case syllabus for natural resources

7/23/2019 Case Syllabus for Natural Resources

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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127060. November 19, 2002]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, FLORENTINO CENIZA,

SANTIAGO CENIZA, ESTANISLAO CENIZA,

ROMEO SIMBAJON, PABLO RAMOS, ATILANO

BONGO, EDGAR ADOLFO, EMMA ADOLFO,

JERRY ADOLFO, GLENN ADOLFO, GINA

ADOLFO, LORNA ADOLFO, CHONA ADOLFO,

EVELYN ADOLFO, in her own behalf and as

guardian of the minors HUBERT and AMIEL

ADOLFO, and ELNITA ADOLFO in her own

behalf and as guardian of minors DAVID and

PRESTINE MAY ADOLFO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the

decision[1]dated September 28, 1994, of theCourt of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 31728,

affirming the decision[2]

in LRC Case No. N-46 of

the Regional Trial Court in Mandaue City,

Branch XXVIII, which declared private

respondents as the owners entitled to the

registration of the lots in question.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Apolinar Ceniza was the declared owner in 1948

of Lot No. 1104, located at Cabancalan,

Mandaue City, under Tax Declaration No.

01686. When he died, his heirs took possessionof the property and in 1960 partitioned the

same through a deed of extrajudicial partition.

Apolinars children, namely, Santiago, Estanislao,

Florencia, Manuela, Mercedes and Florentino,

all surnamed Ceniza, each got 1/8 share of the

property. His grandchildren, namely, the

siblings Remedios Adolfo, Melecio Ceniza, and

Constancia Zanoria, each got 1/24 share, while

Apolinars other grandchildren, namely, the

siblings Concepcion Suico, Benjamin Ceniza, Lilia

Ceniza and Delfin Ceniza, each got 1/32 share.

Private respondent Florentino Ceniza purchased

the shares of his sisters Manuela and Mercedes

and the share pertaining to the siblings

Jesusa,[3]

Benjamin and Delfin. Together with his

share, Florentino became the owner of Lot Nos.

1104-A&C and had them tax declared in his

name.

Florencias share, a portion of Lot No. 1104-B,

was purchased by Mercedes who in turn

bartered the same with the share acquired by

Santiago, another private respondent in this

case.

A portion of Santiagos property was bought by

his daughter, Asuncion Ceniza, married to

private respondent Atillano Bongo and who

successfully obtained a tax declaration therefor.

From the portion purchased by Asuncion

Ceniza, another private respondent, Romeo

Simbajon, purchased an area of 270 square

meters. Romeo also acquired a tax declaration

in his name. He was the husband of Felicitas

Ceniza, another daughter of Santiago.

The share acquired by Estanislao, another child

of Apolinar, was also a portion of Lot No. 1104-

B. He also caused the tax declaration pertainingto the said lot transferred in his name.

The siblings Remedios Adolfo and Constancia

Zanoria, married to private respondent Pablo

Ramos, bought the share of their brother,

Melecio Ceniza. Remedios share, in turn, was

transferred to her heirs, private respondents

Edgar, Emma, Jerry, Glenn, Gina, Lorna, Chona,

Evelyn, Hubert, Amiel, all surnamed Adolfo, and

the heirs of their brother Leoncio Adolfo,

namely, his wife Elenita Adolfo, and children

David and Prestine May Adolfo.On November 4, 1986, private respondents

applied for registration of their respective titles

over the property they inherited from Apolinar

Ceniza, with the Regional Trial Court of

Mandaue City, Branch 28. Petitioner Republic of

the Philippines, represented by the Office of the

Solicitor General opposed the application on

the following grounds:

1. That neither the applicant/s nor their

precedessors-in-interest have been in open

continuous exclusive and notorious possession

and occupation of the land in question since

June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48 [b], C.A.

141, as amended by P.D. 1073).

2. That the muniment/s or title and/or the tax

declaration/s and tax payment/s receipt/s of

applicant/s if any, attached to or alleged in the

application, do/es not constitute competent

and sufficient evidence of a bona fide
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acquisition of the lands applied for or of their

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious

possession and occupation thereof in the

concept of owner, since June 12, 1945, or prior

thereto. Said muniment/s of title do/es not

appear to be genuine and the tax declaration/s

and/or tax payment receipts indicate pretended

possession of applicants to be of recent vintage.

3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on

the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer

be availed of by the applicants who have failed

to file an appropriate application for

registration within the period of six (6) months

from February 16, 1976 as required by

Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records,

it appears that the instant application was filed

on October 25, 1996.

4. That the parcel/s applied for is/are portionsof the public domain belonging to the Republic

of the Philippines not subject to private

appropriation.

In a decision dated February 28, 1990, the

Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City granted

the application.[4]

It held that since the

applicants possession of the land for more than

thirty (30) years was continuous, peaceful,

adverse, public and to the exclusion of

everybody, the same was in the concept of

owners. Since the land was neither encumberednor subject to any other application for

registration, the trial court ordered that, upon

the finality of its decision, the decrees of

registration should be issued in favor of the

applicants.

The Solicitor General interposed an appeal for

petitioner Republic of the Philippines before the

Court of Appeals.

In a decision dated September 28, 1994, the

Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the

trial court. It held that the ruling in Director of

Lands v. Court of Appeals,[5]that before public

land could be registered in the name of a

private individual, it must first be established

that the land had been classified alienable and

disposable, refers to public lands and not to

those which have acquired the nature of a

private property in view of the continuous

possession thereof by its claimants. The Court

of Appeals held:

In this case, it was sufficiently established by

appellees that they have been in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession

of the subject lots even before the year 1927, or

fifty nine (59) years before the application was

filed (TSN, April 13, 1989, pp. 3-4; February 6,

1989, p. 7-11; June 2, 1988, pp. 3, 8-9). This

period more than sufficiently satisfies the 30

years requirement of the Public Land Act for

property to be considered as private land.

Significantly, Section 4, Presidential Decree No.

1073 provides:

Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and

Section 4(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act

are hereby amended in the sense that these

provisions shall apply only to alienable anddisposable lands of the public domain which

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and

notorious possession and occupation by the

applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-

interest, under a bonafide claim of ownership,

since June 12, 1945.

Appellant was thus no longer required to prove

that the property in question is classified as

alienable and disposable land of the public

domain. Clearly, the property no longer forms

part of the public domain. The long andcontinuous possession thereof by appellees

converted said property to a private one. This

finds support in the ruling in Director of Lands

vs. Bengzon, 152 SCRA 369, to wit:

x x x alienable public land held by a possessor,

personally or through his predecessor-in-

interest, openly, continuously and exclusively

for the prescribed statutory period (30) years

under the Public Land Act, as amended is

converted to private property by the mere lapse

or completion of said period, ipso jure. The

above is a reaffirmation of the principle

established in the earlier cases of Cario v.

Insular Government, Suzi v. Razon, and Herico

v. Dar, that open exclusive and undisputed

possession of alienable public land for the

period prescribed by law creates the legal

fiction whereby the land, upon completion of

the requisite period ipso jure and without the
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need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be

public land and becomes private property. x x x

In interpreting the provisions of Section 48 (b)

of Commonwealth Act No. 141, this Court said

in Herico v. Dar, x x x when the conditions as

specified in the foregoing provision are

complied with, the possessor is deemed to have

acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant,

a government grant, without the necessity of a

certificate of title being issued.The land,

therefore, ceases to be of the public domain,

and beyond the authority of the Director of

Lands to dispose of. The application for

confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of

which does not affect the legal sufficiency of

the title as would be evidenced by the patent

and the torrens title to be issued upon the

strength of the patent.The Court of Appeals then cited Director of

Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court.[6]

In that

case, this Court ruled that alienable public land

held by a possessor, personally or through his

predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously

and exclusively for the prescribed statutory

period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as

amended) is converted to private property by

the mere lapse or completion of said

period, ipso jure. Moreover, appellant Republics

claim that the property in question remains tobe public land under the Constitution, is refuted

by this Courts pronouncement in Director of

Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Courtthat the

Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

The Court of Appeals concluded its decision

with the following observations:

Finally, we note that no opposition was filed by

the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest

the application of appellees on the ground that

the property still forms part of the public

domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots

in question are forestal land, unlike the case of

Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA

701, wherein the Director of Lands questioned

the petition for registration filed by the

applicant therein on the claim that the property

applied for registration in his favor was

classified and proven to be forestal land.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,

which was denied in a resolution dated October

29, 1996. Traversing petitioners argument that

under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,

all lands of the public domain are owned by the

State, the Court of Appeals stated that said

provision further states that agricultural lands

are excluded from those lands that may not be

alienated. It further ruled:

In the instant case, among the documents

presented by appellees are Real Estate tax

receipts that sufficiently show that the subject

land is mainly utilized for agricultural purposes

devoted to the planting of coconut, corn x x x

and sugar cane x x x aside from using the same

for residential purposes x x x.

It is noticeable that appellant failed to present

any proof to establish its claim that the land inquestion is not alienable. Although on July 10,

1989, the court a quo issued an order directing

the Bureau of Forest Development [BFD] to

submit xx within thirty (30) days from its receipt

of [said order] a report on the status of the land

xx to determine whether said land or any

portion thereof is within the forest zone xxx

(Record, p. 63), the BFD failed to comply.

Moreover, appellant never contested appellees

application nor did it may (sic) any

manifestation that the land in question is notalienable. Likewise, the prosecutor representing

the Republic of the Philippines during the trial

did not even contest the classification of the

land as stated in the evidence of

appellees. Their belated objection should

therefore not prejudice appellees who openly

and in good faith presented all the documents

pertinent to their claims.

Presidential Decree No. 1073 extended the

period within which a qualified person may

apply for confirmation of an imperfect or

incomplete title by judicial legalization to

December 31, 1987. The filing of this case in

October, 1986 was therefore seasonable. Under

the decree, this right is available to a person

who has been in open, continuous, exclusive

and notorious possession and occupation, by

himself and through his predecessors-in-

interest, under a bona fideclaim of acquisition
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of ownership since June 12, 1945. We reiterate

that appellees have proven themselves to have

been in possession of the subject land even

prior to June 12, 1945.

Hence, this petition for review, alleging that the

Court of Appeals erred in: (1) holding that

private respondents have registerable title to

the lots in question, and (2) ordering the

registration thereof in their names.[7]

The issues raised before us are: (a) whether

there is a need for private respondents to

establish that the land subject of their

application was alienable and disposable

despite proofs showing their possession thereof

for more than 30 years; and (b) whether private

respondents were able to meet the period

required by the Public Land Act, as amended.

Petitioner contends that before a public landcan be registered in the name of a private

individual, it must be shown first that (a) the

land has been classified alienable and

disposable, and (b) the applicant, by himself or

through his predecessors-in-interest, has been

in continuous, exclusive and notorious

possession and occupation of the same under a

bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,

1945 or prior thereto.

Petitioner claims that private respondents failed

to meet the said requirements. They did notcite any official proclamation or presented the

land classification map covering the subject

parcels of land to prove that they are alienable

and disposable public lands. Neither did private

respondents adduce evidence to show that they

had been in possession of the land since June

12, 1945. Although they were able to show

possession by Apolinar, their predecessor-in-

interest, since 1948, and private respondents

actual possession beginning in 1960, no proof

was presented to show possession prior to

1948. Consequently, private respondents are

not entitled to have the subject parcels of land

registered in their names.

In their comment, private respondents cite

Section 48(b),[8]

before it was amended by PD

No. 1073, and Section (50)[9]

of the Public Land

Act as the applicable law in this case. They

maintain that the land subject of their

application is an agricultural land devoted to

corn and other root crops. Further, they have

been in possession of the land since 1927.

Estanislao Ceniza, one of the children of

Apolinar and who was already ten years old at

that time, testified that his father was the one

in possession of the land, appropriating its fruits

and paying its realty taxes. When their father

died in 1947, Apolinars chidren took possession

of the land. They also appropriated the fruits

and paid realty taxes therefor. In 1960,

Apolinars heirs partitioned the property,

declared their respective shares in their names

for tax purposes and paid the realty taxes.

Apart from this, private respondents claim that

the land in question has long been a private

one, it being a part of Hacienda de Mandaue de

Cebu, which in turn was recognized as a privateland by the Court of First Instance of Cebu in

several decisions dated February 27, 1934,

March 27, 1935, May 6, 1937 and August 6,

1937.

Indeed, before one can be granted a

confirmation of title to lands of the public

domain, the Public Land Act requires that the

applicant must prove (a) that the land is

alienable public land and (b) that his open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession

and occupation of the same must either besince time immemorial or for the period

prescribed in the Public Land Act. Only when

these conditions are met may the possessor of

the land acquire, by operation of law, a right to

a grant, a government grant, without the

necessity of a certificate of title being issued.[10]

Conclusively, the Court of Appeals erred when it

held that mere adverse possession in

accordance with law for a period likewise

provided for by law would automatically entitle

the possessor to the right to register public land

in his name. The applicant has to establish first

the disposable and alienable character of the

public land. Otherwise, all public lands,

regardless of their classification, can be subject

of registration of private titles, as long as the

applicant shows that he meets the required

years of possession. Worth noting is the case

of Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,[11]

where the
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applicant had been in possession of the

property since 1908 but it was conclusively

shown by the government that the land was

classified as alienable or disposable only on 27

March 1972. The Court said:

x x x. Thus, even granting that petitioner and his

predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same

since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by

virtue of such possession since the subject

parcels of land were not yet alienable land at

that time nor capable of private

appropriation. The adverse possession which

may be the basis of a grant of title or

confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to

alienable or disposable portions of the public

domain.[12](Italics supplied)

To prove that the land subject of an application

for registration is alienable, an applicant mustestablish the existence of a positive act of the

government such as a presidential proclamation

or an executive order;[13]

an administrative

action;[14]

investigation reports of Bureau of

Lands investigators;[15]

and a legislative act or a

statute.[16]

In this case, private respondents presented a

certification dated November 25, 1994, issued

by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community

Environment and Natural Resources Officer in

the Department of Environment and NaturalResources Office in Cebu City, stating that the

lots involved were found to be within the

alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land

Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-

I555 dated December 9, 1980.[17]

This is

sufficient evidence to show the real character of

the land subject of private respondents

application.[18]

Further, the certification enjoys a

presumption of regularity in the absence of

contradictory evidence,[19]which is true in this

case. Worth noting also was the observation of

the Court of Appeals stating that:

no opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands

and Forestry to contest the application of

appellees on the ground that the property still

forms part of the public domain. Nor is there

any showing that the lots in question are

forestal land....[20]

Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling

that mere possession of public land for the

period required by law would entitle its

occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it

did not err in ruling in favor of private

respondents as far as the first requirement in

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is

concerned, for they were able to overcome the

burden of proving the alienability of the land

subject of their application.

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals,

private respondents were able to prove their

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious

possession of the subject land even before the

year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the

factual findings of the Court of

Appeals.[21]Although there are exceptions,

petitioner did not show that this is one ofthem.[22]

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on

certiorari is DENIED and the decision, as well as

the resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. CV No. 31728 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 128750. January 18, 2001]

CARQUELO OMANDAM and ROSITO

ITOM,[1]

petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS,

BLAS TRABASAS and AMPAROBONILLA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition[2]

for review seeks the reversal of

the decision dated October 29, 1996, of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.

44442,reversing and setting aside the decision

of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Del

Sur, Branch 23, dated November 15, 1996, and

the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated

February 21, 1997,denying the petitioners

motion for reconsideration.

On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands in

Pagadian City issued in favor of Camilo Lasola

Homestead Patent No. IX-6-40 covering Lot No.

8736, with an area of 23,985 sq. m. in Sagrada,

Tambulig, Zamboanga del Sur. On April 28,

1978, the Register of Deeds issued Original
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Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22-690 in his

name.

On April 28, 1983, respondent Blas Trabasas

bought the land from a Dolores Sayson who

claimed she was the owner of said land. In

1984, Trabasas discovered that petitioners

Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom had

occupied the land. Meanwhile, on July 19, 1987,

Omandam protested Lasolas homestead patent

before the Bureau of Lands and prayed for

cancellation of the OCT. Upon Saysons advice,

Trabasas repurchased the land from Lasola,

who executed a deed of sale dated September

24,1987. On August 9,1989, Trabasas acquired a

new transfer certificate of title.

On April 16,1990, spouses Blas Trabasas and

Amparo Bonilla filed a complaint against

petitioners for recovery of possession and/orownership of the land with the Regional Trial

Court of Zamboanga del Sur. They alleged that

they were the true and registered owners of the

land and Omandam and Itom should vacate it.

Petitioners answered that they purchased the

land from one Godofredo Sela who had been in

possession for almost twenty years.

After the parties were duly heard, the Regional

Trial Court issued its decision on November 15,

1993 declaring that neither respondents herein

nor their predecessors-in-interest were ever inpossession of the land. Citing Director of Lands

vs. Court of Appeals, 17 SCRA 71 (1966),

Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358

(1983) and Padre vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA

446 (1992), the trial court disposed:

WHEREFORE, finding that the plaintiffs have no

equitable right to the possession of the land

under litigation, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of the defendants and against the

plaintiff-

1) Finding the defendants to have equitable

right to the possession of the land in litigation.

2) Ordering the plaintiffs to reconvey the title of

the land under litigation in the name of the

plaintiffs to the defendants within 30 days from

the date this decision becomes final and

executory, and upon their failure to so comply,

ordering the Clerk of Court to execute in behalf

of the plaintiffs the necessary deed of

conveyance over the said land in favor of the

defendants which deed would be considered

sufficient to authorize the Register of Deeds of

Zamboanga del Sur, Pagadian City, to cause the

cancellation of the Torrens Certificate of Title in

the names of the plaintiffs, and in lieu thereof,

to issue another in the common names of the

defendants.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Private respondents appealed to the Court of

Appeals. Pending the appeal, the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) -

Region IX dismissed Omandams protest

previously filed with the Bureau of Lands.[4]

It

said that Omandam failed to prove that Lasola,

respondents predecessor-in-interest,

committed fraud and misrepresentation in

acquiring the patent, hence there is no groundfor its revocation and cancellation of its

corresponding title.

On October 29,1996, the Court of Appeals

reversed the trial court. It decided thus:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the

appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET

ASIDE, a new one is hereby issued ordering

defendants-appellees to vacate the subject land

and surrender it to plaintiff -appellant.

Cost against defendants-appellees.

SO ORDERED.

[5]

The Court of Appeals declared that petitioners

collateral attack on the homestead title, to

defeat private respondents accion publiciana,

was not sanctioned by law; that the patent and

title of Camilo Lasola, private respondents

predecessor-in-interest, had already become

indefeasible since April 28, 1977; and that

petitioners action for reconveyance in the

nature of their protest with the Bureau of Lands

and counterclaim in their answer to the

complaint for recovery of possession, already

prescribed.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration

which was denied on February 21,1997. Hence,

this petition for review. Petitioners make the

following assignment of errors, alleging that the

Court of Appeals erred in:

I. ...HOLDING THAT ONE OF THE UNDISPUTED

FACTS IS THAT On April 28,1983, plaintiff
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bought the subject land from Dolores Sayson

who presented herself to be the true owner of

the subject land;

II. ...HOLDING THAT ANOTHER UNDISPUTED

FACT IS THAT ...sometime in 1984 plaintiff

discovered that defendants had entered and

had occupied the subject land. Upon

instructions of Dolores Sayson, plaintiff

approached Camilo Lasola and again bought the

subject land, this time from Camilo Lasola;

III. ...IGNORING THE FINDINGS OF THE

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH THOROUGHLY

DISCUSSED THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO

ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE PRIVATE

RESPONDENTS AND CAMILO LASOLA HAD NO

EQUITABLE POSSESSION ON THE SUBJECT

LAND, WHICH LACK OF EQUITABLE POSSESION

MAKES SOME OF THE RECENT DECISIONS OFTHE SUPREME COURT APPLICABLE TO THE

CASE.[6]

In the first two assigned errors, petitioners

apparently question findings of fact by the

Court of Appeals while disputing the claim of

possession by private respondents and their

predecessors-in-interest.The appellate court

had stated firstly that respondent Trabasas

bought the subject land from Sayson who

presented herself as the true owner, then

secondly, that he bought the land from Lasolaalso. The first two issues, in our view, raise

questions of fact. Well-entrenched is the rule

that the Courts jurisdiction in a petition for

review is limited to reviewing or revising errors

of law allegedly committed by the appellate

court. Findings of fact below are generally

conclusive on the Court. It is not for the Court

to weigh evidence all over again.[7]

There are

instances where the Court departs from this

rule.[8]However, petitioners did not show that

involved here is an exceptional instance. Hence,

we need not tarry on the first two assignments.

In the third assignment of error, petitioners

aver that public respondent erred in ignoring

the trial courts finding that private respondents

had no equitable possession of the subject land.

Again, we are confronted with a question of

fact. But petitioners claim the appellate court

had disregarded or even contradicted our

holdings in the cited cases of Director of

Lands, Abanilla, and Padre.

In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 17

SCRA 71(1966), we ruled that a void title may be

cancelled. A title over a disposable public land is

void if its grantee failed to comply with the

conditions imposed by law. In Director of Lands

vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358 (1983), we held that

the indefeasibility of a Torrens Title cannot be

used as a defense in an action for cancellation

of title acquired through fraud. These two cases

refer to actions for cancellation of title initiated

by the government, through the Solicitor

General, after a finding of fraud by the

Department of Environment and Natural

Resources. InPadre vs. Court of Appeals, 214

SCRA 446 (1992) we said that in an action for

quieting of title, the court may determineincidentally the right to the possession thereof,

in order to provide complete relief to the

parties. The last case refers to determination of

rightful possession in possessory actions.

Notwithstanding the formulation by the

petitioners in the third assigned error, the real

issue raised in this case involves the trial courts

jurisdiction vis--vis administrative agencies.

What is the effect of the trial courts decision in

a possessory action on the order of Bureau of

Lands regarding a homestead application anddecision of the DENR on the protest over the

homestead patent?

Commonwealth Act 141 as amended, otherwise

known as the Public Land Act, gives in its

sections 3 and 4 to the Director of Lands

primarily and to the Secretary of Agriculture

and Natural Resources (now the Secretary of

Department of Environment and Natural

Resources) ultimately the authority to dispose

and manage public lands.[9]In this regard,

courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the

validity of the decree of registration issued by

the Director of Lands.[10]Only the DENR

Secretary can review, on appeal, such decree.

It will be recalled that the Bureau of Lands

approved Lasolas homestead application on

May 21, 1968. No appeal was made therefrom.

Nineteen years after, or on July 9, 1987,

Omandam filed the protest with the Bureau of
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Lands. Thereafter, respondents Trabasas and

Bonilla instituted the present action in the

Regional Trial Court for recovery of possession

and/or ownership. As mentioned earlier, the

trial court held that petitioners were entitled to

a declaration of equitable possession over the

area in question. Said trial court then ordered

the cancellation of respondents title and the

issuance of a new one. In effect, the courts

order reversed the award made by the Director

of Lands in favor of Lasola. This reversal was in

error, for the proper administrative agency, the

DENR under CA 141, had prior jurisdiction over

the patent on the subject matter, which is the

contested homestead area.

DENRs jurisdiction over public lands does not

negate the authority of courts of justice to

resolve questions of possession and theirdecisions stand in the meantime that the DENR

has not settled the respective rights of public

land claimants.[11]

But once the DENR has

decided, particularly with the grant of

homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and

then TCT later, its decision prevails.

In this case, Lasola applied for a homestead

patent over the contested area in 1967. His

application was granted on May 21, 1968. The

Order for the issuance of the patent was issued

by the Bureau of Lands on January 29, 1974 andthe corresponding Original Certificate of Title

was issued by the Register of Deeds on April 28,

1976. From the three latter dates, no appeal

was made. It was only on July 9, 1987, i.e., 13

years from the date of the Order directing the

issuance of the patent that petitioners

protested the homestead grant with the Bureau

of Lands. Despite the said lapse of time, the

Bureau of Lands gave due course to the protest

relying on our ruling in Director vs.

Abanilla[12]

that the doctrine of indefeasibility of

title does not apply when the grant is tainted

with fraud and misrepresentation. From this

date, Lasolas right of possession based on his

OCT and eventually that of respondents were

put on issue. In their desire to get possession of

the property, respondents instituted an action

for recovery of possession and/or ownership on

April 16, 1990 with the Regional Trial Court.

Said court rendered its decision against

respondents on November 15, 1993.

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Pending the appeal or on March 23, 1995, the

DENR-Region IX dismissed petitioners protest

on the ground of absence of fraud and

misrepresentation committed by respondents

predecessors-in-interest.[13]On October 29,

1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated the

decision subject of this petition in favor of

respondents. Petitioners then brought the

instant case to us.

We note that the parties did not manifest as to

whether an appeal was made from the decision

of the Regional Director of DENR-IX. Further, no

mention was ever made in their pleadings

regarding the matter. From the said Order of

the DENR Regional Director up to the present,five years have lapsed. From this, we can

conclude that no appeal has been made and

that the DENR decision dismissing the

petitioners protest and upholding respondents

right on the contested area has attained finality.

By now it appears indubitable that private

respondents, spouses Trabasas and Bonilla,

have been duly confirmed in their right to

possession of Lot No. 8736 as owners

thereof. By virtue of the deed of sale executed

by OCT holder Camilo Lasola as early asSeptember 24, 1987, in favor of Trabasas, who

then secured a transfer certificate of title in his

name, private respondents clearly have

superior right over the land claimed by

petitioners Omandam and Itom. The appellate

court did not err in upholding the right of

private respondents, and in ordering the

petitioners to vacate and surrender the land to

said respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the

decision of the Court of Appeals dated October

29, 1996, and its resolution dated February 21,

1997, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002
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FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ,petitioner,

vs.

PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI

COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION,respondents.

CARPIO,J.:

This is an original Petition for Mandamus with

prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a

temporary restraining order. The petition seeks

to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA"

for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then

on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay

and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for

brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The

petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from

signing a new agreement with AMARI involving

such reclamation.

The FactsOn November 20, 1973, the government,

through the Commissioner of Public Highways,

signed a contract with the Construction and

Development Corporation of the Philippines

("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain

foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The

contract also included the construction of

Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal

Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the

works in consideration of fifty percent of the

total reclaimed land.On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand

E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084

creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to

reclaim land, including foreshore and

submerged areas," and "to develop, improve,

acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of

lands."1On the same date, then President

Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085

transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the

foreshore and offshore of the Manila

Bay"2under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and

Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos

issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend

its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future

works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and

owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP

executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated

December 29, 1981, which stated:

"(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation,

construction, and such other works in the

MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by the parties,

to be paid according to progress of works on a

unit price/lump sum basis for items of work to

be agreed upon, subject to price escalation,

retention and other terms and conditions

provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1594. All

the financing required for such works shall be

provided by PEA.

x x x

(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development

rights and hereby agrees to cede and transfer in

favor of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and

participation of CDCP in and to all the areas of

land reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP as of

December 30, 1981 which have not yet been

sold, transferred or otherwise disposed of byCDCP as of said date, which areas consist of

approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four

Hundred Seventy Three (99,473) square meters

in the Financial Center Area covered by land

pledge No. 5 and approximately Three Million

Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight

Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888) square meters

of reclaimed areas at varying elevations above

Mean Low Water Level located outside the

Financial Center Area and the First

Neighborhood Unit."

3

On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C.

Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting

and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so

reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road

and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a

total area of one million nine hundred fifteen

thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894)

square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988,

the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of

Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title

Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA,

covering the three reclaimed islands known as

the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern

portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road,

Paraaque City. The Freedom Islands have a

total land area of One Million Five Hundred

Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and

Forty One (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841

hectares.


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On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint

Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with

AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the

Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the

reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of

submerged areas surrounding these islands to

complete the configuration in the Master

Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation

Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into

the JVA through negotiation without public

bidding.4On April 28, 1995, the Board of

Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245,

confirmed the JVA.5On June 8, 1995, then

President Fidel V. Ramos, through then

Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the

JVA.6

On November 29, 1996, then Senate President

Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech inthe Senate and denounced the JVA as the

"grandmother of all scams." As a result, the

Senate Committee on Government

Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the

Committee on Accountability of Public Officers

and Investigations, conducted a joint

investigation. The Senate Committees reported

the results of their investigation in Senate

Committee Report No. 560 dated September

16, 1997.7Among the conclusions of their

report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks totransfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of

the public domain which the government has

not classified as alienable lands and therefore

PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the

certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands

are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.

On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V.

Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order

No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a

study on the legality of the JVA in view of

Senate Committee Report No. 560. The

members of the Legal Task Force were the

Secretary of Justice,8the Chief Presidential

Legal Counsel,9and the Government Corporate

Counsel.10

The Legal Task Force upheld the

legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions

reached by the Senate Committees.11

On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily

Inquirerand Todaypublished reports that there

were on-going renegotiations between PEA and

AMARI under an order issued by then President

Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA

Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio

Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz

composed the negotiating panel of PEA.

On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed

before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with

Application for the Issuance of a Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary

Injunctiondocketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking

to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the

petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial

hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of

the case before the proper court."12

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez

("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the

instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer forthe Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction

and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner

contends the government stands to lose billions

of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed

lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA

publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation

of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and

Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on

the right of the people to information on

matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the

sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as ablatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the

1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of

alienable lands of the public domain to private

corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he

seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in

properties of the State that are of public

dominion.

After several motions for extension of

time,13PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on

October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998,

respectively. Meanwhile, on December 28,

1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to

require PEA to submit the terms of the

renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for

issuance of a temporary restraining order; and

(c) to set the case for hearing on oral argument.

Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for

Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which


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the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22,

1999.

In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court

gave due course to the petition and required

the parties to file their respective memoranda.

On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the

Amended Joint Venture Agreement ("Amended

JVA," for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office

of the President under the administration of

then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the

Amended JVA.

Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the

Office of the President, petitioner now prays

that on "constitutional and statutory grounds

the renegotiated contract be declared null and

void."14

The Issues

The issues raised by petitioner, PEA15andAMARI16are as follows:

I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED

FOR IN THE PETITION ARE MOOT AND

ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;

II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL

FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE

GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;

III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL

FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE

REMEDIES;

IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUSSTANDITO BRING THIS SUIT;

V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO

INFORMATION INCLUDES OFFICIAL

INFORMATION ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS

BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT;

VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE

AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR

THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS,

RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED,

VIOLATE THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; AND

VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER

FORUM FOR RAISING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER

THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS

GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE

GOVERNMENT.

The Court's Ruling

First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed

for in the petition are moot and academic

because of subsequent events.

The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the

"terms and conditions of the on-going

negotiations for a new agreement." The

petition also prays that the Court enjoin PEA

from "privately entering into, perfecting and/or

executing any new agreement with AMARI."

PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot

and academic because AMARI furnished

petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed

Amended JVA containing the terms and

conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations.

Thus, PEA has satisfied petitioner's prayer for a

public disclosure of the renegotiations.

Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the

signing of the Amended JVA is now moot

because PEA and AMARI have already signed

the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999.

Moreover, the Office of the President hasapproved the Amended JVA on May 28, 1999.

Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot

avoid the constitutional issue by simply fast-

tracking the signing and approval of the

Amended JVA before the Court could act on the

issue. Presidential approval does not resolve

the constitutional issue or remove it from the

ambit of judicial review.

We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by

PEA and AMARI and its approval by the

President cannot operate to moot the petitionand divest the Court of its jurisdiction. PEA and

AMARI have still to implement the Amended

JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the

Amended JVA on constitutional grounds

necessarily includes preventing its

implementation if in the meantime PEA and

AMARI have signed one in violation of the

Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in

assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its

violation of Section 3, Article XII of the

Constitution, which prohibits the government

from alienating lands of the public domain to

private corporations. If the Amended JVA

indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of

the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if

already implemented, to annul the effects of

such unconstitutional contract.

The Amended JVA is not an ordinary

commercial contract but one which seeks


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to transfer title and ownership to 367.5

hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged

areas of Manila Bay to a single private

corporation. It now becomes more compelling

for the Court to resolve the issue to insure the

government itself does not violate a provision

of the Constitution intended to safeguard the

national patrimony. Supervening events,

whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent

the Court from rendering a decision if there is a

grave violation of the Constitution. In the

instant case, if the Amended JVA runs counter

to the Constitution, the Court can still prevent

the transfer of title and ownership of alienable

lands of the public domain in the name of

AMARI. Even in cases where supervening events

had made the cases moot, the Court did not

hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutionalissues raised to formulate controlling principles

to guide the bench, bar, and the public.17

Also, the instant petition is a case of first

impression. All previous decisions of the Court

involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987

Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the

1973 Constitution,18

covered agricultural

landssold to private corporations which

acquired the lands from private parties. The

transferors of the private corporations claimed

or could claim the right tojudicial confirmationof their imperfect titles

19under Title IIof

Commonwealth Act. 141 ("CA No. 141" for

brevity). In the instant case, AMARI seeks to

acquire from PEA, a public corporation,

reclaimed lands and submerged areas for non-

agriculturalpurposes bypurchaseunder PD

No. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title IIIof CA No.

141. Certain undertakings by AMARI under the

Amended JVA constitute the consideration for

the purchase. Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim

judicial confirmation of their titles because the

lands covered by the Amended JVA are newly

reclaimed or still to be reclaimed. Judicial

confirmation of imperfect title requires open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation

of agricultural lands of the public domain for at

least thirty years since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Besides, the deadline for filing applications for

judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired

on December 31, 1987.20

Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately

the constitutional issue raised in this petition

because of the possible transfer at any time by

PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions

of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended

JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the

latter's seventy percent proportionate share in

the reclaimed areas as the reclamation

progresses. The Amended JVA even allows

AMARI to mortgage at any time

the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for

the reclamation project.21

Second issue: whether the petition merits

dismissal for failing to observe the principle

governing the hierarchy of courts.

PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored thejudicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from

the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts

applies generally to cases involving factual

questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court

cannot entertain cases involving factual issues.

The instant case, however, raises constitutional

issues of transcendental importance to the

public.22

The Court can resolve this case without

determining any factual issue related to the

case. Also, the instant case is a petition for

mandamus which falls under the originaljurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article

VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise

primary jurisdiction over the instant case.

Third issue: whether the petition merits

dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative

remedies.

PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial

intervention in compelling PEA to disclose

publicly certain information without first asking

PEA the needed information. PEA claims

petitioner's direct resort to the Court violates

the principle of exhaustion of administrative

remedies. It also violates the rule that

mandamus may issue only if there is no other

plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the

ordinary course of law.

PEA distinguishes the instant case from Taada

v. Tuvera23

where the Court granted the

petition for mandamus even if the petitioners


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there did not initially demand from the Office of

the President the publication of the presidential

decrees. PEA points out that in Taada, the

Executive Department had an affirmative

statutoryduty under Article 2 of the Civil

Code24and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.

63825to publish the presidential decrees. There

was, therefore, no need for the petitioners in

Taada to make an initial demand from the

Office of the President. In the instant case, PEA

claims it has no affirmative statutory duty to

disclose publicly information about its

renegotiation of the JVA. Thus, PEA asserts that

the Court must apply the principle of

exhaustion of administrative remedies to the

instant case in view of the failure of petitioner

here to demand initially from PEA the needed

information.The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI

public lands held by PEA, a government

corporation. Under Section 79 of the

Government Auditing Code,26

the disposition of

government lands to private parties requires

public bidding. PEA was under a positive legal

duty to disclose to the public the terms and

conditions for the sale of its lands. The law

obligated PEA to make this public disclosure

even without demand from petitioner or from

anyone. PEA failed to make this publicdisclosure because the original JVA, like the

Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated

contract, not of a public bidding. Considering

that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to

make the public disclosure, and was even in

breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the

right to seek direct judicial intervention.

Moreover, and this alone is determinative of

this issue, the principle of exhaustion of

administrative remedies does not apply when

the issue involved is a purely legal or

constitutional question.27The principal issue in

the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to

acquire lands held by PEA in view of the

constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of

lands of the public domain to private

corporations. We rule that the principle of

exhaustion of administrative remedies does not

apply in the instant case.

Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus

standi to bring this suit

PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to

institute mandamusproceedings to enforce his

constitutional right to information without a

showing that PEA refused to perform an

affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the

Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has

not shown that he will suffer any concrete

injury because of the signing or implementation

of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual

controversy requiring the exercise of the power

of judicial review.

The petitioner has standing to bring this

taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to

compel PEA to comply with its constitutional

duties. There are two constitutional issues

involved here. First is the right of citizens toinformation on matters of public concern.

Second is the application of a constitutional

provision intended to insure the equitable

distribution of alienable lands of the public

domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of

the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose

publicly information on the sale of government

lands worth billions of pesos, information which

the Constitution and statutory law mandate

PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue

is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds ofhectares of alienable lands of the public domain

in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA

to comply with a constitutional duty to the

nation.

Moreover, the petition raises matters of

transcendental importance to the public.

In Chavez v. PCGG,28

the Court upheld the right

of a citizen to bring a taxpayer's suit on matters

of transcendental importance to the public,

thus -

"Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of

recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses

is an issue of 'transcendental importance to the

public.' He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have

a right to initiate and prosecute actions

questioning the validity of acts or orders of

government agencies or instrumentalities, if the

issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,'


14/72

and if they 'immediately affect the social,

economic and moral well being of the people.'

Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen

satisfies the requirement of personal interest,

when the proceeding involves the assertion of a

public right, such as in this case. He invokes

several decisions of this Court which have set

aside the procedural matter of locus standi,

when the subject of the case involved public

interest.

x x x

In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that

when the issue concerns a public right and the

object of mandamus is to obtain the

enforcement of a public duty, the people are

regarded as the real parties in interest; and

because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen

and as such is interested in the execution of thelaws, he need not show that he has any legal or

special interest in the result of the action. In the

aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to

enforce their right to be informed on matters of

public concern, a right then recognized in

Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in

connection with the rule that laws in order to

be valid and enforceable must be published in

the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively

promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners' legal

standing, the Court declared that the right theysought to be enforced 'is a public right

recognized by no less than the fundamental law

of the land.'

Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while

reiterating Taada, further declared that 'when

a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion

of a public right, the requirement of personal

interest is satisfied by the mere fact that

petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the

general 'public' which possesses the right.'

Further, inAlbano v. Reyes, we said that while

expenditure of public funds may not have been

involved under the questioned contract for the

development, management and operation of

the Manila International Container Terminal,

'public interest [was] definitely involved

considering the important role [of the subject

contract] . . . in the economic development of

the country and the magnitude of the financial

consideration involved.' We concluded that, as

a consequence, the disclosure provision in the

Constitution would constitute sufficient

authority for upholding the petitioner's

standing.

Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the

right of the people to information and access to

official records, documents and papers a

right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of

the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former

solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of

the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid

down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's

legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a

public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen,

we rule that the petition at bar should be

allowed."

We rule that since the instant petition, broughtby a citizen, involves the enforcement of

constitutional rights - to information and to the

equitable diffusion of natural resources -

matters of transcendental public importance,

the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.

Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to

information includes official information on

on-going negotiations before a final

agreement.

Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains

the people's right to information on matters ofpublic concern in this manner:

"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information

on matters of public concern shall be

recognized. Access to official records, and to

documents, and papers pertaining to official

acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to

government research data used as basis for

policy development, shall be afforded the

citizen, subject to such limitations as may be

provided by law." (Emphasis supplied)

The State policy of full transparency in all

transactions involving public interest reinforces

the people's right to information on matters of

public concern. This State policy is expressed in

Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:

"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions

prescribed by law, the State adopts and

implements apolicy of full public disclosure of


15/72

all its transactions involving public interest."

(Emphasis supplied)

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek

to promote transparency in policy-making and

in the operations of the government, as well as

provide the people sufficient information to

exercise effectively other constitutional rights.

These twin provisions are essential to the

exercise of freedom of expression. If the

government does not disclose its official acts,

transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever

citizens say, even if expressed without any

restraint, will be speculative and amount to

nothing. These twin provisions are also essential

to hold public officials "at all times x x x

accountable to the people,"29for unless citizens

have the proper information, they cannot hold

public officials accountable for anything. Armedwith the right information, citizens can

participate in public discussions leading to the

formulation of government policies and their

effective implementation. An informed citizenry

is essential to the existence and proper

functioning of any democracy. As explained by

the Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.30

"An essential element of these freedoms is to

keep open a continuing dialogue or process of

communication between the government and

the people. It is in the interest of the State thatthe channels for free political discussion be

maintained to the end that the government

may perceive and be responsive to the people's

will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective

only to the extent that the citizenry is informed

and thus able to formulate its will intelligently.

Only when the participants in the discussion are

aware of the issues and have access to

information relating thereto can such bear

fruit."

PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,31that in

cases of on-going negotiations the right to

information is limited to "definite propositions

of the government." PEA maintains the right

does not include access to "intra-agency or

inter-agency recommendations or

communications during the stage when

common assertions are still in the process of

being formulated or are in the 'exploratory

stage'."

Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot

invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or

before the closing of the transaction. To

support its contention, AMARI cites the

following discussion in the 1986 Constitutional

Commission:

"Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions'

which should be distinguished from contracts,

agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the

Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the

consummation of the contract, or does he refer

to the contract itself?

Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I

suppose is generic and therefore, it can cover

both steps leading to a contract and already a

consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of

negotiations leading to the consummation of

the transaction.

Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable

safeguards on the national interest.

Mr. Suarez:Thank you."32

(Emphasis supplied)

AMARI argues there must first be a

consummated contract before petitioner can

invoke the right. Requiring government officials

to reveal their deliberations at the pre-

decisional stage will degrade the quality ofdecision-making in government agencies.

Government officials will hesitate to express

their real sentiments during deliberations if

there is immediate public dissemination of their

discussions, putting them under all kinds of

pressure before they decide.

We must first distinguish between information

the law on public bidding requires PEA to

disclose publicly, and information the

constitutional right to information requires PEA

to release to the public. Before the

consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its

own and without demand from anyone,

disclose to the public matters relating to the

disposition of its property. These include the

size, location, technical description and nature

of the property being disposed of, the terms

and conditions of the disposition, the parties

qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar


16/72

information. PEA must prepare all these data

and disclose them to the public at the start of

the disposition process, long before the

consummation of the contract, because the

Government Auditing Code requirespublic

bidding. If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any

citizen can demand from PEA this information

at any time during the bidding process.

Information, however, on on-going evaluation

or reviewof bids or proposals being undertaken

by the bidding or review committee is not

immediately accessible under the right to

information. While the evaluation or review is

still on-going, there are no "official acts,

transactions, or decisions" on the bids or

proposals. However, once the committee makes

its official recommendation, there arises

a "definite proposition"on the part of thegovernment. From this moment, the public's

right to information attaches, and any citizen

can access all the non-proprietary information

leading to such definite proposition. In Chavez

v. PCGG,33

the Court ruled as follows:

"Considering the intent of the framers of the

Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent

upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other

government representatives, to disclose

sufficient public information on any proposed

settlement they have decided to take up withthe ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten

wealth. Such information, though, must pertain

to definite propositions of the government, not

necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency

recommendations or communications during

the stage when common assertions are still in

the process of being formulated or are in the

"exploratory" stage. There is need, of course, to

observe the same restrictions on disclosure of

information in general, as discussed earlier

such as on matters involving national security,

diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and

other classified information." (Emphasis

supplied)

Contrary to AMARI's contention, the

commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission understood that the right to

information "contemplates inclusion of

negotiations leading to the consummation of

the transaction."Certainly, a consummated

contract is not a requirement for the exercise of

the right to information. Otherwise, the people

can never exercise the right if no contract is

consummated, and if one is consummated, it

may be too late for the public to expose its

defects.1wphi1.nt

Requiring a consummated contract will keep

the public in the dark until the contract, which

may be grossly disadvantageous to the

government or even illegal, becomes afait

accompli. This negates the State policy of full

transparency on matters of public concern, a

situation which the framers of the Constitution

could not have intended. Such a requirement

will prevent the citizenry from participating in

the public discussion of anyproposedcontract,

effectively truncating a basic right enshrined inthe Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an

emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a

retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full

disclosure of all its transactions involving public

interest."

The right covers three categories of information

which are "matters of public concern," namely:

(1) official records; (2) documents and papers

pertaining to official acts, transactions and

decisions; and (3) government research data

used in formulating policies. The first categoryrefers to any document that is part of the public

records in the custody of government agencies

or officials. The second category refers to

documents and papers recording, evidencing,

establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying

or explaining official acts, transactions or

decisions of government agencies or officials.

The third category refers to research data,

whether raw, collated or processed, owned by

the government and used in formulating

government policies.

The information that petitioner may access on

the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation

reports, recommendations, legal and expert

opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of

reference and other documents attached to

such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA.

However, the right to information does not

compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts,


17/72

summaries and the like relating to the

renegotiation of the JVA.34

The right only

affords access to records, documents and

papers, which means the opportunity to inspect

and copy them. One who exercises the right

must copy the records, documents and papers

at his expense. The exercise of the right is also

subject to reasonable regulations to protect the

integrity of the public records and to minimize

disruption to government operations, like rules

specifying when and how to conduct the

inspection and copying.35

The right to information, however, does not

extend to matters recognized as privileged

information under the separation of

powers.36The right does not also apply to

information on military and diplomatic secrets,

information affecting national security, andinformation on investigations of crimes by law

enforcement agencies before the prosecution

of the accused, which courts have long

recognized as confidential.37

The right may also

be subject to other limitations that Congress

may impose by law.

There is no claim by PEA that the information

demanded by petitioner is privileged

information rooted in the separation of powers.

The information does not cover Presidential

conversations, correspondences, or discussionsduring closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like

internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and

other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of

either house of Congress,38

are recognized as

confidential. This kind of information cannot be

pried open by a co-equal branch of

government. A frank exchange of exploratory

ideas and assessments, free from the glare of

publicity and pressure by interested parties, is

essential to protect the independence of

decision-making of those tasked to exercise

Presidential, Legislative and Judicial

power.39This is not the situation in the instant

case.

We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right

to information includes official information

on on-going negotiationsbefore a final

contract. The information, however, must

constitute definite propositions by the

government and should not cover recognized

exceptions like privileged information, military

and diplomatic secrets and similar matters

affecting national security and public

order.40Congress has also prescribed other

limitations on the right to information in several

legislations.41

Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the

Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of

lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the

Constitution.

The Regalian Doctrine

The ownership of lands reclaimed from

foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the

Regalian doctrine which holds that the State

owns all lands and waters of the public domain.

Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,

ownership of all "lands, territories andpossessions" in the Philippines passed to the

Spanish Crown.42

The King, as the sovereign

ruler and representative of the people, acquired

and owned all lands and territories in the

Philippines except those he disposed of by grant

or sale to private individuals.

The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted

the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the

State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all

lands and waters of the public domain. The

Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all

lands that were not acquired from the

Government, either by purchase or by grant,

belong to the public domain."43

Article 339 of

the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article 420

of the Civil Code of 1950, incorporated the

Regalian doctrine.

Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands

The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first

statutory law governing the ownership and

disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines.

On May 18, 1907, the Philippine Commission

enacted Act No. 1654 which providedfor the

lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of

the government to corporations and

individuals. Later, on November 29, 1919, the

Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 2874,

the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease,

but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the


18/72

government to corporations and individuals.

On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly

passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known

as the Public

case syllabus for natural resources

Documents