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InternationalDecisionMakingintheAgeofGenocide:Srebrenica1993-1995June28–July1,2015
TheHagueEditedTranscript
Session4:Endgame–LessonsfromSrebrenica
Potočari,July12,1995,USgovernmentphoto
TOMBLANTON:Ourintentionthisafternoonistolookveryintensivelyattheaftermathof
thefallofSrebrenica,includingtheexperiencesofColonelKarremans,RupertSmith,and
CarlBildtintalkingwithGeneralMladić.IwanttoaskMichaelDobbstoleadoffwitha
couplequestionsaboutthesituationonSrebrenicaonJuly11,andthechoices,orlackof
choices,facedbyColonelKarremansandDutchbat.
SHASHITHAROOR:Beforewestart,mayIjustbrieflyputamarkerforourlaterdiscussion
onlessons.IobjecttoJohnShattuck'ssuggestionthatthissomehowrevealsabankruptcy
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ofUNpeacekeeping.Ihavetriedtoexplainwhypeacekeepingwasinappropriatetoapply
tothissituationandhowwepointedthisoutrepeatedlytotheSecurityCouncil.
TOMBLANTON:I'mcountingonyoutochallengeit.
MICHAELDOBBS:Wewantveryquicklytolookatwhathappenedafterthefallof
Srebrenica.Asyouknow,manyoftheMuslimmenfromSrebrenica,ledbythearmed
remnantsoftheBosnian28thDivision,triedtoescapetheenclave.Theygatheredinthe
northernpartoftheenclaveataplacecalledŠušnjariandattemptedtomakeabreakout,
throughtheencirclementbyBosnianSerbtroops.
DetailfromCIAmap,showingattemptedbreakoutbyMuslimsfromSrebrenica
Therewasanothergroupofcivilians,mainlywomenandchildrenbutalsoafew
hundredmen,whotookrefugeatDutchbatheadquartersinPotočari,whichisjustnorthof
Srebrenica.Weactuallyhaveanoverheadreconnaissancephotographofthesceneat
PotočarionJuly12at2:00p.m.Anotherreconnaissancephotograph,thefollowingday,July
13,showsalineofbusesoutsidetheUNbase,afewhundredmetersdowntheroad.1Aswe
nowknow,Mladićallowedthewomenandchildrentoenterthebuses,fortransportation
1TheJuly12-14photographswereprobablytakenbylow-flyingNATOreconnaissanceaircraftsearchingforDutchbatsoldiersseizedbytheRSAashostages.LaterphotographsweretakenbyAmericanU-2spyplanes,covering30squarekilometersofterritory.
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toBosniangovernmentpositions,buttookthemenawayfor“screening”forallegedwar
criminals.
Potočari,July13,1995,USgovernmentphoto
WealsohaveaJuly11document[sentat6:27p.m.localtime]withinstructionsto
ColonelKarremansfromGeneralHervéGobilliard,whowasactingUNPROFORcommander
inSarajevointheabsenceofGeneralSmith.2Hisinstructionsare:"Concentrateyourforces
intothePotočariCamp,includingwithdrawalofyourOPs.Takeallreasonablemeasuresto
protectrefugeesandciviliansinyourcare."Priortothathesaid,"Enterintolocal
negotiationswithBSAforcesforimmediateceasefire."
WealsohaveareportdatedJuly12fromColonelKarremansinwhichherepliesto
thepointsmadebyGeneralGobilliard.3Bythistime,hehasmettwicewithGeneralMladić
2GobilliardtoSectorNE(Info:CODutchbat),“"OrdersfordefenceofDutchbatandprotectionofrefugeesinSrebrenica,”July11,1995.3KarremanstoJanvier,“MeetingwithGenMladićon11and12July1995,”DutchbatCompoundPotočari,TK95114,July12,1995.
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attheHotelFontanadowntheroadinBratunac.Heisreportingonwhathecalls"a
catastrophicsequenceofevents”thathewitnessedandhisdirecttalkswithMladić.He
basicallysaysthatheisunabletocarryoutGobilliard’sinstructions.Hestates,"Thereare
morethan15,000peoplewithinonesquarekilometer,includingDutchbat,in"anextreme
vulnerableposition:thesittingduckposition.Headdsthatheis“notabletodefendthese
people,"ordefendhisownbattalion.Thereareheavygunsallaroundthecompound,
withindirectsightofthecompound.4ColonelKarremans,youhadthemisfortuneofbeing
thrustintotheseveryone-sidedtalkswithMladić.Couldyougiveusyourimpressionsof
himandthechoicesyoufacedfollowingthefalloftheenclave?
THOMKARREMANS:Sure.WeallknowwhathappenedbetweenJuly6and11.We
discussedthatyesterdayandthismorning.AsIsaidbefore,thiswasawar.Allofasudden,
it'soverandyouareconfrontedwith25,000refugees.Somebodyaskedmesomeyearsago,
“Whydidn'tyoutakealltherefugeesinyourcamp?”Thatwasimpossible.Youcan'tput
25,000refugeesonafewsquaremeters.5Alotofthingshappenedvery,veryfast.Youhad
tomakemanydecisionswithinashrunkenbattalionstaff.Thereishardlyanytimetothink
aboutthedecisionsyouhavetotake.Youtakedecisionsinsplitseconds.Sometimes,the
decisionswerenotgood,ornotwellthoughtout,butwefeltthatmostofthedecisionswe
tookwerecorrect.
WhenIwasaskedtostartnegotiations[withtheBosnianSerbs],Iaskedwhether
somebodyonamuchhigherlevelcanconductthesenegotiations?6Icouldconduct
negotiationsbutaftersixdayswithnosleep,nodrink,nofood,negotiatingwiththelocal
authorities,runningmyownbattalion,Iwasnotinthemoodtostartnegotiations,tobe
honest.Iaskedforsomeonehigheruptonegotiate,butgotnoanswer,soIwentto
4AccordingtotheKarremansJuly12cable,Mladićhaddeployedtwoartillerypieces,twotanks,threemultiplelaunchrocketsystems,andoneanti-aircraftgunwithin"directsight"oftheDutchbatcompound.5AccordingtotheKarremansJuly12cable,therewereabout2,500refugeesinsidetheDutchbatcompoundatPotočari,andafurther15,000refugees"inthedirectvicinity.”6OnJuly12,Akashiappointedajointcivilian-militaryteamledbyUNcivilaffairsofficialKenBiserandUNPROFORchiefofstaff,Gen.KeesNicolai,totraveltoSrebrenicatomanagethecrisis.SeeAkashitoAnnan,“SituationinSrebrenica,”UNPROFORZ-1142,July12,1995,paragraph7.GeneralSmithagreedthatCODutchbatshouldnotnegotiatewithMladićbyhimselfashewas“talkingfromthejail.”SeeRupertSmith,“AftermathofFallofSrebrenica,”July13,1995,paragraph4.Henoted,however,thattheSerbswere“refusingtodealwithHQUNPROFOR,”inSarajevo,and“itseemsHQUNPF”inZagreb.
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Bratunac,thesmallcityoutsidetheenclave.OnmywaytotheFontanahotelinBratunac,I
wassittinginmyvehiclethinkingaboutwhatIshouldsay.ThenIsaw,totheleftandright
oftheroad,thosemortarplatoons.WhenIarrivedatthehotel,IexpectedGeneral
Živanović,theCommanderoftheDrinaCorps,orhissuccessor,GeneralKrstić.Ihadnever
seenMladićbeforeinmylifeandtherehewas.Noweverybodyhasseenthepictures.I
wouldnotliketoexpandonthat,becauseitwasnotapleasantsituationformeeither,I
mustsay.7
Imentiontheword“refugees”severaltimesinthisdocument.ItoldMladićseveral
timesthatIwastheretomakegoodarrangementsfortherefugees.Imaginethatthereare
about5,000refugeesinside,andabout20,000outside,thecompound.Wehadalready
foreseenthehumanitariandisasterthatwasemerging.Wehadnomedicinestodealwith
that.Ihad110severelywoundedpersonsonthecompound.MythoughtwasthatIcannot
startnegotiatinginamilitarysense,butIcantrytomakearrangementsforthewounded
andforthepopulation.Inthebeginning,hedidn'tlisten,butthesecondtimeIwasthere,
[at11:00p.m.],hestartedlistening.
Itwasmoreorlessaone-directionconversation.Hewasorderingratherthan
asking.ThatiswhatIcanrememberfromthosetwotalksintheevening.Thenextmorning
Iwentforthethirdtimewiththreepeoplerepresentingtherefugees,onewomanandtwo
men.Theywereabletoexplainwhatwasgoingonfromtheirperspective.
MICHAELDOBBS:Mladićtoldthemthattheyhadachoice,“tosurvive,stay,orvanish.”8It
wasagreedthattherewouldbeanevacuation.Thelocalpeoplesaidtheywantedtobe
evacuated,butanimportantquestionarose:whowouldorganizetheevacuation?Wouldit
betheUNthatorganizedtheevacuation?OrwouldMladićorganizetheevacuationhimself?
AtonepointitseemedthatUNPROFORwouldorganizetheevacuationinwhichcasethere
presumablywouldnothavebeenaseparationofmenandwomen.Butitturnedoutthatit
7KarremansheldthreemeetingswithMladićattheHotelFontanaatBratunac,atapproximately8:00p.m.and11:00p.m.onJuly11,and10:00a.m.onJuly12.ABosnianSerbcameramantookvideoofthemeetings,whichwasthentranscribedbyICTYresearchers,becomingpartofa“Srebrenicatrialvideo.”KarremanswasjoinedbyMuslimrepresentativesforthesecondandthirdmeetings.8SecondFontanameeting.AtthefirstFontanameeting,MladićtoldKarremansthathedidnotwanttosendUNPROFORpeacekeepersbackhome“incoffins.”
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wasMladićwhobroughtthebusesandMladićwhocontrolledtheevacuation.9Canyoutell
ushowitendedupthatMladićwasallowedtoorganizetheevacuation?
KEESNICOLAI:Icansaysomethingaboutthat.Immediatelyafterwestoppedtheair
attacks,werealizedtheterriblesituationoftherefugees.Weknewwehadtodosomething
aboutthat.Afteradiscussionthatlastedtenminutesorso,weweresurethatournext
missionwouldbetoevacuatethecivilianpopulationtoasafeareawheretheycouldbe
treated.Therewasnowater,nofood,andnomedicinefortheminSrebrenica,asColonel
Karremanshasdescribed.Moreover,itwasverydangerous.Therefugeeswere
unprotected,intheopenair.Thesituationcouldchangeatanymoment.
Itwasclearthattheyhadtoberemovedfromthatplaceassoonaspossible.Soon
afterwards,IhadatelephonecallwithourMinisterofDefense.Itoldhimthatwehad
decidedtostartnegotiationstoarrangeanevacuation.Heagreedimmediately,sothere
wassupportforourdecisionfromTheHague.Aroundthesametime,Ihadashort
telephonecallwithMr.Muratović[theBosnianministerresponsibleforrelationswith
UNPROFOR].Hewasveryupsetthatwehadstoppedtheairstrikes.Hesaidthatwas
contrarytoourmission,butweexplainedthatwecouldnotdoanythingelseduetothe
situationinwhichtheciviliansfoundthemselves.
Shortlyafterwards,IcontactedColonelKarremanstoorderhimtostartnegotiations
withthelocalSerbauthorities.Atthatmoment,IwasnotawarethatMladićwasthere.The
firstprioritywastogettherefugeesout.Eventswentinadirectiondifferenttotheonewe
hadplanned.WeweretakenbysurprisethefollowingdaybyMladićwhenthebuses
arrivedaroundnoon.Theevacuationstartedearlierthanweplanned.Arrangingtransport
shouldnothavebeenaproblemforusbutitwasnecessaryforUNPROFORtoask
permissionfromtheBosnianSerbstoentertheirterritory,whatroutewecoulduse,andso
on.
9MladićannouncedthathewouldprovidethebusesfortheevacuationatthethirdHotelFontanameetingat1000onJuly12.Thebusesarrivedinfrontofthecompoundaround1:00p.m.onJuly12.AccordingtotheDecember2012ICTYjudgmentinthecaseofGeneralZdravkoTolimir,MladićhadissuedanoralorderrequisitioningthebuseslateontheeveningofJuly11.Inaninterceptedconversationat1250onJuly12discoveredbyICTYinvestigators,Mladićcloselymonitoredthedispatchofbuses.“We’llevacuatethemall,”hetoldasubordinate.“Thosewhowantto[go]andthosewhodon’twantto.”
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ItseemsthatMladićhadforeseenwhatwouldhappenandarrangedbusesoneor
twodaysbefore.Therewasonlyoneoptionleftforus,whichwastosendpeacekeepersin
jeepsoronthebusestocontroltheevacuations.Thiswasnotasuccess.Manyjeepswere
stoppedalongthewayandstolen.Theattempttocontroltheevacuationfailedinmany
respects.Itwasmorelikeadeportationthananevacuation.
MICHAELDOBBS:Therewaslittleyoucoulddotoinfluencethewayittookplace?
THOMKARREMANS:I'dliketoaddsomethingonthat.Thingswentsofast.Wewereall
astonishedseeallofthosetrucksandbusesthenextdayalready.InmytalkswithGeneral
MladićIhadgivenhimasequenceofevents,beginningwithevacuationofthewounded,
sayingwewerealsorelyingontheRedCross.Obviouslyhedidn'tlisten.Ihavealwayssaid
thatthiswasapre-plannedoperationfromhisside.Youarenotabletoorganizesomany
busesandvehicleswithinacoupleofhours.Hedidn'tgiveusthechancetomakeproper
arrangements.
Ontheotherhand,asGeneralNicolaisaid,therewasanurgentneedtodo
somethingforthepeople.Therewasnofoodforthem,therewasnoshelterforthem.
Peoplehadhungthemselves,givenbirths.Itwaslikeavillageof25,000peopleallpacked
together.Istillseethesethingsinmymind.Inthissituation,youhavetotakesome
decisions.Everythingwentsofastwiththedeportationofthelocals.
Onelastthing:Isenttwoofficerswiththefirstconvoyofbuses.Theymanagedto
reachTuzlaandwenttoseeColonelBrantz.ColonelBrantzphonedmeandsaid,“Yourtwo
officersarehere,they'veseensomethingsalongtheway,butyoucan'tseeeverything
whentherearefortybusesbehindyou.”Thentheysuggestedputtingasoldieronevery
bus,butIhadalmostnosoldiersleft.Wesaid,“Okay,wewillsendoneortwojeepswith
everyconvoy.”Theywereallstolenontheway.IaskedMladićlaterwhathappenedwith
thosevehicles.Hesaid,"Idon'tknow.Therearedifferentgroupsofparamilitarywho
grabbedthemandstolethem."Isaid,"Youknowbetter."Thatwasnotanoptioneither.
ThenIsentsomevehiclestofacilitatethecommunicationbetweenPotočariandKladanj
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[transferpointbetweenSerbandMuslim-controlledterritory]forcommunications.All
thosevehicleswerealsostolen.10
MICHAELDOBBS:Mladićinsistedthattherefugeesbescreenedforpossiblewarcriminals.
Hesaidthemencouldnotgowiththewomenandchildrenbecausetherewereallegedly
warcriminalsamongthemandheneededtoscreenthem.Wasthereapossibilityof
influencinghimonthatquestion?
THOMKARREMANS:HefirstaskedmeifIcould“deliverthelocalmilitaryandcivilian
authorities”tohim.Isaid,“They’renotthereandiftheywerehere,Idon'tdothat.”Hethen
saidthathewantedtoscreenthemenandlookforwarcriminals.11Weallknowwhat
happenedoutsidethesafearea.Inwars,youshouldbepermittedtoasksomeone,whathe
didduringthewar,butitisnotpermittedistokillthem.Thatiswhathappened.
MICHAELDOBBS:Andyoudidn'tthinkthatwasapossibility?
THOMKARREMANS:Notatthatmoment.Also,therewerenotsomanymenleftImustsay.
Thereweresomeinthecompound.Weknowthatamountbecausetheirnameswereput
onthepieceofpaper.12Thevastmajorityofthemenoutsidethecompoundwerealready
ontheirwaytoTuzla.
TOMBLANTON:Muhamed?
MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:Justtoclarify,thenumberofthemeninsidethecompoundin
Potočaridoesnotreallyrepresentthenumberofmenwhowereseparatedandtakento
differentexecutionsites.13Weknowthisthroughthere-tracingofthemassgraves.We
10SeealsoNetherlandsMinistryofDefense,“ReportbasedonthedebriefingonSrebrenica,”October4,1995.AccordingtotheDutchbatdebrief,itproved“virtuallyimpossibletoprovideproperescortsfortheconvoys.”11AccordingtotheDutchbatdebrief,Mladićannouncedthat“able-bodiedmenweretobescreenedforpossibleinvolvementinwarcrimes”atthethirdFontanahotelmeetingonJuly2.Hesaidthattheevacuationofthewomanandchildrenandwoundedwouldstartat1300.12AccordingtotheDutchbatdebrief,themalerefugeesdrewupalistof239menoffightingagewhohadtakenrefugeonthecompound,withtheintentionofsubmittingittotheICRC.Atleast60menrefusedtoberegistered.13BosnianSerbforcesrefusedtoallowMuslimmengatheredoutsidethecompoundtoboardthebuses.Mostofthemenwhoneverthelessmanagedtoboardthebuseswereremovedbeforethebusesreachedgovernment-
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knowwhichexecutionsitewasusedforthemenfromPotočari,whichsitewasusedforthe
peoplecapturedinCerska,andsoon.Basedontheassessmentthatwewereabletomake,
alittleover2,000menwereseparatedinPotočariandtakentodifferentexecutionsites.
MICHAELDOBBS:Wasitasmanyas2,000?
MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:Yes.Ifyoutakethenumberof8,000plus[totaldisappeared],out
ofthis8,000pluspeople,around2,000camefromPotočariandaround6,000camefrom
thewoods.
MICHAELDOBBS:Right,butthereweretwogroupsinPotočari.Therewasagroupof
aroundthreehundredinsidetheDutchbatbase.TheotherswereoutsidetheDutchbat
base.
MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:That'sexactlywhatweagreeabout.You'retalkingaboutthe
numberofthepeoplewithinthefenceoftheDutchcompound.You'renottalkingabout
20,000civiliansoutsideofthefenceofthecompound,andamongthese20,000thereisat
least1,500peoplewhohavebeenseparatedandtakentoexecutionsites.
TOMBLANTON:Zeidjustshowedmetheprosecutor’sopeningstatementintheMladićtrial
ontheothersideoftown,inwhichhearguesthatMladićdecidedonthemassexecutions
onthenightofJuly11,apparentlyinbetweenthetwomeetingswithColonelKarremans.
Zeid,couldyouquicklysummarizewhattheprosecutionbelieves,basedontheevidence
theyaccumulated.Itreinforcesthesensewehaveofthedecision-makingonSrebrenicaas
aconstantpush,lackofreaction,pushmore,lackofreaction.Itisarollingdecisionmodel
thatispertinenttothelessonswedrawfromSrebrenicaandwhenitispossibletopush
back.
controlledterritory.Muslimmalesweredetainedintheso-called“whitehouse”inPotočari,andtakentoexecutionsitesviaBratunac.
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ZEIDRA'ADALHUSSEIN:Youareabsolutelyright.TheprosecutorintheMladićcase,Peter
McCloskey,contendedthatthemurderplanbegantorevealitselfonthenightofJuly11.14
Theyarenotactuallysurewhetherit'safterthefirstmeetingwithColonelKarremans[at
9:00p.m.]orthesecondmeeting[at11:00p.m.]when[Srebrenicacivilianrepresentative]
NesibMandžićwasalsothere,buttheymakereferenceintheprosecutionstatementtothe
languagethatMladićused.Hedrawsastarkbinarychoiceof“survive,stayorvanish.”
ZeidRa'adalHussein
ThenhesaystoNesib,“Thefutureofyourpeopleisinyourhands,bringthepeople
whocansecurethesurrenderofweaponsandsaveyourpeoplefromdestruction.
Everythingisinyourhands.Bringsomeprominentpeoplefromaroundhere.Inthewords
oftheprosecutor,"HerewecanseethatMladićisobsessedwiththesalvationand
destructionoftheMuslimpeople.Thisisnoidlechatterforthecameraasitwasthisvery
14SeeProsecutor’sopeningstatement,Mladićtrial,ICTY,May17,2012.TheProsecutioncaseintheMladićandothertrialscloselyfollowsa“SrebrenicaMilitaryNarrative,”preparedbytheICTYexpert,RichardButler.MladićbeganmarshalingtransportationassetsontheeveningofJuly11.BSApersonnelbeganseparatingmenfromwomenandchildrenshortlyafterthearrivalofthefirstbusesoutsidetheDutchbatcompoundaround1230onJuly12.
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eveningthatMladićandhisofficersmadetheirfirstdecisionsontheplantomurderthe
Muslimmenandboys."
Thefollowingmorning[July12],there'sthethirdmeetingwithColonelKarremans.
TheprosecutornotesthatLieutenantColonelVujadinPopović[acommanderoftheDrina
Corps]metbrieflywithCaptainMomirNikolić[intelligenceofficerintheBratunacBrigade]
outsidetheFontanahotel.PopovićtoldNikolićthattheablebodiedmeninPotočariwould
beseparatedfromtheirfamiliesandkilled.PopovićaskedNikolićtoprovidethelocations
intheimmediatearea[wherethemencouldbetemporarilydetained].Theythenstartedto
lookattheoldbrickfactory.
ItwouldthereforeseemthatthedecisiontotakeSrebrenicawasmadeonJuly9,
andthedecisiontoconvertastrategicpoliticalplanintoamassatrocitywastakenwithin
thosefewhoursonJuly11.15YesterdayImetwithcolleaguesattheICTY.Theysaidthat
nothinghadchanged.Theywouldnotdisclosetheirthinkingonthecase,buttheybelieve
thisopeningstatementsaysitall.TheyalsobelievethatMladićwasinahighlyagitated,
vengefulandhighlyemotionalstateatthetimethatdecisionwastaken.
Thereasonwearemeetinghereisbecauseofthedecisionthatwastakenthatnight.
Couldwehaveanticipatedthisemotionalstateandthisdesiretocommitmassmurder?
MuhamedmentionedearliertodaythatthepeopleofSrebrenicaknewwhatwasgoingto
happen,butwe,theinternationals,weresurprisedandshockedbyit,eventhoughwehad
beenworkingwithallsidesforthreeorfouryears.Thequestionis,whywereweso
shocked?WeshoulddissecttheeventsofthateveningtounderstandwhyMladićtookthe
decisionhetook.
MICHAELDOBBS:Doyouhaveananswertothat?
ZEIDRA'ADALHUSSEIN:IthinkRuperthasananswerbecausehetoldmetheothernight
thathehasatheorythatcouldwork.
MICHAELDOBBS:SinceRupertandCarlmetwithMladićshortlyafterwards,perhapsthey
couldspeaktothedichotomybetweenwhatpeoplelikeMuhamedwereconvincedwas15See,forexample,ICTYjudgmentinthecaseofGeneralTolimir,paragraph1046,whichstatesthat“aplantomurdertheable-bodiedmenfromtheSrebrenicaenclavehadmaterializedbythemorningof12July.”
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abouttohappenandtheinternationalcommunitynotbeingwillingtobelieveit.Bythe
way,wehadaverysimilardiscussionlastyearinthecaseofRwanda.TheCzech
representativeontheSecurityCouncil,KarelKovanda,talkedabout“afailureof
imagination.”Nobodyreallybelievedthatagenocidewouldtakeplace.Inthecaseof
Rwanda,theydidexpectmassacres,butnobodyontheSecurityCouncilexpectedthescale
ofthegenocidethattookplace.
TOMBLANTON:Letmeaddacaveattothat.Therewasanexpectationthatthemassacres
wouldbeatthelevelofBurundithepreviousyear,whichwas100,000peopledead.
MICHAELDOBBS:ButKovandausedthephrase,"afailureofimagination."Perhapswesee
somethingsimilarhere.
MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:TheassessmentofwhatwasgoingtohappeninSrebrenicaisnot
mypersonalassessmentonly.Theprocessofseparation[ofthementryingtoescapeacross
themountainsfromthewomenandchildrenwhosoughtrefugewithDutchbat]happened
atasmalljunction,justbeforethegasstation,ontheroadtoPotočari.Thereisasmallroad
thatleadsleft,tothevillageofSućeska.Ipassedby[Dutchbat’s]lastposition,inthecenter
ofSrebrenica,nearthecentralmosque,onthenightonJuly11.ThestreetonwhichIhad
spentmostofmylifewasalreadyblocked.BulletswerebuzzingaroundwhenImanagedto
getoutofthatparticularlocation.
Wethentookadecision.Thosewhocannotwalk[togovernment-controlled
territory]willdieanyway.Theywillgowiththewomenandchildrenandelderlyto
PotočariandpraytoGodthatsomemercywouldbeshowntothem.Everyoneelsewho
wantedtohaveatleastsomechanceofsurvivalwouldcomewithus[overthemountains].
Yousawthousandsofpeople,anyoneabletowalk,kidswhowerenine,tenyearsold,and
wholefamiliesincludingwomenandchildren,everyonewalkinginthedirectionof
Sućeska.TheyknewthatgoingtoPotočarimeantcertaindeath.WhenIsaidgoodbyetomy
motheratthatparticularlocation,IhonestlybelievedthatIwasnevergoingtoseeher
again.ThatwasthefeelingofmostpeopleatthatparticularmomentinSrebrenica.
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RUPERTSMITH:YoucanseewhatIthoughtfromthereportIwroteonJuly13.16Igotback
tomyheadquarters[inSarajevo]ontheeveningofJuly12.Ittookalittleovertwenty-four
hourstogetintoSarajevofromSplit,goingdowntheMountIgmantrail.Itwasnotaquick
move.FairlyearlyonthemorningofJuly13,Idictatedthatdocument[tohismilitary
assistant,LtCol.Baxter],asmuchtoclearmyownheadastoinformanyoneelse.Notlong
afterthat,Iformedapictureofwhatwashappeningfromvariousbriefings,talkingtoother
people,readingreports.
Withhindsight,thepictureisn'ttoowrong.Ihadapictureinmyheadofagroupof
armedmen,thedefendersofSrebrenica,withdrawingoutofthepockettowardsTuzla.I
haveapictureoflargenumberofrefugeesclusteredaroundCol.Karremansandhis
battalion.Therewasaseriousrefugeeproblem.IhaveHasanMuratovićonmyback
beatingmeupbecauseIamtheUN,Ihavefailed.Hemakesclearthatthereisgoingtobe
nohelpfromBosniawiththeserefugees,theUNmustdealwiththemall.Assoonasthey
comeovertheborderwithRepublikaSrpska,theyaregoinguptoTuzla.Hasanmakesclear
tome,“They'reyourproblem.Yousolveit.Youcausedthis.”Ihaveabigargumentrunning.
IleaveHasan,gotoPresidentIzetbegovićandsay,“Thiswon'twork,they'reyourpeople,
we'vegottodothistogether.”SlowlyHasancalmsdownandwegetsomethinggoing.
TOMBLANTON:OneofyourconversationswithHasanisrecordedinamemorandumof
yourmeetingwithPrimeMinisterSilajdzićdatedJuly13,1995.17
RUPERTSMITH:Weneedtogetthelogisticsgoing,pullthehelicopterstogether,andget
thetentsandeverythingelsetoTuzlawheretherefugeesareexpected.Thatdoesnottake
toolong.Ihavethestafftogetitgoing.MyimmediateconcernsareaboutThom
[Karremans]whoisinthepositionof“talkingfromthejail.”Ithenreceiveamessage,late
atnight,togetmyselftoBelgrade.18WegobackupoverMountIgman,helicoptertoSplit
16SeeSmithtoHQUNPFZagreb,“AftermathFallofSrebrenica,”HQUNPROFOR,MHHQ48,July13,1995.17SeeCapt.Emma[E.L.]Bliss,Memconof“MeetingGenSmith/PrimeMinisterSilajdzić,”July13,1995.Duringthemeeting,bothMuratovicandSilajdzićexpressedconcernabout“unconfirmedreportsofatrocities.”MuratovicagreedthatallrefugeesbehousedatTuzlaairport“becausetherewasplentyofspaceandUNHCRwouldbeunabletohidetheproblemfromtheworld.”Previously,MuratovicopposedtheevacuationofSrebrenicaresidents.SeeAkashitoAnnan,“SituationinSrebrenica,”UNPROFORZ-1142,July12,1995.18SeediaryentryofGeneralChristopherElliot,militaryaidetoGeneraldeLaPresle,ICTY,courtesyofRupertSmith.
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andthenflytoZagrebandontoBelgradetogettothemeetingwithMilosevićinBelgrade.I
willletCarldescribethemeetingasawhole.Icanfillyouinonmysidemeetingwith
Mladić.
RegardingthenumberofrefugeesinSrebrenica,Iwasabout4,000peopleoutinmy
calculations.Wehadbeenfeedinglesspeoplethanwereactuallythere.Therewasa
mismatchinourfiguresbetweenmenandwomenandchildren.Ourcalculationswere
about4,000bodiesout.Asaresult,wewerenotlookingforalotofpeople.Wethought
therewereabout4,000peopletofind.TheICRCwasalsooftheopinionthattheywere
lookingforabout4,000people.IthoughtmostofthesemissingpeoplewereinBratunac.
WhenItalkedwithMladićinBelgrade[onJuly14-15],IaskedforaccessforICRC
andUNHCRtotheareaingeneral.IalsoaskedfortheICRCinparticulartobegivenaccess
tothe4,000prisonersthatIbelievedwereheldinBratunac.Wedidnothavetheproper
pictureatthistime.19Ihadanideainmyheadofabreakoutbyanarmedmilitaryforceina
war.IwasnottoofussediftheBosniansdidnotwanttodefendtheirpositionsin
SrebrenicaandwerewithdrawingtoTuzla.Itwastheirwar,andthatwastheirproblem.
Theydecidedtogothere.Myfocuswasontherefugees,accesstoprisoners,andwhattodo
withDutchbat.Howdowegetthemout?ThatwaswhereIwasbythetimeIgotonthe
roadtomeetwitheverybodyinBelgradeandZagreb.
BasedonwhatIlaterlearnedfromthecourtsandsoon,mytheoryisthatMladić
andhisofficersconvincethemselvesthattheyhaveasizableforce,muchbiggerthanI
thinkitis,looseintheirreararea.Theirtinymilitarymindsgetveryupsetwiththeidea
thatthisforceisthreateningtheirdefensesfromtherear.Theydonothaveenoughpeople
19EstimatesofthenumberofmissingmenfromSrebrenicafollowingitsJuly11capturebytheBosnianSerbswereconfused.AJuly13,1995cablefromAkashitoNewYork,basedoninformationfromUNHCRSpecialEnvoyAnneWillemBijleveldinTuzlanotedthatthefateof“4,000malesofdraftage”awaitingscreeninginBratunacwasof“obviousconcerntoeveryonehere.”SeeAkashitoAnnan,“SituationinSrebrenica,”Z-1154,July13,1995,paragraph2.TheStateDepartment’spressguidanceorJuly14expressedconcernoverthefateof“upto3,000menandboys”heldintheBratunacarea.AUNPROFORSectorNEreportfromJuly17,1995,reportedthat“uptothreethousand”MuslimmenhadbeenkilledenroutetoTuzla,andafurther2,000-3,000takentoastadiuminBratunac.UNhumanrightscommissionenvoyTadeuszMazowieckitoldjournalistsonJuly24afteravisittoTuzlathat“some7,000peoplefromSrebrenica”weremissingand“anenormousnumberofcrimes”hadoccurred.BosnianSerbestimatesofthecapturedmenweresignificantlyhigherthantheofficialUNestimates.AJuly13interceptofaconversationbetweenunidentifiedBosnianSerbofficersrefersto“about6,000”maleprisonerscapturedfromtheattemptedbreakout,inadditiontothe1,000-2,000malerefugeesfromPotočaritransferredtoBratunac.
4-15
todealwiththisthreatandtakecareoftheseprisoners,aswellaswhatisgoingonaround
SarajevoandtheiroffensiveintoŽepa.Thesimplesolutionis:killtheprisoners.
MICHAELDOBBS:ItisverydifficulttogetintoMladić'shead,buthedidsaywhenhe
enteredSrebrenica[onJuly11],"ThetimehascometotakerevengeontheTurksinthis
region."Theremayhavebeenamixtureofrationalthinking,asyoudescribeit,anda
simplethirstforrevenge.
MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:Ihavetodisagree.ThekillingsofSrebrenicaprisonersdidnot
happenonlyonJuly11,12,or15.Ittookme37daystofightmywayout.Therewere
killingseveryday.Ifsomeonewantedtojustkillafewthousandpeopleandgetridofthem,
theydidnothavetochaseusaroundformonthsandkilleveryonetheyfound.Noonewas
arrestedandnoonewasexchanged.Thenotionthattheykilledtheprisonersbecauseit
wasapracticalthingtodoandtheyhadinsufficientpersonneltoguardtheprisonersdoes
notcomportwithmyownexperience.Forme,theseexecutionswerethefinalstepinthe
ethniccleansingprocessin[eastern]Bosnia-Herzegovina.ŽepawastogoandGoraždeas
well.Anyonewhowasfoundwasexterminated.
AnyonecapturedevenamonthafterthefallofSrebrenica[onJuly11]waskilled.I
foundhundredsofpeople[onUdrcmountain],whichisonthewaytoZvornik.Theyhad
triedtogetthroughtoTuzla.TheSerbsbuiltpositionsnotonlyfacingtheBosnianArmyin
TuzlabutpositionsfacingtheincominggroupofpeoplefromSrebrenica.Thosewho
survivedthosekillingscamebacktoUdrc.ImadethecraziestdecisionIhaveevermade
then,butadecisionthatobviouslysavedmylife.IdecidedtowalkbacktoSrebrenica.Iwas
twentyyearsold,andIrecruitedsixotheryoungsterstojoinme.Thesesixpeoplewere
fifteen,sixteen,orseventeen.
4-16
Durakovic's37-daytrektofreedom
WewerecrazyenoughtocomeupwiththeideatowalkbackintoSrebrenica,the
heartoftheongoinggenocide.EveryoneIleftinUdrc,allmyneighbors,allmyfriends,all
myschoolmates,weretooexhaustedtogobacktoSrebrenica.Itdidnotmakeanysense:
theywerealreadyhalfwaytoTuzla,theywouldeithermakeitorbreakit.Theydecidedto
staythereandhaveneverbeenseensince.Theexecutionpartiesandsearchparties
eventuallycaughtupwiththemsomewhere,tookthemtoexecutionsites,andkilledthem.
TheSrebrenicakillingswentonfortwomonths,eventhreemonths.Therearereportsof
peoplewhocameoutalivefromSrebrenicasixmonthsafterthefallofSrebrenica.
CARLBILDT:Wecanallhaveourtheoriesofwhatactuallyhappened,butit’sspeculation.
Wedon'tknowexactlywhatwasinMladić'smind.Ihavemyideas,nottoodissimilarto
whatRupertissaying.Butletusgothroughmypartinthepoliticaltalksthatweretaking
placeatthattime.IhadbeeninBelgradepreviously[onJuly7]andmetMilosevićto
4-17
negotiatetheContactGroupsanctionsre-impositionformula.Ihadalsobeenaskedto
engagemoreontheenclavesissues.IwasfocusedsomewhatmoreonSarajevothanonthe
easternenclavesbecausetherewere400,000peoplewhowererunningoutoffood.The
UNforceswerenotabletoresupplyoverIgmanandreachUNHCRandWFP,andthe
others.
CarlBildt,left,withCameronHudsonandAbiodunWilliams
Wehadarestrictiononthepoliticaltalksthatwecouldconduct.WhenImetwith
PresidentIzetbegovićinSarajevo,hewasveryfirmthatweshouldnottalktothePale
leadership.Formallyspeaking,IwasanEUrepresentativesomylineofcommand(ifthere
wassuchathingwasatthattime)wastotheSpanish,whohadtakenoverthepresidency
oftheEUfromtheFrenchonJuly1.IwasalsoinfrequentcontactwithDickHolbrooke.The
UShaddefactobackedoffallpoliticaltalksatthattime,soIwastheonlychanneltheyhad.
SincewecouldnottalktoPale,whichwasaslightdisadvantage,wedecidedtoseeifwe
couldsplittheSerbleadershipandengagewithMladić.
WeknewthatMladićwasundermilitarystrain.Hehadlonglines,hewaslacking
soldiers,hewasurgingusalltoarrangeaceasefire,hewantedtoclosedownthewar,
4-18
needlesstosayonhisterms.Thiswasthereasonwhy,priortothemeetinginBelgradeon
July7,wehadsentamessagetoMilosević(Ican’trememberthroughwhichchannel)
sayingthatitwouldbeinterestingtoseeMladićifhepassesby.Accordingtomynotes,the
July7meetingwasoneofthoseusualmeetingswithMilosevićwhichlastedninehours.You
wentbackandforthovereverything,overendlessSerbmeals.Towardstheendofthat
session,IhadaconversationwithMladićintheevening.Iwaskeentolistentohimto
discoverthemoodoftheman,themindsetoftheman,butthesubstancedealtwiththe
enclaves.Accordingtomynotesatthetime,Imentionedhisstrangulationoftheenclaves.
Therewassomeotherissuesrelatedtointer-Serbrivalries,boththetension
betweenMladićandKaradzićandtheratheracutetensionbetweenMilosevićandMladić.
Therewasa[partial]YugoslavblockadeofRepublikaSrpska,whichhitthemquitehard,
primarilyontwoissues,beerandcigarettes.Thismightsoundtrivialtoday,butbeerand
cigarettesareimportantforthemoraleofanarmy.TheBosnianArmycontrolledthe
Sarajevotobaccofactory,whichwasinoperationandprovedastrategicasset.Therewere
nobrewerieswhatsoeverinRepublikaSrpskaterritory.Afairlyminorissueyoumight
think,butMilosevićandMladićspentquiteabitoftimeonit.
IreturnedtoBelgradeonFriday,July14.Bythattime,ofcourse,itwasobviousthat
Srebrenicawasonthetopoftheagenda.YouhaveMladić’snotesofhismeetingonthe
eveningofJuly14withMilosević,Bildt,andGeneraldeLaPresleandJuly15withGeneral
Smith.20TherewasalsoaUKdiplomatpresent,DavidAustin,butheisnotindicated.You
alsohaveAkashi’snotesfromtheJuly15meetingthatincludedAkashi,Bildt,Stoltenberg,
andMilosević,aswellasMladić.21Therearesomedifferencesbetweentheaccounts,but
essentiallytheysaythesamething.Onbothdays,webroughtupthequestionofaccessto
SrebrenicaforUNHCRandICRC.Wewereawareofthefactthatmenandboyshadbeen
separatedfromthewomenandthechildrenwhohadgonetoKladanj.Theystillheldthe
men.
Ofcourse,theSerbswouldsay“militarymen.”Thedefinitionof“military
age”wassomewhatliberal,toputitmildly.Theyclaimedthesemenwereprisonersofwar.
20RatkoMladić,“MeetingwithMilosević,BildtandGeneraldeLaPresle,”personaldiary,July14,1995,2115hours.Mladić,“MeetingwithUNandMilosević,”July15,1995.21AkashitoAnnan,“MeetinginBelgrade,”UNPF-HQ,Z-1175,July17,1995.
4-19
AsyoucanseeMladićapproved,inhisownhandwriting,theprincipleof“ICRCaccessto
prisonersofwar.”Istillfinditstrangethathetakesnotesofthis.Therearemanymysteries
here.ThemostdifficultaspectofourdiscussionsturnedouttobetheresupplyofUNforces
insideSarajevo,notablytheFrench,whohadalreadystartedtoshootbackagainstthe
Serbs,primarilywiththeirheavymortars.TheFrenchwerestartingtorunoutof
ammunitioninsideSarajevoandwantedtoresupply.Mladićwasnotkeentoallowusto
havefreeresupplyofammunitiontotheUNforces.Weinsistedandeventuallyhe,under
strongpressurealsofromMilosević,agreedtoopenuptherouteviaKiseljak.
ThingswerealsohappeningattheUN.UnderthepressureofaSecurityCouncil
resolution,theSecretary-GeneralinstructedMr.AkashitoretakeSrebrenica.22The
immediateactionthatBoutros-GhalitookwastoinstructMr.StoltenbergtogotoPaleand
holdtalkswiththePaleleadership.23Weconsideredthistobeamajormistakeand
managedtostopit.ThatiswhyMr.Akashi,Mr.Stoltenberg,andGeneralSmithwerecalled
tothefollowupmeetingwithMilosevićandMladićinBelgradeonSaturdaymorning.
Therewasalsothequestionofhowtore-establishadialoguebetweenGenerals
MladićandSmith,whichhadbrokenoffwiththeairstrikesagainstthePaleammunition
dumpsonMay25-26.WeweremeetingintheformerTitohuntinglodgeatDobanovci,
outsideBelgrade.Therewasadiscussionbetweenthegenerals,whoincludedGeneral
Smith,GeneralMladić,GeneraldeLaPresle,andGeneralElliot.Iwasthereforpartofthis
fairlyheavydiscussion.Oneofthequestionsdiscussed,needlesstosay,wasthereleaseof
theDutchhostages.Atthetime,thismeetingwashighlysecret,whichmeantthatthe
agreementweconcluded,primarilyontheresupplyofSarajevo,wasnotmadepublic.
Instead,ameetingwassetupbetweenGeneralSmithandGeneralMladićonJuly19.24They
22UNSCResolution1004,passedonJuly12,1994,statesthattheSecretary-Generalshould“useallresourcesavailabletohimtorestorethestatusasdefinedbytheAgreementof18April1993ofthesafeareaofSrebrenicainaccordancewiththemandateofUNPROFOR…”23RatkoMladić,“MeetingwithUNandMilosević,”July15,1995.24SeeBaxtertoUNPFZagreb,“MeetingNotes,”CommanderHQUNPROFOR,July19,1995.MladićagreedtoprovideICRCrepresentativeswithaccesstotheprisonerreceptionpoints“bytheendof20July,”apromisethathefailedtohonor.TheICRCwasnotpermittedaccesstodetentioncentersuntiltheendofJuly,whentheyweregrantedaccesstotheBatkoviccampinnortheasternBosnia,aswellas“anumberofemptydetentioncentresintheBratunacarea”.AccordingtotheUNSrebrenicareport,theywereonlyableto“register164prisonersfromSrebrenica.”ForMladićaccount,seediaryentryforJuly15,1995.AkashiraisedthequestionoftheSrebrenicamissingwithMiloseviconAugust12,repeatingdemandsforICRCaccesstothedetainees.Milosevicagreedthat
4-20
weresupposedtodeliveroneverythingatthatmeeting,whichwasmeanttobeofficially
reported.ThiswaspartofourstrategyofsplittingthePaleleadership.Wewantedtokeep
theMladićchannelassecretaswecouldfromthePaleleadership.
TOMBLANTON:SoyounegotiatedfullaccesstotheareaforUNHCRandICRConJuly15,
butwaituntilJuly19toworkoutthespecifics?Wasitnotsupposedtobeimmediate
access?
CARLBILDT:Itwasimmediate.TheJuly19meetingdealtmorewithSarajevoaccess.
RUPERTSMITH:There'snothingIdisagreewith,Ijustwanttofleshthisoutslightly.My
memoryishelpedbyanentryofthediaryofGeneralElliot,whowasatthetimemilitary
assistanttoGeneraldeLaPresle.25Mymemoryisthatwewentstraighttothemeetingin
the[Dobanovci]huntinglodge.IwasbyimpressedbyhowclearlyMladićandMilosević
wereasone,usingfamiliartermstoaddresseachother.Thiswasacloserelationship.The
generalswerethensentintoacorner“todealwiththemodalities,”intheusualphrase.
HowevermuchMr.Mladićagreedonthenightbefore,asyoucanseefromhisnotes,we
wentstraightbackintoargumentonthemorningofJuly15.
TOMBLANTON:Abouttheaccess?
RUPERTSMITH:Abouthowwedoallthis.Iwillquotesomenotesfromourdiscussionon
July15.“GeneralMladićwasinanexpansive,goodhumored,confidentmoodfollowingthe
fallofSrebrenica.GeneralSmithwascool,correctandstucktothepoint.Mladićneveronce
referredtoKaradzić,northeneedtopassanydecisionsarrivedatthroughPale.Duringthe
firstdiscussionsMladićstatedthattheuseofairpowerwasunjustifiedand‘aterrible
thing.’HereturnedtothismanytimesanddemandedthatGeneralSmithforswearitsuse.
Mladićwastoldthattheuseofairpowerwasinhishands.Ifhegavenoreasonforit,it
wouldn'tbeused.Ifhedid,itwouldbe.GeneralSmithwasresoluteonthis,evenwhenit
Mladic“muststicktohispromises,”butsaidhewas“havingdifficulties”communicatingwithMladic.SeeAkashitoAnnan,“ThemissingpopulationfromSrebrenica,”Z-1416,August14,1995.25SeeGen.ChristopherElliotdiaryentry,ICTY,courtesyofRupertSmith.ElliotwasmilitaryassistanttoGeneralBertranddeLaPresle,anadvisortoFrenchPresidentJacquesChiracandformerUNPROFORcommander.
4-21
lookedasthoughitmightderailthewholediscussions(which,Ihavetosay,hadtherestof
theaudiencesittingontheedgeoftheirseats).ThisisjusttofleshoutthepointthatCarl's
justmade.“Mladićdeferred,eachtime,eventually–asaresult,thedeterrenceofairpower
wasrepairedtosomedegree.”
Quotingagainfromthedocument,“theotherstickingpointwasfreedomof
movementforUNPROFORconvoys.”MladićtalksaboutŽepaandsaysheisnotgoingto
attackGoražde.Hegives“adetailedaccountofthetakingofSrebrenica,almostappealing
foradmirationorsympathy.”
Sowehavethisquiteirritatedargumentanddiscussiononhowwedothis,but
finishupwiththoseheadsofagreementfleshedoutinadocumentthatwethentakeback
tothelunchwhichoccursaboutfourintheafternoon.Theyreceiveastampofapproval
andwe[SmithandMladić]aretoldtomeetagainonJuly19.
Youwillseeinthisdocumentthat,astheyflybacktoZagreb(IamnottherebutI
ambeingtalkedabout),Bildtexpressesconcernthat“GeneralSmithmightsticksoclosely
to his principles nextWednesday [July 19] that a solutionwithMladićwill not emerge.”
Thereisconcernthat“GeneralSmithwouldescalate,notnegotiate,leadingtoawar.”There
wasadebateaboutthis.DeLaPreslemakesacommentthatitwaswrongformenottobe
incommunicationwithMladićsinceMarch.Asaresultofthis,ElliotsaysthatSmithneeds
“correctpoliticalguidance.”WearrangealinksothatCarlandIarecommunicating.Forthe
firsttime,I'mbeingconnectedwithapoliticalprocess.Carl,haveIgotthatmemoryright
aboutthecommunications?
CARLBILDT:Absolutely.Justtoexpandonthat,IwasanEUrepresentativeoperating
closelytogetherwiththeUNrepresentative,ThorvaldStoltenberg.Thatgavemeaccess
intotheUNsystem,althoughtheywereseparate.IreportedtotheEUPresidency.TheUS
rolewasfairlysignificant.IhadanUSdiplomatwithmeforcommunications.Wehada
securityproblemwhenwewereinBelgradewhichmeantthatweusedthefacilitiesofthe
USEmbassy.WemetinthesecureroomoftheUSEmbassyforallofourinternal
deliberations.WealsohadasecurelinktoHolbrookeattheStateDepartmenttomake
certainthathewasinthepicture.
4-22
Wealsohadalinksetupincasetherewereproblemswiththeagreementforthe
resupplyofSarajevo,whichMladićprofoundlydisliked[butMilosevićaccepted].The
FrenchmilitarysetupasatellitelinkbetweenBelgrade,whereIwas,andwhereRupert
was,somewhereoutinthemountainsofBosnia.ItwastobeusedtoputMilosevićin
communicationwithMladićifMladićstartedtobacktrackonwhathadbeenagreed.That
didnothappen.Mladićdidnotbacktrackatthatmeeting,butwewerepreparingforthe
eventuality.
TOMBLANTON:BythetimetheICRCoranybodyelsegottoBratunac,whatwasthere?
Noneofthatagreementwashonored?
RUPERTSMITH:Bitswere.Dutchbatcameout.Thatwaspartofthatagreement.Butaccess
totheareawasnothonoreduntiltheendofJuly.WemetagainonJuly25.26Thememo
statesthat“MladićconfirmedthathewouldallowICRCaccesstoSrebrenicaalthoughwe
understandthisisstilltotakeplace.”ByJuly25,westillhavenothadthataccessthatwas
promisedonJuly15andJuly19.
TOMBLANTON:Ineffect,hehasstalledthenegotiationcontinuously.
HASANMURATOVIĆ:Iwouldliketocomebacktothequestionofrefugees.AsMr.
KarremansandMr.Nicolaisaid,thingswentmuchfasterthananybodyexpectedatthat
time.WhatwastheBosniangovernmentpositionandwhatIwasdoing?Itriedtoputall
pressureandallresponsibilityontheUN.WehadnoaccesstoSrebrenica.OnlyUNPROFOR
hadanyaccess.WeexpectedUNPROFORtoorganizeitselfandstartdoingsomethingabout
therefugeesinSrebrenica.Mysuppositionwastheyhadhelicopters,APCs,transportation,
andverygoodconnectionswithallhumanitarianorganizations.Wethoughttheywouldgo
there,andorganizethetransportofpeopletofreeterritory.
TOMBLANTON:ColonelKarremansisshakinghishead.
26SeeBaxter,“MeetingnotesGeneralSmith/GeneralMladić25July,”UNPROFORCommander,July26,1995.
4-23
HASANMURATOVIĆ:IalwayspressedfortransportationbyUNPROFOR.Ithoughtthat
Dutchbatwasstrongerthantheywereinreality.Ididnotexpectthemtobeintheposition
inwhichtheywere.Ithoughttheycouldstopthetransportation[bytheBosnianSerbs].I
insistedthatpeoplebetransportedbyair,byhelicopters.WeputpressureonUNPROFOR
tobringintheirtransportationresourcesforthetransportationofrefugees.Iknewthey
hadtransportationresources.WedidnotexpectMladićtoorganizethetransportsso
quicklyhimself.IranbetweenGeneralSmith,AmbassadorMenziesoftheUnitedStates,
andTuzla.TheyprovidedmetransportbyhelicopterorbyAPC.IrantoTuzla,cameback.
HasanMuratović,withZlatkoLagumdzija,L
WeexpectedtherefugeestoarriveinKladanj.AlthoughIsaidatthattime,thatwe
werenotresponsiblefortherefugeesandtheUNhastoplacetheminTuzlaairport,you
willseefromthesereportsthatwehousedmanymorerefugeesthanUNPROFOR.27Iknew
thatthiswasgoingtobeaproblemlateron.Theycouldhaveaskedothercountriestotake
27Fordetailsonhandlingofrefugeesandcollectioncenters,seeBisertoMoussalli,“Srebrenica/TuzlaUpdate,”July17,1995.
4-24
refugees(transportingthemoutofTuzlaairport)whichwouldhavebeenmucheasierfor
usthaniftheywerescatteredaroundBosnia-Herzegovina.AsforthosethatleftSrebrenica
andwereontheirwaythroughtheforeststoTuzla,IkeptcallingAmbassadorMenzies,
tellinghim,“Theskyisclear,it'sasunnyday,youhaveAPCs,satellites,planes.Pleasetrack
whathashappenedtothethousandsofpeoplemovingfromSrebrenicatoTuzla.”How
cometheydidnotknowanythingaboutsuchamassofpeople?
Ihadtwomajorproblemstodealwith.Onewastrackingwhathappenedtothe
peoplewholeftSrebrenica.ThesecondwashowtobringthosethatwereinSrebrenicato
freeterritory.WhenIwasinTuzla,IwasassistedbyUNPROFORingettingaphonecallto
oneofourtranslatorsfromDutchbatinSrebrenica.Itoldhim,“Youmusttakeallpossible
carewithDutchbatnottoallowpeopletogetonbusesortrucksorganizedbyMladić.”He
toldme,“Icannotdoanything,theyarealreadyenteringthebuses.”Thatwasatthetime
whenthetransportationstarted.
Inhisbook,Mr.AkashisaidthatIdidnotreceivehimverynicelywhenhecameto
Sarajevo.28[Laughter]IalwaysfoughtwithUNPROFOR.Notwithallofthem.Iseparatethe
humanitariansideoftheUN,whichwasirreplaceableandrecognizedbytheBosnian
government,fromthemilitaryside,whichfailedcompletely.
TOMBLANTON:ColonelKarremans,youwantedtorespondbrieflyhere?
THOMKARREMANS:Yes,Iwouldliketorespond.First,concerningyourremarkabout
trucksandvehicles,IhadnodieselfromMarch1995.Thismadeitnecessarytorestrictuse
ofmyAPCsandtrucks.IftherewasadieseltransportthroughZvornik,Mladićorhismen
stoleit.Thatwasthecaseformany,manymonths.IusedthedieselfromUNHCR,asItold
youyesterday.Ineededdieselformycommunicationssystem,formyradios,andalsofor
thegenerators.WeliterallylivedinthedarkfromMarchonwards.Iextracteddieselfrom
mytrucksandAPCs.Theonlyvehiclesthatcouldbedrivenweremyjeeps.Thatwasit.
Therewasnowaywecouldtransport25,000refugees.Second,Mladićofferedmethe
28YasushiAkashi,IntheValleyBetweenWarandPeace,26-27.Akashiwrotehewas“shocked”bythe“vehemence”displayedbyMuratovicduringavisittoSarajevoinJanuary1994,andthe“extreme”severityofthecriticismoftheUNbytheBosniangovernment.
4-25
possibilitybeforeSrebrenicafellofleavingthesafeareawithmybattalion.29Isaid“No,I
willnotdothat,becausetherearestillwoundedpeoplehere.”
ZEIDRA'ADALHUSSEIN:WhentalkingtotheprosecutorsattheICTY,fromwhatIcould
understand,Mladićwasguidedbythesamelogicduringthosethreedays,July13-15,as
before.AdecisionwastakenonthenightofJuly11wastoexecutethe[military-aged]men
inPotočari.
Mladićdidnotknowthesizeofthecolumn[attemptingthebreakout],howmany
peopleweremakingtheirwayout.Astheyattackedtherearofthecolumn,moreandmore
menidentifiedthemselves.TheBosnianSerbsdiscovered(1)theywerenotbeingexposed,
becausedaybydaytheUNwasnotsayinganything,and(2)inthemeetingonJuly15in
Belgrade,itwasclearthatwedidnotknowwhattheyweredoing.
Theyfelttheyweregettingawaywithit.Sincetheyweregettingawaywithit,and
theyweredoingitefficiently,theyjustcontinuedthebusinessofmasskilling.Thislogic
continuesallthewaythrough.Theymusthavebeensurprisedtoacertaindegreebecause
thebodieswereondisplayatcertainlocations.Mladićwasthere,drivingupanddown,but
theUNdidnotknowthatthiswasgoingon.Thesamelogicisstillinapplication.
WehavenotdiscussedwhathappenedinCroatia,duringthefallofWestern
SlavoniainMay1995.30ItisinterestingasthereverseofwhathappenedafterSrebrenica.
TheCroatianstooktheareaawayfromtheSerbs.Thatoperationalsoinvolvedbuses
providedbytheCroatianswheretheSerbswereseparatedbutlaterfound.Therewereno
massexecutionsinthatcase.Mladićwasdisturbedbythisoperation.Atthebackofhis
mind,inorganizingbusestocartoffpeople,theremayhavebeenanechoofwhathe
understoodhadhappenedinCroatiatothenorth.
29SeeBosnianSerb“ultimatum”toDutchbat,recordedbyMajorFranken.30TheCroatianarmyrecapturedtheSerbbreakawayregionofWesternSlavoniainMay1995during“OperationFlash.”AccordingtoaJuly1995HumanRightsWatchreport,theCroatsdetained“approximately1,500Serbs”ofdraftage.WhilesomeSerbsweremistreatedinitially,theICRCwasabletogainaccesstothedetainees,whowereeventuallyreleased.Thereportdescribedallegationsof“massive”humanrightsabusesbyUNofficials,includingAkashi,as“unfortunateandpremature.”
4-26
TOMBLANTON:Thisbringsustothequestionofwhatweknew,andwhendidweknewit.
AsreportedinTheIndependentonJuly17,BelgradetelevisionscreenedavideoonJuly14
whichincludesafewframesofapileofbodiesoutsidetheKravicawarehousenear
Srebrenica.
Basedonthatvideo,theBelgradecorrespondentofTheIndependent,RobertBlock,wrotea
storyheadlined“BodiespileupinhorrorofSrebrenica,”whichalsomentionedabortive
attemptsbytheICRCtovisitBratunacandtheseparationofmenandwomen.31
OnJuly18,AkashireceivesanotefromAnnan(signedbyShashiTharoor)inNew
Yorkaskingabout“widespreadandconsistent”reportsofatrocitiescommittedbythe
BosnianSerbsfollowingthetakeoverofSrebrenica.32Hecomplainsthatwehave“received
nothingonthesubjectfromUNPROFOR.”AkashirespondsonJuly19,estimatingthetotal
numberof“unaccounted”asbetween4,000-8,000.33TheresponsealsonotesthattheBSA
“stillrefusetograntICRCaccesstodetainees.”
31SeeRobertBlock,“BodiespileupinhorrorofSrebrenica,”TheIndependent,July17,1995.32AnnantoAkashi,“HumanRightsViolationsbyBosnianSerbs,”UN2381,July18,1995.33AkashitoAnnan,“DispositionofDisplacedPersonsfromSrebrenica,”UNPF-HQ,Z-1198,July19,1995.
4-27
IwouldliketoaskMr.Akashiaboutthisresponse.Itisamathematicalresponse
ratherthanaresponsedealingwiththekindofaccountpublishedinTheIndependent.Itis
ananalysisofthenumbersmissing,emphasizing“theimprecisenatureofthesefigures.”
ShashiTharoor,youarehearingfromthemediaandcredibleobservers,including
UNHCR.Couldyoucommentonthatandthismessage?Mr.Akashi,couldyoucommenton
thereplyandcollectionofevidence?
SHASHITHAROOR:WewereobviouslyindailyandfrequentcontactwithUNPROFOR
whileallofthiswasunraveling.Whenthemenandboyswereseparated,werecommended
thatwehaveanUNPROFORarmedpersononboardeachbustoensurethatnoharmwas
donetothem.Thiswasaphoneconversation.Thatturnedoutnottobepracticalbecause
theSerbswouldnotagreetoit.WedidnotrealizethatUNPROFORitselfwasdisarmed
whenwegavethatideatothem.Inanycase,fromthenextdayonwards,storiesof
massacresstartedappearing.Theystartedwithmediareports,andwealsogotinformation
fromsomeofthepermanentmissionsinNewYork,includingtheUSmission.Wewere
worriedthatweweregettingnothingatallfromourownpeople.Wewantedtogetthe
recordstraightastheSecurityCouncilwasclamoringforanauthoritativebriefing.We
weregettingluridaccountsinthepapersandnothingwecouldtelltheCouncil.Thatis
whatthisrequestwasallabout.
TOMBLANTON:Mr.Akashi,howdidyoureadthatrequestandwhatreportsdidyouhave
atthattime?
YASUSHIAKASHI:Wehadbitsofinformationwhichweweretryingtopiecetogether.As
youcanseefromourresponse,itwasadesperateprocessassemblingallthisintoafaxto
getdowntothetruthofthematter.IgotadifferentimpressionofMladićfromthemeeting
withMilosevićonJuly15fromRupert,whodescribedMladićas“expansive,”Ibelieve.34I
observedMladićcloselyandthoughthelookedcompletelydifferentfromhisusual,self-
confidentself.Rupertwascalmandrational,butMladić'smoodchangedsuddenlyfrom
cooltoexcitedandagitated.Hewaslosinghisusualcomposure.Ithoughtsomethingmust
34The“expansive,goodhumored,confident”descriptionofMladićcamefromGeneralElliot,notGeneralSmith.
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havehappenedtohimintheprecedingdays.Inhindsight,verydrasticthingshadbeen
happening.MyimpressionofMladićonJuly15wasthatsomethingwasamissbutIcould
notmakeoutthereasonforhisunusualattitude.
TOMBLANTON:Themoment,atleastontheUSside,whenitbecomescrystalclearisthe
July25,1995cablefromAmbassadorGalbraithinZagreb[forwardedtoTonyLakeand
otherNSCofficialsbySandyVershbow],whichwasbasedonrefugeeaccountscompiledby
[UNofficial]ToneBringainTuzla.35Tone,canyoujustbrieflydescribehowthatstory
reachedPeter,becauseitcertainlywokeupWashington?
ToneBringa,right,withPeterGalbraith
TONEBRINGA:CanIencourageyounottolosesightoftheideologythatmotivatedand
justifiedMladić'sactions?Thereissomethingcalled"priming"whenyoulookatthesteps
inagenocide.MladićhadbeenpriminghisownSerbpopulationinpreparingforgenocide.
IdonotknowifthepeoplewhoworkedatUNPROFORreadthe“Prijedorreport”bytheUN35GalbraithtoSecState,“PossibleMassExecutionofSrebrenicaMalesisreasontosaveŽepa,”AmEmbassyZagreb,Zagreb02788,July25,1995.NSCofficialSandyVershbowforwardedtheGalbraithcabletotheNSCadvisor,TonyLake,andhisdeputy,SandyBerger,thesamedaywiththecomment,“thefactofSerbmasskillingsatSrebrenicaisbecomingincreasinglyclear.Grimreading.”
4-29
CommissionofExpertsandtheconclusionstheydrew.36Thereportqualifiedtheeventsin
PrijedordistrictafterApril30,1992,whichwereillustrativeofthelargerdynamicsin
Bosnia,as“crimesagainsthumanity.”Itpredictedthataninternationalcourtwouldrule
that“theseeventsconstitutegenocide.”WhatwastakingplaceinSrebrenicadidnotappear
outofnowhere.Ineededtosaythat.
ConcerningtheJuly25Galbraithcable,IwasworkingfortheAnalysisand
AssessmentUnitinAkashi'soffice,UNPFHQinZagreb.Iwasexasperatedatthetimeby
whatIperceivedasasenseofbusinessasusualattheHQwhileallthiswasgoingon.We
heardreports,butwhatmostlytriggeredmetoactinsomewaywasallthesewomen
arrivingasrefugeestoTuzla,saying,“Whereareourmen?Wewantourmen,whereare
they?”Wewaited.Aweekpassedandtheydidn'tturnup.Ithought,“WhatcanIdo,I'man
anthropologist,maybeIcangothereandtalktopeopleandmaybepickupsomething.”I
askedpermissiontogotoTuzla.Ithenlearnedthatsomehumanrightsofficersweregoing
toTuzla.Infact,theyarementionedintheJuly19cablefromAkashitoAnnan,replyingto
thequestion“whatareyouplanningtodo?”Akashisays,we'resendingUNofficers“with
specifichumanrightstraining.”Iwentwiththem.
Thereweretwohumanrightsofficers,PeggyHicksandGraceKang.Wewenttothe
UNbasethere[atTuzlaairport].Theyaskedovertheloudspeakersforanyonetocome
forwardwhohadjustarrivedfromSrebrenica.Wedidnotwaitlongwhenamancame
running.Hewasveryagitated.Hesaid,“I'mlookingformywifeandchildren,Ican'tfind
thembutIhavetotalktoyoufirst,IhavetotalktotheUN,Ihavesomethingtotellyou.”
PeggyHicksthensaidthatGraceKangshouldtalktohim.Isatinonthatinterview.37The
waytheywork,theyhaveachecklistandaskveryspecificquestions.SinceIunderstand
Bosnian,Iwasabletolistendirectlytowhatthemansaid,withoutthehelpofthe
interpreter.Itwasverycleartomethathewasspeakingthetruth.Ahumanrightsofficeris
alwaysconcernedwithcredibility.Theyhavedealtwithpeoplewhomakeupstories.As
36TheUNreleasedasummaryofthe“Prijedorreport”onMay24,1994.See“FinalreportofthecommissionofexpertsestablishedpursuanttoSecurityCouncilResolution780(1992),”S/1994/674,particularlyparagraph182.TheIntelligenceandResearchbureauoftheStateDepartmenthadissuedwarningsabout“attemptedgenocideofBosnianMuslims”asearlyasJanuary1993.SeeMulhollandtoKanter,“Bosnia:ActionscontributingtoGenocide,”USDepartmentofState,January11,1993.37TheinterviewtookplaceonJuly22.SeeGraceKang,“ReportofHumanRightsViolations,”July22,1995.
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thisman'sstoryunfolded,however,Ihadaterriblerealizationaboutthefateofthemissing
boysandmenofSrebrenica.Irealizedthatthismasskillingofunimaginableproportions
hadtakenplaceandthathewasjustoneofahandfulofsurvivors.38
Ihadnodoubtthathisstorywastrueandthathewastalkingfrompersonal
experience.Hewasveryconcentratedashespoke.Hislanguagewasfactualandtothe
point,hisdescriptionsweredetailed,hewascitingspecificplacenamesandgivingthe
exactchronologyofevents.ItwasnotthekindofvaguestatementthatIoftenhadseen
frompeoplewhowerereportingthingstheyheardonthenews.Heshowedmethemarks
oftheropearoundhiswrists,andagrazetohistemplecausedbyagunshotwound.That
wasthebulletthatwasmeantforhim.Hesurvivedbecausehewasprotectedbydead
bodiesfallingontopofhim.Theydugtheseditchesthattheythenfellinto.Thatnight,he
heardsomebodyelse'svoice,thevoiceofanothersurvivor.Theyescapedinthenighttothe
safearea.
IreturnedbyhelicopterbacktoZagrebwithGraceKangandimploredher,“Doyou
realizetheenormityofwhatyoujustheard?Doyourealizewhatthisstorymeans?Please
writeastronglywordedreportandmakesureitdoesn'tendupinadrawerattheUN.”By
thenIknewhowthesereportswereoftenwatereddownandmaybeendedupinsome
drawer.PeggyHickswrotethereportbackinZagreb.39Shealsohadanothersurvivor
story,asfarasIcanremember.
38The35-year-oldsurvivorisreferredtoas“O.H.”inanAugust3,1995cablefromGalbraith.[AmEmbassyZagrebtoSecState,“HumanRightsabuses–Srebrenica,”Zagreb02953,August3,1995].AccordingtotheinitialJuly25cable,themansurvivedamassexecutiononJuly14,1995byhidingbeneathapileofbodies.ABosnianarmymilitaryintelligencedocumentdatedJuly20,1995statedthatOsmanHalilovic,aged35,andNedzadAvdic,aged17,had“crossedourdefencelinesintothefreeterritory”onJuly18,1995.ThetwomendescribedhowtheywerecapturedintheKonjevićPolje/NovaKasabaareaonJuly12andtakenonJuly14toamassexecutionsiteatadamnearthevillageofPetkovci,35kilometerstothenorth.TheplacenamesintheinitialGalbraithcablewereconfused,sometimeserroneous,andonlyclarifiedastheresultofasubsequentinvestigationbyICTY.39PeggyHickswasamemberoftheHumanRightsOffice,reportingtotheheadofCivilAffairs,MichelMoussalli.MoussalliforwardedthereporttoAkashionJuly31.SeeMoussallitoAkashi,“Srebrenicahumanrightsreport,”July31,1995.AkashiforwardedthereporttoAnnaninNewYorkonAugust12,incodecableZ-1406,inresponsetoAnnan’srequestforfurtherinformationaboutallegedatrocitiescommittedbytheBosnianSerbs.SeeAnnantoAkashi,“Srebrenica:Investigation,”NewYork2665,August10,1995.TheAnnancablewastriggeredinpartbyapresentationbyMadeleineAlbrighttotheUNSecurityCouncil,identifyingpossiblemassgraves.HickshadearliersentaJuly21memotoMoussalli,“RecommendationConcerningSrebrenicaMissingandDetained”,thaturgedtheSecurityCounciltofocus“urgent”attentionon“theissueofthemissinganddetainedfromSrebrenica.”SeealsoBisertoMoussalli,“SectorNortheastHumanRightsUpdate,”July21,1995.
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AsIreadherreport,Irememberthatmyhandsfelldownonthetablewiththe
paper.ThismusthavebeentherockbottomofmytimeattheUN.Iwas
completelydespondentbecausethereporttalkedaboutaccountsthatwerestill
“unconfirmedandunsubstantiated.”Ithought,“WhatdoIdo?”Myfirstthoughtwas,“I'll
takethisreportandgostraightintomyboss,Akashi,nextdoor,andresignonthespot.”But
Iwasacompletelyinsignificantpersonanditwouldhavehadnoconsequencewhatsoever.
Iwasconcernedthatthereportshouldreachsomeonewhowouldrealizetheimplication
ofitandthenact.Peopledidn'tactthen.Thatevening,IhaddinnerwithPeter,whoI'd
gottentoknowasapersonwhoacted.ItoldhimaboutwhatI'dheardandsaidtohim,
“Pleasedosomething.”
MICHAELDOBBS:Peter’scablegottheattentionoftheWhiteHouse.Itwascirculatedby
SandyVershbowwhowantedtojoinustodaybutwasunableto.SandywasJenonne's
successorasDirectorofEuropeanAffairsattheNationalSecurityCouncil.Sothealarm
bellswentoffinWashington?
TOMBLANTON:AndtriggeredtheroadtoDayton,no?
PETERGALBRAITH:Itgottheattentionofpeopleatthetopalthoughyoucanseethatsome
peoplewereprobablytiredofmyrecommendations.
TOMBLANTON:Thereisalineinhere,“WhateveryouthinkofGalbraith’s
recommendationreŽepa....”40
PETERGALBRAITH:Thatwasprobablyacommonreactiontomycablestotheextentthat
theywereread.Thecablementionsaplace,KonjevićPolje,whichenabledpeopletolook
forsatellitephotographsthatmatchedupwiththedates.Ihavesubsequentlylearnedthat
thismaynothavebeentheplacewherethemassexecutiondescribedbythesurvivortook
40GalbraithurgedtheUSgovernmenttoact“topreventasimilartragedyatŽepa.”ŽepafelltotheSerbstwodayslater,onJuly27,1995.
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place.41ThecablealsotriggeredthemissionbyJohnShattuck,whichreinforcedthewhole
thing.
Ithinkthatthequestionhere,tobehonest,isabouttheUN.Myunderstandingis
thatthePeggyHicksreportwasacompilationofrefugeeaccountsratherthanonestory.It
waswritteninawaythatwassoqualifieditwasnotgoingtoattractattention.
Whatsurprisesmeisthattherewasnotateamoutcollectingthesestoriesright
fromthebeginning.Iknowthatourownembassyhadpeopleoutintherefugeecampsall
thetime.Youhadmanymoreresourcesthanwedid.Whenthestorycamein,youhavethe
41TheJuly25andAugust3GalbraithcableserroneouslyreportedthatthemassexecutiondescribedbythesurvivortookplaceatKonjevićPolje,wheninfactittookplaceatPetkovcidam,35kilometersaway.ThisledCIAanalyststofocustheiroriginalsearchforevidenceofmassgravesalongafivekilometerstretchofroadbetweenKonjevićPoljeandNovaKasaba,ratherthanPetkovcidam.ICTYinvestigatorslaterdiscoveredtheremainsof33individualsburiedattheNovaKasaba/KonjevićPoljesite,farfewerthanthe809setsofremainsassociatedwiththeexecutionsatPetkovcidam.SeeDusanJanc,“UpdatetotheSummaryofForensicEvidence,”April21,2010.
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headofyourhumanrightsunitsaying,“Ihavetodownplaythisbecauseofthehead
ofthemission.”Thequestionis:why?Mysuspicionisthatyouknewthereweredifferent
viewsbetweentheAmericansandtheUNanddidnotwanttoinflametheAmericans.Is
thatacorrectassumption?ItmightinflameMadeleineAlbright.
YASUSHIAKASHI:Ihavenotthoughtaboutthethingsyouhavejustmentioned.Itnever
occurredtome.
JOHNSHATTUCK:Icanjustcarrythisalittlebitfurther.Petercalledmeprobablyeven
beforethiscablewasreceivedintheWhiteHouse.Iwasn'tunderinstructionstofollowup
onhismessagebutitwasobviouslyverycompelling.Iimmediatelystartedworkingtotry
togetoutthere.ThebackgroundwasthatIwasfrustratedbytheinabilitytogetthekindof
informationthatnormallyonegetsfromtheICRCandUNHCRaboutthemissingmenafter
thefallofSrebrenicaalmosttwoweeksearlier.42Ihadtriedthrough[ICRCpresident]
CorneliusSommaruga,withwhomIwasworkingcloselyonothermatters,toseewhat
ICRCmighthave.Theyhadnothing.Theysaidtheyhadn'tbeengivenaccesstothearea.
ThesamewastrueforUNHCR.
ThefirsttangibleinformationcamefromPeter'sphonecallandTone’strip.Istarted
tryingtogooutrightaway,literallythatday.Ithoughtitwasextremelyimportant,butthe
“atmospherics”weredifficult.NeithertheWhiteHousenortheStateDepartmentwould
clearmytriprightawaybecauseoftheratherdelicatenegotiationsanddiscussionsthat
wereunderwayinLondonwiththetroopcontributingnations.Thefeelingwasthat
nothingshouldbefurtherspotlightedonwhatwasgoingoninSrebrenica.43
Ihadfurtherdifficultywithdiplomaticsecuritywhichwouldnotclearmytripfora
coupleofdays.AllofthiswasclearedupbecauseoftheinterventionsofMadeleine
42SeeShattucktoTheSecretary,“DefenseoftheSafeAreasinBosnia,”InformationMemorandum,July19,1995.Shattuckcited“crediblereportsofsummaryexecutions”andreportedthat“tensofthousandsofpeople”hadnotbeenaccountedfor.43Seniorofficialsfrom16NATOcountries,includingtheUnitedStates,plusRussiametinLondononJuly22toforgeacommonpolicyonBosnia.ThemeetingendedwiththreatsofNATOairstrikesiftheSerbsattackedGoražde.SeeMichaelDobbsandFredBarbash,“AllieswarnSerbstoavoidGoražde,”WashingtonPost,July23,1995.
4-34
Albright,RichardHolbrooke,andWarrenChristopher.44TheSecretaryofStatehadbeen
quiteambivalentaboutBosniabutrealizedtheimportanceofthistrip.WhenIgotto
Zagreb,ImetwithToneandobviouslyPeter,andgotfurtherinformationfromthem.We
decidedimmediatelythatIshouldgotoTuzlaandtrytofindmoreofthesemen,notonly
theonethatTonemet,butothers.Ispentadayandahalfthere,talkingtoseveralsurvivors
including[a55-year-oldcrippledbricklayer]HuremSuljic,whobecamemyprincipal
witness.45Iwasableveryquicklytocredithisreportbecauseofthespecificityofthe
informationheprovidedandthewoundsthathehadsuffered,includinggrazingwoundon
histemple,whenhefellintoapitwithbodies.Therewereatleasttwootherswithsimilar
accounts.
TherewasoneremarkablethingthatIrememberhesaid,whichwasMladić's
behaviorthroughoutthistime.Mladićcameandaddressedthemenastheywerebeing
roundedup.Eachtimeheassuredthemthattheywouldeventuallybeabletoleave.Hesaid
44HolbrookeviewedShattuck’stripas“animportantopportunitytoassertsomebasictruths”,butinsistedon“closecoordination”overhispressstatementstoensurethat“John’sbriefcanbeseparatedfrom,butreinforce,ournegotiations.”Seeundated“MsgforAmbG[albraith]fromA/SHolbrooke”,Galbraithpapers,NDU.45SeeSpiegel/ShattucktoSecState,“ShattuckMissiontoBosnia,”USmissionGeneva005948,August2,1995.The“55-year-oldcrippledman”inthecableisareferencetothebricklayerHuremSuljicwhosecrippledconditionmadeitimpossibleforhimtojointhebreakoutattempt.HesoughtrefugewithDutchbatinPotočari,andwastakentoBratunacfollowingtheseparationofthemenfromthewomenandchildren.HissurvivalofamassexecutionnearthetownofOrahovaconJuly14isdescribedinRohde,Endgame,298-300.
HuremSuljic,CNNinterview
4-35
theywerebeingheldasprisonersandhewastryingtocalmthem.Tomethatindicateda
highdegreeofintentionalityonhispart.Assomeonewhohadgatheredalotofevidence
relatedtoethniccleansingandearliergenocidaleventslikePrijedor,Iunderstoodthisas
anextensionofwhathadhappenedearlierinthewar.Thiswasnotsomethingcompletely
differentfromwhathadbeengoingoninBosniaupuntilthen,orindeedCroatia.Itis
importantfortherecordtostressthatthenoveltyofSrebrenicawasthescaleofthekilling
(atleast7,000men,thelargestgenocideinEuropesincetheSecondWorldWar),notthe
natureofit,whichwaspartoftheoverallethniccleansingcampaign.
[AfterIreturnedtoWashington]IwascontactedbyayoungCIAofficerwho
informedmethatheandseveralothersofhiscolleagueshadseenthecablesthatIhad
filed.Theytookituponthemselvestodeterminewhethertherewereaerialphotographs
connectedwiththenamesandplacesthatIhaddescribedinthecables.Itwasthrough
theireffortstoidentifyaerialphotographsthatwewereabletogettheevidenceoffreshly
dugmassgravesthatMadeleineAlbrighttooktotheSecurityCouncilonAugust10.46This
wasnotatop-downdecision.Thepeoplewhoreadmyreportessentiallytaskedthemselves
46AlbrighttoSecStateWashingtonDC,“AmbAlbrightBriefsSecurityCouncilonPossibleMassGravesNearSrebrenica,”USMissiontotheUN,USUN03086,August11,1995.TheAlbrightpresentationincludedaphotographofagroupofprisonersinafieldintheKonjevićPolje/NovaKasabaarea,aswellasaphotographof“disturbedearth”nearby.Forreasonsexplainedabove(seeFN35--TKTK),AlbrightmisidentifiedtheplaceofthemasskillingasKonjevićPolje/NovaKasaba.SherepeatedthegarbledaccountoriginallyreportedbyGalbraithinher2003autobiography,MadamSecretary,page188.Forproblemsininterpretingoverheadimagery,seeinterviewwithJean-ReneRuez,leadICTYinvestigatorforSrebrenica,“LesenquetesduTPIY.”Cultures&Conflits,65(printemps2007).“WhenMadeleineAlbrightshowedthe[July27]photosofmultiplegravesatNovaKasaba[totheUN],shelinkedthephotosingoodfaithwiththepreviousimageofthesoccerstadiumofNovaKasaba.OntheJuly13photo,largegroupsofprisonerscanbeseenintheNovaKasabasoccerstadium...Thelogicalconclusionforanyoneseeingthesephotosisthefollowing:peopleareonasoccerfield,gravesappearednearbyafterwards,thereforethesepeopleareinthegraves.”Ruezexplainedthatthiswasnotthecase.“WealreadyknewinAugust1995thatthissitewasnotthesiteof[mass]executions.Itwasa[prisoner]collectionsitewhere,accordingtothetestimonythatwehad,individualmurderstookplace.”TheprisonersvisibleintheJuly13photoofthesoccerstadiumwere“transferredtoBratunac,”tobeexecutedelsewhere.Ruez’sconclusion:“Thisshowsthattechnologicalintelligencecannotbedisconnectedfromthehumanreality,thatistosayeyewitnesstestimonyfollowedbyverificationontheground.”[TranslationfromFrench.]AnICTYinvestigationlaterestablishedthattheNovaKasabasites(NKS1-4)containedtheremainsof33people.AseniorU.S.officialtoldtheWashingtonPostthattheNovaKasabaimagerywasfoundinthearchivesoftheNationalPhotographicInterpretationCenter(NPIC)onAugust2,andreportedintheNationalIntelligenceDaily,aclassifiednewslettercirculatedtoseniorpolicymakers,onAugust4.SeeDobbsandSmith,“NewProofOfferedofSerbAtrocities,”WashingtonPost,October29,1995.IttooktheCIAanothermonthtoidentifythePetkovcidammassacresite.DavidRohdewasarrestedatthePetkovci[RedDam]siteonOctober28,onareturntriptoBosnia,followingatip-offfroma“Washington-basedU.S.Intelligenceofficial.”[SeeRohde,Endgame,342-343].
4-36
tofindtheaerialphotographs.Thetaskinghadnotyetgoneouttoproduceaerial
photography[onsuspectedwarcrimes].Itwouldhavebeenmuchmorevaluableifithad
beengatheredearlier.
IfrequentlyattendedtheseventhfloormeetingsattheStateDepartmentwhich
wereheldeverymorning,usuallychairedbytheDeputySecretaryofState,StrobeTalbott
thatincludedtheAssistantSecretariesofState.WhenthesubjectofBosniawasdiscussed,
particularlyin1994andearly1995,itwasdifficulttoinjectalotoffactualinformation
aboutwhatwasgoingonthegroundthatIwasreceivingfromembassiesorfrommyown
staff.Therewasagreatdealofskepticismaboutmyuseofthetermgenocide.State
Departmentlegaladvisorsconstantlypushedbackagainstmyuseofthetermbecauseit
wouldimplyanobligationonthesignatoriesoftheGenocideConventiontotake
appropriateactioninresponse.Thatwasthewholepointofusingtheterm,obviously.Ihad
thesameproblemsinthecaseofRwanda.47
WhenIcamebackfromtheseinterviewsinTuzlaandsubmittedadetailedreportto
theSecretaryofStateonAugust4,youcouldhaveheardapindropintheroom.48Virtually
everyonecameuptomeafterwards,nottocongratulatemebutsimplytosaythankyoufor
finallyproducingwhatshouldhavebeenevidentlongbefore,butwasbeingpushedback.
TOMBLANTON:Inhisbook,AlltheMissingSouls,DavidScheffersayshetalkedtoGeorge
TenetonJuly19,andagreedto“produceadailyupdateonhumanitarianandwarcrimes
developments.”GeorgehadjustbecomeDeputyDirectorattheCIAandDavidwasworking
forMadeleineatthattime.Ithinkthereweremultipleplacesthattherequestwascoming
from.49Let’saskDavidRohdeforhispartofthestory.Youtookacrumpledfaxversionofa
photographthatMadeleinehadshownattheUnitedNationsonAugust10andwalked
alongtheroadbetweenNovaKasabaandKonjevićPolje.Isthatcorrect?
47ArticleIofthe1948GenocideConventionstatesthatsignatoriesconfirmthatgenocide“isacrimeunderinternationallawwhichtheyundertaketopreventandtopunish.”Thearticlecanbeinterpretedasmeaningthatsignatorieshaveadutytointervenetopreventgenocide.ForhesitationaboutusingtermgenocideincaseofRwanda,seeRwandaconferencetranscript,2-14.48ShattucktoTheSecretary,“BosniaTripReport,”InformationMemorandum,August4,1995.Thememostatedthat“atrocitieshavetakenplaceonamassivescale”and“hundredsifnotthousands”ofunarmedrefugeeshadbeenkilled,“manybymassexecutions.”49DavidScheffer,AlltheMissingSouls,104.
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PhotoshowninUNonAug.10thatguidedRohdetogravesite
NovaKasabaprisoners,July13
4-38
TOMBLANTON:Inhisbook,AlltheMissingSouls,DavidScheffersayshetalkedtoGeorge
TenetonJuly19,andagreedto“produceadailyupdateonhumanitarianandwarcrimes
developments.”GeorgehadjustbecomeDeputyDirectorattheCIAandDavidwasworking
forMadeleineatthattime.Ithinkthereweremultipleplacesthattherequestwascoming
from.50Let’saskDavidRohdeforhispartofthestory.Youtookacrumpledfaxversionofa
photographthatMadeleinehadshownattheUnitedNationsonAugust10andwalked
alongtheroadbetweenNovaKasabaandKonjevićPolje.Isthatcorrect?
DAVIDROHDE:Yes,onAugust17.Itwasbyaccident.IwasenteringSerb-controlled
territoryfromSerbiatocoverSerbsfleeingtheCroatianadvanceintoKrajina[Operation
Storm].InsteadoflettingmegodirectlytoBanjaLuka,theborderguardsaidyouhaveto
gotothe[RepublikaSrpskacapital]Palefirst.Iwasabletospendtwodayssearching
aroundthearea,butitstartedwithamistakebytheborderguard.Ifyoulookatthe
photograph,youwillseeburialsitesNKS-1andNKS-2,whereIfoundemptyammunition
boxes.TherewasadecomposinglegjuttingoutofthegraveatNKS-3.Ilaterspenttwo
weeksinTuzlawhereIspokewithHuremSuljic,andfoundhalfadozenothermenwho
mentionednotjusttheNovaKasabasite,butatleastsixotherexecutionsites.Igotthe
numberwrong.Iestimatedmaybe3,000dead.Iwasamazedbyitall.51
IhaveaquestionaboutŽepa,whichwaseffectivelywrittenoffonJuly21withthe
Londondeclaration.YoustateinyourJuly25cablethatŽepashouldbesaved.52Therewere
15,000peopleintheenclave.TheBosnianswereholdingtheSerbsoffonJuly21,10days
afterthefallofSrebrenica.Actually,ŽepadoesnotfalluntilJuly25.IhavehadBosniansask
meabouttheconspiracytheory:cleaningupthemap,gettingridoftheenclaves.Whywas
Žepawrittenoff?Theyheldoutfortwoweeks.
50DavidScheffer,AlltheMissingSouls,104.51RohdesummarizedhisinitialfindingsinarticlesfortheChristianScienceMonitor,“EvidenceIndicatesBosniaMassacre,”August18,1995,and“HowaSerbMassacrewasExposed,”August25,1995.OrderedtoproceedtoPale,hefoundhimselfontheroadbetweenKonjevićPoljeandNovaKasaba,nearthesiteofthephotographofthereportedatrocities.52GalbraitharguedinhisJuly27cablethattheLondondeclaration“implicitlywritesoffŽepa,”bydrawingthelineatGoražde.
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PETERGALBRAITH:Toaddsomeadditionalhistory,IhadbeenbackintheUnitedStates.I
havetosaythatChristopherwasnotveryfondofme.Wereallyhadn'tinteractedthat
muchbutheagreedtoseemeafterSrebrenica.Hewasafraidofanother,ratherhighprofile
resignation,whichIwasatthatpointconsidering.DickHolbrookewasalsoconsidering
resigning,althoughhelaterwoulddenythat,butwedidhavethatconversation.My
meetingwithChristopherwasaroundJuly18or19.Iarguedthatweshouldnotbewriting
offŽepa.53
WhentheLondondeclarationcameoutonJuly21,IwasonBrioni[Tito’sformer
privateisland]withTudjmanandTurkishpresidentSuleymanDemirel.Thereactionwas
astonishmentbecauseithadalsowrittenoffBihać.54
Allofthisthensetoffthesequenceofeventsthatbroughtthewartoanend.The
CroatianshadalreadydecidedthattheywouldtakemilitaryactioninNovember1995to
retaketheKrajina.ThatiswhytheyhadaneightmonthextensionoftheUNmandate,
whichwasnowcalledUNCRO,insteadoftheusualsixmonths.WhyNovember?Becauseit
iswinterinnorthernBosniaandmuchharderforSerbiatoresupplytheKrajina.Ifyouare
comingupfromthecoast[inthecaseoftheCroatianarmy],itwasnotsobad.Infactitisa
goodtime.Second,theywerereallytryingtogettheirtouristeconomybackup.Havinga
warinthemiddleofthetouristseasonwasnotagoodthing.
TheCroatianssawtheopportunitythatwaspresentedafterSrebrenica,becausethe
BosnianSerbsandtheCroatianSerbsproceededtoattackBihać.TheCroatianswere
concernedthatifBihaćfellitwouldbetotheirstrategicdisadvantage.TheSerbswouldno
longerneedtodefendbothinternallinesaroundtheBihaćenclaveandexternalonesfacing
theCroatians.Theinsideofthedonutwoulddisappearandthoseforcescouldthenbe
transferredtofaceCroatia.TheCroatianssawtheopportunitythatexistedandwere
alreadyproceedingwithacampaignuptheLivnovalley[southofBihać].Thequestionwas:
53SeeGalbraithdiaryentry,July20,1995.GalbraitharguedthatapublicstatementdrawingthelineatGorazde“couldhavedisastrousconsequencesforthe16,000peopleatŽepa.”54SeeGalbraithdiaryentry,July21,1995,whichnotesthatTurkishdelegationwas“openlycontemptuous”oftheLondondeclaration.TudjmanpointedoutlackofreferencetoBihać.
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whatwouldbetheresponseoftheUnitedStates?
PortionofCIAmaponOperationStorm,August4-8,1995
Remember,asImentionedyesterday,theCroatianshadalreadyaskedon
November12,1994whatourpositionwouldbeiftheyweretogothroughtheKrajinato
relievethesiegeofBihać.55AsmycablestoWashingtonexplain,theyplannedtotakethe
wholething.ThereactionfromWashingtonwasswiftandstrong:wedonotwantawider
war.Idisagreed,butthoseweremyinstructions.OnJuly21[1995]thedefenseminister
ŠušaktoldmeatlunchthatCroatiaagainplannedtorelievethesiegeofBihaćbygoing
throughSlunj.OnceagainCroatiawantedtoknowwhattheUSreactionwouldbe.There
wastheusualbackandforthwithWashington.Atonepointtheinstructionsare:tellthem
nottodoit,butnotverystrongly,i.e.asortofgreenlight.ThemessagethatIeventually
deliveredatthebeginningofAugusttoTudjmanonBrioniwas:weappreciatewhyyou're
willingtoexpendbloodandtreasuretosavethepeopleofBihać.Onmyown,Ithenadded
55Galbraithdiaryentry,November12,1994.
4-41
tougherlanguageaboutrefugeesandprotectingUNpersonnel.Theadministrationwould
saythatitwasa"nolight"butTudjmaninterpreteditasagreenlight.56
ThissequenceofeventswasverymuchtriggeredbywhathappenedinSrebrenica.
TheCroatianoffensive[knownasOperationStorm]retooktheKrajinainfourdays,
[betweenAugust4and8].ItcontinuedintoBosnia,aidedlaterbyNATOairstrikes.Aswe
seefromthedebatesaboutIraqandAfghanistan,itisbootsonthegroundthatmatter.For
betterorworse,thebootsonthegroundwereCroatian,preciselybecausewedidnotwant
tohaveanotherSrebrenica.Inoneofmycablesthatisalsointhediary,IwarnthataBSA
takeoverofBihaćcouldproduce40,000deadiftheSerbsbehavedastheydidin
Srebrenica.
JOHNSHATTUCK:Iwouldliketojustaddonefootnote.TheKrajinaoffensiveendedup
beingstrategicallyvaluablefromadiplomaticstandpointinDayton.Itprovidedvery
concreteevidencethattheSerbsactuallywerealsovictimsofthewarthatwasbroughtto
anendinDayton.IthinkthatitgavetheDaytonprocess,particularlythehumanrights
spotlightingthatIstarteddoingaroundthattime,morecredibilityinBelgradethanit
mighthaveotherwisehad.IspenttimereportingonwhathadhappenedtotheSerbswho
wereforcedoutoftheKrajinaarea.Thosereportsprovidedcredibilityforthepush
forwardtoDayton.
SoonafterthechangeinUSpolicy,RichardHolbrookebecamethepointpersonfor
thewholepeaceprocess.AswemovedtowardDayton,myjobwastotravelinthewar
zonesandgatherevidenceoffreshhumanrightsabusesthatwerebeingcommittedinreal
timeonthegroundandprovidethisinformationbyphonetoHolbrooke.57Hewouldthen
usethisinformationwithTudjmanorMilosevićwhentheydeniedthatcertainthingshad
happenedorclaimedignorance.Holbrookewouldthenbeabletoconfrontthemwiththe
reportsI’dgivenhimandthreatenrenewedNATOairstrikes.Afterbeingsidelinedfor
muchofthisperiodinUSpolicy,thehumanrightselementsmovedtothetopofthelist.
ObviouslyMadeleineAlbright'sinvolvementwascrucialhereaswell.56SeeGalbraithdiary,August1,1995.GalbraithtoldTudjmanthatCroatiacouldnotexpect“anyhelpfromtheUnitedStates”ifthemilitaryoperationwentwrong.TudjmaninterpretedthisasAmericanacquiescence,eventhoughGalbraithexplicitlytoldhimthatitwasnota“greenlight.”57ForcoordinationbetweenHolbrookeandShattuck,seeundatedHolbrookenotetoGalbraith.
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PETERGALBRAITH:Thereisalessonhere.Oneofthedistinctionsbetweenwhathappened
in[Croatian-controlled]westernSlavoniaandtheKrajinaandwhatwasgoingonin
RepublikaSrpskawasthattheCroatianscouldnotsay“no”toUSdemandsforaccess.Even
whentheUNwaslockeddownafterOperationStorm,wewereabletogetpeopleinand
wereabletoreportonthehumanrightsviolationsfromthebeginning.Weraisedthese
violations,particularlythesystematiclootingandburningofhomesandthelaterkillingof
theisolatedpopulation.IwantedTudjmantobecalledtoaccountforsomeofthis.The
storyisnotperfect,however.Holbrookewasadamant.Hewrotemeanote[onAugust16]
saying“NOTNOW,NOTHERE,NOTYET,”whenIwantedtoraisethehumanrights
violationsintheKrajinaandchallengeTudjman’sstatementthatSerbswhohadfledduring
OperationStormcouldneverreturn.58AsBobFrasurehadwritten,“wehiredthisjunkyard
dog[Tudjman]andshouldn'tbecomplainingaboutitnow.”So,humanrightswashigheron
theagendabutmaybenotquiteashighasJohnandImighthavewanted.
DAVIDROHDE:IjustwanttofollowupthoughonŽepa.You[PeterGalbraith]triedtogetit
backontheagenda,butyoulostthebattle.
PETERGALBRAITH:Itwasalonelybattle.IdonotthinkIhadasingleallyinthe
administration.IwasobviouslyinZagreb,[soIdonotknoweverythinghappeningin
Washington].IhadraisedtheŽepaissuepersonallywithChristopheronJuly17or18,soat
leastitwasonthetable.AsfarasIknow,nobodypursuedit.Holbrookewasmoreorless
sidelinedatthatpoint.HewasonvacationinColorado.
JAMIERUBIN:ThisisaRashoman-likesituation:therearealotofthingsgoingon[fromso
manydifferentperspectives].IwasfortunatetobewithAmbassadorAlbrightwhenthere
wasamajorpolicyreviewonBosnia.ThePresidentoftheUnitedStatesdecidedthathedid
notlikethepolicyanymore.InJune1995,MadeleineprovidedapapertothePrincipals
CommitteesuggestingforthefirsttimethatwenolongersupportUNPROFOR.59Ifyoulook
58HolbrooketoGalbraith,handwrittennote,August16,1995.59AccordingtotheStateDepartment“RoadtoDayton”study,page11,Albrightpresentedher“ElementsofaNewStrategy”papertoClinton’sForeignPolicyteamonJune21,1995,callingforthewithdrawalofUNPROFOR,theliftingofthearmsembargoagainsttheBosniangovernment,and“airstrikestoprotectMuslim-heldterritory.”
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atallofTonyLake'smemospriortothismoment,theemphasisisalways“wewantto
strengthenUNPROFOR,wewanttokeepUNPROFOR,UNPROFORhastobethere,itwill
lookbadifweloseUNPROFOR.”UntilyoudecidethatUNPROFORisnotyourfirst
principle,andthatyouhavesomeothergoalasafirstprinciple,whathappenedlaterwould
nothavehappened.
ClintonmeetingonBosnia,August21,1995,CIAcollection
Itwasasimplelittleoneandahalfpagepaper,andshespoketoaboutsevenpeople,
butmyphonerangoffthehook.Someonehadtobethefirsttosaythatourwillingnessto
pullUNPROFORoutwastimelimitedandthatwewouldnolongeragreetoextract
UNPROFORafteracertaindate.ThatwasthefirstsignthatUNPROFORmustend,sincethe
BritishandtheFrenchandtheothersneededthatthepromise.
Idon'tagreewithPeter[Galbraith]thatitwasbootsonthegroundthatendedthe
war,ifthatiswhatyouweresaying.Ithinkallthesethingstogetherchangedthesituation.
ThePresidentoftheUnitedStateswaspartlyinfluencedbywhatChiracwasdoingwith
AlbrightnotedChirac’sstatementthat“thepositionofleaderoftheFreeWorldisvacant,”sayingthatit“hasbeenchillingmybonesforweeks.”
4-44
thisrapidreactionforce.60[Refersto2009bookbyTaylorBranch,“TheClintonTapes”],a
contemporaneousrecordofwhatClintonwasdoing.Wedidnotfindoutuntillaterthat
BranchwasmeetingwiththePresident.[InhisinterviewwithBranch],Clintondescribes
howChiracwastryingtooutperformhimbuthadtoadmitprivatelythathecouldn'tdo
anythingwithoutUShelicopters.
WhatIamsayingisthatafterSrebrenica,andbuildinguptoSrebrenica,therewasa
momentwhenthecapitalsdecidedthatthepolicyhastochangeatthehighestlevel.This
didnothappenbecauseofthegoodworkoftheU.S.AmbassadorinCroatiaor,withaldue
respect,John,theAssistantSecretaryforHumanRights.Thewholegovernmentwas
operating.TherewasamajorpaperwrittenbyChristopher,amajorpaperwrittenbyTony
LakeandSandyVershbow,andonebyMs.Albright.61Thisiswhatledtoanewpolicy
wherethenationalsecurityadvisorwenttocapitals,andsaid,“that'sitguys,it'stimefora
newstrategy.”OnthefamousChristophertriptoEurope[inMay,1993],wesaidwewould
waitandseewhattheEuropeansthought,nowwearenotasking,wearetellingtheallies
whatwearegoingtodo,andthatthereisalimitationonourwillingnesstoextract
UNPROFOR.Oncethosewordswereuttered,everybodystartedpayingseriousattention.
ThatmeantthatUNPROFORwasgoingtoendatsomepoint.Iwon'tboreyouwithany
moredetails,butthisistheturningpointinmymind.Maybethat'smyRashomanproblem
butIvotewiththeheadsofstateonthisone.
TOMBLANTON:RupertSmith,youwereincommandinBosniaatthatpoint,didyouseeit
thisway?Wasitthismoment?
RUPERTSMITH:Togobacktotheatrocitiesandthekilling,wewerebeginningto
understandthattherehadbeenmassexecutionsaroundthetimeofmymeetingwith
GeneralMladićonJuly19.IknowthatŽepahasn'tfallen.Wearealreadytakingmeasures
togetextrapeopleintoŽepatomakesurewehavegotapresencetherethatIcanrelyon.
Straightafterthemeeting[withMladić]onJuly19,IgototheLondonConference,which
wasacompleteeyeopenertome.Noneofwhatwashappeningatthishighlevelwasbeing
60SeeWhiteHousememo,“BilateralmeetingwithPresidentJacquesChiracofFrance,”June14,1995.61SeeStateDepartmentpaper“EndgameStrategy,”NSCpaper,“StrategyfortheBalkanConflict,”preparedonAugust3-4,1995,andAlbright,“MemorandumfortheNationalSecurityAdvisor.”
4-45
toldtomewhatsoever.IgetoffanairplaneandamdrivenstraighttothePrimeMinister
[JohnMajor].IdonotseetheChiefoftheDefenseStaff.IamtoldbymyPrimeMinisterthat
thenexttimethereisanattackonGoražde,ontheBritishbattalion,wearegoingtobomb.
Wearegoingtobombandnotstopbombinguntiltheattackstops,andyouSmitharegoing
tohavethekey.
WethenhaveaverydifficultconversationbecauseIwillnotacceptitunlessthe
threatisforeverybody,notjustGoražde.62Iamsentaway.IgoandfindJanvierandtell
himwhatIamdoingandheagrees.HehasbeentoldthesamethingbyFranceandisvery
worriedaboutittoo.Thereismuchringinginthenight,IexplainaboutBihaćandŽepa.I
havebreakfastwiththenewlyappointeddefensesecretaryMichaelPortillo,whosays,
“You'llhavetotrustme,wewillchangethedecisionovertheweekendbutit'sprecooked
forGoraždeandwewon'tgetthroughtheconferenceonFridayifwechangeitnow.”
Ithengoto[Lancasterhouse],thesiteoftheconferenceonFriday,July21.Itisahot
sweatyday.Wehaveamostpeculiarconferenceinwhichthisprecookedmessageis
rammeddowneveryone'sthroat.Icanbarelyunderstandwhateveryoneissaying.You
wereallinabubblethatIwasn'tin.IkepttryingtogetacrosstopeoplethatIstillhad
hostageseverywhere.Theyarebusymakingtheirplans,andI'mbusyputtingpeopleinto
Žepaandsoon.Thenextmonthwasaverylonelymonth.Ourheadquartersleakedlikea
sievesoIcouldn'ttellanyonewhatwashappeningandwhatIwasplanning.WhatIwanted
todowastohavethefightintheonlyplaceIcouldhaveit,whichwasSarajevobecausethe
Frenchwouldn'tmovetheirgunsoutofrangeofFrenchsoldiers,whowereallinSarajevo.
MyrealfearwasthattheproximatecauseofthisattackwouldcomeoutsideofSarajevo.I
wouldthenhaverealproblems.NooneunderstoodthisandIcouldn'texplainitto
anybody.
62Inhisbook“UtilityofForce,”Smithwritesthathehadnotexpected“thiscompletechangeofpolicy,”focusingonjustoneenclave.Inprivatebriefingsforjournalists,U.S.officialsconcededthattheallieshad“writtenoff”ŽepainadditiontoSrebrenicaasitwas“militarilynotfeasible”toreturntothestatusquo.See,forexample,WolfBlitzer,“WhiteHouseInterpretationofLondonmeeting,”July22,1995.
4-46
ThegreatproblemwastoconcealthepotentialfromMladić.Weallknowaboutthe
rapidreactionforce,butwedidnotgettheFrenchgunsupthehillonMountIgmanuntil
themiddleofAugust.63
MICHAELDOBBS:YoualsowithdrewBritishtroopsfromGoraždeatthispoint,right?64
RUPERTSMITH:Thatwaspartofthedecisiontobomb.Therewasahugefightbetweenme
andHasanMuratovićtowardstheendofAugustwhenhecallsmeeverynameunderthe
sun.Iamtellingeveryonethatwe'renotgoingtobombbecauseI'vestillgottogettheBrits
out.Intheend,theydriveoutthroughSerbia.ItwasaverylonelymonthandIwasnot
helpedbyanyofyouguysonthatsideoftheroom.[Referencetowestern
governments/UN].Youwerebusy.ThereisamoveinRugbyfootballcalled"thehospital
pass,"whenyoupasstheballtoamanwithhalftheenemy’sscrumcomingstraightathim.
[Laughter]
JAMIERUBIN:General,we[Americans]callthatthe“killyourbuddypass”.
RUPERTSMITH:Iwasgivenhospitalpassafterhospitalpassallthroughthatmonth.It
startedwithŽepa,whicheveryonehadwrittenoff.CarldoesawonderfulthinginSerbia
withHasanandIzetbegovićgettingtheBosnianfightersout.Weslowlygeteveryoneelse
out.Weareworkingacrossabarrierofmistrustofthelastninemonthsaswedothat.
MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:Ithinkthisisagoodmomentformetogiveyoutheviewfromthe
groundratherthanthebubbleofthepolicymaking.ImadeittoŽepatwodaysbeforeŽepa
fell[onJuly25].Ididnotknowwhichdaywaswhich.SometimesIwouldpassoutand
wouldwakeupandlookupatthesun.MaybeIhadsleptfortwohours,maybefortwenty-
fourhours,Icouldn'treallytell.Eventually,whenwecametoŽepa,Irealizedwehad
brokenthroughtheline.
63MadeleineAlbrighttoSecstate,“Bosnia/Croatia,”USUNCable03232,August24,1995.AlbrightquotedAnnanassayingthattheFrenchartillerywasdeployed,butBosnianCroatswerepreventingotherRRFconvoysfromcrossingtheborder.64In“UtilityofForce,”SmithdescribeshowhewithdrewtheBritishbattalionfromGoraždeonthenightofAugust28-29,viaSerbia,followingtheMarkalemarketplaceshellinginSarajevo.He“turnedtheUNkey”afterhelearnedthattheBritishwereoutofGoražde,andnolongeratriskofbeingseizedashostagesbyMladić.
4-47
ThefirstguyImetontheBosniansidedidnotlooklikeaBosniansoldieratall.Ihad
ahandgrenadewhichIwastryingtokeepformyselfincaseIhadtocommitsuiciderather
thanfallintoSerbhands.Ipulloutthepinandamreadytorollthehandgrenadetowards
thisguy.EventuallyIrecognizehim[asaBosniansoldier]frommyprevioustripstoŽepa
from1992to1995.Hetellsmethewholestoryaboutwhathappened,howthecivilians
hadbeentakenout,theoptionsofferedbytheŽepacommand.
Ididnotlikeanyoftheoptions,soIchosemyownoption.Iagreewithyou,General
Smith,whenyousayitwasaverylonelymonth.Twodayslater,Ifoundmyselfnolongerat
thefrontlinebecausethelineshavecollapsed.Itwaseverymanforhimselfonceagain.I
decidedtotakemybandofbrothers,thesixkidsthatIbroughtwithmefromSrebrenica,
gointothecanyonoftheDrinariverwithasmuchsuppliesaswepossiblycould.We
barricadedourselvesintooneofthecaves.IfyouevertraveldowntheriverofDrina,you
willseeitisabeautifulcanyonandeasilydefendable.Youhavetobeamountaingoatto
attackanyoneatthatparticularlocation.Onemancanstopthebattalion.Ispentalong
timethinkingwhatreallywentwronginŽepa.ShashitoldusearlierthattheUN“didnot
knowwhathappenedonJuly10,anddidnotexpectwhatwasgoingtohappenonJuly10,"
butyoucertainlyknewwhatwascomingintermsofŽepa.Aftertwentyyears,andmany
sleeplessnights,Iwouldliketohearsomeanswers.
TOMBLANTON:CarlBildt?ThenIwanttotakeafiveminutecoffeebreakandcomeback
andfocusonthelessons.
CARLBILDT:ŽepaisaninterestingstoryAsRupertsaid,Žepawaswrittenoffimmediately.
ItwasassumedthatŽepawasgoingtofallwithinhours[ofthefallofSrebrenica].
Amazingly,itdidnotfallimmediately.TheBosnianArmyfoughtforaveryconsiderable
amountoftime.TheBosnianleadershipwantedhelpingettingthepopulationout,which
wasdonewithUNPROFOR.Atacertainpoint,IgotastrangemessagefromHasan
[Muratović]whosaidhewantedtomeetmeimmediately.IflewtoSplit,andhemanagedto
gettoSplit.Hesaid,“OurremainingforcesinŽepaneedtogetout.It'stoodangerousto
takethemouttowardsSarajevo,IwantthemtogoouttoSerbia.”Heaskedmetogoto
MilosevićandgethimtoclearthewayfortheŽepasoldierstocrosstheDrina,whichwas
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dangerouswiththeMladićforcesthere.Isaid,“Dotheyknowtheroad?”Yes,theyknewthe
roadbecauseitwasthenormalweaponssmugglersroad.TheyaresuppliedfromSerbiato
alargeextent.IwentimmediatelytoMilosevićandmethiminthemiddleofthenight,near
theBulgarianborder.Heimmediatelygaveorders,whichresultedinthesoldiersexiting
ŽepathroughSerbia.Thatwasoneofthoseintriguingthingsthathappenedinthiswar.
TheCroatianOperationStormchangedthepoliticsofthewar,butitwasadifficult
moment.Itwasthesinglelargestethniccleansingoperationoftheentirewar.65It
completelychangedthehumanitarianchallengeaswell.Wearelivingwiththe
consequencesrightupuntiltoday.
[BREAK]
TOMBLANTON:Inourfinalsession,wewanttolookatthelessonstobedrawnfromthis
horriblegenocide.Wearetryingtocreatearecordthatwillhelpthenextsetofgraduate
studentsbecomepolicymakers,politicians,soldiers.Theshorterandmoretothepointyou
canmakeyourremarks,thebetter.JorisVoorhoeve.
JORISVOORHOEVE:Therewerelongdelaysinreceivingandsharinginformationabout
Mladić’sactions.ThesedelayswerealsothesubjectoftheNetherlandsparliamentary
inquiry.ItisclearthatbyaroundJuly15-16,therewereveryseriousindicationsofmany,
manypeoplebeingkilled.Theindicationscamefromtheinternationalmedia,from
individualDutchbatmemberswhohadbeentransportedfromAtoBandhadseenmany
bodiesalongtheway.IamverygratefulfortheworkofAmbassadorShattuckandothersin
bringingoutthefirststoriesaboutthesehorribleevents.Ingeneral,Ithinkwecanseefrom
Srebrenica,fromDarfur,fromCambodiamuchearlier,thatwe,infreecountries,havegreat
difficultyacceptingtheextentofverydisturbinginformationabouthumanrights
violations.Wesometimeshaveatendencytobelittleveryseriousevidence.
Howdowedealwithnastynewsandputourselvesintheshoesofthosewho
commitsuchcrimessothatwecanbetterpredictwhatisgoingtohappen.Imustsay,from
theDutchside,wewerenotgoodatdealingwithdiscordantinformationthatyoudon't65Between150,000and200,000SerbsfledtheKrajinaduringOperationStorm,accordingtocontemporaneousnewsreports.
4-49
wanttobelievebutistrueanyway.IttooktheNetherlandsarmyleadershipseveralmonths
togetthecompletepictureforreasonsIwillnotgointonow.Iwasverygratefultothe
mediaandtheAmericansonthespotnearTuzlaforbringingoutthefirststories.
TOMBLANTON:DavidHarland,youwroteareportthathasbeenwidelypraisedand
interviewedprettymucheveryone,moreorless.66Whatwouldyouchangeaboutyour
conclusionstoday?
DAVIDHARLAND:Alotmorefactsareknowntoday.Thereisafamous,waggishcomment,I
thinkbyEdwardLuttwak[anAmericanmilitarystrategist],aboutthethreerulesof
interveninginotherpeople'sconflicts.Thefirstruleis:don't.Thesecondoneis:ifyoudo,
pickaside.Thethirdoneis:makesureyoursidewins.Fortherecord,Iwrotethatreport
withSalmanAhmed,whoisnowaSpecialAssistantstoPresidentObama.Theconclusions
wereactuallywrittenbysomebodyelse.IwouldchangetheconclusionsnowbecauseI
wouldhavechangedthemthen.Obviously,adisasterrequiresfailureatseverallevels.I
agreewithDavidHannaythatthemandatethatcameoutwasperfectlyworkable.Itwas
ugly,itwasneverintendedtooperateforanextendedperiodoftime,andtherewasno
strategy,butitwasmanageable.
Forme,theabsolutelystrikingleveloffailurethatIwouldgotoistheUNPROFOR
level.IftheuseofcloseairsupporthadbeenapprovedonJuly8orJuly10(Iwillnot
contestGeneralNicolaionJuly6),thereiseveryreasontobelievethattheSerbswould
havestopped.IbasethisconclusionalsoonconversationswithSerbs,including[Karadzić’s
mediaadvisor]JovanZametica,whomIsawasrecentlyasthreedaysago.Peoplewhoare
nowdeadwouldbealiveifUNPROFORhaddonethosethingsthatitwasmandatedtodo
butdidnothavethepoliticalwilltodo.IfeelthattheprincipalweaknessinUNPROFOR
wasinZagrebwithMr.AkashibutalsowithGeneralJanvier.
Therewasanentirecultureestablishedwithinthecivilservice(whichTone
describedbriefly)thatallinformation,includingfactualinformation,hadtoberendered
66SeeReportofSecretary-GeneralpursuanttoGeneralAssemblyResolution53/35,“TheFallofSrebrenica,”November15,1999,A/54/549.TheprincipalauthorswereDavidHarlandandSalmanAhmed,wholaterbecameaseniorStateDepartmentofficialandcounselortoNationalSecurityAdvisorSusanRiceintheObamaAdministration.
4-50
neutrally.TheveryfirstweekthatIarrivedinSarajevo,thechiefUNmilitarywasawaysoI
hadtosignoffthereport.Thereportsaidthattherehadbeen920heavyweapons
violationsbytheSerbsandapproximately80bytheBosnianArmy.ItwenttoZagreband
wasreportedtoNewYorkwithalittlefootnote,sayingthattherehadbeenathousand
ceasefireviolations.Whathadbeenaverysimplefactualstoryreportingagrotesqueaction
byonesideandalimitedresponsebytheotherwasrenderedintosomethingtotallybland.
Inmyview,thekeylessonamidallthismessanddysfunctionalityis:don'tjoinUN
peacekeepingunlessyouarewillingtoviolatealltheLuttwakrules.Ifyoudo,adegreeof
intellectualhonestyandmoralcouragewillallowthousandsandthousandsoflivestobe
saved.
JenonneWalker
JENONNEWALKER:Iwantedthefloorlargelytopassthebuck.It'shumannaturetohear
andrememberremarksthatsupportwhatyoualreadybelieve.Mysenseyesterday
morningoftheconsensusaroundthetablewasthatit'sfollytosendatraditionalUN
peacekeepingforceintoasituationwherethereisnopeacetokeepandthereisno
intentiontoimposeapeace.Acarryonfolly:todeclarea“safearea”whenthere
4-51
isnocapabilityorintentionofmakingitsafe.AsIsaidyesterday,theUnitedStateshadno
moralcredibilityonthisbecausewewerenotwillingtosharetherisk.Atthetime,
however,weinWashingtonwereverydisdainfulofthewholesafeareanotionbecause
therewasnocapabilityorwillingness[toenforcethesafeareas].
WecouldtalkaboutindividualmistakesinBosniathatallofusmadeincapitals,in
theUNbureaucracy,UNPROFOR,etc.Ithinkthemoreinterestingaspectoflessonslearned
isnotwhethertouseforceinasituationlikethis,buthowtodoiteffectively.Themost
provocativethingyoucandoisnotuseforcewhenyouarebeingtested.ThisiswhyIwant
topassthebucktoRupertSmith.IhopeeveryoneherehasreadhisBosniachapterand
concludingchapterinTheUtilityofForceonhowtouseforceeffectively.Ithinkitshould
bememorizedbyeverybodyintheUNsystemandeverybodywithanyintentionofjoining
an[internationalpeacekeepingoperation].
DAVIDHANNAY:Manyofthelessonshavebeenlearnedandarebeingapplied,butit's
worthtryingtoidentifythem.TheEuropeans,collectively,hadahugeshockinBosniathat
reallyblewtheirsocksoff.Theyrealizedthattheywereunabletopreventanoutbreakof
serioushostilitiesinaregionwhereitwasassumedthattheyweretheprimaryproviders
ofsecurity.Itproducedanenormouslystrongreactionfromwhichgrewtheenlargement
oftheEuropeanUniontoincludetheBalkans.AsIthinkeverybodynowrecognizes,the
bestpreventiveactionyoucantakeintheBalkansistomoveBalkancountriestowards
membershipoftheEuropeanUnion.Thisisnotquitethebestweektomakethatlittle
speechbutithappenstobetrue.67Wemustnotlosesightofitbecausethereareongoing
[accession]negotiationswithSerbia.TherewillbenegotiationswithKosovoandAlbania.
Oneday,Ihope,aGreekgovernmentwillagreeto[accessionnegotiations]withMacedonia.
MontenegroismovingtowardstheEU.Europeanslearnedahugelessonfromthe
humiliationthattheyexperienced,firstatthebeginningoftheoperationwhentheycould
notcopewithconflictprevention,andtheninthecourseoftheoperationswhenthey
showedtheywerenotabletodoanythingwithouttheAmericans.Thatisalessonlearned
butitneedstoberepeated.67TheconferencewasheldonJune29-30,2015,atatimewhentheEuropeanUnionwasrivenbydissensionovertheGreekbailoutcrisis,andthepossibilityofGreecewithdrawingfromtheEuro.
4-52
Secondpoint.Itwasshockingtohearduringthisconferenceofthecomplete
absenceofintelligenceavailabletotheUNforcesinthesafeareas.Thatisterrible.National
intelligencecapabilitieshavegottobetailoredinawaythattheycanbemadeavailableto
peopleputtingtheirlivesatriskinthepursuitofpeacekeeping.Thisiseasierwithpolitical
intelligencethanwithmilitaryintelligence.Someofusarequiteusedtodoingitwith
politicalintelligence.InthesevenyearsIwasnegotiatingonCyprus,Ipersuadedmy
governmenttoletmepassallourpoliticalintelligenceaboutCyprustotheUN,whichwas
donewithnoleaksandwasveryuseful.Wereallymusttakethissubjectseriously.Since
Srebrenica,wenowhavesurveillancedrones.Itshouldbefairlyobviousthatanymajor
peacekeepingoperation,particularlyoneinpotentiallyhostilecircumstancessuchas
Bosnia,isgoingtohavetobeprovidedwithasurveillancedronecapacity.Ibelievesomeof
thatisbeginningintheDRC,intheCongo,now.
OneofthethingsthatcameoutofSrebrenicawastheconceptoftheResponsibility
toProtect.68IfyouwerewritinganyoftheseSecurityCouncilresolutionsnow,youwould
havetowriteinelementsofResponsibilitytoProtect.ResponsibilitytoProtectisnow
underchallengebecauseoftheinadequacyofthefollowup,forexampleinLibya.Thefault
wasthenotsavingofthelivesoftheinhabitantsofBenghazi,butwhathappened
afterwards,afterthefallofGadhafi,thetotalabsenceofanyseriousfollow-up.
Experiencehasshownthatifyouaredealingwithaverydifficultsituationhovering
onthelinebetweenpeacekeepingandenforcement,asinBosnia,youreallymusthavean
"overthehorizon"capabilityavailable.SuchacapabilitywasmadeavailabletotheUNin
thecaseofSierraLeone.ItwasmadeavailablebytheFrenchinbothCoted'IvoireandMali.
Itcanbemadetowork.Itdideventuallywork[inBosnia].ThenarrativethattheSerbs
wereforcedtothetableentirelybyairstrikesisnotinfactthecase.Therapidreaction
forcepoundedthehelloutoftheSerbforcesaroundSarajevoandhelpedconvince
MilosevićthathehadtogiveinandgotoDayton.An"overthehorizon"capabilityisvery
importantthoughitcangobadlywrong,astheUSdiscoveredinSomalia,ifitisnot
properlyhandled.
68TheResponsibilitytoProtect,orR2P,stipulatesthattheinternationalcommunitycantakecollectiveactiontoprotectendangeredpopulationsifastatefailstomeetitsresponsibilities.
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Onefinalpoint.Iamnotsurewehaveseenthelastofthedualkeyissue.Dualkey
wasabadideabutIdonotthinkyoucaneverhaveanoperationinwhichairstrikestake
placewithoutconsultationwiththepeopleontheground.Youcannotde-couplethose
thingstotally,eventhoughthedual-keysystem[inBosnia],whichwasbuiltupgradually
andcamecrashingdownin1995,wasaterribleonethatmustneverberepeated.
TOMBLANTON:ThankyouDavid.LetmecallonAmbassadorJacolintogiveussomeofhis
lessons.
HENRYJACOLIN:IwasnotinBosniaatthetimeofthefallofSrebrenica.OnJuly6,Iwas
transferredfromSarajevotoParisforamedicaloperation,anddidnotreturnuntil
September.
IwasconvincedfromtheverybeginningthattheBosnianSerbswantedtodefinitely
cleaneasternBosnia.Imadesomedemographicstudiesandbecameconvincedthatthey
couldnotacceptaborderalongtheDrina,orineasternBosnia,betweenSerbsand
Bosniaks.Iwasconvincedthattheirultimategoalwastomovetheborderbetween
BosniaksandSerbstothemiddleofthecityofSarajevo,tobemoreprecise,totheDobrinja
districtalongtheMiljackariver.TheywantedtomakeSarajevoadividedcityandto
completelycleanseeasternBosniaofitsMuslimpopulation.Iwassoconvincedofthisthat
IsentaseriesoftelegramstoParisreportingGeneralMorillon’striptoSrebrenicainMarch
1993underthetitle,ChronicleofanEthnicCleansingForetold.69Thatwasclear.Iconstantly
repeatedtoParisthatthiswasthegoaloftheSerbs.Pariscouldnothaveanydoubtsthat
thiswastohappenoneday.
Fromthebeginning,IwrotetoParisthatwewereoverestimatingthestrengthofthe
Serbsandthatitwouldbepossibletostopthemifaresolutedecisionwastakentostop
them.IwasdisappointedwhenIarrived[inSarajevoasFrenchambassadorin1993]
becauseIdiscoveredthatUNPROFORwasalwaysnegotiatingwithbothsides.Theywere
alwaystryingtogetanewandfinalceasefire.SomeofmytelegramsirritatedtheMatignon
[Frenchprimeminister’soffice],Elysée[President’soffice],andtheministryofdefense.I
disagreedwithMitterrand’sfamousremarkconcerningthearmsembargo[againstall
69Areferencetothe1981novelbyGabrielGarciaMarquez,Cronicadeunamuerteanunciada.
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republicsoftheformerYugoslavia]stressing“nepasajouterlaguerreàlaguerre.”[“Donot
addwartowar”].IaskedmyselfwhatIshoulddoasaFrenchAmbassadortherein
Sarajevo.MyconclusionwasthatthebestthingIcoulddowouldbetotrytochangethe
positionofmygovernment.Intelegramaftertelegram,Irepeatedthatthiswasnotatribal
conflict,notareligiouswar,butawarofaggressionbytheSerbs.
ImanagedtochangethemindsinParisalittlebit.[ForeignministerAlain]Juppé
wasthefirstonetounderstand.Hethoughtveryquickly.Hetookafirmpositionafterthe
MarkalemarketmassacreinFebruary1994.Youmayrememberthathewasthefirstone
tosaywemuststoptheSerbs.TherewasthenaNATOultimatumwhichwasobservedfora
fewdaysbutitfinallydissolved,likesugarinhotcoffee,andwastotallyforgotten.Whatwe
achievedforafewdaysorweeksbystartingthewithdrawalofheavyweaponstotally
disappearedbecausethewilloftheinternationalcommunitywasnotmaintained.
IwasveryhappywhenChiracannouncedtheformationoftherapidreactionforce
inJune1995.IwasinPariswhenthenewgovernmentwasformed[inMay1995following
Chirac’svictoryinthepresidentialelection].IwasabletomeetverybrieflyCharlesMillon,
whohadjustbeennominatedMinisterofDefense.Heaskedme,“WhatshouldwedoMr.
Ambassador?”Itoldhim,“ilfauttapersurlesSerbes,”[“WemusthittheSerbs”].Itwasthe
onlywayoutofthiswar.IalsometHervédeCharette,whohadbeennominatedMinisterof
ForeignAffairs.Healsoaskedme,“WhatshouldwedoMr.Ambassador?”Ialsotoldhim“il
fauttapersurlesSerbes.”Iwashappywhenthepresidentdecidedtocreatetherapid
reactionforcewhichwasthesolutionIhadbeenadvocatingsinceIarrivedinSarajevoand
realizedwhatwasgoingon,ontheground.
DIEGOARRIA:ThefirstlessonshouldbefortheUnitedNations.Tenyearsago,onthetenth
anniversaryofSrebrenica,togetherwithAmbassadorJamsheedMarkerofPakistan,Iwrote
toKofiAnnan,(atthattimeIwasoneofhisadvisors)tellinghimthattheUnitedNations
shouldnotpushundertherugthetenthanniversaryoftheSrebrenicamassacre.After
manydiscussionsinsidetheSecretariat,Kofiarrangedformetoparticipateinasession
withPrinceZeidofJordanandourfriendSamanthaPowerattheDagHammarskjöld
library,whichminimizedtheimportanceofwhathappenedinBosnia.Asenioradvisorto
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Annansaidtohim,“WhatDiegoisproposingisaself-flagellationexercise.”Nocomments
neededonthatIguess.
IamtryingtofinishabookthatIcall"ARoomwithoutaView,"inspiredbythe
roomusedforinformalconsultationsoftheSecurityCouncil.70Asmanyofyouknow,the
roomhasaverylargewindowoverlookingtheEastriverinNewYork,butthedrapesare
alwaysdrawn.Thepermanentmembersdon'twanttolookoutside.
IrememberinMarch1992thatweadmittedtheRepublicofBosnia-Herzegovinaas
anewmemberoftheUnitedNations.DavidHannaymadeajoke[atthetimeofthe
disintegrationoftheSovietUnionin1991]abouthowfewpeopleintheSecurityCouncil
wouldknowthenamesofthecapitalsofthe15newmembernationsoftheRussian
Federation.TwomonthsafterwerecognizedthesecountriesasUNmembers,we
proceededtodividetheRepublicofBosnia-Herzegovinaalongethnicandreligiouslines
(amazinglyatthesametimewhenapartheidinSouthAfricawasinitsfinalstage,greatly
thankstotheUNcontributions).ThesameUnitedNationswasactivelyengagedin
practicingapartheidinBosnia-Herzegovina,dividingitintoMuslim,Croat,andSerbwith
theconsequencesthatweseetoday.Suddenly,theSecretariatandtheP5startedreferring
totheRepublicofBosniaandHerzegovinaas“theMuslimside.”Irememberraisingmy
handandsayingit'stheRepublicofBosnia-Herzegovina.Thepermanentmemberswiththe
supportoftheSecretariatturnedtheconflictintoareligiousconfrontationratherthana
conquestofterritorybyforce,whichwaswhatwasactuallyhappening.
WhentheSecurityCouncildeclaredanarmsembargoonYugoslaviainSeptember
1991,itsentamessagetothesenewcountries:armyourselfasquicklyasyoucanbecause
theUnitedNationsisgoingtostopyou.71Themajorcountriesknewthattheparties[inthe
formerYugoslavia]thatwerefullyarmedwereSerbiaandCroatia.TheBosniansdidnot
haveanything,aswelatersaw.Bosnia’sfatewassealedfromthebeginning.The
internationalcommunitythoughtthattheBosnianswouldgiveupquickly,butthe
Bosniansdidnotplayaccordingtothescript.Insteadofrollingoverandplayingdead,they
foughtasmuchastheycould.
70AreferencetotheE.M.Forsternovel,ARoomwithaView.71UNSC,“Resolution713(1991),”September25,1991.
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ItwasdisturbingtomehowtheEuropeanssuddenlydiscoveredthattherewasa
MuslimworldinthemiddleofEurope.Thesepeoplewerealwaysthere.Theysuddenly
fearedthataMuslimnationwasemerginginEuropewhenSarajevowasprobablythemost
ecumenicalcityanywhereinEurope.ItremindedmeoftheattitudethattheLatin
AmericanstaketowardHaiti,discriminatingagainstthembecausetheywereblackand
speakFrenchandnotSpanish.TheEuropeansovernightdiscoveredthattheBosnianswere
notEuropeans,theywereMuslims.ItisdifficultformetobelievethattheUnitedNations
wereunabletoanticipatetheeventsthattookplaceinBosnia.Isaidin1993thataslow
motiongenocidewastakingplaceinBosniabeforetheeyesoftheworld.72Lessthantwo
yearslaterithappened.
IthinkthattheDutchhavebeenmadeascapegoatforwhathappened.Iagreewith
whatDavidHannaysaidaboutEuropeabout(theforeignministerofLuxembourg),Jacques
Poos.AtthebeginningoftheYugoslavcrisishesaid,“ThisisthehourofEurope.Itisnot
thehouroftheAmericans.”73WeshouldhaveletEuropecarrythisoutandnotstainedthe
prestigeoftheUnitedNations,ashappenedwiththebotchedoperationSomalia.
JOHNSHATTUCK:Iwouldliketolookatwhathappenedafterwards.Whatwehavenowin
allofBosniaisafrozenconflictsituation.Wehaveafrozenpeace.Fortunatelythekilling
hasbeenended,butitisnotreallypeace.Thefrozenpolitics,inmyview,arearesultofa
failureatDayton.
Alongwithothers,likeMadeleineAlbright,Ifoughtveryhardtotrytobringissues
ofaccountabilityintotheDaytonpeaceprocess.Wehopedthatthosewhoweremost
responsibleforthepoisonouspoliticsthatleduptothewarwouldbearrestedandcharged
bytheinternationalcriminaltribunalorsidetrackedfromthepoliticalprocess.Thatgot
startedalittlebitatDaytonwiththeexclusionofMladićandKaradzić.TheBosnianswere
notgoingtocometothetableatDaytonunlessBosnianSerbleadersweresidetracked.
72“ReportoftheSecurityCouncilMissionEstablishedPursuanttoResolution819(1993),”S/25700,April30,1993,paragraph19.73Luxembourgwaschairingthe12-nationEuropeanCommunityinJune1991whenSloveniaandCroatiamovedtobreakawayfromYugoslavia.LuxembourgforeignministerJacquesPoosledaEuropeandelegationtoYugoslavia,sayingthatEuropeangovernmentshadaspecialresponsibilitytoactinacrisisthatthreatenedEuropeanstability.See,forexample,AlanRiding,“Europeanssendhigh-levelteam,”NewYorkTimes,June30,1991.
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TheyweresidetrackedinpartbecausetheyhadbeenindictedbytheInternational
CriminalTribunal.
TheInternationalCriminalTribunalisfunctioning.Somewouldsayithasbeenquite
successful.Ithascharged,andevenconvicted,alargenumberofpeople.74Thefailure
relatestotheinitialperiodwhenS-FORandlaterI-FORwentin.Becauseoftheambiguity
oftheDaytonlanguage,theNATOforceswerecompletelyunwillingtoarrestindictedwar
criminals.IworkedverycloselywiththeDutchForeignMinisteratthattime,HansVan
Mierlo,inaratherprivateandsecretwaytotrytoestablishaspecialwarcriminalsarrest
forcewhichwouldbemadeupofDutchpolice.Thereweresomeseriousdiscussionswith
theUNandtheUSmilitarybutitcametonaught.
Theresultisthefrozenpeacethatwehavetoday.Iamnotsayingthatthefailureto
arrestwarcriminalsistheonlyreasonforthecurrentstateofaffairsbutIthinkit'sa
seriousreason.Youcannotallowthepeoplewhocausedtheproblemtocontinuetorun
thesecountriesafterwards.Someofthem,overtime,havebeensidetracked.Eventually,
MilosevićwassidetrackedbythepoliticalprocessinSerbia.75
SHASHITHAROOR:IwantedtorespondtoJohn'searlierinterventionaboutthe
bankruptcyofUNpeacekeeping.UNpeacekeepingisnotbankrupt.76Ithasdoneamazingly
goodworkinanumberofsituationsaroundtheworld.Thepeacekeepingforcewonthe
Nobelpeaceprize[in1988]preciselybecauseithasmadeadifference.However,itshould
notbeappliedtoinappropriatesituations.Ihavetalkedaboutthelargenumberof
occasionsinwhichwepointedouttotheSecurityCouncilthattherewasnoviable
peacekeepingconceptavailablebuttheCouncilwentaheadnonetheless.Ifthereisalesson
tobelearnedfromSrebrenica,that'sreallythefirstlesson.
Theformulaforsuccessfulpeacekeepingmissionsisveryclear.Itisatriptych.First
youneedacoherent,clear,implementablemandate.Second,youneedresourcesthatare
74AccordingtoafactsheetpreparedbyICTY,thetribunalhadindicted161individualsbyJuly1995forcrimesrangingfrom“gravebreachesoftheGenevaconvention”togenocide.Atotalof80peoplehadbeensentencedtovaryingprisonterms,and18acquitted.75MilosevićwasoverthrownonOctober5,2000followingpopularprotestsagainstfraudulentelectionsinSerbia.76SeeShattuckremarkinTranscriptPage3-61:“Whatweareseeingdocumented[duringourdiscussionatthisconference]inaverypowerful,realwayisthebankruptcyofUNpeacekeepingandpeacekeepingingeneral.”
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commensuratewiththatmandate.Imeanmilitaryaswellasfinancialresources.Third,you
musthavepoliticalwill.Thisisfundamentalbecauseitunderpinstheothertwo.Without
politicalwill,youwon'tgettheresourcesandyouwon'tgetaclearmandate.Ifyouhaveall
ofthose,youhaveasuccessfulpeacekeepingoperation.Peacekeepingshouldnotbea
substitutefortheabsenceofpoliticalwillwhichiswhatwesawinBosnia.Iffuture
generationsofdecisionmakersaretolearntheproperlessonfromBosnia,thisisamistake
theymustnotmakeagain.
Peacekeepingintheclassicsenserequiresthecooperationofthepartiesinthe
conflict.Thisisfundamental.Whenthecooperationisdoubtful,youshouldnothavea
peacekeepingoperation.Istressthisbecausethereisallthistalkabouttheimmoralityof
neutralitybetweenethniccleansersandtheirreviledbesiegers.Thefactisthatthiswasnot
asituationforwhichpeacekeepingshouldhavebeenapplied.Itisbettertostartwitha
peaceenforcementoperationinthesesituationsthantochangemandatesmidstream,
whichiswhatwedidinBosnia.Wewerewrongtodothatbutitwasforceduponusbythe
forceofcircumstances.ThesheernumberofSecurityCouncilresolutionsisastark
indicationofhowthemandateforthismissiongotchangedwithincrementalenforcement
elementscomingintoit.
YoubeganyesterdaymorningbyaskingaboutChapterVIandChapterVIIofthe
UnitedNationscharter.Thisisacompleteredherring.ThereisnolanguageinChapterVI
thatsupportspeacekeeping.NotevenHammarskjöldpretendedthat.Thedeploymentof
militaryforceisnotforeseenunderChapterVI.TheonlyquestionconcernsChapterVII.
Article40talksaboutcallingonpartiestocomplywith“suchprovisionalmeasuresasit
deemsnecessary”ifnegotiation,mediation,diplomacydonotwork.Peacekeepingwasseen
bytheclassicpuristinternationallawyersasa“provisionalmeasure”underArticle40of
ChapterVII.ThenthereisArticle42whichtalksabout“actionbyair,sea,orlandforcesas
maybenecessary”ifothermeansproveinadequate.JustsayingChapterVIIisirrelevant.
Practicallyspeaking,thereisnoChapterVIpeacekeeping,althoughweusethatasashort
handforsaying“peacekeepingwithoutenforcement”andwetalkaboutChapterVIIfor
“peacekeepingwithenforcement.”
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Inmyview,theyarebothChapterVIIbecausenoonecanpointtoanylanguagein
ChapterVIthatusesmilitaryforce.77Thepointisthatweshouldhavetwoverydistinct
kindsofoperation.(1)Classicpeacekeepingforwhichtherestillisneedandforwhich
thereisaprovabletrackrecordofsuccess,followingtheclassicprinciplesofneutrality.
And(2)peaceenforcementinsituationswhereyoufeelobligedtoviolatetheinterestsof
onepartyortheotherandforceyourwaythrough,andwhereyoucan'ttakeforgranted
theconsistentcooperationoftheparties.
Thatbringsmetothequestionaboutdualkeybecauseagain,weintheSecretariat
hadverylittlesayinthismatter,buttheideaofdualkeywasabsurd.Ifthepurposeof
usingairpowerwastosupporttheinterestsoftheforcesontheground,thekeyshould
havebeenwithoneperson,thelocalUNForceCommander.Ifthepurposeofusingair
powerwastopursuemilitaryobjectives,tochangethenatureoftheconflict,goingwell
beyondtheneedsoftheforcesontheground,thena)thepeacekeepingforcesshouldnot
havebeenthere,theyshouldhavebeenpulledout,andb)thekeyshouldbewiththose
deployingtheairpower,namelyNATO.TherewasnoneedforNATOtohaveasayinthe
firstkindofuseandtherewasnoneedfortheUNtohaveasayinthesecondkindofuse.In
thiscase,theUNshouldhavebeenoutoftheway.Thedualkeypointedtothefundamental
contradictionoftryingtohaveanoutsideagency,inmanycaseswithouttroopsonthe
ground,useforcewhenthereweretroopsonthegroundpursuingadifferentmandate.
Thatsummarizesmymainlessonsfromthesetwodays.
TOMBLANTON:Thankyou,Shashi.Letmeaskaquestion,whichIwillposetoCarl.Inthe
1999UNSrebrenicareport,theymakeapointthatnegotiationswiththe“architectsofSerb
policies,”principallyMilosevićandKaradzićbutalsoMladićonthemilitarylevel,
“amountedtoappeasement”atvariouspointsinthewar.That'stheconclusionofthe
report.Isthatthecase?Isthereadifferencebetweennegotiationsthatendupappeasing
andnegotiationsthatpursueapeace-makingstrategy?
77ChapterVIofthe1945UNCharterdoes,however,includeArticle36,whichstatesthattheSecurityCouncilcanrecommend“appropriateproceduresormethodsofadjustment”forthe“pacificsettlementofdisputes.”
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CARLBILDT:Thatis,ofcourse,amatterofdefinition.Youmakepeacewithyourenemies,
notwithyourfriends,sobydefinition,ifyouwanttoendaconflictnotbymilitarily
defeatingtheenemybutbysomesortofpoliticalcompromisethenofcourseyouhaveto
negotiatewiththoseparticularforces.YouendupwithsomesortofcompromisewhichI
wouldarguewasinevitableinthecaseofaconflictsuchastheonewefacedinBosnia.And
thiswasalsowhatallthemajorcountriesandactorsrecognized.IdonotknowwhatDavid
[Harland]hadinmindwhenhewrotethatparticularphrase.
Acoupleofothercomments.Davidseemedtobearguingthatitwouldhavemadea
bigdifferenceifthekindofstrikepackage[againstBosnianSerbtroopsadvancingon
Srebrenica]thatcameafterlunchonJuly11hadinsteadcomeafterlunchonthe10.
Consideringthefactthatthemilitaryeffectofthatstrikepackagewasvirtuallynada,Iam
lesscertain.Whatmighthavemadeadifferencewouldhavebeenforcesontheground.Itis
difficulttoknowaswearetryingtoreadthemindsetofMr.Mladić.Weknowthathe
changedthedirectivesonthe9fortheoperationandtookthatotherfatefuldecisionon
July11[tokillthemaleprisoners].78MorerobustUNforcesontheground,andperhaps
Žepa-likeoperationsbytheBosnianArmy,mighthavemadeadifference.TheBosnian
Armyemphasiswasgettingthetroopsoutintheotherdirection.Theywerenotprimarily
[inthesouth]wheretheSerbswereadvancing,theywereinthenorthernpartofthe
enclaveheadingtoTuzla.Whetherthatwouldhavemadeanydifferencewedon'tknow,
butIthinkit'smorecomplicated.
Ontheoverallconclusionsofoperationslikethis,IagreewithmuchofwhatShashi
said.Clearlythesafeareaconceptwasamistakeinthewayitwasundertaken.We
promisedsomethingwecouldn'tdeliver.Wecouldn'tsecuretheseareas.Thatgoestowhat
Shashisaid:sometimesthemandatesarehopeless.Ithinkthatlessonhasbeenlearned.
TherewasanavalancheofSecurityCouncilresolutionsonBosnia,overtheentireduration
oftheconflict.IjokedattimesthattheywereissuingSecurityCouncilresolutionsata
78AccordingtochiefICTYSrebrenicainvestigator,Jean-ReneRuez,MladićtookthefinaldecisiontocaptureSrebrenicaonJuly10“againsttheadviceofhisstaffofficers.”
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fasterpacethanwehadtimetoreadthem.Someofthemwereutterlyunrealisticwhich
reducedrespectforthemaswell.79
WedidnotbringupthequestionofwhattheSecurityCouncildidafterthefallof
Srebrenica,whichisanamazingstoryinitself.ThefirstreactionoftheSecurityCouncilwas
very,verylowkey.Thoseofuswhoweretherewereverysurprised.Therewassomesort
ofPresidentialStatement,whichisvirtuallynothing.TheSecurityCouncilthensuddenly
changedandadoptedaresolutionorderingtheUNtoretake,militarily,Srebrenica.80Of
coursenoonetookthatresolutionseriously,buttherewasanobviousdisconnectbetween
mandateandresourceswhichhasimplicationsforthediscussionswearehavingtodayon
safeareasindifferentpartsoftheworld.Don'ttalkaboutitifyoucan'tdoit.
TheUNoperationinBosniawasafailureifyouseeitasapeacekeepingoperation.
Butitwasnevermeanttobe.
PuttingonmyhatasSwedishPrimeMinister,weprobablysentaround10,000
soldierstoservethereduringtheconflict.Didtheydoanythinguseful?Ithinktheydid.Did
theyproducepeace?No,theydidn't.DidtheydefeattheSerbs?Notheydidn't,butthey
rescuedalotofpeople.Weshouldnotforgetthatthisstarted,rightlyorwrongly,asa
massivehumanitarianoperation.Itwasthemostmassivehumanitariancatastrophethat
wehadexperiencedinEuropesince1945.Itwasaquestionofhelping,protectingwith
lorriesandlogisticstogethelpin.Wealsoprotectedpeopleindifferentareaswho
otherwisewouldhavebeensubjecttoallsortsofthings.Ithinkitwasmostuseful-butit
wasnotapeacekeepingoperation.
Ithinkwehavelearnedalessonabouttheneedforbetterintelligence.Sweden,
alongwiththeNetherlands,isnowinvolvedintheMalioperation.ThereisaDutch
79AformerUNPROFORcommander,BelgiangeneralFrancisBriquemont,toldjournalistsinDecember1993that“Idon’treadtheSecurityCouncilresolutionsanymorebecausetheydon’thelpme.”Heresignedthefollowingweek.See,forexample,“UNGeneralinBosniaquits,”January5,1994,NYT.80UNSCResolution1004,adoptedonJuly12,1995calledontheUNSecretaryGeneral“touseallresourcesavailabletohim”torestorethe“safeareaofSrebrenica.”TheFrenchrepresentative(Mérimée)offeredto“maketroopsavailable”forsuchoperations.TheUSrepresentative(Albright)saidtheUSwaspreparedto“providenecessaryairlift”forthedeploymentofarapidreactionforcetoBosnia.PresidentClintonagreedwiththeprivateassessmentofFrenchmilitaryleadersthat“retakingSrebrenica[is]toorisky.”SeeTonyLakememo,“PointstobemadefortelephoneconversationwithChancellorHelmutKohl,”July14,1995.AkashiurgedUNSecretary-GeneralBoutros-GhalitourgeUNSCmembersto“focusonhumanitarianassistanceratherthansuggestingevenobliquelythatthestatusquoantecanbere-establishedbyforce.”SeeAkashitoAnnan,“APossibleCommunicationfromtheSecretary-GeneraltotheSecurityCouncil,”UNPF-HQ,Zagreb1149.
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intelligenceunitandaSwedishintelligenceunittherethatoperatewithdronesand
listeningdevices.WhetherthatwillhelpinMaliremainstobeseen,butthecapacityis
there.BetterintelligencewouldnothavehelpedintheSrebrenicacasebecauseweknow
thedecision[tocapturetheenclave]wastakenverylate.ButIthinkthatparticularlesson
hasbeenlearned.
Overall,IagreethatBosniaisnotwhereitshouldbe.81Wearenowtwentyyears
afterthewar.CompareBosniatodaytoGermanyin1965.Therehasbeenafailureof
leadershipinthecountryitselftocometotermswithwhatneedstobedone.Hadwe
pickedupsomeICTYindictees[e.g.MladićandKaradzić]earlierthatwouldhavebeena
goodthing,noquestionaboutthat.Butitwasimpossible,inthewakeof[theOctober1993
BlackHawkDownincidentin]Mogadishu[when18USsoldierswerekilledattemptingto
captureaSomaliwarlord].Theforces,particularlytheUSforcesbytheway,wereopposed
tothatsortbecauseitwasconsideredtoodangerous.Ithinkitwouldhavebeenmorally
goodifwehaddoneit.Idonotknowwhetheritwouldhavemademuchadifferenceinthe
longerperspective.Theywerepickedupeventuallyanyhow.Essentiallyitisthefailureof
theBosnianpoliticalsystemtoseethemagnitudeoftheirresponsibilitythatexplainsthe
situationtheretoday.
TOMBLANTON:ThankyouCarl.IwantedtoaskRuperttocommenton
thenegotiation/appeasementissueandthenmoveontoyouroveralllessons.
RUPERTSMITH:Thankyou,DavidHannay,forthepointabouttherapidreactionforce.Just
toadd,itwasnowuptome,theUNPROFORCommander,tochooseallthetargetsthat
NATObombed.Theyhadtoagreetobombthem,butIchosethetargets.Theonlyonesthat
NATOchosewerethesuppressionofairdefensetargets.NATOwasmyagentinthatsense.
Secondly,theartilleryfromFrance,BritainandtheNetherlandsfiredsomethinginthe
orderof600roundsontheveryfirstdayofthoseattacks,August30anditstayedatthat
leveluntilthesiegewasbrokenaboutthreedayslater.Twoarmoredbattlegroups,one
81AftertheDaytonagreement,CarlBildtwasappointedtheinternationalcommunity’sfirstHighRepresentativetoBosniaandHerzegovina,servingfromDecember14,1995toJune17,1997.
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French,oneBritish,thencameinandbrokethesiege.UNPROFOR’sroleinthissagahas
beenleftoutofthestoryabittoomuch.
AFPmapofSarajevo1995.Brownshaderepresentshigherground.
Iwanttotalkaboutthedirectionofoperationsandthepolitical-military
relationship.Theuseofarmedforcetoachieveanythingwillneverworkunlessthereisan
extremelycloselinkagebetweenthepoliticaldirectionandthemilitarycommander.Ithas
tobeaniterative,continuousconversation.Itisnotonemeeting,inwhichyouaretoldto
gooutanddosomething.Ithastobeacontinuousrelationship.Youaccommodateeach
other'spointofview.Thepoliticalviewisn'tthesameasthemilitaryone.Theyare
separateactivities.Youhavetoarriveatapositionwhereyouapplytheuseofforcetoa
particularpoliticalend.Ifyoucannotdothat,inwhateverwayyouwireitup,itwillnot
work.Itwillfail.Ifyouropponentsaredoingitbetterthanyou,theywilldefeatyou.Thisis
whatyouseetakingplaceateverylevelofthisventureuntiltheveryendwhenwe
managedtogetittogetherinAugust1995.
Asanexampleofhowitdoesnotwork,considerthepointaboutnegotiations.Asa
youngofficerincounter-terroristtraining,Ilearnedabitabouthostagesituations.Iwasn't
thehostage:hewasinsidetheroomandIwasoutsideit.Oneofthelessonsdrummedinto
usfrombitterexperiencewasthatcommanderscommandandnegotiatorsnegotiate.Ifa
commandernegotiates,hehasonlygothimselfandhispositiontodealwith.Hestartsto
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givehispositionawayinordertoachievetheextractionofthehostage.Between1992and
1995,weconductedaroundthirtynegotiationswithoutanypoliticalcontextordirectionat
all.Whetheritwasonthemilitaryoneorthecivilside,theUNimmediatelystartedtosell
theirpositioninordertoachievethegoalofgettingtheconvoythroughordoingthesafe
area.Thatwaswhattheyweretrading.Overthecourseofthreeyears,youwatch
UNPROFORsellitselfawayuntilwegetto1995.Thishappenedbecausethecommanders
(andhereIincludeMr.Akashiandhispredecessors)hadonlythemselvestotradewith.
Commanderscommand,negotiatorsnegotiate.Thepoliticianisthenegotiatorandtheman
ontheground,civilormilitary,isthecommander.Don’tputthecommanderintheposition
whereheistradingwithhimself.Thatiswhatweweredoingandweshouldn'tdoitagain.
ThisleadsmetoaphrasethatIhate,negotiationbyforce.Ladiesandgentlemen,it's
afight,abattle.ThatisnegotiationbyforceandthatiswhatIdo.Youcannotnegotiateby
force,youwinorloseafightwithforce.Itisabinaryoutcome,winorlose.Itisnota
negotiation.Ifyouwantanegotiationwithforceassociated,thengetanegotiatoranduse
metousetheforce.Thisishowthepolitical-militaryrelationshipshouldbewiredup.It
doesnothavetobejustindividuals,itcanbecommittees,butyouhavetosatisfythose
requirements.
Iwasrecentlyaskedbyapublishertowriteanewintroductiontoabook,originally
writtenin1976,calledOnThePsychologyofMilitaryIncompetence,whichIrecommend
reading.82Itcausedmetothinkabouttheproblemofchangingmyowncommand'swayof
thinkinginthespringandsummerof1995andturningthenervoussystemofmy
headquartersintosomethingmoreoffensive.Theauthor,NormanDixon,mentionsthe
need“tobreakthecollectiverationalizingawayofinformationchallengingthegroup’s
assumption.”Didn'twehavetobreakthat?Hetalksaboutthe“unquestioningmoralityof
rightnessthatenabletheconsequencesofactionstobeoverlooked.”Didn'twefallintothat
one?Herefersto“asharedillusionofunanimityinamajorityviewpoint.”Lastly,he
mentions“aselectiveavailabilityofinformationtoavoidchallengingpreviousdecisions.”
Inotherwords,groupthink.Ifyouareincommandinoneofthesesituations,makesure
thegroupthinkssafe.Thosearealsomylessons.82NormanDixonOnthepsychologyofmilitaryincompetenceisasurveyof“100yearsofmilitaryinefficiency”fromtheCrimeanwartoWorldWarII.
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YASUSHIAKASHI:TherearemanylessonstobelearnedfromtheSrebrenicaexperienceor
theentireBosniaandHerzegovinaoperation.First,Iwouldliketosaythattheperfect
solutionisanenemyofagoodsolution.Inpeacekeepingyoufirsthavetodothe
humanitarianassistanceside.Youalsohavetonegotiateaceasefiretostopbloodshed,
howeverfragileitmightbe.Whatwemostwanttoaccomplishmaynotbewhatisthemost
feasibleorrealistic.AsDagHammarskjöldsaid,whattheUNtriestodoisnottotake
peopletoheaven,buttosavethemfromhell.Wehavetobemodestandrealistic.
IthinkthispeacekeepingeffortwasdoomedtobeafailurebecausetheBosnian
governmentdidnotwantpeacekeeping.Theywantedpeaceenforcement.TheBosnian
Serbswantednopeacekeepingatall.Itwasboundtobeverydifficult,verydelicate,and
verycontroversial.
IwouldliketotellourDutchcolleaguesthattheyshouldnotblamethemselvestoo
much.TheywenttoSrebrenicabecauseCanadiansdidnotwanttocontinueandSweden
refusedtogo.Youundertookaverydifficulttask.Iamsureyouwereawareoftherisksbut
Imustsayyouhadthecouragetodoathanklessjob.YourCalvinisttradition[ofindividual
responsibility]isgreat,butdon'tgotoofar.IthinkColonelKarremansandhiscolleagues
didtheirbest.Weneedtoputourselvesintheirshoes.
Iagreewithotherspeakersthattheapproximately200resolutionsandpresidential
statementsissuedbytheUNSecurityCouncil[relatedtoBosnia]werealittletoomuch.We
achievedpeaceCambodiawithabout5percentofthisnumberofresolutionsand
presidentialstatements,UNSCResolution836[ofJune4,1993],inparticular,wasavery
unfortunateresolution.Ithinkmanyofusreadittwenty,fortytimes,oreven100times,
withoutmakingsenseofit.Itincludessomanyphasesandqualifiers.Youhavetoadopt
resolutionsthatwillnotbelaughedatbycommandersandnegotiatorsontheground.
IthinkDavidHarlandmadeaverygoodpointaboutthedefectivestructureofthe
peacekeeping.TheheadquarterswasinSarajevoatfirst,whichwasagoodlocation,but
wasmovedtoZagreb.83Thiswasamajordefect.[AsthespecialrepresentativeoftheUN
83TheUNProtectionForcefortheformerYugoslavia(UNPROFOR)wasestablishedinFebruary1992,primarilyforCroatia,withheadquartersinSarajevo.TheheadquartersmovedtoZagrebinMay1992duetothelackofsecurityinSarajevo.
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Secretary-General]inCambodia[between1992and1994],Iestablishedmyheadquarters
inPhnomPenh.Iwasabletoconsultwithforeignambassadorsatmyleisure,anytime,ata
moment’snotice.Iestablishedaso-called"expandedfive"committee,representingthe
PermanentFiveSecurityCouncilmembersandregionallyimportantcountries.Theywerea
perfectsoundingboardforme.TheforeignambassadorsinZagrebwereaccreditedto
Croatia,notBosnia.MyaccesstoSarajevoambassadorswasmuchmoredifficultthanin
PhnomPenh.
Sometimes,welearntoomanylessonsfromthepreviouspeacekeepingoperation.
Wekeptontellingourselvesnottocrossthe“Mogadishuline.”Wewereawareofthe
debacleinSomalia.SecretaryofStateChristopherwarnedusoftheso-calledCNNeffect.
Publicopinionandthemediasometimescauseustolaunchoperationsprematurelyand
prematurelywithdraw,ashappenedafterOctober1993whentheAmericanRangerswere
draggedthroughthestreetsofMogadishu.Wehavetoalwayswarnagainsttheeerieeffects
ofmediaandtheficklenessofpublicopinion.Isubscribeto95percentoftheBrahimi
reportthatcameoutinAugust2000.Itisfullofverygoodlessonsforpeacekeeping
operationsanditdistributestheblameonallofus:fromtheSecurityCouncil,member
governments,andUNHeadquartersinNewYorktoindividualcommanders.Theprimary
warningistoavoidtryingtodotheimpossible.
Ifyoudecidetosendapeacekeepingforcesomewhere,youshouldnotbestingy
aboutresources.Donotunderestimatethetaskswhichyouconfront.IamgladthatUN
peacekeepingoperationstodayarefarbetterthanthoseinthe1990s,butaretheyperfect?
No,farfromit.Anewreporthasjustcomeoutfromagroupheadedbytheformer
PresidentofEastTimor,JoséRamos-Hortathatemphasizesthevitalimportanceofthe
politicalprocessaccompanyingpeacekeepingoperations.Peacekeepingoperationsare
muchmoreeffectiveifthereisapre-agreedpeaceagreement.Wehadsuchanagreement
inCambodiabuteventhentheinstrumentwasnotperfect.Wehadtoamendandrevisethe
frameworkaswewenton.Mylegaladviserwasextremelydisturbedbymyattemptsto
departfromthatfundamentaltextwhichwasveryimportantforus,butnopaperisperfect.
Nothingcanreplacehumanintelligence,humanwisdom.
Peacekeepingisinconstantevolution.Allconflictsareuniqueandsuigeneris.Letus
notapplythesamesolutiontoalloperations.Wehavetobehumbleandkeepoureyes
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wideopentoagreatdiversityofpeacekeepingoperations.Thelessonswedrawfrom
BosniaandHerzegovinashouldnotbeconsideredasabible,apanaceaforallfuture
peacekeeping.
AsRupertandShashimentioned,thereisnoreferencetopeacekeepingintheUN
Charter.WewillhavetocontinuetomuddlethroughsomewherebetweenChapterVIand
ChapterVII.Boutros-Ghali,inhisfamous“agendaforpeace”saidthattheUNshouldstick
topeacekeepingbutthatpeaceenforcementmaybeallowedonaverysmallscale.The
SomaliaexperiencedforcedBoutros-GhalitoamendhisagendaandsaythattheUNshould
neverventureintopeaceenforcement.Forpeaceenforcement,youneedanentirely
differentforcestructure,philosophy,training,equipment,andintelligencecapabilities,as
manyofyouhavementioned.
OneofthefewrecommendationsintheBrahimireportthatwerenotacceptedby
theGeneralAssemblyorSecurityCouncilwasanintelligenceservice.Member
governmentshatetogivetheUNSecretariatanintelligencecapacity.Wehavetogotothe
DutchgovernmentortheSwedishgovernmentortheUSgovernmenttogetour
intelligence.IftrustisestablishedbetweentheUNSecretariatandUNmember
governments,youwillbeallowedaccesstoveryvaluableinformation,aswasthecasewith
mewithregardtoNorthKoreannuclearinstallations.Ofcoursethosesatellitepictures
wereimmediatelywithdrawnandtakenback.
Iwillstophere,butIthinkthelasttwodayshavebeenextremelyvaluableandhave
givenusmanylessonstoponder.
ZEIDRA'ADALHUSSEIN:EveryonearoundthistablewasonceaseniorUNofficialor
representedtheirstatesattheUNorworkedwiththeUNasjournalistsoracademic.Iam
theonly[serving]UNofficialatthistable,andformysinsIhavetobrieftheSecurity
CouncilnextweekonSrebrenica.Iamtheonlyonewhoisbriefing.Iconsiderthisexercise
notjustarefreshingofmyownmindbuthopefully,withyourpermission,Iwillalso
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representallofyouatthe20thcommemoration[oftheSrebrenicaevents].TheCouncilhas
tohearthehardtruthemergingfromthisdiscussion.84
Iwas[Jordan’sambassadorto]theSecurityCouncil[in2014]whentheSecretary-
Generaldecidedtocallforafullscalecomprehensivereviewofpeacekeeping.HereIdepart
fromShashi.Itistruethatmandatesareimportantandresourcesandpoliticalwillare
necessary,butwhatalsomattersisperformance.WediscussedthisintheCouncilatlength.
Youhavewhatyouhave,buthowwelldoyouperformwithwhatyouhave?Whatwe
discoveredcomingoutofaninternalreportlastyearwasthatthereisamassivefailurein
theprotectionofciviliansbytheUN,notwithstandingeverythingwrittenintheresolutions
oftheSecurityCouncil.85
Oneofthematterswediscussedlastyearwasthecontinuing,chronicproblemof
interferencebynationalauthoritiesintheworkingofpeacekeepingoperations.Ithasnot
diminished,ithasnotgoneaway.Whentheatmosphereisbenign,nooneinterferes,but
whentheatmospherebecomesdangerousandacute,everybodyinterferes.National
commandstelltheircontingentsnottoobeytheUN,nottooccupythisbridge,toevacuate
thisposition,exfiltrateoutofthatposition.Itisstillhappening.Welearnveryslowlyornot
atall.Ourpowersofanticipationremainextremelypoor.
Whenlookingatthelessonswedrawfromourexperiences,thereareafewthings
thatwehavetobearinmind.Inmanycases,notjustBosniabuttodayaswell,weareoften
terrifiedofourinterlocutorsandwhattheymaydo.Weshouldalsobepreparedtoallow
thepossibilitythattheymaybeterrifiedofustoo.Wedonotfactorthatintoourthinking.
Nolessonappearstohavebeenlearnedinthisregard,whichissodepressing.
Justbecausethereisacomplexpoliticalsituationdoesnotmeanthatthemoral
situationissimilarlycomplex.ThereisaverycomplexpoliticalsituationinMyanmar,but
themoralsituationisveryclear.Weshouldnotconfusethetwo.Understandingthe
grievancesoftheothersidedoesnotmeanthatyouhavetosympathizewiththeactionsof
theotherside.
84HighCommissionerZeidaddressedtheUNSecurityCouncilsessiononSrebrenicaonJuly8,2015.RussiavetoedaUK-sponsoredresolutiondescribingtheeventsinSrebrenicaasa“genocide.”Theresolutionreceived10affirmativevotes.China,Venezuela,Angola,andNigeriaabstained.85OIOSreport,“EvaluationoftheimplementationandresultsofprotectionofciviliansmandatesinUnitedNationspeacekeepingoperations,”A/68/787,March7,2014.
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Myfinalpointisthisthat[theparties]havetorespecttheUN.Theydon'thaveto
likeus,butiftheydonotrespectus,theywillhavetheirwaywithus.86Thisiswhat
happenstoomanytimeswhentheUNispresent.Wearetooquicktotrytoplease.We
wanttobeongoodtermswitheverybody,wewanttobelikedbyeverybody,wewantto
feelthatwearepartners.Itdoesn'tmatterintheend.Ihaveinfuriatedmoregovernments
inthelastninemonthsthanmostpeopleherecouldpossiblydo,simplybecauseofmyjob
[asUNHighCommissionerforHumanRights].Thethingistheyallwanttotalktoyou.
Theyrealizethatthereissomerespectfortheoffice.Thatisafundamentallessonforthe
UN.
Weneedtounderstandwhowearedealingwith.Wesimplydidn'tunderstand
enoughaboutwhatMladićwascapableof.Welearnextremelyslowly,ifatall.
IhavebeenanalmostcontinuouspresenceattheUNsincemydaysinUNPROFOR,
butwehaveneverhadadiscussionlikethis.WehadadebateintheGeneralAssemblyon
DavidHarland'sreportin1999,butitwasn'tadiscussion.Iwouldloveforthecurrent
membersoftheSecurityCounciltohavebeenhere[inTheHague]tolistentoour
discussion.TheyneededtocomeandlistentothediscussionlastyearonRwanda.Both
VitalyChurkinandSamanthaPower[representativesofRussiaandUnitedStatesonthe
SecurityCouncil]werebothwithusintheBalkans,buttheCouncilwritlargehasnoclue
abouttheanatomyofallofthis.
OneofthemostseriousconsequencesofourfailureinSrebrenicaandŽepawasthe
abandonmentofthewholeideaofsafeareas.Manyofusthoughtthatitcouldstillhave
applicabilityifitweredoneright.YoucouldpossiblyhavehadasafeareainSyriain2012,
but[theBosniaexperiencecausedusto]castitasideassomethingcompletelyimpractical.
Idonotbelieveyoucan'tdoit.Inhisreport,Davidsaiditwasdifficulttodounderthe
circumstanceswehadinBosnia,butthatdoesnotmeanitisimpossibleinother
circumstances.87ForthesakeofallthepeoplewhoaresufferinginSyria,Iraq,andLibya,
86HighCommissionerZeidelaboratedonthispointinhisaddresstotheUNSecurityCouncilonJuly8.“ThemostfoundationallessonofSrebrenicawasthis:Tosucceed,theUnitedNationsmustberespected.FortheUnitedNationstobeeffectiveinrobustpeacekeeping,allpartiestoaconflict,andinparticulartheaggressor,musttakethemeasureoftheCouncil,itsdecisionsandtheUnitedNationspresenceontheground.Theymustbelievetherewillbeseriousconsequences,andnoimpunity.”87The1999Srebrenicareportconcludedthat“protectedzonesandsafeareascanhavearoleinprotectingciviliansinarmedconflict,”buttheymusteitherbe“demilitarizedandestablishedbytheagreementofthe
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weneedtorescuetheideaofsafeareaandseeifwecanmakeitworkproperlythenext
time.
ZLATKOLAGUMŽDIJA:First,Iwanttothankyoufororganizingthismeeting.Afewpoints
whichIlearned.Peacekeepingandpeacebuildingaredifferentthings.Wehavetomoveto
thenextlevelwhichisconflictpreventionandsomethingcalled“responsibilitytoprotect.”
Thisexercisecangiveussometools,oratleastelementsofthetools,ofhowtoproceedin
thefuture.
Whenyouareinfrontofthecourt,youcanbechargedwithintentional[criminal
acts]becauseyouplannedit.Youcanbechargedforbeingpartofa[plotorconspiracy].
Youcanbechargedforknowingaboutit,youcanbechargedifyoushouldhaveknownit.
InthecaseofMilosevićandMladić,theypurposefullyplannedtheseevents.Thenotionthat
Mladićbecameakindoffalsemessiahat11p.m.oneeveningtotakerevengeforsomething
thathappened500yearsago,inordertocleanhiscommunistpast,isverydangerous.88
Iunderstandthatsomepeopledidn'texpectit.Iunderstandthatsomepeoplewere
shocked.Iwasmyselfshockedbythelevelofatrocity,Iexpectedittohappen,butnoton
suchascale.Iexpecteditfromtheverybeginning.Iwarnedattheverybeginningthat
somethinglikethiswouldhappen.Asdeputyprimeminister,ItalkedtoUNrepresentatives
aboutplanned,organizedrapesofwomenindifferentpartsofthecountry.Massgraves
wererecentlydiscoveredwith400bodiesinamassgraveatTomašicainthePrijedorarea,
andanotheronewith700people,thatwerepartofthecrimesofJune-July1992.Therewas
aplanned,self-evidentchainofeventsbeginninginTomašicaandthepeopleofPrijedor
beingmadetowearwhiteribbons[in1992].89WhathappenedinSrebrenicawasalogical
consequenceofeverythingthathappenedbefore.90
belligerents”ortheymustbe“trulysafeareas,fullydefendedbyacrediblemilitarydeterrent.Thetwoconceptsareabsolutelydistinctandmustnotbeconfused.”88AreferencetoMladić’sstatement,onJuly11,2015,that“thetimehascometotakerevengeontheTurks”forpasthistoricalinjustices.ICTYprosecutorsbelievethatMladićtookthedecisionlateontheeveningofJuly11tokillthemalecaptivesfromSrebrenica.89InAugust2013,BosnianauthoritiesdiscoveredamassgraveinTomasicavillage,nearPrijedorinnorthwestBosnia,datingbacktothefirstphaseoftheBosniawar.ICTYinvestigatorslateridentifiedtheremainsof600victims,manyofwhomhaddisappearedfromtheirhomesinthePrijedorareainJune-July1992.TheSerbauthoritiesinPrijedorhadissuedanorder,onMay31,1992,forthenon-Serbpopulationofthetowntowear
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Iunderstandthatyouhavetodiscuss,debate,cooperatewiththebutchersand
criminals,butwithallduerespectIcannotseehowyoucanbefornegotiationsand
cooperationinbetweenanunprotectedvictimandanarmedmurdereraboutthevictim’s
righttolife,property,religion,freedomanddignity.Toputitanotherway,canyouimagine
awolfandalambdiscussingwhattheywillhavefordinner?Inthatcase,weshouldnotbe
surprisedifthewolfisatthetable,notonthetable.
Asotherparticipantshavesaid,weneedtoredefinethenotionofneutrality.I
witnessedtheobsessionwithneutralityfrommyfirstcontactwiththeUN,whenI
participatedinnegotiationsbetweentheUNGeneralLewisMacKenzieandaYugoslav
armygeneralonMay2,1992.IwasarrestedwithPresidentIzetbegovićafterIreturned
frompeacenegotiationsinLisbononaEuropeancommunityplane.91Isawhowitworks.
IagreewithDiegothatwewitnessedaplanned“slow-motiongenocide”from
TomašicaandthewhiteribbonsofPrijedortoSrebrenica.Weshouldhaveseenitcoming.
Thefirsttimethattherewasacomprehensive,seriousstrategywithacleargoal,of
stoppingthepeoplewhohadcommittedthegenocide,wasonAugust30toSeptember20,
1995,withthebombingcampaignrunbyGeneralSmith.Thatwasalessonlearned.Thank
you.
TOMBLANTON:ThankyouZlatko.Hasan?
HASANMURATOVIĆ:WemustallagreewithAmbassadorArria’sconclusion[fromhisvisit
toSrebrenicainApril1993],thatSrebrenicawasan“openjail”inwhichaslowgenocide
wastakingplace.Thecreationandmanagementofthesafeareawasapostponementof
genocideandpostponementoftransferofterritorytotheenemybytheUN.Theterritory
whiteribbonsontheirarmswhentheywentoutsidetheiroutsidetheirhomes,whichwereidentifiedbywhitesheets.90OnMay31,1992,theSerbauthoritiesinPrijedorissuedanorderforthenon-Serbpopulationofthetowntowearwhitestripesontheirarmswhentheywentoutsidetheirhomes,whichwereidentifiedbywhitesheets.Earlyinthewar,MladićcriticizedtheethniccleansingpolicyadvocatedbyBosnianSerbpoliticalleaders.OnMay16,1992,hetoldtheRepublikaSrpskaAssemblythat“wecannotcleansenorcanwehaveasievetosiftsothatonlySerbswouldstay...IdonotknowhowMr.KrajisnikandMr.Karadzićwouldexplainthistotheworld.Peoplethatwouldbegenocide.”[SeeMladićspeechto16thSessionoftheRSAssembly.]91IzetbegovićandLagumdzijawerearrestedbytheYugoslavarmyatSarajevoairportwhentheyreturnedfrompeacetalksinLisbonaboardaEuropeanCommunityjetonMay2,1992.FightingflaredupinSarajevoshortlyafterwards.
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wastransferredthroughthemistakesoftheUN.ItshouldhavebeenprotectedbytheUN
forcesontheground,withsupportfromtheair.NATOandtheUNfailedtodefendthe
enclavebecauseofmistakesmadebytheheadquartersinZagreb.IthinkMr.Harland
expresseditverywell.Itwasnotafailureofthesystem,itwasafailureofindividuals.Iam
convincedthatJanvierhadpromisedMladićnottocallforairsupport.Hedidkeephis
promiseduringthetimeoftheattackandfallofSrebrenica.
Asforthelessons,weallknowthattheinternationalcommunity,andtheUN,can
actinoneoftwoways:throughpoliticalandlegalinfluenceorbyforce.Ithinkitisclear
thattheUNcannotimplementanykindofefficientorusefulpeacekeepingmissionwithout
someuseofforce.IntheBosniacase,mechanismsfortheuseofforcewerenotworking
properly.Theywerenotimplementedproperly,theyweremisusedbyindividuals.To
avoidsimilarmistakesinthefuture,IthinkthatNATOmustbeincludedinthe
implementationofSecurityCouncilinstructionsandresolutions.
TorepeatwhatIsaidbefore,wemustgivecredittotheUNforitsactionsinthe
humanitarianandmedicalfields,eventhoughthereweremanymistakesduetothefact
thatsomanypeoplewereinvolved.WhenwearetalkingaboutwrongandtragicUN
engagementinBosnia-Herzegovina,wearetalkingaboutUNPROFOR.ThispartoftheUN
operationinBosniawasunprincipled,counterproductive,irresponsible,unfortunate,tragic
andshameful.TheseareallwordsthatdescribetheactionsoftheUNinBosnia-
Herzegovina,andespeciallyinSrebrenica.
OBRADKESIC:AsthesoleSerbianvoicehere,Iwouldliketohavetheopportunitytosay
somethinginclosing.Firstandforemost,Ithinkeventhoughmyvoicecomesfrom
Washington,DC,itcomeswiththeapprovalofthePresidentofRepublikaSrpska[Milorad
Dodik]whoisawarethatIamhereandwhohasshownanopennessandwillingnessto
engageinthesekindsofdiscussions.
Havingsaidthat,theoneregretIhaveisthattheSerbleadershipdidnotshowthe
willingnesstoengageonthetragiceventsinSrebrenicaandgetaheadoftheneedfor
informationaboutwhathappened.ImyselfencouragedKaradzićinFebruary1996and
alsothelasttimeIsawhimattheendofJuly1996,tobeforthrightaboutwhathappened
andgetasmuchinformationaspossibleaboutdiscrepanciesinthenumbersofmissing
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menandcasualties.Unfortunately,hisfocusthenwasontheagreementheclaimedthathe
hadwithHolbrooke[toretirefromthepoliticalsceneinreturnforimmunityfromwar
crimesprosecution].Hesawnoneedtomovefurtherintryingtoclarifyanythingthathad
happenedduringthewar.
TherewasmuchinourdiscussionsthatwasveryusefulandIcouldagreewith,butI
hadtroublewiththepoliticalandmoralisticstatements.Idonotfindthemveryhelpfulor
constructive.Atthesametime,itdoesshowhowemotionalthisissuehasbeenand
continuestobe.Hopefully,atsomepointinBosniaandHerzegovina,therewillbeachance
todosomethinglikethis,notonlyconcerningSrebrenicabutthemany,manyfestering
woundsthatallpeoplehave.AswerememberthevictimsofSrebrenicaduringthe20th
anniversarycommemoration,Ihopeyouwillhavesomecompassionandempathyforall
thevictims,includingtheSerbianvictimswhotendtobeoverlookedwheneverthereisany
kindofdiscussionaboutthesufferingofBosnia-Herzegovina.
TOMBLANTON:Thankyou,Obrad.LetmegiveafinalwordtoKeesMatthijssen.
KEESMATTHIJSSEN:IthinkIamtheonlymilitarypersonherestillonactiveduty.Ihave
frequentlybeenaskedaboutthedifferencebetweenmyexperienceinBosniaandmy
experienceinIraqandinAfghanistan,whereIwasalsoacommandingofficerbutata
higherlevel.InbothIraqandinAfghanistan,IhadthecertaintythatIhadthemeansorthe
accesstomeanstoallowmetodomyjobevenifthingswentwrong.Thatwasthebig
differencewiththesituationwefacedinSrebrenica.ThemainlessonIwouldliketo
emphasizeisthatthemilitaryareeducated,trainedtodotheirjobs.Policymakeror
decisionmakersmustmakesurethatthemilitarycandotheirjob.Icompletelyagreewith
SirRupert’sremarksabouttherelationshipbetweenpoliticiansandpolicymakersandthe
military.Makesurethatyoucreatetherightconditionssothatthemilitarycandotheir
jobs.
TOMBLANTON:Thankyou,Kees.LetmeaskAbiWilliams,ourhostandinspirationin
manyways,toconcludeourdeliberations.
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ABIODUNWILLIAMS:Ithasbeenanextraordinarytwodays.Asyouhaveheard,wehada
similarconferenceayearagoonRwanda.WhenIcametothisInstitute,particularly
becauseofmyexperienceattheUN,Ithoughtitwasimportantforustolookbackatthese
reallytwotragiceventsandtogetabettersenseofwhathappenedthroughcritical
dialogueandcloseengagementwiththekeyplayersandtheirinteractionwithessential
documents.Injoiningus,youhavedoneaservicenotonlytopolicymaking,butalsoto
history.
WefocusedonwhatwentwronginBosniaoverthepastcoupleofdays,butifwe
lookatMacedoniainthesameperiodyoucouldseewhatwentright.Ifyoulookatthe
mandate,theresources,thecooperationoftheparties,politicalwill,theperformance,you
canseewhywegotitright.Incontrasttoallthoseresolutionsandpresidentialstatements
onBosnia,inthecaseofMacedonia,therewereessentiallyjusttworesolutions,plusthe
pro-formaones,extendingthemandates.92Theresourceswereclear:500Americansmade
up50percentoftheforce,complimentedbyaNordicforceof500.Itwasarobustsignalto
therestoftheformerYugoslaviadrawingonthepeacekeepingtraditionsoftheNordic
troops.Wesawwhatwentright.
ItisappropriatethatweheldthisconferenceintheNetherlands.Srebrenicahas
understandablybeenaparticularlysensitivesubjectinthiscountry.Itisatestamenttothe
leadersoftheNetherlandsandthelevelofpublicdebatethatthesubjecthasremainedhigh
onthepoliticalandlegalagendaofthiscountry.Wehavewitnessedarevolutionin
accountabilityandindividualresponsibilitysinceSrebrenicaandRwanda.Theunique
constellationofcourtsandtribunalsthatwehaveinthiscityrepresentsanenormousstep
forwardinthefightagainstimpunity.ThisiswhyTheHagueInstitute,togetherwithother
institutionsinthiscity,areengagedindiscussionsaboutpreservingthejudicialheritageof
theICTY.Itiscriticalthatthisheritagebepreservedandnotlost.ItisimportantfortheUN
toexaminethepolicyandprogrammaticimplications[ofpastactions].Wecannotmake
historiansofeverydiplomatbutwecanprovidethemwiththetoolstodrawonthelessons
thatpastexperienceprovides.
92AccordingtotheUNdatabase,theSecurityCouncilpassedthreeresolutionsrelatedtotheformerYugoslaviain1991,21in1992,22in1993,13in1994,and21in1995,i.e.atotalof80resolutions.
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Ithasbeenanhonortohostthissecondeditionofourprojectandpartneragain
withtheUSHolocaustMemorialMuseumandtheNationalSecurityArchive.Thankyou,
CameronandMichaelforyourtirelesseffortsinpreparingthisconference,andTom,for
yourveryskillfulmoderationofthesediscussions.Aboveall,thankstoourcolleaguesfrom
Bosnia.InthewordsofthegreatpoetMayaAngelou,inherpoeminhonorofPresident
Clinton’sfirstinauguration,"History,despiteitswrenchingpain,cannotbeunlived,butif
facedwithcourage,neednotbelivedagain."Wearedeeplygratefultoallofyouforyour
willingnesstoengagewithusandfortheopennesswithwhichyouhavediscussedthevery
traumaticandverypainfuleventsoftwodecadesago.Thankyou.
[ENDOFOFFICIALTRANSCRIPT]
