Srebrenica Transcript Session 4 MD International Decision Making in the Age of Genocide: Srebrenica 1993-1995 June 28 July 1, 2015 The Hague Edited Transcript Session 4: Endgame ...

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4-1InternationalDecisionMakingintheAgeofGenocide:Srebrenica1993-1995June28July1,2015TheHagueEditedTranscriptSession4:EndgameLessonsfromSrebrenicaPotoari,July12,1995,USgovernmentphotoTOMBLANTON:OurintentionthisafternoonistolookveryintensivelyattheaftermathofthefallofSrebrenica,includingtheexperiencesofColonelKarremans,RupertSmith,andCarlBildtintalkingwithGeneralMladi.IwanttoaskMichaelDobbstoleadoffwithacouplequestionsaboutthesituationonSrebrenicaonJuly11,andthechoices,orlackofchoices,facedbyColonelKarremansandDutchbat.SHASHITHAROOR:Beforewestart,mayIjustbrieflyputamarkerforourlaterdiscussiononlessons.IobjecttoJohnShattuck'ssuggestionthatthissomehowrevealsabankruptcy4-2ofUNpeacekeeping.IhavetriedtoexplainwhypeacekeepingwasinappropriatetoapplytothissituationandhowwepointedthisoutrepeatedlytotheSecurityCouncil.TOMBLANTON:I'mcountingonyoutochallengeit.MICHAELDOBBS:WewantveryquicklytolookatwhathappenedafterthefallofSrebrenica.Asyouknow,manyoftheMuslimmenfromSrebrenica,ledbythearmedremnantsoftheBosnian28thDivision,triedtoescapetheenclave.Theygatheredinthenorthernpartoftheenclaveataplacecalledunjariandattemptedtomakeabreakout,throughtheencirclementbyBosnianSerbtroops.DetailfromCIAmap,showingattemptedbreakoutbyMuslimsfromSrebrenicaTherewasanothergroupofcivilians,mainlywomenandchildrenbutalsoafewhundredmen,whotookrefugeatDutchbatheadquartersinPotoari,whichisjustnorthofSrebrenica.WeactuallyhaveanoverheadreconnaissancephotographofthesceneatPotoarionJuly12at2:00p.m.Anotherreconnaissancephotograph,thefollowingday,July13,showsalineofbusesoutsidetheUNbase,afewhundredmetersdowntheroad.1Aswenowknow,Mladiallowedthewomenandchildrentoenterthebuses,fortransportation1TheJuly12-14photographswereprobablytakenbylow-flyingNATOreconnaissanceaircraftsearchingforDutchbatsoldiersseizedbytheRSAashostages.LaterphotographsweretakenbyAmericanU-2spyplanes,covering30squarekilometersofterritory.4-3toBosniangovernmentpositions,buttookthemenawayforscreeningforallegedwarcriminals.Potoari,July13,1995,USgovernmentphotoWealsohaveaJuly11document[sentat6:27p.m.localtime]withinstructionstoColonelKarremansfromGeneralHervGobilliard,whowasactingUNPROFORcommanderinSarajevointheabsenceofGeneralSmith.2Hisinstructionsare:"ConcentrateyourforcesintothePotoariCamp,includingwithdrawalofyourOPs.Takeallreasonablemeasurestoprotectrefugeesandciviliansinyourcare."Priortothathesaid,"EnterintolocalnegotiationswithBSAforcesforimmediateceasefire."WealsohaveareportdatedJuly12fromColonelKarremansinwhichherepliestothepointsmadebyGeneralGobilliard.3Bythistime,hehasmettwicewithGeneralMladi2GobilliardtoSectorNE(Info:CODutchbat),"OrdersfordefenceofDutchbatandprotectionofrefugeesinSrebrenica,July11,1995.3KarremanstoJanvier,MeetingwithGenMladion11and12July1995,DutchbatCompoundPotoari,TK95114,July12,1995.4-4attheHotelFontanadowntheroadinBratunac.Heisreportingonwhathecalls"acatastrophicsequenceofeventsthathewitnessedandhisdirecttalkswithMladi.HebasicallysaysthatheisunabletocarryoutGobilliardsinstructions.Hestates,"Therearemorethan15,000peoplewithinonesquarekilometer,includingDutchbat,in"anextremevulnerableposition:thesittingduckposition.Headdsthatheisnotabletodefendthesepeople,"ordefendhisownbattalion.Thereareheavygunsallaroundthecompound,withindirectsightofthecompound.4ColonelKarremans,youhadthemisfortuneofbeingthrustintotheseveryone-sidedtalkswithMladi.Couldyougiveusyourimpressionsofhimandthechoicesyoufacedfollowingthefalloftheenclave?THOMKARREMANS:Sure.WeallknowwhathappenedbetweenJuly6and11.Wediscussedthatyesterdayandthismorning.AsIsaidbefore,thiswasawar.Allofasudden,it'soverandyouareconfrontedwith25,000refugees.Somebodyaskedmesomeyearsago,Whydidn'tyoutakealltherefugeesinyourcamp?Thatwasimpossible.Youcan'tput25,000refugeesonafewsquaremeters.5Alotofthingshappenedvery,veryfast.Youhadtomakemanydecisionswithinashrunkenbattalionstaff.Thereishardlyanytimetothinkaboutthedecisionsyouhavetotake.Youtakedecisionsinsplitseconds.Sometimes,thedecisionswerenotgood,ornotwellthoughtout,butwefeltthatmostofthedecisionswetookwerecorrect.WhenIwasaskedtostartnegotiations[withtheBosnianSerbs],Iaskedwhethersomebodyonamuchhigherlevelcanconductthesenegotiations?6Icouldconductnegotiationsbutaftersixdayswithnosleep,nodrink,nofood,negotiatingwiththelocalauthorities,runningmyownbattalion,Iwasnotinthemoodtostartnegotiations,tobehonest.Iaskedforsomeonehigheruptonegotiate,butgotnoanswer,soIwentto4AccordingtotheKarremansJuly12cable,Mladihaddeployedtwoartillerypieces,twotanks,threemultiplelaunchrocketsystems,andoneanti-aircraftgunwithin"directsight"oftheDutchbatcompound.5AccordingtotheKarremansJuly12cable,therewereabout2,500refugeesinsidetheDutchbatcompoundatPotoari,andafurther15,000refugees"inthedirectvicinity.6OnJuly12,Akashiappointedajointcivilian-militaryteamledbyUNcivilaffairsofficialKenBiserandUNPROFORchiefofstaff,Gen.KeesNicolai,totraveltoSrebrenicatomanagethecrisis.SeeAkashitoAnnan,SituationinSrebrenica,UNPROFORZ-1142,July12,1995,paragraph7.GeneralSmithagreedthatCODutchbatshouldnotnegotiatewithMladibyhimselfashewastalkingfromthejail.SeeRupertSmith,AftermathofFallofSrebrenica,July13,1995,paragraph4.Henoted,however,thattheSerbswererefusingtodealwithHQUNPROFOR,inSarajevo,anditseemsHQUNPFinZagreb.4-5Bratunac,thesmallcityoutsidetheenclave.OnmywaytotheFontanahotelinBratunac,IwassittinginmyvehiclethinkingaboutwhatIshouldsay.ThenIsaw,totheleftandrightoftheroad,thosemortarplatoons.WhenIarrivedatthehotel,IexpectedGeneralivanovi,theCommanderoftheDrinaCorps,orhissuccessor,GeneralKrsti.IhadneverseenMladibeforeinmylifeandtherehewas.Noweverybodyhasseenthepictures.Iwouldnotliketoexpandonthat,becauseitwasnotapleasantsituationformeeither,Imustsay.7Imentionthewordrefugeesseveraltimesinthisdocument.ItoldMladiseveraltimesthatIwastheretomakegoodarrangementsfortherefugees.Imaginethatthereareabout5,000refugeesinside,andabout20,000outside,thecompound.Wehadalreadyforeseenthehumanitariandisasterthatwasemerging.Wehadnomedicinestodealwiththat.Ihad110severelywoundedpersonsonthecompound.MythoughtwasthatIcannotstartnegotiatinginamilitarysense,butIcantrytomakearrangementsforthewoundedandforthepopulation.Inthebeginning,hedidn'tlisten,butthesecondtimeIwasthere,[at11:00p.m.],hestartedlistening.Itwasmoreorlessaone-directionconversation.Hewasorderingratherthanasking.ThatiswhatIcanrememberfromthosetwotalksintheevening.ThenextmorningIwentforthethirdtimewiththreepeoplerepresentingtherefugees,onewomanandtwomen.Theywereabletoexplainwhatwasgoingonfromtheirperspective.MICHAELDOBBS:Mladitoldthemthattheyhadachoice,tosurvive,stay,orvanish.8Itwasagreedthattherewouldbeanevacuation.Thelocalpeoplesaidtheywantedtobeevacuated,butanimportantquestionarose:whowouldorganizetheevacuation?WoulditbetheUNthatorganizedtheevacuation?OrwouldMladiorganizetheevacuationhimself?AtonepointitseemedthatUNPROFORwouldorganizetheevacuationinwhichcasetherepresumablywouldnothavebeenaseparationofmenandwomen.Butitturnedoutthatit7KarremansheldthreemeetingswithMladiattheHotelFontanaatBratunac,atapproximately8:00p.m.and11:00p.m.onJuly11,and10:00a.m.onJuly12.ABosnianSerbcameramantookvideoofthemeetings,whichwasthentranscribedbyICTYresearchers,becomingpartofaSrebrenicatrialvideo.KarremanswasjoinedbyMuslimrepresentativesforthesecondandthirdmeetings.8SecondFontanameeting.AtthefirstFontanameeting,MladitoldKarremansthathedidnotwanttosendUNPROFORpeacekeepersbackhomeincoffins.4-6wasMladiwhobroughtthebusesandMladiwhocontrolledtheevacuation.9CanyoutellushowitendedupthatMladiwasallowedtoorganizetheevacuation?KEESNICOLAI:Icansaysomethingaboutthat.Immediatelyafterwestoppedtheairattacks,werealizedtheterriblesituationoftherefugees.Weknewwehadtodosomethingaboutthat.Afteradiscussionthatlastedtenminutesorso,weweresurethatournextmissionwouldbetoevacuatethecivilianpopulationtoasafeareawheretheycouldbetreated.Therewasnowater,nofood,andnomedicinefortheminSrebrenica,asColonelKarremanshasdescribed.Moreover,itwasverydangerous.Therefugeeswereunprotected,intheopenair.Thesituationcouldchangeatanymoment.Itwasclearthattheyhadtoberemovedfromthatplaceassoonaspossible.Soonafterwards,IhadatelephonecallwithourMinisterofDefense.Itoldhimthatwehaddecidedtostartnegotiationstoarrangeanevacuation.Heagreedimmediately,sotherewassupportforourdecisionfromTheHague.Aroundthesametime,IhadashorttelephonecallwithMr.Muratovi[theBosnianministerresponsibleforrelationswithUNPROFOR].Hewasveryupsetthatwehadstoppedtheairstrikes.Hesaidthatwascontrarytoourmission,butweexplainedthatwecouldnotdoanythingelseduetothesituationinwhichtheciviliansfoundthemselves.Shortlyafterwards,IcontactedColonelKarremanstoorderhimtostartnegotiationswiththelocalSerbauthorities.Atthatmoment,IwasnotawarethatMladiwasthere.Thefirstprioritywastogettherefugeesout.Eventswentinadirectiondifferenttotheonewehadplanned.WeweretakenbysurprisethefollowingdaybyMladiwhenthebusesarrivedaroundnoon.Theevacuationstartedearlierthanweplanned.ArrangingtransportshouldnothavebeenaproblemforusbutitwasnecessaryforUNPROFORtoaskpermissionfromtheBosnianSerbstoentertheirterritory,whatroutewecoulduse,andsoon.9MladiannouncedthathewouldprovidethebusesfortheevacuationatthethirdHotelFontanameetingat1000onJuly12.Thebusesarrivedinfrontofthecompoundaround1:00p.m.onJuly12.AccordingtotheDecember2012ICTYjudgmentinthecaseofGeneralZdravkoTolimir,MladihadissuedanoralorderrequisitioningthebuseslateontheeveningofJuly11.Inaninterceptedconversationat1250onJuly12discoveredbyICTYinvestigators,Mladicloselymonitoredthedispatchofbuses.Wellevacuatethemall,hetoldasubordinate.Thosewhowantto[go]andthosewhodontwantto.4-7ItseemsthatMladihadforeseenwhatwouldhappenandarrangedbusesoneortwodaysbefore.Therewasonlyoneoptionleftforus,whichwastosendpeacekeepersinjeepsoronthebusestocontroltheevacuations.Thiswasnotasuccess.Manyjeepswerestoppedalongthewayandstolen.Theattempttocontroltheevacuationfailedinmanyrespects.Itwasmorelikeadeportationthananevacuation.MICHAELDOBBS:Therewaslittleyoucoulddotoinfluencethewayittookplace?THOMKARREMANS:I'dliketoaddsomethingonthat.Thingswentsofast.Wewereallastonishedseeallofthosetrucksandbusesthenextdayalready.InmytalkswithGeneralMladiIhadgivenhimasequenceofevents,beginningwithevacuationofthewounded,sayingwewerealsorelyingontheRedCross.Obviouslyhedidn'tlisten.Ihavealwayssaidthatthiswasapre-plannedoperationfromhisside.Youarenotabletoorganizesomanybusesandvehicleswithinacoupleofhours.Hedidn'tgiveusthechancetomakeproperarrangements.Ontheotherhand,asGeneralNicolaisaid,therewasanurgentneedtodosomethingforthepeople.Therewasnofoodforthem,therewasnoshelterforthem.Peoplehadhungthemselves,givenbirths.Itwaslikeavillageof25,000peopleallpackedtogether.Istillseethesethingsinmymind.Inthissituation,youhavetotakesomedecisions.Everythingwentsofastwiththedeportationofthelocals.Onelastthing:Isenttwoofficerswiththefirstconvoyofbuses.TheymanagedtoreachTuzlaandwenttoseeColonelBrantz.ColonelBrantzphonedmeandsaid,Yourtwoofficersarehere,they'veseensomethingsalongtheway,butyoucan'tseeeverythingwhentherearefortybusesbehindyou.Thentheysuggestedputtingasoldieroneverybus,butIhadalmostnosoldiersleft.Wesaid,Okay,wewillsendoneortwojeepswitheveryconvoy.Theywereallstolenontheway.IaskedMladilaterwhathappenedwiththosevehicles.Hesaid,"Idon'tknow.Therearedifferentgroupsofparamilitarywhograbbedthemandstolethem."Isaid,"Youknowbetter."Thatwasnotanoptioneither.ThenIsentsomevehiclestofacilitatethecommunicationbetweenPotoariandKladanj4-8[transferpointbetweenSerbandMuslim-controlledterritory]forcommunications.Allthosevehicleswerealsostolen.10MICHAELDOBBS:Mladiinsistedthattherefugeesbescreenedforpossiblewarcriminals.Hesaidthemencouldnotgowiththewomenandchildrenbecausetherewereallegedlywarcriminalsamongthemandheneededtoscreenthem.Wasthereapossibilityofinfluencinghimonthatquestion?THOMKARREMANS:HefirstaskedmeifIcoulddeliverthelocalmilitaryandcivilianauthoritiestohim.Isaid,Theyrenotthereandiftheywerehere,Idon'tdothat.Hethensaidthathewantedtoscreenthemenandlookforwarcriminals.11Weallknowwhathappenedoutsidethesafearea.Inwars,youshouldbepermittedtoasksomeone,whathedidduringthewar,butitisnotpermittedistokillthem.Thatiswhathappened.MICHAELDOBBS:Andyoudidn'tthinkthatwasapossibility?THOMKARREMANS:Notatthatmoment.Also,therewerenotsomanymenleftImustsay.Thereweresomeinthecompound.Weknowthatamountbecausetheirnameswereputonthepieceofpaper.12ThevastmajorityofthemenoutsidethecompoundwerealreadyontheirwaytoTuzla.TOMBLANTON:Muhamed?MUHAMEDDURAKOVI:Justtoclarify,thenumberofthemeninsidethecompoundinPotoaridoesnotreallyrepresentthenumberofmenwhowereseparatedandtakentodifferentexecutionsites.13Weknowthisthroughthere-tracingofthemassgraves.We10SeealsoNetherlandsMinistryofDefense,ReportbasedonthedebriefingonSrebrenica,October4,1995.AccordingtotheDutchbatdebrief,itprovedvirtuallyimpossibletoprovideproperescortsfortheconvoys.11AccordingtotheDutchbatdebrief,Mladiannouncedthatable-bodiedmenweretobescreenedforpossibleinvolvementinwarcrimesatthethirdFontanahotelmeetingonJuly2.Hesaidthattheevacuationofthewomanandchildrenandwoundedwouldstartat1300.12AccordingtotheDutchbatdebrief,themalerefugeesdrewupalistof239menoffightingagewhohadtakenrefugeonthecompound,withtheintentionofsubmittingittotheICRC.Atleast60menrefusedtoberegistered.13BosnianSerbforcesrefusedtoallowMuslimmengatheredoutsidethecompoundtoboardthebuses.Mostofthemenwhoneverthelessmanagedtoboardthebuseswereremovedbeforethebusesreachedgovernment-4-9knowwhichexecutionsitewasusedforthemenfromPotoari,whichsitewasusedforthepeoplecapturedinCerska,andsoon.Basedontheassessmentthatwewereabletomake,alittleover2,000menwereseparatedinPotoariandtakentodifferentexecutionsites.MICHAELDOBBS:Wasitasmanyas2,000?MUHAMEDDURAKOVI:Yes.Ifyoutakethenumberof8,000plus[totaldisappeared],outofthis8,000pluspeople,around2,000camefromPotoariandaround6,000camefromthewoods.MICHAELDOBBS:Right,butthereweretwogroupsinPotoari.TherewasagroupofaroundthreehundredinsidetheDutchbatbase.TheotherswereoutsidetheDutchbatbase.MUHAMEDDURAKOVI:That'sexactlywhatweagreeabout.You'retalkingaboutthenumberofthepeoplewithinthefenceoftheDutchcompound.You'renottalkingabout20,000civiliansoutsideofthefenceofthecompound,andamongthese20,000thereisatleast1,500peoplewhohavebeenseparatedandtakentoexecutionsites.TOMBLANTON:ZeidjustshowedmetheprosecutorsopeningstatementintheMladitrialontheothersideoftown,inwhichhearguesthatMladidecidedonthemassexecutionsonthenightofJuly11,apparentlyinbetweenthetwomeetingswithColonelKarremans.Zeid,couldyouquicklysummarizewhattheprosecutionbelieves,basedontheevidencetheyaccumulated.Itreinforcesthesensewehaveofthedecision-makingonSrebrenicaasaconstantpush,lackofreaction,pushmore,lackofreaction.ItisarollingdecisionmodelthatispertinenttothelessonswedrawfromSrebrenicaandwhenitispossibletopushback.controlledterritory.Muslimmalesweredetainedintheso-calledwhitehouseinPotoari,andtakentoexecutionsitesviaBratunac.4-10ZEIDRA'ADALHUSSEIN:Youareabsolutelyright.TheprosecutorintheMladicase,PeterMcCloskey,contendedthatthemurderplanbegantorevealitselfonthenightofJuly11.14Theyarenotactuallysurewhetherit'safterthefirstmeetingwithColonelKarremans[at9:00p.m.]orthesecondmeeting[at11:00p.m.]when[Srebrenicacivilianrepresentative]NesibMandiwasalsothere,buttheymakereferenceintheprosecutionstatementtothelanguagethatMladiused.Hedrawsastarkbinarychoiceofsurvive,stayorvanish. ZeidRa'adalHusseinThenhesaystoNesib,Thefutureofyourpeopleisinyourhands,bringthepeoplewhocansecurethesurrenderofweaponsandsaveyourpeoplefromdestruction.Everythingisinyourhands.Bringsomeprominentpeoplefromaroundhere.Inthewordsoftheprosecutor,"HerewecanseethatMladiisobsessedwiththesalvationanddestructionoftheMuslimpeople.Thisisnoidlechatterforthecameraasitwasthisvery14SeeProsecutorsopeningstatement,Mladitrial,ICTY,May17,2012.TheProsecutioncaseintheMladiandothertrialscloselyfollowsaSrebrenicaMilitaryNarrative,preparedbytheICTYexpert,RichardButler.MladibeganmarshalingtransportationassetsontheeveningofJuly11.BSApersonnelbeganseparatingmenfromwomenandchildrenshortlyafterthearrivalofthefirstbusesoutsidetheDutchbatcompoundaround1230onJuly12.4-11eveningthatMladiandhisofficersmadetheirfirstdecisionsontheplantomurdertheMuslimmenandboys."Thefollowingmorning[July12],there'sthethirdmeetingwithColonelKarremans.TheprosecutornotesthatLieutenantColonelVujadinPopovi[acommanderoftheDrinaCorps]metbrieflywithCaptainMomirNikoli[intelligenceofficerintheBratunacBrigade]outsidetheFontanahotel.PopovitoldNikolithattheablebodiedmeninPotoariwouldbeseparatedfromtheirfamiliesandkilled.PopoviaskedNikolitoprovidethelocationsintheimmediatearea[wherethemencouldbetemporarilydetained].Theythenstartedtolookattheoldbrickfactory.ItwouldthereforeseemthatthedecisiontotakeSrebrenicawasmadeonJuly9,andthedecisiontoconvertastrategicpoliticalplanintoamassatrocitywastakenwithinthosefewhoursonJuly11.15YesterdayImetwithcolleaguesattheICTY.Theysaidthatnothinghadchanged.Theywouldnotdisclosetheirthinkingonthecase,buttheybelievethisopeningstatementsaysitall.TheyalsobelievethatMladiwasinahighlyagitated,vengefulandhighlyemotionalstateatthetimethatdecisionwastaken.Thereasonwearemeetinghereisbecauseofthedecisionthatwastakenthatnight.Couldwehaveanticipatedthisemotionalstateandthisdesiretocommitmassmurder?MuhamedmentionedearliertodaythatthepeopleofSrebrenicaknewwhatwasgoingtohappen,butwe,theinternationals,weresurprisedandshockedbyit,eventhoughwehadbeenworkingwithallsidesforthreeorfouryears.Thequestionis,whywerewesoshocked?WeshoulddissecttheeventsofthateveningtounderstandwhyMladitookthedecisionhetook.MICHAELDOBBS:Doyouhaveananswertothat?ZEIDRA'ADALHUSSEIN:IthinkRuperthasananswerbecausehetoldmetheothernightthathehasatheorythatcouldwork.MICHAELDOBBS:SinceRupertandCarlmetwithMladishortlyafterwards,perhapstheycouldspeaktothedichotomybetweenwhatpeoplelikeMuhamedwereconvincedwas15See,forexample,ICTYjudgmentinthecaseofGeneralTolimir,paragraph1046,whichstatesthataplantomurdertheable-bodiedmenfromtheSrebrenicaenclavehadmaterializedbythemorningof12July.4-12abouttohappenandtheinternationalcommunitynotbeingwillingtobelieveit.Bytheway,wehadaverysimilardiscussionlastyearinthecaseofRwanda.TheCzechrepresentativeontheSecurityCouncil,KarelKovanda,talkedaboutafailureofimagination.Nobodyreallybelievedthatagenocidewouldtakeplace.InthecaseofRwanda,theydidexpectmassacres,butnobodyontheSecurityCouncilexpectedthescaleofthegenocidethattookplace.TOMBLANTON:Letmeaddacaveattothat.TherewasanexpectationthatthemassacreswouldbeatthelevelofBurundithepreviousyear,whichwas100,000peopledead.MICHAELDOBBS:ButKovandausedthephrase,"afailureofimagination."Perhapsweseesomethingsimilarhere.MUHAMEDDURAKOVI:TheassessmentofwhatwasgoingtohappeninSrebrenicaisnotmypersonalassessmentonly.Theprocessofseparation[ofthementryingtoescapeacrossthemountainsfromthewomenandchildrenwhosoughtrefugewithDutchbat]happenedatasmalljunction,justbeforethegasstation,ontheroadtoPotoari.Thereisasmallroadthatleadsleft,tothevillageofSueska.Ipassedby[Dutchbats]lastposition,inthecenterofSrebrenica,nearthecentralmosque,onthenightonJuly11.ThestreetonwhichIhadspentmostofmylifewasalreadyblocked.BulletswerebuzzingaroundwhenImanagedtogetoutofthatparticularlocation.Wethentookadecision.Thosewhocannotwalk[togovernment-controlledterritory]willdieanyway.TheywillgowiththewomenandchildrenandelderlytoPotoariandpraytoGodthatsomemercywouldbeshowntothem.Everyoneelsewhowantedtohaveatleastsomechanceofsurvivalwouldcomewithus[overthemountains].Yousawthousandsofpeople,anyoneabletowalk,kidswhowerenine,tenyearsold,andwholefamiliesincludingwomenandchildren,everyonewalkinginthedirectionofSueska.TheyknewthatgoingtoPotoarimeantcertaindeath.WhenIsaidgoodbyetomymotheratthatparticularlocation,IhonestlybelievedthatIwasnevergoingtoseeheragain.ThatwasthefeelingofmostpeopleatthatparticularmomentinSrebrenica.4-13RUPERTSMITH:YoucanseewhatIthoughtfromthereportIwroteonJuly13.16Igotbacktomyheadquarters[inSarajevo]ontheeveningofJuly12.Ittookalittleovertwenty-fourhourstogetintoSarajevofromSplit,goingdowntheMountIgmantrail.Itwasnotaquickmove.FairlyearlyonthemorningofJuly13,Idictatedthatdocument[tohismilitaryassistant,LtCol.Baxter],asmuchtoclearmyownheadastoinformanyoneelse.Notlongafterthat,Iformedapictureofwhatwashappeningfromvariousbriefings,talkingtootherpeople,readingreports.Withhindsight,thepictureisn'ttoowrong.Ihadapictureinmyheadofagroupofarmedmen,thedefendersofSrebrenica,withdrawingoutofthepockettowardsTuzla.IhaveapictureoflargenumberofrefugeesclusteredaroundCol.Karremansandhisbattalion.Therewasaseriousrefugeeproblem.IhaveHasanMuratovionmybackbeatingmeupbecauseIamtheUN,Ihavefailed.HemakesclearthatthereisgoingtobenohelpfromBosniawiththeserefugees,theUNmustdealwiththemall.AssoonastheycomeovertheborderwithRepublikaSrpska,theyaregoinguptoTuzla.Hasanmakescleartome,They'reyourproblem.Yousolveit.Youcausedthis.Ihaveabigargumentrunning.IleaveHasan,gotoPresidentIzetbegoviandsay,Thiswon'twork,they'reyourpeople,we'vegottodothistogether.SlowlyHasancalmsdownandwegetsomethinggoing.TOMBLANTON:OneofyourconversationswithHasanisrecordedinamemorandumofyourmeetingwithPrimeMinisterSilajdzidatedJuly13,1995.17RUPERTSMITH:Weneedtogetthelogisticsgoing,pullthehelicopterstogether,andgetthetentsandeverythingelsetoTuzlawheretherefugeesareexpected.Thatdoesnottaketoolong.Ihavethestafftogetitgoing.MyimmediateconcernsareaboutThom[Karremans]whoisinthepositionoftalkingfromthejail.Ithenreceiveamessage,lateatnight,togetmyselftoBelgrade.18WegobackupoverMountIgman,helicoptertoSplit16SeeSmithtoHQUNPFZagreb,AftermathFallofSrebrenica,HQUNPROFOR,MHHQ48,July13,1995.17SeeCapt.Emma[E.L.]Bliss,MemconofMeetingGenSmith/PrimeMinisterSilajdzi,July13,1995.Duringthemeeting,bothMuratovicandSilajdziexpressedconcernaboutunconfirmedreportsofatrocities.MuratovicagreedthatallrefugeesbehousedatTuzlaairportbecausetherewasplentyofspaceandUNHCRwouldbeunabletohidetheproblemfromtheworld.Previously,MuratovicopposedtheevacuationofSrebrenicaresidents.SeeAkashitoAnnan,SituationinSrebrenica,UNPROFORZ-1142,July12,1995.18SeediaryentryofGeneralChristopherElliot,militaryaidetoGeneraldeLaPresle,ICTY,courtesyofRupertSmith.4-14andthenflytoZagrebandontoBelgradetogettothemeetingwithMiloseviinBelgrade.IwillletCarldescribethemeetingasawhole.IcanfillyouinonmysidemeetingwithMladi.RegardingthenumberofrefugeesinSrebrenica,Iwasabout4,000peopleoutinmycalculations.Wehadbeenfeedinglesspeoplethanwereactuallythere.Therewasamismatchinourfiguresbetweenmenandwomenandchildren.Ourcalculationswereabout4,000bodiesout.Asaresult,wewerenotlookingforalotofpeople.Wethoughttherewereabout4,000peopletofind.TheICRCwasalsooftheopinionthattheywerelookingforabout4,000people.IthoughtmostofthesemissingpeoplewereinBratunac.WhenItalkedwithMladiinBelgrade[onJuly14-15],IaskedforaccessforICRCandUNHCRtotheareaingeneral.IalsoaskedfortheICRCinparticulartobegivenaccesstothe4,000prisonersthatIbelievedwereheldinBratunac.Wedidnothavetheproperpictureatthistime.19Ihadanideainmyheadofabreakoutbyanarmedmilitaryforceinawar.IwasnottoofussediftheBosniansdidnotwanttodefendtheirpositionsinSrebrenicaandwerewithdrawingtoTuzla.Itwastheirwar,andthatwastheirproblem.Theydecidedtogothere.Myfocuswasontherefugees,accesstoprisoners,andwhattodowithDutchbat.Howdowegetthemout?ThatwaswhereIwasbythetimeIgotontheroadtomeetwitheverybodyinBelgradeandZagreb.BasedonwhatIlaterlearnedfromthecourtsandsoon,mytheoryisthatMladiandhisofficersconvincethemselvesthattheyhaveasizableforce,muchbiggerthanIthinkitis,looseintheirreararea.Theirtinymilitarymindsgetveryupsetwiththeideathatthisforceisthreateningtheirdefensesfromtherear.Theydonothaveenoughpeople19EstimatesofthenumberofmissingmenfromSrebrenicafollowingitsJuly11capturebytheBosnianSerbswereconfused.AJuly13,1995cablefromAkashitoNewYork,basedoninformationfromUNHCRSpecialEnvoyAnneWillemBijleveldinTuzlanotedthatthefateof4,000malesofdraftageawaitingscreeninginBratunacwasofobviousconcerntoeveryonehere.SeeAkashitoAnnan,SituationinSrebrenica,Z-1154,July13,1995,paragraph2.TheStateDepartmentspressguidanceorJuly14expressedconcernoverthefateofupto3,000menandboysheldintheBratunacarea.AUNPROFORSectorNEreportfromJuly17,1995,reportedthatuptothreethousandMuslimmenhadbeenkilledenroutetoTuzla,andafurther2,000-3,000takentoastadiuminBratunac.UNhumanrightscommissionenvoyTadeuszMazowieckitoldjournalistsonJuly24afteravisittoTuzlathatsome7,000peoplefromSrebrenicaweremissingandanenormousnumberofcrimeshadoccurred.BosnianSerbestimatesofthecapturedmenweresignificantlyhigherthantheofficialUNestimates.AJuly13interceptofaconversationbetweenunidentifiedBosnianSerbofficersreferstoabout6,000maleprisonerscapturedfromtheattemptedbreakout,inadditiontothe1,000-2,000malerefugeesfromPotoaritransferredtoBratunac.4-15todealwiththisthreatandtakecareoftheseprisoners,aswellaswhatisgoingonaroundSarajevoandtheiroffensiveintoepa.Thesimplesolutionis:killtheprisoners.MICHAELDOBBS:ItisverydifficulttogetintoMladi'shead,buthedidsaywhenheenteredSrebrenica[onJuly11],"ThetimehascometotakerevengeontheTurksinthisregion."Theremayhavebeenamixtureofrationalthinking,asyoudescribeit,andasimplethirstforrevenge.MUHAMEDDURAKOVI:Ihavetodisagree.ThekillingsofSrebrenicaprisonersdidnothappenonlyonJuly11,12,or15.Ittookme37daystofightmywayout.Therewerekillingseveryday.Ifsomeonewantedtojustkillafewthousandpeopleandgetridofthem,theydidnothavetochaseusaroundformonthsandkilleveryonetheyfound.Noonewasarrestedandnoonewasexchanged.Thenotionthattheykilledtheprisonersbecauseitwasapracticalthingtodoandtheyhadinsufficientpersonneltoguardtheprisonersdoesnotcomportwithmyownexperience.Forme,theseexecutionswerethefinalstepintheethniccleansingprocessin[eastern]Bosnia-Herzegovina.epawastogoandGoradeaswell.Anyonewhowasfoundwasexterminated.AnyonecapturedevenamonthafterthefallofSrebrenica[onJuly11]waskilled.Ifoundhundredsofpeople[onUdrcmountain],whichisonthewaytoZvornik.TheyhadtriedtogetthroughtoTuzla.TheSerbsbuiltpositionsnotonlyfacingtheBosnianArmyinTuzlabutpositionsfacingtheincominggroupofpeoplefromSrebrenica.ThosewhosurvivedthosekillingscamebacktoUdrc.ImadethecraziestdecisionIhaveevermadethen,butadecisionthatobviouslysavedmylife.IdecidedtowalkbacktoSrebrenica.Iwastwentyyearsold,andIrecruitedsixotheryoungsterstojoinme.Thesesixpeoplewerefifteen,sixteen,orseventeen.4-16 Durakovic's37-daytrektofreedomWewerecrazyenoughtocomeupwiththeideatowalkbackintoSrebrenica,theheartoftheongoinggenocide.EveryoneIleftinUdrc,allmyneighbors,allmyfriends,allmyschoolmates,weretooexhaustedtogobacktoSrebrenica.Itdidnotmakeanysense:theywerealreadyhalfwaytoTuzla,theywouldeithermakeitorbreakit.Theydecidedtostaythereandhaveneverbeenseensince.Theexecutionpartiesandsearchpartieseventuallycaughtupwiththemsomewhere,tookthemtoexecutionsites,andkilledthem.TheSrebrenicakillingswentonfortwomonths,eventhreemonths.TherearereportsofpeoplewhocameoutalivefromSrebrenicasixmonthsafterthefallofSrebrenica.CARLBILDT:Wecanallhaveourtheoriesofwhatactuallyhappened,butitsspeculation.Wedon'tknowexactlywhatwasinMladi'smind.Ihavemyideas,nottoodissimilartowhatRupertissaying.Butletusgothroughmypartinthepoliticaltalksthatweretakingplaceatthattime.IhadbeeninBelgradepreviously[onJuly7]andmetMilosevito4-17negotiatetheContactGroupsanctionsre-impositionformula.Ihadalsobeenaskedtoengagemoreontheenclavesissues.IwasfocusedsomewhatmoreonSarajevothanontheeasternenclavesbecausetherewere400,000peoplewhowererunningoutoffood.TheUNforceswerenotabletoresupplyoverIgmanandreachUNHCRandWFP,andtheothers.CarlBildt,left,withCameronHudsonandAbiodunWilliamsWehadarestrictiononthepoliticaltalksthatwecouldconduct.WhenImetwithPresidentIzetbegoviinSarajevo,hewasveryfirmthatweshouldnottalktothePaleleadership.Formallyspeaking,IwasanEUrepresentativesomylineofcommand(iftherewassuchathingwasatthattime)wastotheSpanish,whohadtakenoverthepresidencyoftheEUfromtheFrenchonJuly1.IwasalsoinfrequentcontactwithDickHolbrooke.TheUShaddefactobackedoffallpoliticaltalksatthattime,soIwastheonlychanneltheyhad.SincewecouldnottalktoPale,whichwasaslightdisadvantage,wedecidedtoseeifwecouldsplittheSerbleadershipandengagewithMladi.WeknewthatMladiwasundermilitarystrain.Hehadlonglines,hewaslackingsoldiers,hewasurgingusalltoarrangeaceasefire,hewantedtoclosedownthewar,4-18needlesstosayonhisterms.Thiswasthereasonwhy,priortothemeetinginBelgradeonJuly7,wehadsentamessagetoMilosevi(Icantrememberthroughwhichchannel)sayingthatitwouldbeinterestingtoseeMladiifhepassesby.Accordingtomynotes,theJuly7meetingwasoneofthoseusualmeetingswithMiloseviwhichlastedninehours.Youwentbackandforthovereverything,overendlessSerbmeals.Towardstheendofthatsession,IhadaconversationwithMladiintheevening.Iwaskeentolistentohimtodiscoverthemoodoftheman,themindsetoftheman,butthesubstancedealtwiththeenclaves.Accordingtomynotesatthetime,Imentionedhisstrangulationoftheenclaves.Therewassomeotherissuesrelatedtointer-Serbrivalries,boththetensionbetweenMladiandKaradziandtheratheracutetensionbetweenMiloseviandMladi.Therewasa[partial]YugoslavblockadeofRepublikaSrpska,whichhitthemquitehard,primarilyontwoissues,beerandcigarettes.Thismightsoundtrivialtoday,butbeerandcigarettesareimportantforthemoraleofanarmy.TheBosnianArmycontrolledtheSarajevotobaccofactory,whichwasinoperationandprovedastrategicasset.TherewerenobrewerieswhatsoeverinRepublikaSrpskaterritory.Afairlyminorissueyoumightthink,butMiloseviandMladispentquiteabitoftimeonit.IreturnedtoBelgradeonFriday,July14.Bythattime,ofcourse,itwasobviousthatSrebrenicawasonthetopoftheagenda.YouhaveMladisnotesofhismeetingontheeveningofJuly14withMilosevi,Bildt,andGeneraldeLaPresleandJuly15withGeneralSmith.20TherewasalsoaUKdiplomatpresent,DavidAustin,butheisnotindicated.YoualsohaveAkashisnotesfromtheJuly15meetingthatincludedAkashi,Bildt,Stoltenberg,andMilosevi,aswellasMladi.21Therearesomedifferencesbetweentheaccounts,butessentiallytheysaythesamething.Onbothdays,webroughtupthequestionofaccesstoSrebrenicaforUNHCRandICRC.WewereawareofthefactthatmenandboyshadbeenseparatedfromthewomenandthechildrenwhohadgonetoKladanj.Theystillheldthemen.Ofcourse,theSerbswouldsaymilitarymen.Thedefinitionofmilitaryagewassomewhatliberal,toputitmildly.Theyclaimedthesemenwereprisonersofwar.20RatkoMladi,MeetingwithMilosevi,BildtandGeneraldeLaPresle,personaldiary,July14,1995,2115hours.Mladi,MeetingwithUNandMilosevi,July15,1995.21AkashitoAnnan,MeetinginBelgrade,UNPF-HQ,Z-1175,July17,1995.4-19AsyoucanseeMladiapproved,inhisownhandwriting,theprincipleofICRCaccesstoprisonersofwar.Istillfinditstrangethathetakesnotesofthis.Therearemanymysterieshere.ThemostdifficultaspectofourdiscussionsturnedouttobetheresupplyofUNforcesinsideSarajevo,notablytheFrench,whohadalreadystartedtoshootbackagainsttheSerbs,primarilywiththeirheavymortars.TheFrenchwerestartingtorunoutofammunitioninsideSarajevoandwantedtoresupply.MladiwasnotkeentoallowustohavefreeresupplyofammunitiontotheUNforces.Weinsistedandeventuallyhe,understrongpressurealsofromMilosevi,agreedtoopenuptherouteviaKiseljak.ThingswerealsohappeningattheUN.UnderthepressureofaSecurityCouncilresolution,theSecretary-GeneralinstructedMr.AkashitoretakeSrebrenica.22TheimmediateactionthatBoutros-GhalitookwastoinstructMr.StoltenbergtogotoPaleandholdtalkswiththePaleleadership.23Weconsideredthistobeamajormistakeandmanagedtostopit.ThatiswhyMr.Akashi,Mr.Stoltenberg,andGeneralSmithwerecalledtothefollowupmeetingwithMiloseviandMladiinBelgradeonSaturdaymorning.Therewasalsothequestionofhowtore-establishadialoguebetweenGeneralsMladiandSmith,whichhadbrokenoffwiththeairstrikesagainstthePaleammunitiondumpsonMay25-26.WeweremeetingintheformerTitohuntinglodgeatDobanovci,outsideBelgrade.Therewasadiscussionbetweenthegenerals,whoincludedGeneralSmith,GeneralMladi,GeneraldeLaPresle,andGeneralElliot.Iwasthereforpartofthisfairlyheavydiscussion.Oneofthequestionsdiscussed,needlesstosay,wasthereleaseoftheDutchhostages.Atthetime,thismeetingwashighlysecret,whichmeantthattheagreementweconcluded,primarilyontheresupplyofSarajevo,wasnotmadepublic.Instead,ameetingwassetupbetweenGeneralSmithandGeneralMladionJuly19.24They22UNSCResolution1004,passedonJuly12,1994,statesthattheSecretary-GeneralshoulduseallresourcesavailabletohimtorestorethestatusasdefinedbytheAgreementof18April1993ofthesafeareaofSrebrenicainaccordancewiththemandateofUNPROFOR23RatkoMladi,MeetingwithUNandMilosevi,July15,1995.24SeeBaxtertoUNPFZagreb,MeetingNotes,CommanderHQUNPROFOR,July19,1995.MladiagreedtoprovideICRCrepresentativeswithaccesstotheprisonerreceptionpointsbytheendof20July,apromisethathefailedtohonor.TheICRCwasnotpermittedaccesstodetentioncentersuntiltheendofJuly,whentheyweregrantedaccesstotheBatkoviccampinnortheasternBosnia,aswellasanumberofemptydetentioncentresintheBratunacarea.AccordingtotheUNSrebrenicareport,theywereonlyabletoregister164prisonersfromSrebrenica.ForMladiaccount,seediaryentryforJuly15,1995.AkashiraisedthequestionoftheSrebrenicamissingwithMiloseviconAugust12,repeatingdemandsforICRCaccesstothedetainees.Milosevicagreedthat4-20weresupposedtodeliveroneverythingatthatmeeting,whichwasmeanttobeofficiallyreported.ThiswaspartofourstrategyofsplittingthePaleleadership.WewantedtokeeptheMladichannelassecretaswecouldfromthePaleleadership.TOMBLANTON:SoyounegotiatedfullaccesstotheareaforUNHCRandICRConJuly15,butwaituntilJuly19toworkoutthespecifics?Wasitnotsupposedtobeimmediateaccess?CARLBILDT:Itwasimmediate.TheJuly19meetingdealtmorewithSarajevoaccess.RUPERTSMITH:There'snothingIdisagreewith,Ijustwanttofleshthisoutslightly.MymemoryishelpedbyanentryofthediaryofGeneralElliot,whowasatthetimemilitaryassistanttoGeneraldeLaPresle.25Mymemoryisthatwewentstraighttothemeetinginthe[Dobanovci]huntinglodge.IwasbyimpressedbyhowclearlyMladiandMiloseviwereasone,usingfamiliartermstoaddresseachother.Thiswasacloserelationship.Thegeneralswerethensentintoacornertodealwiththemodalities,intheusualphrase.HowevermuchMr.Mladiagreedonthenightbefore,asyoucanseefromhisnotes,wewentstraightbackintoargumentonthemorningofJuly15.TOMBLANTON:Abouttheaccess?RUPERTSMITH:Abouthowwedoallthis.IwillquotesomenotesfromourdiscussiononJuly15.GeneralMladiwasinanexpansive,goodhumored,confidentmoodfollowingthefallofSrebrenica.GeneralSmithwascool,correctandstucktothepoint.MladineveroncereferredtoKaradzi,northeneedtopassanydecisionsarrivedatthroughPale.DuringthefirstdiscussionsMladistatedthattheuseofairpowerwasunjustifiedandaterriblething.HereturnedtothismanytimesanddemandedthatGeneralSmithforswearitsuse.Mladiwastoldthattheuseofairpowerwasinhishands.Ifhegavenoreasonforit,itwouldn'tbeused.Ifhedid,itwouldbe.GeneralSmithwasresoluteonthis,evenwhenitMladicmuststicktohispromises,butsaidhewashavingdifficultiescommunicatingwithMladic.SeeAkashitoAnnan,ThemissingpopulationfromSrebrenica,Z-1416,August14,1995.25SeeGen.ChristopherElliotdiaryentry,ICTY,courtesyofRupertSmith.ElliotwasmilitaryassistanttoGeneralBertranddeLaPresle,anadvisortoFrenchPresidentJacquesChiracandformerUNPROFORcommander.4-21lookedasthoughitmightderailthewholediscussions(which,Ihavetosay,hadtherestoftheaudiencesittingontheedgeoftheirseats).ThisisjusttofleshoutthepointthatCarl'sjustmade.Mladideferred,eachtime,eventuallyasaresult,thedeterrenceofairpowerwasrepairedtosomedegree.Quotingagainfromthedocument,theotherstickingpointwasfreedomofmovementforUNPROFORconvoys.MladitalksaboutepaandsaysheisnotgoingtoattackGorade.HegivesadetailedaccountofthetakingofSrebrenica,almostappealingforadmirationorsympathy.Sowehavethisquiteirritatedargumentanddiscussiononhowwedothis,butfinishupwiththoseheadsofagreementfleshedoutinadocumentthatwethentakebacktothelunchwhichoccursaboutfourintheafternoon.Theyreceiveastampofapprovalandwe[SmithandMladi]aretoldtomeetagainonJuly19.Youwillseeinthisdocumentthat,astheyflybacktoZagreb(IamnottherebutIambeingtalkedabout),BildtexpressesconcernthatGeneralSmithmightsticksocloselyto his principles nextWednesday [July 19] that a solutionwithMladiwill not emerge.ThereisconcernthatGeneralSmithwouldescalate,notnegotiate,leadingtoawar.Therewasadebateaboutthis.DeLaPreslemakesacommentthatitwaswrongformenottobeincommunicationwithMladisinceMarch.Asaresultofthis,ElliotsaysthatSmithneedscorrectpoliticalguidance.WearrangealinksothatCarlandIarecommunicating.Forthefirsttime,I'mbeingconnectedwithapoliticalprocess.Carl,haveIgotthatmemoryrightaboutthecommunications?CARLBILDT:Absolutely.Justtoexpandonthat,IwasanEUrepresentativeoperatingcloselytogetherwiththeUNrepresentative,ThorvaldStoltenberg.ThatgavemeaccessintotheUNsystem,althoughtheywereseparate.IreportedtotheEUPresidency.TheUSrolewasfairlysignificant.IhadanUSdiplomatwithmeforcommunications.WehadasecurityproblemwhenwewereinBelgradewhichmeantthatweusedthefacilitiesoftheUSEmbassy.WemetinthesecureroomoftheUSEmbassyforallofourinternaldeliberations.WealsohadasecurelinktoHolbrookeattheStateDepartmenttomakecertainthathewasinthepicture.4-22WealsohadalinksetupincasetherewereproblemswiththeagreementfortheresupplyofSarajevo,whichMladiprofoundlydisliked[butMiloseviaccepted].TheFrenchmilitarysetupasatellitelinkbetweenBelgrade,whereIwas,andwhereRupertwas,somewhereoutinthemountainsofBosnia.ItwastobeusedtoputMiloseviincommunicationwithMladiifMladistartedtobacktrackonwhathadbeenagreed.Thatdidnothappen.Mladididnotbacktrackatthatmeeting,butwewerepreparingfortheeventuality.TOMBLANTON:BythetimetheICRCoranybodyelsegottoBratunac,whatwasthere?Noneofthatagreementwashonored?RUPERTSMITH:Bitswere.Dutchbatcameout.Thatwaspartofthatagreement.ButaccesstotheareawasnothonoreduntiltheendofJuly.WemetagainonJuly25.26ThememostatesthatMladiconfirmedthathewouldallowICRCaccesstoSrebrenicaalthoughweunderstandthisisstilltotakeplace.ByJuly25,westillhavenothadthataccessthatwaspromisedonJuly15andJuly19.TOMBLANTON:Ineffect,hehasstalledthenegotiationcontinuously.HASANMURATOVI:Iwouldliketocomebacktothequestionofrefugees.AsMr.KarremansandMr.Nicolaisaid,thingswentmuchfasterthananybodyexpectedatthattime.WhatwastheBosniangovernmentpositionandwhatIwasdoing?ItriedtoputallpressureandallresponsibilityontheUN.WehadnoaccesstoSrebrenica.OnlyUNPROFORhadanyaccess.WeexpectedUNPROFORtoorganizeitselfandstartdoingsomethingabouttherefugeesinSrebrenica.Mysuppositionwastheyhadhelicopters,APCs,transportation,andverygoodconnectionswithallhumanitarianorganizations.Wethoughttheywouldgothere,andorganizethetransportofpeopletofreeterritory.TOMBLANTON:ColonelKarremansisshakinghishead.26SeeBaxter,MeetingnotesGeneralSmith/GeneralMladi25July,UNPROFORCommander,July26,1995.4-23HASANMURATOVI:IalwayspressedfortransportationbyUNPROFOR.IthoughtthatDutchbatwasstrongerthantheywereinreality.Ididnotexpectthemtobeinthepositioninwhichtheywere.Ithoughttheycouldstopthetransportation[bytheBosnianSerbs].Iinsistedthatpeoplebetransportedbyair,byhelicopters.WeputpressureonUNPROFORtobringintheirtransportationresourcesforthetransportationofrefugees.Iknewtheyhadtransportationresources.WedidnotexpectMladitoorganizethetransportssoquicklyhimself.IranbetweenGeneralSmith,AmbassadorMenziesoftheUnitedStates,andTuzla.TheyprovidedmetransportbyhelicopterorbyAPC.IrantoTuzla,cameback. HasanMuratovi,withZlatkoLagumdzija,LWeexpectedtherefugeestoarriveinKladanj.AlthoughIsaidatthattime,thatwewerenotresponsiblefortherefugeesandtheUNhastoplacetheminTuzlaairport,youwillseefromthesereportsthatwehousedmanymorerefugeesthanUNPROFOR.27Iknewthatthiswasgoingtobeaproblemlateron.Theycouldhaveaskedothercountriestotake27Fordetailsonhandlingofrefugeesandcollectioncenters,seeBisertoMoussalli,Srebrenica/TuzlaUpdate,July17,1995.4-24refugees(transportingthemoutofTuzlaairport)whichwouldhavebeenmucheasierforusthaniftheywerescatteredaroundBosnia-Herzegovina.AsforthosethatleftSrebrenicaandwereontheirwaythroughtheforeststoTuzla,IkeptcallingAmbassadorMenzies,tellinghim,Theskyisclear,it'sasunnyday,youhaveAPCs,satellites,planes.PleasetrackwhathashappenedtothethousandsofpeoplemovingfromSrebrenicatoTuzla.Howcometheydidnotknowanythingaboutsuchamassofpeople?Ihadtwomajorproblemstodealwith.OnewastrackingwhathappenedtothepeoplewholeftSrebrenica.ThesecondwashowtobringthosethatwereinSrebrenicatofreeterritory.WhenIwasinTuzla,IwasassistedbyUNPROFORingettingaphonecalltooneofourtranslatorsfromDutchbatinSrebrenica.Itoldhim,YoumusttakeallpossiblecarewithDutchbatnottoallowpeopletogetonbusesortrucksorganizedbyMladi.Hetoldme,Icannotdoanything,theyarealreadyenteringthebuses.Thatwasatthetimewhenthetransportationstarted.Inhisbook,Mr.AkashisaidthatIdidnotreceivehimverynicelywhenhecametoSarajevo.28[Laughter]IalwaysfoughtwithUNPROFOR.Notwithallofthem.IseparatethehumanitariansideoftheUN,whichwasirreplaceableandrecognizedbytheBosniangovernment,fromthemilitaryside,whichfailedcompletely.TOMBLANTON:ColonelKarremans,youwantedtorespondbrieflyhere?THOMKARREMANS:Yes,Iwouldliketorespond.First,concerningyourremarkabouttrucksandvehicles,IhadnodieselfromMarch1995.ThismadeitnecessarytorestrictuseofmyAPCsandtrucks.IftherewasadieseltransportthroughZvornik,Mladiorhismenstoleit.Thatwasthecaseformany,manymonths.IusedthedieselfromUNHCR,asItoldyouyesterday.Ineededdieselformycommunicationssystem,formyradios,andalsoforthegenerators.WeliterallylivedinthedarkfromMarchonwards.IextracteddieselfrommytrucksandAPCs.Theonlyvehiclesthatcouldbedrivenweremyjeeps.Thatwasit.Therewasnowaywecouldtransport25,000refugees.Second,Mladiofferedmethe28YasushiAkashi,IntheValleyBetweenWarandPeace,26-27.AkashiwrotehewasshockedbythevehemencedisplayedbyMuratovicduringavisittoSarajevoinJanuary1994,andtheextremeseverityofthecriticismoftheUNbytheBosniangovernment.4-25possibilitybeforeSrebrenicafellofleavingthesafeareawithmybattalion.29IsaidNo,Iwillnotdothat,becausetherearestillwoundedpeoplehere.ZEIDRA'ADALHUSSEIN:WhentalkingtotheprosecutorsattheICTY,fromwhatIcouldunderstand,Mladiwasguidedbythesamelogicduringthosethreedays,July13-15,asbefore.AdecisionwastakenonthenightofJuly11wastoexecutethe[military-aged]meninPotoari.Mladididnotknowthesizeofthecolumn[attemptingthebreakout],howmanypeopleweremakingtheirwayout.Astheyattackedtherearofthecolumn,moreandmoremenidentifiedthemselves.TheBosnianSerbsdiscovered(1)theywerenotbeingexposed,becausedaybydaytheUNwasnotsayinganything,and(2)inthemeetingonJuly15inBelgrade,itwasclearthatwedidnotknowwhattheyweredoing.Theyfelttheyweregettingawaywithit.Sincetheyweregettingawaywithit,andtheyweredoingitefficiently,theyjustcontinuedthebusinessofmasskilling.Thislogiccontinuesallthewaythrough.Theymusthavebeensurprisedtoacertaindegreebecausethebodieswereondisplayatcertainlocations.Mladiwasthere,drivingupanddown,buttheUNdidnotknowthatthiswasgoingon.Thesamelogicisstillinapplication.WehavenotdiscussedwhathappenedinCroatia,duringthefallofWesternSlavoniainMay1995.30ItisinterestingasthereverseofwhathappenedafterSrebrenica.TheCroatianstooktheareaawayfromtheSerbs.ThatoperationalsoinvolvedbusesprovidedbytheCroatianswheretheSerbswereseparatedbutlaterfound.Therewerenomassexecutionsinthatcase.Mladiwasdisturbedbythisoperation.Atthebackofhismind,inorganizingbusestocartoffpeople,theremayhavebeenanechoofwhatheunderstoodhadhappenedinCroatiatothenorth.29SeeBosnianSerbultimatumtoDutchbat,recordedbyMajorFranken.30TheCroatianarmyrecapturedtheSerbbreakawayregionofWesternSlavoniainMay1995duringOperationFlash.AccordingtoaJuly1995HumanRightsWatchreport,theCroatsdetainedapproximately1,500Serbsofdraftage.WhilesomeSerbsweremistreatedinitially,theICRCwasabletogainaccesstothedetainees,whowereeventuallyreleased.ThereportdescribedallegationsofmassivehumanrightsabusesbyUNofficials,includingAkashi,asunfortunateandpremature.4-26TOMBLANTON:Thisbringsustothequestionofwhatweknew,andwhendidweknewit.AsreportedinTheIndependentonJuly17,BelgradetelevisionscreenedavideoonJuly14whichincludesafewframesofapileofbodiesoutsidetheKravicawarehousenearSrebrenica.Basedonthatvideo,theBelgradecorrespondentofTheIndependent,RobertBlock,wroteastoryheadlinedBodiespileupinhorrorofSrebrenica,whichalsomentionedabortiveattemptsbytheICRCtovisitBratunacandtheseparationofmenandwomen.31OnJuly18,AkashireceivesanotefromAnnan(signedbyShashiTharoor)inNewYorkaskingaboutwidespreadandconsistentreportsofatrocitiescommittedbytheBosnianSerbsfollowingthetakeoverofSrebrenica.32HecomplainsthatwehavereceivednothingonthesubjectfromUNPROFOR.AkashirespondsonJuly19,estimatingthetotalnumberofunaccountedasbetween4,000-8,000.33TheresponsealsonotesthattheBSAstillrefusetograntICRCaccesstodetainees.31SeeRobertBlock,BodiespileupinhorrorofSrebrenica,TheIndependent,July17,1995.32AnnantoAkashi,HumanRightsViolationsbyBosnianSerbs,UN2381,July18,1995.33AkashitoAnnan,DispositionofDisplacedPersonsfromSrebrenica,UNPF-HQ,Z-1198,July19,1995.4-27IwouldliketoaskMr.Akashiaboutthisresponse.ItisamathematicalresponseratherthanaresponsedealingwiththekindofaccountpublishedinTheIndependent.Itisananalysisofthenumbersmissing,emphasizingtheimprecisenatureofthesefigures.ShashiTharoor,youarehearingfromthemediaandcredibleobservers,includingUNHCR.Couldyoucommentonthatandthismessage?Mr.Akashi,couldyoucommentonthereplyandcollectionofevidence?SHASHITHAROOR:WewereobviouslyindailyandfrequentcontactwithUNPROFORwhileallofthiswasunraveling.Whenthemenandboyswereseparated,werecommendedthatwehaveanUNPROFORarmedpersononboardeachbustoensurethatnoharmwasdonetothem.Thiswasaphoneconversation.ThatturnedoutnottobepracticalbecausetheSerbswouldnotagreetoit.WedidnotrealizethatUNPROFORitselfwasdisarmedwhenwegavethatideatothem.Inanycase,fromthenextdayonwards,storiesofmassacresstartedappearing.Theystartedwithmediareports,andwealsogotinformationfromsomeofthepermanentmissionsinNewYork,includingtheUSmission.Wewereworriedthatweweregettingnothingatallfromourownpeople.WewantedtogettherecordstraightastheSecurityCouncilwasclamoringforanauthoritativebriefing.WeweregettingluridaccountsinthepapersandnothingwecouldtelltheCouncil.Thatiswhatthisrequestwasallabout.TOMBLANTON:Mr.Akashi,howdidyoureadthatrequestandwhatreportsdidyouhaveatthattime?YASUSHIAKASHI:Wehadbitsofinformationwhichweweretryingtopiecetogether.Asyoucanseefromourresponse,itwasadesperateprocessassemblingallthisintoafaxtogetdowntothetruthofthematter.IgotadifferentimpressionofMladifromthemeetingwithMilosevionJuly15fromRupert,whodescribedMladiasexpansive,Ibelieve.34IobservedMladicloselyandthoughthelookedcompletelydifferentfromhisusual,self-confidentself.Rupertwascalmandrational,butMladi'smoodchangedsuddenlyfromcooltoexcitedandagitated.Hewaslosinghisusualcomposure.Ithoughtsomethingmust34Theexpansive,goodhumored,confidentdescriptionofMladicamefromGeneralElliot,notGeneralSmith.4-28havehappenedtohimintheprecedingdays.Inhindsight,verydrasticthingshadbeenhappening.MyimpressionofMladionJuly15wasthatsomethingwasamissbutIcouldnotmakeoutthereasonforhisunusualattitude.TOMBLANTON:Themoment,atleastontheUSside,whenitbecomescrystalclearistheJuly25,1995cablefromAmbassadorGalbraithinZagreb[forwardedtoTonyLakeandotherNSCofficialsbySandyVershbow],whichwasbasedonrefugeeaccountscompiledby[UNofficial]ToneBringainTuzla.35Tone,canyoujustbrieflydescribehowthatstoryreachedPeter,becauseitcertainlywokeupWashington? ToneBringa,right,withPeterGalbraith TONEBRINGA:CanIencourageyounottolosesightoftheideologythatmotivatedandjustifiedMladi'sactions?Thereissomethingcalled"priming"whenyoulookatthestepsinagenocide.MladihadbeenpriminghisownSerbpopulationinpreparingforgenocide.IdonotknowifthepeoplewhoworkedatUNPROFORreadthePrijedorreportbytheUN35GalbraithtoSecState,PossibleMassExecutionofSrebrenicaMalesisreasontosaveepa,AmEmbassyZagreb,Zagreb02788,July25,1995.NSCofficialSandyVershbowforwardedtheGalbraithcabletotheNSCadvisor,TonyLake,andhisdeputy,SandyBerger,thesamedaywiththecomment,thefactofSerbmasskillingsatSrebrenicaisbecomingincreasinglyclear.Grimreading.4-29CommissionofExpertsandtheconclusionstheydrew.36ThereportqualifiedtheeventsinPrijedordistrictafterApril30,1992,whichwereillustrativeofthelargerdynamicsinBosnia,ascrimesagainsthumanity.Itpredictedthataninternationalcourtwouldrulethattheseeventsconstitutegenocide.WhatwastakingplaceinSrebrenicadidnotappearoutofnowhere.Ineededtosaythat.ConcerningtheJuly25Galbraithcable,IwasworkingfortheAnalysisandAssessmentUnitinAkashi'soffice,UNPFHQinZagreb.IwasexasperatedatthetimebywhatIperceivedasasenseofbusinessasusualattheHQwhileallthiswasgoingon.Weheardreports,butwhatmostlytriggeredmetoactinsomewaywasallthesewomenarrivingasrefugeestoTuzla,saying,Whereareourmen?Wewantourmen,wherearethey?Wewaited.Aweekpassedandtheydidn'tturnup.Ithought,WhatcanIdo,I'mananthropologist,maybeIcangothereandtalktopeopleandmaybepickupsomething.IaskedpermissiontogotoTuzla.IthenlearnedthatsomehumanrightsofficersweregoingtoTuzla.Infact,theyarementionedintheJuly19cablefromAkashitoAnnan,replyingtothequestionwhatareyouplanningtodo?Akashisays,we'resendingUNofficerswithspecifichumanrightstraining.Iwentwiththem.Thereweretwohumanrightsofficers,PeggyHicksandGraceKang.WewenttotheUNbasethere[atTuzlaairport].TheyaskedovertheloudspeakersforanyonetocomeforwardwhohadjustarrivedfromSrebrenica.Wedidnotwaitlongwhenamancamerunning.Hewasveryagitated.Hesaid,I'mlookingformywifeandchildren,Ican'tfindthembutIhavetotalktoyoufirst,IhavetotalktotheUN,Ihavesomethingtotellyou.PeggyHicksthensaidthatGraceKangshouldtalktohim.Isatinonthatinterview.37Thewaytheywork,theyhaveachecklistandaskveryspecificquestions.SinceIunderstandBosnian,Iwasabletolistendirectlytowhatthemansaid,withoutthehelpoftheinterpreter.Itwasverycleartomethathewasspeakingthetruth.Ahumanrightsofficerisalwaysconcernedwithcredibility.Theyhavedealtwithpeoplewhomakeupstories.As36TheUNreleasedasummaryofthePrijedorreportonMay24,1994.SeeFinalreportofthecommissionofexpertsestablishedpursuanttoSecurityCouncilResolution780(1992),S/1994/674,particularlyparagraph182.TheIntelligenceandResearchbureauoftheStateDepartmenthadissuedwarningsaboutattemptedgenocideofBosnianMuslimsasearlyasJanuary1993.SeeMulhollandtoKanter,Bosnia:ActionscontributingtoGenocide,USDepartmentofState,January11,1993.37TheinterviewtookplaceonJuly22.SeeGraceKang,ReportofHumanRightsViolations,July22,1995.4-30thisman'sstoryunfolded,however,IhadaterriblerealizationaboutthefateofthemissingboysandmenofSrebrenica.Irealizedthatthismasskillingofunimaginableproportionshadtakenplaceandthathewasjustoneofahandfulofsurvivors.38Ihadnodoubtthathisstorywastrueandthathewastalkingfrompersonalexperience.Hewasveryconcentratedashespoke.Hislanguagewasfactualandtothepoint,hisdescriptionsweredetailed,hewascitingspecificplacenamesandgivingtheexactchronologyofevents.ItwasnotthekindofvaguestatementthatIoftenhadseenfrompeoplewhowerereportingthingstheyheardonthenews.Heshowedmethemarksoftheropearoundhiswrists,andagrazetohistemplecausedbyagunshotwound.Thatwasthebulletthatwasmeantforhim.Hesurvivedbecausehewasprotectedbydeadbodiesfallingontopofhim.Theydugtheseditchesthattheythenfellinto.Thatnight,heheardsomebodyelse'svoice,thevoiceofanothersurvivor.Theyescapedinthenighttothesafearea.IreturnedbyhelicopterbacktoZagrebwithGraceKangandimploredher,Doyourealizetheenormityofwhatyoujustheard?Doyourealizewhatthisstorymeans?Pleasewriteastronglywordedreportandmakesureitdoesn'tendupinadrawerattheUN.BythenIknewhowthesereportswereoftenwatereddownandmaybeendedupinsomedrawer.PeggyHickswrotethereportbackinZagreb.39Shealsohadanothersurvivorstory,asfarasIcanremember.38The35-year-oldsurvivorisreferredtoasO.H.inanAugust3,1995cablefromGalbraith.[AmEmbassyZagrebtoSecState,HumanRightsabusesSrebrenica,Zagreb02953,August3,1995].AccordingtotheinitialJuly25cable,themansurvivedamassexecutiononJuly14,1995byhidingbeneathapileofbodies.ABosnianarmymilitaryintelligencedocumentdatedJuly20,1995statedthatOsmanHalilovic,aged35,andNedzadAvdic,aged17,hadcrossedourdefencelinesintothefreeterritoryonJuly18,1995.ThetwomendescribedhowtheywerecapturedintheKonjeviPolje/NovaKasabaareaonJuly12andtakenonJuly14toamassexecutionsiteatadamnearthevillageofPetkovci,35kilometerstothenorth.TheplacenamesintheinitialGalbraithcablewereconfused,sometimeserroneous,andonlyclarifiedastheresultofasubsequentinvestigationbyICTY.39PeggyHickswasamemberoftheHumanRightsOffice,reportingtotheheadofCivilAffairs,MichelMoussalli.MoussalliforwardedthereporttoAkashionJuly31.SeeMoussallitoAkashi,Srebrenicahumanrightsreport,July31,1995.AkashiforwardedthereporttoAnnaninNewYorkonAugust12,incodecableZ-1406,inresponsetoAnnansrequestforfurtherinformationaboutallegedatrocitiescommittedbytheBosnianSerbs.SeeAnnantoAkashi,Srebrenica:Investigation,NewYork2665,August10,1995.TheAnnancablewastriggeredinpartbyapresentationbyMadeleineAlbrighttotheUNSecurityCouncil,identifyingpossiblemassgraves.HickshadearliersentaJuly21memotoMoussalli,RecommendationConcerningSrebrenicaMissingandDetained,thaturgedtheSecurityCounciltofocusurgentattentionontheissueofthemissinganddetainedfromSrebrenica.SeealsoBisertoMoussalli,SectorNortheastHumanRightsUpdate,July21,1995.4-31AsIreadherreport,Irememberthatmyhandsfelldownonthetablewiththepaper.ThismusthavebeentherockbottomofmytimeattheUN.Iwascompletelydespondentbecausethereporttalkedaboutaccountsthatwerestillunconfirmedandunsubstantiated.Ithought,WhatdoIdo?Myfirstthoughtwas,I'lltakethisreportandgostraightintomyboss,Akashi,nextdoor,andresignonthespot.ButIwasacompletelyinsignificantpersonanditwouldhavehadnoconsequencewhatsoever.Iwasconcernedthatthereportshouldreachsomeonewhowouldrealizetheimplicationofitandthenact.Peopledidn'tactthen.Thatevening,IhaddinnerwithPeter,whoI'dgottentoknowasapersonwhoacted.ItoldhimaboutwhatI'dheardandsaidtohim,Pleasedosomething.MICHAELDOBBS:PeterscablegottheattentionoftheWhiteHouse.ItwascirculatedbySandyVershbowwhowantedtojoinustodaybutwasunableto.SandywasJenonne'ssuccessorasDirectorofEuropeanAffairsattheNationalSecurityCouncil.SothealarmbellswentoffinWashington?TOMBLANTON:AndtriggeredtheroadtoDayton,no?PETERGALBRAITH:Itgottheattentionofpeopleatthetopalthoughyoucanseethatsomepeoplewereprobablytiredofmyrecommendations.TOMBLANTON:Thereisalineinhere,WhateveryouthinkofGalbraithsrecommendationreepa....40PETERGALBRAITH:Thatwasprobablyacommonreactiontomycablestotheextentthattheywereread.Thecablementionsaplace,KonjeviPolje,whichenabledpeopletolookforsatellitephotographsthatmatchedupwiththedates.Ihavesubsequentlylearnedthatthismaynothavebeentheplacewherethemassexecutiondescribedbythesurvivortook40GalbraithurgedtheUSgovernmenttoacttopreventasimilartragedyatepa.epafelltotheSerbstwodayslater,onJuly27,1995.4-32place.41ThecablealsotriggeredthemissionbyJohnShattuck,whichreinforcedthewholething.Ithinkthatthequestionhere,tobehonest,isabouttheUN.MyunderstandingisthatthePeggyHicksreportwasacompilationofrefugeeaccountsratherthanonestory.Itwaswritteninawaythatwassoqualifieditwasnotgoingtoattractattention.Whatsurprisesmeisthattherewasnotateamoutcollectingthesestoriesrightfromthebeginning.Iknowthatourownembassyhadpeopleoutintherefugeecampsallthetime.Youhadmanymoreresourcesthanwedid.Whenthestorycamein,youhavethe41TheJuly25andAugust3GalbraithcableserroneouslyreportedthatthemassexecutiondescribedbythesurvivortookplaceatKonjeviPolje,wheninfactittookplaceatPetkovcidam,35kilometersaway.ThisledCIAanalyststofocustheiroriginalsearchforevidenceofmassgravesalongafivekilometerstretchofroadbetweenKonjeviPoljeandNovaKasaba,ratherthanPetkovcidam.ICTYinvestigatorslaterdiscoveredtheremainsof33individualsburiedattheNovaKasaba/KonjeviPoljesite,farfewerthanthe809setsofremainsassociatedwiththeexecutionsatPetkovcidam.SeeDusanJanc,UpdatetotheSummaryofForensicEvidence,April21,2010.4-33headofyourhumanrightsunitsaying,Ihavetodownplaythisbecauseoftheheadofthemission.Thequestionis:why?MysuspicionisthatyouknewthereweredifferentviewsbetweentheAmericansandtheUNanddidnotwanttoinflametheAmericans.Isthatacorrectassumption?ItmightinflameMadeleineAlbright.YASUSHIAKASHI:Ihavenotthoughtaboutthethingsyouhavejustmentioned.Itneveroccurredtome.JOHNSHATTUCK:Icanjustcarrythisalittlebitfurther.PetercalledmeprobablyevenbeforethiscablewasreceivedintheWhiteHouse.Iwasn'tunderinstructionstofollowuponhismessagebutitwasobviouslyverycompelling.Iimmediatelystartedworkingtotrytogetoutthere.ThebackgroundwasthatIwasfrustratedbytheinabilitytogetthekindofinformationthatnormallyonegetsfromtheICRCandUNHCRaboutthemissingmenafterthefallofSrebrenicaalmosttwoweeksearlier.42Ihadtriedthrough[ICRCpresident]CorneliusSommaruga,withwhomIwasworkingcloselyonothermatters,toseewhatICRCmighthave.Theyhadnothing.Theysaidtheyhadn'tbeengivenaccesstothearea.ThesamewastrueforUNHCR.ThefirsttangibleinformationcamefromPeter'sphonecallandTonestrip.Istartedtryingtogooutrightaway,literallythatday.Ithoughtitwasextremelyimportant,buttheatmosphericsweredifficult.NeithertheWhiteHousenortheStateDepartmentwouldclearmytriprightawaybecauseoftheratherdelicatenegotiationsanddiscussionsthatwereunderwayinLondonwiththetroopcontributingnations.ThefeelingwasthatnothingshouldbefurtherspotlightedonwhatwasgoingoninSrebrenica.43Ihadfurtherdifficultywithdiplomaticsecuritywhichwouldnotclearmytripforacoupleofdays.AllofthiswasclearedupbecauseoftheinterventionsofMadeleine42SeeShattucktoTheSecretary,DefenseoftheSafeAreasinBosnia,InformationMemorandum,July19,1995.Shattuckcitedcrediblereportsofsummaryexecutionsandreportedthattensofthousandsofpeoplehadnotbeenaccountedfor.43Seniorofficialsfrom16NATOcountries,includingtheUnitedStates,plusRussiametinLondononJuly22toforgeacommonpolicyonBosnia.ThemeetingendedwiththreatsofNATOairstrikesiftheSerbsattackedGorade.SeeMichaelDobbsandFredBarbash,AllieswarnSerbstoavoidGorade,WashingtonPost,July23,1995.4-34Albright,RichardHolbrooke,andWarrenChristopher.44TheSecretaryofStatehadbeenquiteambivalentaboutBosniabutrealizedtheimportanceofthistrip.WhenIgottoZagreb,ImetwithToneandobviouslyPeter,andgotfurtherinformationfromthem.WedecidedimmediatelythatIshouldgotoTuzlaandtrytofindmoreofthesemen,notonlytheonethatTonemet,butothers.Ispentadayandahalfthere,talkingtoseveralsurvivorsincluding[a55-year-oldcrippledbricklayer]HuremSuljic,whobecamemyprincipalwitness.45Iwasableveryquicklytocredithisreportbecauseofthespecificityoftheinformationheprovidedandthewoundsthathehadsuffered,includinggrazingwoundonhistemple,whenhefellintoapitwithbodies.Therewereatleasttwootherswithsimilaraccounts.TherewasoneremarkablethingthatIrememberhesaid,whichwasMladi'sbehaviorthroughoutthistime.Mladicameandaddressedthemenastheywerebeingroundedup.Eachtimeheassuredthemthattheywouldeventuallybeabletoleave.Hesaid44HolbrookeviewedShattuckstripasanimportantopportunitytoassertsomebasictruths,butinsistedonclosecoordinationoverhispressstatementstoensurethatJohnsbriefcanbeseparatedfrom,butreinforce,ournegotiations.SeeundatedMsgforAmbG[albraith]fromA/SHolbrooke,Galbraithpapers,NDU.45SeeSpiegel/ShattucktoSecState,ShattuckMissiontoBosnia,USmissionGeneva005948,August2,1995.The55-year-oldcrippledmaninthecableisareferencetothebricklayerHuremSuljicwhosecrippledconditionmadeitimpossibleforhimtojointhebreakoutattempt.HesoughtrefugewithDutchbatinPotoari,andwastakentoBratunacfollowingtheseparationofthemenfromthewomenandchildren.HissurvivalofamassexecutionnearthetownofOrahovaconJuly14isdescribedinRohde,Endgame,298-300.HuremSuljic,CNNinterview4-35theywerebeingheldasprisonersandhewastryingtocalmthem.Tomethatindicatedahighdegreeofintentionalityonhispart.AssomeonewhohadgatheredalotofevidencerelatedtoethniccleansingandearliergenocidaleventslikePrijedor,Iunderstoodthisasanextensionofwhathadhappenedearlierinthewar.ThiswasnotsomethingcompletelydifferentfromwhathadbeengoingoninBosniaupuntilthen,orindeedCroatia.ItisimportantfortherecordtostressthatthenoveltyofSrebrenicawasthescaleofthekilling(atleast7,000men,thelargestgenocideinEuropesincetheSecondWorldWar),notthenatureofit,whichwaspartoftheoverallethniccleansingcampaign.[AfterIreturnedtoWashington]IwascontactedbyayoungCIAofficerwhoinformedmethatheandseveralothersofhiscolleagueshadseenthecablesthatIhadfiled.TheytookituponthemselvestodeterminewhethertherewereaerialphotographsconnectedwiththenamesandplacesthatIhaddescribedinthecables.ItwasthroughtheireffortstoidentifyaerialphotographsthatwewereabletogettheevidenceoffreshlydugmassgravesthatMadeleineAlbrighttooktotheSecurityCouncilonAugust10.46Thiswasnotatop-downdecision.Thepeoplewhoreadmyreportessentiallytaskedthemselves46AlbrighttoSecStateWashingtonDC,AmbAlbrightBriefsSecurityCouncilonPossibleMassGravesNearSrebrenica,USMissiontotheUN,USUN03086,August11,1995.TheAlbrightpresentationincludedaphotographofagroupofprisonersinafieldintheKonjeviPolje/NovaKasabaarea,aswellasaphotographofdisturbedearthnearby.Forreasonsexplainedabove(seeFN35--TKTK),AlbrightmisidentifiedtheplaceofthemasskillingasKonjeviPolje/NovaKasaba.SherepeatedthegarbledaccountoriginallyreportedbyGalbraithinher2003autobiography,MadamSecretary,page188.Forproblemsininterpretingoverheadimagery,seeinterviewwithJean-ReneRuez,leadICTYinvestigatorforSrebrenica,LesenquetesduTPIY.Cultures&Conflits,65(printemps2007).WhenMadeleineAlbrightshowedthe[July27]photosofmultiplegravesatNovaKasaba[totheUN],shelinkedthephotosingoodfaithwiththepreviousimageofthesoccerstadiumofNovaKasaba.OntheJuly13photo,largegroupsofprisonerscanbeseenintheNovaKasabasoccerstadium...Thelogicalconclusionforanyoneseeingthesephotosisthefollowing:peopleareonasoccerfield,gravesappearednearbyafterwards,thereforethesepeopleareinthegraves.Ruezexplainedthatthiswasnotthecase.WealreadyknewinAugust1995thatthissitewasnotthesiteof[mass]executions.Itwasa[prisoner]collectionsitewhere,accordingtothetestimonythatwehad,individualmurderstookplace.TheprisonersvisibleintheJuly13photoofthesoccerstadiumweretransferredtoBratunac,tobeexecutedelsewhere.Ruezsconclusion:Thisshowsthattechnologicalintelligencecannotbedisconnectedfromthehumanreality,thatistosayeyewitnesstestimonyfollowedbyverificationontheground.[TranslationfromFrench.]AnICTYinvestigationlaterestablishedthattheNovaKasabasites(NKS1-4)containedtheremainsof33people.AseniorU.S.officialtoldtheWashingtonPostthattheNovaKasabaimagerywasfoundinthearchivesoftheNationalPhotographicInterpretationCenter(NPIC)onAugust2,andreportedintheNationalIntelligenceDaily,aclassifiednewslettercirculatedtoseniorpolicymakers,onAugust4.SeeDobbsandSmith,NewProofOfferedofSerbAtrocities,WashingtonPost,October29,1995.IttooktheCIAanothermonthtoidentifythePetkovcidammassacresite.DavidRohdewasarrestedatthePetkovci[RedDam]siteonOctober28,onareturntriptoBosnia,followingatip-offfromaWashington-basedU.S.Intelligenceofficial.[SeeRohde,Endgame,342-343].4-36tofindtheaerialphotographs.Thetaskinghadnotyetgoneouttoproduceaerialphotography[onsuspectedwarcrimes].Itwouldhavebeenmuchmorevaluableifithadbeengatheredearlier.IfrequentlyattendedtheseventhfloormeetingsattheStateDepartmentwhichwereheldeverymorning,usuallychairedbytheDeputySecretaryofState,StrobeTalbottthatincludedtheAssistantSecretariesofState.WhenthesubjectofBosniawasdiscussed,particularlyin1994andearly1995,itwasdifficulttoinjectalotoffactualinformationaboutwhatwasgoingonthegroundthatIwasreceivingfromembassiesorfrommyownstaff.Therewasagreatdealofskepticismaboutmyuseofthetermgenocide.StateDepartmentlegaladvisorsconstantlypushedbackagainstmyuseofthetermbecauseitwouldimplyanobligationonthesignatoriesoftheGenocideConventiontotakeappropriateactioninresponse.Thatwasthewholepointofusingtheterm,obviously.IhadthesameproblemsinthecaseofRwanda.47 WhenIcamebackfromtheseinterviewsinTuzlaandsubmittedadetailedreporttotheSecretaryofStateonAugust4,youcouldhaveheardapindropintheroom.48Virtuallyeveryonecameuptomeafterwards,nottocongratulatemebutsimplytosaythankyouforfinallyproducingwhatshouldhavebeenevidentlongbefore,butwasbeingpushedback.TOMBLANTON:Inhisbook,AlltheMissingSouls,DavidScheffersayshetalkedtoGeorgeTenetonJuly19,andagreedtoproduceadailyupdateonhumanitarianandwarcrimesdevelopments.GeorgehadjustbecomeDeputyDirectorattheCIAandDavidwasworkingforMadeleineatthattime.Ithinkthereweremultipleplacesthattherequestwascomingfrom.49LetsaskDavidRohdeforhispartofthestory.YoutookacrumpledfaxversionofaphotographthatMadeleinehadshownattheUnitedNationsonAugust10andwalkedalongtheroadbetweenNovaKasabaandKonjeviPolje.Isthatcorrect?47ArticleIofthe1948GenocideConventionstatesthatsignatoriesconfirmthatgenocideisacrimeunderinternationallawwhichtheyundertaketopreventandtopunish.Thearticlecanbeinterpretedasmeaningthatsignatorieshaveadutytointervenetopreventgenocide.ForhesitationaboutusingtermgenocideincaseofRwanda,seeRwandaconferencetranscript,2-14.48ShattucktoTheSecretary,BosniaTripReport,InformationMemorandum,August4,1995.Thememostatedthatatrocitieshavetakenplaceonamassivescaleandhundredsifnotthousandsofunarmedrefugeeshadbeenkilled,manybymassexecutions.49DavidScheffer,AlltheMissingSouls,104.4-37PhotoshowninUNonAug.10thatguidedRohdetogravesiteNovaKasabaprisoners,July134-38TOMBLANTON:Inhisbook,AlltheMissingSouls,DavidScheffersayshetalkedtoGeorgeTenetonJuly19,andagreedtoproduceadailyupdateonhumanitarianandwarcrimesdevelopments.GeorgehadjustbecomeDeputyDirectorattheCIAandDavidwasworkingforMadeleineatthattime.Ithinkthereweremultipleplacesthattherequestwascomingfrom.50LetsaskDavidRohdeforhispartofthestory.YoutookacrumpledfaxversionofaphotographthatMadeleinehadshownattheUnitedNationsonAugust10andwalkedalongtheroadbetweenNovaKasabaandKonjeviPolje.Isthatcorrect?DAVIDROHDE:Yes,onAugust17.Itwasbyaccident.IwasenteringSerb-controlledterritoryfromSerbiatocoverSerbsfleeingtheCroatianadvanceintoKrajina[OperationStorm].InsteadoflettingmegodirectlytoBanjaLuka,theborderguardsaidyouhavetogotothe[RepublikaSrpskacapital]Palefirst.Iwasabletospendtwodayssearchingaroundthearea,butitstartedwithamistakebytheborderguard.Ifyoulookatthephotograph,youwillseeburialsitesNKS-1andNKS-2,whereIfoundemptyammunitionboxes.TherewasadecomposinglegjuttingoutofthegraveatNKS-3.IlaterspenttwoweeksinTuzlawhereIspokewithHuremSuljic,andfoundhalfadozenothermenwhomentionednotjusttheNovaKasabasite,butatleastsixotherexecutionsites.Igotthenumberwrong.Iestimatedmaybe3,000dead.Iwasamazedbyitall.51 Ihaveaquestionaboutepa,whichwaseffectivelywrittenoffonJuly21withtheLondondeclaration.YoustateinyourJuly25cablethatepashouldbesaved.52Therewere15,000peopleintheenclave.TheBosnianswereholdingtheSerbsoffonJuly21,10daysafterthefallofSrebrenica.Actually,epadoesnotfalluntilJuly25.IhavehadBosniansaskmeabouttheconspiracytheory:cleaningupthemap,gettingridoftheenclaves.Whywasepawrittenoff?Theyheldoutfortwoweeks.50DavidScheffer,AlltheMissingSouls,104.51RohdesummarizedhisinitialfindingsinarticlesfortheChristianScienceMonitor,EvidenceIndicatesBosniaMassacre,August18,1995,andHowaSerbMassacrewasExposed,August25,1995.OrderedtoproceedtoPale,hefoundhimselfontheroadbetweenKonjeviPoljeandNovaKasaba,nearthesiteofthephotographofthereportedatrocities.52GalbraitharguedinhisJuly27cablethattheLondondeclarationimplicitlywritesoffepa,bydrawingthelineatGorade.4-39PETERGALBRAITH:Toaddsomeadditionalhistory,IhadbeenbackintheUnitedStates.IhavetosaythatChristopherwasnotveryfondofme.Wereallyhadn'tinteractedthatmuchbutheagreedtoseemeafterSrebrenica.Hewasafraidofanother,ratherhighprofileresignation,whichIwasatthatpointconsidering.DickHolbrookewasalsoconsideringresigning,althoughhelaterwoulddenythat,butwedidhavethatconversation.MymeetingwithChristopherwasaroundJuly18or19.Iarguedthatweshouldnotbewritingoffepa.53WhentheLondondeclarationcameoutonJuly21,IwasonBrioni[Titosformerprivateisland]withTudjmanandTurkishpresidentSuleymanDemirel.ThereactionwasastonishmentbecauseithadalsowrittenoffBiha.54Allofthisthensetoffthesequenceofeventsthatbroughtthewartoanend.TheCroatianshadalreadydecidedthattheywouldtakemilitaryactioninNovember1995toretaketheKrajina.ThatiswhytheyhadaneightmonthextensionoftheUNmandate,whichwasnowcalledUNCRO,insteadoftheusualsixmonths.WhyNovember?BecauseitiswinterinnorthernBosniaandmuchharderforSerbiatoresupplytheKrajina.Ifyouarecomingupfromthecoast[inthecaseoftheCroatianarmy],itwasnotsobad.Infactitisagoodtime.Second,theywerereallytryingtogettheirtouristeconomybackup.Havingawarinthemiddleofthetouristseasonwasnotagoodthing.TheCroatianssawtheopportunitythatwaspresentedafterSrebrenica,becausetheBosnianSerbsandtheCroatianSerbsproceededtoattackBiha.TheCroatianswereconcernedthatifBihafellitwouldbetotheirstrategicdisadvantage.TheSerbswouldnolongerneedtodefendbothinternallinesaroundtheBihaenclaveandexternalonesfacingtheCroatians.TheinsideofthedonutwoulddisappearandthoseforcescouldthenbetransferredtofaceCroatia.TheCroatianssawtheopportunitythatexistedandwerealreadyproceedingwithacampaignuptheLivnovalley[southofBiha].Thequestionwas:53SeeGalbraithdiaryentry,July20,1995.GalbraitharguedthatapublicstatementdrawingthelineatGorazdecouldhavedisastrousconsequencesforthe16,000peopleatepa.54SeeGalbraithdiaryentry,July21,1995,whichnotesthatTurkishdelegationwasopenlycontemptuousoftheLondondeclaration.TudjmanpointedoutlackofreferencetoBiha.4-40whatwouldbetheresponseoftheUnitedStates? PortionofCIAmaponOperationStorm,August4-8,1995Remember,asImentionedyesterday,theCroatianshadalreadyaskedonNovember12,1994whatourpositionwouldbeiftheyweretogothroughtheKrajinatorelievethesiegeofBiha.55AsmycablestoWashingtonexplain,theyplannedtotakethewholething.ThereactionfromWashingtonwasswiftandstrong:wedonotwantawiderwar.Idisagreed,butthoseweremyinstructions.OnJuly21[1995]thedefenseministeruaktoldmeatlunchthatCroatiaagainplannedtorelievethesiegeofBihabygoingthroughSlunj.OnceagainCroatiawantedtoknowwhattheUSreactionwouldbe.TherewastheusualbackandforthwithWashington.Atonepointtheinstructionsare:tellthemnottodoit,butnotverystrongly,i.e.asortofgreenlight.ThemessagethatIeventuallydeliveredatthebeginningofAugusttoTudjmanonBrioniwas:weappreciatewhyyou'rewillingtoexpendbloodandtreasuretosavethepeopleofBiha.Onmyown,Ithenadded55Galbraithdiaryentry,November12,1994.4-41tougherlanguageaboutrefugeesandprotectingUNpersonnel.Theadministrationwouldsaythatitwasa"nolight"butTudjmaninterpreteditasagreenlight.56ThissequenceofeventswasverymuchtriggeredbywhathappenedinSrebrenica.TheCroatianoffensive[knownasOperationStorm]retooktheKrajinainfourdays,[betweenAugust4and8].ItcontinuedintoBosnia,aidedlaterbyNATOairstrikes.AsweseefromthedebatesaboutIraqandAfghanistan,itisbootsonthegroundthatmatter.Forbetterorworse,thebootsonthegroundwereCroatian,preciselybecausewedidnotwanttohaveanotherSrebrenica.Inoneofmycablesthatisalsointhediary,IwarnthataBSAtakeoverofBihacouldproduce40,000deadiftheSerbsbehavedastheydidinSrebrenica.JOHNSHATTUCK:Iwouldliketojustaddonefootnote.TheKrajinaoffensiveendedupbeingstrategicallyvaluablefromadiplomaticstandpointinDayton.ItprovidedveryconcreteevidencethattheSerbsactuallywerealsovictimsofthewarthatwasbroughttoanendinDayton.IthinkthatitgavetheDaytonprocess,particularlythehumanrightsspotlightingthatIstarteddoingaroundthattime,morecredibilityinBelgradethanitmighthaveotherwisehad.IspenttimereportingonwhathadhappenedtotheSerbswhowereforcedoutoftheKrajinaarea.ThosereportsprovidedcredibilityforthepushforwardtoDayton.SoonafterthechangeinUSpolicy,RichardHolbrookebecamethepointpersonforthewholepeaceprocess.AswemovedtowardDayton,myjobwastotravelinthewarzonesandgatherevidenceoffreshhumanrightsabusesthatwerebeingcommittedinrealtimeonthegroundandprovidethisinformationbyphonetoHolbrooke.57HewouldthenusethisinformationwithTudjmanorMiloseviwhentheydeniedthatcertainthingshadhappenedorclaimedignorance.HolbrookewouldthenbeabletoconfrontthemwiththereportsIdgivenhimandthreatenrenewedNATOairstrikes.AfterbeingsidelinedformuchofthisperiodinUSpolicy,thehumanrightselementsmovedtothetopofthelist.ObviouslyMadeleineAlbright'sinvolvementwascrucialhereaswell.56SeeGalbraithdiary,August1,1995.GalbraithtoldTudjmanthatCroatiacouldnotexpectanyhelpfromtheUnitedStatesifthemilitaryoperationwentwrong.TudjmaninterpretedthisasAmericanacquiescence,eventhoughGalbraithexplicitlytoldhimthatitwasnotagreenlight.57ForcoordinationbetweenHolbrookeandShattuck,seeundatedHolbrookenotetoGalbraith.4-42PETERGALBRAITH:Thereisalessonhere.Oneofthedistinctionsbetweenwhathappenedin[Croatian-controlled]westernSlavoniaandtheKrajinaandwhatwasgoingoninRepublikaSrpskawasthattheCroatianscouldnotsaynotoUSdemandsforaccess.EvenwhentheUNwaslockeddownafterOperationStorm,wewereabletogetpeopleinandwereabletoreportonthehumanrightsviolationsfromthebeginning.Weraisedtheseviolations,particularlythesystematiclootingandburningofhomesandthelaterkillingoftheisolatedpopulation.IwantedTudjmantobecalledtoaccountforsomeofthis.Thestoryisnotperfect,however.Holbrookewasadamant.Hewrotemeanote[onAugust16]sayingNOTNOW,NOTHERE,NOTYET,whenIwantedtoraisethehumanrightsviolationsintheKrajinaandchallengeTudjmansstatementthatSerbswhohadfledduringOperationStormcouldneverreturn.58AsBobFrasurehadwritten,wehiredthisjunkyarddog[Tudjman]andshouldn'tbecomplainingaboutitnow.So,humanrightswashigherontheagendabutmaybenotquiteashighasJohnandImighthavewanted.DAVIDROHDE:Ijustwanttofollowupthoughonepa.You[PeterGalbraith]triedtogetitbackontheagenda,butyoulostthebattle.PETERGALBRAITH:Itwasalonelybattle.IdonotthinkIhadasingleallyintheadministration.IwasobviouslyinZagreb,[soIdonotknoweverythinghappeninginWashington].IhadraisedtheepaissuepersonallywithChristopheronJuly17or18,soatleastitwasonthetable.AsfarasIknow,nobodypursuedit.Holbrookewasmoreorlesssidelinedatthatpoint.HewasonvacationinColorado.JAMIERUBIN:ThisisaRashoman-likesituation:therearealotofthingsgoingon[fromsomanydifferentperspectives].IwasfortunatetobewithAmbassadorAlbrightwhentherewasamajorpolicyreviewonBosnia.ThePresidentoftheUnitedStatesdecidedthathedidnotlikethepolicyanymore.InJune1995,MadeleineprovidedapapertothePrincipalsCommitteesuggestingforthefirsttimethatwenolongersupportUNPROFOR.59Ifyoulook58HolbrooketoGalbraith,handwrittennote,August16,1995.59AccordingtotheStateDepartmentRoadtoDaytonstudy,page11,AlbrightpresentedherElementsofaNewStrategypapertoClintonsForeignPolicyteamonJune21,1995,callingforthewithdrawalofUNPROFOR,theliftingofthearmsembargoagainsttheBosniangovernment,andairstrikestoprotectMuslim-heldterritory.4-43atallofTonyLake'smemospriortothismoment,theemphasisisalwayswewanttostrengthenUNPROFOR,wewanttokeepUNPROFOR,UNPROFORhastobethere,itwilllookbadifweloseUNPROFOR.UntilyoudecidethatUNPROFORisnotyourfirstprinciple,andthatyouhavesomeothergoalasafirstprinciple,whathappenedlaterwouldnothavehappened. ClintonmeetingonBosnia,August21,1995,CIAcollectionItwasasimplelittleoneandahalfpagepaper,andshespoketoaboutsevenpeople,butmyphonerangoffthehook.SomeonehadtobethefirsttosaythatourwillingnesstopullUNPROFORoutwastimelimitedandthatwewouldnolongeragreetoextractUNPROFORafteracertaindate.ThatwasthefirstsignthatUNPROFORmustend,sincetheBritishandtheFrenchandtheothersneededthatthepromise.Idon'tagreewithPeter[Galbraith]thatitwasbootsonthegroundthatendedthewar,ifthatiswhatyouweresaying.Ithinkallthesethingstogetherchangedthesituation.ThePresidentoftheUnitedStateswaspartlyinfluencedbywhatChiracwasdoingwithAlbrightnotedChiracsstatementthatthepositionofleaderoftheFreeWorldisvacant,sayingthatithasbeenchillingmybonesforweeks.4-44thisrapidreactionforce.60[Refersto2009bookbyTaylorBranch,TheClintonTapes],acontemporaneousrecordofwhatClintonwasdoing.WedidnotfindoutuntillaterthatBranchwasmeetingwiththePresident.[InhisinterviewwithBranch],ClintondescribeshowChiracwastryingtooutperformhimbuthadtoadmitprivatelythathecouldn'tdoanythingwithoutUShelicopters.WhatIamsayingisthatafterSrebrenica,andbuildinguptoSrebrenica,therewasamomentwhenthecapitalsdecidedthatthepolicyhastochangeatthehighestlevel.ThisdidnothappenbecauseofthegoodworkoftheU.S.AmbassadorinCroatiaor,withalduerespect,John,theAssistantSecretaryforHumanRights.Thewholegovernmentwasoperating.TherewasamajorpaperwrittenbyChristopher,amajorpaperwrittenbyTonyLakeandSandyVershbow,andonebyMs.Albright.61Thisiswhatledtoanewpolicywherethenationalsecurityadvisorwenttocapitals,andsaid,that'sitguys,it'stimeforanewstrategy.OnthefamousChristophertriptoEurope[inMay,1993],wesaidwewouldwaitandseewhattheEuropeansthought,nowwearenotasking,wearetellingtheallieswhatwearegoingtodo,andthatthereisalimitationonourwillingnesstoextractUNPROFOR.Oncethosewordswereuttered,everybodystartedpayingseriousattention.ThatmeantthatUNPROFORwasgoingtoendatsomepoint.Iwon'tboreyouwithanymoredetails,butthisistheturningpointinmymind.Maybethat'smyRashomanproblembutIvotewiththeheadsofstateonthisone.TOMBLANTON:RupertSmith,youwereincommandinBosniaatthatpoint,didyouseeitthisway?Wasitthismoment?RUPERTSMITH:Togobacktotheatrocitiesandthekilling,wewerebeginningtounderstandthattherehadbeenmassexecutionsaroundthetimeofmymeetingwithGeneralMladionJuly19.Iknowthatepahasn'tfallen.WearealreadytakingmeasurestogetextrapeopleintoepatomakesurewehavegotapresencetherethatIcanrelyon.Straightafterthemeeting[withMladi]onJuly19,IgototheLondonConference,whichwasacompleteeyeopenertome.Noneofwhatwashappeningatthishighlevelwasbeing60SeeWhiteHousememo,BilateralmeetingwithPresidentJacquesChiracofFrance,June14,1995.61SeeStateDepartmentpaperEndgameStrategy,NSCpaper,StrategyfortheBalkanConflict,preparedonAugust3-4,1995,andAlbright,MemorandumfortheNationalSecurityAdvisor.4-45toldtomewhatsoever.IgetoffanairplaneandamdrivenstraighttothePrimeMinister[JohnMajor].IdonotseetheChiefoftheDefenseStaff.IamtoldbymyPrimeMinisterthatthenexttimethereisanattackonGorade,ontheBritishbattalion,wearegoingtobomb.Wearegoingtobombandnotstopbombinguntiltheattackstops,andyouSmitharegoingtohavethekey.WethenhaveaverydifficultconversationbecauseIwillnotacceptitunlessthethreatisforeverybody,notjustGorade.62Iamsentaway.IgoandfindJanvierandtellhimwhatIamdoingandheagrees.HehasbeentoldthesamethingbyFranceandisveryworriedaboutittoo.Thereismuchringinginthenight,IexplainaboutBihaandepa.IhavebreakfastwiththenewlyappointeddefensesecretaryMichaelPortillo,whosays,You'llhavetotrustme,wewillchangethedecisionovertheweekendbutit'sprecookedforGoradeandwewon'tgetthroughtheconferenceonFridayifwechangeitnow.Ithengoto[Lancasterhouse],thesiteoftheconferenceonFriday,July21.Itisahotsweatyday.Wehaveamostpeculiarconferenceinwhichthisprecookedmessageisrammeddowneveryone'sthroat.Icanbarelyunderstandwhateveryoneissaying.YouwereallinabubblethatIwasn'tin.IkepttryingtogetacrosstopeoplethatIstillhadhostageseverywhere.Theyarebusymakingtheirplans,andI'mbusyputtingpeopleintoepaandsoon.Thenextmonthwasaverylonelymonth.OurheadquartersleakedlikeasievesoIcouldn'ttellanyonewhatwashappeningandwhatIwasplanning.WhatIwantedtodowastohavethefightintheonlyplaceIcouldhaveit,whichwasSarajevobecausetheFrenchwouldn'tmovetheirgunsoutofrangeofFrenchsoldiers,whowereallinSarajevo.MyrealfearwasthattheproximatecauseofthisattackwouldcomeoutsideofSarajevo.Iwouldthenhaverealproblems.NooneunderstoodthisandIcouldn'texplainittoanybody.62InhisbookUtilityofForce,Smithwritesthathehadnotexpectedthiscompletechangeofpolicy,focusingonjustoneenclave.Inprivatebriefingsforjournalists,U.S.officialsconcededthattheallieshadwrittenoffepainadditiontoSrebrenicaasitwasmilitarilynotfeasibletoreturntothestatusquo.See,forexample,WolfBlitzer,WhiteHouseInterpretationofLondonmeeting,July22,1995.4-46ThegreatproblemwastoconcealthepotentialfromMladi.Weallknowabouttherapidreactionforce,butwedidnotgettheFrenchgunsupthehillonMountIgmanuntilthemiddleofAugust.63MICHAELDOBBS:YoualsowithdrewBritishtroopsfromGoradeatthispoint,right?64RUPERTSMITH:Thatwaspartofthedecisiontobomb.TherewasahugefightbetweenmeandHasanMuratovitowardstheendofAugustwhenhecallsmeeverynameunderthesun.Iamtellingeveryonethatwe'renotgoingtobombbecauseI'vestillgottogettheBritsout.Intheend,theydriveoutthroughSerbia.ItwasaverylonelymonthandIwasnothelpedbyanyofyouguysonthatsideoftheroom.[Referencetowesterngovernments/UN].Youwerebusy.ThereisamoveinRugbyfootballcalled"thehospitalpass,"whenyoupasstheballtoamanwithhalftheenemysscrumcomingstraightathim.[Laughter]JAMIERUBIN:General,we[Americans]callthatthekillyourbuddypass.RUPERTSMITH:Iwasgivenhospitalpassafterhospitalpassallthroughthatmonth.Itstartedwithepa,whicheveryonehadwrittenoff.CarldoesawonderfulthinginSerbiawithHasanandIzetbegovigettingtheBosnianfightersout.Weslowlygeteveryoneelseout.Weareworkingacrossabarrierofmistrustofthelastninemonthsaswedothat.MUHAMEDDURAKOVI:Ithinkthisisagoodmomentformetogiveyoutheviewfromthegroundratherthanthebubbleofthepolicymaking.Imadeittoepatwodaysbeforeepafell[onJuly25].Ididnotknowwhichdaywaswhich.SometimesIwouldpassoutandwouldwakeupandlookupatthesun.MaybeIhadsleptfortwohours,maybefortwenty-fourhours,Icouldn'treallytell.Eventually,whenwecametoepa,Irealizedwehadbrokenthroughtheline.63MadeleineAlbrighttoSecstate,Bosnia/Croatia,USUNCable03232,August24,1995.AlbrightquotedAnnanassayingthattheFrenchartillerywasdeployed,butBosnianCroatswerepreventingotherRRFconvoysfromcrossingtheborder.64InUtilityofForce,SmithdescribeshowhewithdrewtheBritishbattalionfromGoradeonthenightofAugust28-29,viaSerbia,followingtheMarkalemarketplaceshellinginSarajevo.HeturnedtheUNkeyafterhelearnedthattheBritishwereoutofGorade,andnolongeratriskofbeingseizedashostagesbyMladi.4-47ThefirstguyImetontheBosniansidedidnotlooklikeaBosniansoldieratall.IhadahandgrenadewhichIwastryingtokeepformyselfincaseIhadtocommitsuicideratherthanfallintoSerbhands.Ipulloutthepinandamreadytorollthehandgrenadetowardsthisguy.EventuallyIrecognizehim[asaBosniansoldier]frommyprevioustripstoepafrom1992to1995.Hetellsmethewholestoryaboutwhathappened,howthecivilianshadbeentakenout,theoptionsofferedbytheepacommand.Ididnotlikeanyoftheoptions,soIchosemyownoption.Iagreewithyou,GeneralSmith,whenyousayitwasaverylonelymonth.Twodayslater,Ifoundmyselfnolongeratthefrontlinebecausethelineshavecollapsed.Itwaseverymanforhimselfonceagain.Idecidedtotakemybandofbrothers,thesixkidsthatIbroughtwithmefromSrebrenica,gointothecanyonoftheDrinariverwithasmuchsuppliesaswepossiblycould.Webarricadedourselvesintooneofthecaves.IfyouevertraveldowntheriverofDrina,youwillseeitisabeautifulcanyonandeasilydefendable.Youhavetobeamountaingoattoattackanyoneatthatparticularlocation.Onemancanstopthebattalion.Ispentalongtimethinkingwhatreallywentwronginepa.ShashitoldusearlierthattheUNdidnotknowwhathappenedonJuly10,anddidnotexpectwhatwasgoingtohappenonJuly10,"butyoucertainlyknewwhatwascomingintermsofepa.Aftertwentyyears,andmanysleeplessnights,Iwouldliketohearsomeanswers.TOMBLANTON:CarlBildt?ThenIwanttotakeafiveminutecoffeebreakandcomebackandfocusonthelessons.CARLBILDT:epaisaninterestingstoryAsRupertsaid,epawaswrittenoffimmediately.Itwasassumedthatepawasgoingtofallwithinhours[ofthefallofSrebrenica].Amazingly,itdidnotfallimmediately.TheBosnianArmyfoughtforaveryconsiderableamountoftime.TheBosnianleadershipwantedhelpingettingthepopulationout,whichwasdonewithUNPROFOR.Atacertainpoint,IgotastrangemessagefromHasan[Muratovi]whosaidhewantedtomeetmeimmediately.IflewtoSplit,andhemanagedtogettoSplit.Hesaid,Ourremainingforcesinepaneedtogetout.It'stoodangeroustotakethemouttowardsSarajevo,IwantthemtogoouttoSerbia.HeaskedmetogotoMiloseviandgethimtoclearthewayfortheepasoldierstocrosstheDrina,whichwas4-48dangerouswiththeMladiforcesthere.Isaid,Dotheyknowtheroad?Yes,theyknewtheroadbecauseitwasthenormalweaponssmugglersroad.TheyaresuppliedfromSerbiatoalargeextent.IwentimmediatelytoMiloseviandmethiminthemiddleofthenight,neartheBulgarianborder.Heimmediatelygaveorders,whichresultedinthesoldiersexitingepathroughSerbia.Thatwasoneofthoseintriguingthingsthathappenedinthiswar.TheCroatianOperationStormchangedthepoliticsofthewar,butitwasadifficultmoment.Itwasthesinglelargestethniccleansingoperationoftheentirewar.65Itcompletelychangedthehumanitarianchallengeaswell.Wearelivingwiththeconsequencesrightupuntiltoday.[BREAK]TOMBLANTON:Inourfinalsession,wewanttolookatthelessonstobedrawnfromthishorriblegenocide.Wearetryingtocreatearecordthatwillhelpthenextsetofgraduatestudentsbecomepolicymakers,politicians,soldiers.Theshorterandmoretothepointyoucanmakeyourremarks,thebetter.JorisVoorhoeve.JORISVOORHOEVE:TherewerelongdelaysinreceivingandsharinginformationaboutMladisactions.ThesedelayswerealsothesubjectoftheNetherlandsparliamentaryinquiry.ItisclearthatbyaroundJuly15-16,therewereveryseriousindicationsofmany,manypeoplebeingkilled.Theindicationscamefromtheinternationalmedia,fromindividualDutchbatmemberswhohadbeentransportedfromAtoBandhadseenmanybodiesalongtheway.IamverygratefulfortheworkofAmbassadorShattuckandothersinbringingoutthefirststoriesaboutthesehorribleevents.Ingeneral,IthinkwecanseefromSrebrenica,fromDarfur,fromCambodiamuchearlier,thatwe,infreecountries,havegreatdifficultyacceptingtheextentofverydisturbinginformationabouthumanrightsviolations.Wesometimeshaveatendencytobelittleveryseriousevidence.Howdowedealwithnastynewsandputourselvesintheshoesofthosewhocommitsuchcrimessothatwecanbetterpredictwhatisgoingtohappen.Imustsay,fromtheDutchside,wewerenotgoodatdealingwithdiscordantinformationthatyoudon't65Between150,000and200,000SerbsfledtheKrajinaduringOperationStorm,accordingtocontemporaneousnewsreports.4-49wanttobelievebutistrueanyway.IttooktheNetherlandsarmyleadershipseveralmonthstogetthecompletepictureforreasonsIwillnotgointonow.IwasverygratefultothemediaandtheAmericansonthespotnearTuzlaforbringingoutthefirststories.TOMBLANTON:DavidHarland,youwroteareportthathasbeenwidelypraisedandinterviewedprettymucheveryone,moreorless.66Whatwouldyouchangeaboutyourconclusionstoday?DAVIDHARLAND:Alotmorefactsareknowntoday.Thereisafamous,waggishcomment,IthinkbyEdwardLuttwak[anAmericanmilitarystrategist],aboutthethreerulesofinterveninginotherpeople'sconflicts.Thefirstruleis:don't.Thesecondoneis:ifyoudo,pickaside.Thethirdoneis:makesureyoursidewins.Fortherecord,IwrotethatreportwithSalmanAhmed,whoisnowaSpecialAssistantstoPresidentObama.Theconclusionswereactuallywrittenbysomebodyelse.IwouldchangetheconclusionsnowbecauseIwouldhavechangedthemthen.Obviously,adisasterrequiresfailureatseverallevels.IagreewithDavidHannaythatthemandatethatcameoutwasperfectlyworkable.Itwasugly,itwasneverintendedtooperateforanextendedperiodoftime,andtherewasnostrategy,butitwasmanageable.Forme,theabsolutelystrikingleveloffailurethatIwouldgotoistheUNPROFORlevel.IftheuseofcloseairsupporthadbeenapprovedonJuly8orJuly10(IwillnotcontestGeneralNicolaionJuly6),thereiseveryreasontobelievethattheSerbswouldhavestopped.IbasethisconclusionalsoonconversationswithSerbs,including[Karadzismediaadvisor]JovanZametica,whomIsawasrecentlyasthreedaysago.PeoplewhoarenowdeadwouldbealiveifUNPROFORhaddonethosethingsthatitwasmandatedtodobutdidnothavethepoliticalwilltodo.IfeelthattheprincipalweaknessinUNPROFORwasinZagrebwithMr.AkashibutalsowithGeneralJanvier.Therewasanentirecultureestablishedwithinthecivilservice(whichTonedescribedbriefly)thatallinformation,includingfactualinformation,hadtoberendered66SeeReportofSecretary-GeneralpursuanttoGeneralAssemblyResolution53/35,TheFallofSrebrenica,November15,1999,A/54/549.TheprincipalauthorswereDavidHarlandandSalmanAhmed,wholaterbecameaseniorStateDepartmentofficialandcounselortoNationalSecurityAdvisorSusanRiceintheObamaAdministration.4-50neutrally.TheveryfirstweekthatIarrivedinSarajevo,thechiefUNmilitarywasawaysoIhadtosignoffthereport.Thereportsaidthattherehadbeen920heavyweaponsviolationsbytheSerbsandapproximately80bytheBosnianArmy.ItwenttoZagrebandwasreportedtoNewYorkwithalittlefootnote,sayingthattherehadbeenathousandceasefireviolations.Whathadbeenaverysimplefactualstoryreportingagrotesqueactionbyonesideandalimitedresponsebytheotherwasrenderedintosomethingtotallybland.Inmyview,thekeylessonamidallthismessanddysfunctionalityis:don'tjoinUNpeacekeepingunlessyouarewillingtoviolatealltheLuttwakrules.Ifyoudo,adegreeofintellectualhonestyandmoralcouragewillallowthousandsandthousandsoflivestobesaved. JenonneWalkerJENONNEWALKER:Iwantedthefloorlargelytopassthebuck.It'shumannaturetohearandrememberremarksthatsupportwhatyoualreadybelieve.Mysenseyesterdaymorningoftheconsensusaroundthetablewasthatit'sfollytosendatraditionalUNpeacekeepingforceintoasituationwherethereisnopeacetokeepandthereisnointentiontoimposeapeace.Acarryonfolly:todeclareasafeareawhenthere4-51isnocapabilityorintentionofmakingitsafe.AsIsaidyesterday,theUnitedStateshadnomoralcredibilityonthisbecausewewerenotwillingtosharetherisk.Atthetime,however,weinWashingtonwereverydisdainfulofthewholesafeareanotionbecausetherewasnocapabilityorwillingness[toenforcethesafeareas].WecouldtalkaboutindividualmistakesinBosniathatallofusmadeincapitals,intheUNbureaucracy,UNPROFOR,etc.Ithinkthemoreinterestingaspectoflessonslearnedisnotwhethertouseforceinasituationlikethis,buthowtodoiteffectively.Themostprovocativethingyoucandoisnotuseforcewhenyouarebeingtested.ThisiswhyIwanttopassthebucktoRupertSmith.IhopeeveryoneherehasreadhisBosniachapterandconcludingchapterinTheUtilityofForceonhowtouseforceeffectively.IthinkitshouldbememorizedbyeverybodyintheUNsystemandeverybodywithanyintentionofjoiningan[internationalpeacekeepingoperation].DAVIDHANNAY:Manyofthelessonshavebeenlearnedandarebeingapplied,butit'sworthtryingtoidentifythem.TheEuropeans,collectively,hadahugeshockinBosniathatreallyblewtheirsocksoff.Theyrealizedthattheywereunabletopreventanoutbreakofserioushostilitiesinaregionwhereitwasassumedthattheyweretheprimaryprovidersofsecurity.ItproducedanenormouslystrongreactionfromwhichgrewtheenlargementoftheEuropeanUniontoincludetheBalkans.AsIthinkeverybodynowrecognizes,thebestpreventiveactionyoucantakeintheBalkansistomoveBalkancountriestowardsmembershipoftheEuropeanUnion.Thisisnotquitethebestweektomakethatlittlespeechbutithappenstobetrue.67Wemustnotlosesightofitbecausethereareongoing[accession]negotiationswithSerbia.TherewillbenegotiationswithKosovoandAlbania.Oneday,Ihope,aGreekgovernmentwillagreeto[accessionnegotiations]withMacedonia.MontenegroismovingtowardstheEU.Europeanslearnedahugelessonfromthehumiliationthattheyexperienced,firstatthebeginningoftheoperationwhentheycouldnotcopewithconflictprevention,andtheninthecourseoftheoperationswhentheyshowedtheywerenotabletodoanythingwithouttheAmericans.Thatisalessonlearnedbutitneedstoberepeated.67TheconferencewasheldonJune29-30,2015,atatimewhentheEuropeanUnionwasrivenbydissensionovertheGreekbailoutcrisis,andthepossibilityofGreecewithdrawingfromtheEuro.4-52Secondpoint.ItwasshockingtohearduringthisconferenceofthecompleteabsenceofintelligenceavailabletotheUNforcesinthesafeareas.Thatisterrible.Nationalintelligencecapabilitieshavegottobetailoredinawaythattheycanbemadeavailabletopeopleputtingtheirlivesatriskinthepursuitofpeacekeeping.Thisiseasierwithpoliticalintelligencethanwithmilitaryintelligence.Someofusarequiteusedtodoingitwithpoliticalintelligence.InthesevenyearsIwasnegotiatingonCyprus,IpersuadedmygovernmenttoletmepassallourpoliticalintelligenceaboutCyprustotheUN,whichwasdonewithnoleaksandwasveryuseful.Wereallymusttakethissubjectseriously.SinceSrebrenica,wenowhavesurveillancedrones.Itshouldbefairlyobviousthatanymajorpeacekeepingoperation,particularlyoneinpotentiallyhostilecircumstancessuchasBosnia,isgoingtohavetobeprovidedwithasurveillancedronecapacity.IbelievesomeofthatisbeginningintheDRC,intheCongo,now.OneofthethingsthatcameoutofSrebrenicawastheconceptoftheResponsibilitytoProtect.68IfyouwerewritinganyoftheseSecurityCouncilresolutionsnow,youwouldhavetowriteinelementsofResponsibilitytoProtect.ResponsibilitytoProtectisnowunderchallengebecauseoftheinadequacyofthefollowup,forexampleinLibya.ThefaultwasthenotsavingofthelivesoftheinhabitantsofBenghazi,butwhathappenedafterwards,afterthefallofGadhafi,thetotalabsenceofanyseriousfollow-up.Experiencehasshownthatifyouaredealingwithaverydifficultsituationhoveringonthelinebetweenpeacekeepingandenforcement,asinBosnia,youreallymusthavean"overthehorizon"capabilityavailable.SuchacapabilitywasmadeavailabletotheUNinthecaseofSierraLeone.ItwasmadeavailablebytheFrenchinbothCoted'IvoireandMali.Itcanbemadetowork.Itdideventuallywork[inBosnia].ThenarrativethattheSerbswereforcedtothetableentirelybyairstrikesisnotinfactthecase.TherapidreactionforcepoundedthehelloutoftheSerbforcesaroundSarajevoandhelpedconvinceMilosevithathehadtogiveinandgotoDayton.An"overthehorizon"capabilityisveryimportantthoughitcangobadlywrong,astheUSdiscoveredinSomalia,ifitisnotproperlyhandled.68TheResponsibilitytoProtect,orR2P,stipulatesthattheinternationalcommunitycantakecollectiveactiontoprotectendangeredpopulationsifastatefailstomeetitsresponsibilities.4-53Onefinalpoint.Iamnotsurewehaveseenthelastofthedualkeyissue.DualkeywasabadideabutIdonotthinkyoucaneverhaveanoperationinwhichairstrikestakeplacewithoutconsultationwiththepeopleontheground.Youcannotde-couplethosethingstotally,eventhoughthedual-keysystem[inBosnia],whichwasbuiltupgraduallyandcamecrashingdownin1995,wasaterribleonethatmustneverberepeated.TOMBLANTON:ThankyouDavid.LetmecallonAmbassadorJacolintogiveussomeofhislessons.HENRYJACOLIN:IwasnotinBosniaatthetimeofthefallofSrebrenica.OnJuly6,IwastransferredfromSarajevotoParisforamedicaloperation,anddidnotreturnuntilSeptember.IwasconvincedfromtheverybeginningthattheBosnianSerbswantedtodefinitelycleaneasternBosnia.ImadesomedemographicstudiesandbecameconvincedthattheycouldnotacceptaborderalongtheDrina,orineasternBosnia,betweenSerbsandBosniaks.IwasconvincedthattheirultimategoalwastomovetheborderbetweenBosniaksandSerbstothemiddleofthecityofSarajevo,tobemoreprecise,totheDobrinjadistrictalongtheMiljackariver.TheywantedtomakeSarajevoadividedcityandtocompletelycleanseeasternBosniaofitsMuslimpopulation.IwassoconvincedofthisthatIsentaseriesoftelegramstoParisreportingGeneralMorillonstriptoSrebrenicainMarch1993underthetitle,ChronicleofanEthnicCleansingForetold.69Thatwasclear.IconstantlyrepeatedtoParisthatthiswasthegoaloftheSerbs.Pariscouldnothaveanydoubtsthatthiswastohappenoneday.Fromthebeginning,IwrotetoParisthatwewereoverestimatingthestrengthoftheSerbsandthatitwouldbepossibletostopthemifaresolutedecisionwastakentostopthem.IwasdisappointedwhenIarrived[inSarajevoasFrenchambassadorin1993]becauseIdiscoveredthatUNPROFORwasalwaysnegotiatingwithbothsides.Theywerealwaystryingtogetanewandfinalceasefire.SomeofmytelegramsirritatedtheMatignon[Frenchprimeministersoffice],Elyse[Presidentsoffice],andtheministryofdefense.IdisagreedwithMitterrandsfamousremarkconcerningthearmsembargo[againstall69Areferencetothe1981novelbyGabrielGarciaMarquez,Cronicadeunamuerteanunciada.4-54republicsoftheformerYugoslavia]stressingnepasajouterlaguerrelaguerre.[Donotaddwartowar].IaskedmyselfwhatIshoulddoasaFrenchAmbassadorthereinSarajevo.MyconclusionwasthatthebestthingIcoulddowouldbetotrytochangethepositionofmygovernment.Intelegramaftertelegram,Irepeatedthatthiswasnotatribalconflict,notareligiouswar,butawarofaggressionbytheSerbs.ImanagedtochangethemindsinParisalittlebit.[ForeignministerAlain]Juppwasthefirstonetounderstand.Hethoughtveryquickly.HetookafirmpositionaftertheMarkalemarketmassacreinFebruary1994.YoumayrememberthathewasthefirstonetosaywemuststoptheSerbs.TherewasthenaNATOultimatumwhichwasobservedforafewdaysbutitfinallydissolved,likesugarinhotcoffee,andwastotallyforgotten.Whatweachievedforafewdaysorweeksbystartingthewithdrawalofheavyweaponstotallydisappearedbecausethewilloftheinternationalcommunitywasnotmaintained.IwasveryhappywhenChiracannouncedtheformationoftherapidreactionforceinJune1995.IwasinPariswhenthenewgovernmentwasformed[inMay1995followingChiracsvictoryinthepresidentialelection].IwasabletomeetverybrieflyCharlesMillon,whohadjustbeennominatedMinisterofDefense.Heaskedme,WhatshouldwedoMr.Ambassador?Itoldhim,ilfauttapersurlesSerbes,[WemusthittheSerbs].Itwastheonlywayoutofthiswar.IalsometHervdeCharette,whohadbeennominatedMinisterofForeignAffairs.Healsoaskedme,WhatshouldwedoMr.Ambassador?IalsotoldhimilfauttapersurlesSerbes.IwashappywhenthepresidentdecidedtocreatetherapidreactionforcewhichwasthesolutionIhadbeenadvocatingsinceIarrivedinSarajevoandrealizedwhatwasgoingon,ontheground.DIEGOARRIA:ThefirstlessonshouldbefortheUnitedNations.Tenyearsago,onthetenthanniversaryofSrebrenica,togetherwithAmbassadorJamsheedMarkerofPakistan,IwrotetoKofiAnnan,(atthattimeIwasoneofhisadvisors)tellinghimthattheUnitedNationsshouldnotpushundertherugthetenthanniversaryoftheSrebrenicamassacre.AftermanydiscussionsinsidetheSecretariat,KofiarrangedformetoparticipateinasessionwithPrinceZeidofJordanandourfriendSamanthaPowerattheDagHammarskjldlibrary,whichminimizedtheimportanceofwhathappenedinBosnia.Asenioradvisorto4-55Annansaidtohim,WhatDiegoisproposingisaself-flagellationexercise.NocommentsneededonthatIguess.IamtryingtofinishabookthatIcall"ARoomwithoutaView,"inspiredbytheroomusedforinformalconsultationsoftheSecurityCouncil.70Asmanyofyouknow,theroomhasaverylargewindowoverlookingtheEastriverinNewYork,butthedrapesarealwaysdrawn.Thepermanentmembersdon'twanttolookoutside.IrememberinMarch1992thatweadmittedtheRepublicofBosnia-HerzegovinaasanewmemberoftheUnitedNations.DavidHannaymadeajoke[atthetimeofthedisintegrationoftheSovietUnionin1991]abouthowfewpeopleintheSecurityCouncilwouldknowthenamesofthecapitalsofthe15newmembernationsoftheRussianFederation.TwomonthsafterwerecognizedthesecountriesasUNmembers,weproceededtodividetheRepublicofBosnia-Herzegovinaalongethnicandreligiouslines(amazinglyatthesametimewhenapartheidinSouthAfricawasinitsfinalstage,greatlythankstotheUNcontributions).ThesameUnitedNationswasactivelyengagedinpracticingapartheidinBosnia-Herzegovina,dividingitintoMuslim,Croat,andSerbwiththeconsequencesthatweseetoday.Suddenly,theSecretariatandtheP5startedreferringtotheRepublicofBosniaandHerzegovinaastheMuslimside.Irememberraisingmyhandandsayingit'stheRepublicofBosnia-Herzegovina.ThepermanentmemberswiththesupportoftheSecretariatturnedtheconflictintoareligiousconfrontationratherthanaconquestofterritorybyforce,whichwaswhatwasactuallyhappening.WhentheSecurityCouncildeclaredanarmsembargoonYugoslaviainSeptember1991,itsentamessagetothesenewcountries:armyourselfasquicklyasyoucanbecausetheUnitedNationsisgoingtostopyou.71Themajorcountriesknewthattheparties[intheformerYugoslavia]thatwerefullyarmedwereSerbiaandCroatia.TheBosniansdidnothaveanything,aswelatersaw.Bosniasfatewassealedfromthebeginning.TheinternationalcommunitythoughtthattheBosnianswouldgiveupquickly,buttheBosniansdidnotplayaccordingtothescript.Insteadofrollingoverandplayingdead,theyfoughtasmuchastheycould.70AreferencetotheE.M.Forsternovel,ARoomwithaView.71UNSC,Resolution713(1991),September25,1991.4-56ItwasdisturbingtomehowtheEuropeanssuddenlydiscoveredthattherewasaMuslimworldinthemiddleofEurope.Thesepeoplewerealwaysthere.TheysuddenlyfearedthataMuslimnationwasemerginginEuropewhenSarajevowasprobablythemostecumenicalcityanywhereinEurope.ItremindedmeoftheattitudethattheLatinAmericanstaketowardHaiti,discriminatingagainstthembecausetheywereblackandspeakFrenchandnotSpanish.TheEuropeansovernightdiscoveredthattheBosnianswerenotEuropeans,theywereMuslims.ItisdifficultformetobelievethattheUnitedNationswereunabletoanticipatetheeventsthattookplaceinBosnia.Isaidin1993thataslowmotiongenocidewastakingplaceinBosniabeforetheeyesoftheworld.72Lessthantwoyearslaterithappened.IthinkthattheDutchhavebeenmadeascapegoatforwhathappened.IagreewithwhatDavidHannaysaidaboutEuropeabout(theforeignministerofLuxembourg),JacquesPoos.AtthebeginningoftheYugoslavcrisishesaid,ThisisthehourofEurope.ItisnotthehouroftheAmericans.73WeshouldhaveletEuropecarrythisoutandnotstainedtheprestigeoftheUnitedNations,ashappenedwiththebotchedoperationSomalia.JOHNSHATTUCK:Iwouldliketolookatwhathappenedafterwards.WhatwehavenowinallofBosniaisafrozenconflictsituation.Wehaveafrozenpeace.Fortunatelythekillinghasbeenended,butitisnotreallypeace.Thefrozenpolitics,inmyview,arearesultofafailureatDayton.Alongwithothers,likeMadeleineAlbright,IfoughtveryhardtotrytobringissuesofaccountabilityintotheDaytonpeaceprocess.Wehopedthatthosewhoweremostresponsibleforthepoisonouspoliticsthatleduptothewarwouldbearrestedandchargedbytheinternationalcriminaltribunalorsidetrackedfromthepoliticalprocess.ThatgotstartedalittlebitatDaytonwiththeexclusionofMladiandKaradzi.TheBosnianswerenotgoingtocometothetableatDaytonunlessBosnianSerbleadersweresidetracked.72ReportoftheSecurityCouncilMissionEstablishedPursuanttoResolution819(1993),S/25700,April30,1993,paragraph19.73Luxembourgwaschairingthe12-nationEuropeanCommunityinJune1991whenSloveniaandCroatiamovedtobreakawayfromYugoslavia.LuxembourgforeignministerJacquesPoosledaEuropeandelegationtoYugoslavia,sayingthatEuropeangovernmentshadaspecialresponsibilitytoactinacrisisthatthreatenedEuropeanstability.See,forexample,AlanRiding,Europeanssendhigh-levelteam,NewYorkTimes,June30,1991.4-57TheyweresidetrackedinpartbecausetheyhadbeenindictedbytheInternationalCriminalTribunal.TheInternationalCriminalTribunalisfunctioning.Somewouldsayithasbeenquitesuccessful.Ithascharged,andevenconvicted,alargenumberofpeople.74ThefailurerelatestotheinitialperiodwhenS-FORandlaterI-FORwentin.BecauseoftheambiguityoftheDaytonlanguage,theNATOforceswerecompletelyunwillingtoarrestindictedwarcriminals.IworkedverycloselywiththeDutchForeignMinisteratthattime,HansVanMierlo,inaratherprivateandsecretwaytotrytoestablishaspecialwarcriminalsarrestforcewhichwouldbemadeupofDutchpolice.ThereweresomeseriousdiscussionswiththeUNandtheUSmilitarybutitcametonaught.Theresultisthefrozenpeacethatwehavetoday.IamnotsayingthatthefailuretoarrestwarcriminalsistheonlyreasonforthecurrentstateofaffairsbutIthinkit'saseriousreason.Youcannotallowthepeoplewhocausedtheproblemtocontinuetorunthesecountriesafterwards.Someofthem,overtime,havebeensidetracked.Eventually,MiloseviwassidetrackedbythepoliticalprocessinSerbia.75SHASHITHAROOR:IwantedtorespondtoJohn'searlierinterventionaboutthebankruptcyofUNpeacekeeping.UNpeacekeepingisnotbankrupt.76Ithasdoneamazinglygoodworkinanumberofsituationsaroundtheworld.ThepeacekeepingforcewontheNobelpeaceprize[in1988]preciselybecauseithasmadeadifference.However,itshouldnotbeappliedtoinappropriatesituations.IhavetalkedaboutthelargenumberofoccasionsinwhichwepointedouttotheSecurityCouncilthattherewasnoviablepeacekeepingconceptavailablebuttheCouncilwentaheadnonetheless.IfthereisalessontobelearnedfromSrebrenica,that'sreallythefirstlesson.Theformulaforsuccessfulpeacekeepingmissionsisveryclear.Itisatriptych.Firstyouneedacoherent,clear,implementablemandate.Second,youneedresourcesthatare74AccordingtoafactsheetpreparedbyICTY,thetribunalhadindicted161individualsbyJuly1995forcrimesrangingfromgravebreachesoftheGenevaconventiontogenocide.Atotalof80peoplehadbeensentencedtovaryingprisonterms,and18acquitted.75MiloseviwasoverthrownonOctober5,2000followingpopularprotestsagainstfraudulentelectionsinSerbia.76SeeShattuckremarkinTranscriptPage3-61:Whatweareseeingdocumented[duringourdiscussionatthisconference]inaverypowerful,realwayisthebankruptcyofUNpeacekeepingandpeacekeepingingeneral.4-58commensuratewiththatmandate.Imeanmilitaryaswellasfinancialresources.Third,youmusthavepoliticalwill.Thisisfundamentalbecauseitunderpinstheothertwo.Withoutpoliticalwill,youwon'tgettheresourcesandyouwon'tgetaclearmandate.Ifyouhaveallofthose,youhaveasuccessfulpeacekeepingoperation.PeacekeepingshouldnotbeasubstitutefortheabsenceofpoliticalwillwhichiswhatwesawinBosnia.IffuturegenerationsofdecisionmakersaretolearntheproperlessonfromBosnia,thisisamistaketheymustnotmakeagain.Peacekeepingintheclassicsenserequiresthecooperationofthepartiesintheconflict.Thisisfundamental.Whenthecooperationisdoubtful,youshouldnothaveapeacekeepingoperation.Istressthisbecausethereisallthistalkabouttheimmoralityofneutralitybetweenethniccleansersandtheirreviledbesiegers.Thefactisthatthiswasnotasituationforwhichpeacekeepingshouldhavebeenapplied.Itisbettertostartwithapeaceenforcementoperationinthesesituationsthantochangemandatesmidstream,whichiswhatwedidinBosnia.Wewerewrongtodothatbutitwasforceduponusbytheforceofcircumstances.ThesheernumberofSecurityCouncilresolutionsisastarkindicationofhowthemandateforthismissiongotchangedwithincrementalenforcementelementscomingintoit.YoubeganyesterdaymorningbyaskingaboutChapterVIandChapterVIIoftheUnitedNationscharter.Thisisacompleteredherring.ThereisnolanguageinChapterVIthatsupportspeacekeeping.NotevenHammarskjldpretendedthat.ThedeploymentofmilitaryforceisnotforeseenunderChapterVI.TheonlyquestionconcernsChapterVII.Article40talksaboutcallingonpartiestocomplywithsuchprovisionalmeasuresasitdeemsnecessaryifnegotiation,mediation,diplomacydonotwork.PeacekeepingwasseenbytheclassicpuristinternationallawyersasaprovisionalmeasureunderArticle40ofChapterVII.ThenthereisArticle42whichtalksaboutactionbyair,sea,orlandforcesasmaybenecessaryifothermeansproveinadequate.JustsayingChapterVIIisirrelevant.Practicallyspeaking,thereisnoChapterVIpeacekeeping,althoughweusethatasashorthandforsayingpeacekeepingwithoutenforcementandwetalkaboutChapterVIIforpeacekeepingwithenforcement.4-59Inmyview,theyarebothChapterVIIbecausenoonecanpointtoanylanguageinChapterVIthatusesmilitaryforce.77Thepointisthatweshouldhavetwoverydistinctkindsofoperation.(1)Classicpeacekeepingforwhichtherestillisneedandforwhichthereisaprovabletrackrecordofsuccess,followingtheclassicprinciplesofneutrality.And(2)peaceenforcementinsituationswhereyoufeelobligedtoviolatetheinterestsofonepartyortheotherandforceyourwaythrough,andwhereyoucan'ttakeforgrantedtheconsistentcooperationoftheparties.Thatbringsmetothequestionaboutdualkeybecauseagain,weintheSecretariathadverylittlesayinthismatter,buttheideaofdualkeywasabsurd.Ifthepurposeofusingairpowerwastosupporttheinterestsoftheforcesontheground,thekeyshouldhavebeenwithoneperson,thelocalUNForceCommander.Ifthepurposeofusingairpowerwastopursuemilitaryobjectives,tochangethenatureoftheconflict,goingwellbeyondtheneedsoftheforcesontheground,thena)thepeacekeepingforcesshouldnothavebeenthere,theyshouldhavebeenpulledout,andb)thekeyshouldbewiththosedeployingtheairpower,namelyNATO.TherewasnoneedforNATOtohaveasayinthefirstkindofuseandtherewasnoneedfortheUNtohaveasayinthesecondkindofuse.Inthiscase,theUNshouldhavebeenoutoftheway.Thedualkeypointedtothefundamentalcontradictionoftryingtohaveanoutsideagency,inmanycaseswithouttroopsontheground,useforcewhenthereweretroopsonthegroundpursuingadifferentmandate.Thatsummarizesmymainlessonsfromthesetwodays.TOMBLANTON:Thankyou,Shashi.Letmeaskaquestion,whichIwillposetoCarl.Inthe1999UNSrebrenicareport,theymakeapointthatnegotiationswiththearchitectsofSerbpolicies,principallyMiloseviandKaradzibutalsoMladionthemilitarylevel,amountedtoappeasementatvariouspointsinthewar.That'stheconclusionofthereport.Isthatthecase?Isthereadifferencebetweennegotiationsthatendupappeasingandnegotiationsthatpursueapeace-makingstrategy?77ChapterVIofthe1945UNCharterdoes,however,includeArticle36,whichstatesthattheSecurityCouncilcanrecommendappropriateproceduresormethodsofadjustmentforthepacificsettlementofdisputes.4-60CARLBILDT:Thatis,ofcourse,amatterofdefinition.Youmakepeacewithyourenemies,notwithyourfriends,sobydefinition,ifyouwanttoendaconflictnotbymilitarilydefeatingtheenemybutbysomesortofpoliticalcompromisethenofcourseyouhavetonegotiatewiththoseparticularforces.YouendupwithsomesortofcompromisewhichIwouldarguewasinevitableinthecaseofaconflictsuchastheonewefacedinBosnia.Andthiswasalsowhatallthemajorcountriesandactorsrecognized.IdonotknowwhatDavid[Harland]hadinmindwhenhewrotethatparticularphrase.Acoupleofothercomments.Davidseemedtobearguingthatitwouldhavemadeabigdifferenceifthekindofstrikepackage[againstBosnianSerbtroopsadvancingonSrebrenica]thatcameafterlunchonJuly11hadinsteadcomeafterlunchonthe10.Consideringthefactthatthemilitaryeffectofthatstrikepackagewasvirtuallynada,Iamlesscertain.Whatmighthavemadeadifferencewouldhavebeenforcesontheground.ItisdifficulttoknowaswearetryingtoreadthemindsetofMr.Mladi.Weknowthathechangedthedirectivesonthe9fortheoperationandtookthatotherfatefuldecisiononJuly11[tokillthemaleprisoners].78MorerobustUNforcesontheground,andperhapsepa-likeoperationsbytheBosnianArmy,mighthavemadeadifference.TheBosnianArmyemphasiswasgettingthetroopsoutintheotherdirection.Theywerenotprimarily[inthesouth]wheretheSerbswereadvancing,theywereinthenorthernpartoftheenclaveheadingtoTuzla.Whetherthatwouldhavemadeanydifferencewedon'tknow,butIthinkit'smorecomplicated.Ontheoverallconclusionsofoperationslikethis,IagreewithmuchofwhatShashisaid.Clearlythesafeareaconceptwasamistakeinthewayitwasundertaken.Wepromisedsomethingwecouldn'tdeliver.Wecouldn'tsecuretheseareas.ThatgoestowhatShashisaid:sometimesthemandatesarehopeless.Ithinkthatlessonhasbeenlearned.TherewasanavalancheofSecurityCouncilresolutionsonBosnia,overtheentiredurationoftheconflict.IjokedattimesthattheywereissuingSecurityCouncilresolutionsata78AccordingtochiefICTYSrebrenicainvestigator,Jean-ReneRuez,MladitookthefinaldecisiontocaptureSrebrenicaonJuly10againsttheadviceofhisstaffofficers.4-61fasterpacethanwehadtimetoreadthem.Someofthemwereutterlyunrealisticwhichreducedrespectforthemaswell.79WedidnotbringupthequestionofwhattheSecurityCouncildidafterthefallofSrebrenica,whichisanamazingstoryinitself.ThefirstreactionoftheSecurityCouncilwasvery,verylowkey.Thoseofuswhoweretherewereverysurprised.TherewassomesortofPresidentialStatement,whichisvirtuallynothing.TheSecurityCouncilthensuddenlychangedandadoptedaresolutionorderingtheUNtoretake,militarily,Srebrenica.80Ofcoursenoonetookthatresolutionseriously,buttherewasanobviousdisconnectbetweenmandateandresourceswhichhasimplicationsforthediscussionswearehavingtodayonsafeareasindifferentpartsoftheworld.Don'ttalkaboutitifyoucan'tdoit.TheUNoperationinBosniawasafailureifyouseeitasapeacekeepingoperation.Butitwasnevermeanttobe.PuttingonmyhatasSwedishPrimeMinister,weprobablysentaround10,000soldierstoservethereduringtheconflict.Didtheydoanythinguseful?Ithinktheydid.Didtheyproducepeace?No,theydidn't.DidtheydefeattheSerbs?Notheydidn't,buttheyrescuedalotofpeople.Weshouldnotforgetthatthisstarted,rightlyorwrongly,asamassivehumanitarianoperation.ItwasthemostmassivehumanitariancatastrophethatwehadexperiencedinEuropesince1945.Itwasaquestionofhelping,protectingwithlorriesandlogisticstogethelpin.Wealsoprotectedpeopleindifferentareaswhootherwisewouldhavebeensubjecttoallsortsofthings.Ithinkitwasmostuseful-butitwasnotapeacekeepingoperation.Ithinkwehavelearnedalessonabouttheneedforbetterintelligence.Sweden,alongwiththeNetherlands,isnowinvolvedintheMalioperation.ThereisaDutch79AformerUNPROFORcommander,BelgiangeneralFrancisBriquemont,toldjournalistsinDecember1993thatIdontreadtheSecurityCouncilresolutionsanymorebecausetheydonthelpme.Heresignedthefollowingweek.See,forexample,UNGeneralinBosniaquits,January5,1994,NYT.80UNSCResolution1004,adoptedonJuly12,1995calledontheUNSecretaryGeneraltouseallresourcesavailabletohimtorestorethesafeareaofSrebrenica.TheFrenchrepresentative(Mrime)offeredtomaketroopsavailableforsuchoperations.TheUSrepresentative(Albright)saidtheUSwaspreparedtoprovidenecessaryairliftforthedeploymentofarapidreactionforcetoBosnia.PresidentClintonagreedwiththeprivateassessmentofFrenchmilitaryleadersthatretakingSrebrenica[is]toorisky.SeeTonyLakememo,PointstobemadefortelephoneconversationwithChancellorHelmutKohl,July14,1995.AkashiurgedUNSecretary-GeneralBoutros-GhalitourgeUNSCmemberstofocusonhumanitarianassistanceratherthansuggestingevenobliquelythatthestatusquoantecanbere-establishedbyforce.SeeAkashitoAnnan,APossibleCommunicationfromtheSecretary-GeneraltotheSecurityCouncil,UNPF-HQ,Zagreb1149.4-62intelligenceunitandaSwedishintelligenceunittherethatoperatewithdronesandlisteningdevices.WhetherthatwillhelpinMaliremainstobeseen,butthecapacityisthere.BetterintelligencewouldnothavehelpedintheSrebrenicacasebecauseweknowthedecision[tocapturetheenclave]wastakenverylate.ButIthinkthatparticularlessonhasbeenlearned.Overall,IagreethatBosniaisnotwhereitshouldbe.81Wearenowtwentyyearsafterthewar.CompareBosniatodaytoGermanyin1965.Therehasbeenafailureofleadershipinthecountryitselftocometotermswithwhatneedstobedone.HadwepickedupsomeICTYindictees[e.g.MladiandKaradzi]earlierthatwouldhavebeenagoodthing,noquestionaboutthat.Butitwasimpossible,inthewakeof[theOctober1993BlackHawkDownincidentin]Mogadishu[when18USsoldierswerekilledattemptingtocaptureaSomaliwarlord].Theforces,particularlytheUSforcesbytheway,wereopposedtothatsortbecauseitwasconsideredtoodangerous.Ithinkitwouldhavebeenmorallygoodifwehaddoneit.Idonotknowwhetheritwouldhavemademuchadifferenceinthelongerperspective.Theywerepickedupeventuallyanyhow.EssentiallyitisthefailureoftheBosnianpoliticalsystemtoseethemagnitudeoftheirresponsibilitythatexplainsthesituationtheretoday.TOMBLANTON:ThankyouCarl.IwantedtoaskRuperttocommentonthenegotiation/appeasementissueandthenmoveontoyouroveralllessons.RUPERTSMITH:Thankyou,DavidHannay,forthepointabouttherapidreactionforce.Justtoadd,itwasnowuptome,theUNPROFORCommander,tochooseallthetargetsthatNATObombed.Theyhadtoagreetobombthem,butIchosethetargets.TheonlyonesthatNATOchosewerethesuppressionofairdefensetargets.NATOwasmyagentinthatsense.Secondly,theartilleryfromFrance,BritainandtheNetherlandsfiredsomethingintheorderof600roundsontheveryfirstdayofthoseattacks,August30anditstayedatthatleveluntilthesiegewasbrokenaboutthreedayslater.Twoarmoredbattlegroups,one81AftertheDaytonagreement,CarlBildtwasappointedtheinternationalcommunitysfirstHighRepresentativetoBosniaandHerzegovina,servingfromDecember14,1995toJune17,1997.4-63French,oneBritish,thencameinandbrokethesiege.UNPROFORsroleinthissagahasbeenleftoutofthestoryabittoomuch.AFPmapofSarajevo1995.Brownshaderepresentshigherground.Iwanttotalkaboutthedirectionofoperationsandthepolitical-militaryrelationship.Theuseofarmedforcetoachieveanythingwillneverworkunlessthereisanextremelycloselinkagebetweenthepoliticaldirectionandthemilitarycommander.Ithastobeaniterative,continuousconversation.Itisnotonemeeting,inwhichyouaretoldtogooutanddosomething.Ithastobeacontinuousrelationship.Youaccommodateeachother'spointofview.Thepoliticalviewisn'tthesameasthemilitaryone.Theyareseparateactivities.Youhavetoarriveatapositionwhereyouapplytheuseofforcetoaparticularpoliticalend.Ifyoucannotdothat,inwhateverwayyouwireitup,itwillnotwork.Itwillfail.Ifyouropponentsaredoingitbetterthanyou,theywilldefeatyou.ThisiswhatyouseetakingplaceateverylevelofthisventureuntiltheveryendwhenwemanagedtogetittogetherinAugust1995.Asanexampleofhowitdoesnotwork,considerthepointaboutnegotiations.Asayoungofficerincounter-terroristtraining,Ilearnedabitabouthostagesituations.Iwasn'tthehostage:hewasinsidetheroomandIwasoutsideit.Oneofthelessonsdrummedintousfrombitterexperiencewasthatcommanderscommandandnegotiatorsnegotiate.Ifacommandernegotiates,hehasonlygothimselfandhispositiontodealwith.Hestartsto4-64givehispositionawayinordertoachievetheextractionofthehostage.Between1992and1995,weconductedaroundthirtynegotiationswithoutanypoliticalcontextordirectionatall.Whetheritwasonthemilitaryoneorthecivilside,theUNimmediatelystartedtoselltheirpositioninordertoachievethegoalofgettingtheconvoythroughordoingthesafearea.Thatwaswhattheyweretrading.Overthecourseofthreeyears,youwatchUNPROFORsellitselfawayuntilwegetto1995.Thishappenedbecausethecommanders(andhereIincludeMr.Akashiandhispredecessors)hadonlythemselvestotradewith.Commanderscommand,negotiatorsnegotiate.Thepoliticianisthenegotiatorandthemanontheground,civilormilitary,isthecommander.Dontputthecommanderinthepositionwhereheistradingwithhimself.Thatiswhatweweredoingandweshouldn'tdoitagain.ThisleadsmetoaphrasethatIhate,negotiationbyforce.Ladiesandgentlemen,it'safight,abattle.ThatisnegotiationbyforceandthatiswhatIdo.Youcannotnegotiatebyforce,youwinorloseafightwithforce.Itisabinaryoutcome,winorlose.Itisnotanegotiation.Ifyouwantanegotiationwithforceassociated,thengetanegotiatorandusemetousetheforce.Thisishowthepolitical-militaryrelationshipshouldbewiredup.Itdoesnothavetobejustindividuals,itcanbecommittees,butyouhavetosatisfythoserequirements.Iwasrecentlyaskedbyapublishertowriteanewintroductiontoabook,originallywrittenin1976,calledOnThePsychologyofMilitaryIncompetence,whichIrecommendreading.82Itcausedmetothinkabouttheproblemofchangingmyowncommand'swayofthinkinginthespringandsummerof1995andturningthenervoussystemofmyheadquartersintosomethingmoreoffensive.Theauthor,NormanDixon,mentionstheneedtobreakthecollectiverationalizingawayofinformationchallengingthegroupsassumption.Didn'twehavetobreakthat?Hetalksabouttheunquestioningmoralityofrightnessthatenabletheconsequencesofactionstobeoverlooked.Didn'twefallintothatone?Hereferstoasharedillusionofunanimityinamajorityviewpoint.Lastly,hementionsaselectiveavailabilityofinformationtoavoidchallengingpreviousdecisions.Inotherwords,groupthink.Ifyouareincommandinoneofthesesituations,makesurethegroupthinkssafe.Thosearealsomylessons.82NormanDixonOnthepsychologyofmilitaryincompetenceisasurveyof100yearsofmilitaryinefficiencyfromtheCrimeanwartoWorldWarII.4-65YASUSHIAKASHI:TherearemanylessonstobelearnedfromtheSrebrenicaexperienceortheentireBosniaandHerzegovinaoperation.First,Iwouldliketosaythattheperfectsolutionisanenemyofagoodsolution.Inpeacekeepingyoufirsthavetodothehumanitarianassistanceside.Youalsohavetonegotiateaceasefiretostopbloodshed,howeverfragileitmightbe.Whatwemostwanttoaccomplishmaynotbewhatisthemostfeasibleorrealistic.AsDagHammarskjldsaid,whattheUNtriestodoisnottotakepeopletoheaven,buttosavethemfromhell.Wehavetobemodestandrealistic.IthinkthispeacekeepingeffortwasdoomedtobeafailurebecausetheBosniangovernmentdidnotwantpeacekeeping.Theywantedpeaceenforcement.TheBosnianSerbswantednopeacekeepingatall.Itwasboundtobeverydifficult,verydelicate,andverycontroversial.IwouldliketotellourDutchcolleaguesthattheyshouldnotblamethemselvestoomuch.TheywenttoSrebrenicabecauseCanadiansdidnotwanttocontinueandSwedenrefusedtogo.Youundertookaverydifficulttask.IamsureyouwereawareoftherisksbutImustsayyouhadthecouragetodoathanklessjob.YourCalvinisttradition[ofindividualresponsibility]isgreat,butdon'tgotoofar.IthinkColonelKarremansandhiscolleaguesdidtheirbest.Weneedtoputourselvesintheirshoes.Iagreewithotherspeakersthattheapproximately200resolutionsandpresidentialstatementsissuedbytheUNSecurityCouncil[relatedtoBosnia]werealittletoomuch.WeachievedpeaceCambodiawithabout5percentofthisnumberofresolutionsandpresidentialstatements,UNSCResolution836[ofJune4,1993],inparticular,wasaveryunfortunateresolution.Ithinkmanyofusreadittwenty,fortytimes,oreven100times,withoutmakingsenseofit.Itincludessomanyphasesandqualifiers.Youhavetoadoptresolutionsthatwillnotbelaughedatbycommandersandnegotiatorsontheground.IthinkDavidHarlandmadeaverygoodpointaboutthedefectivestructureofthepeacekeeping.TheheadquarterswasinSarajevoatfirst,whichwasagoodlocation,butwasmovedtoZagreb.83Thiswasamajordefect.[AsthespecialrepresentativeoftheUN83TheUNProtectionForcefortheformerYugoslavia(UNPROFOR)wasestablishedinFebruary1992,primarilyforCroatia,withheadquartersinSarajevo.TheheadquartersmovedtoZagrebinMay1992duetothelackofsecurityinSarajevo.4-66Secretary-General]inCambodia[between1992and1994],IestablishedmyheadquartersinPhnomPenh.Iwasabletoconsultwithforeignambassadorsatmyleisure,anytime,atamomentsnotice.Iestablishedaso-called"expandedfive"committee,representingthePermanentFiveSecurityCouncilmembersandregionallyimportantcountries.Theywereaperfectsoundingboardforme.TheforeignambassadorsinZagrebwereaccreditedtoCroatia,notBosnia.MyaccesstoSarajevoambassadorswasmuchmoredifficultthaninPhnomPenh.Sometimes,welearntoomanylessonsfromthepreviouspeacekeepingoperation.WekeptontellingourselvesnottocrosstheMogadishuline.WewereawareofthedebacleinSomalia.SecretaryofStateChristopherwarnedusoftheso-calledCNNeffect.Publicopinionandthemediasometimescauseustolaunchoperationsprematurelyandprematurelywithdraw,ashappenedafterOctober1993whentheAmericanRangersweredraggedthroughthestreetsofMogadishu.Wehavetoalwayswarnagainsttheeerieeffectsofmediaandtheficklenessofpublicopinion.Isubscribeto95percentoftheBrahimireportthatcameoutinAugust2000.Itisfullofverygoodlessonsforpeacekeepingoperationsanditdistributestheblameonallofus:fromtheSecurityCouncil,membergovernments,andUNHeadquartersinNewYorktoindividualcommanders.Theprimarywarningistoavoidtryingtodotheimpossible.Ifyoudecidetosendapeacekeepingforcesomewhere,youshouldnotbestingyaboutresources.Donotunderestimatethetaskswhichyouconfront.IamgladthatUNpeacekeepingoperationstodayarefarbetterthanthoseinthe1990s,butaretheyperfect?No,farfromit.AnewreporthasjustcomeoutfromagroupheadedbytheformerPresidentofEastTimor,JosRamos-Hortathatemphasizesthevitalimportanceofthepoliticalprocessaccompanyingpeacekeepingoperations.Peacekeepingoperationsaremuchmoreeffectiveifthereisapre-agreedpeaceagreement.WehadsuchanagreementinCambodiabuteventhentheinstrumentwasnotperfect.Wehadtoamendandrevisetheframeworkaswewenton.Mylegaladviserwasextremelydisturbedbymyattemptstodepartfromthatfundamentaltextwhichwasveryimportantforus,butnopaperisperfect.Nothingcanreplacehumanintelligence,humanwisdom.Peacekeepingisinconstantevolution.Allconflictsareuniqueandsuigeneris.Letusnotapplythesamesolutiontoalloperations.Wehavetobehumbleandkeepoureyes4-67wideopentoagreatdiversityofpeacekeepingoperations.ThelessonswedrawfromBosniaandHerzegovinashouldnotbeconsideredasabible,apanaceaforallfuturepeacekeeping.AsRupertandShashimentioned,thereisnoreferencetopeacekeepingintheUNCharter.WewillhavetocontinuetomuddlethroughsomewherebetweenChapterVIandChapterVII.Boutros-Ghali,inhisfamousagendaforpeacesaidthattheUNshouldsticktopeacekeepingbutthatpeaceenforcementmaybeallowedonaverysmallscale.TheSomaliaexperiencedforcedBoutros-GhalitoamendhisagendaandsaythattheUNshouldneverventureintopeaceenforcement.Forpeaceenforcement,youneedanentirelydifferentforcestructure,philosophy,training,equipment,andintelligencecapabilities,asmanyofyouhavementioned.OneofthefewrecommendationsintheBrahimireportthatwerenotacceptedbytheGeneralAssemblyorSecurityCouncilwasanintelligenceservice.MembergovernmentshatetogivetheUNSecretariatanintelligencecapacity.WehavetogototheDutchgovernmentortheSwedishgovernmentortheUSgovernmenttogetourintelligence.IftrustisestablishedbetweentheUNSecretariatandUNmembergovernments,youwillbeallowedaccesstoveryvaluableinformation,aswasthecasewithmewithregardtoNorthKoreannuclearinstallations.Ofcoursethosesatellitepictureswereimmediatelywithdrawnandtakenback.Iwillstophere,butIthinkthelasttwodayshavebeenextremelyvaluableandhavegivenusmanylessonstoponder.ZEIDRA'ADALHUSSEIN:EveryonearoundthistablewasonceaseniorUNofficialorrepresentedtheirstatesattheUNorworkedwiththeUNasjournalistsoracademic.Iamtheonly[serving]UNofficialatthistable,andformysinsIhavetobrieftheSecurityCouncilnextweekonSrebrenica.Iamtheonlyonewhoisbriefing.Iconsiderthisexercisenotjustarefreshingofmyownmindbuthopefully,withyourpermission,Iwillalso4-68representallofyouatthe20thcommemoration[oftheSrebrenicaevents].TheCouncilhastohearthehardtruthemergingfromthisdiscussion.84Iwas[Jordansambassadorto]theSecurityCouncil[in2014]whentheSecretary-Generaldecidedtocallforafullscalecomprehensivereviewofpeacekeeping.HereIdepartfromShashi.Itistruethatmandatesareimportantandresourcesandpoliticalwillarenecessary,butwhatalsomattersisperformance.WediscussedthisintheCouncilatlength.Youhavewhatyouhave,buthowwelldoyouperformwithwhatyouhave?WhatwediscoveredcomingoutofaninternalreportlastyearwasthatthereisamassivefailureintheprotectionofciviliansbytheUN,notwithstandingeverythingwrittenintheresolutionsoftheSecurityCouncil.85Oneofthematterswediscussedlastyearwasthecontinuing,chronicproblemofinterferencebynationalauthoritiesintheworkingofpeacekeepingoperations.Ithasnotdiminished,ithasnotgoneaway.Whentheatmosphereisbenign,nooneinterferes,butwhentheatmospherebecomesdangerousandacute,everybodyinterferes.NationalcommandstelltheircontingentsnottoobeytheUN,nottooccupythisbridge,toevacuatethisposition,exfiltrateoutofthatposition.Itisstillhappening.Welearnveryslowlyornotatall.Ourpowersofanticipationremainextremelypoor.Whenlookingatthelessonswedrawfromourexperiences,thereareafewthingsthatwehavetobearinmind.Inmanycases,notjustBosniabuttodayaswell,weareoftenterrifiedofourinterlocutorsandwhattheymaydo.Weshouldalsobepreparedtoallowthepossibilitythattheymaybeterrifiedofustoo.Wedonotfactorthatintoourthinking.Nolessonappearstohavebeenlearnedinthisregard,whichissodepressing.Justbecausethereisacomplexpoliticalsituationdoesnotmeanthatthemoralsituationissimilarlycomplex.ThereisaverycomplexpoliticalsituationinMyanmar,butthemoralsituationisveryclear.Weshouldnotconfusethetwo.Understandingthegrievancesoftheothersidedoesnotmeanthatyouhavetosympathizewiththeactionsoftheotherside.84HighCommissionerZeidaddressedtheUNSecurityCouncilsessiononSrebrenicaonJuly8,2015.RussiavetoedaUK-sponsoredresolutiondescribingtheeventsinSrebrenicaasagenocide.Theresolutionreceived10affirmativevotes.China,Venezuela,Angola,andNigeriaabstained.85OIOSreport,EvaluationoftheimplementationandresultsofprotectionofciviliansmandatesinUnitedNationspeacekeepingoperations,A/68/787,March7,2014.4-69Myfinalpointisthisthat[theparties]havetorespecttheUN.Theydon'thavetolikeus,butiftheydonotrespectus,theywillhavetheirwaywithus.86ThisiswhathappenstoomanytimeswhentheUNispresent.Wearetooquicktotrytoplease.Wewanttobeongoodtermswitheverybody,wewanttobelikedbyeverybody,wewanttofeelthatwearepartners.Itdoesn'tmatterintheend.Ihaveinfuriatedmoregovernmentsinthelastninemonthsthanmostpeopleherecouldpossiblydo,simplybecauseofmyjob[asUNHighCommissionerforHumanRights].Thethingistheyallwanttotalktoyou.Theyrealizethatthereissomerespectfortheoffice.ThatisafundamentallessonfortheUN.Weneedtounderstandwhowearedealingwith.Wesimplydidn'tunderstandenoughaboutwhatMladiwascapableof.Welearnextremelyslowly,ifatall.IhavebeenanalmostcontinuouspresenceattheUNsincemydaysinUNPROFOR,butwehaveneverhadadiscussionlikethis.WehadadebateintheGeneralAssemblyonDavidHarland'sreportin1999,butitwasn'tadiscussion.IwouldloveforthecurrentmembersoftheSecurityCounciltohavebeenhere[inTheHague]tolistentoourdiscussion.TheyneededtocomeandlistentothediscussionlastyearonRwanda.BothVitalyChurkinandSamanthaPower[representativesofRussiaandUnitedStatesontheSecurityCouncil]werebothwithusintheBalkans,buttheCouncilwritlargehasnoclueabouttheanatomyofallofthis.OneofthemostseriousconsequencesofourfailureinSrebrenicaandepawastheabandonmentofthewholeideaofsafeareas.Manyofusthoughtthatitcouldstillhaveapplicabilityifitweredoneright.YoucouldpossiblyhavehadasafeareainSyriain2012,but[theBosniaexperiencecausedusto]castitasideassomethingcompletelyimpractical.Idonotbelieveyoucan'tdoit.Inhisreport,DavidsaiditwasdifficulttodounderthecircumstanceswehadinBosnia,butthatdoesnotmeanitisimpossibleinothercircumstances.87ForthesakeofallthepeoplewhoaresufferinginSyria,Iraq,andLibya,86HighCommissionerZeidelaboratedonthispointinhisaddresstotheUNSecurityCouncilonJuly8.ThemostfoundationallessonofSrebrenicawasthis:Tosucceed,theUnitedNationsmustberespected.FortheUnitedNationstobeeffectiveinrobustpeacekeeping,allpartiestoaconflict,andinparticulartheaggressor,musttakethemeasureoftheCouncil,itsdecisionsandtheUnitedNationspresenceontheground.Theymustbelievetherewillbeseriousconsequences,andnoimpunity.87The1999Srebrenicareportconcludedthatprotectedzonesandsafeareascanhavearoleinprotectingciviliansinarmedconflict,buttheymusteitherbedemilitarizedandestablishedbytheagreementofthe4-70weneedtorescuetheideaofsafeareaandseeifwecanmakeitworkproperlythenexttime.ZLATKOLAGUMDIJA:First,Iwanttothankyoufororganizingthismeeting.AfewpointswhichIlearned.Peacekeepingandpeacebuildingaredifferentthings.Wehavetomovetothenextlevelwhichisconflictpreventionandsomethingcalledresponsibilitytoprotect.Thisexercisecangiveussometools,oratleastelementsofthetools,ofhowtoproceedinthefuture.Whenyouareinfrontofthecourt,youcanbechargedwithintentional[criminalacts]becauseyouplannedit.Youcanbechargedforbeingpartofa[plotorconspiracy].Youcanbechargedforknowingaboutit,youcanbechargedifyoushouldhaveknownit.InthecaseofMiloseviandMladi,theypurposefullyplannedtheseevents.ThenotionthatMladibecameakindoffalsemessiahat11p.m.oneeveningtotakerevengeforsomethingthathappened500yearsago,inordertocleanhiscommunistpast,isverydangerous.88Iunderstandthatsomepeopledidn'texpectit.Iunderstandthatsomepeoplewereshocked.Iwasmyselfshockedbythelevelofatrocity,Iexpectedittohappen,butnotonsuchascale.Iexpecteditfromtheverybeginning.Iwarnedattheverybeginningthatsomethinglikethiswouldhappen.Asdeputyprimeminister,ItalkedtoUNrepresentativesaboutplanned,organizedrapesofwomenindifferentpartsofthecountry.Massgraveswererecentlydiscoveredwith400bodiesinamassgraveatTomaicainthePrijedorarea,andanotheronewith700people,thatwerepartofthecrimesofJune-July1992.Therewasaplanned,self-evidentchainofeventsbeginninginTomaicaandthepeopleofPrijedorbeingmadetowearwhiteribbons[in1992].89WhathappenedinSrebrenicawasalogicalconsequenceofeverythingthathappenedbefore.90belligerentsortheymustbetrulysafeareas,fullydefendedbyacrediblemilitarydeterrent.Thetwoconceptsareabsolutelydistinctandmustnotbeconfused.88AreferencetoMladisstatement,onJuly11,2015,thatthetimehascometotakerevengeontheTurksforpasthistoricalinjustices.ICTYprosecutorsbelievethatMladitookthedecisionlateontheeveningofJuly11tokillthemalecaptivesfromSrebrenica.89InAugust2013,BosnianauthoritiesdiscoveredamassgraveinTomasicavillage,nearPrijedorinnorthwestBosnia,datingbacktothefirstphaseoftheBosniawar.ICTYinvestigatorslateridentifiedtheremainsof600victims,manyofwhomhaddisappearedfromtheirhomesinthePrijedorareainJune-July1992.TheSerbauthoritiesinPrijedorhadissuedanorder,onMay31,1992,forthenon-Serbpopulationofthetowntowear4-71Iunderstandthatyouhavetodiscuss,debate,cooperatewiththebutchersandcriminals,butwithallduerespectIcannotseehowyoucanbefornegotiationsandcooperationinbetweenanunprotectedvictimandanarmedmurdereraboutthevictimsrighttolife,property,religion,freedomanddignity.Toputitanotherway,canyouimagineawolfandalambdiscussingwhattheywillhavefordinner?Inthatcase,weshouldnotbesurprisedifthewolfisatthetable,notonthetable.Asotherparticipantshavesaid,weneedtoredefinethenotionofneutrality.IwitnessedtheobsessionwithneutralityfrommyfirstcontactwiththeUN,whenIparticipatedinnegotiationsbetweentheUNGeneralLewisMacKenzieandaYugoslavarmygeneralonMay2,1992.IwasarrestedwithPresidentIzetbegoviafterIreturnedfrompeacenegotiationsinLisbononaEuropeancommunityplane.91Isawhowitworks.IagreewithDiegothatwewitnessedaplannedslow-motiongenocidefromTomaicaandthewhiteribbonsofPrijedortoSrebrenica.Weshouldhaveseenitcoming.Thefirsttimethattherewasacomprehensive,seriousstrategywithacleargoal,ofstoppingthepeoplewhohadcommittedthegenocide,wasonAugust30toSeptember20,1995,withthebombingcampaignrunbyGeneralSmith.Thatwasalessonlearned.Thankyou.TOMBLANTON:ThankyouZlatko.Hasan?HASANMURATOVI:WemustallagreewithAmbassadorArriasconclusion[fromhisvisittoSrebrenicainApril1993],thatSrebrenicawasanopenjailinwhichaslowgenocidewastakingplace.ThecreationandmanagementofthesafeareawasapostponementofgenocideandpostponementoftransferofterritorytotheenemybytheUN.Theterritorywhiteribbonsontheirarmswhentheywentoutsidetheiroutsidetheirhomes,whichwereidentifiedbywhitesheets.90OnMay31,1992,theSerbauthoritiesinPrijedorissuedanorderforthenon-Serbpopulationofthetowntowearwhitestripesontheirarmswhentheywentoutsidetheirhomes,whichwereidentifiedbywhitesheets.Earlyinthewar,MladicriticizedtheethniccleansingpolicyadvocatedbyBosnianSerbpoliticalleaders.OnMay16,1992,hetoldtheRepublikaSrpskaAssemblythatwecannotcleansenorcanwehaveasievetosiftsothatonlySerbswouldstay...IdonotknowhowMr.KrajisnikandMr.Karadziwouldexplainthistotheworld.Peoplethatwouldbegenocide.[SeeMladispeechto16thSessionoftheRSAssembly.]91IzetbegoviandLagumdzijawerearrestedbytheYugoslavarmyatSarajevoairportwhentheyreturnedfrompeacetalksinLisbonaboardaEuropeanCommunityjetonMay2,1992.FightingflaredupinSarajevoshortlyafterwards.4-72wastransferredthroughthemistakesoftheUN.ItshouldhavebeenprotectedbytheUNforcesontheground,withsupportfromtheair.NATOandtheUNfailedtodefendtheenclavebecauseofmistakesmadebytheheadquartersinZagreb.IthinkMr.Harlandexpresseditverywell.Itwasnotafailureofthesystem,itwasafailureofindividuals.IamconvincedthatJanvierhadpromisedMladinottocallforairsupport.HedidkeephispromiseduringthetimeoftheattackandfallofSrebrenica.Asforthelessons,weallknowthattheinternationalcommunity,andtheUN,canactinoneoftwoways:throughpoliticalandlegalinfluenceorbyforce.IthinkitisclearthattheUNcannotimplementanykindofefficientorusefulpeacekeepingmissionwithoutsomeuseofforce.IntheBosniacase,mechanismsfortheuseofforcewerenotworkingproperly.Theywerenotimplementedproperly,theyweremisusedbyindividuals.Toavoidsimilarmistakesinthefuture,IthinkthatNATOmustbeincludedintheimplementationofSecurityCouncilinstructionsandresolutions.TorepeatwhatIsaidbefore,wemustgivecredittotheUNforitsactionsinthehumanitarianandmedicalfields,eventhoughthereweremanymistakesduetothefactthatsomanypeoplewereinvolved.WhenwearetalkingaboutwrongandtragicUNengagementinBosnia-Herzegovina,wearetalkingaboutUNPROFOR.ThispartoftheUNoperationinBosniawasunprincipled,counterproductive,irresponsible,unfortunate,tragicandshameful.TheseareallwordsthatdescribetheactionsoftheUNinBosnia-Herzegovina,andespeciallyinSrebrenica.OBRADKESIC:AsthesoleSerbianvoicehere,Iwouldliketohavetheopportunitytosaysomethinginclosing.Firstandforemost,IthinkeventhoughmyvoicecomesfromWashington,DC,itcomeswiththeapprovalofthePresidentofRepublikaSrpska[MiloradDodik]whoisawarethatIamhereandwhohasshownanopennessandwillingnesstoengageinthesekindsofdiscussions.Havingsaidthat,theoneregretIhaveisthattheSerbleadershipdidnotshowthewillingnesstoengageonthetragiceventsinSrebrenicaandgetaheadoftheneedforinformationaboutwhathappened.ImyselfencouragedKaradziinFebruary1996andalsothelasttimeIsawhimattheendofJuly1996,tobeforthrightaboutwhathappenedandgetasmuchinformationaspossibleaboutdiscrepanciesinthenumbersofmissing4-73menandcasualties.Unfortunately,hisfocusthenwasontheagreementheclaimedthathehadwithHolbrooke[toretirefromthepoliticalsceneinreturnforimmunityfromwarcrimesprosecution].Hesawnoneedtomovefurtherintryingtoclarifyanythingthathadhappenedduringthewar.TherewasmuchinourdiscussionsthatwasveryusefulandIcouldagreewith,butIhadtroublewiththepoliticalandmoralisticstatements.Idonotfindthemveryhelpfulorconstructive.Atthesametime,itdoesshowhowemotionalthisissuehasbeenandcontinuestobe.Hopefully,atsomepointinBosniaandHerzegovina,therewillbeachancetodosomethinglikethis,notonlyconcerningSrebrenicabutthemany,manyfesteringwoundsthatallpeoplehave.AswerememberthevictimsofSrebrenicaduringthe20thanniversarycommemoration,Ihopeyouwillhavesomecompassionandempathyforallthevictims,includingtheSerbianvictimswhotendtobeoverlookedwheneverthereisanykindofdiscussionaboutthesufferingofBosnia-Herzegovina.TOMBLANTON:Thankyou,Obrad.LetmegiveafinalwordtoKeesMatthijssen.KEESMATTHIJSSEN:IthinkIamtheonlymilitarypersonherestillonactiveduty.IhavefrequentlybeenaskedaboutthedifferencebetweenmyexperienceinBosniaandmyexperienceinIraqandinAfghanistan,whereIwasalsoacommandingofficerbutatahigherlevel.InbothIraqandinAfghanistan,IhadthecertaintythatIhadthemeansortheaccesstomeanstoallowmetodomyjobevenifthingswentwrong.ThatwasthebigdifferencewiththesituationwefacedinSrebrenica.ThemainlessonIwouldliketoemphasizeisthatthemilitaryareeducated,trainedtodotheirjobs.Policymakerordecisionmakersmustmakesurethatthemilitarycandotheirjob.IcompletelyagreewithSirRupertsremarksabouttherelationshipbetweenpoliticiansandpolicymakersandthemilitary.Makesurethatyoucreatetherightconditionssothatthemilitarycandotheirjobs.TOMBLANTON:Thankyou,Kees.LetmeaskAbiWilliams,ourhostandinspirationinmanyways,toconcludeourdeliberations.4-74ABIODUNWILLIAMS:Ithasbeenanextraordinarytwodays.Asyouhaveheard,wehadasimilarconferenceayearagoonRwanda.WhenIcametothisInstitute,particularlybecauseofmyexperienceattheUN,Ithoughtitwasimportantforustolookbackatthesereallytwotragiceventsandtogetabettersenseofwhathappenedthroughcriticaldialogueandcloseengagementwiththekeyplayersandtheirinteractionwithessentialdocuments.Injoiningus,youhavedoneaservicenotonlytopolicymaking,butalsotohistory.WefocusedonwhatwentwronginBosniaoverthepastcoupleofdays,butifwelookatMacedoniainthesameperiodyoucouldseewhatwentright.Ifyoulookatthemandate,theresources,thecooperationoftheparties,politicalwill,theperformance,youcanseewhywegotitright.IncontrasttoallthoseresolutionsandpresidentialstatementsonBosnia,inthecaseofMacedonia,therewereessentiallyjusttworesolutions,plusthepro-formaones,extendingthemandates.92Theresourceswereclear:500Americansmadeup50percentoftheforce,complimentedbyaNordicforceof500.ItwasarobustsignaltotherestoftheformerYugoslaviadrawingonthepeacekeepingtraditionsoftheNordictroops.Wesawwhatwentright.ItisappropriatethatweheldthisconferenceintheNetherlands.Srebrenicahasunderstandablybeenaparticularlysensitivesubjectinthiscountry.ItisatestamenttotheleadersoftheNetherlandsandthelevelofpublicdebatethatthesubjecthasremainedhighonthepoliticalandlegalagendaofthiscountry.WehavewitnessedarevolutioninaccountabilityandindividualresponsibilitysinceSrebrenicaandRwanda.Theuniqueconstellationofcourtsandtribunalsthatwehaveinthiscityrepresentsanenormousstepforwardinthefightagainstimpunity.ThisiswhyTheHagueInstitute,togetherwithotherinstitutionsinthiscity,areengagedindiscussionsaboutpreservingthejudicialheritageoftheICTY.Itiscriticalthatthisheritagebepreservedandnotlost.ItisimportantfortheUNtoexaminethepolicyandprogrammaticimplications[ofpastactions].Wecannotmakehistoriansofeverydiplomatbutwecanprovidethemwiththetoolstodrawonthelessonsthatpastexperienceprovides.92AccordingtotheUNdatabase,theSecurityCouncilpassedthreeresolutionsrelatedtotheformerYugoslaviain1991,21in1992,22in1993,13in1994,and21in1995,i.e.atotalof80resolutions.4-75IthasbeenanhonortohostthissecondeditionofourprojectandpartneragainwiththeUSHolocaustMemorialMuseumandtheNationalSecurityArchive.Thankyou,CameronandMichaelforyourtirelesseffortsinpreparingthisconference,andTom,foryourveryskillfulmoderationofthesediscussions.Aboveall,thankstoourcolleaguesfromBosnia.InthewordsofthegreatpoetMayaAngelou,inherpoeminhonorofPresidentClintonsfirstinauguration,"History,despiteitswrenchingpain,cannotbeunlived,butiffacedwithcourage,neednotbelivedagain."Wearedeeplygratefultoallofyouforyourwillingnesstoengagewithusandfortheopennesswithwhichyouhavediscussedtheverytraumaticandverypainfuleventsoftwodecadesago.Thankyou.[ENDOFOFFICIALTRANSCRIPT]

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