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InternationalDecisionMakingintheAgeofGenocide:Srebrenica1993-1995June28–July1,2015

TheHagueEditedTranscript

Session4:Endgame–LessonsfromSrebrenica

Potočari,July12,1995,USgovernmentphoto

TOMBLANTON:Ourintentionthisafternoonistolookveryintensivelyattheaftermathof

thefallofSrebrenica,includingtheexperiencesofColonelKarremans,RupertSmith,and

CarlBildtintalkingwithGeneralMladić.IwanttoaskMichaelDobbstoleadoffwitha

couplequestionsaboutthesituationonSrebrenicaonJuly11,andthechoices,orlackof

choices,facedbyColonelKarremansandDutchbat.

SHASHITHAROOR:Beforewestart,mayIjustbrieflyputamarkerforourlaterdiscussion

onlessons.IobjecttoJohnShattuck'ssuggestionthatthissomehowrevealsabankruptcy

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ofUNpeacekeeping.Ihavetriedtoexplainwhypeacekeepingwasinappropriatetoapply

tothissituationandhowwepointedthisoutrepeatedlytotheSecurityCouncil.

TOMBLANTON:I'mcountingonyoutochallengeit.

MICHAELDOBBS:Wewantveryquicklytolookatwhathappenedafterthefallof

Srebrenica.Asyouknow,manyoftheMuslimmenfromSrebrenica,ledbythearmed

remnantsoftheBosnian28thDivision,triedtoescapetheenclave.Theygatheredinthe

northernpartoftheenclaveataplacecalledŠušnjariandattemptedtomakeabreakout,

throughtheencirclementbyBosnianSerbtroops.

DetailfromCIAmap,showingattemptedbreakoutbyMuslimsfromSrebrenica

Therewasanothergroupofcivilians,mainlywomenandchildrenbutalsoafew

hundredmen,whotookrefugeatDutchbatheadquartersinPotočari,whichisjustnorthof

Srebrenica.Weactuallyhaveanoverheadreconnaissancephotographofthesceneat

PotočarionJuly12at2:00p.m.Anotherreconnaissancephotograph,thefollowingday,July

13,showsalineofbusesoutsidetheUNbase,afewhundredmetersdowntheroad.1Aswe

nowknow,Mladićallowedthewomenandchildrentoenterthebuses,fortransportation

1TheJuly12-14photographswereprobablytakenbylow-flyingNATOreconnaissanceaircraftsearchingforDutchbatsoldiersseizedbytheRSAashostages.LaterphotographsweretakenbyAmericanU-2spyplanes,covering30squarekilometersofterritory.

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toBosniangovernmentpositions,buttookthemenawayfor“screening”forallegedwar

criminals.

Potočari,July13,1995,USgovernmentphoto

WealsohaveaJuly11document[sentat6:27p.m.localtime]withinstructionsto

ColonelKarremansfromGeneralHervéGobilliard,whowasactingUNPROFORcommander

inSarajevointheabsenceofGeneralSmith.2Hisinstructionsare:"Concentrateyourforces

intothePotočariCamp,includingwithdrawalofyourOPs.Takeallreasonablemeasuresto

protectrefugeesandciviliansinyourcare."Priortothathesaid,"Enterintolocal

negotiationswithBSAforcesforimmediateceasefire."

WealsohaveareportdatedJuly12fromColonelKarremansinwhichherepliesto

thepointsmadebyGeneralGobilliard.3Bythistime,hehasmettwicewithGeneralMladić

2GobilliardtoSectorNE(Info:CODutchbat),“"OrdersfordefenceofDutchbatandprotectionofrefugeesinSrebrenica,”July11,1995.3KarremanstoJanvier,“MeetingwithGenMladićon11and12July1995,”DutchbatCompoundPotočari,TK95114,July12,1995.

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attheHotelFontanadowntheroadinBratunac.Heisreportingonwhathecalls"a

catastrophicsequenceofevents”thathewitnessedandhisdirecttalkswithMladić.He

basicallysaysthatheisunabletocarryoutGobilliard’sinstructions.Hestates,"Thereare

morethan15,000peoplewithinonesquarekilometer,includingDutchbat,in"anextreme

vulnerableposition:thesittingduckposition.Headdsthatheis“notabletodefendthese

people,"ordefendhisownbattalion.Thereareheavygunsallaroundthecompound,

withindirectsightofthecompound.4ColonelKarremans,youhadthemisfortuneofbeing

thrustintotheseveryone-sidedtalkswithMladić.Couldyougiveusyourimpressionsof

himandthechoicesyoufacedfollowingthefalloftheenclave?

THOMKARREMANS:Sure.WeallknowwhathappenedbetweenJuly6and11.We

discussedthatyesterdayandthismorning.AsIsaidbefore,thiswasawar.Allofasudden,

it'soverandyouareconfrontedwith25,000refugees.Somebodyaskedmesomeyearsago,

“Whydidn'tyoutakealltherefugeesinyourcamp?”Thatwasimpossible.Youcan'tput

25,000refugeesonafewsquaremeters.5Alotofthingshappenedvery,veryfast.Youhad

tomakemanydecisionswithinashrunkenbattalionstaff.Thereishardlyanytimetothink

aboutthedecisionsyouhavetotake.Youtakedecisionsinsplitseconds.Sometimes,the

decisionswerenotgood,ornotwellthoughtout,butwefeltthatmostofthedecisionswe

tookwerecorrect.

WhenIwasaskedtostartnegotiations[withtheBosnianSerbs],Iaskedwhether

somebodyonamuchhigherlevelcanconductthesenegotiations?6Icouldconduct

negotiationsbutaftersixdayswithnosleep,nodrink,nofood,negotiatingwiththelocal

authorities,runningmyownbattalion,Iwasnotinthemoodtostartnegotiations,tobe

honest.Iaskedforsomeonehigheruptonegotiate,butgotnoanswer,soIwentto

4AccordingtotheKarremansJuly12cable,Mladićhaddeployedtwoartillerypieces,twotanks,threemultiplelaunchrocketsystems,andoneanti-aircraftgunwithin"directsight"oftheDutchbatcompound.5AccordingtotheKarremansJuly12cable,therewereabout2,500refugeesinsidetheDutchbatcompoundatPotočari,andafurther15,000refugees"inthedirectvicinity.”6OnJuly12,Akashiappointedajointcivilian-militaryteamledbyUNcivilaffairsofficialKenBiserandUNPROFORchiefofstaff,Gen.KeesNicolai,totraveltoSrebrenicatomanagethecrisis.SeeAkashitoAnnan,“SituationinSrebrenica,”UNPROFORZ-1142,July12,1995,paragraph7.GeneralSmithagreedthatCODutchbatshouldnotnegotiatewithMladićbyhimselfashewas“talkingfromthejail.”SeeRupertSmith,“AftermathofFallofSrebrenica,”July13,1995,paragraph4.Henoted,however,thattheSerbswere“refusingtodealwithHQUNPROFOR,”inSarajevo,and“itseemsHQUNPF”inZagreb.

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Bratunac,thesmallcityoutsidetheenclave.OnmywaytotheFontanahotelinBratunac,I

wassittinginmyvehiclethinkingaboutwhatIshouldsay.ThenIsaw,totheleftandright

oftheroad,thosemortarplatoons.WhenIarrivedatthehotel,IexpectedGeneral

Živanović,theCommanderoftheDrinaCorps,orhissuccessor,GeneralKrstić.Ihadnever

seenMladićbeforeinmylifeandtherehewas.Noweverybodyhasseenthepictures.I

wouldnotliketoexpandonthat,becauseitwasnotapleasantsituationformeeither,I

mustsay.7

Imentiontheword“refugees”severaltimesinthisdocument.ItoldMladićseveral

timesthatIwastheretomakegoodarrangementsfortherefugees.Imaginethatthereare

about5,000refugeesinside,andabout20,000outside,thecompound.Wehadalready

foreseenthehumanitariandisasterthatwasemerging.Wehadnomedicinestodealwith

that.Ihad110severelywoundedpersonsonthecompound.MythoughtwasthatIcannot

startnegotiatinginamilitarysense,butIcantrytomakearrangementsforthewounded

andforthepopulation.Inthebeginning,hedidn'tlisten,butthesecondtimeIwasthere,

[at11:00p.m.],hestartedlistening.

Itwasmoreorlessaone-directionconversation.Hewasorderingratherthan

asking.ThatiswhatIcanrememberfromthosetwotalksintheevening.Thenextmorning

Iwentforthethirdtimewiththreepeoplerepresentingtherefugees,onewomanandtwo

men.Theywereabletoexplainwhatwasgoingonfromtheirperspective.

MICHAELDOBBS:Mladićtoldthemthattheyhadachoice,“tosurvive,stay,orvanish.”8It

wasagreedthattherewouldbeanevacuation.Thelocalpeoplesaidtheywantedtobe

evacuated,butanimportantquestionarose:whowouldorganizetheevacuation?Wouldit

betheUNthatorganizedtheevacuation?OrwouldMladićorganizetheevacuationhimself?

AtonepointitseemedthatUNPROFORwouldorganizetheevacuationinwhichcasethere

presumablywouldnothavebeenaseparationofmenandwomen.Butitturnedoutthatit

7KarremansheldthreemeetingswithMladićattheHotelFontanaatBratunac,atapproximately8:00p.m.and11:00p.m.onJuly11,and10:00a.m.onJuly12.ABosnianSerbcameramantookvideoofthemeetings,whichwasthentranscribedbyICTYresearchers,becomingpartofa“Srebrenicatrialvideo.”KarremanswasjoinedbyMuslimrepresentativesforthesecondandthirdmeetings.8SecondFontanameeting.AtthefirstFontanameeting,MladićtoldKarremansthathedidnotwanttosendUNPROFORpeacekeepersbackhome“incoffins.”

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wasMladićwhobroughtthebusesandMladićwhocontrolledtheevacuation.9Canyoutell

ushowitendedupthatMladićwasallowedtoorganizetheevacuation?

KEESNICOLAI:Icansaysomethingaboutthat.Immediatelyafterwestoppedtheair

attacks,werealizedtheterriblesituationoftherefugees.Weknewwehadtodosomething

aboutthat.Afteradiscussionthatlastedtenminutesorso,weweresurethatournext

missionwouldbetoevacuatethecivilianpopulationtoasafeareawheretheycouldbe

treated.Therewasnowater,nofood,andnomedicinefortheminSrebrenica,asColonel

Karremanshasdescribed.Moreover,itwasverydangerous.Therefugeeswere

unprotected,intheopenair.Thesituationcouldchangeatanymoment.

Itwasclearthattheyhadtoberemovedfromthatplaceassoonaspossible.Soon

afterwards,IhadatelephonecallwithourMinisterofDefense.Itoldhimthatwehad

decidedtostartnegotiationstoarrangeanevacuation.Heagreedimmediately,sothere

wassupportforourdecisionfromTheHague.Aroundthesametime,Ihadashort

telephonecallwithMr.Muratović[theBosnianministerresponsibleforrelationswith

UNPROFOR].Hewasveryupsetthatwehadstoppedtheairstrikes.Hesaidthatwas

contrarytoourmission,butweexplainedthatwecouldnotdoanythingelseduetothe

situationinwhichtheciviliansfoundthemselves.

Shortlyafterwards,IcontactedColonelKarremanstoorderhimtostartnegotiations

withthelocalSerbauthorities.Atthatmoment,IwasnotawarethatMladićwasthere.The

firstprioritywastogettherefugeesout.Eventswentinadirectiondifferenttotheonewe

hadplanned.WeweretakenbysurprisethefollowingdaybyMladićwhenthebuses

arrivedaroundnoon.Theevacuationstartedearlierthanweplanned.Arrangingtransport

shouldnothavebeenaproblemforusbutitwasnecessaryforUNPROFORtoask

permissionfromtheBosnianSerbstoentertheirterritory,whatroutewecoulduse,andso

on.

9MladićannouncedthathewouldprovidethebusesfortheevacuationatthethirdHotelFontanameetingat1000onJuly12.Thebusesarrivedinfrontofthecompoundaround1:00p.m.onJuly12.AccordingtotheDecember2012ICTYjudgmentinthecaseofGeneralZdravkoTolimir,MladićhadissuedanoralorderrequisitioningthebuseslateontheeveningofJuly11.Inaninterceptedconversationat1250onJuly12discoveredbyICTYinvestigators,Mladićcloselymonitoredthedispatchofbuses.“We’llevacuatethemall,”hetoldasubordinate.“Thosewhowantto[go]andthosewhodon’twantto.”

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ItseemsthatMladićhadforeseenwhatwouldhappenandarrangedbusesoneor

twodaysbefore.Therewasonlyoneoptionleftforus,whichwastosendpeacekeepersin

jeepsoronthebusestocontroltheevacuations.Thiswasnotasuccess.Manyjeepswere

stoppedalongthewayandstolen.Theattempttocontroltheevacuationfailedinmany

respects.Itwasmorelikeadeportationthananevacuation.

MICHAELDOBBS:Therewaslittleyoucoulddotoinfluencethewayittookplace?

THOMKARREMANS:I'dliketoaddsomethingonthat.Thingswentsofast.Wewereall

astonishedseeallofthosetrucksandbusesthenextdayalready.InmytalkswithGeneral

MladićIhadgivenhimasequenceofevents,beginningwithevacuationofthewounded,

sayingwewerealsorelyingontheRedCross.Obviouslyhedidn'tlisten.Ihavealwayssaid

thatthiswasapre-plannedoperationfromhisside.Youarenotabletoorganizesomany

busesandvehicleswithinacoupleofhours.Hedidn'tgiveusthechancetomakeproper

arrangements.

Ontheotherhand,asGeneralNicolaisaid,therewasanurgentneedtodo

somethingforthepeople.Therewasnofoodforthem,therewasnoshelterforthem.

Peoplehadhungthemselves,givenbirths.Itwaslikeavillageof25,000peopleallpacked

together.Istillseethesethingsinmymind.Inthissituation,youhavetotakesome

decisions.Everythingwentsofastwiththedeportationofthelocals.

Onelastthing:Isenttwoofficerswiththefirstconvoyofbuses.Theymanagedto

reachTuzlaandwenttoseeColonelBrantz.ColonelBrantzphonedmeandsaid,“Yourtwo

officersarehere,they'veseensomethingsalongtheway,butyoucan'tseeeverything

whentherearefortybusesbehindyou.”Thentheysuggestedputtingasoldieronevery

bus,butIhadalmostnosoldiersleft.Wesaid,“Okay,wewillsendoneortwojeepswith

everyconvoy.”Theywereallstolenontheway.IaskedMladićlaterwhathappenedwith

thosevehicles.Hesaid,"Idon'tknow.Therearedifferentgroupsofparamilitarywho

grabbedthemandstolethem."Isaid,"Youknowbetter."Thatwasnotanoptioneither.

ThenIsentsomevehiclestofacilitatethecommunicationbetweenPotočariandKladanj

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[transferpointbetweenSerbandMuslim-controlledterritory]forcommunications.All

thosevehicleswerealsostolen.10

MICHAELDOBBS:Mladićinsistedthattherefugeesbescreenedforpossiblewarcriminals.

Hesaidthemencouldnotgowiththewomenandchildrenbecausetherewereallegedly

warcriminalsamongthemandheneededtoscreenthem.Wasthereapossibilityof

influencinghimonthatquestion?

THOMKARREMANS:HefirstaskedmeifIcould“deliverthelocalmilitaryandcivilian

authorities”tohim.Isaid,“They’renotthereandiftheywerehere,Idon'tdothat.”Hethen

saidthathewantedtoscreenthemenandlookforwarcriminals.11Weallknowwhat

happenedoutsidethesafearea.Inwars,youshouldbepermittedtoasksomeone,whathe

didduringthewar,butitisnotpermittedistokillthem.Thatiswhathappened.

MICHAELDOBBS:Andyoudidn'tthinkthatwasapossibility?

THOMKARREMANS:Notatthatmoment.Also,therewerenotsomanymenleftImustsay.

Thereweresomeinthecompound.Weknowthatamountbecausetheirnameswereput

onthepieceofpaper.12Thevastmajorityofthemenoutsidethecompoundwerealready

ontheirwaytoTuzla.

TOMBLANTON:Muhamed?

MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:Justtoclarify,thenumberofthemeninsidethecompoundin

Potočaridoesnotreallyrepresentthenumberofmenwhowereseparatedandtakento

differentexecutionsites.13Weknowthisthroughthere-tracingofthemassgraves.We

10SeealsoNetherlandsMinistryofDefense,“ReportbasedonthedebriefingonSrebrenica,”October4,1995.AccordingtotheDutchbatdebrief,itproved“virtuallyimpossibletoprovideproperescortsfortheconvoys.”11AccordingtotheDutchbatdebrief,Mladićannouncedthat“able-bodiedmenweretobescreenedforpossibleinvolvementinwarcrimes”atthethirdFontanahotelmeetingonJuly2.Hesaidthattheevacuationofthewomanandchildrenandwoundedwouldstartat1300.12AccordingtotheDutchbatdebrief,themalerefugeesdrewupalistof239menoffightingagewhohadtakenrefugeonthecompound,withtheintentionofsubmittingittotheICRC.Atleast60menrefusedtoberegistered.13BosnianSerbforcesrefusedtoallowMuslimmengatheredoutsidethecompoundtoboardthebuses.Mostofthemenwhoneverthelessmanagedtoboardthebuseswereremovedbeforethebusesreachedgovernment-

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knowwhichexecutionsitewasusedforthemenfromPotočari,whichsitewasusedforthe

peoplecapturedinCerska,andsoon.Basedontheassessmentthatwewereabletomake,

alittleover2,000menwereseparatedinPotočariandtakentodifferentexecutionsites.

MICHAELDOBBS:Wasitasmanyas2,000?

MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:Yes.Ifyoutakethenumberof8,000plus[totaldisappeared],out

ofthis8,000pluspeople,around2,000camefromPotočariandaround6,000camefrom

thewoods.

MICHAELDOBBS:Right,butthereweretwogroupsinPotočari.Therewasagroupof

aroundthreehundredinsidetheDutchbatbase.TheotherswereoutsidetheDutchbat

base.

MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:That'sexactlywhatweagreeabout.You'retalkingaboutthe

numberofthepeoplewithinthefenceoftheDutchcompound.You'renottalkingabout

20,000civiliansoutsideofthefenceofthecompound,andamongthese20,000thereisat

least1,500peoplewhohavebeenseparatedandtakentoexecutionsites.

TOMBLANTON:Zeidjustshowedmetheprosecutor’sopeningstatementintheMladićtrial

ontheothersideoftown,inwhichhearguesthatMladićdecidedonthemassexecutions

onthenightofJuly11,apparentlyinbetweenthetwomeetingswithColonelKarremans.

Zeid,couldyouquicklysummarizewhattheprosecutionbelieves,basedontheevidence

theyaccumulated.Itreinforcesthesensewehaveofthedecision-makingonSrebrenicaas

aconstantpush,lackofreaction,pushmore,lackofreaction.Itisarollingdecisionmodel

thatispertinenttothelessonswedrawfromSrebrenicaandwhenitispossibletopush

back.

controlledterritory.Muslimmalesweredetainedintheso-called“whitehouse”inPotočari,andtakentoexecutionsitesviaBratunac.

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ZEIDRA'ADALHUSSEIN:Youareabsolutelyright.TheprosecutorintheMladićcase,Peter

McCloskey,contendedthatthemurderplanbegantorevealitselfonthenightofJuly11.14

Theyarenotactuallysurewhetherit'safterthefirstmeetingwithColonelKarremans[at

9:00p.m.]orthesecondmeeting[at11:00p.m.]when[Srebrenicacivilianrepresentative]

NesibMandžićwasalsothere,buttheymakereferenceintheprosecutionstatementtothe

languagethatMladićused.Hedrawsastarkbinarychoiceof“survive,stayorvanish.”

ZeidRa'adalHussein

ThenhesaystoNesib,“Thefutureofyourpeopleisinyourhands,bringthepeople

whocansecurethesurrenderofweaponsandsaveyourpeoplefromdestruction.

Everythingisinyourhands.Bringsomeprominentpeoplefromaroundhere.Inthewords

oftheprosecutor,"HerewecanseethatMladićisobsessedwiththesalvationand

destructionoftheMuslimpeople.Thisisnoidlechatterforthecameraasitwasthisvery

14SeeProsecutor’sopeningstatement,Mladićtrial,ICTY,May17,2012.TheProsecutioncaseintheMladićandothertrialscloselyfollowsa“SrebrenicaMilitaryNarrative,”preparedbytheICTYexpert,RichardButler.MladićbeganmarshalingtransportationassetsontheeveningofJuly11.BSApersonnelbeganseparatingmenfromwomenandchildrenshortlyafterthearrivalofthefirstbusesoutsidetheDutchbatcompoundaround1230onJuly12.

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eveningthatMladićandhisofficersmadetheirfirstdecisionsontheplantomurderthe

Muslimmenandboys."

Thefollowingmorning[July12],there'sthethirdmeetingwithColonelKarremans.

TheprosecutornotesthatLieutenantColonelVujadinPopović[acommanderoftheDrina

Corps]metbrieflywithCaptainMomirNikolić[intelligenceofficerintheBratunacBrigade]

outsidetheFontanahotel.PopovićtoldNikolićthattheablebodiedmeninPotočariwould

beseparatedfromtheirfamiliesandkilled.PopovićaskedNikolićtoprovidethelocations

intheimmediatearea[wherethemencouldbetemporarilydetained].Theythenstartedto

lookattheoldbrickfactory.

ItwouldthereforeseemthatthedecisiontotakeSrebrenicawasmadeonJuly9,

andthedecisiontoconvertastrategicpoliticalplanintoamassatrocitywastakenwithin

thosefewhoursonJuly11.15YesterdayImetwithcolleaguesattheICTY.Theysaidthat

nothinghadchanged.Theywouldnotdisclosetheirthinkingonthecase,buttheybelieve

thisopeningstatementsaysitall.TheyalsobelievethatMladićwasinahighlyagitated,

vengefulandhighlyemotionalstateatthetimethatdecisionwastaken.

Thereasonwearemeetinghereisbecauseofthedecisionthatwastakenthatnight.

Couldwehaveanticipatedthisemotionalstateandthisdesiretocommitmassmurder?

MuhamedmentionedearliertodaythatthepeopleofSrebrenicaknewwhatwasgoingto

happen,butwe,theinternationals,weresurprisedandshockedbyit,eventhoughwehad

beenworkingwithallsidesforthreeorfouryears.Thequestionis,whywereweso

shocked?WeshoulddissecttheeventsofthateveningtounderstandwhyMladićtookthe

decisionhetook.

MICHAELDOBBS:Doyouhaveananswertothat?

ZEIDRA'ADALHUSSEIN:IthinkRuperthasananswerbecausehetoldmetheothernight

thathehasatheorythatcouldwork.

MICHAELDOBBS:SinceRupertandCarlmetwithMladićshortlyafterwards,perhapsthey

couldspeaktothedichotomybetweenwhatpeoplelikeMuhamedwereconvincedwas15See,forexample,ICTYjudgmentinthecaseofGeneralTolimir,paragraph1046,whichstatesthat“aplantomurdertheable-bodiedmenfromtheSrebrenicaenclavehadmaterializedbythemorningof12July.”

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abouttohappenandtheinternationalcommunitynotbeingwillingtobelieveit.Bythe

way,wehadaverysimilardiscussionlastyearinthecaseofRwanda.TheCzech

representativeontheSecurityCouncil,KarelKovanda,talkedabout“afailureof

imagination.”Nobodyreallybelievedthatagenocidewouldtakeplace.Inthecaseof

Rwanda,theydidexpectmassacres,butnobodyontheSecurityCouncilexpectedthescale

ofthegenocidethattookplace.

TOMBLANTON:Letmeaddacaveattothat.Therewasanexpectationthatthemassacres

wouldbeatthelevelofBurundithepreviousyear,whichwas100,000peopledead.

MICHAELDOBBS:ButKovandausedthephrase,"afailureofimagination."Perhapswesee

somethingsimilarhere.

MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:TheassessmentofwhatwasgoingtohappeninSrebrenicaisnot

mypersonalassessmentonly.Theprocessofseparation[ofthementryingtoescapeacross

themountainsfromthewomenandchildrenwhosoughtrefugewithDutchbat]happened

atasmalljunction,justbeforethegasstation,ontheroadtoPotočari.Thereisasmallroad

thatleadsleft,tothevillageofSućeska.Ipassedby[Dutchbat’s]lastposition,inthecenter

ofSrebrenica,nearthecentralmosque,onthenightonJuly11.ThestreetonwhichIhad

spentmostofmylifewasalreadyblocked.BulletswerebuzzingaroundwhenImanagedto

getoutofthatparticularlocation.

Wethentookadecision.Thosewhocannotwalk[togovernment-controlled

territory]willdieanyway.Theywillgowiththewomenandchildrenandelderlyto

PotočariandpraytoGodthatsomemercywouldbeshowntothem.Everyoneelsewho

wantedtohaveatleastsomechanceofsurvivalwouldcomewithus[overthemountains].

Yousawthousandsofpeople,anyoneabletowalk,kidswhowerenine,tenyearsold,and

wholefamiliesincludingwomenandchildren,everyonewalkinginthedirectionof

Sućeska.TheyknewthatgoingtoPotočarimeantcertaindeath.WhenIsaidgoodbyetomy

motheratthatparticularlocation,IhonestlybelievedthatIwasnevergoingtoseeher

again.ThatwasthefeelingofmostpeopleatthatparticularmomentinSrebrenica.

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RUPERTSMITH:YoucanseewhatIthoughtfromthereportIwroteonJuly13.16Igotback

tomyheadquarters[inSarajevo]ontheeveningofJuly12.Ittookalittleovertwenty-four

hourstogetintoSarajevofromSplit,goingdowntheMountIgmantrail.Itwasnotaquick

move.FairlyearlyonthemorningofJuly13,Idictatedthatdocument[tohismilitary

assistant,LtCol.Baxter],asmuchtoclearmyownheadastoinformanyoneelse.Notlong

afterthat,Iformedapictureofwhatwashappeningfromvariousbriefings,talkingtoother

people,readingreports.

Withhindsight,thepictureisn'ttoowrong.Ihadapictureinmyheadofagroupof

armedmen,thedefendersofSrebrenica,withdrawingoutofthepockettowardsTuzla.I

haveapictureoflargenumberofrefugeesclusteredaroundCol.Karremansandhis

battalion.Therewasaseriousrefugeeproblem.IhaveHasanMuratovićonmyback

beatingmeupbecauseIamtheUN,Ihavefailed.Hemakesclearthatthereisgoingtobe

nohelpfromBosniawiththeserefugees,theUNmustdealwiththemall.Assoonasthey

comeovertheborderwithRepublikaSrpska,theyaregoinguptoTuzla.Hasanmakesclear

tome,“They'reyourproblem.Yousolveit.Youcausedthis.”Ihaveabigargumentrunning.

IleaveHasan,gotoPresidentIzetbegovićandsay,“Thiswon'twork,they'reyourpeople,

we'vegottodothistogether.”SlowlyHasancalmsdownandwegetsomethinggoing.

TOMBLANTON:OneofyourconversationswithHasanisrecordedinamemorandumof

yourmeetingwithPrimeMinisterSilajdzićdatedJuly13,1995.17

RUPERTSMITH:Weneedtogetthelogisticsgoing,pullthehelicopterstogether,andget

thetentsandeverythingelsetoTuzlawheretherefugeesareexpected.Thatdoesnottake

toolong.Ihavethestafftogetitgoing.MyimmediateconcernsareaboutThom

[Karremans]whoisinthepositionof“talkingfromthejail.”Ithenreceiveamessage,late

atnight,togetmyselftoBelgrade.18WegobackupoverMountIgman,helicoptertoSplit

16SeeSmithtoHQUNPFZagreb,“AftermathFallofSrebrenica,”HQUNPROFOR,MHHQ48,July13,1995.17SeeCapt.Emma[E.L.]Bliss,Memconof“MeetingGenSmith/PrimeMinisterSilajdzić,”July13,1995.Duringthemeeting,bothMuratovicandSilajdzićexpressedconcernabout“unconfirmedreportsofatrocities.”MuratovicagreedthatallrefugeesbehousedatTuzlaairport“becausetherewasplentyofspaceandUNHCRwouldbeunabletohidetheproblemfromtheworld.”Previously,MuratovicopposedtheevacuationofSrebrenicaresidents.SeeAkashitoAnnan,“SituationinSrebrenica,”UNPROFORZ-1142,July12,1995.18SeediaryentryofGeneralChristopherElliot,militaryaidetoGeneraldeLaPresle,ICTY,courtesyofRupertSmith.

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andthenflytoZagrebandontoBelgradetogettothemeetingwithMilosevićinBelgrade.I

willletCarldescribethemeetingasawhole.Icanfillyouinonmysidemeetingwith

Mladić.

RegardingthenumberofrefugeesinSrebrenica,Iwasabout4,000peopleoutinmy

calculations.Wehadbeenfeedinglesspeoplethanwereactuallythere.Therewasa

mismatchinourfiguresbetweenmenandwomenandchildren.Ourcalculationswere

about4,000bodiesout.Asaresult,wewerenotlookingforalotofpeople.Wethought

therewereabout4,000peopletofind.TheICRCwasalsooftheopinionthattheywere

lookingforabout4,000people.IthoughtmostofthesemissingpeoplewereinBratunac.

WhenItalkedwithMladićinBelgrade[onJuly14-15],IaskedforaccessforICRC

andUNHCRtotheareaingeneral.IalsoaskedfortheICRCinparticulartobegivenaccess

tothe4,000prisonersthatIbelievedwereheldinBratunac.Wedidnothavetheproper

pictureatthistime.19Ihadanideainmyheadofabreakoutbyanarmedmilitaryforceina

war.IwasnottoofussediftheBosniansdidnotwanttodefendtheirpositionsin

SrebrenicaandwerewithdrawingtoTuzla.Itwastheirwar,andthatwastheirproblem.

Theydecidedtogothere.Myfocuswasontherefugees,accesstoprisoners,andwhattodo

withDutchbat.Howdowegetthemout?ThatwaswhereIwasbythetimeIgotonthe

roadtomeetwitheverybodyinBelgradeandZagreb.

BasedonwhatIlaterlearnedfromthecourtsandsoon,mytheoryisthatMladić

andhisofficersconvincethemselvesthattheyhaveasizableforce,muchbiggerthanI

thinkitis,looseintheirreararea.Theirtinymilitarymindsgetveryupsetwiththeidea

thatthisforceisthreateningtheirdefensesfromtherear.Theydonothaveenoughpeople

19EstimatesofthenumberofmissingmenfromSrebrenicafollowingitsJuly11capturebytheBosnianSerbswereconfused.AJuly13,1995cablefromAkashitoNewYork,basedoninformationfromUNHCRSpecialEnvoyAnneWillemBijleveldinTuzlanotedthatthefateof“4,000malesofdraftage”awaitingscreeninginBratunacwasof“obviousconcerntoeveryonehere.”SeeAkashitoAnnan,“SituationinSrebrenica,”Z-1154,July13,1995,paragraph2.TheStateDepartment’spressguidanceorJuly14expressedconcernoverthefateof“upto3,000menandboys”heldintheBratunacarea.AUNPROFORSectorNEreportfromJuly17,1995,reportedthat“uptothreethousand”MuslimmenhadbeenkilledenroutetoTuzla,andafurther2,000-3,000takentoastadiuminBratunac.UNhumanrightscommissionenvoyTadeuszMazowieckitoldjournalistsonJuly24afteravisittoTuzlathat“some7,000peoplefromSrebrenica”weremissingand“anenormousnumberofcrimes”hadoccurred.BosnianSerbestimatesofthecapturedmenweresignificantlyhigherthantheofficialUNestimates.AJuly13interceptofaconversationbetweenunidentifiedBosnianSerbofficersrefersto“about6,000”maleprisonerscapturedfromtheattemptedbreakout,inadditiontothe1,000-2,000malerefugeesfromPotočaritransferredtoBratunac.

4-15

todealwiththisthreatandtakecareoftheseprisoners,aswellaswhatisgoingonaround

SarajevoandtheiroffensiveintoŽepa.Thesimplesolutionis:killtheprisoners.

MICHAELDOBBS:ItisverydifficulttogetintoMladić'shead,buthedidsaywhenhe

enteredSrebrenica[onJuly11],"ThetimehascometotakerevengeontheTurksinthis

region."Theremayhavebeenamixtureofrationalthinking,asyoudescribeit,anda

simplethirstforrevenge.

MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:Ihavetodisagree.ThekillingsofSrebrenicaprisonersdidnot

happenonlyonJuly11,12,or15.Ittookme37daystofightmywayout.Therewere

killingseveryday.Ifsomeonewantedtojustkillafewthousandpeopleandgetridofthem,

theydidnothavetochaseusaroundformonthsandkilleveryonetheyfound.Noonewas

arrestedandnoonewasexchanged.Thenotionthattheykilledtheprisonersbecauseit

wasapracticalthingtodoandtheyhadinsufficientpersonneltoguardtheprisonersdoes

notcomportwithmyownexperience.Forme,theseexecutionswerethefinalstepinthe

ethniccleansingprocessin[eastern]Bosnia-Herzegovina.ŽepawastogoandGoraždeas

well.Anyonewhowasfoundwasexterminated.

AnyonecapturedevenamonthafterthefallofSrebrenica[onJuly11]waskilled.I

foundhundredsofpeople[onUdrcmountain],whichisonthewaytoZvornik.Theyhad

triedtogetthroughtoTuzla.TheSerbsbuiltpositionsnotonlyfacingtheBosnianArmyin

TuzlabutpositionsfacingtheincominggroupofpeoplefromSrebrenica.Thosewho

survivedthosekillingscamebacktoUdrc.ImadethecraziestdecisionIhaveevermade

then,butadecisionthatobviouslysavedmylife.IdecidedtowalkbacktoSrebrenica.Iwas

twentyyearsold,andIrecruitedsixotheryoungsterstojoinme.Thesesixpeoplewere

fifteen,sixteen,orseventeen.

4-16

Durakovic's37-daytrektofreedom

WewerecrazyenoughtocomeupwiththeideatowalkbackintoSrebrenica,the

heartoftheongoinggenocide.EveryoneIleftinUdrc,allmyneighbors,allmyfriends,all

myschoolmates,weretooexhaustedtogobacktoSrebrenica.Itdidnotmakeanysense:

theywerealreadyhalfwaytoTuzla,theywouldeithermakeitorbreakit.Theydecidedto

staythereandhaveneverbeenseensince.Theexecutionpartiesandsearchparties

eventuallycaughtupwiththemsomewhere,tookthemtoexecutionsites,andkilledthem.

TheSrebrenicakillingswentonfortwomonths,eventhreemonths.Therearereportsof

peoplewhocameoutalivefromSrebrenicasixmonthsafterthefallofSrebrenica.

CARLBILDT:Wecanallhaveourtheoriesofwhatactuallyhappened,butit’sspeculation.

Wedon'tknowexactlywhatwasinMladić'smind.Ihavemyideas,nottoodissimilarto

whatRupertissaying.Butletusgothroughmypartinthepoliticaltalksthatweretaking

placeatthattime.IhadbeeninBelgradepreviously[onJuly7]andmetMilosevićto

4-17

negotiatetheContactGroupsanctionsre-impositionformula.Ihadalsobeenaskedto

engagemoreontheenclavesissues.IwasfocusedsomewhatmoreonSarajevothanonthe

easternenclavesbecausetherewere400,000peoplewhowererunningoutoffood.The

UNforceswerenotabletoresupplyoverIgmanandreachUNHCRandWFP,andthe

others.

CarlBildt,left,withCameronHudsonandAbiodunWilliams

Wehadarestrictiononthepoliticaltalksthatwecouldconduct.WhenImetwith

PresidentIzetbegovićinSarajevo,hewasveryfirmthatweshouldnottalktothePale

leadership.Formallyspeaking,IwasanEUrepresentativesomylineofcommand(ifthere

wassuchathingwasatthattime)wastotheSpanish,whohadtakenoverthepresidency

oftheEUfromtheFrenchonJuly1.IwasalsoinfrequentcontactwithDickHolbrooke.The

UShaddefactobackedoffallpoliticaltalksatthattime,soIwastheonlychanneltheyhad.

SincewecouldnottalktoPale,whichwasaslightdisadvantage,wedecidedtoseeifwe

couldsplittheSerbleadershipandengagewithMladić.

WeknewthatMladićwasundermilitarystrain.Hehadlonglines,hewaslacking

soldiers,hewasurgingusalltoarrangeaceasefire,hewantedtoclosedownthewar,

4-18

needlesstosayonhisterms.Thiswasthereasonwhy,priortothemeetinginBelgradeon

July7,wehadsentamessagetoMilosević(Ican’trememberthroughwhichchannel)

sayingthatitwouldbeinterestingtoseeMladićifhepassesby.Accordingtomynotes,the

July7meetingwasoneofthoseusualmeetingswithMilosevićwhichlastedninehours.You

wentbackandforthovereverything,overendlessSerbmeals.Towardstheendofthat

session,IhadaconversationwithMladićintheevening.Iwaskeentolistentohimto

discoverthemoodoftheman,themindsetoftheman,butthesubstancedealtwiththe

enclaves.Accordingtomynotesatthetime,Imentionedhisstrangulationoftheenclaves.

Therewassomeotherissuesrelatedtointer-Serbrivalries,boththetension

betweenMladićandKaradzićandtheratheracutetensionbetweenMilosevićandMladić.

Therewasa[partial]YugoslavblockadeofRepublikaSrpska,whichhitthemquitehard,

primarilyontwoissues,beerandcigarettes.Thismightsoundtrivialtoday,butbeerand

cigarettesareimportantforthemoraleofanarmy.TheBosnianArmycontrolledthe

Sarajevotobaccofactory,whichwasinoperationandprovedastrategicasset.Therewere

nobrewerieswhatsoeverinRepublikaSrpskaterritory.Afairlyminorissueyoumight

think,butMilosevićandMladićspentquiteabitoftimeonit.

IreturnedtoBelgradeonFriday,July14.Bythattime,ofcourse,itwasobviousthat

Srebrenicawasonthetopoftheagenda.YouhaveMladić’snotesofhismeetingonthe

eveningofJuly14withMilosević,Bildt,andGeneraldeLaPresleandJuly15withGeneral

Smith.20TherewasalsoaUKdiplomatpresent,DavidAustin,butheisnotindicated.You

alsohaveAkashi’snotesfromtheJuly15meetingthatincludedAkashi,Bildt,Stoltenberg,

andMilosević,aswellasMladić.21Therearesomedifferencesbetweentheaccounts,but

essentiallytheysaythesamething.Onbothdays,webroughtupthequestionofaccessto

SrebrenicaforUNHCRandICRC.Wewereawareofthefactthatmenandboyshadbeen

separatedfromthewomenandthechildrenwhohadgonetoKladanj.Theystillheldthe

men.

Ofcourse,theSerbswouldsay“militarymen.”Thedefinitionof“military

age”wassomewhatliberal,toputitmildly.Theyclaimedthesemenwereprisonersofwar.

20RatkoMladić,“MeetingwithMilosević,BildtandGeneraldeLaPresle,”personaldiary,July14,1995,2115hours.Mladić,“MeetingwithUNandMilosević,”July15,1995.21AkashitoAnnan,“MeetinginBelgrade,”UNPF-HQ,Z-1175,July17,1995.

4-19

AsyoucanseeMladićapproved,inhisownhandwriting,theprincipleof“ICRCaccessto

prisonersofwar.”Istillfinditstrangethathetakesnotesofthis.Therearemanymysteries

here.ThemostdifficultaspectofourdiscussionsturnedouttobetheresupplyofUNforces

insideSarajevo,notablytheFrench,whohadalreadystartedtoshootbackagainstthe

Serbs,primarilywiththeirheavymortars.TheFrenchwerestartingtorunoutof

ammunitioninsideSarajevoandwantedtoresupply.Mladićwasnotkeentoallowusto

havefreeresupplyofammunitiontotheUNforces.Weinsistedandeventuallyhe,under

strongpressurealsofromMilosević,agreedtoopenuptherouteviaKiseljak.

ThingswerealsohappeningattheUN.UnderthepressureofaSecurityCouncil

resolution,theSecretary-GeneralinstructedMr.AkashitoretakeSrebrenica.22The

immediateactionthatBoutros-GhalitookwastoinstructMr.StoltenbergtogotoPaleand

holdtalkswiththePaleleadership.23Weconsideredthistobeamajormistakeand

managedtostopit.ThatiswhyMr.Akashi,Mr.Stoltenberg,andGeneralSmithwerecalled

tothefollowupmeetingwithMilosevićandMladićinBelgradeonSaturdaymorning.

Therewasalsothequestionofhowtore-establishadialoguebetweenGenerals

MladićandSmith,whichhadbrokenoffwiththeairstrikesagainstthePaleammunition

dumpsonMay25-26.WeweremeetingintheformerTitohuntinglodgeatDobanovci,

outsideBelgrade.Therewasadiscussionbetweenthegenerals,whoincludedGeneral

Smith,GeneralMladić,GeneraldeLaPresle,andGeneralElliot.Iwasthereforpartofthis

fairlyheavydiscussion.Oneofthequestionsdiscussed,needlesstosay,wasthereleaseof

theDutchhostages.Atthetime,thismeetingwashighlysecret,whichmeantthatthe

agreementweconcluded,primarilyontheresupplyofSarajevo,wasnotmadepublic.

Instead,ameetingwassetupbetweenGeneralSmithandGeneralMladićonJuly19.24They

22UNSCResolution1004,passedonJuly12,1994,statesthattheSecretary-Generalshould“useallresourcesavailabletohimtorestorethestatusasdefinedbytheAgreementof18April1993ofthesafeareaofSrebrenicainaccordancewiththemandateofUNPROFOR…”23RatkoMladić,“MeetingwithUNandMilosević,”July15,1995.24SeeBaxtertoUNPFZagreb,“MeetingNotes,”CommanderHQUNPROFOR,July19,1995.MladićagreedtoprovideICRCrepresentativeswithaccesstotheprisonerreceptionpoints“bytheendof20July,”apromisethathefailedtohonor.TheICRCwasnotpermittedaccesstodetentioncentersuntiltheendofJuly,whentheyweregrantedaccesstotheBatkoviccampinnortheasternBosnia,aswellas“anumberofemptydetentioncentresintheBratunacarea”.AccordingtotheUNSrebrenicareport,theywereonlyableto“register164prisonersfromSrebrenica.”ForMladićaccount,seediaryentryforJuly15,1995.AkashiraisedthequestionoftheSrebrenicamissingwithMiloseviconAugust12,repeatingdemandsforICRCaccesstothedetainees.Milosevicagreedthat

4-20

weresupposedtodeliveroneverythingatthatmeeting,whichwasmeanttobeofficially

reported.ThiswaspartofourstrategyofsplittingthePaleleadership.Wewantedtokeep

theMladićchannelassecretaswecouldfromthePaleleadership.

TOMBLANTON:SoyounegotiatedfullaccesstotheareaforUNHCRandICRConJuly15,

butwaituntilJuly19toworkoutthespecifics?Wasitnotsupposedtobeimmediate

access?

CARLBILDT:Itwasimmediate.TheJuly19meetingdealtmorewithSarajevoaccess.

RUPERTSMITH:There'snothingIdisagreewith,Ijustwanttofleshthisoutslightly.My

memoryishelpedbyanentryofthediaryofGeneralElliot,whowasatthetimemilitary

assistanttoGeneraldeLaPresle.25Mymemoryisthatwewentstraighttothemeetingin

the[Dobanovci]huntinglodge.IwasbyimpressedbyhowclearlyMladićandMilosević

wereasone,usingfamiliartermstoaddresseachother.Thiswasacloserelationship.The

generalswerethensentintoacorner“todealwiththemodalities,”intheusualphrase.

HowevermuchMr.Mladićagreedonthenightbefore,asyoucanseefromhisnotes,we

wentstraightbackintoargumentonthemorningofJuly15.

TOMBLANTON:Abouttheaccess?

RUPERTSMITH:Abouthowwedoallthis.Iwillquotesomenotesfromourdiscussionon

July15.“GeneralMladićwasinanexpansive,goodhumored,confidentmoodfollowingthe

fallofSrebrenica.GeneralSmithwascool,correctandstucktothepoint.Mladićneveronce

referredtoKaradzić,northeneedtopassanydecisionsarrivedatthroughPale.Duringthe

firstdiscussionsMladićstatedthattheuseofairpowerwasunjustifiedand‘aterrible

thing.’HereturnedtothismanytimesanddemandedthatGeneralSmithforswearitsuse.

Mladićwastoldthattheuseofairpowerwasinhishands.Ifhegavenoreasonforit,it

wouldn'tbeused.Ifhedid,itwouldbe.GeneralSmithwasresoluteonthis,evenwhenit

Mladic“muststicktohispromises,”butsaidhewas“havingdifficulties”communicatingwithMladic.SeeAkashitoAnnan,“ThemissingpopulationfromSrebrenica,”Z-1416,August14,1995.25SeeGen.ChristopherElliotdiaryentry,ICTY,courtesyofRupertSmith.ElliotwasmilitaryassistanttoGeneralBertranddeLaPresle,anadvisortoFrenchPresidentJacquesChiracandformerUNPROFORcommander.

4-21

lookedasthoughitmightderailthewholediscussions(which,Ihavetosay,hadtherestof

theaudiencesittingontheedgeoftheirseats).ThisisjusttofleshoutthepointthatCarl's

justmade.“Mladićdeferred,eachtime,eventually–asaresult,thedeterrenceofairpower

wasrepairedtosomedegree.”

Quotingagainfromthedocument,“theotherstickingpointwasfreedomof

movementforUNPROFORconvoys.”MladićtalksaboutŽepaandsaysheisnotgoingto

attackGoražde.Hegives“adetailedaccountofthetakingofSrebrenica,almostappealing

foradmirationorsympathy.”

Sowehavethisquiteirritatedargumentanddiscussiononhowwedothis,but

finishupwiththoseheadsofagreementfleshedoutinadocumentthatwethentakeback

tothelunchwhichoccursaboutfourintheafternoon.Theyreceiveastampofapproval

andwe[SmithandMladić]aretoldtomeetagainonJuly19.

Youwillseeinthisdocumentthat,astheyflybacktoZagreb(IamnottherebutI

ambeingtalkedabout),Bildtexpressesconcernthat“GeneralSmithmightsticksoclosely

to his principles nextWednesday [July 19] that a solutionwithMladićwill not emerge.”

Thereisconcernthat“GeneralSmithwouldescalate,notnegotiate,leadingtoawar.”There

wasadebateaboutthis.DeLaPreslemakesacommentthatitwaswrongformenottobe

incommunicationwithMladićsinceMarch.Asaresultofthis,ElliotsaysthatSmithneeds

“correctpoliticalguidance.”WearrangealinksothatCarlandIarecommunicating.Forthe

firsttime,I'mbeingconnectedwithapoliticalprocess.Carl,haveIgotthatmemoryright

aboutthecommunications?

CARLBILDT:Absolutely.Justtoexpandonthat,IwasanEUrepresentativeoperating

closelytogetherwiththeUNrepresentative,ThorvaldStoltenberg.Thatgavemeaccess

intotheUNsystem,althoughtheywereseparate.IreportedtotheEUPresidency.TheUS

rolewasfairlysignificant.IhadanUSdiplomatwithmeforcommunications.Wehada

securityproblemwhenwewereinBelgradewhichmeantthatweusedthefacilitiesofthe

USEmbassy.WemetinthesecureroomoftheUSEmbassyforallofourinternal

deliberations.WealsohadasecurelinktoHolbrookeattheStateDepartmenttomake

certainthathewasinthepicture.

4-22

Wealsohadalinksetupincasetherewereproblemswiththeagreementforthe

resupplyofSarajevo,whichMladićprofoundlydisliked[butMilosevićaccepted].The

FrenchmilitarysetupasatellitelinkbetweenBelgrade,whereIwas,andwhereRupert

was,somewhereoutinthemountainsofBosnia.ItwastobeusedtoputMilosevićin

communicationwithMladićifMladićstartedtobacktrackonwhathadbeenagreed.That

didnothappen.Mladićdidnotbacktrackatthatmeeting,butwewerepreparingforthe

eventuality.

TOMBLANTON:BythetimetheICRCoranybodyelsegottoBratunac,whatwasthere?

Noneofthatagreementwashonored?

RUPERTSMITH:Bitswere.Dutchbatcameout.Thatwaspartofthatagreement.Butaccess

totheareawasnothonoreduntiltheendofJuly.WemetagainonJuly25.26Thememo

statesthat“MladićconfirmedthathewouldallowICRCaccesstoSrebrenicaalthoughwe

understandthisisstilltotakeplace.”ByJuly25,westillhavenothadthataccessthatwas

promisedonJuly15andJuly19.

TOMBLANTON:Ineffect,hehasstalledthenegotiationcontinuously.

HASANMURATOVIĆ:Iwouldliketocomebacktothequestionofrefugees.AsMr.

KarremansandMr.Nicolaisaid,thingswentmuchfasterthananybodyexpectedatthat

time.WhatwastheBosniangovernmentpositionandwhatIwasdoing?Itriedtoputall

pressureandallresponsibilityontheUN.WehadnoaccesstoSrebrenica.OnlyUNPROFOR

hadanyaccess.WeexpectedUNPROFORtoorganizeitselfandstartdoingsomethingabout

therefugeesinSrebrenica.Mysuppositionwastheyhadhelicopters,APCs,transportation,

andverygoodconnectionswithallhumanitarianorganizations.Wethoughttheywouldgo

there,andorganizethetransportofpeopletofreeterritory.

TOMBLANTON:ColonelKarremansisshakinghishead.

26SeeBaxter,“MeetingnotesGeneralSmith/GeneralMladić25July,”UNPROFORCommander,July26,1995.

4-23

HASANMURATOVIĆ:IalwayspressedfortransportationbyUNPROFOR.Ithoughtthat

Dutchbatwasstrongerthantheywereinreality.Ididnotexpectthemtobeintheposition

inwhichtheywere.Ithoughttheycouldstopthetransportation[bytheBosnianSerbs].I

insistedthatpeoplebetransportedbyair,byhelicopters.WeputpressureonUNPROFOR

tobringintheirtransportationresourcesforthetransportationofrefugees.Iknewthey

hadtransportationresources.WedidnotexpectMladićtoorganizethetransportsso

quicklyhimself.IranbetweenGeneralSmith,AmbassadorMenziesoftheUnitedStates,

andTuzla.TheyprovidedmetransportbyhelicopterorbyAPC.IrantoTuzla,cameback.

HasanMuratović,withZlatkoLagumdzija,L

WeexpectedtherefugeestoarriveinKladanj.AlthoughIsaidatthattime,thatwe

werenotresponsiblefortherefugeesandtheUNhastoplacetheminTuzlaairport,you

willseefromthesereportsthatwehousedmanymorerefugeesthanUNPROFOR.27Iknew

thatthiswasgoingtobeaproblemlateron.Theycouldhaveaskedothercountriestotake

27Fordetailsonhandlingofrefugeesandcollectioncenters,seeBisertoMoussalli,“Srebrenica/TuzlaUpdate,”July17,1995.

4-24

refugees(transportingthemoutofTuzlaairport)whichwouldhavebeenmucheasierfor

usthaniftheywerescatteredaroundBosnia-Herzegovina.AsforthosethatleftSrebrenica

andwereontheirwaythroughtheforeststoTuzla,IkeptcallingAmbassadorMenzies,

tellinghim,“Theskyisclear,it'sasunnyday,youhaveAPCs,satellites,planes.Pleasetrack

whathashappenedtothethousandsofpeoplemovingfromSrebrenicatoTuzla.”How

cometheydidnotknowanythingaboutsuchamassofpeople?

Ihadtwomajorproblemstodealwith.Onewastrackingwhathappenedtothe

peoplewholeftSrebrenica.ThesecondwashowtobringthosethatwereinSrebrenicato

freeterritory.WhenIwasinTuzla,IwasassistedbyUNPROFORingettingaphonecallto

oneofourtranslatorsfromDutchbatinSrebrenica.Itoldhim,“Youmusttakeallpossible

carewithDutchbatnottoallowpeopletogetonbusesortrucksorganizedbyMladić.”He

toldme,“Icannotdoanything,theyarealreadyenteringthebuses.”Thatwasatthetime

whenthetransportationstarted.

Inhisbook,Mr.AkashisaidthatIdidnotreceivehimverynicelywhenhecameto

Sarajevo.28[Laughter]IalwaysfoughtwithUNPROFOR.Notwithallofthem.Iseparatethe

humanitariansideoftheUN,whichwasirreplaceableandrecognizedbytheBosnian

government,fromthemilitaryside,whichfailedcompletely.

TOMBLANTON:ColonelKarremans,youwantedtorespondbrieflyhere?

THOMKARREMANS:Yes,Iwouldliketorespond.First,concerningyourremarkabout

trucksandvehicles,IhadnodieselfromMarch1995.Thismadeitnecessarytorestrictuse

ofmyAPCsandtrucks.IftherewasadieseltransportthroughZvornik,Mladićorhismen

stoleit.Thatwasthecaseformany,manymonths.IusedthedieselfromUNHCR,asItold

youyesterday.Ineededdieselformycommunicationssystem,formyradios,andalsofor

thegenerators.WeliterallylivedinthedarkfromMarchonwards.Iextracteddieselfrom

mytrucksandAPCs.Theonlyvehiclesthatcouldbedrivenweremyjeeps.Thatwasit.

Therewasnowaywecouldtransport25,000refugees.Second,Mladićofferedmethe

28YasushiAkashi,IntheValleyBetweenWarandPeace,26-27.Akashiwrotehewas“shocked”bythe“vehemence”displayedbyMuratovicduringavisittoSarajevoinJanuary1994,andthe“extreme”severityofthecriticismoftheUNbytheBosniangovernment.

4-25

possibilitybeforeSrebrenicafellofleavingthesafeareawithmybattalion.29Isaid“No,I

willnotdothat,becausetherearestillwoundedpeoplehere.”

ZEIDRA'ADALHUSSEIN:WhentalkingtotheprosecutorsattheICTY,fromwhatIcould

understand,Mladićwasguidedbythesamelogicduringthosethreedays,July13-15,as

before.AdecisionwastakenonthenightofJuly11wastoexecutethe[military-aged]men

inPotočari.

Mladićdidnotknowthesizeofthecolumn[attemptingthebreakout],howmany

peopleweremakingtheirwayout.Astheyattackedtherearofthecolumn,moreandmore

menidentifiedthemselves.TheBosnianSerbsdiscovered(1)theywerenotbeingexposed,

becausedaybydaytheUNwasnotsayinganything,and(2)inthemeetingonJuly15in

Belgrade,itwasclearthatwedidnotknowwhattheyweredoing.

Theyfelttheyweregettingawaywithit.Sincetheyweregettingawaywithit,and

theyweredoingitefficiently,theyjustcontinuedthebusinessofmasskilling.Thislogic

continuesallthewaythrough.Theymusthavebeensurprisedtoacertaindegreebecause

thebodieswereondisplayatcertainlocations.Mladićwasthere,drivingupanddown,but

theUNdidnotknowthatthiswasgoingon.Thesamelogicisstillinapplication.

WehavenotdiscussedwhathappenedinCroatia,duringthefallofWestern

SlavoniainMay1995.30ItisinterestingasthereverseofwhathappenedafterSrebrenica.

TheCroatianstooktheareaawayfromtheSerbs.Thatoperationalsoinvolvedbuses

providedbytheCroatianswheretheSerbswereseparatedbutlaterfound.Therewereno

massexecutionsinthatcase.Mladićwasdisturbedbythisoperation.Atthebackofhis

mind,inorganizingbusestocartoffpeople,theremayhavebeenanechoofwhathe

understoodhadhappenedinCroatiatothenorth.

29SeeBosnianSerb“ultimatum”toDutchbat,recordedbyMajorFranken.30TheCroatianarmyrecapturedtheSerbbreakawayregionofWesternSlavoniainMay1995during“OperationFlash.”AccordingtoaJuly1995HumanRightsWatchreport,theCroatsdetained“approximately1,500Serbs”ofdraftage.WhilesomeSerbsweremistreatedinitially,theICRCwasabletogainaccesstothedetainees,whowereeventuallyreleased.Thereportdescribedallegationsof“massive”humanrightsabusesbyUNofficials,includingAkashi,as“unfortunateandpremature.”

4-26

TOMBLANTON:Thisbringsustothequestionofwhatweknew,andwhendidweknewit.

AsreportedinTheIndependentonJuly17,BelgradetelevisionscreenedavideoonJuly14

whichincludesafewframesofapileofbodiesoutsidetheKravicawarehousenear

Srebrenica.

Basedonthatvideo,theBelgradecorrespondentofTheIndependent,RobertBlock,wrotea

storyheadlined“BodiespileupinhorrorofSrebrenica,”whichalsomentionedabortive

attemptsbytheICRCtovisitBratunacandtheseparationofmenandwomen.31

OnJuly18,AkashireceivesanotefromAnnan(signedbyShashiTharoor)inNew

Yorkaskingabout“widespreadandconsistent”reportsofatrocitiescommittedbythe

BosnianSerbsfollowingthetakeoverofSrebrenica.32Hecomplainsthatwehave“received

nothingonthesubjectfromUNPROFOR.”AkashirespondsonJuly19,estimatingthetotal

numberof“unaccounted”asbetween4,000-8,000.33TheresponsealsonotesthattheBSA

“stillrefusetograntICRCaccesstodetainees.”

31SeeRobertBlock,“BodiespileupinhorrorofSrebrenica,”TheIndependent,July17,1995.32AnnantoAkashi,“HumanRightsViolationsbyBosnianSerbs,”UN2381,July18,1995.33AkashitoAnnan,“DispositionofDisplacedPersonsfromSrebrenica,”UNPF-HQ,Z-1198,July19,1995.

4-27

IwouldliketoaskMr.Akashiaboutthisresponse.Itisamathematicalresponse

ratherthanaresponsedealingwiththekindofaccountpublishedinTheIndependent.Itis

ananalysisofthenumbersmissing,emphasizing“theimprecisenatureofthesefigures.”

ShashiTharoor,youarehearingfromthemediaandcredibleobservers,including

UNHCR.Couldyoucommentonthatandthismessage?Mr.Akashi,couldyoucommenton

thereplyandcollectionofevidence?

SHASHITHAROOR:WewereobviouslyindailyandfrequentcontactwithUNPROFOR

whileallofthiswasunraveling.Whenthemenandboyswereseparated,werecommended

thatwehaveanUNPROFORarmedpersononboardeachbustoensurethatnoharmwas

donetothem.Thiswasaphoneconversation.Thatturnedoutnottobepracticalbecause

theSerbswouldnotagreetoit.WedidnotrealizethatUNPROFORitselfwasdisarmed

whenwegavethatideatothem.Inanycase,fromthenextdayonwards,storiesof

massacresstartedappearing.Theystartedwithmediareports,andwealsogotinformation

fromsomeofthepermanentmissionsinNewYork,includingtheUSmission.Wewere

worriedthatweweregettingnothingatallfromourownpeople.Wewantedtogetthe

recordstraightastheSecurityCouncilwasclamoringforanauthoritativebriefing.We

weregettingluridaccountsinthepapersandnothingwecouldtelltheCouncil.Thatis

whatthisrequestwasallabout.

TOMBLANTON:Mr.Akashi,howdidyoureadthatrequestandwhatreportsdidyouhave

atthattime?

YASUSHIAKASHI:Wehadbitsofinformationwhichweweretryingtopiecetogether.As

youcanseefromourresponse,itwasadesperateprocessassemblingallthisintoafaxto

getdowntothetruthofthematter.IgotadifferentimpressionofMladićfromthemeeting

withMilosevićonJuly15fromRupert,whodescribedMladićas“expansive,”Ibelieve.34I

observedMladićcloselyandthoughthelookedcompletelydifferentfromhisusual,self-

confidentself.Rupertwascalmandrational,butMladić'smoodchangedsuddenlyfrom

cooltoexcitedandagitated.Hewaslosinghisusualcomposure.Ithoughtsomethingmust

34The“expansive,goodhumored,confident”descriptionofMladićcamefromGeneralElliot,notGeneralSmith.

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havehappenedtohimintheprecedingdays.Inhindsight,verydrasticthingshadbeen

happening.MyimpressionofMladićonJuly15wasthatsomethingwasamissbutIcould

notmakeoutthereasonforhisunusualattitude.

TOMBLANTON:Themoment,atleastontheUSside,whenitbecomescrystalclearisthe

July25,1995cablefromAmbassadorGalbraithinZagreb[forwardedtoTonyLakeand

otherNSCofficialsbySandyVershbow],whichwasbasedonrefugeeaccountscompiledby

[UNofficial]ToneBringainTuzla.35Tone,canyoujustbrieflydescribehowthatstory

reachedPeter,becauseitcertainlywokeupWashington?

ToneBringa,right,withPeterGalbraith

TONEBRINGA:CanIencourageyounottolosesightoftheideologythatmotivatedand

justifiedMladić'sactions?Thereissomethingcalled"priming"whenyoulookatthesteps

inagenocide.MladićhadbeenpriminghisownSerbpopulationinpreparingforgenocide.

IdonotknowifthepeoplewhoworkedatUNPROFORreadthe“Prijedorreport”bytheUN35GalbraithtoSecState,“PossibleMassExecutionofSrebrenicaMalesisreasontosaveŽepa,”AmEmbassyZagreb,Zagreb02788,July25,1995.NSCofficialSandyVershbowforwardedtheGalbraithcabletotheNSCadvisor,TonyLake,andhisdeputy,SandyBerger,thesamedaywiththecomment,“thefactofSerbmasskillingsatSrebrenicaisbecomingincreasinglyclear.Grimreading.”

4-29

CommissionofExpertsandtheconclusionstheydrew.36Thereportqualifiedtheeventsin

PrijedordistrictafterApril30,1992,whichwereillustrativeofthelargerdynamicsin

Bosnia,as“crimesagainsthumanity.”Itpredictedthataninternationalcourtwouldrule

that“theseeventsconstitutegenocide.”WhatwastakingplaceinSrebrenicadidnotappear

outofnowhere.Ineededtosaythat.

ConcerningtheJuly25Galbraithcable,IwasworkingfortheAnalysisand

AssessmentUnitinAkashi'soffice,UNPFHQinZagreb.Iwasexasperatedatthetimeby

whatIperceivedasasenseofbusinessasusualattheHQwhileallthiswasgoingon.We

heardreports,butwhatmostlytriggeredmetoactinsomewaywasallthesewomen

arrivingasrefugeestoTuzla,saying,“Whereareourmen?Wewantourmen,whereare

they?”Wewaited.Aweekpassedandtheydidn'tturnup.Ithought,“WhatcanIdo,I'man

anthropologist,maybeIcangothereandtalktopeopleandmaybepickupsomething.”I

askedpermissiontogotoTuzla.Ithenlearnedthatsomehumanrightsofficersweregoing

toTuzla.Infact,theyarementionedintheJuly19cablefromAkashitoAnnan,replyingto

thequestion“whatareyouplanningtodo?”Akashisays,we'resendingUNofficers“with

specifichumanrightstraining.”Iwentwiththem.

Thereweretwohumanrightsofficers,PeggyHicksandGraceKang.Wewenttothe

UNbasethere[atTuzlaairport].Theyaskedovertheloudspeakersforanyonetocome

forwardwhohadjustarrivedfromSrebrenica.Wedidnotwaitlongwhenamancame

running.Hewasveryagitated.Hesaid,“I'mlookingformywifeandchildren,Ican'tfind

thembutIhavetotalktoyoufirst,IhavetotalktotheUN,Ihavesomethingtotellyou.”

PeggyHicksthensaidthatGraceKangshouldtalktohim.Isatinonthatinterview.37The

waytheywork,theyhaveachecklistandaskveryspecificquestions.SinceIunderstand

Bosnian,Iwasabletolistendirectlytowhatthemansaid,withoutthehelpofthe

interpreter.Itwasverycleartomethathewasspeakingthetruth.Ahumanrightsofficeris

alwaysconcernedwithcredibility.Theyhavedealtwithpeoplewhomakeupstories.As

36TheUNreleasedasummaryofthe“Prijedorreport”onMay24,1994.See“FinalreportofthecommissionofexpertsestablishedpursuanttoSecurityCouncilResolution780(1992),”S/1994/674,particularlyparagraph182.TheIntelligenceandResearchbureauoftheStateDepartmenthadissuedwarningsabout“attemptedgenocideofBosnianMuslims”asearlyasJanuary1993.SeeMulhollandtoKanter,“Bosnia:ActionscontributingtoGenocide,”USDepartmentofState,January11,1993.37TheinterviewtookplaceonJuly22.SeeGraceKang,“ReportofHumanRightsViolations,”July22,1995.

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thisman'sstoryunfolded,however,Ihadaterriblerealizationaboutthefateofthemissing

boysandmenofSrebrenica.Irealizedthatthismasskillingofunimaginableproportions

hadtakenplaceandthathewasjustoneofahandfulofsurvivors.38

Ihadnodoubtthathisstorywastrueandthathewastalkingfrompersonal

experience.Hewasveryconcentratedashespoke.Hislanguagewasfactualandtothe

point,hisdescriptionsweredetailed,hewascitingspecificplacenamesandgivingthe

exactchronologyofevents.ItwasnotthekindofvaguestatementthatIoftenhadseen

frompeoplewhowerereportingthingstheyheardonthenews.Heshowedmethemarks

oftheropearoundhiswrists,andagrazetohistemplecausedbyagunshotwound.That

wasthebulletthatwasmeantforhim.Hesurvivedbecausehewasprotectedbydead

bodiesfallingontopofhim.Theydugtheseditchesthattheythenfellinto.Thatnight,he

heardsomebodyelse'svoice,thevoiceofanothersurvivor.Theyescapedinthenighttothe

safearea.

IreturnedbyhelicopterbacktoZagrebwithGraceKangandimploredher,“Doyou

realizetheenormityofwhatyoujustheard?Doyourealizewhatthisstorymeans?Please

writeastronglywordedreportandmakesureitdoesn'tendupinadrawerattheUN.”By

thenIknewhowthesereportswereoftenwatereddownandmaybeendedupinsome

drawer.PeggyHickswrotethereportbackinZagreb.39Shealsohadanothersurvivor

story,asfarasIcanremember.

38The35-year-oldsurvivorisreferredtoas“O.H.”inanAugust3,1995cablefromGalbraith.[AmEmbassyZagrebtoSecState,“HumanRightsabuses–Srebrenica,”Zagreb02953,August3,1995].AccordingtotheinitialJuly25cable,themansurvivedamassexecutiononJuly14,1995byhidingbeneathapileofbodies.ABosnianarmymilitaryintelligencedocumentdatedJuly20,1995statedthatOsmanHalilovic,aged35,andNedzadAvdic,aged17,had“crossedourdefencelinesintothefreeterritory”onJuly18,1995.ThetwomendescribedhowtheywerecapturedintheKonjevićPolje/NovaKasabaareaonJuly12andtakenonJuly14toamassexecutionsiteatadamnearthevillageofPetkovci,35kilometerstothenorth.TheplacenamesintheinitialGalbraithcablewereconfused,sometimeserroneous,andonlyclarifiedastheresultofasubsequentinvestigationbyICTY.39PeggyHickswasamemberoftheHumanRightsOffice,reportingtotheheadofCivilAffairs,MichelMoussalli.MoussalliforwardedthereporttoAkashionJuly31.SeeMoussallitoAkashi,“Srebrenicahumanrightsreport,”July31,1995.AkashiforwardedthereporttoAnnaninNewYorkonAugust12,incodecableZ-1406,inresponsetoAnnan’srequestforfurtherinformationaboutallegedatrocitiescommittedbytheBosnianSerbs.SeeAnnantoAkashi,“Srebrenica:Investigation,”NewYork2665,August10,1995.TheAnnancablewastriggeredinpartbyapresentationbyMadeleineAlbrighttotheUNSecurityCouncil,identifyingpossiblemassgraves.HickshadearliersentaJuly21memotoMoussalli,“RecommendationConcerningSrebrenicaMissingandDetained”,thaturgedtheSecurityCounciltofocus“urgent”attentionon“theissueofthemissinganddetainedfromSrebrenica.”SeealsoBisertoMoussalli,“SectorNortheastHumanRightsUpdate,”July21,1995.

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AsIreadherreport,Irememberthatmyhandsfelldownonthetablewiththe

paper.ThismusthavebeentherockbottomofmytimeattheUN.Iwas

completelydespondentbecausethereporttalkedaboutaccountsthatwerestill

“unconfirmedandunsubstantiated.”Ithought,“WhatdoIdo?”Myfirstthoughtwas,“I'll

takethisreportandgostraightintomyboss,Akashi,nextdoor,andresignonthespot.”But

Iwasacompletelyinsignificantpersonanditwouldhavehadnoconsequencewhatsoever.

Iwasconcernedthatthereportshouldreachsomeonewhowouldrealizetheimplication

ofitandthenact.Peopledidn'tactthen.Thatevening,IhaddinnerwithPeter,whoI'd

gottentoknowasapersonwhoacted.ItoldhimaboutwhatI'dheardandsaidtohim,

“Pleasedosomething.”

MICHAELDOBBS:Peter’scablegottheattentionoftheWhiteHouse.Itwascirculatedby

SandyVershbowwhowantedtojoinustodaybutwasunableto.SandywasJenonne's

successorasDirectorofEuropeanAffairsattheNationalSecurityCouncil.Sothealarm

bellswentoffinWashington?

TOMBLANTON:AndtriggeredtheroadtoDayton,no?

PETERGALBRAITH:Itgottheattentionofpeopleatthetopalthoughyoucanseethatsome

peoplewereprobablytiredofmyrecommendations.

TOMBLANTON:Thereisalineinhere,“WhateveryouthinkofGalbraith’s

recommendationreŽepa....”40

PETERGALBRAITH:Thatwasprobablyacommonreactiontomycablestotheextentthat

theywereread.Thecablementionsaplace,KonjevićPolje,whichenabledpeopletolook

forsatellitephotographsthatmatchedupwiththedates.Ihavesubsequentlylearnedthat

thismaynothavebeentheplacewherethemassexecutiondescribedbythesurvivortook

40GalbraithurgedtheUSgovernmenttoact“topreventasimilartragedyatŽepa.”ŽepafelltotheSerbstwodayslater,onJuly27,1995.

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place.41ThecablealsotriggeredthemissionbyJohnShattuck,whichreinforcedthewhole

thing.

Ithinkthatthequestionhere,tobehonest,isabouttheUN.Myunderstandingis

thatthePeggyHicksreportwasacompilationofrefugeeaccountsratherthanonestory.It

waswritteninawaythatwassoqualifieditwasnotgoingtoattractattention.

Whatsurprisesmeisthattherewasnotateamoutcollectingthesestoriesright

fromthebeginning.Iknowthatourownembassyhadpeopleoutintherefugeecampsall

thetime.Youhadmanymoreresourcesthanwedid.Whenthestorycamein,youhavethe

41TheJuly25andAugust3GalbraithcableserroneouslyreportedthatthemassexecutiondescribedbythesurvivortookplaceatKonjevićPolje,wheninfactittookplaceatPetkovcidam,35kilometersaway.ThisledCIAanalyststofocustheiroriginalsearchforevidenceofmassgravesalongafivekilometerstretchofroadbetweenKonjevićPoljeandNovaKasaba,ratherthanPetkovcidam.ICTYinvestigatorslaterdiscoveredtheremainsof33individualsburiedattheNovaKasaba/KonjevićPoljesite,farfewerthanthe809setsofremainsassociatedwiththeexecutionsatPetkovcidam.SeeDusanJanc,“UpdatetotheSummaryofForensicEvidence,”April21,2010.

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headofyourhumanrightsunitsaying,“Ihavetodownplaythisbecauseofthehead

ofthemission.”Thequestionis:why?Mysuspicionisthatyouknewthereweredifferent

viewsbetweentheAmericansandtheUNanddidnotwanttoinflametheAmericans.Is

thatacorrectassumption?ItmightinflameMadeleineAlbright.

YASUSHIAKASHI:Ihavenotthoughtaboutthethingsyouhavejustmentioned.Itnever

occurredtome.

JOHNSHATTUCK:Icanjustcarrythisalittlebitfurther.Petercalledmeprobablyeven

beforethiscablewasreceivedintheWhiteHouse.Iwasn'tunderinstructionstofollowup

onhismessagebutitwasobviouslyverycompelling.Iimmediatelystartedworkingtotry

togetoutthere.ThebackgroundwasthatIwasfrustratedbytheinabilitytogetthekindof

informationthatnormallyonegetsfromtheICRCandUNHCRaboutthemissingmenafter

thefallofSrebrenicaalmosttwoweeksearlier.42Ihadtriedthrough[ICRCpresident]

CorneliusSommaruga,withwhomIwasworkingcloselyonothermatters,toseewhat

ICRCmighthave.Theyhadnothing.Theysaidtheyhadn'tbeengivenaccesstothearea.

ThesamewastrueforUNHCR.

ThefirsttangibleinformationcamefromPeter'sphonecallandTone’strip.Istarted

tryingtogooutrightaway,literallythatday.Ithoughtitwasextremelyimportant,butthe

“atmospherics”weredifficult.NeithertheWhiteHousenortheStateDepartmentwould

clearmytriprightawaybecauseoftheratherdelicatenegotiationsanddiscussionsthat

wereunderwayinLondonwiththetroopcontributingnations.Thefeelingwasthat

nothingshouldbefurtherspotlightedonwhatwasgoingoninSrebrenica.43

Ihadfurtherdifficultywithdiplomaticsecuritywhichwouldnotclearmytripfora

coupleofdays.AllofthiswasclearedupbecauseoftheinterventionsofMadeleine

42SeeShattucktoTheSecretary,“DefenseoftheSafeAreasinBosnia,”InformationMemorandum,July19,1995.Shattuckcited“crediblereportsofsummaryexecutions”andreportedthat“tensofthousandsofpeople”hadnotbeenaccountedfor.43Seniorofficialsfrom16NATOcountries,includingtheUnitedStates,plusRussiametinLondononJuly22toforgeacommonpolicyonBosnia.ThemeetingendedwiththreatsofNATOairstrikesiftheSerbsattackedGoražde.SeeMichaelDobbsandFredBarbash,“AllieswarnSerbstoavoidGoražde,”WashingtonPost,July23,1995.

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Albright,RichardHolbrooke,andWarrenChristopher.44TheSecretaryofStatehadbeen

quiteambivalentaboutBosniabutrealizedtheimportanceofthistrip.WhenIgotto

Zagreb,ImetwithToneandobviouslyPeter,andgotfurtherinformationfromthem.We

decidedimmediatelythatIshouldgotoTuzlaandtrytofindmoreofthesemen,notonly

theonethatTonemet,butothers.Ispentadayandahalfthere,talkingtoseveralsurvivors

including[a55-year-oldcrippledbricklayer]HuremSuljic,whobecamemyprincipal

witness.45Iwasableveryquicklytocredithisreportbecauseofthespecificityofthe

informationheprovidedandthewoundsthathehadsuffered,includinggrazingwoundon

histemple,whenhefellintoapitwithbodies.Therewereatleasttwootherswithsimilar

accounts.

TherewasoneremarkablethingthatIrememberhesaid,whichwasMladić's

behaviorthroughoutthistime.Mladićcameandaddressedthemenastheywerebeing

roundedup.Eachtimeheassuredthemthattheywouldeventuallybeabletoleave.Hesaid

44HolbrookeviewedShattuck’stripas“animportantopportunitytoassertsomebasictruths”,butinsistedon“closecoordination”overhispressstatementstoensurethat“John’sbriefcanbeseparatedfrom,butreinforce,ournegotiations.”Seeundated“MsgforAmbG[albraith]fromA/SHolbrooke”,Galbraithpapers,NDU.45SeeSpiegel/ShattucktoSecState,“ShattuckMissiontoBosnia,”USmissionGeneva005948,August2,1995.The“55-year-oldcrippledman”inthecableisareferencetothebricklayerHuremSuljicwhosecrippledconditionmadeitimpossibleforhimtojointhebreakoutattempt.HesoughtrefugewithDutchbatinPotočari,andwastakentoBratunacfollowingtheseparationofthemenfromthewomenandchildren.HissurvivalofamassexecutionnearthetownofOrahovaconJuly14isdescribedinRohde,Endgame,298-300.

HuremSuljic,CNNinterview

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theywerebeingheldasprisonersandhewastryingtocalmthem.Tomethatindicateda

highdegreeofintentionalityonhispart.Assomeonewhohadgatheredalotofevidence

relatedtoethniccleansingandearliergenocidaleventslikePrijedor,Iunderstoodthisas

anextensionofwhathadhappenedearlierinthewar.Thiswasnotsomethingcompletely

differentfromwhathadbeengoingoninBosniaupuntilthen,orindeedCroatia.Itis

importantfortherecordtostressthatthenoveltyofSrebrenicawasthescaleofthekilling

(atleast7,000men,thelargestgenocideinEuropesincetheSecondWorldWar),notthe

natureofit,whichwaspartoftheoverallethniccleansingcampaign.

[AfterIreturnedtoWashington]IwascontactedbyayoungCIAofficerwho

informedmethatheandseveralothersofhiscolleagueshadseenthecablesthatIhad

filed.Theytookituponthemselvestodeterminewhethertherewereaerialphotographs

connectedwiththenamesandplacesthatIhaddescribedinthecables.Itwasthrough

theireffortstoidentifyaerialphotographsthatwewereabletogettheevidenceoffreshly

dugmassgravesthatMadeleineAlbrighttooktotheSecurityCouncilonAugust10.46This

wasnotatop-downdecision.Thepeoplewhoreadmyreportessentiallytaskedthemselves

46AlbrighttoSecStateWashingtonDC,“AmbAlbrightBriefsSecurityCouncilonPossibleMassGravesNearSrebrenica,”USMissiontotheUN,USUN03086,August11,1995.TheAlbrightpresentationincludedaphotographofagroupofprisonersinafieldintheKonjevićPolje/NovaKasabaarea,aswellasaphotographof“disturbedearth”nearby.Forreasonsexplainedabove(seeFN35--TKTK),AlbrightmisidentifiedtheplaceofthemasskillingasKonjevićPolje/NovaKasaba.SherepeatedthegarbledaccountoriginallyreportedbyGalbraithinher2003autobiography,MadamSecretary,page188.Forproblemsininterpretingoverheadimagery,seeinterviewwithJean-ReneRuez,leadICTYinvestigatorforSrebrenica,“LesenquetesduTPIY.”Cultures&Conflits,65(printemps2007).“WhenMadeleineAlbrightshowedthe[July27]photosofmultiplegravesatNovaKasaba[totheUN],shelinkedthephotosingoodfaithwiththepreviousimageofthesoccerstadiumofNovaKasaba.OntheJuly13photo,largegroupsofprisonerscanbeseenintheNovaKasabasoccerstadium...Thelogicalconclusionforanyoneseeingthesephotosisthefollowing:peopleareonasoccerfield,gravesappearednearbyafterwards,thereforethesepeopleareinthegraves.”Ruezexplainedthatthiswasnotthecase.“WealreadyknewinAugust1995thatthissitewasnotthesiteof[mass]executions.Itwasa[prisoner]collectionsitewhere,accordingtothetestimonythatwehad,individualmurderstookplace.”TheprisonersvisibleintheJuly13photoofthesoccerstadiumwere“transferredtoBratunac,”tobeexecutedelsewhere.Ruez’sconclusion:“Thisshowsthattechnologicalintelligencecannotbedisconnectedfromthehumanreality,thatistosayeyewitnesstestimonyfollowedbyverificationontheground.”[TranslationfromFrench.]AnICTYinvestigationlaterestablishedthattheNovaKasabasites(NKS1-4)containedtheremainsof33people.AseniorU.S.officialtoldtheWashingtonPostthattheNovaKasabaimagerywasfoundinthearchivesoftheNationalPhotographicInterpretationCenter(NPIC)onAugust2,andreportedintheNationalIntelligenceDaily,aclassifiednewslettercirculatedtoseniorpolicymakers,onAugust4.SeeDobbsandSmith,“NewProofOfferedofSerbAtrocities,”WashingtonPost,October29,1995.IttooktheCIAanothermonthtoidentifythePetkovcidammassacresite.DavidRohdewasarrestedatthePetkovci[RedDam]siteonOctober28,onareturntriptoBosnia,followingatip-offfroma“Washington-basedU.S.Intelligenceofficial.”[SeeRohde,Endgame,342-343].

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tofindtheaerialphotographs.Thetaskinghadnotyetgoneouttoproduceaerial

photography[onsuspectedwarcrimes].Itwouldhavebeenmuchmorevaluableifithad

beengatheredearlier.

IfrequentlyattendedtheseventhfloormeetingsattheStateDepartmentwhich

wereheldeverymorning,usuallychairedbytheDeputySecretaryofState,StrobeTalbott

thatincludedtheAssistantSecretariesofState.WhenthesubjectofBosniawasdiscussed,

particularlyin1994andearly1995,itwasdifficulttoinjectalotoffactualinformation

aboutwhatwasgoingonthegroundthatIwasreceivingfromembassiesorfrommyown

staff.Therewasagreatdealofskepticismaboutmyuseofthetermgenocide.State

Departmentlegaladvisorsconstantlypushedbackagainstmyuseofthetermbecauseit

wouldimplyanobligationonthesignatoriesoftheGenocideConventiontotake

appropriateactioninresponse.Thatwasthewholepointofusingtheterm,obviously.Ihad

thesameproblemsinthecaseofRwanda.47

WhenIcamebackfromtheseinterviewsinTuzlaandsubmittedadetailedreportto

theSecretaryofStateonAugust4,youcouldhaveheardapindropintheroom.48Virtually

everyonecameuptomeafterwards,nottocongratulatemebutsimplytosaythankyoufor

finallyproducingwhatshouldhavebeenevidentlongbefore,butwasbeingpushedback.

TOMBLANTON:Inhisbook,AlltheMissingSouls,DavidScheffersayshetalkedtoGeorge

TenetonJuly19,andagreedto“produceadailyupdateonhumanitarianandwarcrimes

developments.”GeorgehadjustbecomeDeputyDirectorattheCIAandDavidwasworking

forMadeleineatthattime.Ithinkthereweremultipleplacesthattherequestwascoming

from.49Let’saskDavidRohdeforhispartofthestory.Youtookacrumpledfaxversionofa

photographthatMadeleinehadshownattheUnitedNationsonAugust10andwalked

alongtheroadbetweenNovaKasabaandKonjevićPolje.Isthatcorrect?

47ArticleIofthe1948GenocideConventionstatesthatsignatoriesconfirmthatgenocide“isacrimeunderinternationallawwhichtheyundertaketopreventandtopunish.”Thearticlecanbeinterpretedasmeaningthatsignatorieshaveadutytointervenetopreventgenocide.ForhesitationaboutusingtermgenocideincaseofRwanda,seeRwandaconferencetranscript,2-14.48ShattucktoTheSecretary,“BosniaTripReport,”InformationMemorandum,August4,1995.Thememostatedthat“atrocitieshavetakenplaceonamassivescale”and“hundredsifnotthousands”ofunarmedrefugeeshadbeenkilled,“manybymassexecutions.”49DavidScheffer,AlltheMissingSouls,104.

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PhotoshowninUNonAug.10thatguidedRohdetogravesite

NovaKasabaprisoners,July13

4-38

TOMBLANTON:Inhisbook,AlltheMissingSouls,DavidScheffersayshetalkedtoGeorge

TenetonJuly19,andagreedto“produceadailyupdateonhumanitarianandwarcrimes

developments.”GeorgehadjustbecomeDeputyDirectorattheCIAandDavidwasworking

forMadeleineatthattime.Ithinkthereweremultipleplacesthattherequestwascoming

from.50Let’saskDavidRohdeforhispartofthestory.Youtookacrumpledfaxversionofa

photographthatMadeleinehadshownattheUnitedNationsonAugust10andwalked

alongtheroadbetweenNovaKasabaandKonjevićPolje.Isthatcorrect?

DAVIDROHDE:Yes,onAugust17.Itwasbyaccident.IwasenteringSerb-controlled

territoryfromSerbiatocoverSerbsfleeingtheCroatianadvanceintoKrajina[Operation

Storm].InsteadoflettingmegodirectlytoBanjaLuka,theborderguardsaidyouhaveto

gotothe[RepublikaSrpskacapital]Palefirst.Iwasabletospendtwodayssearching

aroundthearea,butitstartedwithamistakebytheborderguard.Ifyoulookatthe

photograph,youwillseeburialsitesNKS-1andNKS-2,whereIfoundemptyammunition

boxes.TherewasadecomposinglegjuttingoutofthegraveatNKS-3.Ilaterspenttwo

weeksinTuzlawhereIspokewithHuremSuljic,andfoundhalfadozenothermenwho

mentionednotjusttheNovaKasabasite,butatleastsixotherexecutionsites.Igotthe

numberwrong.Iestimatedmaybe3,000dead.Iwasamazedbyitall.51

IhaveaquestionaboutŽepa,whichwaseffectivelywrittenoffonJuly21withthe

Londondeclaration.YoustateinyourJuly25cablethatŽepashouldbesaved.52Therewere

15,000peopleintheenclave.TheBosnianswereholdingtheSerbsoffonJuly21,10days

afterthefallofSrebrenica.Actually,ŽepadoesnotfalluntilJuly25.IhavehadBosniansask

meabouttheconspiracytheory:cleaningupthemap,gettingridoftheenclaves.Whywas

Žepawrittenoff?Theyheldoutfortwoweeks.

50DavidScheffer,AlltheMissingSouls,104.51RohdesummarizedhisinitialfindingsinarticlesfortheChristianScienceMonitor,“EvidenceIndicatesBosniaMassacre,”August18,1995,and“HowaSerbMassacrewasExposed,”August25,1995.OrderedtoproceedtoPale,hefoundhimselfontheroadbetweenKonjevićPoljeandNovaKasaba,nearthesiteofthephotographofthereportedatrocities.52GalbraitharguedinhisJuly27cablethattheLondondeclaration“implicitlywritesoffŽepa,”bydrawingthelineatGoražde.

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PETERGALBRAITH:Toaddsomeadditionalhistory,IhadbeenbackintheUnitedStates.I

havetosaythatChristopherwasnotveryfondofme.Wereallyhadn'tinteractedthat

muchbutheagreedtoseemeafterSrebrenica.Hewasafraidofanother,ratherhighprofile

resignation,whichIwasatthatpointconsidering.DickHolbrookewasalsoconsidering

resigning,althoughhelaterwoulddenythat,butwedidhavethatconversation.My

meetingwithChristopherwasaroundJuly18or19.Iarguedthatweshouldnotbewriting

offŽepa.53

WhentheLondondeclarationcameoutonJuly21,IwasonBrioni[Tito’sformer

privateisland]withTudjmanandTurkishpresidentSuleymanDemirel.Thereactionwas

astonishmentbecauseithadalsowrittenoffBihać.54

Allofthisthensetoffthesequenceofeventsthatbroughtthewartoanend.The

CroatianshadalreadydecidedthattheywouldtakemilitaryactioninNovember1995to

retaketheKrajina.ThatiswhytheyhadaneightmonthextensionoftheUNmandate,

whichwasnowcalledUNCRO,insteadoftheusualsixmonths.WhyNovember?Becauseit

iswinterinnorthernBosniaandmuchharderforSerbiatoresupplytheKrajina.Ifyouare

comingupfromthecoast[inthecaseoftheCroatianarmy],itwasnotsobad.Infactitisa

goodtime.Second,theywerereallytryingtogettheirtouristeconomybackup.Havinga

warinthemiddleofthetouristseasonwasnotagoodthing.

TheCroatianssawtheopportunitythatwaspresentedafterSrebrenica,becausethe

BosnianSerbsandtheCroatianSerbsproceededtoattackBihać.TheCroatianswere

concernedthatifBihaćfellitwouldbetotheirstrategicdisadvantage.TheSerbswouldno

longerneedtodefendbothinternallinesaroundtheBihaćenclaveandexternalonesfacing

theCroatians.Theinsideofthedonutwoulddisappearandthoseforcescouldthenbe

transferredtofaceCroatia.TheCroatianssawtheopportunitythatexistedandwere

alreadyproceedingwithacampaignuptheLivnovalley[southofBihać].Thequestionwas:

53SeeGalbraithdiaryentry,July20,1995.GalbraitharguedthatapublicstatementdrawingthelineatGorazde“couldhavedisastrousconsequencesforthe16,000peopleatŽepa.”54SeeGalbraithdiaryentry,July21,1995,whichnotesthatTurkishdelegationwas“openlycontemptuous”oftheLondondeclaration.TudjmanpointedoutlackofreferencetoBihać.

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whatwouldbetheresponseoftheUnitedStates?

PortionofCIAmaponOperationStorm,August4-8,1995

Remember,asImentionedyesterday,theCroatianshadalreadyaskedon

November12,1994whatourpositionwouldbeiftheyweretogothroughtheKrajinato

relievethesiegeofBihać.55AsmycablestoWashingtonexplain,theyplannedtotakethe

wholething.ThereactionfromWashingtonwasswiftandstrong:wedonotwantawider

war.Idisagreed,butthoseweremyinstructions.OnJuly21[1995]thedefenseminister

ŠušaktoldmeatlunchthatCroatiaagainplannedtorelievethesiegeofBihaćbygoing

throughSlunj.OnceagainCroatiawantedtoknowwhattheUSreactionwouldbe.There

wastheusualbackandforthwithWashington.Atonepointtheinstructionsare:tellthem

nottodoit,butnotverystrongly,i.e.asortofgreenlight.ThemessagethatIeventually

deliveredatthebeginningofAugusttoTudjmanonBrioniwas:weappreciatewhyyou're

willingtoexpendbloodandtreasuretosavethepeopleofBihać.Onmyown,Ithenadded

55Galbraithdiaryentry,November12,1994.

4-41

tougherlanguageaboutrefugeesandprotectingUNpersonnel.Theadministrationwould

saythatitwasa"nolight"butTudjmaninterpreteditasagreenlight.56

ThissequenceofeventswasverymuchtriggeredbywhathappenedinSrebrenica.

TheCroatianoffensive[knownasOperationStorm]retooktheKrajinainfourdays,

[betweenAugust4and8].ItcontinuedintoBosnia,aidedlaterbyNATOairstrikes.Aswe

seefromthedebatesaboutIraqandAfghanistan,itisbootsonthegroundthatmatter.For

betterorworse,thebootsonthegroundwereCroatian,preciselybecausewedidnotwant

tohaveanotherSrebrenica.Inoneofmycablesthatisalsointhediary,IwarnthataBSA

takeoverofBihaćcouldproduce40,000deadiftheSerbsbehavedastheydidin

Srebrenica.

JOHNSHATTUCK:Iwouldliketojustaddonefootnote.TheKrajinaoffensiveendedup

beingstrategicallyvaluablefromadiplomaticstandpointinDayton.Itprovidedvery

concreteevidencethattheSerbsactuallywerealsovictimsofthewarthatwasbroughtto

anendinDayton.IthinkthatitgavetheDaytonprocess,particularlythehumanrights

spotlightingthatIstarteddoingaroundthattime,morecredibilityinBelgradethanit

mighthaveotherwisehad.IspenttimereportingonwhathadhappenedtotheSerbswho

wereforcedoutoftheKrajinaarea.Thosereportsprovidedcredibilityforthepush

forwardtoDayton.

SoonafterthechangeinUSpolicy,RichardHolbrookebecamethepointpersonfor

thewholepeaceprocess.AswemovedtowardDayton,myjobwastotravelinthewar

zonesandgatherevidenceoffreshhumanrightsabusesthatwerebeingcommittedinreal

timeonthegroundandprovidethisinformationbyphonetoHolbrooke.57Hewouldthen

usethisinformationwithTudjmanorMilosevićwhentheydeniedthatcertainthingshad

happenedorclaimedignorance.Holbrookewouldthenbeabletoconfrontthemwiththe

reportsI’dgivenhimandthreatenrenewedNATOairstrikes.Afterbeingsidelinedfor

muchofthisperiodinUSpolicy,thehumanrightselementsmovedtothetopofthelist.

ObviouslyMadeleineAlbright'sinvolvementwascrucialhereaswell.56SeeGalbraithdiary,August1,1995.GalbraithtoldTudjmanthatCroatiacouldnotexpect“anyhelpfromtheUnitedStates”ifthemilitaryoperationwentwrong.TudjmaninterpretedthisasAmericanacquiescence,eventhoughGalbraithexplicitlytoldhimthatitwasnota“greenlight.”57ForcoordinationbetweenHolbrookeandShattuck,seeundatedHolbrookenotetoGalbraith.

4-42

PETERGALBRAITH:Thereisalessonhere.Oneofthedistinctionsbetweenwhathappened

in[Croatian-controlled]westernSlavoniaandtheKrajinaandwhatwasgoingonin

RepublikaSrpskawasthattheCroatianscouldnotsay“no”toUSdemandsforaccess.Even

whentheUNwaslockeddownafterOperationStorm,wewereabletogetpeopleinand

wereabletoreportonthehumanrightsviolationsfromthebeginning.Weraisedthese

violations,particularlythesystematiclootingandburningofhomesandthelaterkillingof

theisolatedpopulation.IwantedTudjmantobecalledtoaccountforsomeofthis.The

storyisnotperfect,however.Holbrookewasadamant.Hewrotemeanote[onAugust16]

saying“NOTNOW,NOTHERE,NOTYET,”whenIwantedtoraisethehumanrights

violationsintheKrajinaandchallengeTudjman’sstatementthatSerbswhohadfledduring

OperationStormcouldneverreturn.58AsBobFrasurehadwritten,“wehiredthisjunkyard

dog[Tudjman]andshouldn'tbecomplainingaboutitnow.”So,humanrightswashigheron

theagendabutmaybenotquiteashighasJohnandImighthavewanted.

DAVIDROHDE:IjustwanttofollowupthoughonŽepa.You[PeterGalbraith]triedtogetit

backontheagenda,butyoulostthebattle.

PETERGALBRAITH:Itwasalonelybattle.IdonotthinkIhadasingleallyinthe

administration.IwasobviouslyinZagreb,[soIdonotknoweverythinghappeningin

Washington].IhadraisedtheŽepaissuepersonallywithChristopheronJuly17or18,soat

leastitwasonthetable.AsfarasIknow,nobodypursuedit.Holbrookewasmoreorless

sidelinedatthatpoint.HewasonvacationinColorado.

JAMIERUBIN:ThisisaRashoman-likesituation:therearealotofthingsgoingon[fromso

manydifferentperspectives].IwasfortunatetobewithAmbassadorAlbrightwhenthere

wasamajorpolicyreviewonBosnia.ThePresidentoftheUnitedStatesdecidedthathedid

notlikethepolicyanymore.InJune1995,MadeleineprovidedapapertothePrincipals

CommitteesuggestingforthefirsttimethatwenolongersupportUNPROFOR.59Ifyoulook

58HolbrooketoGalbraith,handwrittennote,August16,1995.59AccordingtotheStateDepartment“RoadtoDayton”study,page11,Albrightpresentedher“ElementsofaNewStrategy”papertoClinton’sForeignPolicyteamonJune21,1995,callingforthewithdrawalofUNPROFOR,theliftingofthearmsembargoagainsttheBosniangovernment,and“airstrikestoprotectMuslim-heldterritory.”

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atallofTonyLake'smemospriortothismoment,theemphasisisalways“wewantto

strengthenUNPROFOR,wewanttokeepUNPROFOR,UNPROFORhastobethere,itwill

lookbadifweloseUNPROFOR.”UntilyoudecidethatUNPROFORisnotyourfirst

principle,andthatyouhavesomeothergoalasafirstprinciple,whathappenedlaterwould

nothavehappened.

ClintonmeetingonBosnia,August21,1995,CIAcollection

Itwasasimplelittleoneandahalfpagepaper,andshespoketoaboutsevenpeople,

butmyphonerangoffthehook.Someonehadtobethefirsttosaythatourwillingnessto

pullUNPROFORoutwastimelimitedandthatwewouldnolongeragreetoextract

UNPROFORafteracertaindate.ThatwasthefirstsignthatUNPROFORmustend,sincethe

BritishandtheFrenchandtheothersneededthatthepromise.

Idon'tagreewithPeter[Galbraith]thatitwasbootsonthegroundthatendedthe

war,ifthatiswhatyouweresaying.Ithinkallthesethingstogetherchangedthesituation.

ThePresidentoftheUnitedStateswaspartlyinfluencedbywhatChiracwasdoingwith

AlbrightnotedChirac’sstatementthat“thepositionofleaderoftheFreeWorldisvacant,”sayingthatit“hasbeenchillingmybonesforweeks.”

4-44

thisrapidreactionforce.60[Refersto2009bookbyTaylorBranch,“TheClintonTapes”],a

contemporaneousrecordofwhatClintonwasdoing.Wedidnotfindoutuntillaterthat

BranchwasmeetingwiththePresident.[InhisinterviewwithBranch],Clintondescribes

howChiracwastryingtooutperformhimbuthadtoadmitprivatelythathecouldn'tdo

anythingwithoutUShelicopters.

WhatIamsayingisthatafterSrebrenica,andbuildinguptoSrebrenica,therewasa

momentwhenthecapitalsdecidedthatthepolicyhastochangeatthehighestlevel.This

didnothappenbecauseofthegoodworkoftheU.S.AmbassadorinCroatiaor,withaldue

respect,John,theAssistantSecretaryforHumanRights.Thewholegovernmentwas

operating.TherewasamajorpaperwrittenbyChristopher,amajorpaperwrittenbyTony

LakeandSandyVershbow,andonebyMs.Albright.61Thisiswhatledtoanewpolicy

wherethenationalsecurityadvisorwenttocapitals,andsaid,“that'sitguys,it'stimefora

newstrategy.”OnthefamousChristophertriptoEurope[inMay,1993],wesaidwewould

waitandseewhattheEuropeansthought,nowwearenotasking,wearetellingtheallies

whatwearegoingtodo,andthatthereisalimitationonourwillingnesstoextract

UNPROFOR.Oncethosewordswereuttered,everybodystartedpayingseriousattention.

ThatmeantthatUNPROFORwasgoingtoendatsomepoint.Iwon'tboreyouwithany

moredetails,butthisistheturningpointinmymind.Maybethat'smyRashomanproblem

butIvotewiththeheadsofstateonthisone.

TOMBLANTON:RupertSmith,youwereincommandinBosniaatthatpoint,didyouseeit

thisway?Wasitthismoment?

RUPERTSMITH:Togobacktotheatrocitiesandthekilling,wewerebeginningto

understandthattherehadbeenmassexecutionsaroundthetimeofmymeetingwith

GeneralMladićonJuly19.IknowthatŽepahasn'tfallen.Wearealreadytakingmeasures

togetextrapeopleintoŽepatomakesurewehavegotapresencetherethatIcanrelyon.

Straightafterthemeeting[withMladić]onJuly19,IgototheLondonConference,which

wasacompleteeyeopenertome.Noneofwhatwashappeningatthishighlevelwasbeing

60SeeWhiteHousememo,“BilateralmeetingwithPresidentJacquesChiracofFrance,”June14,1995.61SeeStateDepartmentpaper“EndgameStrategy,”NSCpaper,“StrategyfortheBalkanConflict,”preparedonAugust3-4,1995,andAlbright,“MemorandumfortheNationalSecurityAdvisor.”

4-45

toldtomewhatsoever.IgetoffanairplaneandamdrivenstraighttothePrimeMinister

[JohnMajor].IdonotseetheChiefoftheDefenseStaff.IamtoldbymyPrimeMinisterthat

thenexttimethereisanattackonGoražde,ontheBritishbattalion,wearegoingtobomb.

Wearegoingtobombandnotstopbombinguntiltheattackstops,andyouSmitharegoing

tohavethekey.

WethenhaveaverydifficultconversationbecauseIwillnotacceptitunlessthe

threatisforeverybody,notjustGoražde.62Iamsentaway.IgoandfindJanvierandtell

himwhatIamdoingandheagrees.HehasbeentoldthesamethingbyFranceandisvery

worriedaboutittoo.Thereismuchringinginthenight,IexplainaboutBihaćandŽepa.I

havebreakfastwiththenewlyappointeddefensesecretaryMichaelPortillo,whosays,

“You'llhavetotrustme,wewillchangethedecisionovertheweekendbutit'sprecooked

forGoraždeandwewon'tgetthroughtheconferenceonFridayifwechangeitnow.”

Ithengoto[Lancasterhouse],thesiteoftheconferenceonFriday,July21.Itisahot

sweatyday.Wehaveamostpeculiarconferenceinwhichthisprecookedmessageis

rammeddowneveryone'sthroat.Icanbarelyunderstandwhateveryoneissaying.You

wereallinabubblethatIwasn'tin.IkepttryingtogetacrosstopeoplethatIstillhad

hostageseverywhere.Theyarebusymakingtheirplans,andI'mbusyputtingpeopleinto

Žepaandsoon.Thenextmonthwasaverylonelymonth.Ourheadquartersleakedlikea

sievesoIcouldn'ttellanyonewhatwashappeningandwhatIwasplanning.WhatIwanted

todowastohavethefightintheonlyplaceIcouldhaveit,whichwasSarajevobecausethe

Frenchwouldn'tmovetheirgunsoutofrangeofFrenchsoldiers,whowereallinSarajevo.

MyrealfearwasthattheproximatecauseofthisattackwouldcomeoutsideofSarajevo.I

wouldthenhaverealproblems.NooneunderstoodthisandIcouldn'texplainitto

anybody.

62Inhisbook“UtilityofForce,”Smithwritesthathehadnotexpected“thiscompletechangeofpolicy,”focusingonjustoneenclave.Inprivatebriefingsforjournalists,U.S.officialsconcededthattheallieshad“writtenoff”ŽepainadditiontoSrebrenicaasitwas“militarilynotfeasible”toreturntothestatusquo.See,forexample,WolfBlitzer,“WhiteHouseInterpretationofLondonmeeting,”July22,1995.

4-46

ThegreatproblemwastoconcealthepotentialfromMladić.Weallknowaboutthe

rapidreactionforce,butwedidnotgettheFrenchgunsupthehillonMountIgmanuntil

themiddleofAugust.63

MICHAELDOBBS:YoualsowithdrewBritishtroopsfromGoraždeatthispoint,right?64

RUPERTSMITH:Thatwaspartofthedecisiontobomb.Therewasahugefightbetweenme

andHasanMuratovićtowardstheendofAugustwhenhecallsmeeverynameunderthe

sun.Iamtellingeveryonethatwe'renotgoingtobombbecauseI'vestillgottogettheBrits

out.Intheend,theydriveoutthroughSerbia.ItwasaverylonelymonthandIwasnot

helpedbyanyofyouguysonthatsideoftheroom.[Referencetowestern

governments/UN].Youwerebusy.ThereisamoveinRugbyfootballcalled"thehospital

pass,"whenyoupasstheballtoamanwithhalftheenemy’sscrumcomingstraightathim.

[Laughter]

JAMIERUBIN:General,we[Americans]callthatthe“killyourbuddypass”.

RUPERTSMITH:Iwasgivenhospitalpassafterhospitalpassallthroughthatmonth.It

startedwithŽepa,whicheveryonehadwrittenoff.CarldoesawonderfulthinginSerbia

withHasanandIzetbegovićgettingtheBosnianfightersout.Weslowlygeteveryoneelse

out.Weareworkingacrossabarrierofmistrustofthelastninemonthsaswedothat.

MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:Ithinkthisisagoodmomentformetogiveyoutheviewfromthe

groundratherthanthebubbleofthepolicymaking.ImadeittoŽepatwodaysbeforeŽepa

fell[onJuly25].Ididnotknowwhichdaywaswhich.SometimesIwouldpassoutand

wouldwakeupandlookupatthesun.MaybeIhadsleptfortwohours,maybefortwenty-

fourhours,Icouldn'treallytell.Eventually,whenwecametoŽepa,Irealizedwehad

brokenthroughtheline.

63MadeleineAlbrighttoSecstate,“Bosnia/Croatia,”USUNCable03232,August24,1995.AlbrightquotedAnnanassayingthattheFrenchartillerywasdeployed,butBosnianCroatswerepreventingotherRRFconvoysfromcrossingtheborder.64In“UtilityofForce,”SmithdescribeshowhewithdrewtheBritishbattalionfromGoraždeonthenightofAugust28-29,viaSerbia,followingtheMarkalemarketplaceshellinginSarajevo.He“turnedtheUNkey”afterhelearnedthattheBritishwereoutofGoražde,andnolongeratriskofbeingseizedashostagesbyMladić.

4-47

ThefirstguyImetontheBosniansidedidnotlooklikeaBosniansoldieratall.Ihad

ahandgrenadewhichIwastryingtokeepformyselfincaseIhadtocommitsuiciderather

thanfallintoSerbhands.Ipulloutthepinandamreadytorollthehandgrenadetowards

thisguy.EventuallyIrecognizehim[asaBosniansoldier]frommyprevioustripstoŽepa

from1992to1995.Hetellsmethewholestoryaboutwhathappened,howthecivilians

hadbeentakenout,theoptionsofferedbytheŽepacommand.

Ididnotlikeanyoftheoptions,soIchosemyownoption.Iagreewithyou,General

Smith,whenyousayitwasaverylonelymonth.Twodayslater,Ifoundmyselfnolongerat

thefrontlinebecausethelineshavecollapsed.Itwaseverymanforhimselfonceagain.I

decidedtotakemybandofbrothers,thesixkidsthatIbroughtwithmefromSrebrenica,

gointothecanyonoftheDrinariverwithasmuchsuppliesaswepossiblycould.We

barricadedourselvesintooneofthecaves.IfyouevertraveldowntheriverofDrina,you

willseeitisabeautifulcanyonandeasilydefendable.Youhavetobeamountaingoatto

attackanyoneatthatparticularlocation.Onemancanstopthebattalion.Ispentalong

timethinkingwhatreallywentwronginŽepa.ShashitoldusearlierthattheUN“didnot

knowwhathappenedonJuly10,anddidnotexpectwhatwasgoingtohappenonJuly10,"

butyoucertainlyknewwhatwascomingintermsofŽepa.Aftertwentyyears,andmany

sleeplessnights,Iwouldliketohearsomeanswers.

TOMBLANTON:CarlBildt?ThenIwanttotakeafiveminutecoffeebreakandcomeback

andfocusonthelessons.

CARLBILDT:ŽepaisaninterestingstoryAsRupertsaid,Žepawaswrittenoffimmediately.

ItwasassumedthatŽepawasgoingtofallwithinhours[ofthefallofSrebrenica].

Amazingly,itdidnotfallimmediately.TheBosnianArmyfoughtforaveryconsiderable

amountoftime.TheBosnianleadershipwantedhelpingettingthepopulationout,which

wasdonewithUNPROFOR.Atacertainpoint,IgotastrangemessagefromHasan

[Muratović]whosaidhewantedtomeetmeimmediately.IflewtoSplit,andhemanagedto

gettoSplit.Hesaid,“OurremainingforcesinŽepaneedtogetout.It'stoodangerousto

takethemouttowardsSarajevo,IwantthemtogoouttoSerbia.”Heaskedmetogoto

MilosevićandgethimtoclearthewayfortheŽepasoldierstocrosstheDrina,whichwas

4-48

dangerouswiththeMladićforcesthere.Isaid,“Dotheyknowtheroad?”Yes,theyknewthe

roadbecauseitwasthenormalweaponssmugglersroad.TheyaresuppliedfromSerbiato

alargeextent.IwentimmediatelytoMilosevićandmethiminthemiddleofthenight,near

theBulgarianborder.Heimmediatelygaveorders,whichresultedinthesoldiersexiting

ŽepathroughSerbia.Thatwasoneofthoseintriguingthingsthathappenedinthiswar.

TheCroatianOperationStormchangedthepoliticsofthewar,butitwasadifficult

moment.Itwasthesinglelargestethniccleansingoperationoftheentirewar.65It

completelychangedthehumanitarianchallengeaswell.Wearelivingwiththe

consequencesrightupuntiltoday.

[BREAK]

TOMBLANTON:Inourfinalsession,wewanttolookatthelessonstobedrawnfromthis

horriblegenocide.Wearetryingtocreatearecordthatwillhelpthenextsetofgraduate

studentsbecomepolicymakers,politicians,soldiers.Theshorterandmoretothepointyou

canmakeyourremarks,thebetter.JorisVoorhoeve.

JORISVOORHOEVE:Therewerelongdelaysinreceivingandsharinginformationabout

Mladić’sactions.ThesedelayswerealsothesubjectoftheNetherlandsparliamentary

inquiry.ItisclearthatbyaroundJuly15-16,therewereveryseriousindicationsofmany,

manypeoplebeingkilled.Theindicationscamefromtheinternationalmedia,from

individualDutchbatmemberswhohadbeentransportedfromAtoBandhadseenmany

bodiesalongtheway.IamverygratefulfortheworkofAmbassadorShattuckandothersin

bringingoutthefirststoriesaboutthesehorribleevents.Ingeneral,Ithinkwecanseefrom

Srebrenica,fromDarfur,fromCambodiamuchearlier,thatwe,infreecountries,havegreat

difficultyacceptingtheextentofverydisturbinginformationabouthumanrights

violations.Wesometimeshaveatendencytobelittleveryseriousevidence.

Howdowedealwithnastynewsandputourselvesintheshoesofthosewho

commitsuchcrimessothatwecanbetterpredictwhatisgoingtohappen.Imustsay,from

theDutchside,wewerenotgoodatdealingwithdiscordantinformationthatyoudon't65Between150,000and200,000SerbsfledtheKrajinaduringOperationStorm,accordingtocontemporaneousnewsreports.

4-49

wanttobelievebutistrueanyway.IttooktheNetherlandsarmyleadershipseveralmonths

togetthecompletepictureforreasonsIwillnotgointonow.Iwasverygratefultothe

mediaandtheAmericansonthespotnearTuzlaforbringingoutthefirststories.

TOMBLANTON:DavidHarland,youwroteareportthathasbeenwidelypraisedand

interviewedprettymucheveryone,moreorless.66Whatwouldyouchangeaboutyour

conclusionstoday?

DAVIDHARLAND:Alotmorefactsareknowntoday.Thereisafamous,waggishcomment,I

thinkbyEdwardLuttwak[anAmericanmilitarystrategist],aboutthethreerulesof

interveninginotherpeople'sconflicts.Thefirstruleis:don't.Thesecondoneis:ifyoudo,

pickaside.Thethirdoneis:makesureyoursidewins.Fortherecord,Iwrotethatreport

withSalmanAhmed,whoisnowaSpecialAssistantstoPresidentObama.Theconclusions

wereactuallywrittenbysomebodyelse.IwouldchangetheconclusionsnowbecauseI

wouldhavechangedthemthen.Obviously,adisasterrequiresfailureatseverallevels.I

agreewithDavidHannaythatthemandatethatcameoutwasperfectlyworkable.Itwas

ugly,itwasneverintendedtooperateforanextendedperiodoftime,andtherewasno

strategy,butitwasmanageable.

Forme,theabsolutelystrikingleveloffailurethatIwouldgotoistheUNPROFOR

level.IftheuseofcloseairsupporthadbeenapprovedonJuly8orJuly10(Iwillnot

contestGeneralNicolaionJuly6),thereiseveryreasontobelievethattheSerbswould

havestopped.IbasethisconclusionalsoonconversationswithSerbs,including[Karadzić’s

mediaadvisor]JovanZametica,whomIsawasrecentlyasthreedaysago.Peoplewhoare

nowdeadwouldbealiveifUNPROFORhaddonethosethingsthatitwasmandatedtodo

butdidnothavethepoliticalwilltodo.IfeelthattheprincipalweaknessinUNPROFOR

wasinZagrebwithMr.AkashibutalsowithGeneralJanvier.

Therewasanentirecultureestablishedwithinthecivilservice(whichTone

describedbriefly)thatallinformation,includingfactualinformation,hadtoberendered

66SeeReportofSecretary-GeneralpursuanttoGeneralAssemblyResolution53/35,“TheFallofSrebrenica,”November15,1999,A/54/549.TheprincipalauthorswereDavidHarlandandSalmanAhmed,wholaterbecameaseniorStateDepartmentofficialandcounselortoNationalSecurityAdvisorSusanRiceintheObamaAdministration.

4-50

neutrally.TheveryfirstweekthatIarrivedinSarajevo,thechiefUNmilitarywasawaysoI

hadtosignoffthereport.Thereportsaidthattherehadbeen920heavyweapons

violationsbytheSerbsandapproximately80bytheBosnianArmy.ItwenttoZagreband

wasreportedtoNewYorkwithalittlefootnote,sayingthattherehadbeenathousand

ceasefireviolations.Whathadbeenaverysimplefactualstoryreportingagrotesqueaction

byonesideandalimitedresponsebytheotherwasrenderedintosomethingtotallybland.

Inmyview,thekeylessonamidallthismessanddysfunctionalityis:don'tjoinUN

peacekeepingunlessyouarewillingtoviolatealltheLuttwakrules.Ifyoudo,adegreeof

intellectualhonestyandmoralcouragewillallowthousandsandthousandsoflivestobe

saved.

JenonneWalker

JENONNEWALKER:Iwantedthefloorlargelytopassthebuck.It'shumannaturetohear

andrememberremarksthatsupportwhatyoualreadybelieve.Mysenseyesterday

morningoftheconsensusaroundthetablewasthatit'sfollytosendatraditionalUN

peacekeepingforceintoasituationwherethereisnopeacetokeepandthereisno

intentiontoimposeapeace.Acarryonfolly:todeclarea“safearea”whenthere

4-51

isnocapabilityorintentionofmakingitsafe.AsIsaidyesterday,theUnitedStateshadno

moralcredibilityonthisbecausewewerenotwillingtosharetherisk.Atthetime,

however,weinWashingtonwereverydisdainfulofthewholesafeareanotionbecause

therewasnocapabilityorwillingness[toenforcethesafeareas].

WecouldtalkaboutindividualmistakesinBosniathatallofusmadeincapitals,in

theUNbureaucracy,UNPROFOR,etc.Ithinkthemoreinterestingaspectoflessonslearned

isnotwhethertouseforceinasituationlikethis,buthowtodoiteffectively.Themost

provocativethingyoucandoisnotuseforcewhenyouarebeingtested.ThisiswhyIwant

topassthebucktoRupertSmith.IhopeeveryoneherehasreadhisBosniachapterand

concludingchapterinTheUtilityofForceonhowtouseforceeffectively.Ithinkitshould

bememorizedbyeverybodyintheUNsystemandeverybodywithanyintentionofjoining

an[internationalpeacekeepingoperation].

DAVIDHANNAY:Manyofthelessonshavebeenlearnedandarebeingapplied,butit's

worthtryingtoidentifythem.TheEuropeans,collectively,hadahugeshockinBosniathat

reallyblewtheirsocksoff.Theyrealizedthattheywereunabletopreventanoutbreakof

serioushostilitiesinaregionwhereitwasassumedthattheyweretheprimaryproviders

ofsecurity.Itproducedanenormouslystrongreactionfromwhichgrewtheenlargement

oftheEuropeanUniontoincludetheBalkans.AsIthinkeverybodynowrecognizes,the

bestpreventiveactionyoucantakeintheBalkansistomoveBalkancountriestowards

membershipoftheEuropeanUnion.Thisisnotquitethebestweektomakethatlittle

speechbutithappenstobetrue.67Wemustnotlosesightofitbecausethereareongoing

[accession]negotiationswithSerbia.TherewillbenegotiationswithKosovoandAlbania.

Oneday,Ihope,aGreekgovernmentwillagreeto[accessionnegotiations]withMacedonia.

MontenegroismovingtowardstheEU.Europeanslearnedahugelessonfromthe

humiliationthattheyexperienced,firstatthebeginningoftheoperationwhentheycould

notcopewithconflictprevention,andtheninthecourseoftheoperationswhenthey

showedtheywerenotabletodoanythingwithouttheAmericans.Thatisalessonlearned

butitneedstoberepeated.67TheconferencewasheldonJune29-30,2015,atatimewhentheEuropeanUnionwasrivenbydissensionovertheGreekbailoutcrisis,andthepossibilityofGreecewithdrawingfromtheEuro.

4-52

Secondpoint.Itwasshockingtohearduringthisconferenceofthecomplete

absenceofintelligenceavailabletotheUNforcesinthesafeareas.Thatisterrible.National

intelligencecapabilitieshavegottobetailoredinawaythattheycanbemadeavailableto

peopleputtingtheirlivesatriskinthepursuitofpeacekeeping.Thisiseasierwithpolitical

intelligencethanwithmilitaryintelligence.Someofusarequiteusedtodoingitwith

politicalintelligence.InthesevenyearsIwasnegotiatingonCyprus,Ipersuadedmy

governmenttoletmepassallourpoliticalintelligenceaboutCyprustotheUN,whichwas

donewithnoleaksandwasveryuseful.Wereallymusttakethissubjectseriously.Since

Srebrenica,wenowhavesurveillancedrones.Itshouldbefairlyobviousthatanymajor

peacekeepingoperation,particularlyoneinpotentiallyhostilecircumstancessuchas

Bosnia,isgoingtohavetobeprovidedwithasurveillancedronecapacity.Ibelievesomeof

thatisbeginningintheDRC,intheCongo,now.

OneofthethingsthatcameoutofSrebrenicawastheconceptoftheResponsibility

toProtect.68IfyouwerewritinganyoftheseSecurityCouncilresolutionsnow,youwould

havetowriteinelementsofResponsibilitytoProtect.ResponsibilitytoProtectisnow

underchallengebecauseoftheinadequacyofthefollowup,forexampleinLibya.Thefault

wasthenotsavingofthelivesoftheinhabitantsofBenghazi,butwhathappened

afterwards,afterthefallofGadhafi,thetotalabsenceofanyseriousfollow-up.

Experiencehasshownthatifyouaredealingwithaverydifficultsituationhovering

onthelinebetweenpeacekeepingandenforcement,asinBosnia,youreallymusthavean

"overthehorizon"capabilityavailable.SuchacapabilitywasmadeavailabletotheUNin

thecaseofSierraLeone.ItwasmadeavailablebytheFrenchinbothCoted'IvoireandMali.

Itcanbemadetowork.Itdideventuallywork[inBosnia].ThenarrativethattheSerbs

wereforcedtothetableentirelybyairstrikesisnotinfactthecase.Therapidreaction

forcepoundedthehelloutoftheSerbforcesaroundSarajevoandhelpedconvince

MilosevićthathehadtogiveinandgotoDayton.An"overthehorizon"capabilityisvery

importantthoughitcangobadlywrong,astheUSdiscoveredinSomalia,ifitisnot

properlyhandled.

68TheResponsibilitytoProtect,orR2P,stipulatesthattheinternationalcommunitycantakecollectiveactiontoprotectendangeredpopulationsifastatefailstomeetitsresponsibilities.

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Onefinalpoint.Iamnotsurewehaveseenthelastofthedualkeyissue.Dualkey

wasabadideabutIdonotthinkyoucaneverhaveanoperationinwhichairstrikestake

placewithoutconsultationwiththepeopleontheground.Youcannotde-couplethose

thingstotally,eventhoughthedual-keysystem[inBosnia],whichwasbuiltupgradually

andcamecrashingdownin1995,wasaterribleonethatmustneverberepeated.

TOMBLANTON:ThankyouDavid.LetmecallonAmbassadorJacolintogiveussomeofhis

lessons.

HENRYJACOLIN:IwasnotinBosniaatthetimeofthefallofSrebrenica.OnJuly6,Iwas

transferredfromSarajevotoParisforamedicaloperation,anddidnotreturnuntil

September.

IwasconvincedfromtheverybeginningthattheBosnianSerbswantedtodefinitely

cleaneasternBosnia.Imadesomedemographicstudiesandbecameconvincedthatthey

couldnotacceptaborderalongtheDrina,orineasternBosnia,betweenSerbsand

Bosniaks.Iwasconvincedthattheirultimategoalwastomovetheborderbetween

BosniaksandSerbstothemiddleofthecityofSarajevo,tobemoreprecise,totheDobrinja

districtalongtheMiljackariver.TheywantedtomakeSarajevoadividedcityandto

completelycleanseeasternBosniaofitsMuslimpopulation.Iwassoconvincedofthisthat

IsentaseriesoftelegramstoParisreportingGeneralMorillon’striptoSrebrenicainMarch

1993underthetitle,ChronicleofanEthnicCleansingForetold.69Thatwasclear.Iconstantly

repeatedtoParisthatthiswasthegoaloftheSerbs.Pariscouldnothaveanydoubtsthat

thiswastohappenoneday.

Fromthebeginning,IwrotetoParisthatwewereoverestimatingthestrengthofthe

Serbsandthatitwouldbepossibletostopthemifaresolutedecisionwastakentostop

them.IwasdisappointedwhenIarrived[inSarajevoasFrenchambassadorin1993]

becauseIdiscoveredthatUNPROFORwasalwaysnegotiatingwithbothsides.Theywere

alwaystryingtogetanewandfinalceasefire.SomeofmytelegramsirritatedtheMatignon

[Frenchprimeminister’soffice],Elysée[President’soffice],andtheministryofdefense.I

disagreedwithMitterrand’sfamousremarkconcerningthearmsembargo[againstall

69Areferencetothe1981novelbyGabrielGarciaMarquez,Cronicadeunamuerteanunciada.

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republicsoftheformerYugoslavia]stressing“nepasajouterlaguerreàlaguerre.”[“Donot

addwartowar”].IaskedmyselfwhatIshoulddoasaFrenchAmbassadortherein

Sarajevo.MyconclusionwasthatthebestthingIcoulddowouldbetotrytochangethe

positionofmygovernment.Intelegramaftertelegram,Irepeatedthatthiswasnotatribal

conflict,notareligiouswar,butawarofaggressionbytheSerbs.

ImanagedtochangethemindsinParisalittlebit.[ForeignministerAlain]Juppé

wasthefirstonetounderstand.Hethoughtveryquickly.Hetookafirmpositionafterthe

MarkalemarketmassacreinFebruary1994.Youmayrememberthathewasthefirstone

tosaywemuststoptheSerbs.TherewasthenaNATOultimatumwhichwasobservedfora

fewdaysbutitfinallydissolved,likesugarinhotcoffee,andwastotallyforgotten.Whatwe

achievedforafewdaysorweeksbystartingthewithdrawalofheavyweaponstotally

disappearedbecausethewilloftheinternationalcommunitywasnotmaintained.

IwasveryhappywhenChiracannouncedtheformationoftherapidreactionforce

inJune1995.IwasinPariswhenthenewgovernmentwasformed[inMay1995following

Chirac’svictoryinthepresidentialelection].IwasabletomeetverybrieflyCharlesMillon,

whohadjustbeennominatedMinisterofDefense.Heaskedme,“WhatshouldwedoMr.

Ambassador?”Itoldhim,“ilfauttapersurlesSerbes,”[“WemusthittheSerbs”].Itwasthe

onlywayoutofthiswar.IalsometHervédeCharette,whohadbeennominatedMinisterof

ForeignAffairs.Healsoaskedme,“WhatshouldwedoMr.Ambassador?”Ialsotoldhim“il

fauttapersurlesSerbes.”Iwashappywhenthepresidentdecidedtocreatetherapid

reactionforcewhichwasthesolutionIhadbeenadvocatingsinceIarrivedinSarajevoand

realizedwhatwasgoingon,ontheground.

DIEGOARRIA:ThefirstlessonshouldbefortheUnitedNations.Tenyearsago,onthetenth

anniversaryofSrebrenica,togetherwithAmbassadorJamsheedMarkerofPakistan,Iwrote

toKofiAnnan,(atthattimeIwasoneofhisadvisors)tellinghimthattheUnitedNations

shouldnotpushundertherugthetenthanniversaryoftheSrebrenicamassacre.After

manydiscussionsinsidetheSecretariat,Kofiarrangedformetoparticipateinasession

withPrinceZeidofJordanandourfriendSamanthaPowerattheDagHammarskjöld

library,whichminimizedtheimportanceofwhathappenedinBosnia.Asenioradvisorto

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Annansaidtohim,“WhatDiegoisproposingisaself-flagellationexercise.”Nocomments

neededonthatIguess.

IamtryingtofinishabookthatIcall"ARoomwithoutaView,"inspiredbythe

roomusedforinformalconsultationsoftheSecurityCouncil.70Asmanyofyouknow,the

roomhasaverylargewindowoverlookingtheEastriverinNewYork,butthedrapesare

alwaysdrawn.Thepermanentmembersdon'twanttolookoutside.

IrememberinMarch1992thatweadmittedtheRepublicofBosnia-Herzegovinaas

anewmemberoftheUnitedNations.DavidHannaymadeajoke[atthetimeofthe

disintegrationoftheSovietUnionin1991]abouthowfewpeopleintheSecurityCouncil

wouldknowthenamesofthecapitalsofthe15newmembernationsoftheRussian

Federation.TwomonthsafterwerecognizedthesecountriesasUNmembers,we

proceededtodividetheRepublicofBosnia-Herzegovinaalongethnicandreligiouslines

(amazinglyatthesametimewhenapartheidinSouthAfricawasinitsfinalstage,greatly

thankstotheUNcontributions).ThesameUnitedNationswasactivelyengagedin

practicingapartheidinBosnia-Herzegovina,dividingitintoMuslim,Croat,andSerbwith

theconsequencesthatweseetoday.Suddenly,theSecretariatandtheP5startedreferring

totheRepublicofBosniaandHerzegovinaas“theMuslimside.”Irememberraisingmy

handandsayingit'stheRepublicofBosnia-Herzegovina.Thepermanentmemberswiththe

supportoftheSecretariatturnedtheconflictintoareligiousconfrontationratherthana

conquestofterritorybyforce,whichwaswhatwasactuallyhappening.

WhentheSecurityCouncildeclaredanarmsembargoonYugoslaviainSeptember

1991,itsentamessagetothesenewcountries:armyourselfasquicklyasyoucanbecause

theUnitedNationsisgoingtostopyou.71Themajorcountriesknewthattheparties[inthe

formerYugoslavia]thatwerefullyarmedwereSerbiaandCroatia.TheBosniansdidnot

haveanything,aswelatersaw.Bosnia’sfatewassealedfromthebeginning.The

internationalcommunitythoughtthattheBosnianswouldgiveupquickly,butthe

Bosniansdidnotplayaccordingtothescript.Insteadofrollingoverandplayingdead,they

foughtasmuchastheycould.

70AreferencetotheE.M.Forsternovel,ARoomwithaView.71UNSC,“Resolution713(1991),”September25,1991.

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ItwasdisturbingtomehowtheEuropeanssuddenlydiscoveredthattherewasa

MuslimworldinthemiddleofEurope.Thesepeoplewerealwaysthere.Theysuddenly

fearedthataMuslimnationwasemerginginEuropewhenSarajevowasprobablythemost

ecumenicalcityanywhereinEurope.ItremindedmeoftheattitudethattheLatin

AmericanstaketowardHaiti,discriminatingagainstthembecausetheywereblackand

speakFrenchandnotSpanish.TheEuropeansovernightdiscoveredthattheBosnianswere

notEuropeans,theywereMuslims.ItisdifficultformetobelievethattheUnitedNations

wereunabletoanticipatetheeventsthattookplaceinBosnia.Isaidin1993thataslow

motiongenocidewastakingplaceinBosniabeforetheeyesoftheworld.72Lessthantwo

yearslaterithappened.

IthinkthattheDutchhavebeenmadeascapegoatforwhathappened.Iagreewith

whatDavidHannaysaidaboutEuropeabout(theforeignministerofLuxembourg),Jacques

Poos.AtthebeginningoftheYugoslavcrisishesaid,“ThisisthehourofEurope.Itisnot

thehouroftheAmericans.”73WeshouldhaveletEuropecarrythisoutandnotstainedthe

prestigeoftheUnitedNations,ashappenedwiththebotchedoperationSomalia.

JOHNSHATTUCK:Iwouldliketolookatwhathappenedafterwards.Whatwehavenowin

allofBosniaisafrozenconflictsituation.Wehaveafrozenpeace.Fortunatelythekilling

hasbeenended,butitisnotreallypeace.Thefrozenpolitics,inmyview,arearesultofa

failureatDayton.

Alongwithothers,likeMadeleineAlbright,Ifoughtveryhardtotrytobringissues

ofaccountabilityintotheDaytonpeaceprocess.Wehopedthatthosewhoweremost

responsibleforthepoisonouspoliticsthatleduptothewarwouldbearrestedandcharged

bytheinternationalcriminaltribunalorsidetrackedfromthepoliticalprocess.Thatgot

startedalittlebitatDaytonwiththeexclusionofMladićandKaradzić.TheBosnianswere

notgoingtocometothetableatDaytonunlessBosnianSerbleadersweresidetracked.

72“ReportoftheSecurityCouncilMissionEstablishedPursuanttoResolution819(1993),”S/25700,April30,1993,paragraph19.73Luxembourgwaschairingthe12-nationEuropeanCommunityinJune1991whenSloveniaandCroatiamovedtobreakawayfromYugoslavia.LuxembourgforeignministerJacquesPoosledaEuropeandelegationtoYugoslavia,sayingthatEuropeangovernmentshadaspecialresponsibilitytoactinacrisisthatthreatenedEuropeanstability.See,forexample,AlanRiding,“Europeanssendhigh-levelteam,”NewYorkTimes,June30,1991.

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TheyweresidetrackedinpartbecausetheyhadbeenindictedbytheInternational

CriminalTribunal.

TheInternationalCriminalTribunalisfunctioning.Somewouldsayithasbeenquite

successful.Ithascharged,andevenconvicted,alargenumberofpeople.74Thefailure

relatestotheinitialperiodwhenS-FORandlaterI-FORwentin.Becauseoftheambiguity

oftheDaytonlanguage,theNATOforceswerecompletelyunwillingtoarrestindictedwar

criminals.IworkedverycloselywiththeDutchForeignMinisteratthattime,HansVan

Mierlo,inaratherprivateandsecretwaytotrytoestablishaspecialwarcriminalsarrest

forcewhichwouldbemadeupofDutchpolice.Thereweresomeseriousdiscussionswith

theUNandtheUSmilitarybutitcametonaught.

Theresultisthefrozenpeacethatwehavetoday.Iamnotsayingthatthefailureto

arrestwarcriminalsistheonlyreasonforthecurrentstateofaffairsbutIthinkit'sa

seriousreason.Youcannotallowthepeoplewhocausedtheproblemtocontinuetorun

thesecountriesafterwards.Someofthem,overtime,havebeensidetracked.Eventually,

MilosevićwassidetrackedbythepoliticalprocessinSerbia.75

SHASHITHAROOR:IwantedtorespondtoJohn'searlierinterventionaboutthe

bankruptcyofUNpeacekeeping.UNpeacekeepingisnotbankrupt.76Ithasdoneamazingly

goodworkinanumberofsituationsaroundtheworld.Thepeacekeepingforcewonthe

Nobelpeaceprize[in1988]preciselybecauseithasmadeadifference.However,itshould

notbeappliedtoinappropriatesituations.Ihavetalkedaboutthelargenumberof

occasionsinwhichwepointedouttotheSecurityCouncilthattherewasnoviable

peacekeepingconceptavailablebuttheCouncilwentaheadnonetheless.Ifthereisalesson

tobelearnedfromSrebrenica,that'sreallythefirstlesson.

Theformulaforsuccessfulpeacekeepingmissionsisveryclear.Itisatriptych.First

youneedacoherent,clear,implementablemandate.Second,youneedresourcesthatare

74AccordingtoafactsheetpreparedbyICTY,thetribunalhadindicted161individualsbyJuly1995forcrimesrangingfrom“gravebreachesoftheGenevaconvention”togenocide.Atotalof80peoplehadbeensentencedtovaryingprisonterms,and18acquitted.75MilosevićwasoverthrownonOctober5,2000followingpopularprotestsagainstfraudulentelectionsinSerbia.76SeeShattuckremarkinTranscriptPage3-61:“Whatweareseeingdocumented[duringourdiscussionatthisconference]inaverypowerful,realwayisthebankruptcyofUNpeacekeepingandpeacekeepingingeneral.”

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commensuratewiththatmandate.Imeanmilitaryaswellasfinancialresources.Third,you

musthavepoliticalwill.Thisisfundamentalbecauseitunderpinstheothertwo.Without

politicalwill,youwon'tgettheresourcesandyouwon'tgetaclearmandate.Ifyouhaveall

ofthose,youhaveasuccessfulpeacekeepingoperation.Peacekeepingshouldnotbea

substitutefortheabsenceofpoliticalwillwhichiswhatwesawinBosnia.Iffuture

generationsofdecisionmakersaretolearntheproperlessonfromBosnia,thisisamistake

theymustnotmakeagain.

Peacekeepingintheclassicsenserequiresthecooperationofthepartiesinthe

conflict.Thisisfundamental.Whenthecooperationisdoubtful,youshouldnothavea

peacekeepingoperation.Istressthisbecausethereisallthistalkabouttheimmoralityof

neutralitybetweenethniccleansersandtheirreviledbesiegers.Thefactisthatthiswasnot

asituationforwhichpeacekeepingshouldhavebeenapplied.Itisbettertostartwitha

peaceenforcementoperationinthesesituationsthantochangemandatesmidstream,

whichiswhatwedidinBosnia.Wewerewrongtodothatbutitwasforceduponusbythe

forceofcircumstances.ThesheernumberofSecurityCouncilresolutionsisastark

indicationofhowthemandateforthismissiongotchangedwithincrementalenforcement

elementscomingintoit.

YoubeganyesterdaymorningbyaskingaboutChapterVIandChapterVIIofthe

UnitedNationscharter.Thisisacompleteredherring.ThereisnolanguageinChapterVI

thatsupportspeacekeeping.NotevenHammarskjöldpretendedthat.Thedeploymentof

militaryforceisnotforeseenunderChapterVI.TheonlyquestionconcernsChapterVII.

Article40talksaboutcallingonpartiestocomplywith“suchprovisionalmeasuresasit

deemsnecessary”ifnegotiation,mediation,diplomacydonotwork.Peacekeepingwasseen

bytheclassicpuristinternationallawyersasa“provisionalmeasure”underArticle40of

ChapterVII.ThenthereisArticle42whichtalksabout“actionbyair,sea,orlandforcesas

maybenecessary”ifothermeansproveinadequate.JustsayingChapterVIIisirrelevant.

Practicallyspeaking,thereisnoChapterVIpeacekeeping,althoughweusethatasashort

handforsaying“peacekeepingwithoutenforcement”andwetalkaboutChapterVIIfor

“peacekeepingwithenforcement.”

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Inmyview,theyarebothChapterVIIbecausenoonecanpointtoanylanguagein

ChapterVIthatusesmilitaryforce.77Thepointisthatweshouldhavetwoverydistinct

kindsofoperation.(1)Classicpeacekeepingforwhichtherestillisneedandforwhich

thereisaprovabletrackrecordofsuccess,followingtheclassicprinciplesofneutrality.

And(2)peaceenforcementinsituationswhereyoufeelobligedtoviolatetheinterestsof

onepartyortheotherandforceyourwaythrough,andwhereyoucan'ttakeforgranted

theconsistentcooperationoftheparties.

Thatbringsmetothequestionaboutdualkeybecauseagain,weintheSecretariat

hadverylittlesayinthismatter,buttheideaofdualkeywasabsurd.Ifthepurposeof

usingairpowerwastosupporttheinterestsoftheforcesontheground,thekeyshould

havebeenwithoneperson,thelocalUNForceCommander.Ifthepurposeofusingair

powerwastopursuemilitaryobjectives,tochangethenatureoftheconflict,goingwell

beyondtheneedsoftheforcesontheground,thena)thepeacekeepingforcesshouldnot

havebeenthere,theyshouldhavebeenpulledout,andb)thekeyshouldbewiththose

deployingtheairpower,namelyNATO.TherewasnoneedforNATOtohaveasayinthe

firstkindofuseandtherewasnoneedfortheUNtohaveasayinthesecondkindofuse.In

thiscase,theUNshouldhavebeenoutoftheway.Thedualkeypointedtothefundamental

contradictionoftryingtohaveanoutsideagency,inmanycaseswithouttroopsonthe

ground,useforcewhenthereweretroopsonthegroundpursuingadifferentmandate.

Thatsummarizesmymainlessonsfromthesetwodays.

TOMBLANTON:Thankyou,Shashi.Letmeaskaquestion,whichIwillposetoCarl.Inthe

1999UNSrebrenicareport,theymakeapointthatnegotiationswiththe“architectsofSerb

policies,”principallyMilosevićandKaradzićbutalsoMladićonthemilitarylevel,

“amountedtoappeasement”atvariouspointsinthewar.That'stheconclusionofthe

report.Isthatthecase?Isthereadifferencebetweennegotiationsthatendupappeasing

andnegotiationsthatpursueapeace-makingstrategy?

77ChapterVIofthe1945UNCharterdoes,however,includeArticle36,whichstatesthattheSecurityCouncilcanrecommend“appropriateproceduresormethodsofadjustment”forthe“pacificsettlementofdisputes.”

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CARLBILDT:Thatis,ofcourse,amatterofdefinition.Youmakepeacewithyourenemies,

notwithyourfriends,sobydefinition,ifyouwanttoendaconflictnotbymilitarily

defeatingtheenemybutbysomesortofpoliticalcompromisethenofcourseyouhaveto

negotiatewiththoseparticularforces.YouendupwithsomesortofcompromisewhichI

wouldarguewasinevitableinthecaseofaconflictsuchastheonewefacedinBosnia.And

thiswasalsowhatallthemajorcountriesandactorsrecognized.IdonotknowwhatDavid

[Harland]hadinmindwhenhewrotethatparticularphrase.

Acoupleofothercomments.Davidseemedtobearguingthatitwouldhavemadea

bigdifferenceifthekindofstrikepackage[againstBosnianSerbtroopsadvancingon

Srebrenica]thatcameafterlunchonJuly11hadinsteadcomeafterlunchonthe10.

Consideringthefactthatthemilitaryeffectofthatstrikepackagewasvirtuallynada,Iam

lesscertain.Whatmighthavemadeadifferencewouldhavebeenforcesontheground.Itis

difficulttoknowaswearetryingtoreadthemindsetofMr.Mladić.Weknowthathe

changedthedirectivesonthe9fortheoperationandtookthatotherfatefuldecisionon

July11[tokillthemaleprisoners].78MorerobustUNforcesontheground,andperhaps

Žepa-likeoperationsbytheBosnianArmy,mighthavemadeadifference.TheBosnian

Armyemphasiswasgettingthetroopsoutintheotherdirection.Theywerenotprimarily

[inthesouth]wheretheSerbswereadvancing,theywereinthenorthernpartofthe

enclaveheadingtoTuzla.Whetherthatwouldhavemadeanydifferencewedon'tknow,

butIthinkit'smorecomplicated.

Ontheoverallconclusionsofoperationslikethis,IagreewithmuchofwhatShashi

said.Clearlythesafeareaconceptwasamistakeinthewayitwasundertaken.We

promisedsomethingwecouldn'tdeliver.Wecouldn'tsecuretheseareas.Thatgoestowhat

Shashisaid:sometimesthemandatesarehopeless.Ithinkthatlessonhasbeenlearned.

TherewasanavalancheofSecurityCouncilresolutionsonBosnia,overtheentireduration

oftheconflict.IjokedattimesthattheywereissuingSecurityCouncilresolutionsata

78AccordingtochiefICTYSrebrenicainvestigator,Jean-ReneRuez,MladićtookthefinaldecisiontocaptureSrebrenicaonJuly10“againsttheadviceofhisstaffofficers.”

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fasterpacethanwehadtimetoreadthem.Someofthemwereutterlyunrealisticwhich

reducedrespectforthemaswell.79

WedidnotbringupthequestionofwhattheSecurityCouncildidafterthefallof

Srebrenica,whichisanamazingstoryinitself.ThefirstreactionoftheSecurityCouncilwas

very,verylowkey.Thoseofuswhoweretherewereverysurprised.Therewassomesort

ofPresidentialStatement,whichisvirtuallynothing.TheSecurityCouncilthensuddenly

changedandadoptedaresolutionorderingtheUNtoretake,militarily,Srebrenica.80Of

coursenoonetookthatresolutionseriously,buttherewasanobviousdisconnectbetween

mandateandresourceswhichhasimplicationsforthediscussionswearehavingtodayon

safeareasindifferentpartsoftheworld.Don'ttalkaboutitifyoucan'tdoit.

TheUNoperationinBosniawasafailureifyouseeitasapeacekeepingoperation.

Butitwasnevermeanttobe.

PuttingonmyhatasSwedishPrimeMinister,weprobablysentaround10,000

soldierstoservethereduringtheconflict.Didtheydoanythinguseful?Ithinktheydid.Did

theyproducepeace?No,theydidn't.DidtheydefeattheSerbs?Notheydidn't,butthey

rescuedalotofpeople.Weshouldnotforgetthatthisstarted,rightlyorwrongly,asa

massivehumanitarianoperation.Itwasthemostmassivehumanitariancatastrophethat

wehadexperiencedinEuropesince1945.Itwasaquestionofhelping,protectingwith

lorriesandlogisticstogethelpin.Wealsoprotectedpeopleindifferentareaswho

otherwisewouldhavebeensubjecttoallsortsofthings.Ithinkitwasmostuseful-butit

wasnotapeacekeepingoperation.

Ithinkwehavelearnedalessonabouttheneedforbetterintelligence.Sweden,

alongwiththeNetherlands,isnowinvolvedintheMalioperation.ThereisaDutch

79AformerUNPROFORcommander,BelgiangeneralFrancisBriquemont,toldjournalistsinDecember1993that“Idon’treadtheSecurityCouncilresolutionsanymorebecausetheydon’thelpme.”Heresignedthefollowingweek.See,forexample,“UNGeneralinBosniaquits,”January5,1994,NYT.80UNSCResolution1004,adoptedonJuly12,1995calledontheUNSecretaryGeneral“touseallresourcesavailabletohim”torestorethe“safeareaofSrebrenica.”TheFrenchrepresentative(Mérimée)offeredto“maketroopsavailable”forsuchoperations.TheUSrepresentative(Albright)saidtheUSwaspreparedto“providenecessaryairlift”forthedeploymentofarapidreactionforcetoBosnia.PresidentClintonagreedwiththeprivateassessmentofFrenchmilitaryleadersthat“retakingSrebrenica[is]toorisky.”SeeTonyLakememo,“PointstobemadefortelephoneconversationwithChancellorHelmutKohl,”July14,1995.AkashiurgedUNSecretary-GeneralBoutros-GhalitourgeUNSCmembersto“focusonhumanitarianassistanceratherthansuggestingevenobliquelythatthestatusquoantecanbere-establishedbyforce.”SeeAkashitoAnnan,“APossibleCommunicationfromtheSecretary-GeneraltotheSecurityCouncil,”UNPF-HQ,Zagreb1149.

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intelligenceunitandaSwedishintelligenceunittherethatoperatewithdronesand

listeningdevices.WhetherthatwillhelpinMaliremainstobeseen,butthecapacityis

there.BetterintelligencewouldnothavehelpedintheSrebrenicacasebecauseweknow

thedecision[tocapturetheenclave]wastakenverylate.ButIthinkthatparticularlesson

hasbeenlearned.

Overall,IagreethatBosniaisnotwhereitshouldbe.81Wearenowtwentyyears

afterthewar.CompareBosniatodaytoGermanyin1965.Therehasbeenafailureof

leadershipinthecountryitselftocometotermswithwhatneedstobedone.Hadwe

pickedupsomeICTYindictees[e.g.MladićandKaradzić]earlierthatwouldhavebeena

goodthing,noquestionaboutthat.Butitwasimpossible,inthewakeof[theOctober1993

BlackHawkDownincidentin]Mogadishu[when18USsoldierswerekilledattemptingto

captureaSomaliwarlord].Theforces,particularlytheUSforcesbytheway,wereopposed

tothatsortbecauseitwasconsideredtoodangerous.Ithinkitwouldhavebeenmorally

goodifwehaddoneit.Idonotknowwhetheritwouldhavemademuchadifferenceinthe

longerperspective.Theywerepickedupeventuallyanyhow.Essentiallyitisthefailureof

theBosnianpoliticalsystemtoseethemagnitudeoftheirresponsibilitythatexplainsthe

situationtheretoday.

TOMBLANTON:ThankyouCarl.IwantedtoaskRuperttocommenton

thenegotiation/appeasementissueandthenmoveontoyouroveralllessons.

RUPERTSMITH:Thankyou,DavidHannay,forthepointabouttherapidreactionforce.Just

toadd,itwasnowuptome,theUNPROFORCommander,tochooseallthetargetsthat

NATObombed.Theyhadtoagreetobombthem,butIchosethetargets.Theonlyonesthat

NATOchosewerethesuppressionofairdefensetargets.NATOwasmyagentinthatsense.

Secondly,theartilleryfromFrance,BritainandtheNetherlandsfiredsomethinginthe

orderof600roundsontheveryfirstdayofthoseattacks,August30anditstayedatthat

leveluntilthesiegewasbrokenaboutthreedayslater.Twoarmoredbattlegroups,one

81AftertheDaytonagreement,CarlBildtwasappointedtheinternationalcommunity’sfirstHighRepresentativetoBosniaandHerzegovina,servingfromDecember14,1995toJune17,1997.

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French,oneBritish,thencameinandbrokethesiege.UNPROFOR’sroleinthissagahas

beenleftoutofthestoryabittoomuch.

AFPmapofSarajevo1995.Brownshaderepresentshigherground.

Iwanttotalkaboutthedirectionofoperationsandthepolitical-military

relationship.Theuseofarmedforcetoachieveanythingwillneverworkunlessthereisan

extremelycloselinkagebetweenthepoliticaldirectionandthemilitarycommander.Ithas

tobeaniterative,continuousconversation.Itisnotonemeeting,inwhichyouaretoldto

gooutanddosomething.Ithastobeacontinuousrelationship.Youaccommodateeach

other'spointofview.Thepoliticalviewisn'tthesameasthemilitaryone.Theyare

separateactivities.Youhavetoarriveatapositionwhereyouapplytheuseofforcetoa

particularpoliticalend.Ifyoucannotdothat,inwhateverwayyouwireitup,itwillnot

work.Itwillfail.Ifyouropponentsaredoingitbetterthanyou,theywilldefeatyou.Thisis

whatyouseetakingplaceateverylevelofthisventureuntiltheveryendwhenwe

managedtogetittogetherinAugust1995.

Asanexampleofhowitdoesnotwork,considerthepointaboutnegotiations.Asa

youngofficerincounter-terroristtraining,Ilearnedabitabouthostagesituations.Iwasn't

thehostage:hewasinsidetheroomandIwasoutsideit.Oneofthelessonsdrummedinto

usfrombitterexperiencewasthatcommanderscommandandnegotiatorsnegotiate.Ifa

commandernegotiates,hehasonlygothimselfandhispositiontodealwith.Hestartsto

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givehispositionawayinordertoachievetheextractionofthehostage.Between1992and

1995,weconductedaroundthirtynegotiationswithoutanypoliticalcontextordirectionat

all.Whetheritwasonthemilitaryoneorthecivilside,theUNimmediatelystartedtosell

theirpositioninordertoachievethegoalofgettingtheconvoythroughordoingthesafe

area.Thatwaswhattheyweretrading.Overthecourseofthreeyears,youwatch

UNPROFORsellitselfawayuntilwegetto1995.Thishappenedbecausethecommanders

(andhereIincludeMr.Akashiandhispredecessors)hadonlythemselvestotradewith.

Commanderscommand,negotiatorsnegotiate.Thepoliticianisthenegotiatorandtheman

ontheground,civilormilitary,isthecommander.Don’tputthecommanderintheposition

whereheistradingwithhimself.Thatiswhatweweredoingandweshouldn'tdoitagain.

ThisleadsmetoaphrasethatIhate,negotiationbyforce.Ladiesandgentlemen,it's

afight,abattle.ThatisnegotiationbyforceandthatiswhatIdo.Youcannotnegotiateby

force,youwinorloseafightwithforce.Itisabinaryoutcome,winorlose.Itisnota

negotiation.Ifyouwantanegotiationwithforceassociated,thengetanegotiatoranduse

metousetheforce.Thisishowthepolitical-militaryrelationshipshouldbewiredup.It

doesnothavetobejustindividuals,itcanbecommittees,butyouhavetosatisfythose

requirements.

Iwasrecentlyaskedbyapublishertowriteanewintroductiontoabook,originally

writtenin1976,calledOnThePsychologyofMilitaryIncompetence,whichIrecommend

reading.82Itcausedmetothinkabouttheproblemofchangingmyowncommand'swayof

thinkinginthespringandsummerof1995andturningthenervoussystemofmy

headquartersintosomethingmoreoffensive.Theauthor,NormanDixon,mentionsthe

need“tobreakthecollectiverationalizingawayofinformationchallengingthegroup’s

assumption.”Didn'twehavetobreakthat?Hetalksaboutthe“unquestioningmoralityof

rightnessthatenabletheconsequencesofactionstobeoverlooked.”Didn'twefallintothat

one?Herefersto“asharedillusionofunanimityinamajorityviewpoint.”Lastly,he

mentions“aselectiveavailabilityofinformationtoavoidchallengingpreviousdecisions.”

Inotherwords,groupthink.Ifyouareincommandinoneofthesesituations,makesure

thegroupthinkssafe.Thosearealsomylessons.82NormanDixonOnthepsychologyofmilitaryincompetenceisasurveyof“100yearsofmilitaryinefficiency”fromtheCrimeanwartoWorldWarII.

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YASUSHIAKASHI:TherearemanylessonstobelearnedfromtheSrebrenicaexperienceor

theentireBosniaandHerzegovinaoperation.First,Iwouldliketosaythattheperfect

solutionisanenemyofagoodsolution.Inpeacekeepingyoufirsthavetodothe

humanitarianassistanceside.Youalsohavetonegotiateaceasefiretostopbloodshed,

howeverfragileitmightbe.Whatwemostwanttoaccomplishmaynotbewhatisthemost

feasibleorrealistic.AsDagHammarskjöldsaid,whattheUNtriestodoisnottotake

peopletoheaven,buttosavethemfromhell.Wehavetobemodestandrealistic.

IthinkthispeacekeepingeffortwasdoomedtobeafailurebecausetheBosnian

governmentdidnotwantpeacekeeping.Theywantedpeaceenforcement.TheBosnian

Serbswantednopeacekeepingatall.Itwasboundtobeverydifficult,verydelicate,and

verycontroversial.

IwouldliketotellourDutchcolleaguesthattheyshouldnotblamethemselvestoo

much.TheywenttoSrebrenicabecauseCanadiansdidnotwanttocontinueandSweden

refusedtogo.Youundertookaverydifficulttask.Iamsureyouwereawareoftherisksbut

Imustsayyouhadthecouragetodoathanklessjob.YourCalvinisttradition[ofindividual

responsibility]isgreat,butdon'tgotoofar.IthinkColonelKarremansandhiscolleagues

didtheirbest.Weneedtoputourselvesintheirshoes.

Iagreewithotherspeakersthattheapproximately200resolutionsandpresidential

statementsissuedbytheUNSecurityCouncil[relatedtoBosnia]werealittletoomuch.We

achievedpeaceCambodiawithabout5percentofthisnumberofresolutionsand

presidentialstatements,UNSCResolution836[ofJune4,1993],inparticular,wasavery

unfortunateresolution.Ithinkmanyofusreadittwenty,fortytimes,oreven100times,

withoutmakingsenseofit.Itincludessomanyphasesandqualifiers.Youhavetoadopt

resolutionsthatwillnotbelaughedatbycommandersandnegotiatorsontheground.

IthinkDavidHarlandmadeaverygoodpointaboutthedefectivestructureofthe

peacekeeping.TheheadquarterswasinSarajevoatfirst,whichwasagoodlocation,but

wasmovedtoZagreb.83Thiswasamajordefect.[AsthespecialrepresentativeoftheUN

83TheUNProtectionForcefortheformerYugoslavia(UNPROFOR)wasestablishedinFebruary1992,primarilyforCroatia,withheadquartersinSarajevo.TheheadquartersmovedtoZagrebinMay1992duetothelackofsecurityinSarajevo.

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Secretary-General]inCambodia[between1992and1994],Iestablishedmyheadquarters

inPhnomPenh.Iwasabletoconsultwithforeignambassadorsatmyleisure,anytime,ata

moment’snotice.Iestablishedaso-called"expandedfive"committee,representingthe

PermanentFiveSecurityCouncilmembersandregionallyimportantcountries.Theywerea

perfectsoundingboardforme.TheforeignambassadorsinZagrebwereaccreditedto

Croatia,notBosnia.MyaccesstoSarajevoambassadorswasmuchmoredifficultthanin

PhnomPenh.

Sometimes,welearntoomanylessonsfromthepreviouspeacekeepingoperation.

Wekeptontellingourselvesnottocrossthe“Mogadishuline.”Wewereawareofthe

debacleinSomalia.SecretaryofStateChristopherwarnedusoftheso-calledCNNeffect.

Publicopinionandthemediasometimescauseustolaunchoperationsprematurelyand

prematurelywithdraw,ashappenedafterOctober1993whentheAmericanRangerswere

draggedthroughthestreetsofMogadishu.Wehavetoalwayswarnagainsttheeerieeffects

ofmediaandtheficklenessofpublicopinion.Isubscribeto95percentoftheBrahimi

reportthatcameoutinAugust2000.Itisfullofverygoodlessonsforpeacekeeping

operationsanditdistributestheblameonallofus:fromtheSecurityCouncil,member

governments,andUNHeadquartersinNewYorktoindividualcommanders.Theprimary

warningistoavoidtryingtodotheimpossible.

Ifyoudecidetosendapeacekeepingforcesomewhere,youshouldnotbestingy

aboutresources.Donotunderestimatethetaskswhichyouconfront.IamgladthatUN

peacekeepingoperationstodayarefarbetterthanthoseinthe1990s,butaretheyperfect?

No,farfromit.Anewreporthasjustcomeoutfromagroupheadedbytheformer

PresidentofEastTimor,JoséRamos-Hortathatemphasizesthevitalimportanceofthe

politicalprocessaccompanyingpeacekeepingoperations.Peacekeepingoperationsare

muchmoreeffectiveifthereisapre-agreedpeaceagreement.Wehadsuchanagreement

inCambodiabuteventhentheinstrumentwasnotperfect.Wehadtoamendandrevisethe

frameworkaswewenton.Mylegaladviserwasextremelydisturbedbymyattemptsto

departfromthatfundamentaltextwhichwasveryimportantforus,butnopaperisperfect.

Nothingcanreplacehumanintelligence,humanwisdom.

Peacekeepingisinconstantevolution.Allconflictsareuniqueandsuigeneris.Letus

notapplythesamesolutiontoalloperations.Wehavetobehumbleandkeepoureyes

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wideopentoagreatdiversityofpeacekeepingoperations.Thelessonswedrawfrom

BosniaandHerzegovinashouldnotbeconsideredasabible,apanaceaforallfuture

peacekeeping.

AsRupertandShashimentioned,thereisnoreferencetopeacekeepingintheUN

Charter.WewillhavetocontinuetomuddlethroughsomewherebetweenChapterVIand

ChapterVII.Boutros-Ghali,inhisfamous“agendaforpeace”saidthattheUNshouldstick

topeacekeepingbutthatpeaceenforcementmaybeallowedonaverysmallscale.The

SomaliaexperiencedforcedBoutros-GhalitoamendhisagendaandsaythattheUNshould

neverventureintopeaceenforcement.Forpeaceenforcement,youneedanentirely

differentforcestructure,philosophy,training,equipment,andintelligencecapabilities,as

manyofyouhavementioned.

OneofthefewrecommendationsintheBrahimireportthatwerenotacceptedby

theGeneralAssemblyorSecurityCouncilwasanintelligenceservice.Member

governmentshatetogivetheUNSecretariatanintelligencecapacity.Wehavetogotothe

DutchgovernmentortheSwedishgovernmentortheUSgovernmenttogetour

intelligence.IftrustisestablishedbetweentheUNSecretariatandUNmember

governments,youwillbeallowedaccesstoveryvaluableinformation,aswasthecasewith

mewithregardtoNorthKoreannuclearinstallations.Ofcoursethosesatellitepictures

wereimmediatelywithdrawnandtakenback.

Iwillstophere,butIthinkthelasttwodayshavebeenextremelyvaluableandhave

givenusmanylessonstoponder.

ZEIDRA'ADALHUSSEIN:EveryonearoundthistablewasonceaseniorUNofficialor

representedtheirstatesattheUNorworkedwiththeUNasjournalistsoracademic.Iam

theonly[serving]UNofficialatthistable,andformysinsIhavetobrieftheSecurity

CouncilnextweekonSrebrenica.Iamtheonlyonewhoisbriefing.Iconsiderthisexercise

notjustarefreshingofmyownmindbuthopefully,withyourpermission,Iwillalso

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representallofyouatthe20thcommemoration[oftheSrebrenicaevents].TheCouncilhas

tohearthehardtruthemergingfromthisdiscussion.84

Iwas[Jordan’sambassadorto]theSecurityCouncil[in2014]whentheSecretary-

Generaldecidedtocallforafullscalecomprehensivereviewofpeacekeeping.HereIdepart

fromShashi.Itistruethatmandatesareimportantandresourcesandpoliticalwillare

necessary,butwhatalsomattersisperformance.WediscussedthisintheCouncilatlength.

Youhavewhatyouhave,buthowwelldoyouperformwithwhatyouhave?Whatwe

discoveredcomingoutofaninternalreportlastyearwasthatthereisamassivefailurein

theprotectionofciviliansbytheUN,notwithstandingeverythingwrittenintheresolutions

oftheSecurityCouncil.85

Oneofthematterswediscussedlastyearwasthecontinuing,chronicproblemof

interferencebynationalauthoritiesintheworkingofpeacekeepingoperations.Ithasnot

diminished,ithasnotgoneaway.Whentheatmosphereisbenign,nooneinterferes,but

whentheatmospherebecomesdangerousandacute,everybodyinterferes.National

commandstelltheircontingentsnottoobeytheUN,nottooccupythisbridge,toevacuate

thisposition,exfiltrateoutofthatposition.Itisstillhappening.Welearnveryslowlyornot

atall.Ourpowersofanticipationremainextremelypoor.

Whenlookingatthelessonswedrawfromourexperiences,thereareafewthings

thatwehavetobearinmind.Inmanycases,notjustBosniabuttodayaswell,weareoften

terrifiedofourinterlocutorsandwhattheymaydo.Weshouldalsobepreparedtoallow

thepossibilitythattheymaybeterrifiedofustoo.Wedonotfactorthatintoourthinking.

Nolessonappearstohavebeenlearnedinthisregard,whichissodepressing.

Justbecausethereisacomplexpoliticalsituationdoesnotmeanthatthemoral

situationissimilarlycomplex.ThereisaverycomplexpoliticalsituationinMyanmar,but

themoralsituationisveryclear.Weshouldnotconfusethetwo.Understandingthe

grievancesoftheothersidedoesnotmeanthatyouhavetosympathizewiththeactionsof

theotherside.

84HighCommissionerZeidaddressedtheUNSecurityCouncilsessiononSrebrenicaonJuly8,2015.RussiavetoedaUK-sponsoredresolutiondescribingtheeventsinSrebrenicaasa“genocide.”Theresolutionreceived10affirmativevotes.China,Venezuela,Angola,andNigeriaabstained.85OIOSreport,“EvaluationoftheimplementationandresultsofprotectionofciviliansmandatesinUnitedNationspeacekeepingoperations,”A/68/787,March7,2014.

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Myfinalpointisthisthat[theparties]havetorespecttheUN.Theydon'thaveto

likeus,butiftheydonotrespectus,theywillhavetheirwaywithus.86Thisiswhat

happenstoomanytimeswhentheUNispresent.Wearetooquicktotrytoplease.We

wanttobeongoodtermswitheverybody,wewanttobelikedbyeverybody,wewantto

feelthatwearepartners.Itdoesn'tmatterintheend.Ihaveinfuriatedmoregovernments

inthelastninemonthsthanmostpeopleherecouldpossiblydo,simplybecauseofmyjob

[asUNHighCommissionerforHumanRights].Thethingistheyallwanttotalktoyou.

Theyrealizethatthereissomerespectfortheoffice.Thatisafundamentallessonforthe

UN.

Weneedtounderstandwhowearedealingwith.Wesimplydidn'tunderstand

enoughaboutwhatMladićwascapableof.Welearnextremelyslowly,ifatall.

IhavebeenanalmostcontinuouspresenceattheUNsincemydaysinUNPROFOR,

butwehaveneverhadadiscussionlikethis.WehadadebateintheGeneralAssemblyon

DavidHarland'sreportin1999,butitwasn'tadiscussion.Iwouldloveforthecurrent

membersoftheSecurityCounciltohavebeenhere[inTheHague]tolistentoour

discussion.TheyneededtocomeandlistentothediscussionlastyearonRwanda.Both

VitalyChurkinandSamanthaPower[representativesofRussiaandUnitedStatesonthe

SecurityCouncil]werebothwithusintheBalkans,buttheCouncilwritlargehasnoclue

abouttheanatomyofallofthis.

OneofthemostseriousconsequencesofourfailureinSrebrenicaandŽepawasthe

abandonmentofthewholeideaofsafeareas.Manyofusthoughtthatitcouldstillhave

applicabilityifitweredoneright.YoucouldpossiblyhavehadasafeareainSyriain2012,

but[theBosniaexperiencecausedusto]castitasideassomethingcompletelyimpractical.

Idonotbelieveyoucan'tdoit.Inhisreport,Davidsaiditwasdifficulttodounderthe

circumstanceswehadinBosnia,butthatdoesnotmeanitisimpossibleinother

circumstances.87ForthesakeofallthepeoplewhoaresufferinginSyria,Iraq,andLibya,

86HighCommissionerZeidelaboratedonthispointinhisaddresstotheUNSecurityCouncilonJuly8.“ThemostfoundationallessonofSrebrenicawasthis:Tosucceed,theUnitedNationsmustberespected.FortheUnitedNationstobeeffectiveinrobustpeacekeeping,allpartiestoaconflict,andinparticulartheaggressor,musttakethemeasureoftheCouncil,itsdecisionsandtheUnitedNationspresenceontheground.Theymustbelievetherewillbeseriousconsequences,andnoimpunity.”87The1999Srebrenicareportconcludedthat“protectedzonesandsafeareascanhavearoleinprotectingciviliansinarmedconflict,”buttheymusteitherbe“demilitarizedandestablishedbytheagreementofthe

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weneedtorescuetheideaofsafeareaandseeifwecanmakeitworkproperlythenext

time.

ZLATKOLAGUMŽDIJA:First,Iwanttothankyoufororganizingthismeeting.Afewpoints

whichIlearned.Peacekeepingandpeacebuildingaredifferentthings.Wehavetomoveto

thenextlevelwhichisconflictpreventionandsomethingcalled“responsibilitytoprotect.”

Thisexercisecangiveussometools,oratleastelementsofthetools,ofhowtoproceedin

thefuture.

Whenyouareinfrontofthecourt,youcanbechargedwithintentional[criminal

acts]becauseyouplannedit.Youcanbechargedforbeingpartofa[plotorconspiracy].

Youcanbechargedforknowingaboutit,youcanbechargedifyoushouldhaveknownit.

InthecaseofMilosevićandMladić,theypurposefullyplannedtheseevents.Thenotionthat

Mladićbecameakindoffalsemessiahat11p.m.oneeveningtotakerevengeforsomething

thathappened500yearsago,inordertocleanhiscommunistpast,isverydangerous.88

Iunderstandthatsomepeopledidn'texpectit.Iunderstandthatsomepeoplewere

shocked.Iwasmyselfshockedbythelevelofatrocity,Iexpectedittohappen,butnoton

suchascale.Iexpecteditfromtheverybeginning.Iwarnedattheverybeginningthat

somethinglikethiswouldhappen.Asdeputyprimeminister,ItalkedtoUNrepresentatives

aboutplanned,organizedrapesofwomenindifferentpartsofthecountry.Massgraves

wererecentlydiscoveredwith400bodiesinamassgraveatTomašicainthePrijedorarea,

andanotheronewith700people,thatwerepartofthecrimesofJune-July1992.Therewas

aplanned,self-evidentchainofeventsbeginninginTomašicaandthepeopleofPrijedor

beingmadetowearwhiteribbons[in1992].89WhathappenedinSrebrenicawasalogical

consequenceofeverythingthathappenedbefore.90

belligerents”ortheymustbe“trulysafeareas,fullydefendedbyacrediblemilitarydeterrent.Thetwoconceptsareabsolutelydistinctandmustnotbeconfused.”88AreferencetoMladić’sstatement,onJuly11,2015,that“thetimehascometotakerevengeontheTurks”forpasthistoricalinjustices.ICTYprosecutorsbelievethatMladićtookthedecisionlateontheeveningofJuly11tokillthemalecaptivesfromSrebrenica.89InAugust2013,BosnianauthoritiesdiscoveredamassgraveinTomasicavillage,nearPrijedorinnorthwestBosnia,datingbacktothefirstphaseoftheBosniawar.ICTYinvestigatorslateridentifiedtheremainsof600victims,manyofwhomhaddisappearedfromtheirhomesinthePrijedorareainJune-July1992.TheSerbauthoritiesinPrijedorhadissuedanorder,onMay31,1992,forthenon-Serbpopulationofthetowntowear

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Iunderstandthatyouhavetodiscuss,debate,cooperatewiththebutchersand

criminals,butwithallduerespectIcannotseehowyoucanbefornegotiationsand

cooperationinbetweenanunprotectedvictimandanarmedmurdereraboutthevictim’s

righttolife,property,religion,freedomanddignity.Toputitanotherway,canyouimagine

awolfandalambdiscussingwhattheywillhavefordinner?Inthatcase,weshouldnotbe

surprisedifthewolfisatthetable,notonthetable.

Asotherparticipantshavesaid,weneedtoredefinethenotionofneutrality.I

witnessedtheobsessionwithneutralityfrommyfirstcontactwiththeUN,whenI

participatedinnegotiationsbetweentheUNGeneralLewisMacKenzieandaYugoslav

armygeneralonMay2,1992.IwasarrestedwithPresidentIzetbegovićafterIreturned

frompeacenegotiationsinLisbononaEuropeancommunityplane.91Isawhowitworks.

IagreewithDiegothatwewitnessedaplanned“slow-motiongenocide”from

TomašicaandthewhiteribbonsofPrijedortoSrebrenica.Weshouldhaveseenitcoming.

Thefirsttimethattherewasacomprehensive,seriousstrategywithacleargoal,of

stoppingthepeoplewhohadcommittedthegenocide,wasonAugust30toSeptember20,

1995,withthebombingcampaignrunbyGeneralSmith.Thatwasalessonlearned.Thank

you.

TOMBLANTON:ThankyouZlatko.Hasan?

HASANMURATOVIĆ:WemustallagreewithAmbassadorArria’sconclusion[fromhisvisit

toSrebrenicainApril1993],thatSrebrenicawasan“openjail”inwhichaslowgenocide

wastakingplace.Thecreationandmanagementofthesafeareawasapostponementof

genocideandpostponementoftransferofterritorytotheenemybytheUN.Theterritory

whiteribbonsontheirarmswhentheywentoutsidetheiroutsidetheirhomes,whichwereidentifiedbywhitesheets.90OnMay31,1992,theSerbauthoritiesinPrijedorissuedanorderforthenon-Serbpopulationofthetowntowearwhitestripesontheirarmswhentheywentoutsidetheirhomes,whichwereidentifiedbywhitesheets.Earlyinthewar,MladićcriticizedtheethniccleansingpolicyadvocatedbyBosnianSerbpoliticalleaders.OnMay16,1992,hetoldtheRepublikaSrpskaAssemblythat“wecannotcleansenorcanwehaveasievetosiftsothatonlySerbswouldstay...IdonotknowhowMr.KrajisnikandMr.Karadzićwouldexplainthistotheworld.Peoplethatwouldbegenocide.”[SeeMladićspeechto16thSessionoftheRSAssembly.]91IzetbegovićandLagumdzijawerearrestedbytheYugoslavarmyatSarajevoairportwhentheyreturnedfrompeacetalksinLisbonaboardaEuropeanCommunityjetonMay2,1992.FightingflaredupinSarajevoshortlyafterwards.

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wastransferredthroughthemistakesoftheUN.ItshouldhavebeenprotectedbytheUN

forcesontheground,withsupportfromtheair.NATOandtheUNfailedtodefendthe

enclavebecauseofmistakesmadebytheheadquartersinZagreb.IthinkMr.Harland

expresseditverywell.Itwasnotafailureofthesystem,itwasafailureofindividuals.Iam

convincedthatJanvierhadpromisedMladićnottocallforairsupport.Hedidkeephis

promiseduringthetimeoftheattackandfallofSrebrenica.

Asforthelessons,weallknowthattheinternationalcommunity,andtheUN,can

actinoneoftwoways:throughpoliticalandlegalinfluenceorbyforce.Ithinkitisclear

thattheUNcannotimplementanykindofefficientorusefulpeacekeepingmissionwithout

someuseofforce.IntheBosniacase,mechanismsfortheuseofforcewerenotworking

properly.Theywerenotimplementedproperly,theyweremisusedbyindividuals.To

avoidsimilarmistakesinthefuture,IthinkthatNATOmustbeincludedinthe

implementationofSecurityCouncilinstructionsandresolutions.

TorepeatwhatIsaidbefore,wemustgivecredittotheUNforitsactionsinthe

humanitarianandmedicalfields,eventhoughthereweremanymistakesduetothefact

thatsomanypeoplewereinvolved.WhenwearetalkingaboutwrongandtragicUN

engagementinBosnia-Herzegovina,wearetalkingaboutUNPROFOR.ThispartoftheUN

operationinBosniawasunprincipled,counterproductive,irresponsible,unfortunate,tragic

andshameful.TheseareallwordsthatdescribetheactionsoftheUNinBosnia-

Herzegovina,andespeciallyinSrebrenica.

OBRADKESIC:AsthesoleSerbianvoicehere,Iwouldliketohavetheopportunitytosay

somethinginclosing.Firstandforemost,Ithinkeventhoughmyvoicecomesfrom

Washington,DC,itcomeswiththeapprovalofthePresidentofRepublikaSrpska[Milorad

Dodik]whoisawarethatIamhereandwhohasshownanopennessandwillingnessto

engageinthesekindsofdiscussions.

Havingsaidthat,theoneregretIhaveisthattheSerbleadershipdidnotshowthe

willingnesstoengageonthetragiceventsinSrebrenicaandgetaheadoftheneedfor

informationaboutwhathappened.ImyselfencouragedKaradzićinFebruary1996and

alsothelasttimeIsawhimattheendofJuly1996,tobeforthrightaboutwhathappened

andgetasmuchinformationaspossibleaboutdiscrepanciesinthenumbersofmissing

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menandcasualties.Unfortunately,hisfocusthenwasontheagreementheclaimedthathe

hadwithHolbrooke[toretirefromthepoliticalsceneinreturnforimmunityfromwar

crimesprosecution].Hesawnoneedtomovefurtherintryingtoclarifyanythingthathad

happenedduringthewar.

TherewasmuchinourdiscussionsthatwasveryusefulandIcouldagreewith,butI

hadtroublewiththepoliticalandmoralisticstatements.Idonotfindthemveryhelpfulor

constructive.Atthesametime,itdoesshowhowemotionalthisissuehasbeenand

continuestobe.Hopefully,atsomepointinBosniaandHerzegovina,therewillbeachance

todosomethinglikethis,notonlyconcerningSrebrenicabutthemany,manyfestering

woundsthatallpeoplehave.AswerememberthevictimsofSrebrenicaduringthe20th

anniversarycommemoration,Ihopeyouwillhavesomecompassionandempathyforall

thevictims,includingtheSerbianvictimswhotendtobeoverlookedwheneverthereisany

kindofdiscussionaboutthesufferingofBosnia-Herzegovina.

TOMBLANTON:Thankyou,Obrad.LetmegiveafinalwordtoKeesMatthijssen.

KEESMATTHIJSSEN:IthinkIamtheonlymilitarypersonherestillonactiveduty.Ihave

frequentlybeenaskedaboutthedifferencebetweenmyexperienceinBosniaandmy

experienceinIraqandinAfghanistan,whereIwasalsoacommandingofficerbutata

higherlevel.InbothIraqandinAfghanistan,IhadthecertaintythatIhadthemeansorthe

accesstomeanstoallowmetodomyjobevenifthingswentwrong.Thatwasthebig

differencewiththesituationwefacedinSrebrenica.ThemainlessonIwouldliketo

emphasizeisthatthemilitaryareeducated,trainedtodotheirjobs.Policymakeror

decisionmakersmustmakesurethatthemilitarycandotheirjob.Icompletelyagreewith

SirRupert’sremarksabouttherelationshipbetweenpoliticiansandpolicymakersandthe

military.Makesurethatyoucreatetherightconditionssothatthemilitarycandotheir

jobs.

TOMBLANTON:Thankyou,Kees.LetmeaskAbiWilliams,ourhostandinspirationin

manyways,toconcludeourdeliberations.

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ABIODUNWILLIAMS:Ithasbeenanextraordinarytwodays.Asyouhaveheard,wehada

similarconferenceayearagoonRwanda.WhenIcametothisInstitute,particularly

becauseofmyexperienceattheUN,Ithoughtitwasimportantforustolookbackatthese

reallytwotragiceventsandtogetabettersenseofwhathappenedthroughcritical

dialogueandcloseengagementwiththekeyplayersandtheirinteractionwithessential

documents.Injoiningus,youhavedoneaservicenotonlytopolicymaking,butalsoto

history.

WefocusedonwhatwentwronginBosniaoverthepastcoupleofdays,butifwe

lookatMacedoniainthesameperiodyoucouldseewhatwentright.Ifyoulookatthe

mandate,theresources,thecooperationoftheparties,politicalwill,theperformance,you

canseewhywegotitright.Incontrasttoallthoseresolutionsandpresidentialstatements

onBosnia,inthecaseofMacedonia,therewereessentiallyjusttworesolutions,plusthe

pro-formaones,extendingthemandates.92Theresourceswereclear:500Americansmade

up50percentoftheforce,complimentedbyaNordicforceof500.Itwasarobustsignalto

therestoftheformerYugoslaviadrawingonthepeacekeepingtraditionsoftheNordic

troops.Wesawwhatwentright.

ItisappropriatethatweheldthisconferenceintheNetherlands.Srebrenicahas

understandablybeenaparticularlysensitivesubjectinthiscountry.Itisatestamenttothe

leadersoftheNetherlandsandthelevelofpublicdebatethatthesubjecthasremainedhigh

onthepoliticalandlegalagendaofthiscountry.Wehavewitnessedarevolutionin

accountabilityandindividualresponsibilitysinceSrebrenicaandRwanda.Theunique

constellationofcourtsandtribunalsthatwehaveinthiscityrepresentsanenormousstep

forwardinthefightagainstimpunity.ThisiswhyTheHagueInstitute,togetherwithother

institutionsinthiscity,areengagedindiscussionsaboutpreservingthejudicialheritageof

theICTY.Itiscriticalthatthisheritagebepreservedandnotlost.ItisimportantfortheUN

toexaminethepolicyandprogrammaticimplications[ofpastactions].Wecannotmake

historiansofeverydiplomatbutwecanprovidethemwiththetoolstodrawonthelessons

thatpastexperienceprovides.

92AccordingtotheUNdatabase,theSecurityCouncilpassedthreeresolutionsrelatedtotheformerYugoslaviain1991,21in1992,22in1993,13in1994,and21in1995,i.e.atotalof80resolutions.

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Ithasbeenanhonortohostthissecondeditionofourprojectandpartneragain

withtheUSHolocaustMemorialMuseumandtheNationalSecurityArchive.Thankyou,

CameronandMichaelforyourtirelesseffortsinpreparingthisconference,andTom,for

yourveryskillfulmoderationofthesediscussions.Aboveall,thankstoourcolleaguesfrom

Bosnia.InthewordsofthegreatpoetMayaAngelou,inherpoeminhonorofPresident

Clinton’sfirstinauguration,"History,despiteitswrenchingpain,cannotbeunlived,butif

facedwithcourage,neednotbelivedagain."Wearedeeplygratefultoallofyouforyour

willingnesstoengagewithusandfortheopennesswithwhichyouhavediscussedthevery

traumaticandverypainfuleventsoftwodecadesago.Thankyou.

[ENDOFOFFICIALTRANSCRIPT]