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Government Have a Future? Political Parties, Public Engagement, and Westminster Government ill Canada

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Introduction

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The Institute On Governance (lOG) is a non-1!;~~tit organization,

founded in 1990 in response to global trend~f~~fnsforming ma aspects ofgovernance. These trends are reslJ,ii1~hg approache

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leadership; the role ofgovernments; relati~~~~1ps among t! private and voluntary sectors; and relatiq~iifis among

politicians and civil servants.

Since governance profoundly in flue

enjoy, the Institute's mission is tl

which we define as the respon

on matters ofpublic conce

applying knowledge abo

and by fostering lea

internationally.

Beginning in 1

the Citizen E ell, 1996

explored th uting and

mediating articular focus

on prosp s

d, Director of

Gradu ' cience at Carleton

Univ. ithin which '''iii

Can ''and social movements

ist" efforts, and

context of the

The objective-of this Round Table session is to coITl.9are'political parties with the other consultative processes thiItbr~ngthe pub­lic voice into decision-making and in doingso'tfiink about the

performance of Canadian pOlitiG,~n~~~:tiiesin the aggregation and transmission of public i2'~~~~?tsto decision makers. M~joB

is to define par~governmerl'1Eapiaprovide an overvie~ofOl~r'~;

system. In addition to that role, I would like to offer some com­ments aQ9tltthe relationships between elected and appointed officials.'

For the moment I am going to content myself by saying that there is a crisis in this second regard. The evidence is found in the number of cases in which Ministers have passed the blame

to public officials - unnecessarily - and in the various ways the system is being forced to run at cross-purposes with itself, rang­

ing from an over-dependence for briefings and opinions on the Office of the Auditor General to a tendency of ordinary mem­bers of parliamentary committees to conduct themselves as

though they were the universe's last crime busters, facing a wild west of a civil service.

It is probably fair to preface the body of my remarks with a con­

fession: I am that rare thing, a Canadian academic who believes

that the Westminster system of government provides a better basic design for government than the available alternatives, and that it can be adapted to modern needs. In fact, Westminster

government, I believe, has a number of features that are star­tlingly "modem." Alone among feasible political systems, the Westminster model has the potential to become what r

is fashionably called"a learning organization."

Briefly, this is because responsible government builds heavily on a retrospective cycle of discussion, evaluation, argument and blame, so that parliamentarians have the opportunity to educate themselves about the outcomes of legislation and policies now in effect, as well as the quality of all ministers' administrative

leadership of their departments. This cycle of learning and discussion takes place formally, and on a daily basis, in the House of Commons, the heart of our representative institutions. A related and equally "modern" feature of Westminster govern­

ment is that it makes no fine philosophical and technical distinction between policy, conceived as high ideas, and admin­

istration, conceived as mere implementation. What could be more modern, even post-modern, than to refuse to get caught up in untenable distinctions between facts and values, or to refuse to confuse the responsibility for correction with issues

of who really did what at an output stage? This potency - the possibility to cut through confusion and make things right

again - is accomplished simply by making the minister answerable for both policy and administration in the

retrospective cycle.

In what follows I discuss civil society, define Westminster government as a form of party government, and ask whether we would be better off with the American form of party govern­ment. I then recklessly go out on a limb and reveal many of my opinions about what ought to be done to make responsible

government function better in Canada.

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I have OW objections to thi~forrhulation. First, the representa­

tions may"p.a~~'beenmore important as a focus of ,,,y:;;~~":!"'"

popular interest-ef'some earlier point, but they have always been surrounded by economic and social institutions and chan­nels. Second, if it is true that people actually want and even feel a need to communicate directly with government and to have a direct, immediate and measurable impact upon government decisions, then it is important to understand that such people do not want either democracy or government. People who think they need instant and individual gratification should

be connected up directly to home shopping channels and kept away from government. This is because in government, out­comes are negotiated and nothing is forever - retrospection

and responsibility taken together mean that everything is open to discussion and change. Government is not something one person does, regardless of any ambient mood of "fed up" , and "not going to take it any more."

Hence a caveat - I am not going to call people "citizens" except in reference to the electoral process and the representative insti­tutions. One is not a "citizen" - one is not exercising citizenship - in adding one's voice to a gun lobby petition, nor is one

engaging in citizen behaviour when one calls up a talk show. One is entering one's opinion in one of the little institutions that make up civil society.

This is not a pedantic distinction. Government and civil society are separate spheres. The common core of definitions of civil society is that"civil society" signifies a sphere of social action apart from the state (or government), even a sphere opposed to the state. Civil society is constituted of a combination of networks of legal protection (usually meaning protection from the state), voluntary associations, and forms of independent public expression.!" The more well developed a state is in its democracy, the more its civil society is well structured and well institutionalised. Where agreement about what is in or out of civil society breaks down is in discussion of the economy - is it to be wholly independent and unregulated (purely private), or can a country's citizens affect distributive issues and regulation of the economy (is the economy within and part of politics)?

Civil society is under assault in modern life. The institutions

that form its tissue are apparently dwindling or frankly dying. David Elkins, a Canadian political scientist, says ina recent book that the territorial institutions that were once the most important voluntary associations in society - churches, labour unions, school associations - are now very often bypassed. As a society we now have to struggle to find ways to get people to organize themselves locally, among their physical rather than their "virtual" neighbours of professional, avocational or "interest" space. Given that many pure public goods like safe transportation and sanitation are delivered to physical settings, the worry that people are disengaging themselves from caring about local action is not a good Sign.

Political parties in Ca~ada are in~.~~~ti~ns of CiVi~

bears thinking about. Political p$!!fies are priv<y~~!i~i'ganisati(JI1S, they are not significantly state-regulated nor ~ie they.€fltl=ctly funded by the state. As in the other forms of pep~i~r assocta­

tion, our Canadian civil society isf~~li~g ushere: our

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mainline

parties, when viewed in comp~~~~~'~9<e~tablished parties in some other developed weste~~~'~~~tries, are only very opportunistic el~ctoral org~~ID£~~IOns which do not plan to enswet.f'reir ownc6mpetence as potential governments. They do!~®'t: develop systems of ideas and policy, nor do they providea structure that can recruit and train serious political talent. Robert Young, another Canadian political SCientist, once reported that the Pulp and Paper Association has more capacity to do strategic analytical work than the Liberal and Conservative parties combined.

In Canada, we very often have absolute political amateurs appointed as ministers to lead the administration and policy of departments, and sometimes our prime ministers are equally green. In 1993 the Canadian population watched one of its two great parties reduced to almost nothing because the public sim­

ply could not take it seriously any longer: it had allowed itself to be captured for an "excellent adventure" by a rank political amateur. More and more often, parties that have nothing to say campaign for office against the state and "bureaucracy." In doing so, they are declaring that they are unfit to govern because they do not understand what government is.

The links from civil society to the state have also changed. Television is now said to form public preferences in a kind of "vacuum land," outside of the experiential context of where

lives arelived. As civil society becomes less and less thoroughly organised, public opinion is no longer mediated and represented to the state by long-standing institutions. Instead opinion is presented "raw" by polling firms. This does not mean opinion is uncontaminated, or that its interpretation serves no particular "agenda", it only means that it is downloaded one bite at a time, without an internal logic. Thus logic has to be imputed

, to the diverse bits of public opinion. It is exactly this that parties are unable to do, because parties are not working on long-term policy agendas. The parties are so impoverished in ideas that they use the polls only to tell them what individual

beads to string together so that they offend the smallest number of potential voters.

Westminster Government as Party Government

It is important to agree on a definition of party government. Westminster government is party government though there are forms of party government other than the Westminster one.

We can spin this out by saying that Westminster government is both responsible and representative government. Responsible

means that the government takes responsibility in the retrospec­tive phase of evaluation for the powers that it exercised as leader of the House of Commons in the legislative and policy-making phase of government. The cabinet in a Westminster-style system

authoritatively directs the whole legislative program of the gov­ernment, and as well holds all the prerogative powers. We know who is responsible. This is driven home in the House of Commons at the time and also, importantly, long after the fact of a decision as the chickens come home to roost. Then the electorate speaking in a general election can change the

executive and its base, Of~upport;?i- tJ'i.'e citizenS,';&~~p:resenta­tives in the legisl,a"".,;l:Uire - at one s,.,lil!,i.",,',",:}6t, in one cl~~~~eep..•

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The basic mechanics of Westminster government are the following:

• the ministers are in parliament and are responsible (answer­able) to it for what is done or proposed by the minister or those under his or her authority, both currently and retro­spectively (it is the acceptance of responsibility that creates the power and jurisdiction for action and restitution)

• the bureaucracy is distinct in status from political appointees, meaning that the officials are appointed, promoted and their

_' careers overseen by an independent agency on grounds of merit and personal suitability to the work

• ministers in charge have final authority over the bureaucra­cy: thus although the tenure of a civil servant is not normal­

ly in the control of the minister, officials are subject in the last analysis to the lawful commands of their minister

• the lines of accountability run from official to minister to cabinet to parliament to voters, without short cuts [31

Thus our system or political regime rests on two partyism (or two and a half, certainly not one and two halves), party discipline, plurality elections and, internally, the Westminster "mechanic". Again, because we are fixated on the decision and

legislative phases of government, it is important to emphasize the retrospective work of the House of Commons, where problems and signals come forward from citizens through representatives who then fight for policy revision - this cycle is more important than the simple output phase. Retrospection is thinking again, the post-mortem, chewing over after the fact, deliberation over ameliorative measures - this is the learning

cycle of politics. This potential to f9Xc~~politician~

is what other systgmsdo not hOlT'"

same extent.

Here is where I do want to say a few words abgl1tfelations between elected MPs and official~,;i&li?;§ji$';L,'1985reforms to the

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mandates of the ~?useof C?,~~~~;{e0mnIitteesthat enc~

them to focus o~;grilling cir~ij~~i~~~ts instead of pOlit~~i~ris foolish, un~air ;~~d profo!J;l!ellylindemocratic. The logft of L

westmi~~!i~system is th;~t the pressure be placed on politi<:;iiirrs in the r@~iospective cycle, to force ministers to learn about their organisations and their problems, and to squeeze information out of civil servants to help ministers acquit themselves well. To turn the House of Commons into a chamber of horrors for

officials may satisfy the housekeeping instincts of the Office of the Auditor General, but in democratic terms it makes as

much sense as striking the waters and cursing the fish.

Is American-Style Government Better?

Would Canada work better under an American-style presidential form of government? The American system is actually a class with one member, because it came about by turning British gov­

ernment upside down: it placed power in the institution whose members were most numerous, moved the general function of retrospection and holding the government to account out of the legislature to the unorganised citizenry beyond the institutional· framework, formally separated the executive from its partisan supporters, and left the bureaucracy without a democratic prin­ciple of leadership to legitimate its activity, lt is now "correct" to say that American government is a diffusion of power system (rather than a separation of powers system) where there is rule

of law, that is, government, but not"a" government. Things

work out. Or they don't. It is hard to believe that it would be good for Canada to simply give up on having a system that could plan and learn from its mistakes if it had the kind of

parties that wanted to.

There are other reasons that a presidential system would not

be good for Canada. In general, Presidential regimes perform very poorly in countries with deep cleavages and multi-party

systems. They are also largely unfixable and therefore inflexible

in certain ways, because it is so hard to consolidate the power necessary to get a change - a simple majority will not do.

In short, it is hard to argue that American style government is

a good option for Canada. It took American political leaders

more than 200 years and a lot of evolution in the context of the American normative framework to create the interlocking

and interdependent system of sub-governments which merge

politicians, bureaucrats and interests within policy areas to pro­

vide policy stability. In American government, there is no one

concerted retrospective cycle that takes place in the representa­

tive institutions, and no way for an exasperated population to

trigger a change of governing personnel. The big, inclusive cycle

of political retrospection takes place out in civil SOCiety, led by

the media, for profit. This provides the spectacle ofcharacter

politics that destroys presidents and presidential candidates.

It is not quite a rhetorical question to ask what country other

than the United States with all its talent and resources could

afford to govern itself by a form of anti-statism fought through

character politics. In fact, there are many who think that

America must find a new public philosophy. For one example,

a startling proportion of the active American electorate thinks

Does Canada hav~",,~arty Government?

Canada has the framework and potential for responsible govern­

ment, but does Canada really operate party government at the

national level?

The answer is, yes and no.

It is "yes" because governments can be sent away by a simple

majority of the House of Commons on an ordinary motion of non confidence, at any time. The government can be changed,

and it can be changed while the shoe is pinching and without

civil war.

And it is "no, we don't" for the following two reasons:

1. we do not have a national party system in which parties are

long standing institutions that provide long-term political

careers to stable groups of politicians who devise policy and

can provide strategic leadership.

2. we do not have party government in the national institu­

tions because of the lack of capacity of parties to reconcile

inside themselves regional interests from across the whole country - probably this capacity never existed in Canada except through substantial patronage allocated inside language groups.

Is a more active civil society a cure?

In general, the answer is no, not unless public sentiment is . mediated by stable social institutions. Interest groups that have

stable memberships perhaps qualify as such, although many commentators think interest groups steal activists directly from political parties. Mainstream churches qualify, professional associations qualify, parties could qualify were they more robust and coherent.

Intense publics made up of intensely self-righteous individuals are dangerous because we are talking about extreme populism. Such publics must be pulled into parties and electoral politics or we Canadians could end up like the American midwest where

there are no-go areas for federal officials - they may be shot on sight. What we need in Canada is for fewer parties to organize

a somewhat larger percentage of the electorate. If a country has as little as twelve percent of its electorate willing to participate in political parties on a year-round basis, doing several conven­tional partisan tasks, party institutions can tick along quite well. More participation might be desired if one adheres to the civic republicanism model of citizenship, in which participation in and of itself is thought to be a good thing because it legitimates government and thus the idea that a polity holds some spaces

and functions in common, and it also develops the capacities of the participating individual. Conventional tasks include

working for a party or candidate, persuading others to join

a party or to aCfept a p~~xaf~me sessions, rallies, gi¥ieii1'i6~ey, ta~.,

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serve as carididate when needed: •. J .• "r"""" "

In short, both political populism and the poI'<'

populist directions of civil sOcie!1jf11~~~!i~~i?aining institutio

are bad ideas. BO~~:!}~t~~~ltin f:l:'i~'~~~e:;issue at a time, .~ defiriiti~n inim,}s1fJ~~0i'Co~~i~':':ife~'·and both mOdaliti~~i;.~'~d,tf~rli to be gneva~;11~,ased. Tb;,i~lJ!treans they focus on persofial kiI'd~

of retribu,~i~~il:ci:stead of I~hncipledresponsibility and the d.jt.eitAri,,~WjJl'" 'l~, ,:,.:" , ',: " ./

account~1fIlityof officials;~h~Yiare anti-statist motors in an age in whicfll! anti-stat~~~iiijSia;worn-out philosophy even in the country of its inven.tion, whose constitution was designed to foster it. Politics needs people who think in ameliorative terms,

and who can see shades of grey, and who therefore do not throw up their hands and cry for revenge at every setback.

Prospective Improvements within the Canadian Political System

Given the limits to public engagement, and given the current character of our system (leaving aside the unity problem), there remain some important ways in which we can improve political

engagement, legitimacy, and accountability in Canada.

1. Provide state funds to political parties so that they can set up the durable analytical organisations to enable them to devel­

op policy between elections, and codify and constitutionalise

the relationships between political parties and cabinet. In other words, take parties out of civil society and make them part of the electoral system. They are too important to be

allowed to drift and be bought in casual ways by interests

that happen to have money - democracy depends on parties.

This would not mean the end of freedom as we know it,

for it is done in several countries otherwise very similar

to ourselves in the freedom and respect showed to business interests. Over the longer term, it would improve stability

and the quality of government.

2. Bring politicians into the 21st century - train Ministers and MPs to become more adept at making use of the newer modes of communication for constituency work (territorial)

and also for interest-based work (non territorial or function­

al). They need to increase the political capacity of the sys­

tem, build local loyalty to themselves, and build a national

constituency for their work so that they can develop person­

al political power to bring to their party. We have to break the cycle of the extreme electoral volatility in Canada that

makes MPs fully disposable, and means that every general

election puts into the House of Commons a large cohort of people who think they have come to Congress and want

to hold inquiries into other peoples' characters.

3. Cut the number of MPs in the House of Commons by close to half, so that there would be fewer MPs, and lessen the

importance of the Commons as a forum for constitutional

and protest grand-standing. The opposition has to get down

to work so that it can appear like an executive - and this

is largely done by dogged and intelligent work in the .retrospective cycle.

4. Change the rules of parliamentary immunity so that MPs

and Senators would not have immunity in parliamentary

committee inquiries when they accuse and libel, under the

protection of the House of Commons, persons who do not

enjoy standing in the House of Commons and therefore

5. Assi.'bn secondmen~~/~~gh~flyerpublic servants to ministe­rial O~ices and to ..~;I;l;eJ'PMO for fixed periods of time, so they

do not enter..p6litical entourage, but can interpret the

bureaucratic organisations to politicians and their

political staff.

6. Use inquiries with court-like rules of evidence where public servants can have counsel for the occasions when the ques­

tion of official misconduct is plausible and is being pushed.

7. Give Ministers explicit media and House training in how

to take ownership of trouble files on their feet. When a Minister is suddenly accused of some fault, she or he should

say, "thank you for bringing this matter to my attention. I

shall look into it and see what can be done." They should

not say, "My goodness, I did not know anything about this

and certainly did not approve it." The latter response leads

inevitably to the media trying to catch a minister out in a lie, whereas the real problem remains to be investigated.

8. Learn to decode much of the current management lore of

the "reinventing government" type as what it is - hidden

ideology and a form of hidden politics.

Endnotes

[1] See Jean 1. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1994.

As a closing note, it may be that we [2] See also Giovanni Sartori,

will have to go considerably further Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes. New York University Press, 1994, p. 104. than these changes I have recklessly

listed if we want to address the unity [3] Adapted from R.S. Parker,

The Administrative Vocation. problem. I close by advocating Sartori Sydney, Australia: Hale and Irernonger, 1993. for alternative forms of supra-govern­

ments, which may be what we have [4] John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse,

Congress as Public Enemy. to come to. Cambridge .University Press, 1995.

See also Michael J. Sandel, "America's Search for a new Public Philosophy," Atlantic Monthly (March, 1996).

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