. Indias

potential as a manufacturing hub in the aerospace and defence sector is just being realised. India is a very importaattractive destination for a company such as Lockheed Martin which is interested in a long-term partnership witindustry and services.

We share the thirst for technological innovation The Indian software industry has developed skills and expertiare applied to such varied sectors as banking, insurance, financial applications and artificial intelligence. We recogIndian industry and research facilities are promising partners for us in this strategically critical field.

Lockheed Martin is committed to a long-term partnership in technology development, manufacturing and scollaboration in third markets with Indian companies from both the public and private sectors. Its broad-based portaddress important Indian requirements in defence, security and delivery of vital public services. Lockheed Martiunmatched performance record in establishing partnerships with industry.

DSA:Lockheed Martins sale of six C-130Jspecial mission transports to the Indian Air Force (IAF) in 2008 represefirst major military deal between the two countries. What are the other deals in the pipeline?

RR: In addition to the sale of six C-130Jspecial mission aircraft, LM also provided turnkey infrastructure to the IAa separate commercial contract. We have since then sold equipment for a Naval programme to MDL and are close to award with the IAF on two other programmes - as prime in one case and jointly with another US company in secondwith substantial LM work share. Beside these, we are also looking at contract award for additional six C 130Jspecialaircraft under FMS programme for which a letter of request was received on 16 September.

DSA:What are the prospects of LM in the Civil Aviation Sector in India, considering the increasing fleet size and eprivate airlines?

RR: Every day across the globe, 60 per cent of the worlds commercial air traffic is monitored and controLockheed Martin air traffic control systems - systems that are powerful, advanced and completely reliable. Lockheedknows how to work with governments worldwide in a way thats fiscally sound and we are accountable for genstrong results.

We provide the experience, technology and financing to bring the most modern and efficient operations to traffic customers in the United States and worldwide. To meet tomorrows growth in global travel, we are devnext-generation systems today to modernise airspace management. Our systems offer air traffic controllers flexiblecollaborative decision-making, conflict resolution tools and more accurate and timely surveillance information, all oleads to safer skies.

Lockheed Martin provides tools for ground surveillance monitoring, coordination between airport service peand the air navigation and management of aircraft in the taxiways and runways. Our hub and ramp managemenintegrates surveillance data, collaborative decision making tools and airline legacy systems into a single automatedThe system helps airline operations managers and air traffic controllers improve the efficiency of their operatiosecurity systems protect the entire aviation infrastructure.

DSA: The US, which lost a bid for US$ 11 billion contract for 126 war planes, has now offered India partnershdevelopment of the worlds most advanced flying machine, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Can you elaborate on this

RR: Sale of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is an issue to be addressed by the Indian and US governments. As an OEMaircraft, we will be happy to support the decision made by the two governments.

DSA: In a recent development the Pentagon has notified the US Congress about the possibility of a US$ 1.2 billwith India for six more C-130J Super Hercules heavy-lift aircraft in addition to six ordered for the same price in 20comments

RR: The original programme to provide India with a highly advanced airlift capability set a new benin international defence cooperation. The acquisition, under the US Foreign Military Sales programme,C-130J Super Hercules called for the highest levels of cooperation between our countries governments, the United StForce and Lockheed Martin. I am happy to say that the levels of cooperation achieved resulted in India receiving its oriaircraft well ahead of schedule and under cost. As we see the capabilities and flexibility of this proven aircraft put to the teIndian Air Force, I know there are many more roles and missions out there that can be met by the C-130Jand we lookto many decades of IAF C-130 operations around the world.

DSA:Where do you place LM in the next 5 years in India?

RR: We expect much larger footprint for LM in India in the next five years with our top end solutions for thAir Force, Navy, Army and the Coast Guard. In addition, we also hope to work with Paramilitary organisations, NDisaster Management Organisation, DPSUs and the private sector defence industry to meet the emerging requirethe fields of aerospace, defence and internal security.

interVieW


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Conventional Wars and the

Shadow Face

Admiral Vijay Shankar

PVSM, AVSM (retd)

emergence of the

generation of warfare

calculus and how its

has twisted the very

of warfare. In the

of stakes normal to

non state actors bring

hem disproportionate

ve powers. They

primordial threat that

y be countered by

tive action

A former C-in-C of the Strategic Forces Command reflectsupon the linkages between conventional warfare and nuclearwarfare. He avers that the dynamics that condition militaryconflicts are largely predicated on the two faces of warfare. Theprimary face as defined by conventional forces and the shadowface as circumscribed by strategic nuclear forces. Application ofthe former is an active art while the latter scripts the perimeterand imposes cut-offs. To bring about a modicum of stabilitygiven a tinderbox situation, diplomacy backed by militaryforce would provide the necessary means of arbitration. Thecoming of non state actors into the picture muddies the waters.Since their stakes in orthodox relations between states do notexist, their potential to cause destruction is extremely high.In dealing with such conditions the state must be preparedto take pre-emptive action and should the need arise, enable

counterforce capabilities to prevent nuclear weapons fallinginto wrong hands.

writer holds an

n Defence Studies

a graduate of the

War College,

, Rhode Island,

He is the former

of the Andaman

Nicobar Command,

f the Strategic Forces

nd and Flag Ofcernding Western Fleet.

mand and operational

nce are comprehensive

clude Command of

at the aircraft carrier.

member of the adjunct

f the National Institute

anced Studies and

rently tenants the

Katari Chair of

ce at the United

s Institute.

AsPerOus reAlities


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LANDMARK LTD CROSSWORDSPENCERS OM BOOK SHOPODYSSEY

A N N O U N C E SFebruary 2012 Issue on

The First and the Only ISO 9001:2008 Certified Defence and Security Magazine in Ind

Jointness, Synergy and Crafting Vibrant Defence Industrial Base

Available at all leading bookstores

aom

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Dr Rajendra Prasad

imited war theorists

any times emphasised

isks of escalation would

war limited. Arguably,

, contradictory it may

he danger of escalation

the underlying reasons

rategy of Limited War

Deterrence and also

Deterrence fails, there is

lity of holding a conflict

A strategy of limited

tributes to Deterrence

very reason generally

ainst it

Indian formulations of limitedwar are to a great extent basedon the same consensus that thelimited war theorists of theUnited States had in the 1950sand 60s. According to Kissinger,a Limited War is fought forspecific political objectives,which by their existence, tend toestablish a relationship betweenthe force employed and the goal tobe attained. It reflects an attemptto affect the opponents will notto crush it, to make the conditions

imposed seem more attractivethan continued resistance, tostrive for specific goals and notfor complete annihilation. Theconcept of India engaging ina Limited War with Pakistangained primacy following theKargil conflict in the nuclearisedpolitico-strategic milieu ofSouth Asia. The primary aim ofLimited War is to infict damagesor to pose risks for the enemy outof proportion to the objectivesunder contention. Henry Kissingeraptly argues that the restraintwhich keeps a war limitedis a psychological one; theconsequences of a limited victoryor a limited defeat or a stalemate- the three possible outcomes of a

limited war - must seem preferableto the consequences of an all-outwar. If Pakistan could initiate andfinalise a limited war on Indiansoil, could the latter repeat thesame on the formers soil? Indiassuccess [in Kargil] was due to theability of our defence forces tofight and win such a limited warat a time, ground and means offighting chosen by the aggressor.Success would be more likely ifthe initiative lay with India.

Preventing Armageddon:Search for a New Strategy

er is Professor in the

ent of Defence and

c Studies (DDSS) and

aculty of Science, DDU

ur University, UP,

cArDinAl OBJectiVes


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Dr M Srinivasan

rm Low Energy Nuclear

s (LENR) is increasingly

ed as a more appropriate

efer to nuclear reactions

ke place under special

ns when certain metals

r mixtures) such as

m, Nickel, Titanium,

m etc. are made to absorb

antities of Deuterium or

n on the surface

A path breaking article on Table-Top Nuclear power via Cold Fusionor Low Energy Nuclear Reactions which could generate a revolution inEnergy generation. A maverick Italian engineer-inventor Andrea Rossi haddemonstrated a 10 KWth cold fusion reactor at the University of Bologna,in Italy on 14th January 2011. This novel Ni-H LENR reactor which has beennamed by Rossi as Energy Catalyser or E-Cat for short, was fuelled withjust one gram of Nickel nano powder exposed to pressurised hydrogengas.

A practical embodiment of the inventive apparatus, installed onOctober 16, 2007, is at present perfectly operating 24 hours per day andprovides an amount of heat sufficient to heat the factory of the CompanyEON at Bondeno in Italy. Imagine having a new source of clean energywhich is decentralised (needs no electrical grid), does not require Uraniumor Plutonium, does not produce any radioactive waste products nor nuclearradiation, does not leave any carbon footprint and is mass manufacturedand sold in the market place as a common consumer product!

A Silent Revolution in Nuclear Science appears to have indeed takenplace behind the backs of our nuclear scientists. In the USA the DefenseAdvanced Projects Agency (DARPA), the Defense Threat ReductionAgency (DTRA) and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) have all beenquietly funding Cold Fusion / LENR research for the past several years.This could turn out to be a significant game changer that can revolutionisethe field of Energy and take us beyond the fossil fuel era to a new andde-massified energy future. DRDO must take a look at this breakthroughtechnology.

Silent Revolution in Nuclear Science

y Associate Director,

Group, BARC,

the writer is from

batch of the BARC

school. He served as

or Physicist and an

ental Nuclear Physicist

, Mumbai for 40 years

to 1997). His

sation was in thearea of Nuclear Science

hnology, focusing on

ysics of Fission Chain

ns and Fusioning

. At the time of his

nt he was Head,

Physics Division of

and also Associate

of its Physics Group.

n contributions were

design, construction

xperimentation with

e Purnima series of

ental nuclear reactors

mbay and played a

in the 1974 Pokhran

explosion experiment.

s responsible for

g Fusion Plasma

ents culminating

building of the huge

Capacitor Bank Facility

rnima laboratories.

he last seven years of

arch career at BARC

deeply involved in the

the controversial new

Cold Fusion.

The writer of this article has just learnt that Dr P K Iyengar,former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, passedaway on 21st December 2011. He would like to dedicatethis article to the memory of Dr Iyengar as he had thecourage and conviction to stand by the early BARC results(1989 to 1995) which confirmed the occurrence of Nuclearreactions in deuterated metallic samples. In recent months hewas very happy to learn of the development of the Ni-H Rossireactor and the imminent commercialisation of Cold Fusion /LENR and has thus passed on with the feeling that his stand

has been fully vindicated!

tABle-tOP nucleAr enerGy!


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Anna Louise Strachan

wing India and

s nuclear tests in

stakes in the conflict

the two countries were

ntly raised. However,

eve that there is a real

of nuclear conflict

rrorist elements are able

re a nuclear weapon.

g the nuclear weapons

ia and Pakistan became

d in the 1999 Kargil

cording to Chandran,

ict constituted a limited

onal war and served to

the fact that a limited

ween India and Pakistan

ible

A cogently argued article that suggests that there are chances ofpeace breaking out between India and Pakistan and as such theoption of a Limited Conventional War can be ruled out. Someargue that this is the only way to compel Pakistan to containjihadi elements undertaking terrorist activities within Indiasborders. However, the writer cites Ganguly and Kapur to pointout, Pakistan may simply be lacking the capacity to eliminatejihadi groups. She feels it is much wiser to create a situationwhereby the economic costs of supporting jihadi groups faroutweigh the benefits of supporting them. Economic andCommercial Cooperation talks between the countries, she feelshave been progressing at an unprecedented rate. She concludescautiously that there are likely to be many setbacks and giventhe intractable nature of the India-Pakistan conflict the road

to peace will be a long one. However, she feels that at a timewhen there is room for cautious optimism it makes sense toembrace the possibility of a peaceful resolution. The editorsare constrained to point out that far too many previous Indianattempts to seek peace have ended up on the battlefield due tothe intransigence of the Military-ISI complex of Pakistan andhence keeping ones options open may be far more prudent.Pak militarys current endorsement of the peace process maybe purely Tactical to seek a free hand in shaping Post-USwithdrawal Afghanistan to Indias extreme discomfiture.

ter is a PhD scholar

S Rajaratnam School

rnational Studies in

re. She also holds

in Asian Politics from

and a BA in Middle

Studies from the

ty of Exeter in the UK.

arch interests include

resolution, electoraland UN peacekeeping.

cAutiOus OPtiMisM


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Barry Bharathan (retd)

er is former Vice Chief

Staff. He also served

an Naval Attache in

gton DC, USA.

to not a single conflict

ndicated the reason

initiation. All players

realise that military

ent would perforce be

duration with enormous

c impact along with

r present possibility

ation into the nuclear

n. More critically

ion, by USA, Russia

r countries is bound to

nhibiting influence on a

to miitary engagement.

to have a battle. It is

have a futile one with

for any one

The writer, a former Vice Admiral with a penchant for out of the bsolutions, contends that there is no scope for a Limited war in South AsHe asserts that hitherto not a single conflict has vindicated the reason fits initiation. All players perhaps realise that military engagement wouperforce be of short duration with enormous economic impact along withe ever present possibility of escalation into the nuclear dimension. Mocritically intercession, by USA, Russia and other countries is bound to haan inhibiting influence on a military to military engagement. It is bad have a battle. It is worse to have a futile one with no gains for any one. Havers that economic development alone is the panacea for our ills.

South Asia is like a wounded, lumbering, mad elephant unsure of where it is going. It often tramples

itself. There are many mahouts with different kinds of ankus, anlius or in the vernacular ankusa

for controlling the pachyderm. The two most inimical neighbours, India and Pakistan are declared

nuclear weapons states. However they are still nascent nuclear militaries. China is a robust

military nuclear / conventional power in comparison. It has the unique ability of being the most

strident of the mahouts, with pervasive influence in the region. The current security environment

is simmering, just at the boil thanks to the unstable, volatile, Nobody really in charge situation

in Pakistan. The degraded Afghan angst, the ham handed American / NATO approach, US-

Pakistan misperceptions, Taliban resurgence, the high probability of nuclear installations falling

into terrorist hands and lastly the Indo-Afghanistan stand alone relationship seem to vindicate

THE LIE OF THE LIMITED WAR in the Sub-continent. The enigmatic Chinese keep every one

guessing including their ally Pakistan. The Am ericans would eventually bid good bye and l eave

behind a sordid, squalid mess that is already oozing through the pores of the Sub-continent. South

Asian Leadership has simply changed to pleader-ship and dealer-ship.

The writers appeal: This article needs to be read purely on the narrow context of limited war and

security in a nuclear weapons environment.

Lie means falsity. It is also a golfing term signifying the position of the golf ball with reference to

the grass beneath it. Both these are relevant to the concept of Limited war.

THE LIE OF THE LIMITED WAR

GrOunD reAlities


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Remembering Bangladesh

A Historic VictoryF R Jacob PVSM (retd)

divided the area of

ns for the freedom

into sectors. Maj Zia

be responsible for the

ng sector. Major Khalid

f for Comilla, Maj

for Mymensingh, Wing

der Bashar for Rangpur,

Zaman for Rajshahi,

sman for Kushtia, Maj

Khulna. Tiger Siddiqui

perate from Tangail as

rul Kadar and Toha

The 40th anniversary of the historic victory in Bangladeshfell on 16 December this year. Lt Gen Jacob, former ArmyCdr Eastern Command and one of the prime architects ofthis victory, reminiscences about that text book campaign.It was a classic campaign that saw Indias political andmilitary leadership at its inspired best. In a blitzkrieg ofjust 14 days, a new nation state was created with the force ofarms and over 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war were taken.Gen Jacob highlights the vital role played by the MuktiBahini Guerillas, as also the in-house debates of what shouldbe the centres of gravity of this campaign. Army HQ felt itshould be the entry ports of Khulna and Chittagong, whereasGen Jacob insisted it should be the capital city of Dacca. Hegives a graphic first hand account of the climactic eventsleading to the Pakistani surrender at Dacca.

ter was the Chief of

f Eastern Command

the 1971 war for the

n of Bangladesh. He

ly regarded as one

key architects of that

ular victory. Post

nt, he has served as

ernor of the states of

and Goa.

herOic cAMPAiGn


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Gurmeet Kanwal (retd)

major aim of launching

onally armed military

o action will change from

g the enemy to creating

rily stable favourable

so that negotiations,

mediation, can be

Traditional military

s and aims, that centred

planning for launching

le offensive operations

the enemy, are likely

ge to limiting military

inflicting devastating

on the enemys field

and thus containing

ather than defeating

comprehensively. The

m emerging trend in

e warfare clearly points

limited wars

Today when nations carry out a cost-benefit analysis todetermine whether the achievement of national aims iscommensurate with the likely costs of waging a major war,prudence invariably dictates that if war is unavoidable, itmust remain limited in scope and conduct. It is now wellaccepted in India that future wars in the Indian context arelikely to be limited wars. These will be predominantly landbattles that will spin out of ongoing conflicts on land likethe proxy war being waged by Pakistan against India inJammu and Kashmir and the half-century old militarystand-off along the Line of Control. The Indian doctrinefor limited war must emphasise massive asymmetries offirepower to achieve destruction and degradation of theadversarys war waging potential in a strategic context.

Limited Warin the Indian Context

er is Director, Centre

nd Warfare Studies,

hi. Views are personal.

PrecluDinG escAlAtiOn


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Limited Warsin South Asia:Against the Nuclear Backdrop

Dr Rajiv Nayan

neW PersPectiVe

The writer is a Senior Res

Associate at the Institu

Defence Studies and An

(IDSA), New Delhi since

where he specialises in e

control, non-prolife

and arms control. He

Visiting Research Fell

Japan Institute of Interna

Affairs, Tokyo, wherpublished his monogr

Non-Proliferation Issue

South Asia.

In 1953, Ralf Lapps te

work was the first pub

literature which analyse

possibility of nuclear w

in limited war. Howev

most popular and autho

work was produced

Bernard Brodie in 195

argued for limited and role of nuclear weapons in

Europe to scuttle the com

advantage in the region

Another civilian perspective on the issue of Limited

wars in South Asia. Though the writer rules out alimited Nuclear war as an obvious absurdity, his

view on a conventional conflict against a backdrop

of nuclear symmetry is more nuanced.

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Cecil Victor

Karakoram Highway

ross Pakistan-occupied

is soon to be turned

el collar around Indias

h the addition of a rail

pipelines to fuel Chinese

nism

An out of the box civilian view of breaking the

Stabilty-Instability Paradox in South Asia. The writer suggestsattacking the China-Pakistan linkage via the Karakoram

Highway in PoK. Would this trigger a two-front war? BREAK THE STEEL COLLAR-------------------------------

ter has covered all

th Pakistan as War

ondent and reported

e conict zones in

, Laos and Cambodia

heast Asia as well

Afghanistan. He is

f India: The Security

a.

unliMiteD threAts


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Nitin Gokhale

ter, a journalist with

ars of experience

him in various conict

, is currently NDTVs

and Strategic Affairs

ew shift is aimed at

ening the Armys

es to fight what a

general calls a war

and a half fronts

eference to possible

eous confrontation with

and China in addition

deployed in counter-

cy situation internally

Exercise Sudarshan Shakti was a major Air-Landbattle exercise that would help synergise theresources of the Army and Air Force and enablethe actualisation of capabilities envisionedduring the recent Transformation studyconducted by the present Army Chief prior toassuming charge. Over 60,000 troops and 300tanks are participating in the exercise. For the firsttime the Army successfully used its satellites andUAVs during Sudarshan Shakti to provide areal-time picture and information of the war zoneto battlefield commanders. The shift in outlookand the matching changes in the Army structureare based on a Transformation Study, carried

out by a group of senior generals over the past twoyears. The new shift is aimed at strengtheningthe Armys capabilities to fight a war ontwo and a half fronts. The Indian Army willmove from a Command-based deployment toa theatre command format where the front orthe spearhead will be seamlessly integrated withresources in the depth or the rear.

EXERCISE SUDARSHAN SHAKTVALIDATING DOCTRINE

trAnsfOrMAtiOn


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Maj Gen (Dr) Sheru Thap

SM (retd)

uniQue scenAriO

Indias Unique Security Situation -Two Nuclear Armed Adversaries as Immediate Neighbours.

A succinct article that highlights the dilemmas India wouldbe faced with in a Limited war scenario in South Asia

which could emerge from a collusive threat by China andPakistan. The writer avers that Pak would be keen to useTactical Nuclear weapons and the onus would be on Indiato prevent such an escalation.

The writer is working

multinational inform

technology company

his retirement. He is P

Sino-Indian Relations

contributes regularly

magazines, periodicals

newspapers on Str

Security and Defence r

issues.

SUB-CONTINENTAL

DILEMMA

A future In

conflict will be a

scenario. On one han

of tactical nuclear weapons

is a distinct possibility w

the other our failure will

us to the status of a minor

and we will remain conf

south Asia - exactly what

wants. Our aim should

gain a clear tactical vict

thwarting Pak designs valley while at the sam

not inviting a nuclear st

nightmarish scenario inde

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IFSEC India / Homeland Security India 2011 a resounding success !!!

IFSEC India 2011 was held at Pragati Maidan, New Delhi, India from 08 - 10 December 2011.

Delhi, December 2011: The fifth security exhibition, IFSEC India 2011, turned out to be a thunderous success with thousandsecurity professionals from all over the globe descending on Pragati Maidan, New Delhi, India, during December 8-10. The UnMinister for Home Affairs, Mr P Chidambaram, inaugurated the event.

The exhibition, which was spread over three days from 8th to 10th December, saw over 11,684 trade visitors, which comprileading names from over 250 exhibitors taking the opportunity to present their latest developments to the market, present and gather market intelligence from the various international pavilions from countries such as UK, USA, France, Sweden, Taiwan China.

This year IFSEC India, in partnership with the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (Assocham), featureHomeland Security India conference titled, War against terror- A challenge to our Homeland Security. The conference was a vevent for all homeland and commercial security professionals in both the public and private sector in India. Mr D R KarthikeyPadma Shri, Chairman, ASSOCHAMs National Council on Installations, Premises & Personnel Security (IPPS) delivered the welcoaddress. The conference focused on the advice, solutions and systems required for vigilance and security.

In his welcome address, Shri Karthikeyan said, Homeland Security is the most important aspect that sets the agenda to a secfuture of the country. The event as always has received very positive responses from the industry and I am very excited with the wthe industry is reacting towards the event.

Various associations, supporters, members and sponsors and domestic and international participants along with the strong vissupport contributed to the one of a kind B2B exhibition, which has gained a stronger foothold as the most prominent and imporexhibition on the commercial and homeland security sector in the country.

Amongst the prominent and most reputed industry names in the business of safety and security that were presentthe exhibition viz. ADI, Aditya, ANG India, Arise, Axis, BGI, BOSCH, DVTel, Everfocus, FAAC, Godrej, Gunnebo, HHIKVISION, Honeywell Security, Indigo Vision, Kores, Kufra, LG, Matrix, Miscrosoft, Morpho, NEC, Neural, PanasoSamriddhi Automation (SPARSH), Turbo, Tyco, Vectra Glosec, Verint etc.

HIGHLIGHTS of IFSEC India and Homeland Security India 2011

Indias Largest Exhibition for Commercial, Homeland Security and Fire Technology.

Supported by UK Trade & Investments & APSA- Asian professional Security Association.

Certified by US Commercial Services.

Country pavilions this year from USA, UK, Sweden, France, Taiwan and China.

Over 250 leading Security & Fire Technology Companies exhibiting.

Spread over 15,000 sq mts area.

IFSEC India 2011 aimed at bringing together the security experts from various industries including financial services, infrastructpublic safety, law enforcement retail, realty and hospitality all searching for the latest products and services in the security mar

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dsa alert jan-2012

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