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FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127060. November 19, 2002]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FLORENTINO CENIZA,
SANTIAGO CENIZA, ESTANISLAO CENIZA,
ROMEO SIMBAJON, PABLO RAMOS, ATILANO
BONGO, EDGAR ADOLFO, EMMA ADOLFO,
JERRY ADOLFO, GLENN ADOLFO, GINA
ADOLFO, LORNA ADOLFO, CHONA ADOLFO,
EVELYN ADOLFO, in her own behalf and as
guardian of the minors HUBERT and AMIEL
ADOLFO, and ELNITA ADOLFO in her own
behalf and as guardian of minors DAVID and
PRESTINE MAY ADOLFO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision[1]dated September 28, 1994, of theCourt of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 31728,
affirming the decision[2]
in LRC Case No. N-46 of
the Regional Trial Court in Mandaue City,
Branch XXVIII, which declared private
respondents as the owners entitled to the
registration of the lots in question.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Apolinar Ceniza was the declared owner in 1948
of Lot No. 1104, located at Cabancalan,
Mandaue City, under Tax Declaration No.
01686. When he died, his heirs took possessionof the property and in 1960 partitioned the
same through a deed of extrajudicial partition.
Apolinars children, namely, Santiago, Estanislao,
Florencia, Manuela, Mercedes and Florentino,
all surnamed Ceniza, each got 1/8 share of the
property. His grandchildren, namely, the
siblings Remedios Adolfo, Melecio Ceniza, and
Constancia Zanoria, each got 1/24 share, while
Apolinars other grandchildren, namely, the
siblings Concepcion Suico, Benjamin Ceniza, Lilia
Ceniza and Delfin Ceniza, each got 1/32 share.
Private respondent Florentino Ceniza purchased
the shares of his sisters Manuela and Mercedes
and the share pertaining to the siblings
Jesusa,[3]
Benjamin and Delfin. Together with his
share, Florentino became the owner of Lot Nos.
1104-A&C and had them tax declared in his
name.
Florencias share, a portion of Lot No. 1104-B,
was purchased by Mercedes who in turn
bartered the same with the share acquired by
Santiago, another private respondent in this
case.
A portion of Santiagos property was bought by
his daughter, Asuncion Ceniza, married to
private respondent Atillano Bongo and who
successfully obtained a tax declaration therefor.
From the portion purchased by Asuncion
Ceniza, another private respondent, Romeo
Simbajon, purchased an area of 270 square
meters. Romeo also acquired a tax declaration
in his name. He was the husband of Felicitas
Ceniza, another daughter of Santiago.
The share acquired by Estanislao, another child
of Apolinar, was also a portion of Lot No. 1104-
B. He also caused the tax declaration pertainingto the said lot transferred in his name.
The siblings Remedios Adolfo and Constancia
Zanoria, married to private respondent Pablo
Ramos, bought the share of their brother,
Melecio Ceniza. Remedios share, in turn, was
transferred to her heirs, private respondents
Edgar, Emma, Jerry, Glenn, Gina, Lorna, Chona,
Evelyn, Hubert, Amiel, all surnamed Adolfo, and
the heirs of their brother Leoncio Adolfo,
namely, his wife Elenita Adolfo, and children
David and Prestine May Adolfo.On November 4, 1986, private respondents
applied for registration of their respective titles
over the property they inherited from Apolinar
Ceniza, with the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City, Branch 28. Petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General opposed the application on
the following grounds:
1. That neither the applicant/s nor their
precedessors-in-interest have been in open
continuous exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the land in question since
June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48 [b], C.A.
141, as amended by P.D. 1073).
2. That the muniment/s or title and/or the tax
declaration/s and tax payment/s receipt/s of
applicant/s if any, attached to or alleged in the
application, do/es not constitute competent
and sufficient evidence of a bona fide
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acquisition of the lands applied for or of their
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, since June 12, 1945, or prior
thereto. Said muniment/s of title do/es not
appear to be genuine and the tax declaration/s
and/or tax payment receipts indicate pretended
possession of applicants to be of recent vintage.
3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on
the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer
be availed of by the applicants who have failed
to file an appropriate application for
registration within the period of six (6) months
from February 16, 1976 as required by
Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records,
it appears that the instant application was filed
on October 25, 1996.
4. That the parcel/s applied for is/are portionsof the public domain belonging to the Republic
of the Philippines not subject to private
appropriation.
In a decision dated February 28, 1990, the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City granted
the application.[4]
It held that since the
applicants possession of the land for more than
thirty (30) years was continuous, peaceful,
adverse, public and to the exclusion of
everybody, the same was in the concept of
owners. Since the land was neither encumberednor subject to any other application for
registration, the trial court ordered that, upon
the finality of its decision, the decrees of
registration should be issued in favor of the
applicants.
The Solicitor General interposed an appeal for
petitioner Republic of the Philippines before the
Court of Appeals.
In a decision dated September 28, 1994, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court. It held that the ruling in Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals,[5]that before public
land could be registered in the name of a
private individual, it must first be established
that the land had been classified alienable and
disposable, refers to public lands and not to
those which have acquired the nature of a
private property in view of the continuous
possession thereof by its claimants. The Court
of Appeals held:
In this case, it was sufficiently established by
appellees that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the subject lots even before the year 1927, or
fifty nine (59) years before the application was
filed (TSN, April 13, 1989, pp. 3-4; February 6,
1989, p. 7-11; June 2, 1988, pp. 3, 8-9). This
period more than sufficiently satisfies the 30
years requirement of the Public Land Act for
property to be considered as private land.
Significantly, Section 4, Presidential Decree No.
1073 provides:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and
Section 4(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act
are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable anddisposable lands of the public domain which
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-
interest, under a bonafide claim of ownership,
since June 12, 1945.
Appellant was thus no longer required to prove
that the property in question is classified as
alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. Clearly, the property no longer forms
part of the public domain. The long andcontinuous possession thereof by appellees
converted said property to a private one. This
finds support in the ruling in Director of Lands
vs. Bengzon, 152 SCRA 369, to wit:
x x x alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessor-in-
interest, openly, continuously and exclusively
for the prescribed statutory period (30) years
under the Public Land Act, as amended is
converted to private property by the mere lapse
or completion of said period, ipso jure. The
above is a reaffirmation of the principle
established in the earlier cases of Cario v.
Insular Government, Suzi v. Razon, and Herico
v. Dar, that open exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the
period prescribed by law creates the legal
fiction whereby the land, upon completion of
the requisite period ipso jure and without the
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need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be
public land and becomes private property. x x x
In interpreting the provisions of Section 48 (b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, this Court said
in Herico v. Dar, x x x when the conditions as
specified in the foregoing provision are
complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant,
a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued.The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain,
and beyond the authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of
which does not affect the legal sufficiency of
the title as would be evidenced by the patent
and the torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of the patent.The Court of Appeals then cited Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court.[6]
In that
case, this Court ruled that alienable public land
held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously
and exclusively for the prescribed statutory
period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by
the mere lapse or completion of said
period, ipso jure. Moreover, appellant Republics
claim that the property in question remains tobe public land under the Constitution, is refuted
by this Courts pronouncement in Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Courtthat the
Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
The Court of Appeals concluded its decision
with the following observations:
Finally, we note that no opposition was filed by
the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest
the application of appellees on the ground that
the property still forms part of the public
domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots
in question are forestal land, unlike the case of
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA
701, wherein the Director of Lands questioned
the petition for registration filed by the
applicant therein on the claim that the property
applied for registration in his favor was
classified and proven to be forestal land.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied in a resolution dated October
29, 1996. Traversing petitioners argument that
under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,
all lands of the public domain are owned by the
State, the Court of Appeals stated that said
provision further states that agricultural lands
are excluded from those lands that may not be
alienated. It further ruled:
In the instant case, among the documents
presented by appellees are Real Estate tax
receipts that sufficiently show that the subject
land is mainly utilized for agricultural purposes
devoted to the planting of coconut, corn x x x
and sugar cane x x x aside from using the same
for residential purposes x x x.
It is noticeable that appellant failed to present
any proof to establish its claim that the land inquestion is not alienable. Although on July 10,
1989, the court a quo issued an order directing
the Bureau of Forest Development [BFD] to
submit xx within thirty (30) days from its receipt
of [said order] a report on the status of the land
xx to determine whether said land or any
portion thereof is within the forest zone xxx
(Record, p. 63), the BFD failed to comply.
Moreover, appellant never contested appellees
application nor did it may (sic) any
manifestation that the land in question is notalienable. Likewise, the prosecutor representing
the Republic of the Philippines during the trial
did not even contest the classification of the
land as stated in the evidence of
appellees. Their belated objection should
therefore not prejudice appellees who openly
and in good faith presented all the documents
pertinent to their claims.
Presidential Decree No. 1073 extended the
period within which a qualified person may
apply for confirmation of an imperfect or
incomplete title by judicial legalization to
December 31, 1987. The filing of this case in
October, 1986 was therefore seasonable. Under
the decree, this right is available to a person
who has been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation, by
himself and through his predecessors-in-
interest, under a bona fideclaim of acquisition
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of ownership since June 12, 1945. We reiterate
that appellees have proven themselves to have
been in possession of the subject land even
prior to June 12, 1945.
Hence, this petition for review, alleging that the
Court of Appeals erred in: (1) holding that
private respondents have registerable title to
the lots in question, and (2) ordering the
registration thereof in their names.[7]
The issues raised before us are: (a) whether
there is a need for private respondents to
establish that the land subject of their
application was alienable and disposable
despite proofs showing their possession thereof
for more than 30 years; and (b) whether private
respondents were able to meet the period
required by the Public Land Act, as amended.
Petitioner contends that before a public landcan be registered in the name of a private
individual, it must be shown first that (a) the
land has been classified alienable and
disposable, and (b) the applicant, by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, has been
in continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or prior thereto.
Petitioner claims that private respondents failed
to meet the said requirements. They did notcite any official proclamation or presented the
land classification map covering the subject
parcels of land to prove that they are alienable
and disposable public lands. Neither did private
respondents adduce evidence to show that they
had been in possession of the land since June
12, 1945. Although they were able to show
possession by Apolinar, their predecessor-in-
interest, since 1948, and private respondents
actual possession beginning in 1960, no proof
was presented to show possession prior to
1948. Consequently, private respondents are
not entitled to have the subject parcels of land
registered in their names.
In their comment, private respondents cite
Section 48(b),[8]
before it was amended by PD
No. 1073, and Section (50)[9]
of the Public Land
Act as the applicable law in this case. They
maintain that the land subject of their
application is an agricultural land devoted to
corn and other root crops. Further, they have
been in possession of the land since 1927.
Estanislao Ceniza, one of the children of
Apolinar and who was already ten years old at
that time, testified that his father was the one
in possession of the land, appropriating its fruits
and paying its realty taxes. When their father
died in 1947, Apolinars chidren took possession
of the land. They also appropriated the fruits
and paid realty taxes therefor. In 1960,
Apolinars heirs partitioned the property,
declared their respective shares in their names
for tax purposes and paid the realty taxes.
Apart from this, private respondents claim that
the land in question has long been a private
one, it being a part of Hacienda de Mandaue de
Cebu, which in turn was recognized as a privateland by the Court of First Instance of Cebu in
several decisions dated February 27, 1934,
March 27, 1935, May 6, 1937 and August 6,
1937.
Indeed, before one can be granted a
confirmation of title to lands of the public
domain, the Public Land Act requires that the
applicant must prove (a) that the land is
alienable public land and (b) that his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the same must either besince time immemorial or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act. Only when
these conditions are met may the possessor of
the land acquire, by operation of law, a right to
a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued.[10]
Conclusively, the Court of Appeals erred when it
held that mere adverse possession in
accordance with law for a period likewise
provided for by law would automatically entitle
the possessor to the right to register public land
in his name. The applicant has to establish first
the disposable and alienable character of the
public land. Otherwise, all public lands,
regardless of their classification, can be subject
of registration of private titles, as long as the
applicant shows that he meets the required
years of possession. Worth noting is the case
of Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,[11]
where the
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applicant had been in possession of the
property since 1908 but it was conclusively
shown by the government that the land was
classified as alienable or disposable only on 27
March 1972. The Court said:
x x x. Thus, even granting that petitioner and his
predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same
since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by
virtue of such possession since the subject
parcels of land were not yet alienable land at
that time nor capable of private
appropriation. The adverse possession which
may be the basis of a grant of title or
confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to
alienable or disposable portions of the public
domain.[12](Italics supplied)
To prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable, an applicant mustestablish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order;[13]
an administrative
action;[14]
investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators;[15]
and a legislative act or a
statute.[16]
In this case, private respondents presented a
certification dated November 25, 1994, issued
by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer in
the Department of Environment and NaturalResources Office in Cebu City, stating that the
lots involved were found to be within the
alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land
Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-
I555 dated December 9, 1980.[17]
This is
sufficient evidence to show the real character of
the land subject of private respondents
application.[18]
Further, the certification enjoys a
presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence,[19]which is true in this
case. Worth noting also was the observation of
the Court of Appeals stating that:
no opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands
and Forestry to contest the application of
appellees on the ground that the property still
forms part of the public domain. Nor is there
any showing that the lots in question are
forestal land....[20]
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that mere possession of public land for the
period required by law would entitle its
occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it
did not err in ruling in favor of private
respondents as far as the first requirement in
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
concerned, for they were able to overcome the
burden of proving the alienability of the land
subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals,
private respondents were able to prove their
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land even before the
year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the
factual findings of the Court of
Appeals.[21]Although there are exceptions,
petitioner did not show that this is one ofthem.[22]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on
certiorari is DENIED and the decision, as well as
the resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 31728 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128750. January 18, 2001]
CARQUELO OMANDAM and ROSITO
ITOM,[1]
petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS,
BLAS TRABASAS and AMPAROBONILLA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition[2]
for review seeks the reversal of
the decision dated October 29, 1996, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
44442,reversing and setting aside the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Del
Sur, Branch 23, dated November 15, 1996, and
the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
February 21, 1997,denying the petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands in
Pagadian City issued in favor of Camilo Lasola
Homestead Patent No. IX-6-40 covering Lot No.
8736, with an area of 23,985 sq. m. in Sagrada,
Tambulig, Zamboanga del Sur. On April 28,
1978, the Register of Deeds issued Original
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Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22-690 in his
name.
On April 28, 1983, respondent Blas Trabasas
bought the land from a Dolores Sayson who
claimed she was the owner of said land. In
1984, Trabasas discovered that petitioners
Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom had
occupied the land. Meanwhile, on July 19, 1987,
Omandam protested Lasolas homestead patent
before the Bureau of Lands and prayed for
cancellation of the OCT. Upon Saysons advice,
Trabasas repurchased the land from Lasola,
who executed a deed of sale dated September
24,1987. On August 9,1989, Trabasas acquired a
new transfer certificate of title.
On April 16,1990, spouses Blas Trabasas and
Amparo Bonilla filed a complaint against
petitioners for recovery of possession and/orownership of the land with the Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga del Sur. They alleged that
they were the true and registered owners of the
land and Omandam and Itom should vacate it.
Petitioners answered that they purchased the
land from one Godofredo Sela who had been in
possession for almost twenty years.
After the parties were duly heard, the Regional
Trial Court issued its decision on November 15,
1993 declaring that neither respondents herein
nor their predecessors-in-interest were ever inpossession of the land. Citing Director of Lands
vs. Court of Appeals, 17 SCRA 71 (1966),
Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358
(1983) and Padre vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA
446 (1992), the trial court disposed:
WHEREFORE, finding that the plaintiffs have no
equitable right to the possession of the land
under litigation, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiff-
1) Finding the defendants to have equitable
right to the possession of the land in litigation.
2) Ordering the plaintiffs to reconvey the title of
the land under litigation in the name of the
plaintiffs to the defendants within 30 days from
the date this decision becomes final and
executory, and upon their failure to so comply,
ordering the Clerk of Court to execute in behalf
of the plaintiffs the necessary deed of
conveyance over the said land in favor of the
defendants which deed would be considered
sufficient to authorize the Register of Deeds of
Zamboanga del Sur, Pagadian City, to cause the
cancellation of the Torrens Certificate of Title in
the names of the plaintiffs, and in lieu thereof,
to issue another in the common names of the
defendants.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Private respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals. Pending the appeal, the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) -
Region IX dismissed Omandams protest
previously filed with the Bureau of Lands.[4]
It
said that Omandam failed to prove that Lasola,
respondents predecessor-in-interest,
committed fraud and misrepresentation in
acquiring the patent, hence there is no groundfor its revocation and cancellation of its
corresponding title.
On October 29,1996, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court. It decided thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the
appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, a new one is hereby issued ordering
defendants-appellees to vacate the subject land
and surrender it to plaintiff -appellant.
Cost against defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED.
[5]
The Court of Appeals declared that petitioners
collateral attack on the homestead title, to
defeat private respondents accion publiciana,
was not sanctioned by law; that the patent and
title of Camilo Lasola, private respondents
predecessor-in-interest, had already become
indefeasible since April 28, 1977; and that
petitioners action for reconveyance in the
nature of their protest with the Bureau of Lands
and counterclaim in their answer to the
complaint for recovery of possession, already
prescribed.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied on February 21,1997. Hence,
this petition for review. Petitioners make the
following assignment of errors, alleging that the
Court of Appeals erred in:
I. ...HOLDING THAT ONE OF THE UNDISPUTED
FACTS IS THAT On April 28,1983, plaintiff
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bought the subject land from Dolores Sayson
who presented herself to be the true owner of
the subject land;
II. ...HOLDING THAT ANOTHER UNDISPUTED
FACT IS THAT ...sometime in 1984 plaintiff
discovered that defendants had entered and
had occupied the subject land. Upon
instructions of Dolores Sayson, plaintiff
approached Camilo Lasola and again bought the
subject land, this time from Camilo Lasola;
III. ...IGNORING THE FINDINGS OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH THOROUGHLY
DISCUSSED THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO
ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AND CAMILO LASOLA HAD NO
EQUITABLE POSSESSION ON THE SUBJECT
LAND, WHICH LACK OF EQUITABLE POSSESION
MAKES SOME OF THE RECENT DECISIONS OFTHE SUPREME COURT APPLICABLE TO THE
CASE.[6]
In the first two assigned errors, petitioners
apparently question findings of fact by the
Court of Appeals while disputing the claim of
possession by private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest.The appellate court
had stated firstly that respondent Trabasas
bought the subject land from Sayson who
presented herself as the true owner, then
secondly, that he bought the land from Lasolaalso. The first two issues, in our view, raise
questions of fact. Well-entrenched is the rule
that the Courts jurisdiction in a petition for
review is limited to reviewing or revising errors
of law allegedly committed by the appellate
court. Findings of fact below are generally
conclusive on the Court. It is not for the Court
to weigh evidence all over again.[7]
There are
instances where the Court departs from this
rule.[8]However, petitioners did not show that
involved here is an exceptional instance. Hence,
we need not tarry on the first two assignments.
In the third assignment of error, petitioners
aver that public respondent erred in ignoring
the trial courts finding that private respondents
had no equitable possession of the subject land.
Again, we are confronted with a question of
fact. But petitioners claim the appellate court
had disregarded or even contradicted our
holdings in the cited cases of Director of
Lands, Abanilla, and Padre.
In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 17
SCRA 71(1966), we ruled that a void title may be
cancelled. A title over a disposable public land is
void if its grantee failed to comply with the
conditions imposed by law. In Director of Lands
vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358 (1983), we held that
the indefeasibility of a Torrens Title cannot be
used as a defense in an action for cancellation
of title acquired through fraud. These two cases
refer to actions for cancellation of title initiated
by the government, through the Solicitor
General, after a finding of fraud by the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources. InPadre vs. Court of Appeals, 214
SCRA 446 (1992) we said that in an action for
quieting of title, the court may determineincidentally the right to the possession thereof,
in order to provide complete relief to the
parties. The last case refers to determination of
rightful possession in possessory actions.
Notwithstanding the formulation by the
petitioners in the third assigned error, the real
issue raised in this case involves the trial courts
jurisdiction vis--vis administrative agencies.
What is the effect of the trial courts decision in
a possessory action on the order of Bureau of
Lands regarding a homestead application anddecision of the DENR on the protest over the
homestead patent?
Commonwealth Act 141 as amended, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, gives in its
sections 3 and 4 to the Director of Lands
primarily and to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources (now the Secretary of
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources) ultimately the authority to dispose
and manage public lands.[9]In this regard,
courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the
validity of the decree of registration issued by
the Director of Lands.[10]Only the DENR
Secretary can review, on appeal, such decree.
It will be recalled that the Bureau of Lands
approved Lasolas homestead application on
May 21, 1968. No appeal was made therefrom.
Nineteen years after, or on July 9, 1987,
Omandam filed the protest with the Bureau of
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Lands. Thereafter, respondents Trabasas and
Bonilla instituted the present action in the
Regional Trial Court for recovery of possession
and/or ownership. As mentioned earlier, the
trial court held that petitioners were entitled to
a declaration of equitable possession over the
area in question. Said trial court then ordered
the cancellation of respondents title and the
issuance of a new one. In effect, the courts
order reversed the award made by the Director
of Lands in favor of Lasola. This reversal was in
error, for the proper administrative agency, the
DENR under CA 141, had prior jurisdiction over
the patent on the subject matter, which is the
contested homestead area.
DENRs jurisdiction over public lands does not
negate the authority of courts of justice to
resolve questions of possession and theirdecisions stand in the meantime that the DENR
has not settled the respective rights of public
land claimants.[11]
But once the DENR has
decided, particularly with the grant of
homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and
then TCT later, its decision prevails.
In this case, Lasola applied for a homestead
patent over the contested area in 1967. His
application was granted on May 21, 1968. The
Order for the issuance of the patent was issued
by the Bureau of Lands on January 29, 1974 andthe corresponding Original Certificate of Title
was issued by the Register of Deeds on April 28,
1976. From the three latter dates, no appeal
was made. It was only on July 9, 1987, i.e., 13
years from the date of the Order directing the
issuance of the patent that petitioners
protested the homestead grant with the Bureau
of Lands. Despite the said lapse of time, the
Bureau of Lands gave due course to the protest
relying on our ruling in Director vs.
Abanilla[12]
that the doctrine of indefeasibility of
title does not apply when the grant is tainted
with fraud and misrepresentation. From this
date, Lasolas right of possession based on his
OCT and eventually that of respondents were
put on issue. In their desire to get possession of
the property, respondents instituted an action
for recovery of possession and/or ownership on
April 16, 1990 with the Regional Trial Court.
Said court rendered its decision against
respondents on November 15, 1993.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Pending the appeal or on March 23, 1995, the
DENR-Region IX dismissed petitioners protest
on the ground of absence of fraud and
misrepresentation committed by respondents
predecessors-in-interest.[13]On October 29,
1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated the
decision subject of this petition in favor of
respondents. Petitioners then brought the
instant case to us.
We note that the parties did not manifest as to
whether an appeal was made from the decision
of the Regional Director of DENR-IX. Further, no
mention was ever made in their pleadings
regarding the matter. From the said Order of
the DENR Regional Director up to the present,five years have lapsed. From this, we can
conclude that no appeal has been made and
that the DENR decision dismissing the
petitioners protest and upholding respondents
right on the contested area has attained finality.
By now it appears indubitable that private
respondents, spouses Trabasas and Bonilla,
have been duly confirmed in their right to
possession of Lot No. 8736 as owners
thereof. By virtue of the deed of sale executed
by OCT holder Camilo Lasola as early asSeptember 24, 1987, in favor of Trabasas, who
then secured a transfer certificate of title in his
name, private respondents clearly have
superior right over the land claimed by
petitioners Omandam and Itom. The appellate
court did not err in upholding the right of
private respondents, and in ordering the
petitioners to vacate and surrender the land to
said respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated October
29, 1996, and its resolution dated February 21,
1997, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002
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FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ,petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI
COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,respondents.
CARPIO,J.:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a
temporary restraining order. The petition seeks
to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA"
for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then
on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay
and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for
brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The
petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from
signing a new agreement with AMARI involving
such reclamation.
The FactsOn November 20, 1973, the government,
through the Commissioner of Public Highways,
signed a contract with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines
("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain
foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The
contract also included the construction of
Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the
works in consideration of fifty percent of the
total reclaimed land.On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084
creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to
reclaim land, including foreshore and
submerged areas," and "to develop, improve,
acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands."1On the same date, then President
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085
transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the
foreshore and offshore of the Manila
Bay"2under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos
issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend
its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future
works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and
owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP
executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated
December 29, 1981, which stated:
"(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation,
construction, and such other works in the
MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by the parties,
to be paid according to progress of works on a
unit price/lump sum basis for items of work to
be agreed upon, subject to price escalation,
retention and other terms and conditions
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1594. All
the financing required for such works shall be
provided by PEA.
x x x
(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development
rights and hereby agrees to cede and transfer in
favor of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and
participation of CDCP in and to all the areas of
land reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP as of
December 30, 1981 which have not yet been
sold, transferred or otherwise disposed of byCDCP as of said date, which areas consist of
approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four
Hundred Seventy Three (99,473) square meters
in the Financial Center Area covered by land
pledge No. 5 and approximately Three Million
Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight
Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888) square meters
of reclaimed areas at varying elevations above
Mean Low Water Level located outside the
Financial Center Area and the First
Neighborhood Unit."
3
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C.
Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting
and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so
reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a
total area of one million nine hundred fifteen
thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894)
square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988,
the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of
Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA,
covering the three reclaimed islands known as
the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern
portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road,
Paraaque City. The Freedom Islands have a
total land area of One Million Five Hundred
Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and
Forty One (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841
hectares.
-
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On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint
Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with
AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the
Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the
reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of
submerged areas surrounding these islands to
complete the configuration in the Master
Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation
Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into
the JVA through negotiation without public
bidding.4On April 28, 1995, the Board of
Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245,
confirmed the JVA.5On June 8, 1995, then
President Fidel V. Ramos, through then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the
JVA.6
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President
Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech inthe Senate and denounced the JVA as the
"grandmother of all scams." As a result, the
Senate Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations, conducted a joint
investigation. The Senate Committees reported
the results of their investigation in Senate
Committee Report No. 560 dated September
16, 1997.7Among the conclusions of their
report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks totransfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of
the public domain which the government has
not classified as alienable lands and therefore
PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the
certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands
are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V.
Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order
No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a
study on the legality of the JVA in view of
Senate Committee Report No. 560. The
members of the Legal Task Force were the
Secretary of Justice,8the Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel,9and the Government Corporate
Counsel.10
The Legal Task Force upheld the
legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Senate Committees.11
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily
Inquirerand Todaypublished reports that there
were on-going renegotiations between PEA and
AMARI under an order issued by then President
Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA
Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio
Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz
composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed
before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with
Application for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunctiondocketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking
to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the
petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial
hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of
the case before the proper court."12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez
("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the
instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer forthe Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner
contends the government stands to lose billions
of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed
lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA
publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation
of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and
Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on
the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the
sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as ablatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of
alienable lands of the public domain to private
corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he
seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in
properties of the State that are of public
dominion.
After several motions for extension of
time,13PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on
October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998,
respectively. Meanwhile, on December 28,
1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to
require PEA to submit the terms of the
renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for
issuance of a temporary restraining order; and
(c) to set the case for hearing on oral argument.
Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for
Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which
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the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22,
1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court
gave due course to the petition and required
the parties to file their respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the
Amended Joint Venture Agreement ("Amended
JVA," for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office
of the President under the administration of
then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the
Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the
Office of the President, petitioner now prays
that on "constitutional and statutory grounds
the renegotiated contract be declared null and
void."14
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA15andAMARI16are as follows:
I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED
FOR IN THE PETITION ARE MOOT AND
ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL
FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE
GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL
FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES;
IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUSSTANDITO BRING THIS SUIT;
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
INFORMATION INCLUDES OFFICIAL
INFORMATION ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS
BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT;
VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE
AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR
THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS,
RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED,
VIOLATE THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; AND
VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER
FORUM FOR RAISING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS
GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE
GOVERNMENT.
The Court's Ruling
First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed
for in the petition are moot and academic
because of subsequent events.
The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the
"terms and conditions of the on-going
negotiations for a new agreement." The
petition also prays that the Court enjoin PEA
from "privately entering into, perfecting and/or
executing any new agreement with AMARI."
PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot
and academic because AMARI furnished
petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed
Amended JVA containing the terms and
conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations.
Thus, PEA has satisfied petitioner's prayer for a
public disclosure of the renegotiations.
Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the
signing of the Amended JVA is now moot
because PEA and AMARI have already signed
the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999.
Moreover, the Office of the President hasapproved the Amended JVA on May 28, 1999.
Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot
avoid the constitutional issue by simply fast-
tracking the signing and approval of the
Amended JVA before the Court could act on the
issue. Presidential approval does not resolve
the constitutional issue or remove it from the
ambit of judicial review.
We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by
PEA and AMARI and its approval by the
President cannot operate to moot the petitionand divest the Court of its jurisdiction. PEA and
AMARI have still to implement the Amended
JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the
Amended JVA on constitutional grounds
necessarily includes preventing its
implementation if in the meantime PEA and
AMARI have signed one in violation of the
Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in
assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its
violation of Section 3, Article XII of the
Constitution, which prohibits the government
from alienating lands of the public domain to
private corporations. If the Amended JVA
indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of
the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if
already implemented, to annul the effects of
such unconstitutional contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary
commercial contract but one which seeks
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to transfer title and ownership to 367.5
hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged
areas of Manila Bay to a single private
corporation. It now becomes more compelling
for the Court to resolve the issue to insure the
government itself does not violate a provision
of the Constitution intended to safeguard the
national patrimony. Supervening events,
whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent
the Court from rendering a decision if there is a
grave violation of the Constitution. In the
instant case, if the Amended JVA runs counter
to the Constitution, the Court can still prevent
the transfer of title and ownership of alienable
lands of the public domain in the name of
AMARI. Even in cases where supervening events
had made the cases moot, the Court did not
hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutionalissues raised to formulate controlling principles
to guide the bench, bar, and the public.17
Also, the instant petition is a case of first
impression. All previous decisions of the Court
involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the
1973 Constitution,18
covered agricultural
landssold to private corporations which
acquired the lands from private parties. The
transferors of the private corporations claimed
or could claim the right tojudicial confirmationof their imperfect titles
19under Title IIof
Commonwealth Act. 141 ("CA No. 141" for
brevity). In the instant case, AMARI seeks to
acquire from PEA, a public corporation,
reclaimed lands and submerged areas for non-
agriculturalpurposes bypurchaseunder PD
No. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title IIIof CA No.
141. Certain undertakings by AMARI under the
Amended JVA constitute the consideration for
the purchase. Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim
judicial confirmation of their titles because the
lands covered by the Amended JVA are newly
reclaimed or still to be reclaimed. Judicial
confirmation of imperfect title requires open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain for at
least thirty years since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Besides, the deadline for filing applications for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired
on December 31, 1987.20
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately
the constitutional issue raised in this petition
because of the possible transfer at any time by
PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions
of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended
JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the
latter's seventy percent proportionate share in
the reclaimed areas as the reclamation
progresses. The Amended JVA even allows
AMARI to mortgage at any time
the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for
the reclamation project.21
Second issue: whether the petition merits
dismissal for failing to observe the principle
governing the hierarchy of courts.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored thejudicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from
the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts
applies generally to cases involving factual
questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court
cannot entertain cases involving factual issues.
The instant case, however, raises constitutional
issues of transcendental importance to the
public.22
The Court can resolve this case without
determining any factual issue related to the
case. Also, the instant case is a petition for
mandamus which falls under the originaljurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article
VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise
primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
Third issue: whether the petition merits
dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial
intervention in compelling PEA to disclose
publicly certain information without first asking
PEA the needed information. PEA claims
petitioner's direct resort to the Court violates
the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. It also violates the rule that
mandamus may issue only if there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
PEA distinguishes the instant case from Taada
v. Tuvera23
where the Court granted the
petition for mandamus even if the petitioners
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there did not initially demand from the Office of
the President the publication of the presidential
decrees. PEA points out that in Taada, the
Executive Department had an affirmative
statutoryduty under Article 2 of the Civil
Code24and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
63825to publish the presidential decrees. There
was, therefore, no need for the petitioners in
Taada to make an initial demand from the
Office of the President. In the instant case, PEA
claims it has no affirmative statutory duty to
disclose publicly information about its
renegotiation of the JVA. Thus, PEA asserts that
the Court must apply the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies to the
instant case in view of the failure of petitioner
here to demand initially from PEA the needed
information.The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI
public lands held by PEA, a government
corporation. Under Section 79 of the
Government Auditing Code,26
the disposition of
government lands to private parties requires
public bidding. PEA was under a positive legal
duty to disclose to the public the terms and
conditions for the sale of its lands. The law
obligated PEA to make this public disclosure
even without demand from petitioner or from
anyone. PEA failed to make this publicdisclosure because the original JVA, like the
Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated
contract, not of a public bidding. Considering
that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to
make the public disclosure, and was even in
breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the
right to seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone is determinative of
this issue, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply when
the issue involved is a purely legal or
constitutional question.27The principal issue in
the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to
acquire lands held by PEA in view of the
constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of
lands of the public domain to private
corporations. We rule that the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply in the instant case.
Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus
standi to bring this suit
PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to
institute mandamusproceedings to enforce his
constitutional right to information without a
showing that PEA refused to perform an
affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the
Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has
not shown that he will suffer any concrete
injury because of the signing or implementation
of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual
controversy requiring the exercise of the power
of judicial review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this
taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to
compel PEA to comply with its constitutional
duties. There are two constitutional issues
involved here. First is the right of citizens toinformation on matters of public concern.
Second is the application of a constitutional
provision intended to insure the equitable
distribution of alienable lands of the public
domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of
the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose
publicly information on the sale of government
lands worth billions of pesos, information which
the Constitution and statutory law mandate
PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue
is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds ofhectares of alienable lands of the public domain
in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA
to comply with a constitutional duty to the
nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of
transcendental importance to the public.
In Chavez v. PCGG,28
the Court upheld the right
of a citizen to bring a taxpayer's suit on matters
of transcendental importance to the public,
thus -
"Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of
recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses
is an issue of 'transcendental importance to the
public.' He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have
a right to initiate and prosecute actions
questioning the validity of acts or orders of
government agencies or instrumentalities, if the
issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,'
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and if they 'immediately affect the social,
economic and moral well being of the people.'
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen
satisfies the requirement of personal interest,
when the proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, such as in this case. He invokes
several decisions of this Court which have set
aside the procedural matter of locus standi,
when the subject of the case involved public
interest.
x x x
In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that
when the issue concerns a public right and the
object of mandamus is to obtain the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real parties in interest; and
because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen
and as such is interested in the execution of thelaws, he need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result of the action. In the
aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to
enforce their right to be informed on matters of
public concern, a right then recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in
connection with the rule that laws in order to
be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners' legal
standing, the Court declared that the right theysought to be enforced 'is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law
of the land.'
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while
reiterating Taada, further declared that 'when
a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion
of a public right, the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that
petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the
general 'public' which possesses the right.'
Further, inAlbano v. Reyes, we said that while
expenditure of public funds may not have been
involved under the questioned contract for the
development, management and operation of
the Manila International Container Terminal,
'public interest [was] definitely involved
considering the important role [of the subject
contract] . . . in the economic development of
the country and the magnitude of the financial
consideration involved.' We concluded that, as
a consequence, the disclosure provision in the
Constitution would constitute sufficient
authority for upholding the petitioner's
standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the
right of the people to information and access to
official records, documents and papers a
right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former
solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of
the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid
down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's
legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a
public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen,
we rule that the petition at bar should be
allowed."
We rule that since the instant petition, broughtby a citizen, involves the enforcement of
constitutional rights - to information and to the
equitable diffusion of natural resources -
matters of transcendental public importance,
the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to
information includes official information on
on-going negotiations before a final
agreement.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains
the people's right to information on matters ofpublic concern in this manner:
"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information
on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all
transactions involving public interest reinforces
the people's right to information on matters of
public concern. This State policy is expressed in
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements apolicy of full public disclosure of
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all its transactions involving public interest."
(Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek
to promote transparency in policy-making and
in the operations of the government, as well as
provide the people sufficient information to
exercise effectively other constitutional rights.
These twin provisions are essential to the
exercise of freedom of expression. If the
government does not disclose its official acts,
transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever
citizens say, even if expressed without any
restraint, will be speculative and amount to
nothing. These twin provisions are also essential
to hold public officials "at all times x x x
accountable to the people,"29for unless citizens
have the proper information, they cannot hold
public officials accountable for anything. Armedwith the right information, citizens can
participate in public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and their
effective implementation. An informed citizenry
is essential to the existence and proper
functioning of any democracy. As explained by
the Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.30
"An essential element of these freedoms is to
keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and
the people. It is in the interest of the State thatthe channels for free political discussion be
maintained to the end that the government
may perceive and be responsive to the people's
will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective
only to the extent that the citizenry is informed
and thus able to formulate its will intelligently.
Only when the participants in the discussion are
aware of the issues and have access to
information relating thereto can such bear
fruit."
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,31that in
cases of on-going negotiations the right to
information is limited to "definite propositions
of the government." PEA maintains the right
does not include access to "intra-agency or
inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when
common assertions are still in the process of
being formulated or are in the 'exploratory
stage'."
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot
invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or
before the closing of the transaction. To
support its contention, AMARI cites the
following discussion in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission:
"Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions'
which should be distinguished from contracts,
agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the
Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the
consummation of the contract, or does he refer
to the contract itself?
Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I
suppose is generic and therefore, it can cover
both steps leading to a contract and already a
consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of
the transaction.
Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable
safeguards on the national interest.
Mr. Suarez:Thank you."32
(Emphasis supplied)
AMARI argues there must first be a
consummated contract before petitioner can
invoke the right. Requiring government officials
to reveal their deliberations at the pre-
decisional stage will degrade the quality ofdecision-making in government agencies.
Government officials will hesitate to express
their real sentiments during deliberations if
there is immediate public dissemination of their
discussions, putting them under all kinds of
pressure before they decide.
We must first distinguish between information
the law on public bidding requires PEA to
disclose publicly, and information the
constitutional right to information requires PEA
to release to the public. Before the
consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its
own and without demand from anyone,
disclose to the public matters relating to the
disposition of its property. These include the
size, location, technical description and nature
of the property being disposed of, the terms
and conditions of the disposition, the parties
qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar
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information. PEA must prepare all these data
and disclose them to the public at the start of
the disposition process, long before the
consummation of the contract, because the
Government Auditing Code requirespublic
bidding. If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any
citizen can demand from PEA this information
at any time during the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation
or reviewof bids or proposals being undertaken
by the bidding or review committee is not
immediately accessible under the right to
information. While the evaluation or review is
still on-going, there are no "official acts,
transactions, or decisions" on the bids or
proposals. However, once the committee makes
its official recommendation, there arises
a "definite proposition"on the part of thegovernment. From this moment, the public's
right to information attaches, and any citizen
can access all the non-proprietary information
leading to such definite proposition. In Chavez
v. PCGG,33
the Court ruled as follows:
"Considering the intent of the framers of the
Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent
upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other
government representatives, to disclose
sufficient public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up withthe ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten
wealth. Such information, though, must pertain
to definite propositions of the government, not
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during
the stage when common assertions are still in
the process of being formulated or are in the
"exploratory" stage. There is need, of course, to
observe the same restrictions on disclosure of
information in general, as discussed earlier
such as on matters involving national security,
diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and
other classified information." (Emphasis
supplied)
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the
commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission understood that the right to
information "contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of
the transaction."Certainly, a consummated
contract is not a requirement for the exercise of
the right to information. Otherwise, the people
can never exercise the right if no contract is
consummated, and if one is consummated, it
may be too late for the public to expose its
defects.1wphi1.nt
Requiring a consummated contract will keep
the public in the dark until the contract, which
may be grossly disadvantageous to the
government or even illegal, becomes afait
accompli. This negates the State policy of full
transparency on matters of public concern, a
situation which the framers of the Constitution
could not have intended. Such a requirement
will prevent the citizenry from participating in
the public discussion of anyproposedcontract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined inthe Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an
emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a
retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest."
The right covers three categories of information
which are "matters of public concern," namely:
(1) official records; (2) documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions and
decisions; and (3) government research data
used in formulating policies. The first categoryrefers to any document that is part of the public
records in the custody of government agencies
or officials. The second category refers to
documents and papers recording, evidencing,
establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying
or explaining official acts, transactions or
decisions of government agencies or officials.
The third category refers to research data,
whether raw, collated or processed, owned by
the government and used in formulating
government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on
the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation
reports, recommendations, legal and expert
opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of
reference and other documents attached to
such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA.
However, the right to information does not
compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts,
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summaries and the like relating to the
renegotiation of the JVA.34
The right only
affords access to records, documents and
papers, which means the opportunity to inspect
and copy them. One who exercises the right
must copy the records, documents and papers
at his expense. The exercise of the right is also
subject to reasonable regulations to protect the
integrity of the public records and to minimize
disruption to government operations, like rules
specifying when and how to conduct the
inspection and copying.35
The right to information, however, does not
extend to matters recognized as privileged
information under the separation of
powers.36The right does not also apply to
information on military and diplomatic secrets,
information affecting national security, andinformation on investigations of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the prosecution
of the accused, which courts have long
recognized as confidential.37
The right may also
be subject to other limitations that Congress
may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information
demanded by petitioner is privileged
information rooted in the separation of powers.
The information does not cover Presidential
conversations, correspondences, or discussionsduring closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like
internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and
other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of
either house of Congress,38
are recognized as
confidential. This kind of information cannot be
pried open by a co-equal branch of
government. A frank exchange of exploratory
ideas and assessments, free from the glare of
publicity and pressure by interested parties, is
essential to protect the independence of
decision-making of those tasked to exercise
Presidential, Legislative and Judicial
power.39This is not the situation in the instant
case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right
to information includes official information
on on-going negotiationsbefore a final
contract. The information, however, must
constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized
exceptions like privileged information, military
and diplomatic secrets and similar matters
affecting national security and public
order.40Congress has also prescribed other
limitations on the right to information in several
legislations.41
Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the
Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of
lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the
Constitution.
The Regalian Doctrine
The ownership of lands reclaimed from
foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the
Regalian doctrine which holds that the State
owns all lands and waters of the public domain.
Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,
ownership of all "lands, territories andpossessions" in the Philippines passed to the
Spanish Crown.42
The King, as the sovereign
ruler and representative of the people, acquired
and owned all lands and territories in the
Philippines except those he disposed of by grant
or sale to private individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted
the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the
State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all
lands and waters of the public domain. The
Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all
lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain."43
Article 339 of
the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article 420
of the Civil Code of 1950, incorporated the
Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first
statutory law governing the ownership and
disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines.
On May 18, 1907, the Philippine Commission
enacted Act No. 1654 which providedfor the
lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of
the government to corporations and
individuals. Later, on November 29, 1919, the
Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 2874,
the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease,
but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the
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government to corporations and individuals.
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly
passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known
as the Public