-
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
1/35
Preventive Counter-Terrorism and Non-
Discrimination in the European Union:
A Call for Systematic Evaluation
Dr. Quirine Eijkman
Bart Schuurman
MA
June 2011
Abstract
As a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the bombings inMadrid and London, a prevention
focussed counterterrorism approach has developed across the European Union (EU). While the
majorityof these laws, regulations andpolicies recognise the importance of the ruleof law and
human rights, it remains relevant to examinewhether in theory and in practice certain security
measures that were implemented have had disproportionate effects on ethnic and religious
minoritiesandtherebyviolatenondiscriminationstandards.Thisstudybrieflydiscussestheconcept
ofpreventivecounterterrorism,afterwhichitwillgoontoconsidertheuseofpreventivecounter
terrorismmeasuresintheEUaswellastheirpotentialdiscriminatorysideeffects.Acasestudywill
bepresentedoftwoofthememberstates:theNetherlandsandtheUK.Intheconclusion,theneed
for systematic evaluation of the effect of preventive counterterrorism measures in relation to
compliancetonondiscriminationstandardsisdiscussed.
-
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
2/35
About the Authors
Dr. Quirine A. M. Eijkman is a SeniorResearcher and Lecturer at the Centre for Terrorism and
CounterterrorismofLeidenUniversity.Additionally,sheisaconsultantforJusticeQ&A.Previouslyshe
worked for the Police andHuman Rights Programme ofAmnesty International, theHuman Rights
CommitteeoftheDutchAdvisoryCouncilonInternationalAffairs,theRooseveltAcademyofUtrecht
University,theNetherlandsInstituteofHumanRights(SIM)andattheInternationalHumanitarianLaw
DepartmentoftheNetherlandsRedCross.In2007,shedefendedherPhDthesisWeAreHeretoServe
You!: Public Security, Police Reform and Human Rights Implementation in Costa Rica at Utrecht
UniversityCurrently,she isaMemberoftheBoardofAdvisorsoftheDutchPlatformonCivilRights
andtheDutchSectionoftheInternationalCommissionofJurists(NJCM)ofwhichbetween2005and
2011 shewas the (vice)President. She has published on the sideeffects of securitymeasures for
humanrights,policereform,andhumanrightsmobilization.Herareasofinterestincludesecurityand
humanrights,counterterrorism,transitionaljusticeandthesociologyoflaw.
Bart
Schuurman,
MA
is
a
junior
researcher
at
the
Centre
for
Terrorism
and
Counterterrorism
of
LeidenUniversity.Additionally,he isworkingonhisPhD thesis.His research is focusedmainlyon
strategicnegotiationsbetweengovernmentalandnongovernmentalorganisations, the influenceof
public support on the outcome of terrorismrelated conflict situations, the theories of military
strategist Carl von Clausewitz, and the obstacles encountered by western actors in socalled
asymmetricconflicts.
About ICCT - The Hague
The International Centre for CounterTerrorism (ICCT) The Hague is an independentknowledge
centre that focuses on information creation, collation and dissemination pertaining to the
preventativeand
international
legal
aspects
of
counter
terrorism.
The
core
of
ICCTs
work
centres
on
such themes as de and counterradicalisation, human rights, impunity, the rule of law and
communication in relation to counterterrorism. Functioning as a nucleuswithin the international
counterterrorismnetwork, ICCTTheHagueendeavours to connectacademics,policymakersand
practitioners by providing a platform for productive collaboration, practical research, exchange of
expertiseandanalysisofrelevantscholarly findings.Byconnectingtheknowledgeofexpertstothe
issuesthatpolicymakersareconfrontedwith, ICCTTheHaguecontributestothestrengtheningof
both research and policy. Consequently, avenues to new and innovative solutions are identified,
whichwillreinforcebothhumanrightsandsecurity.
Contact
ICCTTheHague
KoninginJulianaplein10
P.O.Box13228
2501EE,TheHague
TheNetherlands
T+31(0)708009531
Allpapers
can
be
downloaded
free
of
charge
at
www.icct.nl
StayuptodatewithICCT,followusonlineonFacebook,TwitterandLinkedIn
ICCTTheHague2011
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]://www.icct.nl/https://www.facebook.com/pages/International-Centre-for-Counter-Terrorism-The-Hague/153629044683670?sk=wallhttps://twitter.com/ICCT_TheHaguehttp://www.linkedin.com/groups/International-Centre-CounterTerrorism-Hague-4125332?trk=myg_ugrp_ovrhttp://www.linkedin.com/groups/International-Centre-CounterTerrorism-Hague-4125332?trk=myg_ugrp_ovrhttps://twitter.com/ICCT_TheHaguehttps://www.facebook.com/pages/International-Centre-for-Counter-Terrorism-The-Hague/153629044683670?sk=wallhttp://www.icct.nl/mailto:[email protected] -
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
3/35
1 ICCTTheHagueResearchPaper Dr.QuirineEijkman&BartSchuurman,MA
Introduction
Asaresultofthe9/11terroristattacksandthebombingsinMadridandLondon,apreventionfocussedcounter
terrorism approachhasdeveloped across theEuropeanUnion (EU). Preventive counterterrorism is appealing
because it implies interventionsthat removetheabilityor,betterstill, themotivationofpotential terroriststo
carryout
their
lethal
designs.
Member
states
such
as
the
United
Kingdom
(UK)
and
The
Netherlands
that
have
primarily experience with addressing home grown terrorism, have developed preventive counterterrorism
measuresinresponse.Themajorityoftheselaws,regulationsandpoliciesrecognisetheimportanceoftheruleof
lawandhumanrights.However,itremainsrelevanttoexaminewhetherintheoryandinpracticecertainsecurity
measures that were implemented have had disproportionate effects on ethnic and religious minorities and
thereby violate nondiscrimination standards. For instance, a 2008 survey conducted by the European
FundamentalRightsAgencyshowedthataconsiderablenumberofminoritiesintheEUfeelthattheyarebeing
stoppedbylawenforcementofficialsonthebasisoftheirethnicityorimmigrantstatus.1
When national intelligence and security services, law enforcement officials and other civil servants
implementandexecutecounterterrorismmeasuresinadiscriminatoryfashion,theyalienatethetargetedgroup
and thereby reduce opportunities for effective cooperation. This especially applies to preventive counter
terrorismmeasures includingcounter andderadicalisationpolicies,automaticbordercontrol,passengername
recordsdata,aliendeportationonthegroundsofnationalsecurityorpublicorder,surveillancecameras,stopand
search practices, and administrative measures including control orders. Strong claims are made by both
supporters and criticastersof certainmeasures,with little supportingevidence and inhighly chargedpolitical
climates.2Notwithstandingtheintensityofthisdebate,inmostcasestherehasbeenlittlesystematicevaluation
of the effect of these particular counterterrorismmeasures in terms of effectiveness in preventing terrorist
crimesand/orofadverseresultsforhumanrightssuchasperceivedorrealdiscriminatoryoutcomes.
Despite seriousmethodological and empirical challenges including limited access to confidential data,
mistrustand
limited
opportunities
for
the
informed
exchange
of
information,
there
is
increasing
research
and
advocacy from a human rights perspective on security and counterterrorism measures in relation to non
discriminationstandards.GiventheEUanditsmemberstatescommitmenttoaddressingterrorthreatswithfull
respectforthefundamentalrightsonwhichtheUnionisbased,andtheresearchevidenceindicatingthatpolicies
thatareexperienced and/orperceivedasunfairanddiscriminatoryare ineffectiveandpossiblyeven counter
productive,itisimportanttogivethesequestionsseriousconsideration.Theneedforgreaterscrutinyofcurrent
efforts to prevent terrorism increases as European authorities seek to support improved understanding and
exchangeofgoodpracticesinpreventingterrorismundertheStockholmProgramme.3
TheUnitedKingdom (UK) and theNetherlandshavebeen longstandingpioneers inefforts todevelop
early interventionsto identify individualswhomaybeonapathtoviolentradicalisation,andtousearangeof
police,judicial
and
administrative
measures
to
intercede
prior
to
an
actual
terrorist
attack
and,
at
times,
well
beforethereisanyevidenceofplanningormaterialsupportfortheexecutionofterroristacts.Whiletheneedto
preventactsofterrorismandextremistviolenceisclear,itisimportanttouseonlythoseapproachesthatcanbe
shown with a persuasive degree of assurance to be effective, and meet (inter)national nondiscrimination
standards.4
1EuropeanUnionAgencyforFundamentalRights,EuropeanUnionMinoritiesandDiscrimination Survey:DatainFocusReport4:PoliceStopsandMinorities
(Vienna:FRA,2010).
2EuropeanParliamentCommitteeonCivilLiberties,JusticeandHomeAffairsWorkingDocument1PE456.713v0100of19January2011ontheEUCounter
TerrorismPolicy:MainAchievementsandFutureChallenges,pp.23.
3TheStockholmProgrammedefinestheEUsframeworkforpolice,rescueservicesandcustomscooperation,criminalandcivillawcooperation,aswellas
asylum,migration
and
visa
policy
for
the
period
of
2010
2014.
For
more
information
on
the
Stockholm
Programme
see:
European
Council,
The
Stockholm
Programme:anOpenandSecureEuropeServingandProtectingCitizens,OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnion(4May2010).
4SeeamongothersPeterNeumann,PrisonsandTerrorism:RadicalisationandDeradicalisationin15Countries(TheInternationalCentrefortheStudyof
RadicalisationandPoliticalViolence(ICSR)/TheNationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsetoTerrorism(START),2010),pp.168;Bobde
Graaff,HoeBreed?:Contraterrorisme enRadicaliseringsbeleidOnderdeLoep[CounterterrorismandCounterRadicalisationPolicyReviewed], inJaapvan
-
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
4/35
2 PreventiveCounterterrorismandNondiscrimination intheEuropeanUnion:Acallforsystematicevaluation
Thisstudybrieflydiscussestheconceptofpreventivecounterterrorism. Furthermoreitwillconsiderthe
useofpreventivecounterterrorismmeasuresintheEUaswellastheirpotentialdiscriminatorysideeffects.Two
member states, theNetherlandsand theUK, serveascase studies. In theconclusion, theneed for systematic
evaluationoftheeffectofpreventivecounterterrorismmeasuresinrelationtocompliancetonondiscrimination
standardsisdiscussed.
PreventiveCounterterrorismMeasures
Counterterrorism is a complex andmultifaceted subject that encompasses a host of different strategies for
dealingwithviolentextremism.Itscentralpurposecanbedescribedasdevisingmethodsandpoliciestocause
non state groups that employ [terrorism] to stop using violence to achieve their political objectives.5
ParaphrasingAlexSchmid,itispossibletodividethesemethodsandpoliciesintotwobroadcategories:namely,
those efforts that fight the manifestations of terrorism and those that attempt to address the conditions
conducive
to
the
spread
of
terrorism.
It
is
the
latter
category
of
preventive
counter
terrorism
measures
that
constitutesthefocusofthisreport.6
Whileapreventiveapproachtocounterterrorism istobe lauded for itsemphasisonavertingviolence
rather than responding to it, themanner inwhich such policies are currently being implemented by various
countries and international organisations raise significant questions related to the right to privacy, data
protection,thepresumptionofinnocenceaswellasthepositionofethnicandreligiousminorities.Forinstance,
what, ifany,arethediscriminatorysideeffectsofpreventivecounterterrorismmeasurestakenbytheEU,the
NetherlandsandtheUK,andhowdothese(unintended)consequencesaffectlegislationandpreventivepolicies?
Beforeaddressingthesequestions,thefollowingsectionwillbrieflyexploretheconceptofpreventivecounter
terrorismanditspotentialmerits.
Why(not)focusonprevention?
Themostobviousadvantageofacounterterrorismpolicy that focusesonprevention is itsability toavert the
deathsandinjuriesofinnocentcivilianswhomightotherwisehavefallenvictimtoaterroristattack.Moreover,by
forestallingthesocietalpolarisationandcallsforrevengethatfrequentlyfollowterroristactsandwhich inturn
mayleadtoaviciouscycleofretaliation,preventivestrategiescanalsohaveclearlongertermbenefits.7
However,policiesthatfocusonpreventingterrorismarenotnecessarilylimitedtoavertinganimminent
attack.Abroaderormore fundamental formofpreventive counterterrorismattempts to remove the factors
conducive to the spread of violent extremism. By engaging in dialogue with radicalising individuals or
organisationsandbyaddressingthegrievancesthatengenderanenvironmentinwhichviolentradicalisationmay
occur, governments can take steps towards the longterm resolutionof a conflict anddiminish the appeal to
resort to terrorism. Such a focus on conciliation andmediationwill certainlynot yield results overnight, and
politiciansadvocatingthisformofpreventionmustbepreparedtobeinitforthelonghaul.Thatsaid,removing
Donselaar,PeterRodrigues(eds.),MonitorRacisme&Extremisme:AchtsteRapportage(Leiden/Amsterdam:UniversityofLeiden/AnneFrankFoundation,
2008),pp.125140.
5RobertJ.ArtandLouiseRichardson,Introduction,inRobertJ.ArtandLouiseRichardson(eds.),DemocracyandCounterterrorism:LessonsfromthePast
(Washington:UnitedStatesInstituteofPeacePress,2007),p.1.
6Alex
P.
Schmid,
Prevention
of
Terrorism:
Towards
aMulti
Pronged
Approach,
in
Tore
Bjrgo
(ed.),
Root
Causes
of
Terrorism:
Myths,
Reality
and
Ways
Forward(London:Routledge,2005),p.223.
7Northern Irelands Troublesand Italysexperiencewithdomestic terrorismbothprovidemanyexamplesof thereciprocalnatureof terrorismrelated
violence.Forexample,see:SteveBruce,TheRedHand:ProtestantParamilitariesinNorthernIreland(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1992),pp.31,56,136
138;LeonardWeinberg,TheRedBrigadesin:ArtandRichardson(eds.)(seenote4above),pp.3031.
-
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
5/35
-
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
6/35
4 PreventiveCounterterrorismandNondiscrimination intheEuropeanUnion:Acallforsystematicevaluation
beingespeciallyprone to radicalisation.14
Governmentscanalsodevelopa strategicnarrative todiminish the
appeal of the terroristsmessagewhilewinning support for its own, and timely and accurate intelligence is
anothercruciallyimportantaspectofdetectingandpreventingterroristplots.Finally,thereareahostofjudicial
measures thatpoliticianscanenact to increase thepowerof theexecutiveand thejudiciaryvisvis terrorist
organisations.15
PreventingTerrorismintheEuropeanUnion,theNetherlandsandtheUnitedKingdom
Statesabilitiestoimplementpreventivelawsandpolicies inthefieldsoutlinedabovearemosteffectivewithin
theirownnationalborders.Yetmanyoftodaysterroristthreatshaveaninternationalortransnationalcharacter;
operativesplanningattacksinWesterncountrieshavefrequentlyvisitedtrainingcampsinfailedorfailingstates,
mayreceiveplanningadviceandinstructionsfromhandlersinforeigncountriesoraresupportedlogisticallyand
financiallybyaninternationalnetwork.Howcaneffortstoaddressrootcausesbefruitfulinthiscontext?Asthis
sectionwill show,while statesareawareof theseconcernsandcommitted toaddressing themonpaper, the
difficultiesofactuallydoingsomayexplainwhy inpracticepreventivecounterterrorismhasastrongdomestic
focusaimedat identifyingandremovingradicalising individualsandgroupsbeforetheyhaveanopportunityto
strike.16
ApreventivefocussharedbytheEU,theNetherlandsandtheUKaimsathaltingthefinancingofterrorist
organisationsandindividuals.Afterthefatefulattacksof9/11,theUnitedNations(UN)SecurityCounciladopted
abindingresolutioncallingonitsmemberstofightterroristfinancingbyfreezingtheassetsoforganisationsand
individualswhohavecommitted,orare likely tocommit, terroristattacks.ThisUNSecurityCouncil resolution
1373hassinceformedanimportantbasisforcooperationoncounterterrorismamongEUmemberstates.17
TheEUscounterterrorismstrategyconsistsoffourstrands;prevent,protect,pursueandrespond.The
preventiveaspect
of
this
strategy
is
in
turn
divided
into
three
segments;
disrupting
radicalisation
and
terrorist
recruitment, ensuring mainstream opinion prevails over extremist views and promoting with a strong third
countrydimensionsecurity,justice,democracyandequalopportunity.18
Thislatteraspectwouldappeartobethe
mostsuitedtoaddressingtheconditionsconducivetothespreadofviolentradicalisationandterrorism,buton
howtoactuallyachievethisoutsideoftheEUsborders,theUnionissomewhatvague.OutsideEurope,wemust
promotegoodgovernance,humanrights,democracy,aswellaseducationandeconomicprosperity,throughour
politicaldialogue,assistance andresponsiblemediaprogrammes.Andwemustworktoresolveconflict.19
Due to the international character of contemporary terrorism, the Dutch government attaches
considerable significance to international cooperation as a means of preventing attacks. 20 This policy focus
corresponds with the preventive portion of the UNs global counterterrorism strategy, which emphasises
increasedcooperation
between
states
within
the
framework
of
existing
international
law
that
outlaw
terrorism
14Ibid.,pp.228229.
15Ibid.,pp.226234;LawrenceFreedman,TheTransformation ofStrategicAffairs.AdelphiPaper379(Abingdon:Routledge,2006).
16Schmid (seenote6above),p.227;Europol,TESAT2010:EUTerrorismSituationandTrendReport (TheHague:Europol,2010),pp.7,20,2226,98;
National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb), Actueel Dreigingsniveau (NCTb, 2011).
http://www.nctb.nl/onderwerpen/Actueel_dreigingsniveau/index.aspx. Retrieved 27 January 2011;House of Commons, Prevent Strategy (London: The
StationaryOffice,2011).
17Committee on the Evaluation of Counterterrorism Policy (Suyver Committee) Report IBIS13171 of May 2009 on An Integrated Evaluation of
CounterterrorismPolicies[NaareenIntegraleEvaluatievanAntiterrorismeMaatregelen],pp.4142;CouncilofEuropeCommitteeofExpertsonTerrorism
ProfilesonCounterTerroristCapacityofApril2007ontheUnitedKingdom,p.3.
18CounciloftheEuropeanUnionNote15893/1/10of17January2011ontheEUActionPlanOnCombatingTerrorism;CounciloftheEuropeanUnionNote
15443/07of23November2007ontheEuropeanUnionStrategyforCombatingRadicalisationandRecruitmenttoTerrorism,p.3.
19Ibid.
2007,
p.
5;
Ibid.
2011,
pp.
67.
20 National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb), Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie 20112015 (NCTb, 2011).
http://www.nctb.nl/Actueel/persberichten/2011/persbericht 110414.aspx. Retrieved 19 April 2011), pp.3031, 7678; House of Representatives of the
StatesGeneral,Terrorismebestrijding:BriefvandeMinistersvanJustitieenvanBinnenlandseZakenenKoninkrijksrelaties,[Counterterrorism:Letterfrom
theMinistersofJusticeandoftheInteriorandKingdromRelations]ParliamentaryPapers20032004,29745,no.1,10September2004,p.18.
-
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
7/35
5 ICCTTheHagueResearchPaper Dr.QuirineEijkman&BartSchuurman,MA
relatedviolence.Specificattention ispaid tosuch topicsas increasingcooperationunderexisting international
treaties,bringing terrorists tojustice, strengthening internationaljudicialcooperation,extraditionprogrammes
and the intensification of information sharing on terrorismrelated subjects between states.21
The Dutch
government recognises that failedand failingstatesareenablersof international terrorism,and thatcountries
withoutthecapacitytodetectterroristorganizationsoperatingwithintheirbordersarealsogroundsforconcern.
Whileit
acknowledges
that
the
effects
of
policies
geared
towards
preventing
or
containing
failed
states
will
only
become apparent in the longrun, the Dutch government believes that helping the latter category of states
improvetheircounterterrorismcapabilitiescanyieldshorttermbenefits.
TheUKscounterterrorismstrategy,Contest,alsoemphasisestheinternationalnatureofcontemporary
terrorismandcitestheimportanceofaddressingtherootcausesthatcanleadtoviolentextremism.22
Overseas
capacitybuilding,internationaloutreachtoMuslimcommunities,povertyalleviation,developmentaidandpeace
operations aredesignated as importantelementsof theUKs counterterrorism strategy,even if theyarenot
directlypartofContestbuttheworkof,forexample,theForeignandCommonwealthOffice.23
Althoughthereis
alackofevidenceforacausalrelationshipbetweenpovertyandterrorism,theBritishgovernmentistobelauded
foritsattentiontoterrorismsenablingfactors.24
Thesearelongtermgoalsandprogresstowardsthemishardto
measure.25Furthermore,
with
no
clear
end
in
sight
for
the
conflicts
in
Afghanistan,
Iraq
and
Israel
subjects
the
Britishrecogniseaskeygrievances fuellingterrorismtheseeffortstoreduceextremismandpoliticalviolence
abroadmaybeoflimitedutility.26
In amore general sense, addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism abroadwill
require at least somedegree of engagementwith organisationsmany voters and politicians considermorally
reprehensible.Theremustbesufficientwillingnesstotalktoterroristsamongpoliticiansandsufficientdomestic
supportforsuchcontroversialcoursesofaction.Withmanysuchorganisationsblacklistedeveniftheyrepresent
considerable constituencies (as isevident in the caseofHamas),andwith the struggleagainst terrorismuntil
recently considered a warby theworlds foremost power, it is hard to conceiveof a sizeable and effective
internationalstrategytopreventterrorismtakingshapeanytimesoon.27
Addressing the factorsconducive toacomplexphenomenonsuchas (international) terrorism isavery
difficultundertaking.Addtothisthestrongincentiveforgovernmentstobeseentodealwithterrorismandthe
moralandpoliticaldifficultiesofnegotiatingwith terroristsandapossibleexplanationarises for theemphasis
thattheEU,theNetherlandsandtheUKplaceonamorenarrowandimmediateinterpretationofprevention.28
Aninterpretationthatfocusesontheearlyidentificationofindividualswhomayberadicalisingandtheuseofa
rangeofpolicing,judicialandadministrative instrumentsto intercedeprior toaterrorattack,sometimeseven
beforethere isanyevidenceofplanningormaterialsupportforactsofterror.An interpretationofprevention,
finally,thatisprimarilyconcernedwiththreatsastheyoccurwithinacountrysborders.
Thereareofcoursealsoverygoodreasonsforfocusingonthedomesticterroristthreatthathavelittleto
dowith
public
pressure
and
limited
abilities
to
alter
the
internal
affairs
of
far
away
states.
As
the
2004
bombing
of
theMadridrailwaystationandthe2005attacksonLondonspublictransportmadeapparent,Europeanstates
may bemost immediately at risk from homegrown terrorism, rather than the international networks and
organisationsdirectlyassociatedwithalQaedaanditscohorts.Indeed,asCoolsaetargues,theseattacksfirmly
21UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyResolutionA/RES/60/288of20September2006ontheUnitedNationsGlobalCounterterrorismStrategy,p.5.
22BritishGovernment(seenote16above),pp.46,50,54,56,80
23Ibid.,pp.68,85,92,9699.
24See,forexample:JamesA.Piazza,RootedinPoverty?:Terrorism,PoorEconomicDevelopment,andSocialCleavages,TerrorismandPoliticalViolence,
vol.18,no.1,2006,pp.159177;Schmid(seenote6above),p.227.
25BritishGovernment(seenote16above),pp.59,96,
26Ibid.,pp.4344.
27Isabelle
Duyvesteyn
and
Bart
Schuurman,
'Dialoog
en
Onderhandeling
met
Terroristische
Organisaties:
Voorbeelden
en
Lessen
uit
de
Westerse
en
Niet
WesterseWereld(19452009)'[DialogueandNegotiationwithTerroristOrganizations:ExamplesandLessonsfromtheWesternandNonWesternWorld],
(ResearchandDocumentationCentre(WODC),June2010)pp.1101.
28DuyvesteynandSchuurman(seenote27above),pp.2835;BeatricedeGraaf,WaarzijnwijBangvoor?VeiligheidsdenkenendeAngstvoordeAnder
[WhatareWeAfraidOf?SecurityandtheFearoftheOther](Rotterdam:Guys&Godoy,2011),pp.2025.
-
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
8/35
6 PreventiveCounterterrorismandNondiscrimination intheEuropeanUnion:Acallforsystematicevaluation
anchored radicalisation, intertwinedwith the socalled homegrown dimension, at the heart of EU counter
terrorismendeavours.29
Theprecedinghastouchedupontheconceptofpreventivecounterterrorisminageneralsenseandhas
attemptedto indicatethat it isadifficultconceptforstatestoput intopracticebeyondtheirownborders.This
paper now turns to the way in which the EU, the Netherlands and the UK have attempted to implement
preventivepolicies
at
home.
PreventivecounterterrorismintheEuropeanUnion
The EUs response to terrorism has been partly eventdriven.30
Following the attacks of 9/11, international
terrorism immediatelybecameakeyconcern for theUnionand led to the formulationofa counterterrorism
actionplan.Thisplanhas sinceundergone severalmodificationsandcurrently listsdetailsofhow thevarious
strands (prevent, protect, pursue and respond) of the EUs Counterterrorism Strategy are to be put into
practice.31
Anotherkeymeasure thatwas taken following theSeptember11attackswas the2002Framework
decisiononcombatingterrorism,whichwillbeoutlinedinmoredetailbelow.32
TheMarch2004terroristattacksinMadridsimilarlyledtoaflurryofcounterterrorismmeasuresinthe
Union.The
EUs
counter
terrorism
action
plan
was
modified
to
incorporate
joint
investigation
teams
(JITs)
that
would enable member states to more effectively tackle this transnational phenomenon, to allow greater
cooperationandeffectiveness regarding theexchangeof terrorismrelated information, tocreateaspecialised
counterterrorism unit within Europol and to strengthen EUUS cooperation on counterterrorismrelated
matters.33
The 7/7/2005 terrorist attacks in London initiated anotherwave of counterterrorism legislation and
policies.TheMadridandLondonattackshadmadeitcleartopolicymakersthattheterroristthreathadtakenon
anewdimension;thatofhomegrownterroristgroupswithlittleornodirectlinkstoalQaedaand itsaffiliates.
Thisrealisationtriggeredan increased interest inthepathwaysthat ledtoradicalisation;whywouldEUcitizens
wish
to
take
up
arms
against
their
own
states
and
what
measures
could
be
taken
to
prevent
this
from
occurring
in
the future? Besides various counterterrorismmeasures aimed at restricting terrorists ability to operate, for
examplethroughtheimplementationofEuropeanArrestWarrants,the2005bombingsalsoledtotheadoption
oftheEUscurrentCounterterrorismStrategyanditsfourseparatestrands.34
AccordingtoCoolsaet,theEUsdomesticapproachtofightingterrorismhasalwaysfocusedondevising
measuresand institutionstocomplementmemberstatesowncounterterrorism initiativesandabilitieswitha
strongfocusoncriminalisingterrorism.35
Suchisindeedtheapproachtakenbythe2005strategy.Withregardto
thepreventstrand,thedocumentstatesthattheEUcanprovideanimportantframeworktohelpcoordinate
national policies, share information and determine good practice.36
Key elements of the prevent strand are
combating radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism, empowering mainstream opinion and promoting
security,justice
and
democracy.37
YetdespitethepreventstrandhavingbeenlabelledastheEUsforemostcounterterrorismpillar,many
ofthemostimportantcountermeasuresadoptedinthedecadesince9/11donotseemtofitthiscategory.38
At
least,not ifprevention isseenasaddressing the factorsconducive to thespreadof terrorism. Instead, theEU
29Coolsaet(seenote9above),p.869.
30EuropeanParliamentCommitteeonCivilLiberties,JusticeandHomeAffairs(seenote2above),p.3;Coolsaet(seenote9above),p.858.
31CounciloftheEuropeanUnion(seenote18above),pp.38.;CounciloftheEuropeanUnionNote5771/1/06of13February2006ontheEUActionPlan
onCombatingTerrorism.
32CounciloftheEuropeanUnionFrameworkDecision2002/475/JHAof13 June2002onCombatingTerrorism;DavidCasale, EU InstitutionalandLegal
CounterTerrorismFramework,DefenceAgainstTerrorismReview,vol.1,no.1,2008,p.52.
33Casale(seenote32above),p.52.
34Ibid.,
pp.
52
53;
Coolsaet
(see
note
9above),
pp.
867
869.
35Coolsaet(seenote9above),pp.871872.
36CounciloftheEuropeanUnionNote14469/4/05of30November2005ontheEuropeanUnionCounterterrorismStrategy,p.8.
37Ibid.,pp.79;CounciloftheEuropeanUnion(seenote18above),pp.38.
38Coolsaet(seenote9above),p.866.
-
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
9/35
-
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
10/35
8 PreventiveCounterterrorismandNondiscrimination intheEuropeanUnion:Acallforsystematicevaluation
EuropeanCommissioncontinuestoproposethemajorityoflegislation,theEuropeanParliament,MemberStates
andotherbodiescannowinitiatelegislativeprocedurestoo.47
AlthoughnotyetcompletelypartoftheEUslegalframework,the2005PrmConventionhasalsoplayed
animportantroleinincreasingEUmemberstatescooperationwithregardtotransnationalcrime,terrorismand
illegal immigration.OriginallydrawnupandsignedbyBelgium,Germany,France,Luxemburg,TheNetherlands,
Austriaand
Spain,
this
conventions
success
has
attracted
the
attention
of
other
European
states
as
well
as
the
EU
itself,which in2007proposedtopartly incorporatethetreaty.Theconventioncalls forclosercooperationand
increased interoperability on such topics asDNA information and fingerprints, vehicle registration and police
work.48
ThereareaplethoraofEUinstitutionswhichconcernthemselvesinonewayoranotherwiththeUnions
internalandexternalsecurityandtherebyhavearoletoplayinimplementingitscounterterrorismstrategy.The
increasedauthorityandexpandedopportunitiesforcooperation thattheLisbontreatyoffersthese institutions
has inmany instances given an impetus toplans forbuilding, expanding,or increasing interagency access to
databases that containextensivebiographicalandbiometric informationonEU citizens and foreignnationals.
Databases that are used, inter alia, for security and immigration policy. Such databases are used to identify
individualswho
may
pose
asecurity
risk,
enabling
the
relevant
authorities
to
launch
an
investigation
to
assess
the
actual levelof risk. In theory,suchprofiling techniquesenableaproactiveandpreventive response toserious
crime and terrorism; removing likely offenders from the general public before they are able to carry out or
completetheircriminaldesigns.49
Europol is a prime example of such an institution, a core EU agency tasked with improving the
cooperationofandcoordinationbetweenmemberstateslawenforcementagenciesinordertomoreeffectively
tackle transnational crime and terrorism. The Europol Information System contains extensive personal
informationonindividualswhocouldhavetheintentiontocommitacriminaloffence.Suchabroadcriterionfor
inclusion in thisdatabasepotentiallyallows forbiographicandbiometric informationonvirtuallyanyone tobe
recorded, which raises a number of concerns related to the presumption of innocence, privacy and data
protection.Furthermore,Europolhastheambitionto integratethissystemwithsimilardatabasesoperatedby
otherEUinstitutionsandmemberstates,creatingavastpoolofinformationthatisaccessiblebyaveritablehost
ofinstitutions,countriesandagencies.Infact,Europolalsowishestomakepossiblethefreeexchangeofpersonal
dataandbiometricinformationwithpartneragenciesintheUnitedStatesofAmerica,makingdataonEUcitizens
accessibletransatlantically.50
Another EU agency that focuses on pooling large amounts of information on potentially unwanted
individuals is Frontex, the EUs External BorderAgency,which is taskedwith protecting theUnions borders,
primarily from illegal immigrants. It strives to establish an integrated border security system that utilises
biometricinformationaswellasdatagarneredfromsatellites,unmanneddroneaircraftandhightechdetection
andborder
surveillance
technology.
51
Neither
Frontex
nor
Europol
is
exclusively
tasked
with
counter
terrorism,
yetbothinstitutionshavearoletoplayinimplementingEUpolicyinthisareaandthedatathattheygathercan
bedirectlyusedforthepurposesofpreventingterrorismbyidentifyingpossibleperpetrators.52
Numerous largescaledatabasescontainingpersonaldataandbiometric informationonEUcitizensand
foreignnationalsalreadyexist,andarebeingdeveloped,withintheEU.AmongthemtheVisaInformationSystem
(VIS),whichwasexpanded to includebiometric information following the9/11attacksspecifically, thoughnot
exclusively,tocontributeto internalsecurityand fightingterrorism.53
TheSchengen InformationSystem (SIS I
47Articles76TreatyofLisbon;Peers(seenote45above),p.3.
48VerdragvanPrm[TreatyofPrm],Stb.2008,25,enteredintoforce17January2008.
49Jespers(seenote12above),pp.259275;OpenSocietyInstitute(seenote40above),p.68.
50Valentina
Pop,
MEPs
Decry
Breach
of
Trust
in
EU
US
Data
Deal,
EUObserver.com
(16
March
2011);
Franoise
Gehring,
Europol
Accord
Sparks
Data
ProtectionFears,Swissinfo(20September2004);Jespers(seenote12above),pp.261265.
51Jespers(seenote12above),pp.272273.
52Casale(seenote32above),pp.5354.
53Ibid.,p.66.
-
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
11/35
9 ICCTTheHagueResearchPaper Dr.QuirineEijkman&BartSchuurman,MA
andSISII):averylargedatabasethatcontainsimmenselistsofwantedandunwantedpersonsandobjects54
and
information,whichisdistributedamongthememberstatesforbordersecurityandlawenforcementpurposes.55
Furthermore,theEuropeanCommissionput forwardanew legislativeproposaltousePassengerNameRecord
(PNR)datatoamongotherpreventterroristoffences.
In2007,theCounciloftheEUlaunchedaninitiativetocreatetheEuropeanCriminalRecordsInformation
System(ECRIS),
aproject
that,
when
completed,
will
ease
the
sharing
of
information
on
convicted
criminals
betweenmemberstates.56
ThereisalsoEurodac,afingerprintsystemcreatedtocoordinateasylumapplications
acrossEUmemberstates.57
Lastly,toconcludethis(notexhaustive)overview,itisworthwhiletopointoutthat
EUalsoallowsinformationonEuropeancitizenswhotraveltotheUStobetransferredtoAmericanauthoritiesas
partofthePassengerNameRecordDataTransferAgreementandtheElectronicSystemforTravelAuthorization
(ESTA).Currently,theEuropeanCommissionhasproposedanewdraftforEUPassengerNameRecordlegislation,
which intends to fight terrorismandseriouscrimebysharingpersonal fight informationcollectedairlineswith
othernations.58
Whatalloftheaforementionedinstitutions,databasesandagreementshaveincommonisthedesireto
collect,storeandshareincreasingamountsofpersonaldataandbiometricinformationonEUcitizensandforeign
visitors.One
of
the
main
goals
of
such
systems
and
institutions
is
to
increase
the
Unions
ability
to
fight
crime
and
terrorismand topreemptively investigateorarrest individualswhomightposea security threat.Even if it is
implicit,preventionisattheheartoftheseendeavours.Butwithfew,ifany,oversightmechanismsinplaceand
plentifulproblemswith dataprotection andprivacy issues, thesedatabases constitute a key concern for civil
liberties and human rights advocates and have even attracted the concern of the EUs own Agency for
FundamentalRights(FRA).59
TheFRAistaskedwithmonitoring,investigatingandreportingonthedevelopmentoffundamentalrights
intheEU.Itisoneoftheagenciesparticularlyconcernedwiththeuseofpersonaldataandbiometricdataforthe
largescaleprofilingofpotentialterroristsuspects,apracticewhichhasbecomeoneofthemainthrustsofpost
9/11terrorismpreventionbutonethathasaverypoortrackrecord,withfewrealthreatsbeingidentifiedand
manyinnocentciviliansbeingsubjectedtodiscriminationandstigmatisationonthebasisofsuchbroadindicators
asplaceofbirthandreligiousconvictions.60
Thedesire to streamlinemember statesandEUagenciesability toaccesseachothersdatabases, to
createnewdata storage facilities andprogrammes and to further the cooperation and coordinationbetween
memberstatesjudicialsystems,policeforcesandintelligenceagenciesisofcentralimportancetotheEUs2010
2014sStockholmProgramme.ThisfiveyearstrategicapproachwasapprovedbytheCouncilinDecember2009
andaimstodevelopwhattheEUcallsitsareaoffreedom,securityandjustice.61
TogetherwiththeEurope2020
Strategy,a tenyearplan forrevivingtheEuropeaneconomy, Stockholm isamajorelementof theEUs long
termplanning.62
Althoughit
claims
to
put
citizens
interests
first,
the
Stockholm
Programme
has
attracted
criticism,
among
others from the FRA andAmnesty International,on accountof itsweak stanceonnondiscrimination and its
54HouseofLordsEuropeanUnionCommitteeReport#92006/2007of2March2007ontheSchengenInformationSystemII(SISII),p.8.
55OpenSocietyInstitute(seenote39above),p.165.
56AssociationEuropennepourlaDfensedesDroitsdelHomme,TheEuropeanCriminalRecordsInformationSystem(ECRIS)CreatesNewRisksforthe
ProtectionofPersonaldata (Brussels:AEDH,October2008),pp.12;MarthaL.Arias, InternetLawTheEuropeanUnionWillHaveaCriminalRecord
InformationSystem(InternetBusinessLawServices,29March2010).
57OpenSocietyInstitute(seenote39above),p.166.
58ProposalforaDirectiveoftheEuropeanParliamentandtheCouncil2011/32(COM)of2February2011ontheuseofPassengerNameRecord(PNR)data
fortheprevention,detection,investigationandprosecutionofterroristoffencesandseriouscrime;TeriSchultz,ATransatlanticTourismTax?,GlobalPost
(27September2010).
59Ibid.; Open Society Institute (see note 39 above), pp. 5869; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Towards More Effective Policing,
Understandingand
Preventing
Discriminatory
Ethnic
Profiling:
aGuide
(Luxembourg:
Publications
Office
of
the
European
Union,
2010),
pp.
910.
60Ibid.,EuropeanAgencyforFundamentalRights;OpenSocietyInstitute(seenote39above),pp.5871;PeterGill,SecurityIntelligenceandHumanRights:
IlluminatingtheHeartofDarkness?,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,vol.24,no.1,2009,p.91.
61EuropeanCouncil,(seenote3above).
62EuropeanCommissionCommunicationCOM(2010)171of22April2010onDeliveringanAreaofFreedom,SecurityandJusticeforEuropesCitizens.
-
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
12/35
10 PreventiveCounterterrorismandNondiscrimination intheEuropeanUnion:Acallforsystematicevaluation
doubtfulprotectionof the rights toprivacy anddataprotection.63
Within the realmof counterterrorism, the
Programme has expanded the definition of terrorism to encompass radicalisation and extremism, thereby
significantlyenlargingthepoolofpotentialsuspectsandraisingthespectreofcitizenswhopracticetheirrightto
protestbecomingthevictimsofrestrictiveandrepressivecounterterrorismpolicies.64
Some, likeInvestigative
Journalist Tony Bunyan,warn that there is an emerging picture across the EU that demonstrations and the
democraticright
to
protest
are
among
the
next
to
be
targeted
to
enforce
internal
security.
65
Lastly,theEUhasintroducedanumberofadministrativeandorganisationalinitiatives.Perhapsthemost
notableofsuchundertakingshasbeen thecreationof theofficeofCounterterrorismCoordinator.Thisoffice,
whichhas received criticism forbeingapaper tiger, is responsible for improvingEU cooperationonCounter
terrorismandcoordinatingthevariousprogrammesandeffortsthatarealreadyinplace.66
Furthermore,efforts
arecurrentlyunderwaytosimplifythemanagementoftheEUsextensivedatabasesbyestablishinganAgencyfor
theoperationalmanagementof largescale ITsystemswithinthenextfewyears.Equallydeservingofattention
aretheplanstocreateaJointSituationCenter(SitCen),ineffectanefforttocoordinatememberstatesciviland
military intelligenceagencies.SitCenwould functionastheEUsown intelligenceagencyandcooperateclosely
withEuropolandEurojust.Aswithmanyof the institutionsand information systems thatconcern themselves
withthe
EUs
internal
and
external
security,
critics
worry
that
democratic
control
of
this
new
institution
is
lacking.67
Finally, the EU has also commissioned a considerable amount of research on fighting terrorism and
countering radicalisation and has convened expert meetings between academics and counterterrorism
practitioners todevelopbestpractices. In the2011EUActionPlanon countering terrorism, reference among
others ismade toMemberState cooperation in relation tomonitoringwebsites,communitypolicingprojects,
developing longtermdisengagement andderadicalisation tools targeted at youngsters and cooperationwith
thirdcountries.68
Preventive
counter
terrorism
in
the
Netherlands
Onanationallevel,theDutchgovernmentemployswhatitreferstoasabroadapproach,aimedataddressing
both the effects of terrorist violence and preventing such incidents fromoccurring by early intervention and
counteringviolentradicalisation.69
TheGeneralIntelligenceandSecurityService(AIVD)playsacentralroleinthe
preventive part of this counterterrorism strategy, using its considerable resources to map trends in
radicalisationandtopinpointindividualsandorganisationswhocouldposeathreattoDutchsociety.TheOffice
ofTheNetherlandsNationalCoordinator forCounterterrorism (NCTb) isprimarilyconcernedwithstreamlining
Dutchcounterterrorismpoliciesandefforts,butalsoconductsthreatlevelassessmentsofitsown.70
TheDutchgovernmentspreemptive approach to counterterrorismhasalso led to several important
legalandpolicyreforms.SomeofthesereformswereundertakeninordertoimplementEUFrameworkdecisions
whileothers
were
the
products
of
domestic
politics.
Such
legislation
has
consistently
viewed
terrorism
as
a
criminalact,consequentlystrengtheningtheabilityoflawenforcementandpublicprosecutorstodealwithit.Of
63European Agency for Fundamental Rights, The Stockholm Programme: a Chance to Put Fundamental Rights Protection Right in the Centre of the
EuropeanAgenda,(Vienna:EUAgencyforFundamentalRights,July2009)pp.114;Amnesty International,AmnestyInternationalBriefingontheFuture
StockholmProgramme,(Brussels:AmnestyInternationalEUOffice,July2009)pp.115.
64Jespers(seenote12above),pp.305326.
65TonyBunyan, Protests intheEU:Troublemakersandtravellingviolentoffenderstoberecordedondatabaseandtargeted,(Londen:Statewatch,
April2010),p.8.
66 Council of the European Union, EU Counterterrorism CoOrdinator (Council of the European Union).
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1344&lang=EN.Retrieved4March2011;OldrichBures,EUCounterTerrorismPolicy:Apaper tiger?,
(Prague:MetropolitanUniversity,2011)pp.137148/245251.
67Jespers(seenote12above),pp.275276;Casale(seenote32above),p.54.
68Coolsaet
(see
note
9above),
p.
870;
European
Commission
Communication
(see
note
44
above),
p.5;
Council
of
the
European
Union
(see
note
18
above),
pp.38.
69NationalCoordinatorforCounterterrorism(NCTb),Terrorisme(NCTb,2011).http://www.nctb.nl/
onderwerpen/wat_is_terrorisme/wat_is_terrorisme.aspx.Retrieved3March2011;NCTb(seenote20above),pp.6279.
70Ibid.
-
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
13/35
-
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
14/35
12 PreventiveCounterterrorismandNondiscrimination intheEuropeanUnion:Acallforsystematicevaluation
Furthermore, the draft Bill on Administrative Measures for National Security enabled a variety of
preventivesecuritymeasures in relation tonaturalpersons.83
Thiscould implya restrictionon the freedomof
movementorassociationandwouldcodifysocalleddisturbanceorinterferenceorders,whichwouldjustifylaw
enforcementofficials(atthebehestofthemayor)todisturbsuspectsonanalmostdailybasis.Eventhoughthe
BillwasrecentlywithdrawnwhilependingbeforetheSenate,84
itcodifiedpractisesthataretoacertainextent
werealready
in
use
and
have
to
some
extent
been
dealt
with
by
new
administrative
and
criminal
legislation.
85
Amongotherthesenewpreventivepowersenabletheauthoritiestotaketemporarymeasuresexclusionorders
(forbidding persons from entering a particular area), restraining orders (forbidding them from going near a
particularperson),arequirementtoreporttothepoliceatsettimes.Underthesenewprovisions,whenseveral
conditionsare fulfilled (necessityand apersonsbehaviour), individualsmaybe subjected to thesepreventive
measuresbyorderofthemayor,thepublicprosecutororajudgeforalimitedperiodoftime.86
According to theNationalCounterterrorismStrategy20112015,personaldisturbanceaswellasearly
intervention will continue to play a key role in future policies to prevent terrorism.87
Early intervention is
executed among others through initiatives designed to counter radicalisation. Using both hard and soft
measures, this broad approach aims to recognise such radicalisation processes at an early stage in their
developmentand
abort
them
using
specific
intervention
strategies.88
They
appear
to
include
administrative,
financial, communicative and immigrationlaw related measures.89
One of the most concrete counter
radicalisationmeasures is the personoriented intervention or disturbance,whereby individuals suspected of
radicalisation are among othermade to understand that law enforcement personnel is following their every
move.90
Takingabroader lookatthissubjectbrings intoviewawidervarietyofprogrammesthatappeartobe
predominantly concerned with improving the social integration of minorities. Examples include efforts to
counteractdiscriminationinthelabourmarket,increasingthechancesyoungpeoplehaveoffindingemployment
bywayofapprenticeshipprogrammesandimprovinginterculturalunderstanding,forexampleviasportsevents.
In addition, Dutch counterradicalisation initiatives focus on developing strong communities and improving
youngstersunderstandingof Islam.91
While thisstudy isnot theplace toprovidea fulloverview, itshouldbe
notedthatthereexistprogrammesaimedatderadicalisingrightwingextremistsaswellas (potential) Islamist
fanatics.92
Somewhatremarkable,however,a2009evaluationofDutchcounterterrorismmeasuresimpliesthat
numerousgovernmentofficialsfeelthatcounterradicalisationinstrumentsareunderutilised,withmostcounter
terrorismmeasuresfocusingonsituationsinwhichradicalisationhadalreadyoccurred.93
PreventivecounterterrorismintheUnitedKingdom
Inordertoprevent terrorismtheBritishgovernmenthas reliedontheextensionofpowersof intelligenceand
securityservicesaswellasspecificpolicies. Itscounterterrorismstrategy iscalledContestandconsistsof four
83Wetsvoorstel Bestuurlijke Maatregelen, Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30566, nrs. 15, Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 30566, nrs. 613 and Kamerstukken I
2006/07,30566,nrs.AB(parliamentarydocuments),passedHouseofRepresentativesinMarch2007,withdrawninJune2011whilependingbeforeSenate.
84DutchGovernment(seenote79above),p.115.
85Forexamplearticles38v38ijCriminalCode;articles366a,509hhand558CriminalProceduralCode;Articles172a/bMunicipalAct
86Ibid.;TheActMeasurestoCombatFootballHooliganismandSeriousPublicNuisance(seeHouseofRepresentativesoftheStatesGeneral,Amendment
oftheMunicipalitiesAct,theCodeofCriminalProcedureandtheCriminalCoderegulatingthepowerofthemayorandthepowerofthepublicprosecutor
to takemeasures to combat footballhooliganism, severepublicnuisanceor seriousdamagingbehaviour in relation topersonsorgoods (measures to
combatfootballhooliganismandseriouspublicnuisance),ParliamentaryPapers2010,31467,no.20,31August2010.
87NCTb(seenote20above),pp.6276.
88SuyverCommittee(seenote17above),p.15;NCTb(seenote20above),pp.6974.
89NationalCoordinatorforCounterterrorism(NCTb),Radicalisering.http://www.nctb.nl/onderwerpen/
terrorismebestrijding/radicalisering.Retrieved17March2011.
90NCTb (seenote20above),pp.6276;NationalCoordinator forCounterterrorism (NCTb) letter to theHouseofRepresentativesof theStatesGeneral
5486478/07/NCTbof
22
August
2007
on
Person
Oriented
Intervention.
91CouncilofEuropeCommitteeofExpertsonTerrorismProfilesonCounterTerroristCapacityofNovember2008ontheNetherlands,p.3.
92FroukjeDemantetal.,TeruggangenUittreding:ProcessenvanDeradicaliseringOntleed[ProcessesofDeradicalisationDissected] (IMES2008),pp.160,
168169.
93SuyverCommittee(seenote17above),p.80.
-
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
15/35
13 ICCTTheHagueResearchPaper Dr.QuirineEijkman&BartSchuurman,MA
strands;pursue,prevent,protectandprepare.Contestwas launched in2003andhasundergonea renewal in
2009.ResponsibilityforputtingthevariousprogrammesthatmakeupContestintopracticerestswiththeOffice
forSecurityandCounterterrorism (OSCT),whichwas founded in2007.94
According to theBritishgovernment
that refocused theprevent strategy in2011,efforts are intended to respond to the ideological challengesof
terrorism, identifyand supportvulnerable individualsandcooperatewith institutionsandorganisationswhere
thereare
risks
of
radicalisation.
95
In
the
independent
oversight
of
the
prevent
review
and
strategy,
it
is
stressed
that the policy should be free of discrimination and that support for extremism is often associated with a
perception of discrimination.96
In the equality impact assessment of the prevent strategy stakeholders
emphasized that theprevious strategy hadhad a disproportionate impact on belief, religion and race. There
mightbeaperceptionamongyoungmanthatthispracticecontinues.97
OverthecourseofthefollowingparagraphsanattemptwillbemadetoclarifyhowtheUKhastriedto
accomplishtheseaims.Toillustrate,accordingtotheWestMidlandsPolice,preventisakeyelementofContest
andone that focusesonbuilding relationshipswith localcommunitieswithaneye topreventing radicalisation
and addressing the conditions conducive to the spreadof terrorism.More specifically, thisentails challenging
violent or extremist rhetoric and supportingmainstream opinion, disrupting those who spreadmessages of
violence,supporting
individuals
vulnerable
to
terrorist
recruitment,
increasing
the
resilience
of
communities
to
extremistpropagandaandaddressingthegrievanceswhichmaymakeindividualsandcommunitiesvulnerableto
suchexploitation.98
Onpaperatleast,thefocusonaddressingtherootcausesofradicalisationandthedesireto
intervene before individuals turn from extremism to violence is very reminiscent of theDutch and European
counterterrorismprogrammes.
Prechargedetentionof terrorist suspects isone suchmeasure thathas extended thepowersof the
executivetothwartpotentialterroristplots.AsdeterminedbytheTerrorismAct2006suspectscouldbedetained
for up to 28days beforehaving tobe chargedwith aparticularoffence. In a January 2011 review ofBritish
counterterrorism policies, a reportwritten by Lord KenMacdonald, the ability to hold suspects for such an
extended period of time was criticised and a recommendationwas issued to reduce themaximum time of
detentionto14days.99
Asofthe25th
ofJanuary2011,prechargedetentionintheUKwasindeedreducedtoa
maximumof14dayswhentheorderwhichalloweda28daylimitwasnotrenewed.100
Otherpreventivecounterterrorismmeasuresthatfocusonremovingpossiblesuspects,andinthiscase
also suspicious objects, from public life are stop and searcheswithout reasonable suspicion and the use of
surveillance cameras.Stopandsearchesby lawenforcementofficialson the street,atairportsorportsallows
individualsand theirproperty, suchas cars, tobe subjected toa searchwithouta specific indication that the
individualinquestionhascommittedanoffence.TheMacdonaldReviewhassupportedthe2010EuropeanCourt
ofHumanRightsrulingthatthismeasureisunlawfulinitscurrentformandrecommendsthatlimitationsintime
andplacebeattachedtothepractice.101
Bothdetentionswithouttrialandstopandsearchpowersaregranted
bythe
Terrorism
Act
2000.
In
2010,
stop
and
search
powers
were
restricted:
except
for
airports
and
ports
British
lawenforcementofficialsarenowrequirereasonablesuspicionthatapersonisaterroristbeforebeingallowed
toexercise it.Asa2011 investigationhas indicatedthatpeoplefromethnicminoritiesarefarmore likelytobe
94HouseofCommons,ProjectCONTEST:theGovernmentsCounterterrorismStrategy,(BritishGovernment,2009).
95HouseofCommons,PreventStrategy,(London:BritishGovernment,2011).
96AlexCarlile,ReporttotheHomeSecretaryofIndependentOversightofPreventReviewandStrategy(London:BritishGovernment,2011),p.4.
97HouseofCommons,PreventStrategy:EqualityImpactAssessment(BritishGovernment,2011),pp.56.
98WestMidlandsPolice,WhatWeDo(WestMidlandsPolice,2011).http://www.westmidlands.police.uk/
crimereduction/tacklingterrorism/index.asp.Retrieved18March2011.
99Ken
Macdonald,
Review
of
Counterterrorism
and
Security
Powers
(London:
The
Stationary
Office,
2011),
p.
4.
100 Liberty, Extended PreCharge Detention (Liberty, 2011). http://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/humanrights/terrorism/extendedprecharge
detention/index.php.Retrieved14April2011.
101Macdonald(seenote99above),pp.45;EuropeanCourtofHumanRights,GillianandQuintonvtheUnitedKingdom,Applicationno4158/05,Judgment
of12January2010,sections57,63,8086;TerrorismAct2000,PartVandSchedule7;RulesonStopandSearchChanged,BBCNews(8July2010).
-
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
16/35
14 PreventiveCounterterrorismandNondiscrimination intheEuropeanUnion:Acallforsystematicevaluation
targetedatairportsandports,therearestillsignificanthumanrightsconcerns.102
Surveillancecamerasareused
todealwithreducingcrime,antisocialbehaviourandcounteringterrorism.However,inadditiontoinvadingon
peoplesprivacysurveillancecamerasmayalsocontributetothestigmatisationofminoritiesandparticularareas.
Forinstance,impactresearchinBirminghamshowsthatsurveillancecameras,whichhadbeendeployedinareas
withsignificantMuslimspopulations,strainedtherelationsbetweenthepoliceandlocalcommunities.103
Afurther
powerful
piece
of
legislation
is
the
2000
Regulation
of
Investigatory
Powers
Act
(RIPA),
which
specifieswhenandhowlocalauthoritiesmayusecovertsurveillancetechniquessuchaswiretapping,informants
orundercoverofficers,andthemonitoringofdigitalcommunicationssuchasemail.104
Therehasbeena lotof
concern in theUK that localauthoritieshaveabused thesepowers to investigatecitizens forminor infractions
insteadofusingthemtofightandpreventseriouscrimeincludingterrorism,andthatuseoftheActhasnotbeen
subjectedtotheappropriatejudicialreview.105
UndertheTerrorismAct2000,theUKgovernmentcanalsoproscribeorganisationsthatopenlyespouse
racialor religioushatredor incite their followers toviolence, if theseorganisationscanbeascribeda terrorist
motive.TheMacdonaldReportarguesthatsuchapracticeisilliberalanddisproportionateandproposesamore
measured response that targets the specific individuals guilty of incitement rather than entire groups or
organisations.106The
Act
also
prohibits
the
gathering
of
information
(often
taken
to
mean
photographs)
which
couldbeusedforterrorismrelatedpurposes. Incombinationwiththestopandsearchpowers,thisprohibition
hasresultedintheuseofcounterterrorismlegislationagainstcitizenstakingharmlessphotographs.107
Anotherpreventivecounterterrorismmeasureemployedby theBritishhas focusedonpreventing the
financingofterrorism.UndertheTerrorismAct2000severaldistinctoffenceshavecomeintobeingthatprohibit
raising funds for terrorismrelated purposes, directly or indirectly using money or property for purposes of
terrorismaswellasanyactivitiesaimedatfacilitatingtheretentionorcontrolofterroristpropertyinanyway.108
InaccordancewithUNSecurityCouncilResolution1373of2001,theUKalsofreezestheassetsofindividualsand
organisationssuspectedofinvolvementin(international)terrorism.109
ThelistofpreventivecounterterrorismmeasuresinusebytheBritishgovernmentdoesnotstopthere.
However,similarto theDutch, theBritishhaveusedthedeportationof foreignnationalsandsocalledcontrol
orders for ostensibly preemptive purposes. The Macdonald Report makes clear that deportations are only
acceptablewhenthedeporteewillnotbesubjectedtotortureormistreatmentintheircountriesoforigin.110
The
abilitytousecontrolordersisgrantedbythe2005PreventionofTerrorismAct.111
ThismeasureallowstheBritish
government to place a variety of restraints upon individuals suspected of involvement in terrorismrelated
activitiesbutagainstwhomthereisinsufficientevidenceto initiatecriminalproceedings.112
Controlordershave
attracted considerable criticism on account of their alleged unlawfulness and because, by essentially placing
suspectsunderhousearrest,nofurtherevidencecanbegatheredtoconfirmordenytheirallegedinvolvementin
terrorism.113
Theintroduction
of
the
Terrorism
Act
2006,
which,
further
adds
as
an
offense
the
encouragement
of
terrorism,forexamplebyglorifyingeventssuchasthe9/11attacksorbydirectlyincitingotherstocarryoutacts
102AsianPeople42TimesMoreLikelytoBeHeldunderTerrorLaw,TheGuardian(23May2011).Formore informationseealsoTufyalChoudhuryand
HelenFenwick,The ImpactofCounterterrorismMeasuresonMuslimCommunities,EqualityandHumanRightsCommissionResearchReportSeriesnr.72
(Manchester:EqualityandHumanRightsCommission,2011),pp.1828.
103Ibid.2011,pp.3638.
104RegulationofInvestigatoryPowersAct2000,TheGuardian(19January2009).
105ExtentofCouncilSpyingRevealed,BBCNews(26March2009);Macdonald(seenote99above),pp.67;HiddenCamerasinPartsofBirminghamWill
BeRemoved,BBCNews(5July2010).
106Macdonald(seenote99above),pp.78.
107Ibid.,pp.56.
108CouncilofEuropeCommitteeofExpertsonTerrorismProfilesonCounterTerroristCapacityofApril2007ontheUnitedKingdom,p.2.
109Ibid.,p.3.
110Macdonald
(see
note
99
above),
pp.
8.
111CommitteeofExpertsonTerrorism(seenote108above),p.3.
112Liberty,ControlOrders(Liberty2011).http://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/humanrights/terrorism/controlorders/index.php.Retrieved24March
2011;DominicCasciani,Q&A:ControlOrders,BBCNews(3January2011).
113Macdonald(seenote99above),pp.915.
-
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
17/35
15 ICCTTheHagueResearchPaper Dr.QuirineEijkman&BartSchuurman,MA
ofterrorism.The2006Actalsooutlawsthedistributionofterroristmaterialsuchaspamphlets,videosanddigital
material.Finally,itmakesitanoffensetotrainorotherwiseprepareforterrorismortoprovidesuchassistanceto
others.114
PreliminaryConclusion
Succinctlyput,
it
appears
that
the
desire
to
prevent
terrorism
and
serious
crime
is
leading
the
EU
and
states
such
as TheNetherlands and theUK to design and adopt counterterrorismmeasures,which affect human rights
compliance. For instance, the presumption of innocence is pressured by (preventive) stop and searches and
personaldisturbance and the rights toprivacy anddataprotection are infringedbymass covert surveillance.
Likewise,when authorities implement andexecutepreventive counterterrorismmeasures in adiscriminatory
fashion, theyalsoalienatethe targetedgroup,whichareoftenethnicorreligiousminorities,andtherebymay
reduceopportunities fordialogueandcooperation.Even thoughbothsupportersandhumanrightsadvocates
make strong claims, in most cases the effect of these particular counterterrorism measures in terms of
effectivenessinpreventingterroristcrimesand/orperceivedorrealdiscriminatoryoutcomesareundetermined.
Thereforethefollowingsectionofthisreportseekstocontributetoaclearerunderstandingoftheissuesatstake.
PreventiveCounterterrorismMeasuresandNondiscrimination
ManypoliticiansandcitizensintheEUfeelthatinexceptionalcircumstancescurtailingtherightsandlibertiesof
minoritiesassociatedwithterrorism isjustified.Mostpeople recognisethatabsolutehuman rightssuchasthe
right to life should be respected, but in order to fight terrorism adequately, particular rights including the
discriminationprohibitionaswellastherighttoequalitymayneedtobelimited.Forinstance,significanteffortis
beingput intofighting violent extremism inBritishMuslimcommunities,but less infarRightcommunities is
discriminatory.115This
point
of
view
has
been
described
as
the
balance
(and/or)
proportionality
response
thesis.116
Since 9/11, numerous governments as well as influential scholars such as Micheal Ignatieff have
supported it.117
Thebasicassumptionholds that inorder toprotect security,public interestmustbeweighed
against human rights. If this means that the rights and liberties of minorities are limited than this is an
unfortunate sideeffect of counterterrorismmeasures,which is tolerated by themajority population. Other
scholars,suchasforinstanceDanielMoeckli,arguethatthebalancingmetaphorismisleadingandthatforlegal,
practicalandpubliclegitimacyreasonstherighttonondiscriminationandequalityintheWaronTerrorshould
beupheld.118
Additionally,humanrightsadvocatessuchasTheEminentJuristsPanel,initsreportonTerrorism,
CounterterrorismandHumanRights,recommendthat (preventive)counterterrorismmeasuresshouldrespect
therightsofminoritycommunitiesandbefullynondiscriminatory.119
Increasingly,humanrightsandcivilrightsorganisationsandcommunitygroupswhostresstherelevance
ofassessingthediscriminatorysideeffectsofcounterterrorismeffortsarebeingheardby(inter)nationalbodies.
Forinstance,inhis2010EuropeanCounterterrorismStrategydiscussionpaper,theEuropeanCounterterrorism
Coordinator acknowledges the relevance of assessing the impact that counterterrorism measures have on
minoritygroups.120
Also,althoughthemajorityofofficialevaluationsonthe impactofcounterterrorismdonot
114CommitteeofExpertsonTerrorism(seenote108above),p.4.
115Arun,Kundani,Spooked:Hownot toprevent violentextremism (London: InstituteofRaceRelations2009),pp.2324.Even though thenewprevent
strategywasrecentlyrefocusedandrecognizedtheissue,itmayinpractiseremainproblematic(HouseofCommons(seenote95),pp.45/1317).
116AndrewAshworth, Security,Terrorismand theValueofHumanRights, inB.JGooldand L.Lazarus (eds).SecurityandHumanRights (Oxford:Hart
Publishing,2007),pp.207209,224.
117Michael
Ignatieff,
The
Lesser
Evil:
Political
Ethics
in
an
Age
of
Terror
(Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press,
2004),
p.46.
118DanielMoeckli,HumanRightsandNonDiscrimination intheWaronTerror,(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2007),pp.234237.
119InternationalCommissionofJurists,AssessingDamage,UrgingAction:ReportoftheEminentJuristsPanelonTerrorism,CounterterrorismandHuman
Rights(Geneva:InternationalCommissionofJurists,2009),pp.116,165.
120CounciloftheEuropeanUnionNote15894/1/10of29November2010onEUCounterTerrorismStrategyDiscussionPaper,pp.1011.
-
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
18/35
16 PreventiveCounterterrorismandNondiscrimination intheEuropeanUnion:Acallforsystematicevaluation
explicitlydiscussthe(potential)discriminatoryeffect,afew,suchasthe2011BritishreviewonCounterterrorism
andSecurityPowers,addressit.121
Despitethesesignificantdevelopments,theeffectofmostcounterterrorism
effortson the rights and libertiesofminorities is uncertain. This can be primarily attributed to the fact that
discriminatorysideeffectsareusuallyrelatedtootherhumanrightsinfringement,includingfairtrial,therightto
privacy,dataprotectionandfreedomofmovementandexpression.Thereforeinthissectiontheexistingreviews
onpreventive
counter
terrorism
measures
are
considered.
This
discussion
is
preceded
by
an
introduction
of
the
(inter)nationalstandardsonequalityandthebanondiscrimination.
NondiscriminationStandardsintheEuropeanUnion
In the EU the right to equal treatment and the ban on discrimination are fundamental human rights.
Discriminationbetweenindividualsonthebasisofrace,ethnicorigin,religion,sex,sexualorientation,nationality,
languageetc.isprohibitedbyseveralinternationalconventionsthataredirectlyorindirectlyapplicable.122
These
include almost allUNhuman rights conventions123
and the Councilof Europes European Convention for the
ProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms(ECHR)124,especiallyArticle14,andtheTwelfthProtocol
to the ECHR125. The EU legal framework that affects equal treatment and the prohibition of discrimination
includesthe
EU
Race
Directive,
Anti
discrimination
Directive,126
Privacy
Directives,127
Lisbon
Treaty,
and
Charter
ofFundamentalRights.128
TheEURaceDirective,whichseekstocurbdiscriminationonthebasisofraceorethnic
origin,deals solelywithequal treatment in the supplyofgoodsand servicesandnotwithnationalityand the
Lisbon Treaty, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality, applies this prohibition only to EU
citizens.129
LikeotherEUMemberStates,TheNetherlandsandtheUKarepartytomostinternationalhumanrights
conventionsandsubjectedtotheEUslegalframework.Discriminationbetweenindividualsonthebasisofrace,
ethnicity, religion, sex, nationality, language etc. is prohibited by international conventions that are directly
applicableintheKingdomofTheNetherlands,aswellasbytheDutchConstitution,theEqualTreatmentAct,and
a
number
of
provisions
of
criminal
and
administrative
law.
130
Article
1
of
the
Dutch
Constitution,
for
instance
enshrinesbothaprincipleofuniversalequalityandabanondiscrimination.131
Someofthesestatutoryprovisions
relatetoinstitutionalpolicyandtheactionsofpolice,security,immigrationandcustomsofficials.TheDutchEqual
121HouseofCommons,ReviewofCounterTerrorismandSecurityPowers:EqualityImpactAssessment(London:BritishGovernment,2011).
122FormoreinformationseeEuropeanUnionAgencyforFundamentalRights,HandbookonEuropeanNondiscrimination Law(Vienna:FRA,2011).
123AmongotherstheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR),especiallyArticle26andtheUnitedNationsRaceConvention,
124Where theECHR isconcerned, itshouldbenoted thatArticle14providesprotection fromdiscriminationonly incombinationwithoneof theother
rights,suchastherighttolibertyandsecurityofperson.
125Article1,paragraph2oftheTwelfthProtocoltotheECHRprohibitsdiscriminationbyanypublicauthority.TheNetherlandsratifiedthisProtocolon1
April2005.
126European
Commission
Proposal
for
aCouncil
Directive
2008/0140
(CNS)
of
2July
2008
on
Implementing
the
Principle
of
Equal
Treatment
between
PersonsIrrespectiveofReligionorBelief,Disability,AgeorSexualorientation.Thisdirectivesupplementsearlierdirectives,includingEuropeanParliament
and the Council of the European Union Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 on Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between Persons
IrrespectiveofRacialorEthnicOrigin.Atthesametime,Article10oftheLisbonTreatystatesthatindefiningandimplementingitspoliciesandactivities,
theUnionshallaimtocombatdiscriminationbasedonsex,racialorethnicorigin,religionorbelief,disability,ageorsexualorientation.
127EuropeanParliamentandCouncilofEuropeDirective1995/46/ECof24October1995ontheProtectionofIndividualswithRegardtotheProcessingof
PersonalDataandontheFreeMovementofsuchData;EuropeanParliamentandtheCouncilofEuropeanUnionDirective2002/58/EUof12July2002on
PrivacyandElectronicCommunication.On28 January2010,EU JusticeCommissionerRedingannounced that shewouldbeproposing amendments to
modernisetheEUprivacyregulationsonthebasisoftheDataProtectionDirectiveandthespecificrulesapplicabletotelecommunicationandtheinternet
(ePrivacyrules).
128TheCharterofFundamentalRightsoftheEuropeanUnion(7December2000,amended12December2007Strasbourg)isnotpartoftheLisbonTreaty
(2007/C306/01),whichmodernisedandreformedtheTreatyonEuropeanUnionandtheTreatyestablishingtheEuropeanCommunity,butEUinstitutions
andnationalstatesthatimplementEUlegislationareobligedtoobservethesefundamentalrightsandtheprincipleofsubsidiarityappliestotheobligations
ofthememberstates.
129UnderthetermsofArticle3,paragraph2ofthisDirective,theprohibitiondoesnot includedifferenceoftreatmentbasedonnationality,andnonEU
residentscannot
derive
any
rights
from
it;
Article
18,
Lisbon
Treaty.
130TheNetherlandsadherestoamonisticsysteminwhichinternationalconventionsandthedecisionsoforganisationsestablishedunderinternationallaw
areselfexecutinganddonothavetobetransposed intonational legislation.Seearticles93and94,ConstitutionoftheKingdomoftheNetherlands,12
September1840(BulletinofActsandDecrees1840,54);
131Article1Grondwet,12September1840(BulletinofActsandDecrees1840,54).
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:NL:HTMLhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:NL:HTMLhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:NL:HTMLhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:NL:HTMLhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:NL:HTMLhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:NL:HTML -
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
19/35
17 ICCTTheHagueResearchPaper Dr.QuirineEijkman&BartSchuurman,MA
Treatment Commission, which is about to transform into the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights, is a
specialisedbodythatpromotesandmonitorscompliancewithequaltreatmentlaws.132
As theUK is thebirthplaceofCommonLaw,whichpredominantlydependsonjudicialprecedents, the
doctrine of stare decisis, there is nowritten law apart from some special acts, administrative guidelines and
practisedirections.Hence,thereisnoconstitution,andinternationallawonlybecomesdirectlyapplicabledueto
specialacts.
For
example,
the
ECHR
was
implemented
with
the
1998
Human
Rights
Act.
Similarly
EU
legislation
is
adopted and then transposed into national law.133
Discrimination between individuals on the basis of race,
religionandbelief,sex,sexualorientation,age,disability,genderreassignmentandpregnancyandmaternity is
prohibitedby theEqualityAct aswell as anumberof criminal (forexample theCrime andDisorderAct) and
administrativeacts.Furthermore,there isageneralequalityduty,whichfocusesontheeliminationofunlawful
discrimination, the integration of equality and good relations in the everyday business, especially of public
authorities, and the Equality andHuman Rights Commission is responsible for consultation and engagement,
monitoringanddatacollectionaswellasequalityimpactassessment.134
Despitethissignificant legalframeworkapplicantintheEU,theeffectofmostcounterterrorismefforts
onnondiscriminationstandardshasreceivedmodestattention.Amongotherexplanationsthiscanbeattributed
tothe
fact
that
even
though
according
to
international
law
non
discrimination
is
anon
derogable
right,
counter
terrorism reviews, following the EuropeanConventionofHumanRights regime,have tended to focuson the
infringements on the primary human right, for example the torture prohibition, fair trial or freedom of
movement, rather thannondiscriminationnormsassuch.135
Furthermore,even thoughexpertopiniondiffers
whenitcomestotheabsoluteprotectiontheprohibitionofdiscriminationandtheprincipleofequality,thereisa
consensusthatitislegitimatetodrawdistinctionsonthebasisofspecificscrutinytests,includingproportionality,
effectivenessandnecessity.136
This isclear from thecase lawof theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsand the
DataProtectionConventionoftheCouncilofEurope.137
GoldschmidtandRodriques,forinstance,maintainthat
whenever there is a breach of human rights, law enforcement officials must ask themselves whether the
advantagesofprofilingoutweighthedisadvantages,andwhethertheobjectivecannotbeattained insome less
extremeway.138
Nondiscriminationreviews
Eventhoughindebatesaboutpreventivecounterterrorismmeasurestherighttoequalityandtheprohibitionof
discriminationarereceivingeverincreasingattention,theissueofnondiscriminationremainsambiguousdueto
legal, political and social factors. The UK governments counterterrorism strategy reflects this ambiguity as,
althoughthereisnoexplicitmentionofaspecificfocusontheMuslimcommunityatanationallevel,itisimplicit
inmanyoftheprogrammes.139
Combinedwiththefactthatthewebsiteofaspecificpoliceforcedoesmakesuch
afocusexplicit,thismightbeseenas indicativeofhowtheterroristthreat isperceivedbyelementsoftheUK
132Formore information seeDutchEqualTreatmentCommission, Homepage (CGB,2011).http://www.cgb.nl/english.Retrieved4March2011;Dutch
HumanRightsInstitute,Home(CGB,2011).http://www.naareenmensenrechteninstituut.nl/.Retrieved4March2011.
133NeilDavidson,DavidsonReview:Implementation ofEULegislation(London:TheStationaryOffice,2006),p.12.
134 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Public Sector Duty, http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/adviceandguidance/publicsectorequality
duty/introductiontotheequalityduty/.Retrieved7April2011;EqualityAct,2010,Section149.FormoreinformationseethewebsiteoftheEqualityand
HumanRightsCommission,Retrieved4April2011.
135AmongothersFRA(seenote122above).
136EuropeanNetworkAgainstRacism (ENAR), Factsheet40:EthnicProfiling, (ENAR, June2009),p5;CouncilofEuropeEuropeanCommissionAgainst
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)General PolicyRecommendationNo11CRI(2007)39of 29 June2007on CombatingRacism andRacialDiscrimination in
Policing,p9.
137EuropeanCourtofHumanRights,TimishevvRussia,Applicationno.55762/00,55974/00,Judgmentof13December2005,sections5658;Councilof
EuropeConvention1981/108of28January1981ontheProtectionofIndividualswithregardtoAutomaticProcessingofPersonalData.
138JennyGoldschmidtandPeterRodriques,HetGebruikvanEtnischeenReligieuzeProfielenbijhetVoorkomenenOpsporenvanStrafbareFeitendieeen
BedreigingVormen
voor
de
Openbare
Orde
en
Veiligheid
[The
Use
of
Ethnic
and
Religious
Profiles
in
Preventing
and
Investigating
Criminal
Offences
that
poseaThreattoPublicOrderandSecurity],inJaapvanDonselaarandPeterRodrigues(eds.),MonitorRacisme&Extremisme:ZevendeRapportage(pp.40
60.InJvanDonselaarandPRRodrigues(2006)(eds),MonitorRacisme&Extremisme:Zevenderapportage(Amsterdam/Leiden:AnneFrankFoundation/
UniversityofLeiden),p.40.
139Kundani(seenote115above),pp.2324.
-
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
20/35
18 PreventiveCounterterrorismandNondiscrimination intheEuropeanUnion:Acallforsystematicevaluation
government.140
TheEUalsoappears tomakeaneffort to stress that the threatcomesnotonly from Islamist
terrorism,butalsofromseparatistandanarchistterrorists.141
TheDutchgovernment,morespecificallytheNCTb
andAIVD,statesthatitdoesnotspecificallyfocusitsbroadapproachonacertaingrouporideology,butatthe
sametimedoesimplyquiteclearlythatinthe21stcenturytheterroristthreatderivesmostlyfromIslamistgroups
andindividuals.142
Somepreventive
counter
terrorism
measures
distinguish
by
their
very
nature.
For
instance,
restrictive
measuresonadmissionortravelbansintheEUarefocusedonpersonsandentitiesinvolvedinterroristacts.143
Theythereforedistinguishbetweenimmigrantswhoarebelievedtobeassociatedwithterrorismandthosethat
arenot. To a certain extent, thediscriminatory side effectsofpreventive securitymeasures are toleratedby
societyatlarge.ThemajoritypopulationinseveralEUmemberstatesmaynotbeawareoforconcernedwithfor
example the fact that theminoritieswho personally or as part of their household own a car have a higher
likelihoodtobestoppedbylawenforcementofficials.144
Additionally,manyEUcitizensdonotknowthatminority
groupsaregenerallylessawareofantidiscriminationlegislationcomparedthemajoritypopulationandtherefore
rarelyissuecomplaints.145
Furthermore,discriminationusuallyoccurs incombinationwithan infringementonotherrightssuchas
thefreedom
of
movement.
For
instance,
police
stops
in
theory
affect
the
entire
population,
but
in
practice
may
sometimesbe implementedselectivelyagainstoneethnicor religiousgroup (ethnicprofiling).146
Lastbutnot
least, notwithstanding a number of official evaluations, there are few empirical studies that independently
substantiatedifferenttreatmentintheEU,TheNetherlandsandtheUK.Inthesubsequentsection,anumberof
existentreviewsof(preventive)counterterrorismmeasuresandreferencestonondiscriminationareconsidered.
ReportsabouttheEuropeanUnion
International human rights committees and civil society organisations have stressed the risk of the negative
impactofEUcounterterrorismmeasuresonminoritiesand immigrants foranumberofyears.Common side
effects
concerns
relating
to
preventive
counter
terrorism
measures
include
the
violation
of
the
presumption
of
innocence,theprivacyofindividualsandpersonaldataprotection,aswellasthestigmatisationofentireorethnic
orreligiousgroupsandthepresumptionoftheexistenceofcollectivesinsby,forinstance,couplingterrorismto
Islaminanationscollectivememory.147
Securitymeasuressuchastheaforementionedpersonaldatabasesand
detection and identification technologies have a tendency to become permanent, thereby normalising the
exception.TheEuropeanDataProtectionSupervisorhasexpressedhisconcernabout the (mis)useofpersonal
data, which in combination with the broad powers of national authorities could lead to discrimination and
stigmatisation.148
Also,itisnotjustaquestionofwhetherornotpeoplewithaminorityandimmigrantstatusintheEUare
disproportionally affected by preventive counterterrorism measures, the very fact that they experience or
perceivebeing
treated
differently
creates
anxiety,
mistrust,
resentment
and
disengagement.149
For
example,
140WestMidlandsPolice(seenote98above).
141EuropeanCommission(seenote44above),p.2.
142NCTb(seenote20above);GeneralIntelligenceandSecurityService(AIVD),Jaarverslag2010[AnnualReport2009](AIVD,April2011),p.1.
143European External Action Service (EEAS), Sanctions or Restrictive Measures (EEAS, 2011). http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/index_en.htm.
Retrieved14April2011.
144EuropeanUnionAgencyforFundamentalRights(FRA)(seenote1,above),p.11
145EuropeanUnionAgencyforFundamentalRights(FRA),EuropeanUnionMinoritiesandDiscrimination Survey:DatainFocusReport3:RightsAwareness
(Vienna:FRA,2010),pp.810.
146OpenSocietyInstitute(seenote39above);EuropeanUnionAgencyforFundamentalRightsseenote58above);QuirineA.M.Eijkman.HastheGenie
Been Letoutof theBottle?:EthnicProfiling in theNetherlands,PublicSpace: theJournalof LawandSocialJustice,vol.5,no.2,2010,pp.121; Frank
Bovenkerk,WieisdeTerrorist:ZinenOnzinvanEthnicProfiling[WhoistheTerrorist?SenseandNonsenseofEthnicProfiling](Rotterdam:GerGuijs,2009).
147AgnesHankissCornerstonesoftheEUsCounterTerrorismStrategy(HungarianCivicUnionintheEuropeanParliament,July2010);ENAR(seenote136
above),pp.8
9;
Open
Society
Institute
(see
note
39
above);
Office
of
the
High
Commissioner
of
Human
Rights
(OHCHR),
Human
Rights,
Terrorism
and
CounterTerrorism:FactsheetNo.32(Geneva:OHCHR,2008),pp.3738.
148EuropeanEconomicandSocialCommittee,Soc/388CESE1570/2010of31March2011ontheEUCounterTerrorismPolicy,p.7.
149OpenSocietyInstitute(seenote39above),pp.8384,98.
149Ibid.,pp.98108.
-
8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011
21/35
19 ICCTTheHagueResearchPaper Dr.QuirineEijkman&BartSchuurman,MA
significantnumbersofEuropeanMuslimsfeelthatsince9/11theyareundersurveillanceandexperiencethisasa
form of stigmatisation. Therefore any potential benefits that this practice offers from a counterterrorism
perspective must be weighed against the increased alienation and stigmatisation that it engenders. As the
effectiveness of preventive counterterrorism measures is hard to judge, one wonders when their
implementation isjustified and when it can be counterproductive: could these measures mobilise the very
individualsand
groups
they
are
supposed
to
prevent
from
turning
to
political
violence?
150
Eventhoughduringthe lastdecadecivilsocietyhassometimeshaddifficulties inhaving itscasesheard
andsystematicevaluationsofcounterterrorismmeasures intermsofeffectivenessandtheir impactonhuman
rights have beenmodest, there are signs that EU politicians and policymakers are becomingmore receptive
towardsthe issueofnondiscriminationandequality.151
TheEUAgency forFundamentalRightshasconducted
several studies in relation to discrimination after 9/11 and has published reports on ethnic profiling.152
Furthermore,inhis2010EuropeanCounterterrorismstrategydiscussionpaper,theEuropeanCounterterrorism
Coordinator acknowledges the relevance of assessing the impact onminority groups, both in the context of
radicalisationaswellasrecruitment.153
Moreover,theEuropeanParliamenthasexpressedinterestinevaluating
thesideeffectsofpreventivecounterterrorismpolicies.154
ReportsaboutTheNetherlands
Inrelationto(preventive)counterterrorismmeasuresnondiscriminationconcernsarenotwidespreadinDutch
political and public discourse. A January 2011 government evaluation of Dutch counterterrorism measures
concludesthattherearenogroundstoassumetheyviolatebasichumanrightsstandardsassetbytheEuropean
ConventiononHumanRights.155
Inaddition tothe fact that thisconclusion isbasedon thegovernmentsown
evaluation andnot thatof the EuropeanCourtofHumanRights (ECHR), assessmentsby internationalhuman
rightscommitteespresentaslightlydifferentpointofview.A2009CouncilofEuropereportonTheNetherlands
expressed concernwith the legislative and administrative counterterrorismmeasures enacted by the Dutch
government.
For
example,
it
argued
that
terrorism
was
too
broadly
defined
in
Dutch
law,
thus
running
the
risk
thatfarreachinginvestigati