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1ACThe United States federal government should reduce itsmilitary presence in Afghanistan to levels consistent with acounterterrorism strategy


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1AC InherencyContention 1: Inherency

Counterinsurgency will inevitably fail a minimalist approach

is sufficient to contain al Qaeda and prevent a TalibantakeoverNelson 9 (Rick "Ozzie" Nelson, Director, Homeland Security and CounterterrorismProgram and Senior Fellow, International Security Program at the Center for Strategicand International Studies, Oct 1, 2009, The Other Side of the COIN,http://csis.org/publication/other-side-coin)

A1: Probably not. Counterinsurgency doctrine, or COIN, has captured the hearts and minds of many inthe D.C. policy community. Upon close inspection, however, it becomes clear that COIN, at least asapplied to Afghanistan, is built on a number of shaky assumptions. Consider: Even ifGeneral McChrystal gets all 40,000 troops he has requested, the combined InternationalSecurity Assistance Force (ISAF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Afghan contingent would

still number less than 250,000far fewer than the 670,000 troops the U.S. Armysown Counterinsurgency Field Manual suggests is necessary to secure a state ofAfghanistans size. Widespread corruption in the August 20 election has widened thetrust gap between the Karzai government and the Afghan people. Because successfulcounterinsurgency requires a government that is credible and responsive to its citizens, thesedevelopments threaten to derail the U.S. and NATO mission. And as our experience inSouth Vietnam made painfully clear, the White House is usually powerless to forceany host nation to enact good-government reforms. General McChrystals strategicreview emphasizes population protection as the key to drying up support for the

Taliban. The claim is based on the assumption that insurgencies require the backing,or at least acquiescence, of surrounding communities in order to function. But a recent article in theWashington Post noted that the Taliban rely primarily on foreign, rather than local, fundingsources, a fact that suggests that population protection may ultimately do little to diminish

the insurgencys strength. Public support for a counterinsurgency campaign of suchmassive proportions simply does not exist. Recent polls suggest that over 50 percent ofAmericans are against sending more troops to Afghanistan. And our European allies are even lessenthusiastic about escalating the war. Finally, the COIN framework is built on the largerassumption that eliminating the Taliban and stabilizing Afghanistan is the best use of American resourcesin the broader effort to combat terrorism. Al Qaedas presence in a pre-9/11, Taliban-controlledAfghanistan has convinced many officials that a Taliban takeover would result in al Qaedas inevitablereturn to the state. But al Qaeda already has established itself in Pakistans semi-governed spaces. Alongwith Taliban and other extremist militants, the group enjoys the relative safety of these territories, wherePakistani sovereignty precludes any substantive U.S. ground force. Even if al Qaeda were to reenterAfghanistan sometime in the future, the United States would face the same basic terrorist threats that itdoes today. Critics will argue that Afghanistan served as a base and planning center for 9/11. True enough;but al Qaeda, in establishing a presence in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen has already developed numerous

safe havens. In short, our overwhelming focus on Afghanistan fails to serve a morenuanced counterterrorism strategy that acknowledges the many other areas in which

al Qaeda operates. Q2: So how should the United States approach the war? A2: We need toreframe our thinking about U.S. goals and the means to achieve them. As outlined above,COIN in Afghanistan is only tenuously linked to counterterrorism, the original purpose of our efforts.TheObama administration should implement a more minimalist policy in the region, onethat employs special operations forces and airstrikes to directly target terrorists,especially leaders of cells. Critics charge that these operations are mere tactical successes, detached from

any larger strategy. This is a disingenuous assessment.Targeted strikes do, in fact, serve thegreater strategic purpose of disrupting the planning and execution of terroristattacks. Unlike COINwhich seems to harbor the grandiose notion of eliminatingterrorism by transforming societies, regardless of costcounterterrorism acknowledges


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that radicalism will always exist and that policymakers should directly seek to containit. At the core of this shift is an acknowledgment that our best Afghanistan policy is no better than ourbest Pakistan policy. ISAF and Afghan forces can do everything imaginable to eliminate Taliban influence inthe country, but any effort that does not address the presence of militants in Pakistans semi-governedspaces ultimately does little to reduce the threat posed by al Qaeda. At a most basic level, the Obamaadministration must change the calculus of the Pakistani military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) withregard to extremists in the countrys northwest. Doing so will force the United States to play a central rolein rapprochement between Pakistan and Indiaand be a fair broker to both parties. What about

Afghanistan? Proponents of an all-in approach tend to misrepresent a minimaliststrategy as complete withdrawal, arguing that the United States abandoned Afghanistan after theSoviet war and that doing so again would plunge the country into anarchy. But few serious analystsare talking about abandoning Afghanistan, and there is no reason to believe that asmaller, more specialized force would not be able to confront any resumption of alQaeda activity in the country. As far as the Taliban are concerned, there is reason tobelieve that an ever-larger foreign troop presence simply swells the movements ranks(to wit: it has been dismaying to watch increased troop levels correlate with recent

Taliban gains). Until the administration can convincingly demonstrate how additional troops will, in fact,support broader national security and counterterrorism goals, the United States is better servedby a strategy that minimizes the loss of life and dizzying levels of expenditure thatany all-in approach would entail.

The Taliban are flexible concepts like momentum dont existand their political calculus precludes negotiationsStratfor 10/28 (Global intelligence company, October 28, 2010, Notions ofProgress and Negotiation in Afghanistan,http://www.stratfor.com/node/174702/geopolitical_diary/20101027_notions_progress_and_negotiation_afghanistan)

According to a report Wednesday in The Washington Post, the U.S. intelligence community islargely of one mind when it comes to Afghanistan: The Taliban are suffering onlyfleeting setbacks while maintaining their resilience and ability to re-establish andrejuvenate themselves. This makes for a rather stark contrast to the portrait U.S. Gen. DavidPetraeus and others have been attempting to paint of progress in Afghanistan, and particularly against the

Taliban, ahead of the White Houses December review of the efficacy of the counterinsurgency-focusedstrategy being pursued. These claims of progress come down to several main themes: First,a concerted special operations forces-led effort to capture or kill senior Talibanleadership is achieving results; second, core Taliban turf is being seized and theirsanctuaries are being rolled back into deeper and more isolated corners ofAfghanistan (as well as across the border into Pakistan) essentially, the Taliban have beenrobbed of momentum and initiative; third, the Taliban are negotiating with theimplication that they have no choice but to negotiate. There have been separatereports of so-called, mid-level or high-level Taliban commanders or important associates ofsome heavyweight leader being killed in a raid or airstrike on either side of the Afghan-Pakistaniborder. But the internal organizational structure of the Taliban is not only extremelymurky, but deliberately amorphous. While some potentially significant progress has been maderecently by the United States to craft a relatively more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of the

Talibans leadership structure, many individuals positions and significance may well remain

more an intelligence estimate than established fact. As importantly, even if accuratelycharacterized, it is far from clear what impact these deaths, the rate of these deaths, and theprospect of more deaths are having on the calculus of the larger Taliban phenomenon andits senior decision-makers thinking. Meanwhile, the surge of U.S. forces into southern andsouthwestern Afghanistan is essentially complete, and the Taliban by many measuresappear to be falling back into northern Helmand province and away from Kandahar, Afghanistanssecond-largest city and the center of the Talibans ideological heartland. In these key areas, the Talibancould be said to be reacting to American-led International Security Assistance Force offensives that they

have lost momentum and sacrificed the initiative. But even setting aside the impending winter thatsees a consistent seasonal lull in offensive Taliban activity, much of the Talibans


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fighting strength is essentially part-time. Many fighters may have fled, but manyothers may simply have laid down their arms for the time being. And traditionalconcepts of momentum and initiative can be problematic in gaugingsuccess in counterinsurgency. Similarly, it is in keeping with classic guerrilladoctrine to cede ground in the face of concentrated force. As in Kabul in 2001, the

Taliban may be declining combat on American terms rather than being defeated. And

this has direct bearing on the third point, negotiation.There has been considerable talk recentlyabout negotiations with various elements ofthe Taliban claims, counterclaims and denials fromall sides.There has undoubtedly been talking. But talking has been going on foryears. The question comes down to meaningful movement toward a negotiatedsettlement. The United States has no prospect of defeating the Taliban withthe troops, resources and time it is willing to dedicate to the conflict . Its onlyoption for an exit that is not a defeat is a negotiated settlement. This is not the case for the Taliban. TheTaliban perceive themselves to be winning and know that the patience ofthe occupying powers has already worn thin. Ultimately, when it comes tonegotiations, the calculus of the Taliban is opaque not the least because of itsamorphous nature. But meaningful negotiation stems from two sources: a fleetingopportunity or a fear of defeat both originating from the belief that onesnegotiating position will weaken in the future. There are many reasons why the Taliban mightaccept a negotiated settlement in search of opportunity, particularly when the various outside players

(Pakistan and Iran, to name two) provide the right leverage and incentive. They also lose nothing fromtalking. But its fairly clear that the Taliban do not face strategic defeat. The U.S.-ledstrategy is intended to attempt to deny them some key areas while pressuring themtoward political accommodation; the American military objective is increasingly becoming a negotiated

settlement.The example of Vietnam should give pause here. As U.S. Col. Harry Summers soclearly articulated, negotiation is achieved militarily when military power is applied insuch a way as to impose upon the enemy a choice: negotiate on American terms and onAmerican timetables, or be destroyed. Negotiation with the Taliban must be understoodfirst and foremost as lacking that latter possibility.

COIN is unsustainable prefer statistical metrics to militarypropaganda

Cohen 10/29(Michael A. Cohen, senior fellow at the American Security Project

and writes about Afghanistan at democracyarsenal.org. OCTOBER 29, 2010,Petraeus Versus Obama,http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/29/petraeus_versus_obama)

Today there are two wars taking place in Afghanistan. The first is the war confidentlydescribed by the U.S. military: a conflict that according to leading military commanders and eventhe secretary of defense is "headed in the right direction" and has a "good chance at success." Thiswar is hard but not hopeless; more Afghan soldiers are being trained and an increasing number of Talibancommanders are, as one Western military commander recently put it, "getting an absolute arse-kicking."

But virtually every daythere are press reports that speak of another war. It is onedefined by rising civilian and military death tolls in a growing number of once-safe regions -- particularly in the north of the country -- now marred by violence andinsecurity; government corruption and incompetence that remains as bad as ever;

and an increasing sense of fatalism among the Afghan people. In this war, pessimism, notoptimism, is the dominant outlook. The problem is that the latter conflict actually seems to betaking place -- while the former seems to be a figment of the military leadership'simagination.This growing divide is increasingly bringing into question the verycredibility of U.S. military statements about military progress in Afghanistan. To besure, this sort of over-optimism is as old as war itself -- and one can hardly be surprised that the United

States' generals would accentuate the positive. What is different now is that while once rosy narrativeswere offered to support the civilian leadership -- think Vietnam -- today, it seems inordinatelygeared toward influencing the policy choices of civilians. And the Obama administrationfaces the possibility that its planned July 2011 deadline for the commencement of troop withdrawals may


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be undermined by the very individuals that are tasked with carrying out the war effort. As was the case

last summer and fall during the presidential review on Afghanistan, the military is engaged in apublic lobbying effort to ensure that President Barack Obama stays the course in theconflict. The first salvo in this public relations effort came October 17: "Top U.S. military and civilianofficials in Afghanistan have begun to assert that they see concrete progress in the war against theTaliban," wrote Joshua Paltrow in the Washington Post. "Despite growing numbers of Taliban attacks andU.S. casualties, U.S. officials are building their case for why they are on the right track." That report was

followed by Carlotta Gall's front-page story in the New York Times asserting that the military was "routing"the Taliban in and around Kandahar. Gall quoted Maj. Gen. Nick Carter, the British commander of the NATOcoalition forces in southern Afghanistan, optimistically remarking, "We now have the initiative. We havecreated momentum. It is everything put together in terms of the effort that has gone in over the last 18

months and it is undoubtedly having an impact." Yet these claims of progress are belied bythe dire facts on the ground. From a security standpoint the situation inAfghanistan is worse than at any point in the past nine years. Already 406U.S. troops have been killed this year -- if the trend continues, the highest annualdeath toll since the conflict began. A recent report by the Afghan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), arespected independent group that advises non-governmental organizations about the securitysituation in Afghanistan, paints a very different picture than the one described by U.S. officials. The

authors conclude that the insurgency is in its ascendancy and describe it as"increasingly mature, complex and effective." ANSO also reports that between July andSeptember of this yearTaliban attacks rose by 59 percent compared with the same period in

2009. One recent week in September saw 1,600 attacks across Afghanistan, 500 morethan in the any previous week of the war. And in the north a third of the region'sprovinces have seen significant increases in violence.The White House got into thepessimism game with an assessment that said "progress across the country was uneven,"Afghan governance remained "unsatisfactory," and "district-by-district data show thatonly minor positive change had occurred with respect to security."The Washington Postquoted unnamed intelligence officials throwing cold water on the military'sdeclarations of success. "[A]n intense military campaign aimed at crippling the

Taliban has so far failed to inflict more than fleeting setbacks on the insurgency orput meaningful pressure on its leaders to seek peace," wrote Greg Miller. With this steadydrumbeat of bad news, it's a bit hard to understand on what basis Gen. David Petraeus recently told Britishinterviewer David Frost, "I think it is arguable, at least, that we are winning" in Afghanistan. During arecent trip to Afghanistan I was hard-pressed to find a single journalist, NGO official, analyst, or localAfghan who found this argument even remotely compelling. What seems most backwards about the

military's congenital optimism is that even by the key metrics of their owncounterinsurgency (COIN) strategy there has been almost no change for thebetter in Afghanistan. Governance in Afghanistan remains as hopeless as ever.September's parliamentary elections now appear to have been so fraud-ridden thatthe entire vote is in question. U.S. efforts to curb incessant government corruptionhave not led to any real crackdown on graft; instead it has heightened tensions withthe Karzai government, and reports that Afghan government officials receive bags ofcash from the Iranian government have been met with official shrugs in Kabul. While thePentagon talks optimistically ofprogress being made in training the Afghan Army, the forceis still years away from being able to operate effectively on its own. Attrition ratesremain high, drug use is rampant, and soldiers lack competence in basic militaryskills. During recent offensives in the town of Marjah in Helmand province and ongoing efforts inKandahar, the Pentagon claimed that the efforts were Afghan-led. According to New York Times reporterC.J. Chivers, in surprisingly declarative language, "it was not." Other independent analysts I spoke to

agreed that NATO is dramatically overstating the role and capabilities ofAfghan forces in the current fight. Indeed, NATO spokesman continue to portray lastFebruary's offensive in Marjah as a success story, in part because of re-opened schools and 300newly trained policemen. But it's hard to square that progress with the fact that 30,000troops remain in Helmand province -- or press reports that describe "a full-blownguerrilla insurgency" fighting against two Marine battalions in Marjah while Afghanaid workers in the region operate under threat of death for working with U.S. NGOs. Militaryleaders have said repeatedly that the United States cannot kill its way out of the warin Afghanistan, and that protecting the population is paramount. This is fundamental


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to the military's counterinsurgencystrategy and was a key talking point in internal discussions lastyear to dissuade the president from choosing a smaller-footprint counterterrorism strategy. In June 2009,General McChrystal even went so far as to argue that "the measure of effectiveness" in Afghanistan, "will

not be enemy killed. It will be the number of Afghans shielded from violence."Yet civiliancasualties jumped by 31 percent in just the first half of 2010, mainly due toinsurgent activity. In Kandahar alone, the focal point of U.S. operations, the Red Cross isreporting that the number of Afghans hospitalized because of war injuries has doubled

in the past year.Today, the key metric used by military officials to assert progress is body counts;success in Afghanistan is now predicated almost exclusively on killing and disrupting the enemy. (NATO iseven putting out daily kill-and-capture lists.) As Kabul-based analyst Thomas Rutting recently noted, there

is "No word anymore about improving governance or fighting corruption (corrupt officialsare welcome as long as they have fire power) or building a legitimate or effectivegovernment...the approach chosen is a new quick-fix, combined with talking upprogress." But even this near-term tactical gain cannot change the fact that from a strategicperspective the United States is not gaining real ground in Afghanistan. Solong as Taliban insurgents can melt over the border into Pakistan and so long as theAfghan government is incapable of taking control of areas that have been cleared --either administratively or militarily -- these gains are likely to be ephemeral.

Now is the key time the small footprint approach is uniquely

sustainable and delaying the transition risks precipitouswithdrawalSimon and Stevenson 9 (Steven Simon is Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on ForeignRelations. Jonathan Stevenson is a Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College.Afghanistan: How Much is Enough?, Survival: Global Politi2cs and Strategy, vol. 51, no. 5, OctoberNovember 2009, pp. 4767 | Suo)

It follows that the most difficult challenge to sustaining a maximalist US policy, leavingaside substantive questions of strategy, is that of keeping the American people on board. TheUS government can sustain a deployment of some 75,000 troops, the funding itrequires, and the public's tolerance for steady casualties for only a finite - anddwindling - period. If the US deployment in Iraq were reduced by two-thirds over the next year, the USpresence in Iraq and Afghanistan would still be about 125,000. To support that number,

US military practices would require a force twice as large to be perpetually eitherpreparing to deploy or recovering from deployment. That would mean one half of USground forces would be indefinitely committed to Iraq and Afghanistan, while Afghanistanbecomes the largest recipient of US foreign aid. An effort on that scale would garner majorityUS domestic support only if the public sees likely victory and Congress, the WhiteHouse and the Beltway punditry line up decisively behind the policy. The emergingtrends are pointing in the contrary direction. As monthly and annual US casualties inAfghanistan reached historical peaks in August 2009, and the Afghan national election loomed, apoll conducted by ABC News and the Washington Post indicated that most Americans did notsupport an extended US military commitment in Afghanistan.31 CongressionalDemocrats are balking at anticipated requests for more troops.32 And evenconservative columnists, like the influential George F. Will, have turned against a maximalistAfghanistan policy.33 Overall, increasingly strong perceptions of the Karzai government

as inept and corrupt are making prospects that the United States could enlist it as aneffective counter-insurgency partner and lend it the legitimacy required to rebuild thecountry seem more and more baseless. The upshot is that only if the United Statesestablishes a well-calibrated limited policy now will it have the politicalflexibility to sustain it over the longer-term and thereby to effectively containthe jihadist threat in Central Asia. If, on the other hand, the Obama administrationpromises more than it can deliver in Afghanistan, a reprise of Vietnam may occur:once failure becomes clear, domestic support will evaporate, the administration willbe compelled to withdraw precipitously, and the United States will lose considerabletraction in the region. These factors suggest that the United States should limit


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its Afghanistan/Pakistan policy to counter-terrorism and disown country-wide counterinsurgency and state-building in Afghanistan. At the same time,Washington must remain highly sensitive to the dynamic whereby decreased military activity inAfghanistan combined with robust operations in Pakistan could induce al-Qaeda to return to Afghanistan

and render it a main threat once again. In that light, any abrupt wholesale American militarywithdrawal from Afghanistan would be too risky. Instead, the United States shouldseek to facilitate a glide-path to a substantial drawdown - and with it fewer

casualties and lower expenditures in Afghanistan - over the next few years. Doing sowould involve continuing to suppress al-Qaeda in Pakistan with selective anddiscriminate drone strikes and denying al-Qaeda access to Afghanistan. The formerwould require bases within Afghan territory from which to deploy airpower andspecial-operations forces against terrorists and terrorist infrastructure, as well as thetroops and equipment to secure these bases. The latter would call for reinforced border security and forceprotection within Afghanistan, which in themselves would entail a surprisingly large number of soldiers. Forthese purposes, the United States would continue to bring extensive human intelligence and surveillancecapabilities to bear on Afghanistan to detect and assess potential threats to American interests. Tomitigate and eliminate such threats, the generous deployment of US special-operations forces toAfghanistan - which currently comprises some 50% of all US special-operations personnel - would have tobe maintained over the medium term. Meanwhile, US train-and-equip programmes for Afghan securityforces should be intensified in contemplation of a gradual and controlled hand-off of the domestic counter-terrorism mission to them when they are ready, as well as to prepare them for counterinsurgencyoperations, should the Afghan government wish to use them for that purpose.


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1AC StabilityContention 2: Stability

Counterinsurgency doctrine is inherently hostile to localauthority structuresFriedman 9 (Benjamin H. Friedman, research fellow in defense and homelandsecurity studies, September 3, 2009, Making Enemies in Afghanistan,http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2009/09/03/making-enemies-in-afghanistan/ | Suo)

YaroslavTrofimovs article in Wednesdays Wall Street Journal explains how GhulamYahya, a former anti-Taliban, Tajik miltia leader from Herat, became an insurgent. The short answer:because the American master plan in Afghanistan required the retirement ofwarlords. The trouble is that in much of Afghanistan warlord is a synonym forlocal government. Attacking local authority structures is a good way to makeenemies. So it went in Herat. Having been fired from a government post, Ghulum Yahya

turned his militia against Kabul and now fires rockets at foreign troops, kidnaps theircontractors, and brags of welcoming foreign jihadists. Herat turned redder on the color-coded maps of theTaliban insurgency. That story reminded me of C.J. Chiverss close-in accounts of firefights he witnessed last spring with an army platoon inAfghanistans Korangal Valley. According to Chivers, the Taliban there revolted in part because theAfghan government shut down their timber business. That is an odd reason for us tofight them. One of the perversions of the branch of technocratic idealismthat we now call counterinsurgency doctrine is its hostility to localauthority structures. As articulated on TV by people like General Stanley McChrystal, counterinsurgency is akind of one-size-fits-all endeavor. You chase off the insurgents, protect the people,and thus provide room for the central government and its foreign backers to provideservices, which win the people to the government.The people then turn against theinsurgency.This makes sense , I suppose, for relatively strong central states facing insurgencies, like India,the Philippines or Colombia. But where the central state is dysfunctional and essentially foreignto the region being pacified, this model may not fit. Certainly it does not describe the tactic of buying offSunni sheiks in Anbar province Iraq (a move pioneered by Saddam Hussein, not David Petraeus, by the way). It is even lessapplicable to the amalgam of fiefdoms labeled on our maps as Afghanistan. From what I cantell, power in much of Afghanistan is really held by headmen warlords who controlenough men with guns to collect some protection taxes and run the local show. Thewestern idea of government says the central state should replace these mini-states,but that only makes sense as a war strategy if their aims are contrary to ours, which is onlythe case if they are trying to overthrow the central government or hosting terrorists that go abroad to attack Americans. Few warlordsmeet those criteria. The way to pacify the other areas is to leave them alone. Doingotherwise stirs up needless trouble; it makes us more the revolutionary than thecounter-revolutionary. On a related note, I see John Nagl attacking George Will for not getting counterinsurgency doctrine.Insofar as Will seems to understand, unlike Nagl, that counterinsurgency doctrine is a set of bestpractices that allow more competent execution of foolish endeavors , this isunsurprising. More interesting is Nagls statement that we, the United States have not properly resourced the Afghan forces. Nagl does not

mention that the United States is already committed to building the Afghan security forces (which are, incidentally, not ours) to a size roughly 450,000 that will annually cost about 500% of Afghanistans budget (Rorys Stewarts calculation), which is another way of saying

we will be paying for these forces for the foreseeable future. It probably goes too far to say thiswar has become a self-licking ice-cream cone where we create both theenemy and the forces to fight them, but its a possibility worth considering.

And, US presence creates deepening spirals of instability andviolence a minimalist approach is keySimon and Stevenson 9 (Steven Simon is Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on ForeignRelations. Jonathan Stevenson is a Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College.


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Afghanistan: How Much is Enough?, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 51, no. 5, OctoberNovember 2009, pp. 4767 | Suo)

Finally, within the operational environment of Afghanistan and Pakistan themselves, thealternative to a minimalist approach is likely to be not the controlled and purposefulescalation envisaged by the current policy but rather a pernicious spiral with anindeterminate outcome. If the United States continues to respond to the

threat of al-Qaeda by deepening intervention in Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Qaeda and the Taliban will rejoin with heightened terrorist and insurgentoperations that bring further instability. Indeed, that appears to be happening. InAugust 2009, as US ground commanders requested more troops, Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on CNNdescribed the situation in Afghanistan as 'serious and deteriorating' and the Talibanas having 'gotten better, more sophisticated, in their tactics'.28The United States'next logical move would be to intensify pressure, raising civilian casualties,increasing political pressure on the Kabul and Islamabad regimes, and ultimatelyweakening them, which would only help al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In fact, some evidence of thisdynamic has already materialised, as the Pakistani government has faced difficulties in dealing with hundreds of thousands of Pakistanisdisplaced by the military campaign, undertaken at Washington's behest, in the Swat Valley. Certainly worries about Islamabad's ability tohandle the Taliban on its own are justified. Some Taliban members are no doubt keen on regime change in favour of jihadists, as noted byBruce Riedel, who headed up the Obama administration's 60-day policy review.29 But Pakistan's military capabilities should not be given shortshrift. The Pakistani army, however preoccupied by India, is seasoned and capable, and able to respond decisively to the Taliban should itsactivities reach a critical level of destabilisation. Inter-Services Intelligence, devious though it may be, would be loath to allow the transfer of

nuclear weapons to the Taliban. Moving forward Al-Qaeda's attrition strategy has a political as well as anoperational dynamic: if the United States and its allies are continually goaded intodrawing Muslim blood, more Muslims will be antagonised and therefore become ripefor recruitment. American strategist Jeffrey Record, a professor at the US Air War College, has argued that barbarism in waging warmakes it difficult, if not impossible, for a democracy like the United States to keep its democratic credentials intact, and thus is hardwired tofail. Citing the French experience in Algeria and both the French and the American campaigns in Vietnam, Record notes that 'the strongerside's vulnerability to defeat in protracted conflicts against irregular foes is arguably heightened if it is a democracy'. This is because citizensof democracies tend to find military escalation - encompassing higher casualties, rising brutality and the near-inevitable erosion of democraticpractices - increasingly intolerable and often reach their limit before victory can be secured.30 It follows that the most difficult challenge tosustaining a maximalist US policy, leaving aside substantive questions of strategy, is that of keeping the American people on board. The USgovernment can sustain a deployment of some 75,000 troops, the funding it requires, and the public's tolerance for steady casualties for onlya finite - and dwindling - period. If the US deployment in Iraq were reduced by two-thirds over the next year, the US presence in Iraq andAfghanistan would still be about 125,000. To support that number, US military practices would require a force twice as large to be perpetuallyeither preparing to deploy or recovering from deployment. That would mean one half of US ground forces would be indefinitely committed toIraq and Afghanistan, while Afghanistan becomes the largest recipient of US foreign aid. An effort on that scale would garner majority USdomestic support only if the public sees likely victory and Congress, the White House and the Beltway punditry line up decisively behind thepolicy. The emerging trends are pointing in the contrary direction. As monthly and annual US casualties in Afghanistan reached historicalpeaks in August 2009, and the Afghan national election loomed, a poll conducted by ABC News and the Washington Post indicated that mostAmericans did not support an extended US military commitment in Afghanistan.31 Congressional Democrats are balking at anticipatedrequests for more troops.32 And even conservative columnists, like the influential George F. Will, have turned against a maximalist

Afghanistan policy.33 Overall, increasingly strong perceptions of the Karzai government as inept and corrupt are making prospects that theUnited States could enlist it as an effective counter-insurgency partner and lend it the legitimacy required to rebuild the country seem more

and more baseless. The upshot is that only if the United States establishes a well-calibratedlimited policy now will it have the political flexibility to sustain it over thelonger-term and thereby to effectively contain the jihadist threat in CentralAsia. If, on the other hand, the Obama administration promises more than it candeliver in Afghanistan, a reprise of Vietnam may occur: once failure becomes clear,domestic support will evaporate, the administration will be compelled to withdrawprecipitously, and the United States will lose considerable traction in the region.

These factors suggest that the United States should limit its Afghanistan/Pakistanpolicy to counter-terrorism and disown country-wide counterinsurgency andstate-building in Afghanistan. At the same time, Washington must remain highlysensitive to the dynamic whereby decreased military activity in Afghanistancombined with robust operations in Pakistan could induce al-Qaeda to return to

Afghanistan and render it a main threat once again. In that light, any abrupt wholesaleAmerican military withdrawal from Afghanistan would be too risky. Instead, theUnited States should seek to facilitate a glide-path to a substantial drawdown - and with it fewercasualties and lower expenditures in Afghanistan - over the next few years.

Withdrawal would create a locally-driven balance of powerSuhrke 10 (Astri Suhrke, Senior Research Fellow, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Ph. D.in International Relations from the University of Denver, 17 March 2010, The Casefor a Light Footprint: The international project in Afghanistan,


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http://www.cmi.no/file/?997)

The insurgency has had a multiplier effect on the contradictions of the state-building project.The warhas produced demands for more and faster results, and hence for more external controland greater presence. Military objectives and institutions are favoured in thereconstruction. Increasing warfare and Western presence undermines the legitimacy of

the government. These pressures created counter-pressures which sharpen thetensions. What, then, can be done? What are the policy implications of this analysis? There are basicallytwo courses of action. One is to add sufficient foreign capital, expertise and forces to in effect overcomethe contradictions. The foreign presence would be there for the very long haul and take an overtly directrole in decision-making; in effect, institute shared sovereignty. This course of action has been tried, albeiton a modest scale, for the past eight years of gradually deepening involvement, culminating in the militaryand civilian surge announced by President Barack Obama in December 2009. The results have not beenconvincing. A more radical version of the same policy, entailing resources on a scale that might bring theachievement of the interventions stated objectives within reach, is likely to meet political resistance in the

Western countries as well as in Afghanistan.The logical alternative is to place greater relianceon the Afghan government to deal with the problems of both the insurgency and thereconstruction. A reduction in the international presence would at least reduce theassociated tensions and contradictions discussed above.This course of action also entailsdifficulties and conflicts. Any Afghan government has to face the problems of amounting insurgency, a fragmented society, a deeply divided polity and a complex

regional context. Nevertheless, to take only the insurgency, it is clear that in large partit is driven by local conflict over land, water and local power, particularly between thetribes and solidarity groups that were pushed out in 2001 and those who seized power after2001. Such conflicts can better be addressed without a deeply disturbing foreignmilitary presence. The often-cited fear that a NATO military withdrawal will sparkrenewed civil war between regional and ethnic factions is more influenced by thememory of the previous civil war in the 1990s than by an assessment of currentregional-ethnic relations. Importantly, many faction leaders today have strong economicand political interests in the status quo. A NATO withdrawal, moreover, is unlikely tobe total and sudden. Maintaining a residual international force in Kabul would help prevent a repeat ofthe civil war that occurred in the 1990s, which was fought over control of the capital. Overall, it seems that

a gradual reduction in the prominent Western presence may give space for nationaland regional forces to explore compromises and a regional balance of power that will

permit the development of a less violent reconstruction of the state and economy inAfghanistan. By early 2010, this seemed to be the way developments were going.

This provincial security regime is comparatively the best wayto stabilize AfghanistanFisher 9 (Max Fisher, associate editor for the Atlantic on foreign affairs andnational security, Nov 18 2009, Can Warlords Save Afghanistan?,http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2009/11/can-warlords-save-afghanistan/30397/ | Suo)

President Obama has made it clear that any strategy he commits to in Afghanistan must

stabilize the country while accounting for our exit. But a very significant hurdlestands in the way: the notorious weakness of Afghanistan's police and military. Of the troop-levelplans Obama has reportedly considered, even the smallest emphasizes training and assistance forAfghan forces. After all, for us to leave, Afghan institutions must be able to replacethe 100,000 foreign troops currently providing security. This makes building amassive, national Afghan military one of our top priorities in the region. Critics of this plan say theAfghan military is hopelessly disorganized, ill-equipped and corrupt . Supporterssay it's crucial to our success. But there may be another way. Bolstering the Afghan militarycarries significant risks. Given how illegitimateAfghan President Hamid Karzai's government isperceived to be by Afghans, a Karzai-led army would be poorly received and perhaps


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worsen anti-government sentiment. If a national Afghanistan army has a fraction ofthe national government's corruption, it could inspire disastrous backlash. UnderKarzai's corrupt governance, the application of a national security force would waxand wane with political whims. With no personal stake in security outside Kabul,would Karzai really risk his resources and military strength to counter every threat orpacify every skirmish? Afghanistan has not been a stable, unified state with a strong

centralized government in three decades. The cultural and political institutions for asingle national force may simply no longer exist. But Afghanistan, owing in part to necessity andin part to the tumultuous processes that have shaped the country, retains functional, if weak, security infrastructureat the provincial level. In the post-Soviet power vacuum and throughout periods of civil war,warlords arose to lead local militias. Many of them still remain in place--they wereamong our strongest allies in routing the Taliban's hold on the government--and have settledinto more stationary roles somewhere between warlord and governor. Local rule has become theAfghan way. Local leaders who operate their own provincial forces, after all, staketheir very lives on the security of their realm. By working with these leaders toestablish and train local militias and police, rather than troubled andmistrusted national forces, the U.S. could find its route to Afghan stabilityand exit. In parts of Afghanistan, strong provincial leadership has already developedsecurity separate from national leadership. In the relatively peaceful and prosperousnorthern region of Mazar-E-Sharif, Governor Atta Mohammad Noor, himself a formerwarlord who fought against the Soviets and Taliban, commands authority rivaling that of PresidentKarzai. Unlike Karzai, Noor is popular among his constituents and his province enjoysremarkable stability.The local military officials are loyal to him before Karzai, if theyare loyal to Karzai at all. By promoting local governance and directing our military training and assistanceto forces loyal to that governance, the U.S. could promote other strong provincial leaders like Noor. LikeNoor, many of these are likely to be former or current warlords. Warlords, despite their scaryname, can be our strongest allies. They tend to be non-ideological and fervently anti-

Taliban. Their fates are tied to the local populaces they govern. They're corrupt and tax heavily, butthey provide real security and are trusted. Their ambitions are not for anti-Westernwar or fundamentalism, but sovereignty, security, and domination. None of these men is ThomasJefferson, but in a country of many evil and exploitative forces, they are the best thatAfghan civilians or American forces are likely to get. Just as important, local security forceswould better suit the region they protect, with more religious militias in the devoutsouth and east but conventional police in the secular north. As General Stanley McChrystal, the topcommander in Afghanistan, wrote in his much-discussed report calling for more troops, "Focusing on force or resource requirements misses

the point entirely." He insisted that Afghans' "needs, identities and grievances vary from provinceto province and from valley to valley." A national security force would struggle toovercome the inevitable Goldilocks problem: Either it would be too secular for thesouth and east or too religious for the north but never just right. After all, the

Taliban's initial support came in part from Afghans who desperately wanted religiousrule. Though we may find the idea of supporting Islamic militias discomforting,forcing secular rule would risk another Taliban-like uprising. Better, perhaps, to establishlocal Islamic governance that is religious enough to satisfy the populace it serves butmoderate enough to resist the Taliban. The U.S. is already enacting a micro variant of this strategy by hiring andarming locals to provide security. The informal militiamen must come from within 50 km of their deployment site, which in addition toproviding local jobs (Afghanistan's unemployment rate is a catastrophic 40%) also deters insurgents, who would be less likely to attack afamiliar neighbor than a foreign invader. The principles that make this so effective would also apply to a larger, standing provincial force.

This does not preclude a national government with its own separate, standing forcein the style of the national guard. Karzai's government could function much like aminiature European Union, setting economic and social policies while facilitating interactions between the provincial leaders.An economically centralized Afghanistan would in fact be crucial in this case so that provincial leaders remain dependent on Karzai for funding.It may be tempting to point to Iraq as a model for putting stock in national security forces. After all, the strong roles of Iraqi military and policewere crucial to stabilizing the country and phasing out American control over the past two years. But modern Iraq has never lacked thetraditions or institutions for national security. If anything, Iraq under Saddam Hussein had one of the world's strictest and most oppressiveregimes since the fall of the Soviet Union. Saddam's Iraq was in many ways a polar opposite from the chaos of frontier Afghanistan. Any rebuiltsecurity in Iraq has been a matter of replacing one national security system with another. In Afghanistan, there is none to be replaced. Of themany problems likely holding up President Obama's decision on Afghanistan, the public contradiction between two of his top officials is likelyhigh on the list. General McChrystal famously warned of "mission failure" without an additional 40,000 troops. More recently, U.S. Ambassadorto Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, a general who previously held McChrystal's command, cautioned in two leaked cables against bolstering the

notoriously corrupt Karzai. Their requests are not mutually exclusive. Working with provincial leaders to establish


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local security forces could meet McChrystal's security priorities while getting aroundEikenberry's concerns about Karzai. Most importantly, it would meet Obama's goalsof stability in Afghanistan with a foreseeable exit strategy.

Inevitable destabilization that results from an imposed centralgovernment leads to the violent fragmentation of Afghanistan,

resulting in multiple nuclear warsMorgan 7 (Stephen John, Former member of the British Labour Party ExecutiveCommittee, http://www.electricarticles.com/display.aspx?id=639)

Although disliked and despised in many quarters, the Taliban could not advance without the support oracquiescence of parts of the population, especially in the south. In particular, theTaliban isdrawing on backing from the Pashtun tribes from whom they originate. The southern andeastern areas have been totally out of government control since 2001. Moreover,not only have they not benefited at all from the Allied occupation , but it isincreasingly clear that with a few small centres of exception, all of the countryoutside Kabul has seen little improvement in its circumstances. Theconditions for unrest are ripe and the Taliban is filling the vacuum.The Break-Up of Afghanistan?However, the Taliban is unlikely to win much support outside of the powerful Pashtuntribes. Although they make up a majority of the nation, they are concentrated in the south and east. Among the other key minorities,such as Tajiks and Uzbeks, who control the north they have no chance of making newinroads. They will fight the Taliban and fight hard, but their loyalty to the NATO andUS forces is tenuous to say the least. The Northern Alliance originally liberated Kabul from the Taliban without Allied ground support.

The Northern Alliance are fierce fighters, veterans of the war of liberation against theSoviets and the Afghanistan civil war. Mobilized they count for a much strongeradversary than the NATO and US forces. It is possible that, while they wont fight for thecurrent government or coalition forces, they will certainly resist any new Talibanrule. They may decide to withdraw to their areas in the north and west of the country. This would leave the Allied forces with few social reserves, excepting afrightened and unstable urban population in Kabul, much like what happened to the Soviets. Squeezed by facing fierce fighting in Helmund and other provinces, and, at

the same time, harried by a complementary tactic of Al Qaeda-style urban terrorism in Kabul, sooner or later, a Saigon-styleevacuation of US and Allied forces could be on the cards. The net result could be thebreak-up and partition of Afghanistan into a northern and western area and a

southern and eastern area, which would include the two key cities of Kandahar and, the capital Kabul. Pastunistan?The Talibanthemselves, howevermay decide not to take on the Northern Alliance and fighting mayconcentrate on creating a border between the two areas, about which the two sides may reach an agreementregardless of US and Allied plans or preferences.The Taliban may claim the name Afghanistan or might opt for Pashtunistan along-standing, though intermittent demand of the Pashtuns, within Afghanistan and especially along theungovernable border regions inside Pakistan. It could not be ruled out that the Taliban could be aiming to lead a break away ofthe Pakistani Pashtuns to form a 30 million strong greater Pashtun state, encompassing some 18 million Pakistani Pashtuns and 12 Afghan Pashtuns. Although thePashtuns are more closely linked to tribal and clan loyalty, there exists a strong latent embryo of a Pashtun national consciousness and the idea of an independentPashtunistan state has been raised regularly in the past with regard to the disputed territories common to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The area was cut in two by the

Durand Line, a totally artificial border between created by British Imperialism in the 19th century. It has been a question bedevillingrelations between the Afghanistan and Pakistan throughout their history, and withIndia before Partition. It has been an untreated, festering wound which has lead tosporadic wars and border clashes between the two countries and occasionalupsurges in movements for Pashtun independence. In fact, is this what lies behind the current policy of appeasementPresident Musharraf of Pakistan towards the Pashtun tribes in along the Frontiers and his armistice with North Waziristan last year? Is he attempting to avoid furtheralienating Pashtun tribes there and headoff a potential separatist movement in Pakistan, which could develop from the Talibans offensive across the border in

Afghanistan? Trying to subdue the frontier lands has proven costly and unpopular for Musharraf. In effect, he faces exactly the same problems as the US and Allies i n

Afghanistan or Iraq. Indeed, fighting Pashtun tribes has cost him double the number of troops as the US has lost i n Iraq. Evidently, he could notwin and has settled instead for an attempted political solution.When he agreed the policy of appeasementand virtual self-rule for North Waziristan last year, President Musharraf stated clearly that he is acting first and foremost to protect the interests of Pakistan. While there

was outrageous in Kabul, his deal with the Pashtuns is essentially an effort to firewall his countryagainst civil war and disintegration. In his own words, what he fears most is, the

Talibanistation of the whole Pashtun people, which he warns could inflame thealready fierce fundamentalist and other separatist movement across his entirecountry. He does not want to open the door for any backdraft from the Afghan war toengulf Pakistan. Musharraf faces the nationalist struggle in Kashmir, an insurgency in Balochistan, unrest in the Sindh, and growing terrorist bombings inthe main cities. There is also a large Shiite population and clashes between Sunnis and Shias are regular. Moreover, fundamentalist support in his own Armed Forces and


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Intelligence Services is extremely strong. So much so that analyst consider it likely that the Army and Secret Service is protecting, not only top Taliban leaders, but BinLaden and the Al Qaeda central l eadership thought to be entrenched in the same Pakistani borderlands. For the same reasons, he has not captured or killed Bin Laden andthe Al Qaeda leadership. Returning from the frontier provinces with Bin Ladens severed head would be a trophy that would cost him his own head in Pakistan. At best hetakes the occasional risk of giving a nod and a wink to a US incursion, but even then at the peril of the chagrin of the people and his own military and secret service. The

Break-Up of Pakistan? Musharraf probably hopes that by giving de facto autonomy to the Talibanand Pashtun leaders now with a virtual free hand for cross border operations intoAfghanistan, he will undercut any future upsurge in support for a break-awayindependent Pashtunistan state or a Peoples War of the Pashtun populace as a

whole, as he himself described it. However events may prove him sorely wrong.Indeed,

his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the currentautonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating,as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, aslooks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtuncaliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns inPakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed,lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unityof Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup dtat. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children

born that year was Osama (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood.Given the weakening base of thetraditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup dtat bythe fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses totake power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although,even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and

sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations.The nightmare that is now Iraq would takeon gothic proportions across the continent .The prophesy of an arc of civil warover Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching fromPakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterraneancoast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regardsto the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks,sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, andpossibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could no be ruled out .Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style governmentwith strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility.Such deep chaos would, ofcourse, open a "Pandora's box" for the region and the world . With the possibility of unstableclerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as

the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option forAmerica. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategicpossibility.This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It couldusher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US. Whatis at stake in "the half-forgotten war" in Afghanistan is far greater thanthat in Iraq. But America's capacities for controlling the situation are extremelyrestricted. Might it be, in the end, they are also forced to accept President Musharraf's unspoken slogan of Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a TalibanNUCLEAR Pakistan!

Uncertain nuclear guarantees and great power interests meanthat Central Asia escalation is uniquely likelyBlank 2k(Stephen J. Blank, Expert on the Soviet Bloc for the Strategic Studies Institute, 2000,American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region, World Affairs. 9-22)

Thus many structural conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict wherethird parties intervene now exist in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. The outbreak ofviolence by disaffected Islamic elements, the drug trade, the Chechen wars, and the unresolvedethnopolitical conflicts that dot the region, not to mention the undemocratic and unbalanceddistribution of income across corrupt governments, provide plenty of tinder forfuture fires. Many Third Worldconflicts generated by local structural factors also havegreat potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged torescue their proxies and proteges. One or anotherbig power may fail to grasp thestakesfor the other side since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hencecommitments involving the use of nuclear weapons or perhaps even conventional war to


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prevent defeat of a client are not well established or clear as in Europe. For instance, in 1993 Turkishnoises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan induced Russian leaders to threaten anuclear war in that case. Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally but probably couldnot prevail in a long war against Russia, or if it could, would conceivably trigger apotential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia's declarednuclear strategies), the danger of major war is higher here than almost

everywhere elsein the CIS or the "arc of crisis" from the Balkans to China. As Richard Betts hasobserved, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability ishigh; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that theother's perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have thecapability to inject conventional forces; and (5) neither has willing proxies capable ofsettling the situation.(77)

No risk of Taliban takeover withdrawal would kill theircohesion and local supportPillar 9 (Paul R. Pillar, 28-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency, a visiting professor atGeorgetown University for security studies and a member of the Center for Peace and Security Studies,10/14/09, Counterterrorism and Stability in Afghanistan,http://cpass.georgetown.edu/documents/AfghanHASCPillarOct09_1.doc | Suo)

This observation sheds light on the nature of the Afghan Taliban, and on the question ofwhat danger they do or do not pose to broader U.S. interests.The Taliban are a loosely organizedresistance concerned above all with society, politics, and power inside Afghanistan.Despite their ideological affinity to, and proven cooperation with, al-Qaida, they are not driven by the

transnational objectives associated with bin Ladin and Zawahiri.Their interest in, and antagonismtoward, the United States is almost entirely a function of what the United States doesinside Afghanistan to thwart their aims there. The Talibans values and practices, as demonstrated intheir previous rule over most of Afghanistan, clearly are repugnant to our own values. But there is

nothing in their origins or objectives to suggest that they will become less insular andinward looking in the future than they are now. The Taliban are the object of widedislike among Afghans, based on the earlier experience of their harsh rule. Their lackof cohesiveness is another of their handicaps.The cause most likely to unite them isresistance to foreign occupation of Afghanistan. They will tend to be stronger to

the extent that our military presence there is seen as an occupation.


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1AC TerrorContention 3: Al Qaeda

Al Qaeda is actively seeking nuclear weapons for use nuclear

energy expansion means risks are multiplying fastEvans 10 (Michael Evans, Pentagon Correspondent, Washington, April 12, 2010,Hillary Clinton fears al-Qaeda is obtaining nuclear weapons material,http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article7094876.ece |Suo)

Terrorists including al-Qaeda pose a serious threat to world security as they attemptto obtain atomic weapons material, Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State,declared on the eve of a global summit in Washington to prevent a nuclear terror attack. President Obama will call on theleaders of 47 nations today the biggest gathering of heads of state by a US leadersince the founding of the UN in 1945 to introduce tougher safeguards to preventnuclear material ending up in the hands of terrorists. As far back as 1998, Osama bin Ladenstated that it was his Islamic duty to acquire and use weapons of massdestruction. During the two-day Nuclear Security Summit, Mr Obama will try to convince representatives, including David Miliband.who is standing in for Gordon Brown, that the dangers of loosely guarded atomic material areso grave that a global agreement is needed to stop al-Qaeda going nuclear.The summit is part of Mr Obamas strategy to put nuclear weapons at the top of foreign policy. He signed a treaty with Russia on April 8,restricted the role and development of US nuclear weapons last week, and is trying to reach agreement on new sanctions against Iran. TheIran component of his strategy will be raised during the summit, notably with President Hu of China, who agreed to attend the event afterinitial doubts. In the speech he gave in Prague a year ago when he outlined his vision of a nuclear-free world, Mr Obama said he aimed to

secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.The summit is intended to rally globalcollective action to achieve this goal. However, with nuclear energy continuing toexpand around the world and safeguard technologies becoming outdated, the scopefor proliferation fissile material leaking to terrorist groups as well as to maverickstates is multiplying. The unprecedented gathering of 47 nations in Washington to address this issue underscores theperceived severity of the threat posed by nuclear terrorism. "We know that terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, are pursuing the materials to build a nuclear weapon and we know that they

have the intent to use one [which would be] a catastrophic danger to Americannational security and to global security were they able to carry out that kind of attack," Ben Rhodes, the White House's deputynational security adviser for strategic communications, said last week. Mr Obama will be seeking specific commitments from individualcountries to lock down their stocks of nuclear material, with particular emphasis on plutonium and highly-enriched uranium, the two materialsthat can be used for nuclear bombs. There already exists a Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, completed in 2005,but it has not yet come into force because some countries still have to sign and ratify it. There will be pressure on them to act soon. There willalso be pressure on countries to follow the example of Chile, which has removed all of its stocks of low-enriched and highly-enriched uranium.Mr Obama will remind delegates that the US and Russia have each agreed to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium, takenfrom their military programmes. This was agreed in 2000 but it has taken ten years for the implementing measures to be worked out. HillaryClinton, the US Secretary of State, and her Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, will finally sign the deal today. The US has spent 20 years andbillions of dollars trying to help the Russians safeguard their huge stockpiles of nuclear material. But there are still concerns that terroristsmight acquire Russian-sourced fissile material. When the Cold War ended there were apocalyptic rumours of Russian tactical nuclear weaponsgoing missing, and there were warnings of suitcase bombs being planted in Western cities. But, apart from a whole series of arrests of would-be nuclear smugglers caught trying to sell low-grade radioactive material during the early post-Cold War period, the nightmare of a terrorist

group acquiring a nuclear weapon never happened. However, Russia still has 5,000 tactical nukes, supposedly underlock and key. Underlining the fear that one might be secreted out of the country, the USDepartment of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration has equipped 160 Russian bordercrossings with radiation detection equipment. Bin Laden's avowed intention to go

nuclear has kept the West's intelligence services busy for years. "Since the mid-1990s, al-Qaeda'sWMD procurement efforts have been managed at the most senior levels, under rules of strict compartmentalisation from lower levels of theorganisation, and with central control over possible targets and the timing of prospective attacks," Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former senior CIAofficer, wrote in Foreign Policy magazine in January. He said Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's Egyptian deputy chief, "personally shepherded the

group's ultimately unsuccessful efforts to set off an anthrax attack in the US". In a 2007 video, bin Laden repeated hispromise "to use massive weapons" to destroy capitalism and help create an Islamiccaliphate, and there have been numerous examples in recent years of al-Qaeda'sattempts to acquire WMD material.According to Mr Mowatt-Larssen, the first evidence of the terrorist group's plans topurchase nuclear material was in late 1993. An al-Qaeda defector who became a source for the CIA and FBI, revealed that bin Laden tried to

buy uranium in Sudan. In 2001, Zawahiri was quoted as saying in an interview: " If you have $30 million, go to theblack market in central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist, and


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dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available."

That is the single greatest threat to global security materialhas already been stolen and an attack is coming in 2013Hall 10 (Mimi Hall, staff writer for USA Today, 4/12/2010, Obama seeks frontagainst nuclear terror, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-04-11-nukesummit_N.htm | Suo)

Obama said "the single biggest threat" to U.S. security is the possibility of aterrorist organization with a nuclear weapon. "If there was ever a detonation inNew York City, or London, or Johannesburg, the ramifications economically,politically and from a security perspective would be devastating ," he said Sundaybefore meeting with South African President Jacob Zuma, who is attending the summit. Also attending: presidents, prime ministers and kingsfrom countries such as Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Jordan. Obama continues one-on-one meetings with leaders today, and on Tuesday,the group will sign a "high-level communiqu" that recognizes the seriousness of the threat and outlines efforts to secure or eliminatevulnerable stockpiles, according to Gary Samore, the White House senior adviser for non-proliferation. The summit is "intended to rallycollective action," White House Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes says. The meetings will present their own security challenge forthe Secret Service and other law enforcement agencies because there will be so many world leaders at one time in Washington. Samore says

several countries will announce plans to eliminate or better protect their stockpiles. Securing nuclear material is achallenging but necessary job "because the global stockpile of nuclear weaponsmaterials is large enough to build 120,000 nuclear bombs (and) because Osama bin

Laden considers it his religious duty to obtain nuclear weapons and to use themagainst the United States," says Alexandra Toma of the Fissile Materials Working Group, a 40-member coalition dedicated tosecuring nuclear material. Five countries the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China and France are internationally recognizednuclear powers and have signed on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which pledges to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons andtechnology. India, Pakistan and North Korea also have nuclear weapons, and Israel is suspected of having warheads, according to the non-partisan Arms Control Association. Israel does not admit or deny having them. The United States and Russia hold the overwhelming majority ofhighly enriched uranium and plutonium, the material that could be used to build a crude but devastating bomb. According to the Nuclear

Threat Initiative, a nuclear-security group run by former Democratic senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, there is nocomprehensive inventory of the world's nuclear material. But 672 research reactorshave been built worldwide and 272 operate in 56 countries, most at universities orother research centers where security is lax, the group says. "Much of the nuclearmaterials that are potentially vulnerable or could be used for nuclear weapons areactually in the hands of private industry, so government regulation is a very important component," Samore says.Some of the material already has been stolen , according to Harvard University'sMatthew Bunn, author of Securing the Bomb. "Nuclear theft is not a hypothetical worry," he

says. "It's an ongoing reality." The International Atomic Energy Agency, a watchdog arm of the United Nations thatmonitors the use of nuclear power and technology, has documented 18 cases involving the theft or loss of plutonium or weapons-gradeuranium, mostly occurring in the former Soviet Union. The IAEA says a majority of these cases have not had a pre-identified buyer and"amateurish character" and "poor organization" have been the hallmark of some of the cases involving unauthorized possession of materials.

In Prague last year, Obama said, "Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclearmaterials abound." Government efforts have been made to secure nuclear material in recent years. Last week, the NationalNuclear Security Agency (NNSA) worked with officials in Chile to remove nuclear material from reactors near Santiago and transport it to theUSA. The agency has removed all significant amounts of highly enriched uranium from 18 countries, helped convert 60 reactors in 32countries to the use of safer, low-enriched uranium and closed seven reactors. The NNSA also has secured highly enriched uranium in more

than 750 buildings worldwide and safely stored 2,691 kilograms of nuclear material. Despite those efforts, in 2008, the Commissionfor the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction warned, "Unless the world community actsdecisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will beused in a terrorist attack" by 2013.

Afghanistan is the ONLY staging point for al Qaeda to launch a

large-scale attack there can only be oneArkedis 9 (Jim Arkedis is the director of the National Security Project at the Progressive PolicyInstitute. He was a counterterrorism analyst with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service from 2002 to2007. OCTOBER 23, 2009, Why Al Qaeda Wants a Safe Haven,http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/23/got_safe_haven | Suo)

As deliberations about the Obama administration's strategic direction in Afghanistan unfold, the White

House is weighing whether al Qaeda, in fact, needs an Afghan safe haven -- an expanseof land under the protection of the Taliban -- to reconstitute its capability to attackthe United States. Many noted scholars doubt it. In a recent Washington Post op-ed, Council on


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Foreign Relations President Richard Haass bluntly stated, "Al Qaeda does not require Afghanreal estate to constitute a regional or global threat." He's wrong. Although the group hasbeen significantly weakened since late 2001, the only chance al Qaeda has ofrebuilding its capability to conduct a large-scale terrorist operation againstthe United States is under the Taliban's umbrella of protection. Objections likeHaass's are rooted in the following arguments: that terrorists don't need physical

space because they can plot online; that the London and Madrid bombings provedeadly attacks can be planned in restrictive, Western, urban locations under the noses oflocal security services; and that denying terrorists one safe haven will simply compelthem to move to another lawless region. I spent five years as a counterterrorismanalyst for the Pentagon and rigorously studied plots from Madrid to London to 9/11.

The above arguments may have merit in a piecemeal or abstract sense, but fallapart in the specific case of what we all dread: a large-scale, al Qaedaoperation aimed at the United States. It is certainly true, for example, that terroristgroups can accomplish much online. Individuals can maintain contact with groups via chat rooms,money can be transferred over the Web (if done with extreme caution), and plotters can download itemslike instruction manuals for bomb-making, photographs of potential targets, and even blueprints for

particular buildings. But all the e-mail accounts, chat rooms, and social media availablewill never account for the human touch. There is simply no substitute for the trustand confidence built by physically meeting, jointly conceiving, and then training

together for a large-scale, complex operation on the other side of the world. As the9/11 plot developed, mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed (KSM) put the future operativesthrough a series of training courses along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Coursesincluded physical fitness, firearms, close combat, Western culture, and Englishlanguage. The 9/11 Commission report notes the extreme physical and mentaldemands KSM put on the participants -- even if the operation didn't require extensivefirearms usage, KSM would have wanted the operatives to be proficient under intensepressure, should the need arise. Juxtapose that with an online learning environment.While you can no doubt learn some amazing things from online courses, it is far preferable to havea dedicated professor physically present to supervise students and monitor theirprogress. Or think of it another way: You wouldn't want the U.S. Marine Corps to sendrecruits into battle without training under a drill instructor, would you? KSM wassomewhere between a professor and sergeant. Second, critics argue that the Madrid

bombings of 2004 (which killed 191) as well those in London a year later (which killed56) were largely -- though not entirely -- conceived, prepared, and executed withintheir respective countries, thus obviating the need for a safe haven. True enough.However, unlike 9/11 (which killed nearly 3,000), those plots' successes were possibledue to their simple concept and small scale. In both cities, the playbook wasessentially the same: Four to eight individuals had to find a safe house, download bomb-makinginstructions, purchase explosive agents, assemble the devices, and deliver charges to the attack points.

Without trivializing the tragic loss of life in the European attacks, building those explosivedevices was akin to conducting a difficult high-school chemistryexperiment. On that scale, 9/11 was like constructing a nuclear warhead. Inevery sense, it was a grander vision, involving 20 highly skilled operatives infiltratingthe U.S. homeland, who conducted a series of hijackings and targeted four nationallandmarks with enough know-how, preparation, and contingency plans to be success.

In one instance, KSM taught the 9/11 operatives to shoot a rifle from the back of amoving motorcycle,just in case. You can't do that in someone's bedroom -- youneed space, time, and the ability to work without worrying that the cops are listeningin. In other words, as a plot grows in number of operatives, scale of target, distancefrom base, and logistical complexity, so does the need for space to reduce thechances of being discovered and disrupted. The final argument is that denying alQaeda a safe haven is an exercise in futility: Drive Osama bin Laden fromAfghanistan and he'd relocate to some place like Sudan, southern Algeria, Somalia, orother swaths of ungoverned territory. However, this logic makes two faultyassumptions: that al Qaeda is mobile, and that the group's international affiliates


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would automatically roll out the red carpet for the jihadi refugees. Neither is true.Bin Laden and his senior and mid level cadre are well-known to intelligence servicesthe world over. Any attempt to travel, let alone cross an international border (saveAfghanistan-Pakistan) would fall somewhere between "utterly unthinkable" and"highly risky." Moving would further require massive reorientation of al Qaeda'sfinancial operations and smuggling networks. Nor would bin Laden's senior leaders be

automatically welcomed abroad in areas their regional partners control. Though alQaeda has established "franchise affiliates" in places like North Africa and SoutheastAsia, relationships between al Qaeda's leadership and its regional nodes areextraordinarily complex. Groups like the North African affiliate "al Qaeda in the IslamicMaghreb" (AQIM) are happy to co-opt the al Qaeda "brand" for recruiting and financialreasons, but they don't necessarily share the al Qaeda senior leadership's ideologicalgoals. AQIM is much more focused on attacking the Algerian government or foreignentities within the country, having not displayed much capability or desire forgrandiose international operations. And last, recruits come to North Africa more oftenthrough independent networks in Europe, not camps along the Durand Line.Think ofthe relationship like the one you have your in-laws: You might share aname, but you probably don't want them coming to visit for three fullweeks. Regional leaders aren't terribly loyal to senior leadership, either.Take AbuMusab al-Zarqawi, the deceased leader of the group's Iraq affiliate. He was summonedto bin Laden's side numerous times in an attempt to exert control as the Iraqicommander's tactics grew more grotesque and questionable. Zarqawi declined, notwanting to risk travel or accept instruction from bin Laden. In the end, a safe havenalong the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is as good as it gets for al Qaeda'schances to launch a large-scale attack against the United States . Certainly,smaller, less complex attacks could be planned without "Afghan real estate," but anysuch plot's death toll and long-term effect on American society will be far morelimited. Unfortunately, that's a risk President Barack Obama has to accept -- no amount ofintelligence or counterterrorism operations can provide 100 percent security. But toavoid the Big One, the U.S. president's best bet is to deny al Qaeda the onlyphysical space it can access.

A nuclear strike by al Qaeda causes US-China-Russia war,environmental collapse, and extinctionMorgan 9 (Dennis Ray Morgan, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, YonginCampus - South Korea Futures, Volume 41, Issue 10, December 2009, Pages 683-693, World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possibleextinction of the human race)

In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question Is Nuclear War Inevitable?? In

Section , Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nucleartensions between powerful countries. No doubt, theyve figured out that the best wayto escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moorepoints out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one smallnuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian

dead hand system, where regional nuclear commanders would be given fullpowers should Moscow be destroyed, it is likely that any attack would be blamed onthe United States Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israelwere to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it wouldretaliate with the suicidal Samson option against all major Muslim cities in theMiddle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks onRussia and even anti-Semitic European cities In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate,and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involvedas well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of themmuch more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon


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most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come,massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout,bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted tofuture generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking asavage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And what many peoplefail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken

communication, false signal or lone wolf act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of afew minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, thenthe likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihoodof a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act underthe use them or lose them strategy and psychology; restraint by one power wouldbe interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window ofopportunity to win the war. In other words, once Pandora's Box is opened, it will spread quickly,as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclearescalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however,everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states useinternal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites needs forpower and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And aslong as large nations oppress groups who seek self-determination, some of those groups will look for anymeans to fight their oppressors In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by theimplicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to

the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many,if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and thedestruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, ifthereis such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter. In Scenarios,

Moore summarizes the various ways a nuclear war could begin:Such a war couldstart through a reaction terrorist to attacks, or through the need to protect againstoverwhelming military opposition, or through the use of small battle field tactical nuclear weapons meant

to destroy hardened targets. It might quickly move on to the use of strategic nuclearweapons delivered by short-range or inter-continental missiles or long-rangebombers. These could deliver high altitude bursts whose electromagnetic pulse knocks out electricalcircuits for hundreds of square miles. Or they could deliver nuclear bombs to destroy nuclear and/or non-

nuclear military facilities, nuclear power plants, important industrial sites and cities. Or it could skip allthose steps and start through the accidental or reckless use of strategic weapons

Al Qaeda represents a uniquely existential threat religiousideology short-circuits deterrenceGorka 10 (Sebastian L. v. Gorka, Faculty of the Irregular Warfare Department of the National DefenseUniversity, Washington DC, and member of the US Atlantic Councils Strategic Advisers Group, 5/17/10,Al-Qaeda and Afghanistan in Strategic Context: Counterinsurgency versus Counterterrorism (WP),http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/dt15-2010 | Suo)

Almost immediately after 9/11, members of the Bush White House and the coterie of so-calledneoconservative thinkers in and around Washington declared that the geopolitics of the newcentury were now clear. To quote Charles Krauthammer, al-Qaeda and similar forms ofIslamist terror posed a new existential threat to America and the West.[3] Americasubsequently declared a Global War on Terrorism, and initiated regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq.Yet not everyone agreed with this core assessment. There are those who today argue that while al-Qaedais a murderous and deadly organisation, it does not pose an overarching threat to the community of

democratic Western nations.[4] To these people, two points must be made. Not only is al-Qaeda themost powerful terrorist group of the modern age, killing thousands in a matter of minutes, butit achieved something the Soviet Union never did: the mass murder of Americans (andother nationals) on US soil and later in Spain, the UK and elsewhere. While this mutation of the Arabmujahidin movement of the 1980s does not possess regiments of T-80 tanks or batteries of SS-20 missiles,

it is more disturbing than the USSR was in one key respect. For although Khrushchev may haverhetorically promised to bury us, he and his Kremlin successors never took the step of initiating conflict

against America and its allies, since he and his administration were fundamentally rational


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actors constrained and deterred by the thought of nuclear retaliation. Osama binLaden is wholly different. He has declared repeatedly that he intends to use weaponsof mass destruction as soon as he can acquire them. Against him and his ilkdeterrence policy has no effect. This paper discusses how the US failed to adequately identifythe nature of the conflict it was embarking upon in response to the 9/11 attacks, our flawedunderstanding of the enemy and the fact that today we are just beginning to

appreciate the central role of religious ideology in this war . Should we continueto misunderstand these three realities of the post-9/11 world, success in Afghanistan andPakistan will not be achievable.

US presence strengthens al Qaeda it drives militant groups toally with it and increases recruitingClemons et al. 10 (Bruce Ackerman, Yale University, Gordon Adams, American University andStimson Center, Amjad Atallah, New America Foundation, James Bamford, Author/Documentary Producer,Darcy Burner, Progressive Caucus Action Fund, James Clad, National Defense University, Steve Clemons,New America Foundation and The Washington Note, Juan Cole, University of Michigan and InformedComme

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