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█, "Much Ado About 'Performatives'" i

Word count: 8340

ABSTRACT

The present paper serves two related purposes. It deals with the debate between Kent Bach & Robert M. Harnish and

Searle about ‘how performatives work’. The first purpose is to explain why there is a debate at all, given that the views of

both parties actually sound completely plausible. It is argued that the opposite parties have and apply different

conceptions of the central notions involved in the debate, ‘performative utterances’ and ‘illocutionary acts’, without being

aware of this fact. As a conse quence, they defend theses which although they appear to contradict each other, really are

about different kinds of ‘things’ (acts, utterances). The second purpose is to give support to the view that scholarly

terminology should be used very strictly—stricter than we actually do. Technical terms such as “performative utterance”

and “illocutionary act”, it is argued, should not be redefined without a very good reason, because any redefinition tends to

cause terminological confusion. Many think that such strictness in terminology is not necessary, because, as it is assumed,

the participants in philosophical debates are aware of any differences between their definitions. The analysis of the

present debate indicates, however, that this expectation is too optimistic.

1 - Introduction

In the present paper we shall be concerned with the debate between Kent Bach & Robert M. Harnish and

John R. Searle about the question of 'how performatives (really) work'. Although there had been several

earlier discussions employing the notion of 'performative utterances'ii, and although the question of 'how

performatives work' continued to be disputed afterwards,iii the exchange between Bach & Harnish and Searle

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stands out; indeed, it is one of the most notorious debates in speech act theory. Among the reasons for this

may be the fact that the opponents are the representatives of two of the leading theories 'of illocutionary

acts',iv and probably also the fact that the participants count as being among the most approved experts in the

field.

The direct aim of this paper is to explain why there is a debate at all, given the fact that the views of both

parties sound rather plausible and appear to be stable during the exchange. The reason for this, it will be

argued, is that the opponents apply different conceptions of the terms ‘illocutionary act’ and ‘performative

utterance’, with the effect that their theses really do not contradict each other—they rather are about different

kinds of ‘things’ (acts, utterances).

Apart from the interest which such an explanation of the debate itself may raise, there is a second task

which the present analysis serves.

it is about the way in which the basic terms of speech act theory are used, and how they should be used.

In █ I argued that technical terms, such as for example "illocutionary act" and "performative utterance",

should, in the absence of reason to the contrary, be used in the way in which they were originally defined. For

inconsistent usage of a technical term, I argue, tends to make the term ambiguous, which again is

undesirable—at least in scholarly discourse.v With reference to this argument I suggest that the term

"illocutionary act", for example, which was coined by John L. Austin, should in the absence of reason to the

contrary be used as Austin originally defined it. (It is obvious how to transfer the argument to Austin's notion

of "performative utterance".)

I took this argument to be pretty much a platitude; but the responses to my view included a good deal of

skepticism. One kind of reaction with which I met was blunt denial. It was suggested that there are no

different conceptions of 'illocutionary acts' and 'performative utterances', or that, anyway, the differences

between the present conceptions of these terms are marginal. Against this suggestion, I show in █ that the

definitions of 'illocutionary acts' given by Austin (1975), Schiffer (1972), Bach & Harnish (1979) and Alston

(2000), for instance, are really very different.

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Another objection I met with was that even if there are different definitions of such terms as

"illocutionary act" and "performative utterance", this does not, as my argument suggests, lead to ambiguity.

For even if there are different ways of capturing the intensions of these terms, their extensions are obvious

enough. In █, however, I show that at least as far as the term "illocutionary act" is concerned, this objection

fails. Thus, for example, William P. Alston (2000), Bach & Harnish (1979) and John R. Searle (1969) turn out

to have very different opinions about the question of whether promising is an illocutionary act, even though

promising is commonly supposed to be an extremely obvious case of an 'illocutionary act'.

A third objection I met with is that even if there was, as I claim, good reason to acknowledge Austin's

original definitions, there is still better reason to stick to the present variety of definitions after all. Because,

as the objection proceeds, such a term as "illocutionary act" has become indispensable, during the years, as a

means of referring to those various things it has been established for. In █ I discard this objection by

demonstrating that and how, for example, the accounts of Alston (2000), Bach & Harnish (1979) and Searle

(1969) might easily dispense with the term "illocutionary act".

Yet there is a fourth objection, and this will be the issue of the present paper. Contrary to what my

argument suggests, it says, the ambiguity of technical terms such as "illocutionary act" and "performative

utterance" does not seriously hinder the success of scholarly discussions. For in fact the participants in the

speech-act theoretic discussion are perfectly able to keep any different conceptions of such terms as

"illocutionary act" and "performative utterance" apart, and are well aware, in each case, of how the relevant

author defined the term, or at least are well able to determine which of the conceptions associated with the

term is under consideration.

I think that this view is illusory. It rather seems to me that many of the present discussions of

"illocutionary acts" and "performative utterances" are affected by debates the subject matter of which is after

all unclear. What, actually, is the phenomenon under consideration? Is the argument about facts or rather

about terms? Do the participants really disagree, and if so, exactly what question do they answer differently?

These are among the questions which, in my impression, many discussions confront us with in connection

with the fact that the participants in the debate are using central terms in profoundly different ways. Now if

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my impression is only approximately true, then it should be easy for me to show one or two cases where

some speech act theorists do misunderstand each other due to different conceptions of central terms.

So let's get ready to rumble. In the present paper I set out to show that the debate between Bach &

Harnish and Searle about 'how performatives (really) work', is indeed such a case. I shall show that the

participants in this debate are talking at cross purposes, simply for the reason that, unawares, they apply

different conceptions of what 'performative utterances' and 'illocutionary acts' are supposed to be. Now if this

is true, then the fourth objection turns out to fail: if even Bach & Harnish and Searle are unable to keep the

terminological ambiguity under control, the view that there is no problem proves false. The conclusion I

suggest is that we should let proper terminology come to the aid of our weakness and use the central terms of

speech act theory in a consistent way, avoiding ambiguities as far as possible.

The debate under consideration starts with some comments by Bach & Harnish on Austin's account of

'performative utterances'. Therefore, I shall start my exposition with an introduction of Austin's account,vi and

then turn to the debate itself.

2 - Austin's account

Originally, Austin had been concerned with the view, then fashionable, that all meaningful sentences are true

or false. In Austin's view, this is mistaken. Calling it the "descriptive fallacy", he starts by emphasising how

many kinds of sentences there are which stand against this view. Firstly, he points to sentences which do not

take the declarative mood: "besides (grammarians') statements", he emphasises, "there are […] also questions

and exclamations, and sentences expressing commands or wishes or concessions" (1975, 1). Even among the

class of declarative sentences, he continues reminding us, there are sentences which are not truth-evaluable.

On the one hand, he refers to sentences which are, "as KANT perhaps first argued systematically, strictly

non-sense, despite an unexceptionable grammatical form" (1975, 2). On the other hand, there are what he

calls "masqueraders", sentences which "masquerade as a statement of fact, descriptive or constative" (1975,

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4), but which "are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart […] information

about the facts" (Austin 1975, 2). Among these he counts "ethical propositions" (1975, 2f.) and sentences

containing "specially perplexing words", which do not describe or report, but rather indicate "the

circumstances in which the statement is made" (1975, 3).

It is in association with these masquerading sentences that Austin first introduces the "performative

utterance".

The type of utterance we are to consider here is not, of course, in general a type of nonsense […]. Rather, it is one of our second

class––the masqueraders. But it does not by any means necessarily masquerade as a statement of fact, descriptive or constative.

Yet it does quite commonly do so, and that, oddly enough, when it assumes its most explicit form. Grammarians have not, I

believe, seen through this 'disguise', and philosophers only at best incidentally. It will be convenient, therefore, to study it first in

this misleading form, in order to bring out its characteristics by contrasting them with those of the statement of fact which it

apes. (Austin 1975, 4)

It should be noted that Austin, although he introduces 'performative utterances' in connection with

'masquerading' declarative sentences, emphasises from the beginning that not all performative utterances

belong to the masqueraders; rather, a performative utterance is a masquerader only when "it assumes its most

explicit form"; if it does not take the explicit form, then neither can it be expected to look like a statement.

Restricting, however, for the first his view to the explicit variety of performative utterances,vii all of

which have, as he (1975, 5) puts it, "humdrum verbs in the first person singular present indicative active",

Austin characterises 'performative utterances' by means of two criteria:

A. they do not 'describe' or 'report' or constate anything at all, are not 'true or false'; and

B. the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as, or as

'just', saying something. (Austin 1975, 5)

The first example Austin gives of (explicit) 'performative utterances' are these.

(E.a) 'I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)'––as uttered in the course of the marriage ceremony.

(E.b) 'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth'––as uttered when smashing the bottle against the stem.

(E.c) 'I give and bequeath my watch to my brother'––as occurring in a will".

(E.d) 'I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.' (Austin 1962, 5)

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So according to criterion B, to utter a 'performative utterance' is to perform an action, rather than merely

to say something. Furthermore, 'performatives', even the explicit ones, do not describe or report, are not true

or false ("I assert this as obvious and do not argue it", he says.viii); instead of being true or false, Austin says,

they are "happy" or "unhappy". Which they are depends on whether the illocutionary act performed in

uttering the words is felicitously performed: if the act is subject to any of a certain range of defects, then this

makes the performative utterance 'unhappy', while in the absence of any such defect it is 'happy'.

Given our task, it should be noted that on Austin's account 'performative utterances' are linguistic

expressions, rather than utterances of linguistic expressions (utterata, rather than utterationesix). Although

this view is not generally acknowledged, there are good reasons for it, such as for example the following. (1)

Austin introduces explicit performatives as a variety of masquerading sentences. (2) Austin argues that

'performative utterances' cannot be true or false: but actions, like utterances of sentences, cannot be true or

false anyway, as Strawson (1950, 129f.) points out in response to an article by Austin.x (3) Austin (1975, 6)

introduces performatives as follows: "What are we to call a sentence or an utterance of this type? I propose to

call it a performative sentence or a performative utterance, or, for short, 'a performative'"; evidently,

“utterances” is here to be interpreted as referring to linguistic devices, rather than utterances thereof:

“Sentences form a class of ‘utterances’”, Austin (1975, 6 n2) comments with reference to the passage under

consideration, “which class is to be defined so far as I am concerned, grammatically”. (4) Austin (1975, 1, 2)

identifies 'performative utterances’ with "grammarians' statements", ascribing to them an "unexceptionable

grammatical form"; he (1975, 4) characterises them by saying that they “fall into [the] grammatical category

[…] of ‘statement’”; and he (1975, 55-66) sets out to find grammatical criteria for them: linguistic

expressions, rather than acts of uttering them, are commonly taken to satisfy grammatical criteria.

Another thing to be noted is that when Austin uses the words "the doing of an action", then this does not

refer to any old action––after all, to say something is to perform an action in some sense, as Austin

observes.xi Rather, with "doing of an action" Austin aims, particularly, at what he later calls "illocutionary

acts".xii He (1975, 116f.) gives a definitionxiii of the notion of 'illocutionary acts' in Lecture IX, requiring

them to satisfy the following two criteria.xiv

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(1) An act is an illocutionary act only if its performance "involves the securing of uptake", where to

'secure uptake' is, roughly, to make clear to an audience that in issuing the utterance this act is performed.xv

(2) An act is an illocutionary act only if it is a 'conventional act',xvi an act constituted by a convention,

which "'takes effect' in certain ways", that is, which involves the production of certain 'conventional

consequences'. Austin mentions, for example, the act of naming a ship the Queen Elizabeth, which has the

conventional consequence that "certain subsequent acts such as referring to it as Generalissimo Stalin will be

out of order".xvii

As I said above, Austin distinguishes between inexplicitxviii performative utterances and explicit ones.xix

In order for an utterance to be "explicit", he (1975, 32) explains, it has to "begin with or include some highly

significant and unambiguous expression such as 'I bet', 'I promise', 'I bequeath'". An explicit performative

utterance "makes explicit both that the utterance is performative, and which act it is that is being performed"

(1975, 62); in performing an illocutionary act by means of an explicit performative I "make my performance

explicit" (1975, 39). There are, however, also "inexplicit" performatives; indeed, their existence is the main

reason why Austin's quest for a grammatical criterion of 'performative utterances' is unsuccessful.xx

"Inexplicit" performative utterances are performative utterances which, though they are performative, do not

make explicit the illocutionary act performed in making the utterance. Contrasting explicit and inexplicit

utterances, Austin refers to "I promise that I shall be there" (explicit) versus "I shall be there" (inexplicit).xxi

Additional examples of inexplicit performatives which Austin mentions are "Go!" (ordering someone to

go),xxii "Turn right!" (ordering someone to turn right), "Done" (accepting a bet) and "Out!" (giving someone

out).xxiii

Now given the task of the present paper, one thing should be noted. Because of the existence of inexplicit

'performative utterances', the question whether 'performatives' (in Austin's sense of the notion) are statements

only makes sense when restricted to the explicit variety. As we saw, Austin himself (1975, 4) points out quite

early that the 'performative utterance' "does by no means necessarily masquerade" as a truth-evaluable

statement, but that it only does so "when it assumes its most explicit form". Given the existence of inexplicit

performative utterances such as "Go!", "Turn right!", and "Done", on Austin's account it would be a rather

strange idea to argue that all 'performatives' are truth-evaluable as they stand.

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Finally, given our issue it is worthwhile considering which property it is that Austin intends to highlight

with the word "performative". As Austin (1975, 6) explains, the term is derived "from 'perform', the usual

verb with the noun 'action'", and it is intended to indicate that "the issuing of the utterance is the performing

of an action". Terms which can sometimes be used in place of "performative", he says, are "contractual" or

"declaratory". Furthermore, "[o]ne technical term that comes nearest to what we need is perhaps 'operative',

as it is used strictly by lawyers in referring to that part, i.e., those clauses, of an instrument which serves to

effect that transaction […] which is its main object". As these passages show, the characteristic trait of an

utterance which is meant to be captured by the term "performative" is that it plays a crucial role for the

action’s being performed, rather than not performed. As we shall see, both Bach & Harnish and Searle instead

use the predicate 'performative' to highlight that the act is performed explicitly, rather than inexplicitly.

In the following, we shall be concerned with conceptions of 'performative utterances' and 'illocutionary

acts' different from Austin's: in order to distinguish his conceptions from those of others, I shall use the

superscript A: "'performative utterance'A", "'illocutionary act'A".

3 - Bach & Harnish's discussion of Austin's account

The debate we are considering starts with a discussion of Austin's account presented by Bach & Harnish

(1979, 203-208).xxiv Three elements of this discussion are of particular interest for us. First of all, Bach &

Harnish have an objection to Austin's account. Referring to his criterion (A) of an utterance's being

'performative', they (1979, 203) argue that "the negative side of Austin's doctrine––that performative

utterances do not constate, are not true or false––is mistaken". Secondly, referring to Austin's criterion (B) of

an utterance's being performative, Bach & Harnish acknowledge that they "accept the positive side––that

[performative utterances] are, or are part of, the doing of an action" (Bach & Harnish 1979, 203). Thirdly,

Bach & Harnish propose a description of 'how', on their account, 'performatives work'.

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Let us begin with the objection. Contrary to what Austin assumed, Bach & Harnish argue, 'performative

utterances' are truth-evaluable statements. Their (1979, 203) argument starts from the assumption that "the

sentence uttered in a performative utterance is grammatically declarative"; indeed, in their view this is the

very reason why "Austin's doctrine once seemed paradoxical" (Bach & Harnish 1979, 203). Also, they (1979,

206) assume that a 'performative utterance' "makes explicit the precise action performed by the utterance". It

is thus, as they argue, "of a form which, with nonperformative verbs,xxv can be used to make true or false

statements, statements to the effect that the speaker is in the state named by the verb, such as 'I see light' or 'I

hate spinach'" (Bach & Harnish 1979, 204).

But notoriously, Austin did not believe that performative utterances are truth-evaluable statements.

According to Bach & Harnish (1979, 204), his reason was that "despite their declarative grammatical form,

performative utterances are not statements, are not true or false", because "the job of the performative

formula is that of 'making explicit (which is not the same thing as stating or describing) what precise action it

is that is being performed by the issuing of the utterance". This reason, however, is unconvincing, according

to Bach & Harnish. "After all", they (1979, 206) argue, "it is possible to perform several actions in one fell

swoop, so why should the utterance of 'I thank you' not be both a giving of thanks and a stating that I am so

doing?". Their (1979, 204-206) examination of several possible reasons why this might be taken to be

impossible yields the result that these are all invalid, and thus they arrive at the conclusion that 'performative

utterances' consist of two acts, (1) a truth-evaluable statement to the effect that the illocutionary act indicated

by the sentence is performed, and (2) the performance of the illocutionary act indicated.

Now regardless of whether it sounds plausible at first, by closer inspection this line of argument turns out

to be invalid, and quite evidently so, at least if it is really taken to be an objection against Austin's

criterion (A) of an utterance's being 'performative'. The reason lies in the two assumptions on which Bach &

Harnish's argument rest, that "the sentence uttered in a performative utterance is grammatically declarative",

and that this sentence "makes explicit the precise action performed by the utterance". As we saw, on Austin's

account neither of these two assumptions is warranted. For 'performative utterances'A can be either explicit or

inexplicit: in the case of inexplicit 'performative utterances'A, however, the two conditions will seldom, if

ever, be satisfied. Such utterances as "Turn right!" and "Go!", for instance, which are among Austin's

examples, are neither declarative sentences, nor do they make the act performed by the speaker explicit.

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Thus, Bach & Harnish's attack against Austin's criterion (A) is based on a presupposition which on Austin's

account is not only unnecessary, but indeed unacceptable.

However, the very fact that the argument appears to fail so bluntly should perhaps let us ask ourselves if

my depiction of their argument is not somehow mistaken. And indeed, there is a sense in which it may be

called mistaken. Although Bach & Harnish do aim at an objection to criterion (A), the interpretation I have

just given to their argument is not quite what they have in mind. The wrong move I made is the application of

Austin's notion of 'performative utterances' to Bach & Harnish's objection against Austin's account. Bach &

Harnish's own definition of the term is this.

An (explicit) performative [utterance] is the utterance of a sentence with main verb in the first-person singular, simple present

indicative active, this verb being the name of the kind of illocutionary act one would ordinarily be performing in uttering that

sentence […]. (Bach & Harnish 1979, 204)

Instances of 'performative utterances', according to Bach & Harnish (1979, 204), are for example

utterances of "I order you to leave", "I promise you a job", or "I apologise for the delay".xxvi

Now, even leaving out details, there are two significant differences between Austin's conception of

'performative utterance' and Bach & Harnish's. Firstly, whereas Austin's 'performative utterance' is defined as

a linguistic token––an 'utterance' in the sense of an utteratum––, Bach & Harnish define it as the utterance of

a linguistic token––an utterance in the sense of an utteratio. Although this difference leaves the extension of

cases where a 'performative utterance' is present nearly untouched, it still marks a profound change; compare

the transition from "apple with a stalk" to "stalk of an apple". Secondly, as the parenthetical insertion of the

word "explicit" in the above quotation already indicates, according to Bach & Harnish's usage, 'performative

utterances' are present only in those cases where according to Austin's usage we have an 'explicit

performative utterance'. Thus, for example, utterances of "Turn right!" and "Go", made in the performance of

an order, do in Bach & Harnish's terminology not involve a 'performative utterance', whereas in Austin's

usage they do. Quite generally, applying the terminology which Bach & Harnish stipulate, inexplicit

'performative utterances' do not exist: indeed, the very notion of an inexplicit 'performative utterance' is in

their terminology a contradictio in adiecto. (When in the following I refer to their notion of 'performative

utterances', I shall write "'performative utterances'B&H".)

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Now as soon as we take into regard the differences between 'performative utterances'A and 'performative

utterances'B&H, and in particular the second difference between these notions, it is easy to see why Bach &

Harnish's argument against Austin's criterion (A) appears as so blunt a failure. What Bach & Harnish point

out is that the utterance of a sentence used to perform an 'illocutionary act', where the sentence explicitly

indicates the act performed, looks like a statement and thus, since arguments to the contrary fail, are

statements. They mean this as an objection against Austin's criterion (A) of an utterance's being

'performative', assuming that to be 'performative' in the relevant sense is to be such an utterance of a sentence

which explicitly indicates the 'illocutionary act' performed. Austin's criterion (A), however, concerns

'performative utterances'A, not 'performative utterance'B&H, and Austin's 'performative utterances' are not

necessarily explicit, do not necessarily take the declarative sentence form, and do not necessarily indicate the

act performed. Hence the appearance that they are all statements, on which Bach & Harnish's argument rests,

in fact does not apply to them at all—and this is exactly why the argument fails. Thus, the reason for the fact

that Bach & Harnish provide their argument as directed against Austin's account of 'performative utterances'

at all is obviously that they fail to take into consideration that Austin's notion of 'performative utterances'

includes inexplicit cases—thus being significantly different from theirs.

Let us turn to the second aspect of Austin's account which Bach & Harnish thematise. Referring to

Austin's criterion (B) of an utterance's being performative, that these utterances are part of the doing of an

action, Bach & Harnish acknowledge consent. "We accept the positive side––that [performative utterances]

are, or are part of, the doing of an action", they (1979, 203) say. Now, with "the doing of an action", Bach &

Harnish refer to what they call "illocutionary acts". And as we saw, when Austin speaks of "the doing of an

action" then what he has in mind is indeed nothing other than what he calls "illocutionary acts". This may

cause in us the conviction that Bach & Harnish have the same view of the connection between 'performative

utterances' and actions as Austin. And yet this apparent consent, by closer inspection, turns out to be quite as

treacherous as the apparent dissent just considered. Let us have a closer look at what their statement of

endorsement really amounts to.

Let us start with Bach & Harnish's conception of "illocutionary acts". There are two phenomena which

Bach & Harnish call "illocutionary acts", the "communicative" 'illocutionary act' and the "conventional"

'illocutionary act'. In the debate we are concerned with, they are throughout assuming that what is under

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consideration is the 'communicative' variety. According to Bach & Harnish's terminology, these

'communicative illocutionary acts' are characterised by "the sorts of intention with which each act is

performed" (1979, xiv). "Illocutionary intentions" are "reflexive intentions, in the sense of H.P. Grice"; more

particularly, they are intentions "whose fulfilment consists in nothing more than their recognition" (1979,

xivf.); thus "the intended illocutionary effect (or simply illocutionary intent) is for H to recognize [the

reflexive] intention" (1979, 16). To have such an intention, in Bach & Harnish's view, is to "[express] an

attitude (such as belief or desire)”.xxvii

It is not quite clear whether on Bach & Harnish's account the obtainment of an illocutionary act involves

the communicative success (the satisfaction of the R-intention), or whether the mere presence of a

communicative intention—the expressing of an attitude—already is an illocutionary act.xxviii In any case,

"[a]n illocutionary act is communicatively successful if the speaker's illocutionary intention is recognized by

the hearer" (and thus satisfied) (1979, 15), and the 'communicative success' is achieved "if the attitude the

speaker expresses is identified by the hearer by means of recognizing the reflexive intention to express it"

(1979, xv). Furthermore, the "identification of the speaker's illocutionary act" consists in the knowledge of

"what attitude the speaker is expressing", and "[w]hat type of attitude is expressed determines the kind of

illocutionary act being performed" (1979, xv).

As we can see, according to Bach & Harnish's definition of (communicative) 'illocutionary acts', these are

mere attempts at communication, perhaps--although this is not quite clear--including the requirement that the

communicative intention be satisfied. (I shall in the following use 'illocutionary act'B&H in order to indicate

that this conception is at issue.) This conception is evidently rather different from Austins conception of

'illocutionary acts'. Furthermore, obviously, it is this conception of 'illocutionary acts' which Bach & Harnish

have in mind when they say that they agree with Austin that performative utterances are part of the

performance of an 'illocutionary act'.

As soon as we take this into consideration, however, we see that Bach & Harnish's endorsement of what

they suppose is criterion (B), of the view that performative utterances are part of the performance of an

'illocutionary act', really is not an endorsement of Austin's criterion. For what Bach & Harnish mean is that

'performative utterances' are part of the performance of an 'illocutionary act'B&H. This, again, amounts to the

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claim that 'performative utterances' are part of (an attempt at) an act of communication, which to endorse is

by no means to endorse Austin's criterion (B). In stating criterion (B), Austin means that to issue a

performative utterance is to perform 'an illocutionary act'A. An 'illocutionary act'A, however, is something

significantly different from (an attempt at) an act of communication: as we saw, it is an act which involves

both the production of conventional consequences and the securing of uptake. It is an act such as voting,

giving an order, or marrying; to perform such an act is not (just) to (intend to) communicate something, as

Bach & Harnish (1979, 108-119) acknowledge themselves. So quite as their supposed objection did, Bach &

Harnish's apparent endorsement turns out to involve another misunderstanding, induced by the failure to

observe the different definitions of the theoretical terms used.

After stating apparent dissent and apparent consent, Bach & Harnish arrive at an account according to

which in making a 'performative utterance' the speaker states that she is performing the 'illocutionary act'

indicated by the explicit sentence, while at the same time performing this act. Thus, they (1979, 203) take the

view that 'performative utterances' "are both doings and statings": "to utter a performative sentence is to do

what one is stating one is doing; indeed, that is what makes the statement true". Now a skeptic may ask, how

are 'performative utterances' supposed to achieve both of these tasks, to state that the speaker performs the

indicated act, and also to achieve the performance of this act? In order to dispel doubts like these, Bach &

Harnish provide "an explanation of how it is possible to do both" (1979, 204), including, for example, an

explanation of "why an utterance like 'I order you to leave' is a performative", and of "what has to be the case

for such an utterance to count as an order" (1979, 208). This explanation proceeds from the assumption,

which is trivial following their terminology, that in the case of a 'performative utterance' "the hearer

determines what that act is [which the speaker performs, or aims at]". "The speaker succeeds" in performing

the 'illocutionary act' indicated by the sentence, they further assume, "insofar as this determination is made

correctly". Using the example of an order to leave, they (1979, 208) now explain the communicative success

of the speaker's intention with reference to a six-step "inference pattern", meant to represent "how the hearer

could reason, and could be intended to reason", given that the speaker utters a sentence which explicitly

indicates his performance of an order to leave (and thus makes a 'performative utterance', acording to their

terminology):

1. He [sc., the speaker] is saying "I order you to leave".

2. He is stating that he is ordering me to leave.

14

3. If his statement is true, then he must be ordering me to leave.

4. If he is ordering me to leave, it must be his utterance that constitutes the order. (What else could it be?)

5. Presumably, he is speaking the truth.

6. Therefore, in stating that he is ordering me to leave he is ordering me to leave.

(Bach & Harnish 1979, 208)

4 Searle's discussion of Bach & Harnish's account

This inference pattern leads us to the focal point of the debate, Searle's objection against Bach & Harnish's

explanation of 'how performatives work'. Given the terminological diversity we have just detected, it may be

a good idea first to ask which notion of 'performative utterances' Searle adopts. "[T]he correct way to situate

the notion of performatives within a general theory of speech acts", he says, "is as follows: some

illocutionary acts can be performed by uttering a sentence containing an expression that names the type of

speech act, as in for example, 'I order you to leave the room'. These utterances, and only these, are correctly

described as performative utterances" (Searle 1989, 536). Thus, according to his suggestion, a 'performative

utterance' is the utterance of a sentence which explicitly indicates the performance of a certain illocutionary

act, "such that the utterance constitutes the performance of the act named by the performative expression in

the sentence" (Searle 1989, 537). Searle (1989, 536) himself emphasises that, according to this terminology,

merely those cases are called 'performative utterances' where an 'explicit performative utterance' in Austin's

sense is present. Furthermore, in his terminology 'performative utterances' are utterationes, whereas in

Austin's they are utterata. Thus, as far as this goes, Searle's definition is evidently different from Austin's, but

apparently is very similar to the one Bach & Harnish apply.

However, in Searle's opinion Bach & Harnish's account is wrong; in his view, it fails to account for

certain 'conditions of adequacy'.xxix In particular, he (1989, 538f., 542) complains that Bach & Harnish do not

explain what he calls the "performative character" and the "self-guaranteeing character" of 'performative

utterances'.

15

The 'performative character', to start with, consists in the fact that "[p]erformative utterances are

performances of the act named by the main verb […] in the sentence" (1989, 542): in Searle's view (1989,

542), any account of 'performative utterances' must explain how the illocutionary act indicated by the

sentence can be constituted by the utterance, such as, for example, "how a [performative utterance] could

constitute an order".xxx "The phenomenon that we are trying to explain", he adds, "is how a statement could

constitute an order, and on this account, it is just blandly asserted in (4) [of Bach & Harnish's inference

pattern] that it does constitute an order. The fact we were trying to explain is left unexplained by the Bach-

Harnish account" (Searle 1989, 542).

The 'self-guaranteeing character' consists in the fact that "the speaker cannot be lying, insincere, or

mistaken about the type of act being performed" (1989, 542): in Searle's view, any account of 'performative

utterances' must explain why in making such an utterance "I can't be lying or mistaken" about the

performance of the act indicated by the sentence––that is, why the obtainment of the action is guaranteed.xxxi

In Searle's view, the presence of both of these features must be explained by an account of 'how performative

utterances work', but the inference schema which Bach & Harnish present explains neither.

The account which Searle proposes as a superior alternative is this. All 'performative utterances', he

(1989, 547, 550) suggests, are 'declarations', where what is declared is the performance of the illocutionary

act indicated by the sentence (1989, 549). (They are assertions, too, he concedes to Bach & Harnish, but on

his account "the assertion is derived from the declaration and not the declaration from the assertion" (1989,

554).) Thus, the 'performative utterance' of "I hereby order you to go", for example, is a declaration to the

effect that the speaker orders the audience to go, and the 'performative utterance' of "I bet you sixpence it will

rain tomorrow" is a declaration to the effect that the speaker bets the audience that it will rain the subsequent

day.

But what exactly is a 'declaration'? In Searle's account, "declaration" is a technical term referring to a

subtype of 'illocutionary act'. Specifically, an 'illocutionary act' is a declaration iff its "point is to create a new

fact corresponding to the propositional content" (1989, 549). Thus, "the successful performance of [a

declaration] is sufficient to bring about the fit between words and world, to make the propositional content

16

true".xxxii Those 'declarations' are possible only against the background of an institution,xxxiii involving

constitutive conventions, for example, to the effect that to manifest one's intention to perform this or that act,

given certain conditions, is to perform the act.xxxiv When God creates light by saying "Let there be light",

Searle starts explaining, then this is a 'supernatural declaration'. "We ordinary humans", he continues,

although we "do not have the ability to perform supernatural declarations", …

… we do have a quasi-magical power nonetheless of bringing about changes in the world through our utterances; and we are

given this power by a kind of human agreement. All of these institutions in question are social institutions, and it is only as long

as the institution is recognized that it can continue to function to allow for the performance of declarations. (Searle 1989, 549)

Considering Searle's definition of 'performative utterances' together with his analysis of these utterances

as declarations, we see that the conception of 'illocutionary acts' he applies in (1989) is the conception of

institutional acts. And indeed, the institutional character of 'illocutionary acts' is a most significant constituent

of Searle's explanation of 'how performatives work'. For the performance of a 'performative utterance', he

says, "there must exist an […] institution and the speaker and hearer must occupy special places within this

institution. It is only given such institutions as the church, the law, private property, the state, and a special

position of the speaker and hearer within these institutions that one can excommunicate, appoint, give and

bequeath one's possessions, or declare war" (Searle 1975, 359). In Searle's view, the conventions of these

institutions rule that to perform one of the acts under consideration (an 'illocutionary act'), the speaker must

'manifest' her intention to perform the act, and communicate it to the audience.

Applying this description of 'illocutionary acts' as institutional acts, Searle provides the following

explanation of 'how performatives work'. He starts by pointing out that there is not—as he had believed

earlier—a special semantic property of performativity. Instead, what we find …

[…] are human conventions, rules, and institutions that enable certain utterances to function to create the state of affairs

represented in the propositional content of the utterance. These new facts are essentially social, and the act of creating them can

succeed only if there is successful communication between speaker and hearer. Thus the connection between the literal meaning

of the sentence uttered and the institutional fact created by its utterance. "I promise" creates a promise; "The meeting is

adjourned" creates an adjournment. (Searle 1989, 555)

The existence of the convention also explains smoothly the self-guaranteeing character which Searle

ascribes to 'performative utterances': "assuming the other conditions on the speech act are satisfied, if [the

17

speaker] intends his utterance to [be the performance] of an order, then it [is such a performance]; because

the manifested intention is constitutive of [the performance of the act]"xxxv (Searle 1989, 556).

When he initially introduced the term "declarations", Searle (1975, 359) stated that these acts are

performed within, and thus require the presence of, "an extra-linguistic institution". The only exceptions to

this "principle", he argued, "are those declarations that concern language itself, as for example when one

says, 'I define, abbreviate, name, or dub'" (1975, 360).xxxvi Now in Searle's view, such acts as promising or

ordering are not constituted by extra-linguistic institutional rules. But then, given his original definition of

declarations, his explanation might appear to fail. For Searle himself assumes that utterances of, for example,

"I promise you to come and see you" and "I order you to leave the room" can be 'performative utterances'.

Searle (1989, 549f.) tackles this problem in a straightforward manner. "Language is itself an institution", he

claims, involving constitutive conventions, and thus it is language that constitutes such acts as promising and

ordering. Since language is itself an institution, utterances of "I promise you to come and see you" or "I order

you to leave the room" can also be 'declarations', by virtue of the constitutive conventions provided by (the

institution of) language.xxxvii

Now let us ask whether Searle's criticism of Bach & Harnish's explanation of 'how performatives work' is

justified. His main objection is that it does not account for those two conditions of adequacy which he

introduced, the 'performative characteristic' and the 'self-guaranteeing character' of 'performative utterances',

which his own account explains quite easily. Bach & Harnish's six-step inference pattern, Searle argues, does

not account for them, and hence their explanation is inadequate.—Is this objection sound?

The first thing we must notice is that although apparently, both Searle and Bach & Harnish define

'performative utterances' in the same way, namely, as utterances of a sentence that explicitly indicates the

'illocutionary act' performed, in fact their conceptions are substantially different. The reason is that the notion

of a 'performative utterance' is defined in terms of the notion of an 'illocutionary act', and that when Searle

(1989) speaks of 'illocutionary acts' then what he has in mind is profoundly different from what Bach &

Harnish (1979) have in mind when they use the same term. As we saw, Bach & Harnish define 'illocutionary

acts' as mere (attempts at) acts of communication', while an attempt at communication, on their account,

amounts to the 'expressing of an attitude'. Now evidently, as Bach & Harnish conceive of it, the expressing of

18

an attitude is not something which essentially involves any institutions, be they linguistic or extra-linguistic.

Vice versa, it is clear that Searle does not subscribe to the conception of (communicative) 'illocutionary acts'

which Bach & Harnish (1989) assume; his 'illocutionary acts' are institutional acts. Since, and insofar as,

Bach & Harnish's conception of an 'illocutionary act' is different from Searle's, their conception of

'performative utterances' is different from his, too.

But as soon as we take this into consideration, we see that Searle's objection to Bach & Harnish's account

is not only invalid, but indeed quite pointless. Being mere (attempts at) acts of communication, an account of

'performative utterances'B&H of course does not 'explain' what Searle postulates as 'conditions of adequacy'. If

it did then this, indeed, would be puzzling. For 'performative utterances' B&H are not supposed to involve any

institutions, while it is precisely the involvement of institutions which the satisfaction of Searle's conditions

would indicate. In particular, (an attempt at) a communicative act is not 'constituted by' an utterance in the

way in which an institutional act is 'constituted', such that there is no reason to assume that it has the

'performative character' which Searle has in mind. Since a communicative act can fail, there is also no reason

to think that such an act has a 'self-guaranteeing feature'. The reason why Searle's objection misses its target

is that in stating it, Searle is not aware of the fact that and how both Bach & Harnish's notion of 'illocutionary

acts', and their notion of 'performative utterances', differ significantly from the conceptions he associates with

these terms. Thus, because of his terminological unconcern, Searle mistakenly requires Bach & Harnish to

satisfy 'conditions of adequacy' which really they need not bother about, and states an argument against their

account which by closer inspection turns out to be clearly invalid.

5 Bach & Harnish's reply to Searle's attack

This failure, however, is not restricted to Searle's argument; the reply which Bach & Harnish give in "How

Performatives Really Work" (1992) involves the same problem. Since they are speaking about (attempts at)

communicative acts, rather than institutional acts, it is quite understandable that they (1992, 103f.) reject the

19

'self-guaranteeing character'. But, like Searle, they do not fully recognise that the apparent disagreement is

due to the use of divergent terminology.

For example, they (1992, 103) argue that "[p]erformatives are but a special case of indirect speech acts, in

which the audience identifies one communicative intention by way of identifying another"; following the

terminology Searle adopts in (1989), however, to 'express an attitude', in Bach & Harnish's sense, is not to

perform an 'illocutionary act' at all. Also, Bach & Harnish (1992, 106) understandably insist that Searle's

"declarational analysis does not apply to ordinary performative utterances", but again they do not appear to

see that the disagreement is terminological. For the argument they bring to bear is that 'performative

utterances' "do not create facts in the same way as genuine declarations"—when we apply the conception of

'performative utterances' which Searle employs in (1989), 'they' evidently do.

Bach & Harnish (1979, 107) also insist that "[i]n non-conventional, communicative speech acts the

intention constitutes the act because the act is nothing more than […]xxxviii expressing an attitude": what they

have in mind is true, and trivially so (in fact, by virtue of their definition of the term "communicative speech

act"), but when Searle (1989) is speaking about 'illocutionary acts' and the acts performed by 'performative

utterances', then despite the fact that he uses the same terms as Bach & Harnish, 'non-conventional,

communicative speech acts' in Bach & Harnish's sense are evidently not what he is concerned with.

Thus, quite as they do in their discussion of Austin's account, and quite as Searle does in his attack against

their account of 'how performatives work', Bach & Harnish are stating arguments which miss the target,

because they do not sufficiently take into consideration that their notions of 'performative utterances' and

'illocutionary acts' are different from those which Searle applies to the same terms.

6 Summary of the analysis and conclusion

20

Analysing the debate between Bach & Harnish and Searle about 'how performatives (really) work', what we

found was this. Austin (1975) originally defined a 'performative utterance' as a sentence uttered in the course

of the performance of an 'illocutionary act', rather than in the performance of a (mere) statement, where,

according to his definition, an 'illocutionary act' is an act which is constituted by a convention, and which

requires the 'securing of uptake' in an audience for its performance. Austin distinguishes explicit and

inexplicit 'performative utterances', where to be an explicit 'performative utterance' is to indicate the

'illocutionary act' performed, which inexplicit performative utterances, such as "Go!" or "Turn right!", do not.

Because of the existence of the inexplicit variety, the assumption that all 'performative utterances'A are truth-

evaluable is obviously not true.

Now Bach & Harnish (1979) have a different conception of 'performative utterances'. In their

terminology, a 'performative utterance' is the utterance of a sentence that explicitly indicates the 'illocutionary

act' performed in making the utterance, where an 'illocutionary act' is defined as (an attempt at) an act of

communication. Applying this conception of 'performative utterances', they criticise Austin for assuming 'that

not all performative utterances are statements, true or false'. As soon as it is taken into consideration that their

notion of 'performative utterances' and Austin's are different, it becomes apparent that their objection 'that

performative utterances are statements' not only fails, but indeed misses the target: for their argument

presupposes the assumption, evidently mistaken if we apply Austin's terminology, that 'performative

utterances' are bound to be explicit. That they even state the objection is due to their failure to observe the

differences between their notion of 'performative utterances' and Austin's.

Anyway, applying their notions of 'performative utterances' and 'illocutionary acts', they explain how

'performative utterances'B&H work with reference to a six-step inference pattern, meant to explain how the

speaker can succeed communicatively in the performance of an 'illocutionary act'B&H in a case where she uses

an explicit linguistic device. Searle objects to this explanation. For Searle (1989), 'illocutionary acts' are

institutional acts of some sort (either intra-linguistic or extra-linguistic); his 'performative utterances' are

utterances of sentences indicating such an institutional act, and issued in performing the act indicated.

Applying this conception of 'illocutionary acts' and 'performative utterances', Searle objects against Bach &

Harnish's account that it fails to explain certain features which the explicit performance of an institutional act

has. Like Bach & Harnish's objection to Austin's account, Searle's objection against their account misses the

21

target, and the reason is again that differences between the notions of 'performative utterances' and

'illocutionary acts' are neglected. For what Bach & Harnish mean when they ask 'how performatives work' is

not how the constitution of an institutional act can be accomplished in uttering an explicit device, but rather

how (an attempt at) a communicative act can be successful. Their reply against Searle's objection, however, is

infected by the same mistake.

So summa summarum, the central arguments stated in the notorious debate about 'how performatives

(really) work' turn out largely to be missing their targets. The disagreement displayed by the debate is not an

overt disagreement about any substantial issues, but rather a covert dissent about what the term “performative

utterance” actually refers to. As a consequence, the participants do not exchange different views about one

and the same issue, as it is the case in a fruitful discussion, but rather exchange views about different issues,

such as the performance of an 'illocutionary act'A, the explicit performance of (an attempt at) a

communicative act, or the explicit performance of an institutional act.

Now let us consider the consequences for my general argument. Technical terms should not be re-defined

without a reason, because this leads to ambiguity, I argue, assuming that ambiguity is undesirable because it

hinders scholarly discourse. The objection we were considering in this paper is that, contrary to what my

argument suggests, the ambiguity of technical terms (such as “illocutionary act” and “performative

utterance”) does not hinder the speech-act theoretical discourse, because the participants in this discourse are

well able to keep under control any differences in terminology.

However, our analysis of the discussion about 'how performatives (really) work' showed that the objection

is ungrounded. Even experts like Bach & Harnish and Searle fail to appropriately take into account several

differences concerning their definitions of such terms as “performative utterance” and “illocutionary act”,

with the consequence that they end up arguing at cross purposes.

In order to avoid problems of this kind, I suggest that we stop trifling our terminological usage and return

to a more scrupulous treatment of our terminological inventory. In particular, I suggest that, unless there is

reason to the contrary, we use technical terms as they were originally introduced. As applied to the present

issue, I suggest that at least in the absence of a reason to the contrary, we use the terms "performative

22

utterance" and "illocutionary act" for the things for which Austin originally defined them, rather than for

something else.

Endnotes

i I should like to thank █, █, and █ for valuable comments. Work on the issues dealt with in this paper has

been supported by █. ii See, e.g., Andersson (1975), Danielsson (1965), Hedenius (1963), Houston (1970), Lemmon (1962),

O'Hair (1967), Samek (1965), Sesonske (1965), Urmson 1977, Warnock (1973). iii See, e.g., Bach and Harnish (1992), Reimer (1995), Harnish (2002), Grewendorf (2002). iv B&H (1979), Searle (1969, 1979). v █ vi For a detailed exposition see █. vii See Austin 1975, 5, n1, 14. viii Austin also hints at arguments, as when he (1975, 6) says that "it may be that the utterance 'serves to

inform you'––but that is quite different", and (ibid.) "When I say, before the registrar or altar, &c., 'I do', I am not reporting on a marriage: I am indulging in it". One may doubt both the force of his arguments and the obviousness of the claim; but for the present purpose the question whether Austin was right is marginal.

ix Cf. Austin (1975, 91, n.1). x Austin (1950). xi See, e.g., Austin 1975, 94. xii See, e.g., Austin (1975, 6n., 133). xiii I mean 'definition' in the broad normal sense (rather than in any special technical or narrow sense), as

referring to a statement that indicates how the term is to be understood. xiv Subsequently, Austin twice confirms the validity of these two criteria. Firstly, he again states them in

his summary of Lecture IX (1975, 120f.). Secondly, and most crucially, he (1975, 139) applies them when he turns to examining whether stating is not an illocutionary act after all––this shows unambiguously that they are Austin's criteria for an act's being an illocutionary act.

xv For details about 'uptake' see, e.g., █, where it is also argued in more detail that the 'securing-of-uptake' requirement is an essential feature of illocutionary acts.

xvi See Austin (1975, 19f., 69f., 105, 107, 117 (implicitly), 121f.). xvii For more details see, e.g., █. Austin additionally mentions a third feature, the necessity of which,

however, he (1975, 117) clearly denies: Many (but not all) "illocutionary acts invite by convention a response or sequel"; thus, for example, "an order invites the response of obedience and a promise that of fulfilment". Austin (ibid.) points out that this effect "cannot be included under the initial stretch of action", and he later (1975, 139) unambiguously repeats that it "is not essential to all illocutionary acts anyway".

xviii See Austin (1975, 32f., 36, 69); as alternatives to "inexplicit" he introduces "implicit" (1975, 32, 69, 71), primary" (1975, 69, 71, 72, 78., 83, 135, 150, 158), and "primitive" (1975, 33, 72f.).

xix See Austin (1975, 4, 69, 150); the passage on page 150 shows that Austin maintains the distinction between explicit and inexplicit performatives even after introducing serious doubts about the contrast between 'performative' and 'constative'.

xx See Austin (1975, 55–66). xxi Austin 1975, 69. xxii Austin 1975, 32. xxiii Austin 1975, 58. xxiv The account which Bach & Harnish defend there goes back to Bach (1975). xxv 'Performative verbs' are verbs which indicate an illocutionary act type, such as "promise" or "order".

Cf. Bach & Harnish (1979, 203f.).

23

xxvi In a comment, Bach and Harnish (1979, 304, n2) represent their conception of 'performative

utterances' as "following Austin", and they insinuate that Austin himself ended up with a conception of 'performatives' which was restricted to explicit cases. To my best knowledge, however, there is no indication that Austin did such a thing. Additionally, I give a detailed reply to their claim in █.

xxvii Bach & Harnish (1979, xv). xxviii In their (1992) reply to Searle's objection, they unambiguously assume a definition of 'illocutionary

acts' as mere attempts at communication. For example, they (1992, 106) argue that ordering to leave "consists simply in the fact that a certain attitude has been expressed", and they (1992, 107) say that, quite in general, "in non-conventional, communicative speech acts, the intention constitutes the act because the act is nothing more than verbally expressing an attitude".

xxix Searle proposes eight, no less, 'conditions of adequacy'; he (1989, 540) subsequently admits, however, that perhaps "not […] all these conditions can be met", and that "perhaps some of them are incorrect". He then continues by concentrating on merely two of them––those which we are here considering.

xxx Searle literally writes: "how a statement could constitute an order"; instead of "statement" we must read 'performative utterance': the original wording assumes a crucial element of the view Searle is opposing, that 'performative utterances' are directly statements, rather than declarations. ["xxx"]

xxxi Literally, Searle (1989, 538) speaks merely about the utterance's "having the force of" the illocutionary act indicated. I assume that this must be read as either meaning, or entailing, the actual performance of the act. For any other interpretation would contradict several other things Searle says in the paper, and be at odds with the description of the utterance as "self-guaranteeing".

xxxii Searle (1989, 547); see also id. (1975, 358). xxxiii See, e.g., Searle (1995, 34). xxxiv From an outside view we would say something like "Among these-or-those people, manifesting one's

intention to do … counts as doing it". xxxv Again I replace the reference to 'having a certain force' by a reference to 'the performance of a certain

act'; cf. █ of this paper. xxxvi Even these apparent exceptions are probably to be rejected: for although these acts concern the matter

of meaning, and thus are in some way 'intra-linguistic', they do not appear to be constituted by institutional rules, and thus do not appear to be 'declarations' in the sense Searle refers to at all.

xxxvii This, no doubt, is a rather peculiar picture. Although it is a commonplace that language involves conventions of the kind which ascribe meaning to signs, it is less obvious that language also involves conventions of this quite different sort, which constitute institutional facts. Searle defends this view in Speech Acts (1969, chs. 2 and 3); for a discussion see █.

xxxviii "Verbally", they qualify here; but according to their account, verbal performance is not necessary.

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