http://www.jstor.orgThe Three Worlds of Merleau-PontyAuthor(s): H. L. Dreyfus and S. J. TodesSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Jun., 1962), pp. 559-565Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2105261Accessed: 23/08/2008 01:52Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. 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For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.DISCUSSION THETHREEWORLDS OF MERLEAU-PONTY Accordingto John Wild in a recent article, the phenomenologist,epito- mized by the later Husserl and exemplifiedbyMauriceMerleau-Ponty, seeks "an accuratedescriptionof the concretephenomenaof the Lebenswelt as theyare experienced and expressed in ordinary language..."1 Merleau- Ponty is doingthis kind of phenomenologywhen he points out in Ph6nome- nologiede la perception2 that I experienceobjects not in the homogeneous space describedby the physical scientist but in a space which is oriented aroundme as subject, and in which I distinguishobjects above and below each other from those merely side byside.3 This isan example of what Prof. Wild calls a"world fact" and thefundamentalphenomenological point he wants to stressin his articleis that "thereis an orderof worldfact which isbound up with ordinarylanguage, and which isquite distinct fromthe differentrangesand levels of scientificfact." 4 From thispointofviewtwoother interpreters ofMerleau-Ponty, Michael Kullman andCharles Taylor, haveutterly misunderstoodthe purpose ofMerleau-Pontyandof phenomenology whentheyoppose phenomenologicaldescriptiontodescriptionof theeveryday world and claim: "The Phenomenologyof Perceptionisfor Merleau-Pontythedis- covery and explorationof the world not such as everyday and scientific discourse describe itbutofthe'pre-objectiveworld' which itpresup- poses." 5 Taylor and Kullmanjustify their assimilationof the Lebenswelt to the pre-objectiveworld, and their subsequentoppositionof the world describedby phenomenologyto the worldof everyday,as follows: Husserl characterizedphenomenologyas "a return to the things themselves." This watchword must not be misinterpreted.Itdoes not mean a return to things in the 1"Is there a World ofOrdinaryLanguage?," The PhilosophicalReview, Oct. 1958, p. 460. 2Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phen'omnologie de laperception,Paris:1945, hereafter citedasPP. 3Op. cit.,p.470. 4 Ibid.,p.465. 5 "The pre-objective world ofMaurice Merleau-Ponty," The Philo8ophicalReview, Oct. 1958, p. 108. 559 560PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH objective world (i.e.,such astheyare described ineveryday andscientific dis- course): if it did, phenomenologywould be superfluous. Itmeans rather, a return to things such as they are, or appear to be in our "original"experienceof them, be- fore theyhaveacquired thedeterminacy thateveryday and scientific discourse presupposethem to have.6 How can Wild'sobservationthat Merleau-Pontyis describingthe world ofordinary experience inordinary language bereconciled withthis theoretical denial of the value of such adescriptionand theclaim that Merleau-Ponty'smondeve'cuis not identicalwith but ratheropposedto the worldof everydayexperience? Acareful studyofPhenomnnologiedelaperceptionreveals various distinguishablebut inseparablelevels of analysisstartingfroma fundieren- de 7 analysisof the structureof appearing,progressingthroughan analysis of the way in which things and personsappearin the worldwe live in, and terminatingwith an analysisof the way in which objective thought posits an ideal reconciliationof the contradictionsor ambiguitiesof appearance. Merleau-Pontycarriesout his analysisin terms of a distinctionbetween "figure"and "ground."At the first level, that of fundierendeexperience, consciousnessfollowsout the solicitationsof a given figureinto its ground and uncoversa new figurethere, only at the priceof the old figurepassing back into the ground from which the new figure is uncovered.Therefore there are at this level no unified perspectives,there is no recollection,no recognition,no organizationof stable schemataor categoriesas unities in respect towhich diversity andchange occur; there isnodistinction between veridical and illusory appearances.8Referenceand anticipation are in a definite directionfrom the actual figuregiven, but lack a definite image or virtual figure of that to which they refers;it is referenceto one knows not what from what one knows; one is led on by each step to the next step but one lacks any over-allsense of the route he is travelling. If one wereto seem to see a completelystrangeobject - so strangeindeed as not even tobe recognizableas an object - as he investigated such a phenomenon,he would find himself in this situation. Each aspect would lead to another completelyunknownaspect and would in turn be lost to sightand tomind.One approachesthisexperience when one isina stateofdisorientation intheeverydayworld, e.g.,asonetriesto find one's wayalone inastrange city.Dreams, too,oftenhavethis primordialquality. 6 Ibid., p. 110. 7Merleau-Ponty speaksoffungierendeIntentionalitta,"1'intentionaliteoperante." This "operativeintentionality," introducedby Husserl to refer to the basic structure of perceptual experience, isalso referred tobyHusserl as"founding" or "fundierennde" intentionality. We will use the latter terminologyto emphasizethe primordialcharacter of this experience. 8 pp, pp. 18-19. THE THREE WORLDSOF MERLEAU-PONTY561 MP draws upon various pathologicalexperiences as illustrations.In the experience of certain brain injured patientsthere is adissociation of thesensory field which does notremain fixedas thesubject perceives, which itselfmovesfollowingthesubject's movements ofexploration and retreats asoneinvestigates it.There isvaguelocation. Thiscontradictory phenomenon reveals apre-objective space whichcertainly hasextension,sinc- several points of the body when touched simultaneously are notconfused bythe subject, but in which there is no unique location because no fixedspatial framee work subsists from one perceptionto another (PP,37). This levelofanalysisisobviouslyinadequatetointerprettheworld of thingsand persons in which we live,theLebenswelt.At thesame time,it is astudyofstructures whichare necessaryifnotsufficienttocharacterize theLebenswelt.The relevanceof theprimordial figure-ground structure to theLebensweltcan be shown only if thisstructure is supplementedby that ofthevirtual figure.MPdistinguishesanactualoreffectivefigure,the onlykind of figure appearing inoriginal experience, from a virtualfigure, which is an image of a figure purported tobe still uncovered in theground of an effectivefigure. The virtualfigure guides the references of theactual figure to itsground and consists of a definite expectationof thefigure that may actually be uncovered from thatground. The expectationembodied in this virtual figure mayor may notbe verified by theactual figure which is revealed in the indicatedplace. For example,whatlooks likea houseseen from thefrontmayturnouttobea facade. Thus,adistinctionremains betweenanticipationandreference ontheonehandandrealizationand actualityon the other. Butthe most important result of theappearance of thevirtual figures is the stabilizationof experience. Pastfigures which are nolongereffective,havingsunk intotheground upontheappearance of neweffectivefigures, are nowpreserved intheform of virtualfigures.In thisway,theformationofperspectives,baseduponrecognitionand recollectionbecomes possible, and expectationbecomes definite insteadof indefinite. Withthevirtualfigurecomesthepossibilityofbelief,butnotyetof certainty.Certaintyispossibleonlywiththeappearance ofapermanent figure. A permanent figure istobedistinguishedfrom a temporary figure andappears atthemomentof"maximumprise."Atsomepointinper- spectivallyorganizedexperiencewegainanoptimalview,revealing figures which will presumably never thereafter be proven illusory although theymayofcourseceasetobeeffectiveandbecomemerelyvirtual.At thispointwepresumptivelyunifyperspectivalexperienceintermsof thesepermanentfiguressoasto"engagethewholeperceptualfuture" (PP,415).The presumption thatthesepermanent figures will never prove tobeillusoryisbasedmerelyuponaperceptualfaith - wewouldbe astonished upon disillusionment - butour experience isorganizedas ifwe 562PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICALRESEARCH had a perceptualguaranteeto supportthis faith. At this point we are said to know particularnatural objects (PP,pp. 343, 348, 367).Thus, once we have walked aroundand inside of a house, it appearsdefinitelyto be a house; we see all aspects of it as aspects of a house; and it would then seem incredibleif on turning a cornerfor a second time we discovereditwas merely a facadeafter all. The use of the expression"I am certain"as analyzedby John Austin in his article "OtherMinds" 9 reflects this perceptualambiguity. After suf- ficient relevantinvestigationwe are justified in saying we are certain,and in saying this we "guarantee"our claim althoughit remainstrue that we may still turn out to be mistaken. Asoneadvances from fundierendeappearancetoappearanceinthe Lebenswelta similar developmenttakes place in the form of the subject. The subject of fundierendeappearance is a pre-personal subject:universal, neutral,andwithoutanego.Withor aftertheappearance ofthevirtual imageandtheattendantdevelopmentofperspectiveinperception,there appears intersubjectivity, an"etreadeux,"expressed primarily by dialogue.In dialogue,I and anotherare in perfectreciprocity,as peaceful collaborators,andour perspectivesglideintoeachother'swithoutbreak and without opposing polarization(PP, 407). With internal monologue, however,private individualsubjectivity develops; each personis isolated from and opposed tothe other (PP,407, 414). Each individual, like an object of which we have maximumgraspin terms of permanentfigures,is atonce shut inonhimself inopposition toothers byhaving hisown individualprincipleof unification(e.g., the Cartesiancogito),and is at the same time opened out toward an indefinite future focused upon an ideal of objectivethoughtin whichthese oppositionsareresolved(PP, 409, 221). We are thus broughtto the thresholdof MP'sthird world,the objective, scientificworld. Since this is not a perceptualworld, MP's account of the figure-ground-subjectstructureof itsappearanceis not explicit, but the following account seems to be in the spirit of his views. On this level it seems that there is no ground at all; there is merely figure. Furthermore there is no distinctionbetween actual and virtual figure,and thereforeno distinction between referenceor anticipation and actualization or reali- zation. To anticipate and to refer is not merely todo so in a definitedi- rection asin fundierendeexperience,nor is itto refer by means of some definitevirtual content which may fail to be verified. Rather,it is so fully toimply that which is "referredto" that it actualizesits own anticipated object in the very act of anticipationor reference. Thus, for example,a theoreticalconsequence,once revealedas following from theoretical assumptions, is"given" inthesame sense astheas- 9 John Austin, "Other Minds,"Logicand Language (secondseries), Oxfordi 1955. THETHREEWORLDSOFMERLEAU-PONTY563 sumptions themselves. This contrasts with the case of perceptualimpli- cation in the Lebensweltwherean effective figurereveals anotherfigureas merelyvirtual; and wherewe must followout the referenceof the effective figure inorder toreveal another effective figure, instead of thesecond effectivefigureitselffollowingfromthe given one. The virtual figurewhich follows from theperceptually givenfigure maybemisleading. E.g., followingfrom the facade of a house, illusorilytaken to be a house, is the virtual figure of the back of that house. But the theoreticalconsequence which follows from the theoreticallygiven figure (the given assumption) is identicalwith that to which the given figure refers, so that there is no such thing asamisleading or virtual theoretical consequence.From a theoreticalgiven, whateverfollows,followsvalidly. Inpre-objectiveexperiencethe transition from figure tofigure is not made by figure alone but requiresmediation byan act of consciousness which is not legislatedby the figuresbut is free to follow or not to follow their demand, thus showingthat the figures do not legislate one another but are contingentlygiven to one another as the circumstance,occasion, or evocative context of each other'sappearance.This primordialcondition thatfigures do notlegislate one another intoexistence butare merely given tooneanother through themediation ofconsciousness,theap- pearanceof one figure being merely the circumstanceof the appearance of another,is the persistenceof the fundierendemode of appearancein the Lebenswelt.On theother hand, -the appearanceofthevirtual figure as supplementary totheactualfigure,forming therebya"perceptual implication"10 by whichthe actualfigurerefersdeterminatelyto its ground, istheforeshadowingor intimation ofthescientific world inthelived world. For the virtual figure, in mediatingbetween $he actual figure and the figure concealedin the ground,partially takes the place of the act of consciousness.In the scientific world this tendency is merely brought to final fulfillment,and consciousnesswith its free assent does not mediate between figure andfigure atall.Consciousness,thethinking subject, merelyhypothesizesor posits the premisesof an ideal conditionand is then theenthralledspectator of, not the participantin, theunfolding of the implicationsof the posited figures. This explicitationis accomplishedby thefigures themselves, as ifeach actual figure implied another notby means of a virtual figurebut ratherby directlyimplyingthat figureitself. In so far as this is true, scientific figures are purely self-revealing.They have no groundand are not in any way concealed.They have overcomethe ambiguityof appearingas the revealingof what is concealed. We mayalso notehow theappearanceofpermanent figures ofthe Lebensweltis intermediatebetweenthe appearanceof temporaryfiguresof 10 Aphrase used byAron Gurwitsch inTheuoriedu champ de la conscience. 564PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICALRESEARCH the Lebensweltand the appearanceof fully revealedfiguresof the scientific world.Permanentfiguresare like temporaryones of the Lebensweltin that they retain the distinctionbetween virtual and actual, and are therefore accordingto the manner of their appearancefalsifiableand groundedin concealment.But they are like scientificfiguresin that any given perma- nent figurepertainingto a given object appearsas if it were not falsifiable, byappearing asifitwholly determined anyother permanent figure pertainingtothe same object and as if itcould be found wholly tode- termineits entire object. In the permanentfigurethere is thus an element of the Lebensweltwhich appearsto escape the ambiguityof the temporary image and appearsas if what is revealed is entirely revealed. Itmakes a claim toescape theambiguity of thetemporaryvirtual image but this claim can be supportedonly by a perceptualfaith in the appearance,and cannot be guaranteedby the mannerof the appearanceitself. However,it isbyvirtue ofthisfaith thattheideal world ofobjective thought is projected,and there figuresappearin such a mannerthat faith in them is guaranteed. Thus, in summary,in the fundierende,pre-personalworld itis totally true that what is revealed(figure)is concealed(ground).Figureand-ground are inseparableand simply differentphases of a single figure-groundfield of consciousnessand itis the entire figure-groundfield of consciousness which is revealed as concealed. Every figure is given atonce as having arisenout of groundor concealmentin having been made figure;as passing in its actual content into the concealmentof groundto which it refers;and as about to pass into the concealmentof groundin the attempt to reveal itscontent presently concealed. In the scientific, objective world on the other hand, what is revealedis entirelyrevealedand not concealed.There is no ground;all figureis completelyself-revealingfigure.The Lebensweltis in an intermediateposition. Insofar as there isany distinction between virtual and actual figure,one figuredoes not appearto produceor legislate another.Insofaras thereis any virtual image at all, one figuredoes appear toproduce or legislate another and there isperceptualimplication; the actual figure,by mediationof the virtual figure,indicatesnot merelythat there is anotherfigureconcealedin the ground,but indicatesalso what the nature of this figureis likely to be. Insofaras the permanentfiguremay be virtual, it is falsifiable;yet insofaras it is supportedby perceptualfaith it is presumednot falsifiable.Fundierendeappearancehas a figure-ground- perceiving-subject(prepersonal)form. Objectiveappearancehas a figure- figure-thinking-subjectform.Lebensweltappearanceisasynthesisin antithesis of both these formsin such a way that the individual subject is the synthesisin antithesisof the perceivingwith the thinking subject, and thevirtual andpermanent figures are indifferent wayssyntheses in antithesisof the figure-groundwith the figure-figurestructure. THETHREEWORLDSOF MERLEAU-PONTY565 This ambiguous character oftheLebenswelt,partaking asitdoes of features of theoriginal world and of thescientific world, explains why both Taylor and Kullman,and Wildcan find supportin Merleau-Pontyfor their differentviews of the boundarybetween phenomenologicaland non- phenomenologicallevels ofexperience.Taylorand Kullman inopposing the pre-objectiveworld to the world of scienceand commonsense, assimi- late the world of everyday experiencetothe objective world of science with which itshares the features of determinacyand certainty. Wild, on the otherhand, focuseson the distinctionbetweenthe totally objectivenon perspectivalcharacterof the world of science and the ambiguousanthro- pocentriccharacterof the Lebenswelt,and overlooksthe distinctionbetween the Lebensweltand the world of originalexperience.Kullman and Taylor cannot account for the fact that phenomenologists,among them Merleau- Ponty,have written elaborate descriptionsofour everyday world, and Wild must ignore the equally substantial studies that phenomenologists have devoted to genetic phenomenologyor fundamentalontology. It is now clear that no dichtomyis adequate,for Merleau-Pontyrefers tothreeworlds. The Lebenswelthas, for him, characteristicsof both the worlds it adjoins-not, however,by having a mixture of structuresfrom each, but by exhibitingfunctionsunique to itself and mediatingbetween those oftheadjoining worlds. Thus, these three worlds are notsimply describedanddistinguished.Merleau-Ponty'sachievement israther to have traced thephenomenologicalgenesis oftheLebensweltand, more sketchily,of the scientificworldfrom the primordialfundierendeworld.11 H.L.DREYFUS. S.J.TODES. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTEOF TECHNOLOGY. 11 The trichotomy can beviewed asadichotomy inordertoemphasizecertain common features. Distinguish three worlds: the original world, the Lebenswelt,and the world of science (perhapsbetter described as a universe, since it is totally determinate andhasnohorizon). Wecan thensummarize theaboveremarks andclarifyMP's terminology, as follows: "Pre-objectiveworld" is generally used to refer to the first two worldsthe worlds prior toidealization - and toemphasize their incompleteness and ambiguity. "Prepersonalworld"is used to refer to the originalworld -the world priorto stabilization - and tooppose this world of the pure field of consciousnesstotheother two worlds of which itis the foundation. MP does occasionally use "pre-objective" to call attention to experience prior tostabilization, and it is this secondary usage which leads Kullman and Taylor tooppose the pre-objective world to the world of everyday experience.